GCAA Corporate News Vol. 3, issue 4 October – December 2015 COVID-19 Pandemic

ISSN: VOL. 3, ISSUE 1 October – December 2015

REPORT

National Security Tour to all border posts in the Gambia

National Logistics and safety committee for COVID-19 response 2020 GCAA Corporate News Vol. 3, issue 4 October – December 2015 was commendable and deeply ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS appreciated.

Members of the Logistics and Safety Sincere appreciation is also extended Sub-committee of the National to the Governors of all Regions, Coronavirus Disease 19 (COVID-19) Mayors, The Gambia Armed Forces, Response recognize and appreciate Gambia Fire and Rescue Services, the Government of The Gambia, Gambia Police Force, Customs World Food Program of the United officers and other sister services for Nations, United Nations Development the collaboration and support that Programme (UNDP) and other contributed to the success of the partners for their continued efforts national tour. and strong commitment to the implementation of National COVID-19

Response. This report, a culmination of nationwide tour by the Logistics

and Safety Sub-committee,

demonstrates collaborative efforts by various stakeholders to pro-actively prevent the spread of coronavirus in The Gambia and specifically across the porous borders. The Team remain grateful and deeply indebted to UNDP for providing the required funds to conduct this worthwhile assessment.

We equally recognize and applaud the guidance and support provided by WFP, including facilitation of groups discussions and reporting. The staff form Ministry of Health deserves recognition for their key role without which, this assessment could not have been possible and successful. The leadership of Commissioner Pateh Jallow, Deputy Commissioner Lamin LK Bojang and Captain Musa N Corr

GCAA Corporate News Vol. 3, issue 4 October – December 2015 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY community policing in some border communities, nonexistence of With 84% of the current COVID-19 effective monitoring of vehicles and positive cases in The Gambia being persons in transit, among others. imported, the role of the Gambian The report also makes security forces in patrolling the porous recommendations to address the borders to prevent illegal crossing challenges and strengthen the becomes extremely important and a capacity of the security services to priority. Equally important is the role of effectively undertake their COVID-19 the security in protecting health functions. The role of development facilities and enforcing government partners in supporting the sector to restrictive measures on movement strengthen capacity for response has and socializing to contain the spread also been emphasized, including in of the pandemic. Indeed, this report capacity building, mobility, has highlighted and settled that the monitoring, WASH, communication, fight against COVID 19 in the Gambia among others. as a result of our geo-location and interconnectedness with Senegal, As the security continue with the role can be lost or won from the land, air of first-line responders, the law and sea Points of entries and not at enforcement officers in The Gambia treatment and Quarantine centers. exposes themselves to a high risk of contamination, particularly since the While the security sector has announcement of the easing of the embraced these roles since the state restrictions on markets and religious of emergency was declared on 27 institutions. It is therefore important for the security sector to be March, this report, compiled after a strengthened to prevent and contain national assessment of over 56 the spread of COVID-19 in The security and related facilities to Gambia but also to minimize infection understand their preparedness and as a massive illness of security officers capacity to respond to COVID-19, will make the country more has identified key challenges that are vulnerable to COVID-19 and internal security threats. likely to impede effective response. Some of the challenges include porosity of borders and lack of mobility to undertake impactful patrols, weak coordination, lack of sustained supply of PPEs to security officers at points of entry, absence of public health officials, weak GCAA Corporate News Vol. 3, issue 4 October – December 2015

1. List of acronyms

AfDB - Africa Development Bank BCC. - Banjul City Council CRR. - Central River Region GBOS - Gambia Bureau of Statistics GBV - Gender Based Violence KMC - Kanifing Municipal Council LogSafe - Logistics & Safety Committee MoH - Ministry of Health NBR - North Bank Region NHEC - National Health Emergency Committee

PHEIC - Public Health Emergency of International Concern

PHO - Public Health Officers PoES - Points of Entry PPEs - Personal Protective Equipment

ToT - Training of Trainers CUG - Close User Group UNDP - United Nations Development Programme

WCR - West Coast Region WFP - World Food Programme

GCAA Corporate News Vol. 3, issue 4 October – December 2015 Introduction stance the Government had been undertaking in recent years. The coronavirus also known as The social-economic impact of COVID-19 has spread globally since December 2019 when it was first COVID-19 is also a major concern as discovered in Wuhan, China. It has many people in both rural and urban since been declared a global areas have lost their income and pandemic by the WHO and as at 21st livelihoods, rolling back the gains May 2020, there have been over made in the fight against extreme 14,879,267 confirmed cases and poverty and zero hunger. Food 613,952deaths. The Gambia registered its first case on March 17th, security was already in decline in The 2020, an imported case but this has Gambia before the pandemic but increased to 61 cases by 6th July 2020, the situation has deteriorated 84% of the cases being imported. Due following the restrictive measures to the porous borders, limited imposed by the government to capacity for effective contact contain the spread of COVID-19 tracing, inadequate testing kits for pandemic, including travel COVID-19, inadequate sensitization and lack of community awareness, restrictions, a ban on public events the number of cases is expected to and agricultural markets (weekly rise exponentially as has been the lumos), the closure of schools and case in most countries. non-essential businesses , and limits COVID-19 has devastating impacts on opening hours of market. on not only the health, safety and The situation calls for urgent measures security of the population but the to prevent the spread of the Virus in effect on GDP and livelihood are just the country and given majority of the as great. Gambia’s small and cases are imported, the role of undiversified economy is susceptible security forces become important in to external shocks as countries securing the country from external around the world close their borders, “invasion” and local transmission of become more protectionist and coronavirus. thereby affecting global and regional commerce. It is estimated that At the same time, the security role in economic impact of the COVID-19 enforcing measures imposed by outbreak would be a loss of close to government to limit local transmission GMD 3 billion and the economic cannot be overemphasized. Security growth in the country will be 5.8 % officers should be capacitated to lower than the initial 6.3% at the accelerate enforcement of measures beginning of the year. 1This will also such as social distancing, wearing of have implications on the budget and masks, surveillance at PoEs, net domestic borrowing, negatively community sensitization, protection of impacting the concessionary fiscal

1 https://standard.gm/covid-19-predicted-to-cost-gambia-d3-billion-if/ GCAA Corporate News Vol. 3, issue 4 October – December 2015 health facilities such as the quarantine centres, among others. Against this background, the Logistics and Safety committee on 29th May launched an 8 days nationwide assessment of over 56 security and related facilities across the country to understand the level of preparedness and capacity to respond to the demands of COVID-19 and identify key challenges with a view to make recommendations to strengthen response. The tour covered security facilities ranging from Official Points of Entry, Porous Borders, Police, Customs and Military Posts, bridges, ferries and discussions with National and Regional Security task forces. The tour also targeted community members to discuss security related issues including community policing. This engagement is expected to amplify the call to have security at the fore in the fight against COVID-19, rally for support to strengthen the security sector in the fight against the pandemic, as well as promote inter- sectoral collaboration. The Tour Party comprised of Commissioners from the National Security Task Force, Police, Gambia National Army, Fire and Rescue Services, Ministry of Health, COVID-19 Logistics and Safety Committee Members and WFP representing the UN team.

GCAA Corporate News Vol. 3, issue 4 October – December 2015 BACKGROUND borders on March 21. The Government of The Gambia The Gambia has a population of activated the National Health about 2 million people, of which 51 Emergency Committee (NHEC) and its sub-committees to ensure a percent are female, and over 60 comprehensive and coordinated percent are under the age of 25 preparedness and response to the years (GBOS, 2013). The GDP per Coronavirus Disease(COVID-19) capita income is US$540 and almost outbreak, with a focus on half the population (48.40 percent) is strengthening coordination at the considered poor. The country is national and regional levels, intensifying active surveillance for surrounded by the Republic of case finding and contact tracing, Senegal on all sides with the Atlantic prompt disease management, Ocean to the West. effective infection prevention and control, social mobilization and risk The two countries have strong cultural communication. A national COVID-19 and socio-economic ties going way Country Response Plan was back before the colonial period. developed with assistance from Although The Gambia has 15 partners to responds to the pandemic designated official Points of Entry and mitigate negative socio- (PoEs), there are wide areas which economic implications. are porous and difficult to monitor and the rapid increase of COVID-19 Key to the COVID-19 response is the cases in Senegal, coupled with national logistics and safety sub- relaxation of protective measures by committee, under the Health the Senegalese government Response pillar, charged with the including re-opening of its borders responsibility of addressing all logistics puts The Gambia at a high risk of and safety needs of the response. The coronavirus importation. membership of the committee comprises the Ministry of Health, The first COVID-19 case was Security forces and UN agencies and confirmed on 17th March 2020 and as objectives include the establishment of July 6th, 2020, 61 cases had been of a robust and reliable logistics confirmed with three fatalities. On 27th system for emergency management; March 2020, the country declared a establishment of safe and secure state of public health emergency, environment for both affected closing all non-essential work, food population and respondents; ensure outlets, public places, markets and the availability of emergency places of worship. The declaration medical and non-medical supplies for included limitation of the number of surveillance, care and management people attending social gathering and supporting coordination and riding public transportation. This processes for emergency declaration had been preceded by management. the closure of the airspace and land

GCAA Corporate News Vol. 3, issue 4 October – December 2015

Table 1: Government proposed COVID 19

Response Structure and Next Steps

GCAA Corporate News Vol. 3, issue 4 October – December 2015 CHAPTER ONE (1) The impact of COVID-19 on National Security and relevance of Security sector in the pandemic

1. COVID-19 implications on national High level of coronavirus outbreak security poses a high risk of massive illnesses of security officers who are at different A pronged COVID-19 period has security installations including in several implications on security, quarantine and isolation centers. especially in small and Low Middle Most of them, as frontline workers, are income countries like the Gambia. In highly exposed as they lack much- addition, to their traditional security needed supply of PPEs and basic functions of providing security and training or knowledge on protecting safety to the country and citizenry, themselves during COVID related the security forces in The Gambia operations or activities. A massive have been assigned additional illness of security officers will leave the function of responding to COVID-19 country vulnerable to other forms of pandemic within the communities internal and external threats. and at border points of entry.

This has not only refocused the security budget and stretched the available manpower, but also the limited resources that were already thin during the pre-COVID-19 period. Faced with less manpower, limited resources to enforce government state of emergency measures and to undertake effective patrols along the porous borders, security agencies under strained conditions had improvised and refocused limited resources to carry out their security functions. This is not sustainable and might lead to demoralized officers who have to look for additional means to support their families An increase in the number of confirmed cases will be directly proportionate to the measures employed in its containment and this will impact safety, security, movement and association of people. Furthermore, GCAA Corporate News Vol. 3, issue 4 October – December 2015 2. Role and relevance of security in declared State of Public Health the covid-19 pandemic Emergency such as:

Protection of sovereignty and a) Essential Commodities territorial integrity have been the Emergency Powers Regulations, traditional role of the military in 2020; general. Internally, law enforcement b) Restriction on Public Transport activities including the protection of Emergency Powers Regulations lives, property and the prevention 2020; and detection of crimes have always c) Restriction on Open Markets and been the traditional role of the Police Shopping Areas Emergency (by law) and often supported by Regulation 2020; other sister services. But the outbreak d) Closure and Restriction on Non- of the pandemic presents a security essential Public Emergency threat that requires moving beyond Powers Regulation 2020 and the the traditional understanding of and Quarantine Act. the role of security forces. Health has therefore become a core This includes ensuring the physical component of security, making a distancing, guarding against price strong case for strategic investments hike, enforcing quarantine guidelines, towards the security architecture of a restriction of movement and trade country, for effective response to and where applicable, wearing of pandemics. masks among others.

The emergence of COVID-19 as a In The Gambia, 84% of the current 61 2 Public Health Emergency of COVID-19 cases are imported, and International Concern (PHEIC) has given the surge of the pandemic in therefore brought to the fore the Senegal, which is currently at over importance of security forces in 8,000 positive cases, more infected responding to pandemics. Although persons are likely to cross the porous not their traditional role, they have land and sea borders and contribute deployed personnel as front-line to the spread of the disease in the workers to combat the deadly country. The role and relevance of coronavirus. the security sector (including working closely with the borderline Their roles range from surveillance at communities) is therefore important, Points of Entries, transportation of especially at the official points of suspected cases to the quarantine entry but also along all porous border centers, provision of physical security points. services to quarantine centers, Across the country at points of entry enforcement of government’s and other security installations, regulation measures under the security officers are performing routine daily patrols in difficult

2 http://www.moh.gov.gm/wp-content/uploads/2020/07/Gambia_The_COVID-19_Sitreps-01-07-2020- 1.pdf GCAA Corporate News Vol. 3, issue 4 October – December 2015 weather conditions and risky rough sharing information of persons who border terrains with limited mobility, have crossed the borders illegally. and often without personal protective In North Bank Region, this has led to equipment and basic training, which the creation of active youth vigilante makes them vulnerable to groups to support COVID-19 response contracting the virus. activities, including reporting cases of Many Senegalese citizens trying to persons crossing the borders illegally. cross the borders illegally have been This model should be promoted and turned back to their country (often aligned to community policing informally done and without proper concepts for effective law documentation of the activity for enforcement. data analysis) while others in Although the Gambian men and possession of legal crossing permits women in uniform are playing these are handed over to the Senegalese key roles, and sacrificing their lives as customs officials whenever screening frontline workers to safeguard the results show abnormal temperature. country, they continue to face However, Non-Gambians including challenges that limit their expected Senegalese who are caught within performance, with some performing the hinterland are placed on 14 days routine daily foot patrols in difficult quarantine. weather conditions and rough border All Gambians entering the country terrains, often without personal from Senegal, at official points of protective equipment, and basic entry or those apprehended when training on COVID-19, make them crossing illegally, are taken to vulnerable to contracting the virus. quarantine centers. These strategic The touring team was been informed interventions by security forces have of instances in which security officers minimized potential positive COVID- used personal money to buy fuel to 19 cases entering the country. facilitate border patrols. Additionally, security forces are providing the much-needed security and protection to the isolation and quarantine centers, and transportation of suspected cases from different parts of the country to the quarantine centers in the Greater Banjul Area is (GBA) and North Bank Region. At the community level, security officers are sensitizing border communities on the importance of community policing to improve GCAA Corporate News Vol. 3, issue 4 October – December 2015 CHAPTER TWO (2) Analysis of issues and Challenges facing the security forces at different installations across the country

1. National and regional/municipal

security task forces

The National Security Taskforce is composed of senior officers from the Military, Police, Navy, Immigration and Fire and Rescue services, Customs, State Intelligence and the Office of the National Security Adviser. Their functions include providing strategic guidance and direction on COVID related security Meeting of the Members of the National Security Task force matters. Some of the issues, surveillance at central, regional and (challenges and recommendations) PoEs. expressed by the national task force affecting COVID-19 response ü This is particularly important in areas included: between the Fonis and CRR where ü Lack of adequate resources for there are long stretches of porous COVID-19 response. The borders. Mobility will be needed, inadequacy is attributed to the including vehicles, motorbikes and coordination gap between the fuel. Promoting joint efforts and Ministry of Health and security creating. Innovative ways to operations center that often lead to enhance cross-sector collaboration delays in disbursement of funds, and communication such as the affecting operation activities use of CUG lines are steps in the including mobility, fuel availability, right direction needed to promote feeding of men on patrol etc. and strengthen coordination.

ü Weak intersectoral collaboration at ü Strategic intra-service the national level, as sectors have communication and advocacy are not been communicating with each weak areas in Gambian security other, hindering effective forces. A lot of good work is done implementation of COVID-19 state by security officers making great of emergency regulations and sacrifices, but this is not measures. Strong collaboration and communicated to the public and coordination among the army, within. Officers are patrolling by police and immigration is important foot, sometimes use personal for better border management and resources and risk their lives as GCAA Corporate News Vol. 3, issue 4 October – December 2015 frontline workers but these stories ü Lack of resources for self-protection are not celebrated and told to the mobility for patrols and execution of public. Given the mistrust between other key security functions the general public and the security remained a challenge.

stemming from a repressive legacy ü CRR is the only region without an of the former regime, the security official border post but has a high sector should apply effective influx of people from Senegal, strategic communication to create including those seeking medical visibility of its work, improve trust of care. There are more than 40 illegal the public and win hearts and routes that people can use to cross minds. the borders illegally in CRR. ü The immigration department is the lead service responsible for the ü The security officers across all the entry of every person or passenger regions are incapacitated by lack into the country and while of vehicles and personnel, and measures should be taken to stop given the porosity of the borders, any entry of foreign individuals into smuggling of people and goods the country while the borders are outside the country at night through officially closed, the department Jakartas (local motorbikes) and does not have the needed donkey carts is a common practice. resources to monitor all the PoEs in the country, sometimes at night along risky borders. Escort by the armed security is important and this will further strengthen collaboration. The replica of representation in the national Security Taskforce exist at regional level including other members of the Technical Advisory Unpatrolled porous border areas are commonly used for illegal crossing and smuggling of goods. The above picture shows Pata Committee headed by the Governor border area in Brikama bar, CRR or Mayor. These regional task forces play a critical role in the enforcement of the public health emergency ü Banjul was found to have a very regulations and the containment of weak municipal security taskforce COVID. Indeed, a Governor said and strained collaboration with the “Gambia`s Fight against COVID is at national authority. Weak the Borders and only at the interior”. collaboration has affected enforcement of emergency At the regional levels, collaboration measures in the markets, streets, among the regional security task ferries, and sea borders. forces is strong but they also face multiple challenges, including the following: GCAA Corporate News Vol. 3, issue 4 October – December 2015 ü The leadership role and collaboration played by the local authorities of CRR, URR, NBR and KM in the regional/municipal security taskforces in the fight against COVID-19 should be a model for other regions and municipalities. At the district levels, the chiefs and Alkalis are directly involved in the fight against COVID-19, an indication that the disease is everyone's responsibility and there is no room for complacency.

2. Point of entries-land

While these figures denote people using Points of entries on land are official PoEs, the porosity of borders frequently used by people to enter allows many people, despite the border the country, especially the traders closure, to use porous borders to exit and truck drivers. The graph below and enter The Gambia. This poses risk depicts the frequency rate at 100%- to security officers who rarely get all POEs. supplies of PPEs as they must interact with and handle travel documents of all those entering and exiting the country.

Smuggling of people and goods is more common at land PoEs compared to the sea and bridges/ferry terminals as there are more porous borders and means of transportation such as motorbikes, horse & donkey carts, trucks, jakartas and by

All official PoEs are frequently used foot.

Visit to porous border point at Brikama Pata, CRR

GCAA Corporate News Vol. 3, issue 4 October – December 2015 Some of the key security concerns TransGambia route. Vehicles use include lack of PPEs and training in porous unofficial borders to enter and COVID-19, and exit the Gambia daily smuggling people attending social functions. As passengers and goods. border communities with blood Monitoring of vehicles in transit should relations, people from both sides of the border at some border points attend the same social functions.

Lack of clear border demarcation is a challenge in some points of entries around the country with some borders almost impossible to identify by villagers. At Darsilameh Border Post, tranquil area is claimed by both Senegal and The Gambia and people use this as an excuse to cross Security officers at Senoba border post inspecting a private car exiting the border. The Gambia

Some people around the borders be strengthened to ensure they don’t stop and interact with Gambians to have dual citizenship and could move in and out of the Gambia with minimize the possibility of spreading the virus. Monitoring can be done little or no restrictions banking on the right to movement as a citizen. The through escorts up to Sene-Gambia bridge, dedicated monitoring security contested border points also have potential to create tensions between officials in Soma, Farafenni and other transit areas, collaboration with security forces of the two countries communities for reporting and and hinder possible cross border information sharing. Officers can also collaboration in the fight against be positioned at strategic locations COVID-19 pandemic. along the trans Gambia belt to

ensure transit vehicles from Senegal Lack of a monitoring mechanism for and Neighboring countries do not vehicles (especially trucks) in transit stop in Gambian communities and through The Gambia is another interact with people. challenge and major threat to the The safety of security officials at PoEs spread of imported COVID-19. At is compromised by lack of sustained Senoba and Kerr-Ali Border Posts, supply of PPEs. Given the high level of many vehicles carrying goods (trucks) interaction with passengers and and private cars enter and exit The drivers, the expose to infection is high. Gambia when in transit. Compounding this problem is lack of The truck drivers, apprentices and infrared thermometers at some points foreigners driving private cars and in of entry to check temperature of transit interact with people especially people entering the country. Allowing at Soma and Farafenni along the people into the country without GCAA Corporate News Vol. 3, issue 4 October – December 2015 checking their temperature is a high Hand washing stations are available risk to the country. Security officers in almost all (95%) border posts and should also check their own washing of hands is enforced. This is temperature every day to know their one of the main achievements by status and detect potential cases before infecting other officers. security officers in prevention through Moving forward, all PoEs should be hygienic measures. Bleach is the supplied with PPEs in a sustainable common thing used to mix with water way and get supply of thermometers. at PoEs. Supply of bleach, soaps to Other related measures should the PoEs for washing hands should be include regular fumigation. regular. Interference by senior officials at the The table below shows all PoEs on border points affects enforcement of land, bridge and ferry terminals have measures. At Senoba border post, the hand washing stations. 80% PoEs at most busy entry point visited by the Sea have the facilities and remaining mission team, there is a tendency by 20% should be assisted with the senior security or Government officers stations. from both countries to interfere with inspection of vehicles, giving orders for vehicle to pass without inspection - making it hard for the security officers on the ground to inspect vehicles and health officers to screen the drivers. GCAA Corporate News Vol. 3, issue 4 October – December 2015 Dual citizenship was identified as a Cross border collaboration between challenge in controlling border Gambian and Senegalese security crossing and it increases the risk of officers at Kerr Pateh, Kerr Jaine and imported COVID-19 cases along Amdallai Border posts constitute best many border communities. At Kerr practice in the fight against COVID- Pateh, the neighbouring Senegalese 19 and should be replicated in other community consists of many PoEs. Gambians who migrated and are now dual citizens. The collaboration led to joint surveillance/patrol, fumigation of They use their Gambian citizenship to posts and information sharing. At cross over to The Gambia and their Amdallai post, security officers from Senegalese identity documents to go Gambia and Senegal meet regularly back. Cross border collaboration and to discuss and resolve issues of community policing should be some common interest. This collaboration of the ways of managing the started before COVID-19. situation. The role of partners is also critical in The location of some border points is cross border collaboration. At Kerr-Ali a concern and affects response border, there is a proposed joint against the pandemic. Some border border post for the two countries to posts in are located within the be funded by Africa Development community and away from the Bank (AfDB). This model, once piloted, border, giving room for uncontrolled should be replicated across all PoEs illegal border crossing. These to strengthen collaboration and posts/offices should be moved to the good relations. actual border point and in a government structure as some current offices are privately owned. GCAA Corporate News Vol. 3, issue 4 October – December 2015 3. Sea, water and air borders engage people inland before they proceed. Ports and Navy officers Sea and water borders are more sometimes board those vessels and common in the greater Banjul area. check their temperature before Some of the key challenges allowing with through. experienced by security officers along sea border lines include: Porosity of borders. Unlike points of entry on the land, smuggling of people and good is not common although few cases have been identified. However, porous border exists and, in few cases, where there is smuggling, fishing canoes that come back to the shore carrying extra people from Senegal are commonly used. The fishermen are normally issued with tickets by officials/associations around the landing sites before leaving the seaside and are expected to return before the lapse of 24 hours and produce the same tickets and number of persons. Fishermen returning without tickets are arrested by the security officers and taken to the quarantine centres. At the Bakau sea rescue mission that is managed by immigration officials, the Senegalese apprehended from the sea are taken to quarantine centers, with security provided by the officers during transportation. Vessels registered in the Gambia and other sub regional countries have been a concern to officials at sea landing sites. These vessels continue to legally enter the Gambia despite being in Senegal and other high-risk countries. Managing such vessels and enforcing the border restrictions is challenging. The personnel on these mostly fishing vessels anchor and GCAA Corporate News Vol. 3, issue 4 October – December 2015 Safety of Navy and Fire and Rescue Lack of mobility for patrols in the sea Service officers is an issue of concern limits the surveillance capacity and as they lack PPEs, thermometer guns this gives space to the smugglers of to check temperature, training on persons and goods using canoes to COVID-19 and infection-prevention- cross via the porous borders. control measures. This exposes the Effective surveillance of the sea and security officers to infection when water borders is critical in the facilitating the entry of vessels and prevention of imported cases of passengers in the country. coronavirus and while the security facilities and officers are making Lack of infrared thermometer could gains in arresting foreigners using the allow infected persons to cross the unmanned sea entry points, border without notice. Of all PoEs, sea interventions and patrols can be and water borders have the least more effective if extra functional infrared thermometers, an issue of boats are provided with regular concern especially because officers supply of fuel. Most of the points of entry require just one or two boats to should check their temperature every accelerate patrols and safeguard the day and ensure the fishermen are country. regularly checked. At Bakau fish landing site, only the temperature of Health capacity in the facilities is also people using the office doors is lacking and should be strengthened checked yet the site has many open with deployment of permanent spaces for accessing the landing site. public health officers by the Ministry of Health while the overall wellbeing and safety of the security officers, including incentives, should be prioritized. Sea and water borders are the PoEs with the least number of deployed public health officers. This has implications in getting sustained supply of PPEs, training on COVID-19 Enforcement of physical distancing and emerging related issues, and and hand washing should be screening of persons crossing the prioritized at sea and water border borders. points due to the large numbers of fishermen and buyers, especially in the morning hours. This lack of social distancing is particularly concerning in Banjul, Bakau, Tanji and Kartong fish landing sites at peak hours. GCAA Corporate News Vol. 3, issue 4 October – December 2015 Living conditions. Just like their International Airport. The risk of the counterparts at land entry points, the Airport becoming the epicenter of living conditions of security officers in transmission if stringent control charge of sea and water borders is measures are not put in place, dire. Officers at Tanji, Kartong have no access to running water while the strengthened and enforced exist. navy team at Banjul Sea Landing site There is an urgent need to develop has no office structure and operate and observe recommended protocol under a tree and open bench. of social distancing and hygiene throughout the airport premises. At all border points, feeding is a challenge and given the salary levels The airport has been found to have in and additional functions as a result of place a standard operating the pandemic, extra allowances Procedure, but the observance of should be considered while social distancing and the use of investment should also be directed masks is poor. The handling of towards provision of services such as water and office structures even if it is luggage, documents and passports mobile or temporal structures in some by many officers and staff of travel of the sites. agents increases the risk of contamination. There is a gap in Airport - The Banjul International coordination and communication Airport is the primary gateway to The between the Airport authority and Gambia and having experienced the Ministry of health. The Airport staff that a substantive percentage of the needs further training on COVID-19 COVID-19 confirmed cases are measures. imported, and a good number had indeed transited through the Banjul

GCAA Corporate News Vol. 3, issue 4 October – December 2015 4. Military points social functions is still common. As border communities with blood The military, tasked to protect the relations, people from both sides of territorial integrity of The Gambia, is the border attend similar social also a key player in the fight against functions. COVID-19. The military has not only provided men in the fight against Lack of clear border demarcation COVID but also logistics to support affects collaboration between patrols in the regions and militaries from both countries and this municipalities. The Military posts has has an impact on efficiency and apprehended people illegally mutual gains that can be derived entering the Gambia and handed from joint operations. Diplomatic them over to the immigration and efforts should therefore continue to Health authorities. pay attention to the contested border areas. Partners should initiate The team visited military posts and cross border projects that promote observed the following: collaboration, including joint border point offices, capacity building, among others. The safety of military officers was compromised for lack of PPEs and training on COVID-19. Being land PoEs, the number of people crossing the porous borders is high and the officers are therefore exposed to the virus. Screening equipment were not available, and security public health officers are in short supply. But hand washing stations were available in all the posts.

The military officers confirmed that the number of Senegalese in transit and crossing the border has increased since the opening of borders on the Senegal side, adding pressure to border management and increasing risk of infection.

The porosity of borders allows smuggling of people and goods at night, exposing the border communities to the probability of infection. Military officers reported Infrared thermometer was supplied to military officers at Darsilameh cases of gathering of people for Military Post

GCAA Corporate News Vol. 3, issue 4 October – December 2015 5. Bridges and ferries A digitized monitoring system should The Safety of Security officers at the be recommended, connecting all Senegambia bridge is compromised PoEs, to capture date that is by lack of enough personal important for planning and response. protective equipment (PPEs), training At Barra and Banjul ferry crossing on COVID-19 and absence of an points, PPEs were not available. Social infrared thermometer to regularly distancing is not observed by the check temperature of the security passengers inside the ferries and no personnel and people crossing the security officer was available to bridge- truck drivers and people enforce social distancing and health driving personal cars. Physical protocol issues. Although attempts contact with foreign nationals, mostly are made to regulate the number of the Senegalese in transit is very people entering the ferry, they are common and the risk of infection is rarely successful. The situation is similar equally high. at the Janjabureh, Bansang and Basse crossing points. There are no public health officers, office structure and mobility for the Hundreds of Non-Gambians who had security officers. A health officer illegally entered the Gambia use the should be deployed at the bridge Barra-Banjul ferries on daily bases. The and motorbikes provided for patrol. authorities at the ferries cannot An office structure should be identify these individuals as travel established to accommodate history or identity documents are not security and health officers. provided at the terminals. The Banjul Barra ferry crossing point is a major There is no record of vehicles, details concern in the importation of cases. of drivers and apprentices passing The lack of social distancing puts through the bridge, making it difficult both passengers and ferry staff at to monitor the number of vehicles in great risk. transit and confirming they exit with the same goods. Enforcement of social distancing and other hygienic measures is important given the high number of passengers (approximately 2,500) who use the Banjul

GCAA Corporate News Vol. 3, issue 4 October – December 2015 Barra ferry every day during the pandemic with restriction of movement. Security and health officers should be deployed to the ferries to enforce this and other measures. The disinfection of the ferries is rare. The ferries should at least be fumigated every night.

Barra Ferry Taminal

1. Holding/isolation centres and health facilities Several health facilities across the country were visited to understand how they collaborate with security sector in response to COVID-19. Isolation centres/holding rooms were also visited. Some of the main issues discussed and observed included the following:

Almost all holding or isolation centers are not functional and cannot Isolation Centre at Soma District Hospital-in need of rehabilitation therefore admit suspected cases of and high rates of local transmission, coronavirus. Most of them have no beds, mattresses and toilets are in majority of the isolation centers across bad condition, often without running the country are not ready to water. The holding rooms at Bwiam, accommodate high number of Essau and Farafenni hospitals are suspected cases and this will be functional but bed capacity need to catastrophic for the country. Support be expanded to be able to from government and partners is accommodate more people. urgently needed to rehabilitate and Farafenni isolation center has only one bed while isolation center at expand capacities of the isolation Amdallai border post requires centers. maintenance replacement of solar Since the COVID-19 Logistics power batteries and the borehole pump system. Capacity rapid assessment was completed in March 2020, the In the likelihood of a serious outbreak isolation centers that were visited of COVID-19 pandemic in the country have received very little assistance from government or other GCAA Corporate News Vol. 3, issue 4 October – December 2015 stakeholders despite the strong GBA. Quarantine facilities are way recommendations in that report. cheaper in the regions than the coast and as such there should be a The collaboration between the reprioritization to establish well hospitals and security sector is positive. Some hospitals supply PPEs to functional quarantine centers in all the security officers. The officers call regions. the hospitals regularly to communicate suspected cases at NBR Health and Security officers the border and assist by providing crossing the river using the ferry and security to the hospital ambulances transportation cost is too high as transporting people to the quarantine many trips are made every week, centers in Banjul. At Essau Regional sometimes daily and transporting only Health Directorate, training is offered one person. The situation is similar to security officers by hospital health across all the regions. workers. Lack of screening people at PoEs is The Regional Health Directorates in an issue of concern to the hospitals NBR and URR have rented two lodges that are in close range. Security and to be used as temporary quarantine Health officers have recommended centers. But they lack adequate installation of tents at the border isolation rooms, mobility and feeding. points for use by public health workers The communities are not happy with to screen passengers and drivers and the use of lodges as isolation rooms, other persons crossing the borders. A fearing potential spread of the request for support was made to the infection in the communities. Isolation military. centers should be in the hospitals or Quarantine centers are not available isolated areas and not in the in the in many regions and requests by middle of communities to prevent regional Governors and hospital apprehension and stigmatization of management to the Ministry of Health isolated persons and the risk of to establish quarantine centers have spread. not been successful. All regional authorities have expressed challenges of not having quarantine centers in the regions, the transportation of suspected cases poses risk to security and health personnel in addition to wasting resources as a result of transporting all Isolation centre at Bansang Hospital suspected cases to the Hotels in the GCAA Corporate News Vol. 3, issue 4 October – December 2015 7. Local and regional administrators response activities, especially Regional COVID-19 Response Work sensitization and reporting cases of Plans have been developed by non-Gambians crossing the border regional governments to respond to illegally. Community radio the pandemic, but implementation programmes have been used has not been rolled out due to lack of successfully by regional leaders to resources and technical support. sensitize communities about the pandemic. The regional authorities highlighted numerous challenges that make Joint operations are important to effective response to COVID-19 increase border surveillance and pandemic difficult. These include overall response to COVID-19. The porosity of the borders/ long leadership of regional governments, stretches of porous borders; lack of especially the Governors, is pivotal for collaboration by some border effective coordination of the regional communities that have strong family security task forces. In CRR, URR and ties with cross border villages and NBR, the Governors have been able limited support from the national to bring the security forces in the government and partners to region together to jointly and implement the Regional COVID-19 strategically respond to COVID-19 Response Work Plans and lack of pandemic. This has led to joint patrols mobility to strengthen border and quick response to reports and surveillance; among others. information shared by the community. The regions don’t have quarantine centers. Requests from regions to KMC leadership responded quickly by support the establishment of a creating a regional COVID-19 quarantine centers has not been Response Task Force that has successful. Even where some of the successfully implemented various regions are using private lodges to measures, including public isolate people, payments have been sensitization across municipalities to delayed. Limited screening of people inform people on the dangers of at the busy border points is an issue of COVID-19, installation of hand concern to the regions and washing stations, fumigation of installation of tents and deployment markets and carparks, production of of health officers were emphasized as face masks and food distribution. some of the measures needed The regions and municipalities work urgently to strengthen screening. closely with central government in In some regions, community policing food distribution and with security has succeeded as result of forces to enforcing physical interventions by regional leaders. In distancing in markets. KMC and WCR some communities in NBR, youth leadership were working with security ‘vigilante' groups were created by to plan decongestion of markets. communities to support COVID-19 GCAA Corporate News Vol. 3, issue 4 October – December 2015 Key challenge faced by local regional quarantine centers if they governments is lack of collaboration are established. Collaboration is by people in the markets to observe stronger in the regions than in KMC social distance and wash hands, and Banjul. despite sensitization, making the role of security officers important in the Meetings with local and regional administrators enforcement. In Banjul, the collaboration with the security command is cordial. The city council has always relied on the command when security issues in the city need attention, especially with the onset of COVID-19. But the city is not fully involved in the security task force. The office of the Mayor has a COVID-19 response task force responsible for food distribution, fumigation of markets, distribution of hand washing stations, public sensitization on COVID-19, among others. Banjul is vulnerable to illegal border crossing as most of water borders are porous, but the city council has no capacity to secure the border points against smugglers and illegal crossings and rely on the national security for which collaboration can be improved. Use of local authorities to respond to COVID-19 was highly recommended by the Banjul City Council and the disconnect between the national government and BCC affects collective response to the pandemic. Overall, the role of security forces in COVID-19 response at local and regional authorities is clear, from joint patrols, enforcing social distancing and hygienic measures, and decongesting markets. The security will also be expected to protect the GCAA Corporate News Vol. 3, issue 4 October – December 2015 1. Communication Communication is a major weakness in the security sector and its absence or loosed implementation affects collaboration and joint efforts such as patrols needed to fight COVID-19. Strengthening communication is important and a proposal has been made to use CUG lines. There is also lack of effective communication between communities and security officers to share information on issues related to COVID-19 response, including cases of illegal border crossing and smuggling.

This can be addressed by establishing 24 hours free CUG lines between border communities and the points of entry, an innovation that will also enhance surveillance among the border communities and PoEs to inform interventions at operational and policy levels. This is an area that development partners can be approached to support.

Communication to the public by security forces is a challenge. The good work, sacrifices and dedication of security forces to duty, including achievements, are not celebrated and told to the public. A communication strategist at the national security task force will be needed to aid with strategic communication within the for-security sector and with public.

GCAA Corporate News Vol. 3, issue 4 October – December 2015 CHAPTER THREE (3) Recommendations and Conclusion # Area Recommendations Actions Responsible Comments 1 Personal Protective Masks should be supplied Public Health Officers PHOs PPEs supply chain equipment (PPEs) regularly to all security (PHOs) to be informed of Regional should be clear. PoEs to protect security their responsibility in Health Some PHOs didn’t officers from contracting supplying PoEs with PPEs. Directorates know their role corona virus. The Masks Regional health LogSafe to may be reusable directorate offices to be monitor preferably. more involved. 2 Mobility Patrol vehicles, The Gambia National motorcycles and boats Government to provide Security should be provided to all the needed resources to Task Force security posts to the security to effectively strengthen border patrols do their job across the regions. Adequate operational Ministry of finance National Funds are fuel should always be through the Ministry of Security available at the made available to Health and Social Task Force MOHSW promote effective Welfare to provide fuel service delivery. The to the National Security ongoing practice of supplying fuel in piece meal to the security posts should halted 3 WASH Wash hand facilities Development partners to LogSafe should be supplied to the be approached for 20% facilities that don’t support have. Soap/omo/bleach GCAA Corporate News Vol. 3, issue 4 October – December 2015 should be supplied on a regular basis to all PoEs in order to promote personal hygiene and prevent the spread of coronavirus. 4 Communication Internal communication CUG lines to be provided National to be strengthened to all security officers at Security through the use of CUG PoE. Task Force lines. This will improve coordination Communication Recruitment/deployment National capacity to be of a communication Security strengthened. expert to the national Task Force Communication expert security task force to to be recruited for the provide strategic national security task communication support force COVID-19 Guidelines for Development partners to National Security Officers should be approached for Security be developed and support Task Force shared with all security officers at PoEs, to compliment training on COVID-19. To include issues of Domestic Violence and Abuse 5 Capacity Training on COVID-19, UN Partners to be Regional building/strengthening infection prevention and approached to assist Security control measures to be a Task Forces GCAA Corporate News Vol. 3, issue 4 October – December 2015 continuous process to build the capacity of all security personnel A training of trainers National UNDP could (ToTs) sessions for Security consider selected security officers, Task Force expanding one from each point of support on entry, should be training of trainers conducted. To train from selected fellow field officers PoEs. Details regularly at PoEs. could be elaborated if PoEs identified. Community sensitization Regional on COVID-19 and Security community policing to Task Forces be continuous. ToTs to facilitate 6 Coordination Collaboration by security Meetings to be held to Regional services at the regional map out areas for joint Security level to be strengthened operations Task Forces Cross border National collaboration to Security promoted. The case of Task Force Amdalaye Border post should be replicated. 7 Health Facilities Regional quarantine National authorities and MoH centres to be established partners to be engaged in NBR and CRR to support GCAA Corporate News Vol. 3, issue 4 October – December 2015 All isolation centers Beds, mattresses should MoH should be urgently be procured. WASH to rehabilitated, and be provided. capacities expanded in readiness for possible high rate of local transmission of COVID-19 virus. Tents at the border points MoH The health officers should be installed for Military don’t have office use by public health space/rooms at workers for screen of the moment and persons crossing the will be exposed borders. during the forthcoming rain season. 8 Security Posts Site improvements are Structures needed to enhance and improve hygiene practices and WASH facilities, create office space for public health officers. Kerr Pateh border post in Construction of security NBR should be moved post for Kerr Pateh from its current location border post. (within the community and away from the border) to the actual GCAA Corporate News Vol. 3, issue 4 October – December 2015 border point and in a government structure Airport Review Airport Standard Review SOP, Train Staff, Operating procedures, Hold regular meetings develop travel advisory with Airport stakeholders, and communication provide PPEs, provide materials for the Airport. visibility and communications materials 9 Ferry terminals Security officers should be deployed at ferry crossing points to enforce social distancing among the passengers. Ferries should also be fumigated every night. Monitoring of Vehicles Monitoring mechanisms Monitoring to be done in transit should be put in place to through escorts up to monitor vehicles in transit Sene-Gambia bridge; to ensure they don’t stop dedicated monitoring and interact with security officials in SOMA Gambians at Soma and and transit areas; other transit areas. collaboration with communities for reporting and information sharing. Establish a digitized system for recording vehicles entering and exiting the borders. The GCAA Corporate News Vol. 3, issue 4 October – December 2015 system should also capture details of drivers and apprentice and goods. 10 Welfare of Security Feeding: The provision of Feeding is a Officers adequate nutritious food problem facing should be provided daily the border posts to all security officers. and officers on patrol are forced to withdraw and report to the center to feed before continuing with patrol, a gap that can be exploited to cross the country illegally. Allowances: Security As frontline officers deployed to workers risking quarantine centres their lives at the deserve be paid border crossing allowances as is the case points, security with other frontline officers are not health workers. paid additional allowances 11 Relations between Collaboration between central and government and Banjul regional/local city Council Should be authorities strengthened for GCAA Corporate News Vol. 3, issue 4 October – December 2015 effective response to COVID-19 Regional governments should be supported to implement COVID-19 Regional Response Plans.

GCAA Corporate News Vol. 3, issue 4 October – December 2015 2. Conclusion protection, mobility for border The role of security services in surveillance and enforcement of responding to COVID-19 and future measures restricting movement and pandemics will continue to be socializing in the communities, important and gain traction. Looking capacity strengthening and ahead, challenges will only get more incentives. complicated as the pandemic goes Border patrol teams in the regions on. As government try to maintain restrictions on movement and socializing while simultaneously trying to restart the economy, the potential for reduced voluntary compliance by citizens should be expected and will require sustained reinforcement. At the same time, issues of crime will resurface and as evidence shows elsewhere, Gender Based Violence (GBV) against women and children has continued and increased in some instances during the COVID-19 period and a prolonged period of the pandemic will likely exacerbate crime and GBV.

The rising COVID-19 positive cases in The Gambia reveals the impact of porous borders and about 75% of the cases are classified as imported cases while majority of people under quarantine have been apprehended by security forces while crossing borders illegally.

Against this background, the work of the security forces becomes very important to contain the spread of the virus across the country. As frontline workers, the security services will need a lot of support for self- GCAA Corporate News Vol. 3, issue 4 October – December 2015 Annex A: Site Visits and Findings

Activity Key Findings Kartong fish landing site is a permanent security post hosting the Naval soldiers, immigration and public health officials. Security officials are not issued with Personal Protective Equipment (PPEs)- face masks and gloves. The post has only been disinfected once. Since Kartong PoE/Fish the closure of the borders, no one from Senegal can enter the country through this point or Landing Site the illegal entry points without the security noticing them. Cases of people smuggling goods or materials through the point of entry are not common. The site has three public health Visited on Thursday officers 4th June 2020 Challenges/concerns facing security services at the landing site include: 1. Lack of mobility. There is only one motorcycle for land patrol and no functional boat for daily sea patrols. 2. Lack of PPEs: Since COVID 19th started, there has never been supply of PPEs 3. Lack of training: No COVID-19 training for security personnel who try to ensure their safely by regularly washing hands and observing social distancing. The officers are also not trained on Infection, Prevention and Control 4. Collaboration from the people in washing hands and observing regulations is lacking 5. Vulnerability to infections as front liners. They should therefore not only get PPEs but get paid allowances

Recommendations: 1. Immediate maintenance of the patrol boat. Operational fuel should be made readily available for effective conduct of daily routine patrols. 2. Portable drinking water should also be made available to security officers as they encounter difficulties in accessing water. 3. Public Health Official at the post should be provided with a motorcycle for ease of mobility. The PHO should also be provided with an office structure 4. Allowances should be allocated to security officers as front-line workers. GCAA Corporate News Vol. 3, issue 4 October – December 2015 Gunjur fish landing is a permanent post hosting immigration officers, fire service officers and Gunjur Fish landing the police. The fire officers have received one packet of gloves since COVID19 started but Site the immigration and police officers haven't received any supply of PPES since the onset of Visited Friday 5th COVID19 in the country. The facility has never been fumigated and there is no inferum June 2020 thermometer to check people's temperature. Hand washing station is available. No public health official has been deployed to the site, but one is available at the village clinic and accessible when needed. Illegal routes of entry by boat are available nearby but the security officers don’t have a functioning boat to patrol. One boy was recently intercepted trying to enter the country from Senegal by boat but was refused entry and sent back to Senegal

Challenges: 1. Lack of PPEs for security officers and thermometer to check people's temperature. 2. No form of mobility is available and land patrols are conducted by foot. There is no functioning boat for sea patrols. The only available patrol boat has a faulty engine which need to be repaired 3. No training on COVID-19, Infection, prevention and control measures have been conducted. The security officers safeguard themselves by maintaining physical distance and regular washing of hands. 4. Allowances from COVID-19 fund not provided. 5. Lack of public health officer at the site.

Recommendations: 1. Mobility should be made available for effective execution of patrol duties to secure the country against imported cases of COVID-19. The patrol boat should be repaired. 2. PPEs and thermometer should be made available. 3. COVID19 training should be conducted to build the capacity of the security personnel. 4. Public Health Officers should be deployed to the site 5. Allowances should be allocated to security officers as front-line workers GCAA Corporate News Vol. 3, issue 4 October – December 2015 This is a permanent military post. PPEs and thermometer are not available. The post has not been fumigated. Hand washing station is available. Although entry of people into the country has been blocked, people use porous border points to exit and enter The Gambia. Smuggling of people and goods is common, but the border communities have been sharing information with the military. One thermometer was donated by mission team and the military officers were encouraged to check their temperature regularly. Omo and bleach were also donated.

Challenges and Concerns: 1. Lack of training in COVID-19 for military and communities 2. Safety concern due to absence of PPEs 3. Common gathering of people for social functions is still common. As border communities with blood relations, people from both sides of the border attend similar social functions. 4. Lack of clear border demarcation. The border point (tranquil area) is claimed by both countries. People take advantage to hide their nationality and cross the border. The Senegalese army is only 300 meters away and tensions do occur from time to time. 5. No allowances given for COVID-19 related work Darsilameh PoE- Military Post Recommendations: 1. Cross border collaboration by both military forces should be encouraged. Visited on 29 May 2. PPEs should be provided, a public health officer deployed and training on COVID-19 2020 undertaken. 3. Border communities should be sensitized on COVID-19 4. Allowances should be provided to the military officers. This is permanent immigration border post. PPEs are limited and the facility has not been fumigated. Temperature check is done, and people arrested while crossing the border are Darsilameh Border taken to Quarantine Centers. There are four public health officers. Porous border points are Post many and used by people to cross illegally. Monitoring/patrol is limited by lack of mobility, but three motorbikes are available although fuel supply is irregular. Sometimes information GCAA Corporate News Vol. 3, issue 4 October – December 2015 Visited on 29 May of people making illegal crossing is shared by the communities. Smuggling of goods is 2020 common and when arrested, smugglers are sent back to Senegal.

Challenges 1. No training on COVID-19, affecting adherence to safety measures by the immigration officers. 2. Limited PPEs and no hand washing facility although sanitizers were available. 3. Feeding. Officers buy food from their own pockets. 4. Limited mobility 5. Border not demarcated and a section is claimed by both countries, creating tensions.

Recommendations 1. Coordination between the military and immigration posts is lacking and should be promoted. 2. Joint border controls should be undertaken 3. A meeting for all stakeholders to map out areas for joint patrols 4. Goods smuggled into the country should be confiscated 5. No persons should enter Gambia-zero tolerance 6. Communication hierarchy should be followed in case of conflicting information or when issues are unclear. 7. LogSafe to request PPEs from MoH on behalf of security officers Dimbaya Border Post PPEs are limited and the post has not been fumigated. InfraRed thermometer is available to check people’s temperature. Hand washing facility is available, and four health officials are Visited on 29 May present. There are several porous border points for illegal entry in the area. Senegalese 2020 arrested after entering Gambia illegally are returned to Senegal and Gambians taken to quarantine centers.

Challenges: 1. Limited mobility for patrol. There is no vehicle available and only one motorbike is available donated by IOM GCAA Corporate News Vol. 3, issue 4 October – December 2015 2. No regular supply of fuel 3. No COVID-19 training for security officers 4. Security officers are not given allowances and would like to be paid as frontline workers 5. Many Gambians go to Casamance for business and always insist on passing and controlling them is difficult. Many ends us using illegal routes to enter Senegal and return to Gambia.

Recommendations: 1. Collaborate with neighbouring security posts to reinforce handling of Gambians demanding to enter Senegal-Casamance 2. Mobility should be strengthened 3. Allowances should be paid to security officers 4. Regular supply of PPEs-to be requested to MoH through the public health officers No PPEs and fumigation have been done. Only trucks carrying goods pass through the Bjiboro Border Post border post. Thermometer is available to check the truck drivers and after screening, those with high temperature are taken to quarantine centers. Four public health officers are Visited on 29 May available, together with Red Cross volunteers. Hand washing station is installed A holding 2020 center is available with three beds, but feeding is a challenge and conditions of the holding center needs improvement. Smuggling of people is done through the jakatas

Challenges: 1. Illegal border entry points used regularly for illegal crossing 2. Lack of fuel for mobility. 4 vehicles available. 3. No training on COVID-19. Only one officer has been trained by IOM 4. Feeding of people at the isolation center 5. Security officers are not paid allowances

Recommendations: 1. Allowances should be paid to security officers GCAA Corporate News Vol. 3, issue 4 October – December 2015 2. Training on COVID-19 3. Fumigation

Senoba Border Post This a permanent and very busy post with many vehicles carrying goods (trucks) and private cars in transit. The drivers use travel documents issued by the Senegalese authority. PPEs are Visited on 30 May supplied when needed except sanitizers. Most of the security officials were not wearing 2020 mask and interact with Senegalese truck drivers. The post has not been fumigated and temperature check is constantly done. Two handwashing stations are available at the border post and washing of hands is enforced. Cases of Gambians with high temperature are booked, biodata taken to establish travel history and then transferred to health facilities. The Senegalese with high temperature are handed over to the Senegalese authorities at the border. There are two holding centers, one for men and one for female.

Smuggling of Senegalese into the Gambia territory is common in nearby border villages through porous borders. The means used for smuggling include motor bikes, horse carts and trucks. In some cases, the Senegalese security officials transport civilians claiming they are family members in transit to the other end of Senegal. Senegalese in transit were seen in SOMA interacting with people. The office used by security officers is poorly ventilated, but rehabilitation is ongoing with funding from IOM.

Challenges 1. Lack of collaboration from border communities. Cases of Senegalese who enter Gambians illegally are hosted and protected by communities. In some cases when arrests are made, community elders interfere by pleading for their release. 2. Senior security officers from both countries interfere with inspection of vehicles, giving orders for vehicle to pass without inspection. This makes it hard to enforce measures. 3. The border is closed on the Gambian side but open on the Senegalese side. Influx of Senegalese in transit is high and expect to be allowed to pass without restraints. 4. Limited mobility. There is no vehicle for patrol, only one motorbike. 5. Irregular supply of fuel GCAA Corporate News Vol. 3, issue 4 October – December 2015 6. Lack of trained officers on COVID-19. Security officers are rotated regularly and those trained are always moved to other posts. 7. No allowances paid to security officers as frontline workers. The officers expressed interest to be given incentives.

Recommendations 1. Monitoring of vehicles in transit should be done to ensure they don’t stop and interact with Gambians at Soma and other transit areas. This can be done through escorts up to Sene-Gambia bridge, dedicated monitoring security officials in SOMA and transit areas, collaboration with communities for reporting and information sharing. 2. Sensitization of the communities on COVID-19 and need to collaborate with security officers in reporting cases of people crossing illegally and living in the communities. It appears community members don’t understand the risk of the virus. Buy-in of community elders is important and initial bantaba meetings with elders should be done before community sensitization through community radios, community platforms for women, youth, among others. 3. Allowances should be paid to the security officers

Community of The border community does not collaborate with the police. Cases have been reported of Senoba Senegalese entering Gambians illegally and being hosted and protected by communities. In some cases when arrests are made by the police, community elders interfere by pleading Visited on 30 May for their release. 2020 There is urgent need for sensitization of the communities on COVID-19 and need to collaborate with security officers in reporting cases of people crossing illegally and living in the communities. It appears community members don’t understand the risk of the virus. Buy-in of community elders is important and initial bantaba meetings with elders should be done before community sensitization through community radios, community platforms for women, youth, among others. GCAA Corporate News Vol. 3, issue 4 October – December 2015 The hospital receives many cases from Senegal as it is located next to porous borders. The hospital cannot turn away patients. The holding/isolation center, developed with hospital resources, is functional. There has been no support from the government since the rapid assessment was completed in March. Assistance is needed to expend the capacity of the holding center. The hospital collaborates with the security and has supplied security officers with PPEs. All staff have been sensitized on COVID-19. Regular reminders are sent to staff on Bwiam Hospital preventive measures. Hand washing facilities were provided and strategically located within the hospital and washing hands is enforced. The holding center has PPEs, a changing room, rd Visited on the 3 nurses’ station, two bed, two-wheel chair, running water and toilet. June Challenges: 1. The holding center has inadequate capacity to admit many patients in case of high local transmission. At least 15 beds will be needed, including entertainment (tv); laptops and tv for nurses’ station. 2. Lack of resources to support and strengthen the isolation center.

Recommendations 1. Bwiam hospital isolation centre should be supported with resources by government

and partners to increase its bed capacity to 15.

The isolation center is not ready to accommodate many people in case of a serious Soma District Hospital outbreak of COVID-19 pandemic. The 12 beds are old, and most have no mattresses. The toilets were in bad condition and without running water. Visited on 30 May 2020 The isolation center is spacious to accommodate at least 10 patients and rehabilitation is urgently needed. Food (rice, oil and salt) donated by WFP is available to feed those who will be taken to the isolation center. Recommendations: The RHD and the facility management were tasked to make the isolation centre functional through basic rehabilitation of the rooms such as cleaning, removing old beds, maintain GCAA Corporate News Vol. 3, issue 4 October – December 2015 maximum of six beds and work on the water supply system. Part of imprest resources from MoH should be used for the rehabilitation work. Soma Customs Post Security officers are highly exposed, they were not wearing masks and constantly interact with Senegalese truck drivers. Supply of PPEs is limited. Temperature is not checked, and Visited on 30 May hand washing facilities are available. Information of people entering the country illegally is 2020 passed to the medical teams. Smuggling of goods is regular through use of motorbikes.

Challenges: 1. Mobility is limited and only two vehicles are available, one for patrol. 2. There is no public health officer deployed to the customs post. 3. Irregular supply of PPEs. 4. Training on COVID-19 has not been conducted, putting the safety of officers at risk. 5. Non-payment of allowances.

Recommendations: 1. Joint operations and meetings should be encouraged 2. Public health officer should be deployed to the customs post 3. Allowances should be paid to the security officers Senegambia bridge PPEs are not available, but the facility has been fumigated once. There is no thermometer Visited on 30 May to check temperature of people crossing the bridge (truck drivers and people driving 2020 personal cars). Contact with Senegalese in transit is very high, posing the risk of infection. Security officers try to ensure their safety by washing hands regularly.

Challenges: 1. No training on COVID-19, putting the safety of all officers at the risk of infection. 2. There is limited mobility for the officers Recommendations: 1. Thermometer should be provided for temperature check. The officers should also check their temperature regularly. 2. Motorbike should be provided to the security officers for patrol. GCAA Corporate News Vol. 3, issue 4 October – December 2015 3. A health officer should be deployed to the site.

Pata Boarder areas There is no structure at the border- common issue in the entire CRR region. This makes patrol Visited on 30 May of porous border posts difficult and efforts should be made to establish border posts in the 2020 regions. A plot of land is already allocated in Boiram for border post. Brikama Ba Police Brikama Ba border area is one of the most porous borders in the country. It stretches all the Post way to SOMA without a permanent border post. The entire CRR has no permanent border post, making the region the most porous and vulnerable to COVID-19 pandemic. Visited on 30 May 2020 Brikama Ba Police post is five minutes’ drive away from the border. It has no PPEs and fumigation has not been done. Cases of people from Senegal crossing the border illegally are reported regularly. Smuggling of goods is common especially at night. Border communities help each other to smuggle goods and few cases of those arrested are handed over to medical officials.

Challenges: 1. Limited mobility for patrol due to lack of manpower, vehicles and fuel. Only one motorbike is available 2. Lack of training on COVID-19 3. Lack of a public health officers 4. Absence of thermometer to check people’s temperature 5. Lack of isolation center 6. Most community members are not sensitizing on COVID-19, making them complacent and support Senegalese crossing the border to do shopping at Brikama Ba shopping centre.

Recommendations 1. At least two permanent border posts should be constructed to strengthen surveillance/borders patrol. 2. An isolation center at Brikama Ba should urgently be made available GCAA Corporate News Vol. 3, issue 4 October – December 2015 3. Public health officer should be deployed 4. As frontline workers in COVID-19 response, security officers deserve incentives and allowances should be given due consideration by the government and partners. Bansang Hospital (CRR), the second referral hospital in the country, is very close to the Bansang General border but there is no official point of entry and most of the patients are therefore from Hospital-CRR outside the country. The hospital has handwashing facilities in many sections of the hospital Visited on 1st June and it is mandatory for all people entering the hospital to have their temperature checked. 2020 The hospital works closely with the Regional Security task Force by referring illegal persons to the security to facilitate their return to Senegal. Gambians are taken to the quarantine center.

The hospital work with youths in the communities to conduct surveillance and sensitization. Local community radio (Bansang community radio) has also been widely used to sensitize people, and leaders of the region participate in the discussions, including the governor. Many community members ask questions and clarification is given. Bansang has a functional isolation centre with capacity of only two people. It will need quarantine and treatment centres.

Bansang Crossing Point Bansang ferry crossing is functional but there is no security to enforce social distancing as agreed in the rapid assessment report.

Nyamanarr Boarder PPEs are not available but functional handwashing stations are available, and handwashing Post is encouraged. Infra-red thermometer for temperature check was available and is used to check the temperature of truck drivers entering the country. Those with high temperatures Visited 31 May 2020 are referred to medical facilities. Fumigation has been done once and smuggling of people and goods is common.

Mobility is a challenge and security officials undertake patrols on foot for lack of a vehicle and motorcycles. There has been no training on COVID-19 and lack of accommodation for security officers was identified as a need that should be prioritized. GCAA Corporate News Vol. 3, issue 4 October – December 2015

The isolation centre at Nyamanyarr (former Ebola crisis centre) needs rehabilitation especially the reactivate solar power and repair the bore hole pump system. Training of security officers and communities should be continuous The border post is used by truck drivers from Senegal, Mali and Guinea, making it a high-risk point of entry. PPEs are not available. Handwashing stations are available, and handwashing is encouraged. An infra-red thermometer for temperature check was available and fumigation has been done. Sabi Boarder Post Smuggling of people and goods is common using motorcycles, donkey/horse carts and by Visited 31 May 2020 foot. There is stronger community policing and villages along the border post share information on time with security officers. They also arrest and force Senegalese to go back to Senegal.

Mobility is a challenge for security officials to undertake patrols. There has been no training on COVID-19. Other challenge include feeding, lack of PPEs and public health officer.

A public health officer should be deployed, and continuous internal training/information sharing should be encouraged among the security officers, especially during the daily morning parades. Officers should be able to empower each other. URR Governor and Regional taskforce URR has only two official border points of entry (Nyamanyarr and Sabi) despite the porous (URR) borders that have proved a challenge to patrol. There are many numbers of COVID-19 cases across the neighbouring Senegal and the region is therefore a red zone. Visited on 1st June 2020 The Regional Task Force, under the leadership of the regional governor, has been conducting sensitization on COVID-19 in the communities, undertaking border patrols, engaging border communities and health workers, distributing PPEs, among others. Effective coordination, through the office of Governor, has ensured joint patrols and response to cases by the regional task force. Regional Work Plan for COVID-19 response GCAA Corporate News Vol. 3, issue 4 October – December 2015 was developed and shared for support. This was the first regional workplan. WFP has supported with rice. COVID-19 has strengthened joint operations by the regional task force, a collaboration that is important in securing the borders. Border communities should be integrated into the response plan using structures such as the Village Development Committees (VDC), among others, to participate in surveillance of border areas and collectively prevent people crossing into The Gambia.

Recommendation was made to have a quarantine center in URR. The cost of sending suspected cases to Banjul is high. Border communities should be integrated in the plan to control illegal crossing and smuggling of goods and people. Community structures such as

the Village Development Committees (VDCs) should be capacitated to undertake surveillance of border areas and interject people crossing illegally. The task force should also be trained on COVID-19. The post covers 86 villages. PPEs are not available, having run out. Additional supplies are Sarengai Boarder yet to be provided. Functional handwashing stations are available, and handwashing is Post-URR North encouraged. Infra-red thermometer for temperature check was not available. Fumigation has not been done and smuggling of people and goods is common using motorcycles, Visited 31 May 2020 donkey/horse carts and by foot. Community policing is weak as cases of smuggling are normally reported late by the communities. Consequently, cases of arrest are very few.

Gambians coming from Senegal are only allowed to wash hands and re-join communities, instead of being taken to quarantine Centers. Senegalese are also allowed in after washing hands but are not allowed to proceed beyond Sare Ngai. This is a high risk that can lead to widespread local transmission of the virus.

Some challenge includes lack of mobility to undertake regular and extensive border patrols. Only one vehicle for patrol is available, irregular supply of fuel that affects border patrols, lack of regular supply of PPEs, putting the safety of security officers at risk, lack of training on COVID-19 and lack of a health officer. GCAA Corporate News Vol. 3, issue 4 October – December 2015

An isolation center should be identified at Sare Ngai and a health officer deployed. All security officers should be supplied with PPEs on a regular basis and trained on COVID-19. Security officers were informed to take all Gambians coming to the country to quarantine centres and Senegalese sent back to Senegal. CRR is the only region without an official border post but has a high influx of people from Senegal, including those seeking medical care. There are more than 40 illegal routes that people can use to cross the borders. The security officers are incapacitated for lack of vehicles and manpower considering the size of the region. There are 639 villages.

The first case of COVID-19 in the region was a Senegalese while the second case is a Gambian who had come from Senegal. Regional Taskforce (CRR) Challenges: Visited on 30th May • Insufficient border monitoring 2020 • PPEs and IPC materials are not available and despite all Lumos getting closed, a lot of people are normally seen in Wassu idling • Lack of mobility-vehicles and fuel • Feeding for security officers

Recommendations: • Establishment of border posts in the region • Regular supply of PPEs • Vehicles and motorbikes should be provided for patrols CRR Governor The Governor briefed the team on the following issues: Visited on 30th May - The Regional security task force is functional and undertake joint border patrols 2020 - There are common cases of Senegalese crossing the border to The Gambia to seek medical attention in hospitals. The first COVID-19 positive case was a Senegalese while the second case was a Gambian who had travelled to Senegal. - Some challenges include mobility-lack of enough vehicles and fuel. GCAA Corporate News Vol. 3, issue 4 October – December 2015 - Cases of smuggling people is common in the region and those arrested are taken back to Senegal if they are Senegalese. The post is busy with trucks entering The Gambia from Senegal but in transit and headed to Kerr Ali Border Post Casamance. Temperature of truck drivers is checked before proceeding to Soma. The trucks are ordered to proceed to Soma before entering Casamance and without stopping in Gambia but there is no monitoring system to ensure they do not stop while in transit.

Approximately 100 vehicles cross every day to Senegal. Goods are not allowed into the country at the border except ECOWAS certified goods in transit. Gambians entering the country are taken to quarantine centers. A proposed joint border post for the two countries is under consideration. It will be funded by AfDB

Farafenni Hospital The isolation centre is functional but has low capacity of one bed. There is running water, Isolation Centre clean toilet and PPEs Visited on 3 June The capacity should be enhanced, oxygen ventilator and flowmeters installed, capacity of 2020 staff strengthened, and case definition reviewed. The task force is functional and hold regular meetings. It has a rapid response team that responds to calls and needy situations in the region. The task force works closely with officers Regional Taskforce ate Kerr Ali and Kerr Jaine; conducts sensitization sessions using community radios. 51 border (NBRE) communities in the region have been engaged.

Community policing is successful. The communities have been reporting many cases to the task force. Task force has also been distributing PPEs and food aid to the communities. Two temporary quarantine centers were established by regional health directorate, and security is provided 24/7.

Challenges faced include lack of adequate isolation rooms; mobility and feeding. The communities are not happy with the use of lodges as isolation rooms, fearing potential spread of the infection in the communities. The task force also experiences mobility challenges. There is only one vehicle. Patrol of porous border points is done every day and fuel is always insufficient. Feeding is a problem facing the border posts and officers on GCAA Corporate News Vol. 3, issue 4 October – December 2015 patrol are forced to withdraw and report to the center to feed before continuing with patrol, a gap that can be exploited to cross the country illegally. Security officers deployed to the quarantine centers are frontline staff too and deserve to be paid allowances. This is a permanent post. There were no PPEs supplied to the post and no fumigation has Kerr Pateh Point of been done. There was no thermometer available at the post, so no temperature was Entry checked on individuals coming into the country. Movement of people into the country has been restricted but still people from the nearby village in Senegal cross over shopping at the nd Visited on 2 shops on Gambian side. The estimated number of people coming into the country June2020 everyday was five to six people.The porous border entry points include Kerr Ardo, Tallen Village and Njonen Village which were unregistered points of entry.

The Villagers are cooperative and alert security of any intruder from Senegal who are sent back. The intruders usually use jakartas to enter into the country. There is a special task force whose responsibility is to conduct patrols along the border. They have not received any supply from COVID19 and no training of personels was conducted in fighting the virus. There was no PHO stationed at the post. Hand washing facility was available and they have not received any COVID19 allowances.

The constraints faced by the security men include lack of mobility -vehicles and fuel. Sometimes the public contribute fuel money for motorcycles. Lack of government structure

as officers are using someone's house as a post which was 200meters away from the border.

Location of Kerr Pateh is therefore not strategic as it is located far from the border point, making it easy for people to cross the border unnoticed and smuggle goods. There is only

one Health officer.

Recommendations: • Location of Kerr Pateh border post should be moved to the actual border point. Its current location, within the community and away from the border, gives room for uncontrolled illegal border crossing. • PPES be made available to enhance operational capability. GCAA Corporate News Vol. 3, issue 4 October – December 2015 • Mobility be provided for effective patrol. • Personnel should be trained on COVID19 and allowances provided. Some COVID-19 related challenges in the regions include long stretches of porous borders; Governor North Bank lack of collaboration by border communities with family relations; lack of support from Region and Team national government and partners to implement the Regional COVID-19 Response Work Plan; lack of mobility to strengthen border surveillance; among others. ` nd Visited on 2 June The region has no functioning quarantine and isolation centres. Request to support the 2020 construction of a quarantine centre at an identified site has not been responded to by the national government. Screening of people entering the country has been affected by lack of tents installation at the busy border points. POEs don’t have office space to accommodate COVID-19 medical staff, making their work difficult.

Social distancing is not observed at the Ferry station. Community policing has succeeded in some communities where youth ‘vigilante' groups have been created to support COVID-19 response activities, especially sensitization and reporting cases of non-Gambians who have crossed the border illegally. Community radio programmes have been used successfully to sensitize communities about the pandemic.

Kerr Jain Boarder This is a permanent post. At the beginning of COVID19, gloves and masks were supplied but point are now exhausted. Only three jackets of PPEs were issued to security team and one hand Visited on 2nd June sanitizer. The post has not been disinfected and there was no thermometer to check 2020 people’s temperature. Washing of hands is emphasized. COVID-19 training has not taken place including training on Infection, Prevention and control. Security personnel protect themselves by regularly washing hands and observing social distancing. There is no Public Health Officer.

The porous entry villages are Kerr Wally, Bantanding Tuklor and Cheesay majaw village which are unregistered entry posts. Information on intruders trying to enter the country is shared by the public and cases of smuggling of goods are yet to be reported. The post has no means of mobility which hinders the execution of their duties.

GCAA Corporate News Vol. 3, issue 4 October – December 2015 Recommendations: • PPEs to be provided for protection of security personnel. • Mobility be provided for routine patrols. • PHO to be deployed, and thermometer provided to conduct temperature checks. • Training of security officers on COVID19 to be facilitated. Also training on Infection Prevention Control. • Allowances should be paid to all front-line workers, including the security officers.

Amdallai Boarder Amdalai is a permanent post mounted by the police, Immigration officials, Custom officials, Point PHO and state intelligence services. No PPEs were supplied disinfection has been recently done by the Senegalese health officials because of the cordial bilateral between the two sides. The National Environment Agency fumigated the offices once. nd Visited on the 2 Some Gambians are coming into the country since the declaration of the state of June 2020 emergency but they are usually taken to the quarantine centers and quarantine for fourteen days.Sick people or people recommended for medical treatment from Senegalese Government are also allowed entry but necessary precautions are normally taken. About ten to fifteen loaded trucks on transit area usually allowed entry but with one driver and one apprentice who will wash their hands and their temperature is usually checked.

The border is a porous border so there is a possibility of intrusion without being noticed. Daily foot and vehicle patrols were conducted and there is a big challenge in controlling the following border villages like Jamagen village , Bakindik koto village ,Malick Sarr village , Touba Angalleh and Kerr Jane village because they're unrecognised points of entry and there were no security personels posted in thoes villages . COVID Sensitization was done in all border villages. Jakartas are used to smuggle goods out of the country. Anybody caught smuggling is apprehended , charged and then taken to court. At the time of writing this report, there was no smuggling of goods outside the Gambia. There were enough vehicles for patrol but not enough fuel to facilitate operations. No COVID19 training was also conducted including training on infection prevention and control. There were no masks and gloves available. Three public health officers are GCAA Corporate News Vol. 3, issue 4 October – December 2015 stationed at the post and there handwashing facility with two dysfunctional thermometers donated during the Ebola pandemic period. Approximately 15 truck drivers and apprentices cross the border every day from Senegal, and failure to take their correct temperature when entering Gambia is a high risk.

Cross border collaboration between Gambian and Senegalese security officers is good best practice for replication in all POEs. The collaboration has led to joint surveillance/patrol, fumigation and information sharing. At Amdallai post, security officers from Gambia and Senegal meet regularly to discuss and resolve issues of common interest. This collaboration started before COVID-19.

Recommendations: • Personal protective equipment be provided to promote effective service delivery. • Regular fumigation of the offices and the environment should be conducted weekly. • Training on COVID19 for the security personnel. • Sufficient operational fuel be provided by the Central government to facilitate border patrols. • As front-line workers, security officers should be paid COVID19 allowances. • Development partners should complement government’s efforts for addressing regional security challenges. Regions have developed Work Plans that are yet to be implemented for lack of resources and technical support. • The Military should consider providing POEs with tents to assist in effective medical screening of people crossing the borders by the health officers who have no office space at the moment and will exposed during the forthcoming rain season. Regional Taskforce The regional task force of North Bank Region was met at the Regional Health Directorate in NBRW Essau of North Bank West. An isolation center has been identified but there is no quarantine Visited on 2nd June center at the hospital. Request for a quarantine centre has not been successful and 2020 transportation of suspect cases poses risk to security officers crossing the river using the ferry. Some challenges faced by the security officers include feeding of the men on patrol, GCAA Corporate News Vol. 3, issue 4 October – December 2015 difficulties in acquiring PPEs for their protection and lack of adequate fuel to function as expected, lack of a tent at Amdalai POE to facilitate easy contact with incoming people. Senegalese intercepted are normally taken to the quarantine Centre. Jerreh Camp was identified as a quarantine center, but the central government is yet to respond.

Recommendations: • Vehicles with enough operational fuel be provided to facilitate easy patrol along the borders. • PPES be provided to the securities and covid19 training conducted. • Tent to be provided at the POE. The military should consider providing the tent Barra Police Station The station has not been disinfected or fumigated and PPEs have not been supplied but Visited on 2nd June protect themselves by regular washing of hands and keeping social distancing. Security 2020 officers perform routine vehicle patrols but are faced with logistics problems especially vehicle and fuel.They also enforce measure on the closure of non-essential shops and opening of essential shops. Enforcing the social distancing regulation is a difficult task to execute a there are people denying that COVID-19 exist in the country.

Recommendations: • Mobility and fuel should be made available • PPEs should be regularly supplied to the securities to protect themselves against covid. • More community Sensitization on COVID-19 should be done to enhance community awareness.

Barra Ferry Terminal Visited on 2nd June 2020 There was no security in the ferry to enforce social distancing and health protocol issues. Attempts are made to regulate the number of people entering the ferry, but they are rarely successful. Hand washing stations are available, and enforcement is done. Security officers are supplied with PPEs.

GCAA Corporate News Vol. 3, issue 4 October – December 2015 Passengers in the ferry do not use masks and truck drivers from Senegal interact freely with passengers. Checking of temperature is not regular for lack of dedicated staff. The red cross volunteers charged with the responsibility don’t report to work every day due to financial limitations. The ferry is not regularly fumigated. The presence of immigration could assist in enforcing social distancing measures.

Recommendations: • Immigration officer/s should be deployed to the ferry at Barra to assist in enforcing social distancing measures. Passengers not wearing face masks should not be allowed to board the ferry. • Ferries should be regularly fumigated, and sensitization done through posters or other reading materials. On the 4th of June, the national security Taskforce was met at the police headquarters in Banjul.Lack of resources for the implementation of covid19 regulation was raised. Every vehicle entering the country should be cleared and clearance should be issued by the commander of the National task force and should be escorted by the police at the expense of the businessman. There was lack of intersectoral collaboration, which was raised, and sectors were not communicating which hinders the effective implementation of covid19 regulation. National Security Taskforce Security personels at border posts were not wearing masks and gloves and were always at the risk of contracting the virus. Lack of operational resources like fuel, mobility and personnel hinders the operational effectiveness of the force. They are using their own resources at their disposal to transport and feed their staffs. Very less resources are received from the central government. The impact of Senegalese entering the country should be made known to people because Senegal is now registering tremendous amount of people infected with covid19. The issuance of laissez passez to foreigners entering the country by immigration officers at the border posts should be put at a halt.A handful number of people were caught GCAA Corporate News Vol. 3, issue 4 October – December 2015 possessing an up to date laissez passez; thoes people were taken to the quarantine center and all that immigration officers were transferred. The immigration is entirely responsible for the entry of any person or passenger into the country and measures should be taken to stop any entry of foreign individuals into the country. The immigration does not have the resources and manpower to man all the POE in the country which the lack of food , fuel, mobility, PPES was also a contributing factor.The immigration should collaborate and coordinate with the police for the easy implementation or execution of their duties in combating covid19. The ministry of health is releasing the money for their operations in peace meal which is hindering the operations of the security and besides it is never enough. The wearing of face masks by everyone entering the markets was suggested.

The terminal is a point of entry by Gambians and non-Gambians. PPEs are supplied regularly to security officers, but fumigation of the terminal areas is irregular. However, the ferry is fumigated three times every week. Temperature of passengers entering Banjul is checked and washing of hands enforced before entry. Handwashing facilities are available. Social distancing is not observed by the passengers inside the ferry. Enforcement is Banjul Ferry Terminal important given the high number of passengers (approximately 2,500) who use the ferry every day. th Visited on 4 of June There have been no cases of interception for people entering the country illegally, 2020 smuggling people or goods. This is more common in the regions - land entry points. Training of security officers on COVID-19 has not been done. There are no permanent public health officers located at the terminal. The health officers visit once a week.

Private canoes are not allowed to ferry passengers at the terminal, but they commonly use other unofficial seaside areas. Security officers are not paid allowances and they expressed interest to be paid as frontline workers.

Banjul Fish Landing Was also visited by the delegation on the 4th of June, 2020.There was a joint patrol site conducted daily. Its also very hard to enforce social distancing. The boat men were GCAA Corporate News Vol. 3, issue 4 October – December 2015 cooperating with the securities which prompted them to form an association called Banjul landing site association. Since the declaration of covid19 regulation they were supplied once with PPEs which were exhausted at the time of taking the report.They were pleading for the authorities to provide them with PPES like face masks, gloves because theywere always interacting with people without protection. No training on covid19 and no training on infection prevention and control for the officers at the landing site. There was a hand wash basin but no sanitisers were made available to them.No thermometer was made available to them. They haven't received any payment from covid19.They said they should be paid from covid19 because they were at high risk of infection. The following were recommended: 1: Training of covid19 be facilitated and also training on infection prevention and control for the securities at the site so that they will be armed with knowledge to protect themselves from covid. 2: Face masks, gloves, sanitizers etc. be provided to them. 3: Thermometer be provided to them to be checking the temperature of individuals. 4: They should benefit from covid19 allowances. Bakau Fish Landing This is a permanent post. PPES were available and they got their supply from fire and rescue Site headquarters Banjul.They also receive supply from the ministry of health. The site has never Visited on 4th June been disinfected. Temperature is normally checked daily upon arrival and a health worker 2020 has been deployed to the site. Security officers safeguard themselves by using masks and gloves when interacting with people. Training has been done on infection prevention and control but there are no allowances for COVID-19 related functions. Officers expressed they would want to receive COVID-19 allowances.

Any Senegalese caught intruding is apprehended and sent to the quarantine center. There are porous landing sites namely Brufut, Tanji, Gunjur, Santana among others that can be used for illegal entry into the country unnoticed. Communities are cooperative and regularly share information of people smuggled into the country. Three boats were recently apprehended for trying to smuggle fishing nets to Senegal.

GCAA Corporate News Vol. 3, issue 4 October – December 2015 Sea patrols are not conducted for lack of patrol boats. They only perform sea rescue operations but when they have enough fuel at their disposal.

Recommendations: • Speed patrol boats to be provided. • Life jackets to be provided. • Hand sanitizers to be made available and regularly supplied. Governor/Regional A COVID-19 Taskforce was formed to sensitize communities on COVID-19. A logistics Taskforce (WCR) committee was formed solely to handle logistic issues like acquisition of PPEs for the different security officers at the border posts and to address the issue of mobility and fuel. The office Visited on 8th June of the Governor is responsible for the coordination on the implementation of the covid19 2020 emergency declaration.

The security task force conducts daily vehicle patrols from Kartong to Kalagi as there is no official border point of entry along this porous border line. There is no official border entry point in the whole of West coast region. This porosity of the border makes people to try and smuggle goods outside the country and those intercepted are handed over to the prison services. 472 people have to date been intercepted at the borders and 360 of them were sent back to Senegal. The recent have bene taken to the quarantine center. Intruders use jakartas to smuggle people late in the night. The Chiefs and Alkalis are directly involved in COVID-19 response which indicates that the pandemic is everyone's responsibility and there is no room for complacency. Efforts are being made to decongest the markets to promote social distancing. The Taskforce also support also enforcement of emergency regulation on closure of non- essential shops. Five imams were taken to court for leading prayers during the covid19 emergency declaration. Enforcing social distancing in the markets is difficult and community sensitization is an ongoing activity.

Recommendations: • PPEs to be provided. GCAA Corporate News Vol. 3, issue 4 October – December 2015 • Vehicles and enough operational fuel should be adequately supplied to enhance the daily vehicle border patrols. • Intergovernmental collaboration should be promoted to fight covid19. • There should be regular meeting of stakeholders to share challenges. • Efforts should be made to engage the communities to take a lead role in securing their communities. GCAA Corporate News Vol. 3, issue 4 October – December 2015 This is a permanent post that host different security apparatus. PPEs have not been supplied Tanji Fish Landing Site since COVID-19 regulations were imposed in the country in March 2020. Visited on the 5th of June Some of the challenges encountered include: - There are no PPEs despite numerous requests. - No public health workers - No disinfection - Lack of thermometers - Lack of adequate portable water for daily consumption - Lack of training on COVID-19, infection, prevention and control measures.

All fishing boats in the site are registered together with occupants before they depart for fishing expeditions in order to identify intruders coming in from Senegal. Temperature of fishermen and people buying fish was not taken upon arrival because there was no thermometer. Entering the country through the site is possible through the sea so efforts are being made to stop any intrusion.Porous points of sea entry into the country were highlighted, including Kartong, Gunjur, sanyang, Tujereng etc and information on any suspected boat is communicated to all points of entry for vigilance.

Smuggling of people into the country has never been experienced at Tanji site but attempts have been made to smuggle goods. A boat was intercepted recently for trying to smuggle 63 bags of sugar and handed over to the police for prosecution.

Recommendations: 1. COVID-19 training to be facilitated. 2. Logistics and mobility be provided to enhance effective service delivery. 3. PPEs be provided and be regularly supplied to protect security officers from COVID19. 4. Portable water be made available to enhance and promote personal hygiene. KMC Municipal The KMC task force was formed to respond to the COVID19 emergency regulations and has Security Task Force experienced challenges of inadequate supply of logistics and mobility. ThereGCAA is Corporatestrong News Vol. 3, issue 4 October – December 2015 intersectoral collaboration between the various security apparatus in the region. Visited on 6th June 2020 To prevent the spread of the virus, the task force installed 320 hand washing stations in the municipality and sensitized people on how to wash hands. The task force has also undertaken other tasks such as fumigation of the markets and parks, sensitization of the public on COVID-19 including use of posters, provided 1000 face masks to Red Cross volunteers and launched production of 50,000 local face masks by tailors. The task force has also distributed 4000 bags (@35kgs) of rice and is working with government to distribute government food to the target households. In collaboration with security forces, KMC task force has been enforcing social distancing measure in the markets.

Some challenges met include: - Lack of training on COVID-19, infection, prevention and control. - Lack of mobility- no vehicles and fuel for effective patrols. Foot patrols are undertaken around the markets to enforce social distancing regulation. - Difficult in enforcing social distancing measures especially in congested markets such as Serekunda and Latrikunda and more support from the security is needed. Alternatives market sites have been identified to decongest the markets and KMC will work with security to move the vendors to the new markets while respecting human rights.

KMC leaders were informed the mission team to collaborate with security in porous fish landing sites that are likely to be used for smuggling people and goods into the country by reporting/sharing timely information of all cases reported by the communities.

Recommendations: - Strengthen collaboration with central government and security sector in order to effectively enforce emergency measures - Develop strategy for the decongestion of the markets - All market entry and exit areas to have handwashing stations and enforcement done. GCAA Corporate News Vol. 3, issue 4 October – December 2015 - All people using the markets to use face masks or be denied entry. - Distribution of face masks to go hand in hand with sensitization. People to be encouraged to buy own masks. Banjul City Council Unlike other regions, there is no municipal/regional security taskforce in Banjul but collaboration with the security agencies is cordial. The city council has always relied on the Visited on 6th of June security officers when security issues in the city need attention, especially with the onset of 2020 COVID-19. Banjul is vulnerable to illegal border crossing as most of water borders are porous, but the city council has no capacity to secure the border points against smugglers and illegal crossings and rely on the national security for which collaboration can be improved. The office of the Mayoress has a COVID-19 response task force responsible for food distribution, fumigation of markets, distribution of handwashing stations, public sensitization on COVID- 19, among others. Challenges include:

Absence of a security task force to guide response on security issues related to COVID- - 19, including capacity to secure the border points against smugglers and illegal

crossings.

- Lack of collaboration between Banjul City Council and National Government. BCC observed that there are no consultations by the central government on issues related to COVID-19 response, yet BCC understands issues better as people’s representatives. One example given was the government food distribution that did not involve BCC. - The disconnect between the national government and BCC affects coordination and collective response to the pandemic. - The securities at the Denton bridge are prone to covid19 infection because they search vehicles without PPES and interact with people. - The municipality has not received any funding since covid19 emergency regulation. No member of the municipality has received covid19 training The Banjul City Council recommended engagement and participation of municipalities/local structures in COVID-19 response. It also suggested participation of Civil GCAA Corporate News Vol. 3, issue 4 October – December 2015 Society Organizations (CSOs) in national security task force activities such as this national tour. Recommendations - More collaboration between BCC and national government is needed - Sensitization and enforcement of social distancing and other measures is needed at the ferry. People still don’t believe the virus exist, making it difficult to enforce the measures.

GCAA Corporate News Vol. 3, issue 4 October – December 2015