The AFRB and China's Subnational Diplomacy in Australia
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Analysis Paper 17 November 2020 A House Divided: The AFRB and China’s Subnational Diplomacy in Australia Salvatore Babones A House Divided: The AFRB and China's Subnational Diplomacy in Australia Salvatore Babones Analysis Paper 17 Contents Executive summary ...............................................................................................1 Introduction: China, Victoria, and the AFRB ..............................................................2 China's global subnational diplomacy .......................................................................4 Victoria's journey onto the 'Belt and Road' ................................................................6 When educational and scientific cooperation become collaboration ...............................8 Conclusions and policy recommendations ................................................................ 10 Endnotes ............................................................................................................ 13 iv Executive Summary Australia is an open society awash in Chinese foreign influence activities that are in any way covert, influence operations, which at times may cross the coercive or corrupt. That is the line that separates lines to constitute foreign interference in Australia’s legitimate influence from unacceptable interference”.2 domestic politics. Some of the most nefarious of these The Attorney-General’s Department actually praises operations take the form of ‘subnational diplomacy’: foreign influence operations that are “conducted in attempts by China to circumvent traditional an open, lawful and transparent manner”, saying international diplomacy by building relationships that they contribute to Australia’s “vibrant and robust directly with Australian state, territory, and local democracy”.3 It takes a very narrow view of foreign governments and associated governmental entities interference as “covert, deceptive and coercive (including state-chartered universities). On August activities intended to affect an Australian political or 27, Prime Minister Scott Morrison announced that governmental process”. Such a strict construction of the government would introduce new legislation the difference between influence and interference , to restore Commonwealth control over Australia’s while perhaps necessary for legal purposes, is rather international relationships at all levels. In the ensuing less helpful as a guide to policy. Even when they press conference, the he explained how his proposed are conducted in a lawful manner, China’s influence Australia’s Foreign Relations Bill (AFRB) would help the operations are never open or transparent, and it is Commonwealth keep tabs on subnational diplomacy doubtful that they ever contribute to a more “vibrant that already involved “more than 130 agreements, and robust democracy”. from 30 countries”. This paper thus examines China’s subnational In fact, these represent only the tip of the iceberg of diplomacy as an attempt to exert influence over Australian governments’ subnational links to foreign Australian politics and society, without attempting governments, which range from grand programs like to make a legal distinction between influence and Victoria’s Belt and Road agreement with China to interference. The AFRB serves as a focal point for the workaday commercial relationships like Hobart’s role exercise. The paper’s first recommendation is that the as a logistics hub for Chinese Antarctic expeditions. AFRB should be amended to require the publication This paper places Australia’s many subnational of subnational government and government entity relationships with China in international perspective agreements with foreign entities, except in a limited before focusing on Victoria’s highly controversial number cases when the filing party convincingly China diplomacy and other states’ and universities’ argues that secrecy is in the public interest. Allowing educational and scientific collaboration with China, subnational governments and government entities including their support for university-based Confucius to continue to do business in the dark is a recipe for Institutes. Reviewing the fitness of the AFRB as a ensuring they continue to be vulnerable to foreign tool for countering Chinese influence and interference influence and interference. The paper’s second operations, the paper presents recommendations for improving its targeting and efficacy. recommendation is that the AFRB should be amended to establish a ‘trusted partners’ list of countries with The Australian government draws a fuzzy line between which arrangements can be made without any need ‘foreign influence’ and ‘foreign interference’, accepting for ministerial approval. Such arrangements might still the legitimacy of some influence operations (but require registration, but they should not be tied up in not others) while consistently condemning political uncertain and potentially time-consuming bureaucratic interference, which it defines as activities that are: processes. Excessive regulation should also not be • carried out by, or on behalf of a foreign actor used as a blunt instrument that prevents universities from cooperating internationally. • coercive, corrupting, deceptive, clandestine In principle, the AFRB is all about protecting • contrary to Australia’s sovereignty, values and Australian sovereignty, without prejudice to any national interests1 particular foreign country. In practice, as nearly every It is not clear whether an action must tick one, commentator has recognised, the AFRB is ‘all about several, or all of the items on this list to be considered China’. For Australia, China is too important to ignore foreign interference by the Australian government. but too dangerous for complacency. Australia has no Speaking in 2017 as prime minister, Malcolm Turnbull choice but to deal with China, but it must do so with proclaimed that Australia “will not tolerate foreign its eyes open, and its values intact. 1 Introduction: China, Victoria, and the AFRB Prime Minister Scott Morrison announced on August placing China at the center of the economic and trade 27 that the government would “introduce new networks of the Afro-Eurasian landmass. Launched in legislation to ensure the arrangements states, late 2013, it theoretically comprises the overland Silk territories, councils and universities have with Road Economic Belt and the seaborne 21st Century foreign governments are consistent with Australian Maritime Silk Road, but in practice it operates as a foreign policy”.4 The new legislation would give the single overarching narrative for nearly all of China’s foreign minister “the power to review any existing geoeconomic diplomacy, spawning a Polar Silk Road, and prospective arrangements between state and a Pacific Silk Road, and even a Latin American Silk territory governments and all foreign governments”, Road. The Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) that under which any arrangements that are “inconsistent Andrews signed with China’s National Development with our foreign policy could be prevented from and Reform Commission (NDRC) chairman He Lifeng proceeding or terminated”. In the ensuing press in 2018 commits Victoria to both branches of the BRI, conference, Morrison explained how his proposed though in such vague language as to represent a Australia’s Foreign Relations Bill (AFRB) would help the broad commitment to supporting China and its global Commonwealth keep tabs on subnational diplomacy, foreign policies, whatever they may be. which already involved “more than 130 agreements, The contents of the October 8, 2018 MOU were 5 from 30 countries”. initially kept secret, until public and political pressure 6 At that press conference, a journalist challenged forced their release more than a month later. The 7 the Prime Minster to name the target or at least the English version of the MOU is so poorly written that concerns that prompted the bill, but Morrison refused it must have been drafted in China, or else by a to take the bait, answering repeatedly that the non-native English speaker working without official laws, and his biggest concern, are about “Australia’s oversight in Victoria. It provides for exchanges, national sovereign interests”. dialogues, “joint researches”, and the like. One provision suggests that the parties may “discuss Of course, the AFRB is all about China, as are a cooperation with a third Party on jointly building panoply of other Commonwealth mechanisms that the Belt and Road, and provide convenience to such have been recently set up to counter potential malign cooperation”, whatever that means. Interestingly, foreign influences on, and interference with, Australian the termination provisions specify that “one Party institutions: should give the other party a written notice through • Australia’s Foreign Relations Bill (AFRB) — under diplomatic channels at least three months in advance”, consideration implying that Victoria has appropriate standing to communicate via diplomatic channels. Given • Foreign Investment Review Board (FIRB) overhaul the amateurism that is characteristic of Chinese — announced June, 2020 diplomacy, it is likely that this language is a holdover • Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and from the standard provisions it uses in its conventional Security (PJCIS) inquiry into foreign interference in sovereign-level agreements, but the implication that Victoria has the sovereign standing to conduct Australia’s universities — under consideration diplomacy