october 1935

Jugoslavia in Transition

Hamilton Fish Armstrong

Volume 14 • Number 1

The contents of Foreign Affairs are copyrighted.©1935 Council on Foreign Relations, Inc. All rights reserved. Reproduction and distribution of this material is permitted only with the express written consent of Foreign Affairs. Visit www.foreignaffairs.com/permissions for more information. JUGOSLAVIA IN TRANSITION

TPtoECENT events in Jugoslavia deserve to be recorded because they mark the first instance in which one of the Jf^ postwar European dictatorships has turned back to democratic processes in the attempt to solve pressing domes tic problems. The circumstances which induced the late King Alexander to were too try dictatorship special for the abandonment of that dictatorship to carry immediate implications for other countries. But the proceeding is in structive none the less. on King Alexander proclaimed his dictatorship January 6, 1929. He had come to believe, after trying to cope for more than ten years with the cease a less wrangling of Serb and Croat politicians, that continuance of parlia mentary government would destroy the unity of the Jugoslav state, jeopardize the Karageorgevitch dynasty and make it impossible for him to defend national on not interests against enemies several frontiers. He did share the pretentious nor ideology of the Fascist and Nazi dictators, did he assume supreme power at moment in order to satisfy his personal vanity. He simply chose what the seemed to him, rightly or wrongly, the less risky of two risky courses. It is no a secret that he considered his dictatorship temporary expedient, and that a he several times made plans for gradual restoration of political liberty. In deed, one of his intimate collaborators, Dr. Perovitch, who now serves with Prince Paul as a member of the Regency, was busy at the moment of the Mar a seilles assassination (October 9, 1934) with project of law which would have as extended the jurisdiction and authority of the provincial governments the basis for a reconciliation of sectional groups within the state and a step toward the eventual rehabilitation of parliament.1 After Marseilles it was an open question whether those entrusted with power in King Alexander's political testament could exploit the sobering effect of the murder to effect a reconciliation between Serbs and Croats and, while curbing a course a the ambitions of old-line politicians, set and hold for return to con stitutional and representative government. To these doubts Prince Paul, head on on of the Regency which acts behalf of twelve-year-old King Peter, has three separate occasions given a firm answer. We cannot say that the issue is are settled definitively. But at least the intentions of the Regency plain. The first test occurred when Prince Paul successfully resisted the bold re quest of Premier Uzunovitch, made the evening that news of the assassination a reached Belgrade, for delay in the publication of King Alexander's political a came was will establishing Regency. The second test when Prince Paul faced, the day after King Alexander's funeral, with Premier Uzunovitch's demand that he be given a free hand to reform his cabinet. The Premier's obvious aim was to get rid of the ten non-political members introduced into the cabinet by a new the late King Alexander, pack cabinet exclusively with Serbs, and rule with an iron hand. In face of the First Regent's positive attitude this manoeuvre also failed, and eventually the Regency handed the reins of govern a ment to Foreign Minister Jevtitch, trusted servant of the late King. Dr. Jevtitch began well. His cabinet contained a number of non-Serbs; he i Foreign Cf. "After the Assassination of King Alexander," by Hamilton Fish Armstrong, Affairs, January 1935.

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Dr. Matchek from promised free elections; he released prison; and he pro a claimed his intention of following progressive program of decentralization and Serbo-Croat reconciliation. Unfortunately he proved unable to control his as some con colleagues, if indeed his liberal program did not, suspect, undergo siderable modification in his own mind as avenues of greater power seemed to open before him. The candidates which he chose for the spring elections fell far short of proper standards, and the campaign in April and May was marked severe measures by the customary charges of the opposition that repressive was were being used against them. A bad feature the aggravation of regional issues. Dr. Jevtitch put up candidates in every district; but in reality his party was an artificial creation outside Serbia proper. The bulk of the opposition was formed by Dr. Matchek's Croat Peasant Party. In alliance with him were the Serbian Democrats of L. Davidovitch, the Serbian Peasants of Jovan Jovano vitch, and the Bosnian Mohammedans of Mehmed Spaho. The Serbian Radi as cals, greatest of the old Serbian parties, abstained, did the Slovene Clericals of Dr. Koroshetz. on a The election took place May 5. The Jevtitch candidates received total of 1,747,037 votes, while the combined opposition received 1,076,346. Accord ing to the terms of the electoral law, this gave Jevtitch 303 deputies and the opposition 67 deputies. The latter protested violently about election abuses and was a decided to boycott Belgrade. Clearly what threatened resumption of the fatal stalemate of the long years when the Croat Peasant deputies remained away from Belgrade, while the Serbo-Croat rift grew wider and wider. In the new Parliament a savage attack was launched against Dr. Matchek a by government supporters. In particular deputy named Banitch revived a was charge heard during the campaign that Dr. Matchek "morally responsi ble" for the Marseilles assassination. Obviously it was essential to put an end to such a dangerous state of affairs, and here for the third time the First was Regent's intervention important. General Zhivkovitch, Minister of War and former Premier, announced that since he represented Croatian as well as Serbian soldiers and officers he could not remain in a cabinet which tolerated was such talk among its supporters. He joined by his Croatian and Slovene non-party colleagues and by Dr. Milan Stoyadinovitch, Minister of Finance, a a former leader of the Serbian Radical Party often spoken of as possible factor in some moment of crisis. once Prince Paul at called into conference the principal party leaders, in cluding Dr. Matchek. Apparently he and the Croat leader had a most cordial conversation. Dr. Matchek assured Prince Paul that he had confidence in him personally, and that he supported the dynasty and the national union. He de a enter as con clined to join coalition cabinet and Parliament presently not on new stituted. But he said that he would pass adverse judgment the cabinet to be formed by Dr. Stoyadinovitch, and that later, if and when a new electoral law had been adopted and free elections held, he would come to Bel a grade and participate in parliamentary effort to settle the proper bases of the state organization. The cabinet which Dr. Stoyadinovitch formed reversed the dangerous trend recent Dr. was of months. Koroshetz, the Slovene leader, given the key position of Minister of Justice, and Dr. Spaho, the Bosnian leader who had been an ally 16a FOREIGN AFFAIRS

of Dr. Matchek in the elections, was included, as also were four non-party Croats. Whereas the result of Jevtitch's activity had been to isolate Serbia from the other regions, Stoyadinovitch was able to form a government which included responsible leaders from Bosnia and Slovenia as well as from Serbia. The importance of the friendly meeting between Prince Paul and Dr. new Matchek was emphasized by the government's relaxation of the censor ship and by its request that Parliament give it full powers to amend the electoral law and the laws regulating the press and political meetings. Political rallies were the parties began openly organizing, political held, newspapers" a was reported these events fully, and general amnesty proclaimed for political offenses" connected with the recent elections. In general, both "centralists" and "federalists" gave evidence of having been sobered by the evident decay at a in Jugoslavia's prestige time when European conditions demanded that she be united and strong. We must not conclude that all is now clear sailing. While Dr. Stoyadinovitch, with the collaboration of Dr. Koroshetz and Dr. Spaho, is preparing the new a new electoral law, he is also busy forming nation-wide political party, the "Jugoslav Radical Union." Will he find it feasible and will he consider it as as expedient to hold elections promptly promised? On the other hand, will Dr. Matchek stick to his statement that all he wants is a fair election, when he sees the government using the interval to organize its electoral strength? a to The Croatian psychology is also factor be reckoned with. No matter how sincerely he tries, Dr. Matchek will not easily throw off the traditional Croat habit, developed in Hapsburg days and perfected by Raditch, of asking the maximum in the hope of getting the minimum. Once the elections have been held, will he bring himself to do what neither Raditch nor he ever yet did, to namely state publicly precisely how it is possible satisfy Croatia's legitimate own demand to manage her provincial affairs without damaging the state's political, economic and military unity? Obviously Prince Paul will need all his store of persuasive good sense, all his on one to prudent instinct for compromise, if the hand he is retain the confi dence of Dr. Matchek and persuade him to wait quietly for the right moment to put forward a moderate program, and if on the other hand he is to hold the a government to its avowed intention of preparing and holding fair election, a and then of accepting fair compromise with the Croats. To both sides he can new argue that the European unrest caused by Italy's adventurous foreign an policy, and the possibility that it will induce either attempted Hapsburg restoration in Austria or (an only slightly less obnoxious eventuality, from the a new at Jugoslav viewpoint) German attempt annexation, require that there a be in existence Jugoslav Government able to negotiate abroad in the name of a united people. H. F. A.