Vietnam and the International War on Drugs

From Counter-Insurgency to Narco-Insurgency: Vietnam and the International War on Drugs

Jeremy Kuzmarov

Journal of Policy History, Volume 20, Number 3, 2008, pp. 344-378 (Article)

Published by Penn State University Press

For additional information about this article http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/jph/summary/v020/20.3.kuzmarov.html

Access Provided by CAPES-FundaÃ§Ã£o CoordenaÃ§Ã£o de AperfeiÃ§oamento de Pessoal de NÃ-vel Superior at 06/15/11 2:56AM GMT jeremy kuzmarov From Counter-Insurgency to Narco-Insurgency: Vietnam and the International War on Drugs

If we have found we cannot be the world’s policeman, can we hope to become the world’s narc? —H. D. S. Greenway, Life Magazine, October 19721

In the January 1968 issue of the Washingtonian magazine, the son of the great American novelist John Steinbeck made his professional journalistic debut with the publication of a controversial article, “Th e Importance of Being Stoned in Vietnam.” John Steinbeck IV, who served as a roving correspondent for the Paciﬁ c Stars and Stripes, wrote that marijuana of a potent quality was grown naturally in Vietnam, sold by farmers at a fraction of the cost than in the United States, and could be obtained “more easily than a package of Lucky Strikes cigarettes.” He estimated that up to 75 percent of soldiers in Vietnam got high regularly. “Th e average soldier sees that for all intents and purposes, the entire country is stoned,” Steinbeck observed. “To enforce a prohibition against smoking the plant [in Vietnam] would be like trying to prohibit the inhalation of smog in Los Angeles.”2 Although his words were evocative, Steinbeck exaggerated the scope of drug abuse in Vietnam for political purposes. He had been arrested on marijuana charges upon return to his native California and wanted to point out the hypocrisy of government policies targeting those who had fought for their country in Vietnam.3 Military psychiatrists working closest to the situation later determined that between 30 percent and 35 percent of American

Th e author wishes to thank David C. Engerman, William O. Walker III, Michael Willrich, Clark Dougan, and the two additional anonymous reviewers for their excellent sugges- tions and insights in shaping this article, as well as Dr. Roger Roﬀ man, Dr. Jerome H. Jaﬀ e, and other veterans of the war who took time to speak with me.

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gis likely used marijuana—largely on an experimental basis and to escape the harrowing social conditions of the war.4 Th e media nevertheless largely bought into Steinbeck’s infl ated fi gures and became fl ooded with articles pointing to the ravaging eff ects of drug use in combat, even though predominantly this was rare.5 Th ey oft en used sensationalistic rhetoric, including reference to “epidemics” and “plagues,” as well as Orientalist stereotypes depicting drugs as a foreign corrupting agent, resulting in a rise in public support for an escalation of federal drug-control measures—particularly in the international realm.6 In May 1971, Newsweek columnist Stewart Alsop went so far as to proclaim that drug use during the war was worse than the My-Lai massacre, which Senator Th omas J. Dodd (D-Conn.) had previously tried to blame on marijuana.7 Public hysteria over drug abuse in Vietnam—and its pronounced political consequence—has generally been ignored in the academic litera- ture on the War on Drugs, which has focused more on domestic political developments and the pathologies of the Nixon White House.8 Writing from a predominantly liberal disposition, many analysts reason that the drug war emerged as a product of the Conservative backlash toward the hippie counterculture and the sociocultural tensions of the 1960s.9 Others contend that conservatives manipulated public opinion on the drug issue through infl ated statistics in order to push forward a social agenda focused on expanding law enforcement at the expense of social welfare programs.10 Th ese arguments are compelling and demonstrate how the War on Drugs has been adopted to serve important political ends while ushering in what deputy drug czar, John Walters (1989–93), characterized as a “conservative cultural revolution.”11 Th ey nevertheless neglect the broader global context and impact of the crisis in Vietnam in exacerbating popular anxieties over drugs and in shaping a shift in governmental priorities. On June 17, 1971, in the face of mounting domestic protest and the release of a congressional report claiming—exaggeratingly as it turned out—that 10 percent to 15 percent of gis were addicted to high-grade heroin supplied by cia allies, Nixon offi cially declared a War on Drugs. He called drug abuse “public enemy number one in America.”12 Escalating the budget for domestic treatment and enforcement, Nixon stepped up eff orts to train foreign police in the so-called Golden Triangle (encompassing northern Th ailand, Laos, and South Vietnam) and implemented aerial spraying and crop substitution campaigns more extensive in scope than in Mexico. Nixon further enacted a highly controversial urinalysis program in the military accompanied by a rehabilitation regiment for those caught with positive samples. Th ese initia- tives were all designed to curb the spread of addiction in the Armed Forces,

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assuage public fears about the return of addicted gis to the United States, and silence charges of governmental complicity in the international drug traﬃ c, which had become the source of pronounced political embarrassment.13 Nixon’s policies also had broader implications in providing the groundwork for his “Vietnamization” program, which sought to shift the burden of ﬁ ghting to the U.S.-dependent South Vietnamese allies. Although neglected by historians, the Southeast Asian drug war of the early 1970s, intricately connected to America’s involvement in Vietnam, served in retrospect as a watershed in U.S. foreign narcotics policy in terms of the breadth of federal commitment and the scope of its programs.14 It further exposed the limits of American international policing and the nation’s universal approach to foreign policy more broadly by arousing popular animosity and resistance and failing to curb supply rates.

the “addicted army” and escalation of the southeast asian drug war

Since the beginning of the twentieth century, the United States had been at the vanguard among Western nations in promoting global drug- control eff orts through diplomatic means as well as the United Nations, largely as an extension of its domestic policing program. From 1930 until 1962, Harry J. Anslinger was particularly infl uential as head of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics (fbn) in making drug control an important aspect of American national security policy and in increasing the presence of U.S narcotic agents overseas.15 In 1962, in a deal that would set a precedent for the future, the Kennedy administration provided Mexico with $500,000 worth of helicopters, light planes, jeeps, and rifl es through the Agency of International Development (aid) for a special narcotic destruction campaign targeting marijuana and opium growers.16 During the mid-1950s, the Federal Bureau of Narcotics (fbn) fi rst established bureau posts in Southeast Asia because of an interest in curbing the source of supply from the region. Following the French defeat at Dien Bien Phu in 1954, fbn agents began to investigate the alleged involvement of the Communist Viet Minh in traffi cking opium from Laos, which actually paled before the deeper participation of American allies in Th ailand.17 Th e infl ux of American troops in South Vietnam during the early 1960s reinforced administrative concerns about the availability of illicit narcotics. Th e most widely used intoxicant in Vietnam was marijuana of a high potency, which grew wild in the countryside.18 Many farmers sold the drug through local

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retailing merchants, oft en in packs of Parker Lane and Kent cigarettes. Th ey could be purchased for 400 Vietnamese piasters or $1.50—an unheard of price by American standards. “Marijuana in Vietnam is cheap, easy to fi nd— and potent,” remarked one medical psychiatrist, as quoted in U.S. News & World Report. “Th e drug is everywhere. All a person has to do to get it is say the word Khan Sa.”19 Despite the easy availability, soldiers predominantly used drugs on a casual basis and away from the theater of combat. One study found that less than 10 percent of men admitted to the use of marijuana on duty at some time. Within the Air Force, the fi gure was only 2.6 percent.20 Having interviewed more than fi ve hundred military personnel, psychiatrist W. B. Postel found that “the usual habit was to smoke the drug aft er a battle to calm down. Only one person indicated that he smoked while fi ghting.”21 Frank Bartimo, assistant general counsel for the Department of Defense, similarly concluded, “We have very little, about no drug abuse among troops going into the fi eld. Guys who use it say they never do it when they’re going into combat.”22 Marvin Matthiak, an infantryman stationed with the Alpha First Battalion Cavalry Division added, “Th e press has done a tremendous disservice to this country in portraying grunts as being out there doing drugs. As far as I know and as far as everyone else I ever talk to about it, there was essentially no drug use whatsoever in the bush. Everybody knew what the dangers were and nobody was stupid enough to incapacitate themselves.”23 In 1967, as a result of a growing wave of media attention, the Department of Defense formed a special task force on narcotics and commissioned psychiatrist Roger A. Roff man to conduct a study at the Long Binh Jail, where drugs were prevalent despite tightening security. He found that 63 percent of prisoners tried marijuana.24 In a follow-up survey, Roff man and Ely Sapol determined that 28.9 percent of gis stationed in the Southern Corps experimented with marijuana at least once during their tour of duty in South Vietnam, compa- rable to the rate for young adults between the ages of eighteen and twenty-one in the United States.25 Both Roff man and Sapol later testifi ed before Congress about the methodological limits of their study in that subjects might have been reluctant to admit partaking in an illegal activity, though they stressed that they took pains to ensure strict confi dentiality. Both were deeply dismayed by the media’s coverage, which infl ated their data and issued “bombastic statements that 60, 70, 80 or even 90 percent of American troops” were on drugs. “Th e average soldier in Vietnam,” Sapol stated, “is not a drug addict.”26 Subsequent military studies found that approximately 35 percent of soldiers tried marijuana, with only a small percentage recording “heavy” or

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“daily” use. 27 Hard narcotics were used much less, though many gis began smoking a form of heroin known as “scag” in January 1970 aft er the open- ing of transportation routes through Cambodia. Government urinalysis tests recorded a user rate of 5.5 percent.28 Media portrayals made the rate of abuse seem to be far worse and made no distinction between heroin use and abuse.29 Th ey also warned exaggeratingly about addicted soldiers returning to the United States to exacerbate domestic unrest and crime, feeding into a conservative social agenda.30 In June 1971, Time editorialized, “Th e specter of weapons-trained, addicted combat veterans joining the deadly struggle for drugs in the streets of America is ominous.” Quoting Iowa Senator Howard E. Hughes, the article continued, “Within a matter of months in our large cities, the Capone era of the 1920s may look like a Sunday school picnic by comparison!”31 In reality, while the fbi’s crime index was on the increase, less than one-half of one percent of all veterans committed any criminal off enses aft er returning to the United States and generally achieved higher education and income levels than their peers.32 Many engaged, further, in principled dissent against the war, which received scant media coverage, as Jerry Lee Lembcke documents in Th e Spitting Image: Myth, Memory, and the Legacy of Vietnam and was oft en depicted as a product of their supposed psychopathology.33 In 1973, psychiatrist Lee N. Robins of Washington University conducted a series of interviews with Vietnam veterans who had tested positive for heroin and concluded that less than 10 percent used any drugs at all back in the United States–an extraordinarily high remission rate, which she attributed to shift ing social circumstances and their removal from the death-tainted social environment of Vietnam. Only 1.3 percent of those sampled were drug dependent and less than one percent addicted to opiates.34 Ensconced in a culture of fear, the public was falsely imbued with the impression that America’s social fabric was being torn apart at the seams by half-crazed and doped-up soldiers from whom nobody was safe.35 From the military’s perspective, any amount of drug use was intoler- able. Born of a generation that came of age drinking whiskey, rum, and hard alcohol, most career offi cers believed that drug use was a sign of “individ- ual character weakness” and that gis who partook in this activity were unfi t for duty and should be thrown out of the service.36 Lewis Walt, commander of the 3rd Amphibious Marine Division and later assistant commandant of the Marine Corps, referred to drugs in Vietnam as “a contagious disease nearly as deadly as the bubonic plague. . . . Th e only explanation is that our enemy wants to hook as many gi’s as possible.”37 In June 1966, General Walt,

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or “Uncle Lew” as he was aff ectionately known to his troops, wrote a letter to aid representatives stating that opium and marijuana were being sold in Danang and Hoa Phat village near American military bases.38 James E. McMahon, an aid public safety adviser in Danang responsible for law-enforcement training, responded by setting up a meeting with the district chief of police, who assured him of his “personal interest in taking action on this matter.”39 Secretary of State Robert S. McNamara subsequently called for a monthly report on all drug-abuse cases under investigation in the Republic of Vietnam.40 In 1967, as rumors of drug abuse grew stronger, aid’s Offi ce of Public Safety (ops) expanded advisory assistance to the South Vietnamese police, which established a special Narcotics Bureau to coordinate intelligence gathering as well as a pioneering “buy program” designed to stop the fl ow of marijuana into U.S. troop areas.41 Th e cia sometimes staff ed the bureau with counterterror specialists, who used the guise of narcotics control to ini- tiate covert programs like Operation Phoenix, where “hunter-killer” squads worked to decimate the political infrastructure of the National Liberation Front (nlf) through targeted assassination.42 Despite this ulterior function, which fi t a long-standing pattern of collaboration between American counterintelligence and narcotics enforcement offi cers, in 1967, one hundred national policemen were brought to Saigon and given their fi rst formalized narcotics training. Between 1967 and 1971, 1,254 members of the national police received specialized eighty-hour courses of instruction in the investigation and enforcement of narcotic and drug laws.43 In 1968, in the aft ermath of the Tet Off ensive, the Army’s Criminal Investiga- tion Division (cid) developed a special antinarcotics brigade, which received training in undercover work and intelligence gathering from fbn agents stationed in Th ailand.44 Th e Department of Defense simultaneously instructed all unit commanders to “conduct an aggressive program to combat the threat of drug abuse.”45 In select instances, unit commanders allowed Vietnamese prostitutes, or “local national guests,” as they were sometimes referred to as, into military barracks in order to dissuade soldiers from using drugs. Hannah Browning, the outraged wife of a Marine, wrote to her congressional representative, “I don’t want my husband living in a brothel, nor to think of the commanding general as a pimp—horrible but logical.”46 In 1969, as a result of the media’s increasing focus on the problem of drug abuse in the Armed Forces, the ops launched a marijuana destruction campaign in collaboration with the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs (bndd) and the Vietnamese national police. While serving in some instances as a pretext to unleash chemical weapons on suspected guerrilla

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“infested” areas and to force villagers into strategic government controlled “hamlets” by ravaging their food crops, the aim of the program was generally to eradicate the growth of marijuana at the source.47 American helicopters began to conduct fl y-over missions predominantly in the Mekong Delta region, with pilots assigning kill-ratios to the number of crops destroyed.48 According to aid records, they wiped out more than 504,795 marijuana plants (or 27,770 pounds). In most cases, aid offi cials paid farmers one piaster (less than one U.S. cent) for each plant targeted.49 Journalist Richard Boyle aptly commented, “Th e United States is now waging two wars in Vietnam; one against the Vietcong and the other against Mary Jane [slang for marijuana].”50 Th e United States eventually realized that it could not successfully sustain a two-front war. American pilots encountered resistance among farmers who profi ted from the black market economy and sought to protect their water buff alo and crops from errant sprayings. As with the broader crop-destruction program, they reported having to abort several missions aft er being shot at. Besides facing open popular defi ance, the aerial interdiction campaign faced constraints from the military high command.51 In May 1971, Director of Pacifi - cation John Paul Vann sent a memo to senior ops advisers warning them not to spray marijuana growing fi elds in the Chau Doc, An Giang, and Se Dec provinces controlled by the Hoa-Hao sect. He feared alienating them and driving them into the hands of the nlf. Vann viewed the marijuana program as a bane to broader pacifi cation eff orts designed to win over the “hearts and minds” of the South Vietnamese people.52 Although considering the smoking of marijuana to be a “major command problem,” he advocated a “more restrained” crop-substitution program, which was eventually abandoned because of what John Ingersoll, head of the Bureau of Dangerous Drugs and Narcotics (bndd – successor to the fb) termed “higher combat priorities.”53 Coinciding with the collapse of the marijuana destruction campaign, the Department of Defense began to enforce more stringent custom-inspections guidelines and initiated a program to train specialized dogs in detecting the scent of marijuana and later opium.54 Th e vigorous policing tactics, and growth of the cid’s antinarcotics brigade, ultimately led to a near ten- fold surge in arrest rates, with approximately 6,500 soldiers being court marshaled for drug-related off enses in 1971 (compared to fewer than 1,000 in 1968, for example).55 Th e military court system became so jammed with drug cases that Henry Aronson, a lawyer who provided counsel for accused soldiers, commented, “Drug cases have become to the judicial system here [in Vietnam] what automobile accidents have become to the civil courts at home.”56

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Faced with court overcrowding and an overburdened criminal justice apparatus, the Department of Defense in January 1970 adopted a novel amnesty program, which granted prosecutorial immunity and the promise of rehabilitation to soldiers who admitted to using drugs. During the fi rst three months of its implementation, 3,600 Marines took advantage of this policy—though many distrusted the military’s pledge that their permanent records would be unaff ected.57 In winter of 1970, Military Assistance Command (macv) established a special telephone line where gis could get help for drug-related problems and report any drug “tips” to the police.58 Th ey also developed their own drug library, which included antidrug tracts like Donald Louria’s evocatively titled Nightmare Drugs and Gabriel Nahas’s Marihuana: Deceptive Weed.59 As another preventive measure, the military command upgraded several state-of-the-art recreational facilities, including one at Vung Tau off the South China Sea, where gis could go to the beach and enjoy a luxurious whirlpool and sauna.60 Th ey also invited Hollywood entertainers to South Vietnam, including Sammy Davis Jr., who was urged to mix a distinctive antidrug theme with his music.61

smashing an epidemic? operation golden-flow and the military heroin war

More than its predecessors, the Nixon administration played a key role in promoting the international War on Drugs as part of its broader law-and-order campaign. Nixon came to offi ce as part of a Middle American backlash toward the hippie counterculture, which challenged the dominant consum- erist culture of the 1950s and took drugs as a “cultural detoxicant” and form of rebellion.62 Nixon exploited divisions in American society by blaming liberal “permissiveness” for the social upheavals gripping the country, including the “national agony” of Vietnam.63 Because of their symbolic status, drug eradication assumed special signifi cance in Nixon’s attempt to restore traditional moral values and the pre-war status quo. During the 1968 election campaign, he branded drugs as “the modern curse of American youth” akin to “the plagues and epidemics of former years” threatening to “decimate a generation of Americans.”64 In July 1969, aft er winning the presidency, he made a special plea before Congress to expand federal funding for antidrug programs, and in September initiated a sustained interdiction drive on the Mexican border called Operation Intercept.65 He later launched “Operation Cooperation,” in which the United States helped to train more than fi ve hundred Mexican police in narcotics enforcement and supplied special military helicopters and aerial

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surveillance equipment. Th ese were crucial in the destruction of more than twenty thousand opium cultivation sites and eighteen thousand marijuana fi elds through the spraying of herbicidal defoliants. An internal State Depart- ment study later determined that nearly sixty thousand hectares of nontarget vegetation was also aff ected, causing pronounced health and environmental damages, including skin corrosions among poor farmers, the contamination of grazing cattle and natural drinking water, and a devastation of the natural habitat of various endangered animal and fi sh species.66 Domestically, Nixon developed a nationally coordinated drug rehabilitation system, as well as the fi rst federal antidrug police force, which was also used to bolster the internal state security apparatus and target radical and subversive organizations under the pretext that they used drugs.67 Th e urgency of Nixon’s antidrug agenda was hastened by the drug crisis emanating out of Vietnam. As Dr. Jerome H. Jaff e, a pharmacologist at the University of Chicago, appointed by Nixon as the fi rst national director of drug control, put it in a recent interview, “Th e media had helped to create panic on the streets and the government was forced to respond. While programs were in place before . . . the Vietnam War was a deter- mining factor [in shaping the growth of federal drug control policies] and helped to ensure major presidential support.”68 In August 1970, National Security Adviser Henry Kissinger sent Cabinet member Egil “Bud” Krogh on a four-day investigative trip to South Vietnam along with Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird.69 Th e duo visited thirteen fi rebases from the demili- tarized zone along the 17th parallel to Bac Lu in the southern tip of the country and witnessed soldiers smoking marijuana and other illegal drugs almost everywhere they went. Upon return to the United States, Krogh told Nixon, “Mr. President, you don’t have a drug problem in Vietnam, you have a condition.”70 He urged Nixon to “more conspi cuously associate himself with the War on Drugs” and also ordered military commanders to conceal the gravity of the crisis from visiting congressional representatives bent on exploiting it for political benefi t.71 In a secret memo to John Ehrlichman, which refl ected in part the growing hostility of high-ranking White House offi cials to domestic political opposition, he commented, “My Lai, Con Son and drug abuse are the type of issues which ‘radical liberals’ will publicize in their eff orts to undermine the war. I think the U.S. command in South Vietnam is well aware of these problems created by unlimited disclosure of sensitive, embarrassing information to hostile Congressional types.”72 In May 1971, the public relations fallout surrounding the crisis of the “addicted army” reached a high point following the release of a sensational

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congressional report claiming that between 10 percent and 15 percent of American soldiers were addicted to heroin. Authors Morgan F. Murphy (D-Ill.) and Robert H. Steele (R-Conn.) traced the roots of this “epidemic” to the corruption of American allies in the Golden Triangle and to a sharp decline in military morale. Steele later recanted on the original fi gures, claiming that 5 percent was more realistic.73 Th e report nevertheless ignited a potent political controversy, which was intensifi ed following the publication of Alfred W. McCoy’s well-researched expose Th e Politics of Heroin in South- east Asia, which confi rmed allegations of cia complicity in the global drug trade.74 Both studies gave strength to public demands for the withdrawal of American troops from Vietnam—based in part on the desire to shield them from the ravages of addiction—while also promoting support for an expansion of the international War on Drugs. In a June 1971 speech before the New Hampshire Bar Association, Sena- tor Edmund Muskie (D-Me.) captured the prevailing mood in declaring, “If it is in the interest of our national security to save the people of Vietnam from Communism,” it is also in our national interest to “save our own citizens from the devastation of heroin addiction. . . . Th e fi rst step must be to withdraw our troops by the end of this year.”75 Senator William Proxmire (D-Wisc.) told Congress one year later that “the drug problem alone” was “suffi cient reason to get us out. Th e war in Southeast Asia is not worth a single drug addicted American.”76 Seymour Halpern (R-N.Y.) added that he had become convinced that “the American people were more ‘turned off ’ by the war because of the drug problem than for any other reason. Th ey have more fear of their sons becoming drug addicts than being shot. Th is is refl ected by so many parents who come to me as Congressman, who emphasize fears of their youngsters becoming addicts.”77 Top Nixon presidential aides by this time were weary of the political ramifi cations of the drug crisis in Vietnam, as popular support for the war reached a nadir. Aft er receiving an advance copy of the Murphy-Steele report on the eve of its release, Special Counselor to the President Donald Rumsfeld phoned Steele, a former cia agent, and pleaded with him to moderate his tone before the media and withhold any damning information pertaining to America’s geopolitical alliance with traffi ckers.78 Th e State Department and cia later engaged in a concerted public relations campaign to discredit McCoy, then a twenty-six-year-old Yale graduate student, as a “knee-jerk opponent of U.S. foreign policy” and “black sheep gone astray,” and even tried to convince Harper & Row to suppress publication of his book.79 Th is in spite of disclosure by cia operative Edgar “Pop” Buell that he

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oversaw the cultivation of opium by American-backed Hmong tribesman in Laos and the fact that an internal government study concluded that “local offi cials of whom we are in contact have been or may still be involved in the drug business.”80 cia Director Richard Helms publicly proclaimed, nevertheless: “It is arrant nonsense that the cia is somehow involved in the drug traffi c. As fathers, we are as concerned about the lives of our children and grandchildren as the rest of you, while as an agency we are engaged in tracing the foreign roots of the narcotics scourge.”81 Egil Krogh had previously instructed the State Department and Department of Defense to deny knowledge of the corruption of American allies and to openly declare that there was “not suffi cient basis to believe that the allegations [of administrative support for drug traffi ckers] were true.”82 Krogh also privately urged Nixon to “take more eff ective measures” and develop a “mandate for action” against drugs in order to curb public criticism of his foreign policy.83 Heeding this advice, Nixon undertook a major eradication campaign in South Vietnam, in addition to expanding domestic policing eff orts. On June 3, 1971, Nixon had convened a meeting in the White House with top military and civilian leaders in which he expressed concern that Vietnam veterans were popularly perceived to be “ruthless killers” and “junkies” and that “this image must be changed.”84 Two weeks later, he declared a national state of emergency surrounding drugs and appropriated $50 million to Dr. Jaff e as the new drug czar to establish a urinalysis program for all departing gis, which was dubbed “Operation Golden-Flow.”85 Soldiers who tested positive were medevacked to newly created rehabilitation facilities at Long Binh and Cam Ranh Bay for a fi ve- to seven-day period, where they were treated through group counseling and methadone, a synthetic narcotic substitute deemed capable of weaning patients off heroin.86 Th e House Appropriations Com- mittee later approved $17.1 million toward the construction of twenty-eight specialized Veteran Administration (va) rehab clinics, where gis could continue their treatment upon return to the United States. Th e va had previously refused to assist veterans thought to be using drugs.87 In June 1972, the Department of Defense began to administer urinalysis testing to randomly selected units and extended “Golden-Flow” to troop displacements in Th ailand, Japan, Korea, and West Germany, where senior White House offi cials warned that institutional lethargy toward drug abuse was helping to create a “European Vietnam.”88 By the end of 1972, Dr. Jaff e boasted that the program was responsible for limiting the scope of heroin use to under 2 percent from just over 5 percent at its peak, and thought that he had made a contribution to science equivalent to the discovery

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of the X-Ray and a cure for tuberculosis!89 Assistant Secretary of Defense Dr. Richard S. Wilbur subsequently proclaimed that “Golden-Flow” had helped to “smash the gravest disease epidemic in modern military history— virtually overnight!”90 Not everyone shared in Wilbur’s enthusiasm. Dr. Carl A. Segal resigned his offi cer’s commission because he thought that the tests were unethical and a violation of personal liberty.91 Sociologist Paul Starr chronicled a culture of resistance by gis placed in rehabilitation centers against their will. Many saw them as “ineff ective, badly run, based on a simplistic view of drug use and designed to save political face.”92 Th ey oft en refused to participate in therapy sessions run by the same authorities responsible for prosecuting the war, and attempted to defy the system through acts of insubordination and violence. Th e culprits were oft en placed in solitary confi nement and eventually forced into handcuff s on the plane ride back to the United States in a vivid refl ection of the deep internal divisions plaguing the Armed Forces at this time and the climate of rebellion among lower-ranking “grunts.”93 From the perspective of those it was designed to assist, the rehabilitation system was hence not nearly as successful or enlightened as Jaff e and his backers claimed. Th ey lacked the foresight to recognize that the only likely solution to the drug problem—given how wedded it was to the social environment of the war—was the unilateral withdrawal of American troops. Dr. Norman Zinberg of Harvard Medical School commented, “Unfortu- nately, the possibility that going home is more eff ective therapy [for the gi] than any treatment program now available is scarcely considered.” Perhaps, he added, “because then no agency or class of professionals could claim him as their success.”94 For all its shortcomings, nevertheless, which were legion, “Operation-Golden-Flow” played an important political role for the Nixon administration in proving its resolve in fi ghting drug abuse. Nixon received positive press coverage, as well as numerous letters from citizens praising his commitment toward solving a crisis some Americans viewed as the “gravest facing their generation,” as one Maine woman put it in a letter to Senator Muskie.95 Th is was crucial coming at a time when his administration faced intense criticism for failing to abide by its 1968 campaign promise of “peace with honor” and furthering the devastation in large parts of Indochina (including Laos and Cambodia).96 In many ways, Nixon’s drug policies refl ect what the historian Joan Hoff has found to be Nixon’s hidden pragmatism and uncanny ability to bounce back politically from scandal and the abuse of power, which marred his presidency, in part by tapping into popular anxieties to his benefi t.97 He was successful in turn in advancing

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grass-roots support for the conservative movement, whose main goal was to restore public conﬁ dence in the nation’s capacity for global power, and transcend the social crisis of the 1960s, for which drugs provided a potent symbol.98

“vietnamization” of the war on drugs

For Nixon, Vietnam was always a sideshow that detracted from his grander ambition of easing Cold War tensions through détente and gaining international acclaim for promoting world peace. In the face of mounting protest against the war, including from U.S. troops, Nixon craft ed the “Vietnamiza- tion” strategy, which called for a shift in the fi ghting burden to the South Vietnamese Army (arvn) and the renewal of “nation-building programs.” It was designed to help salvage American credibility without sacrifi cing any of its strategic interests, while at the same time minimizing public dissent.99 Unrecognized to many historians, Nixon’s escalation of the international War on Drugs was a central dimension to Vietnamization. Its primary aim, besides bolstering the public reputation of the U.S. Armed Forces and easing public anxieties about the return of addicted vets, was to improve the image of the South Vietnamese government so as to allow for its political sustainability.100 Nixon was fi ghting an uphill battle due to revelations of widespread human rights abuses and systematic torture. Th is was in addition to the connection with drug traffi cking, which was fi rst exposed by the radical Ramparts magazine and eventually in the mainstream press.101 In mid-1970, Nixon had begun applying diplomatic pressure on President Nguyen Van Th ieu to crack down on this problem, which congressional opponents of the war likened to an “infectious cancer.”102 In May 1971, aft er the release of the Murphy-Steele report, Congress included a provision in the Foreign Assistance Act requiring the president to cut off military and economic aid to any country determined to be uncooperative in narcotics control and to petition international development organizations, including the World Bank, to deny monetary assistance.103 In a secret meeting, Ameri- can ambassador Bunker and General Creighton Abrams threatened to break ties with Th ieu if he did not comply with the new regulations. Bunker told him, “In all frankness, no one can assure that the American people will continue to support Vietnam or the Congress will vote the hundreds of millions required for economic assistance next year and in the following years, if this situation continues.” Bunker added, “You are well aware that the American press is now fi lled with articles about the heroin traffi c in Vietnam and the

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involvement of high offi cials. A more concentrated eff ort is required by your government as a whole to penetrate the upper level of the narcotic traffi cking organizations.”104 Aft er being issued the ultimatum, Th ieu launched a sustained antidrug off ensive under the leadership of Admiral Chung Tan Cang, a former class- mate at Saigon’s merchant marine academy, who replaced twenty-fi ve police chiefs throughout the countryside and ten out of eleven precinct commanders in Saigon.105 Admiral Chung also issued an order to have more than three hundred corrupt offi cers dismissed from Tansonhut airport and to fi re several prominent offi cials linked to the drug traffi c, which critics viewed as a public relations ploy to protect Th ieu’s inner ruling circle from exposure.106 Tran Van Tuyen, a deputy in Th ieu’s cabinet who led an anticorruption drive, commented cynically, “Eradication was done with reluctance [by Th ieu] in order to gag the press so that he and a group of protégés could continue to exploit the anti-Communist struggle to get rich upon the toil and blood of the people.”107 Irrespective of the true motives, following the purges, Admiral Chung helped to create a special Joint Narcotics Investigation Division (jnid) to coordinate all police interdiction in conjunction with former cia operative Byron Engle, head of the ops.108 In the fall of 1971, sixty-seven jnid offi cers were sent to the United States for intensive counter-narcotics training. New members were outfi tted with modernized law enforcement equipment, including off shore patrolling boats capable of intercepting Th ai fi shing traw- lers, which regularly smuggled heroin into the country, and Marquis Reagent testing kits, which held the capability of positive “on the spot” identifi cation of narcotic substances.109 Receiving more than $2 million in foreign aid, jnid offi cers became known for their ruthlessness and corruption.110 Th ey nevertheless nabbed several high-profi le traffi ckers, including portly Saigon fi nancier Tap Vinh, and, according to U.S. data, seized 14,269 marijuana cigarettes as well as 23,656 vials of heroin and contributed to an estimated 70 percent increase in arrest rates. Th e street price of heroin subsequently rose from $1.50 to $9 per gram.111 On June 17, 1971, Th ieu initiated a “Vi-Dan campaign to eradicate social evils,” which included a major focus on narcotics.112 In Phu-Bon, located in II Corps, provincial chiefs organized a massive parade to celebrate the com- memoration of a special “anti-narcotics day” in which banners, posters, and placards were raised depicting the evils of drugs and speeches were made denouncing them as the “fi rst enemy of the South Vietnamese nation.” In a symbolic act, local residents burned a dummy labeled “heroin” in effi gy in the town center.113 On August 12, 1972, Th ieu issued a decree mandating a life

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sentence for the importation of opium, morphine, or heroin and the death penalty for members of organized traﬃ cking syndicates.114 Th e new laws were promoted in a public relations campaign funded by the ops. One emblematic poster pictured a sad man sitting in a tiny and decrepit jail cell under the headline, “One day in jail equals 1000 days in freedom. Don’t sell Heroin to American gis.”115 Th ieu sought to portray himself through these ads as a champion of drug prohibition—ready to dole out swift justice to anyone caught selling heroin. Reliant on U.S. military support and foreign aid for survival, as his vice president openly admitted in a 1977 interview, Th ieu faced few alternatives.116 Th e State Department had come under intense public pressure to clean up the image of American allies and curb the spread of drug abuse in the military as a precondition for implementing their “Vietnam- ization” strategy and preserving the war eﬀ ort. Th ey were also desperate to smooth over the scandal surrounding the cia, which the South Vietnamese drug war was in part designed to counteract.

“internationalization of american criminal justice”: the war on drugs in thailand

For political and security reasons, the State Department extended its narco- insurgency into the notorious Golden Triangle, which was a major source base for the opium imported into South Vietnam. Th e United States enjoyed a particularly close relationship with the Th ai ruling dictatorship, which agreed to cooperate with the War on Drugs in return for aid in crushing an incipient guerrilla insurrection.117 During the late 1960s, the ops began advisory training of the 7th subdivision of the Th ai national police in narcotics enforcement and intelligence gathering in an attempt to curb the source of supply reaching American gis. Th ey also formed a police aerial reinforce- ment unit, which was intended to enhance customs and border patrol, while sometimes providing a camoufl age for cia operations into neighboring Laos and Vietnam.118 As the drug crisis in Vietnam intensifi ed, Nixon increased the number of federal narcotics agents in Th ailand from fi ve to eleven. On August 4, 1971, Egil Krogh visited with Th ai offi cials and issued a memo to State Depart- ment offi cials calling for an “all out war to disrupt those supplying American troops” with drugs.119 On September 28, 1971, American ambassador Leonard Ungar helped broker a pact, in which the United States agreed to send Black Hawk helicopters to bolster the drug enforcement capacities of the Royal Th ai police, which had received previous U.S. monetary assistance under ops programs for what it termed domestic “security purposes.”120 A congressional

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investigation later uncovered that much of the American drug war aid continued to fulfi ll these ends and was funneled toward fi nancing the repres- sive policing apparatus of the Th ai government, which frequently carried out spot executions and torture.121 In October 1971, Prime Minister Th anom Kittikachorn fi red the deputy commander of the national Police, Colonel Pramuel Vanigbhandu, and Paesert Ruchirawongse, director general of the national police. Both had been publicly linked to drug traffi cking networks in a series of articles appearing in the Bangkok Daily Post. Colonel Pramuel later turned up at Water Reed Hospital in Washington, D.C., where he claimed to be suff ering from mental problems.122 In 1972, the State Department helped to develop a mobile task force to crack down on drug smuggling in loosely policed zones in the northern part of the country. Within a few months, the Th ai police had a total of thirty-seven offi cers on active duty and seized upward of 4,720 kilograms of opiates.123 Th ey also landed several high-profi le arrests, including William Henry Jackson, an African American veteran indicted for smuggling heroin in the coffi ns of dead soldiers, and Burmese warlord Lo Hsing-Han, who senior U.S. narcotics adviser Nelson Gross termed “an international bandit responsible for a growing proportion of Asia’s and America’s drug caused miseries.”124 Th e cia proclaimed Lo’s capture to be a “major step forward in the War on Drugs,” though in reality it enabled rival Khun Sa (aka Chiang Chi Foo) to take over his market share and emerge as the most powerful opium warlord in the Golden Triangle—without any major eff ect on supply.125 Crop substitution was an important element of the drug war in Th ailand and was tied to broader economic development programs designed to inculcate pro-American sentiments among the indigenous population and improve their living conditions. As part of the 1971 agreement, Ambassador Ungar pledged to donate $5 million to encourage the growth of maize, corn, peaches, and kidney beans as an alternative to opium.126 Th e Department of Agriculture later established a specialized research center at Chiang Mai and, with un backing, two fruit and nut experimental centers on opium- growing sites in the Doi Suthep Mountains.127 In July 1972, the State Department brokered a resettlement program for Chinese Guomindang (kmt) soldiers under the command of General Li Wen-Huan. Th e kmt had become major opium traders aft er losing fi nancial support from the cia following a failed Bay of Pigs–style reinvasion of the Chinese mainland during the early 1960s.128 In return for land, citizenship, and 20.8 million baht (almost $1 million), they agreed to burn twenty-six tons of opium in a ceremony witnessed by two State Department envoys and a forensic chemist. It was later uncovered

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that they substituted horse fodder for opium.129 Th is fi asco exemplifi ed the ineff ectiveness of American drug-control eff orts in Th ailand, which nevertheless endured through the reinstitution of democracy in 1973 and the bloody U.S.-supported 1976 Kittikachorn counter-coup.130

“poppies, pipes, and people”: the war on heroin in laos

Th e State Department enacted its most sustained drug-control program in Laos. Th roughout the 1960s, the United States had kept a “hands-off policy” on narcotics control according to internal government documents because American allies fi ghting a secret war under cia tutelage, including Hmong chief Vang Pao, were heavily involved in the opium traffi c. Legendary cia operative Anthony Poshepny (aka Ton Poe), best known for providing rewards for the capture of enemy ears, bluntly told journalist Roger Warner years later, “You could have a war against Communism or a war against drugs, but you couldn’t have both.”131 Following the publication of the Murphy-Steele report, the State Depart- ment began levying greater pressure on the Royal Lao government (rlg) for reform.132 In November 1971, the rlg implemented a federal decree making illegal the importation of acetic anhydride, an essential element in the production of heroin. Under U.S. pressure, they further banned the production, sale, and consumption of opium, which was known locally as “khai,” or fl ower medicine.133 Th e new bills sparked vocal opposition and were highly unpopu- lar because opium was for centuries an important cash crop in Laos and was used for medicinal, spiritual, and holistic purposes.134 In January 1972, the bndd nevertheless helped to form a special police unit capable of enforcing the government’s edict.135 By August, several American-trained teams headed by the Lao chief of intelligence conducted raids of known refi neries in Ban Houei Sai, Luang Prabang, and in the capital of Vientiane.136 In January 1973, the bndd stationed two full-time agents in Vientiane and provided customs offi cers with jeeps, boats, and walkie-talkies for narcotic enforcement purposes. Th ey further organized a vigorous system of cargo inspection at Wat- tay airport in Vientiane resulting in several major arrests.137 On the whole, the Nixon administration procured over $2.9 million toward the Laotian drug war, some of which was diverted toward pure military and counterinsurgency ends. Part of Nixon’s budget went toward the development of a drug rehabilitation program to treat Lao heroin addicts, including soldiers, which resulted from the growth of the refi nery industry.138 In 1972, usaid funded two major clinics in Wat Th am Ka Bok and Vientiane

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providing methadone treatment to addicts mixed with Buddhist spirituality and prayer.139 Dr. Jaff e later advocated that aid turn all opium parlors into methadone centers.140 Th ese programs served as a latch-ditch eff ort at nation- building by American policymakers, who saw them as a means of pro moting goodwill and showing the benign intent of U.S. foreign policy. Th ey also exemplifi ed the interplay between foreign and domestic policy and mis- sionary-like drive of the “methadone king” (as Jaff e was nicknamed) and his contemporaries to curb the global “scourge” of drug abuse using the latest scientifi c innovation. Th is was notwithstanding the contradiction that heroin in Laos was a direct by-product of American foreign policy and the social ravages of the war. Th e public health model that Jaff e espoused was generally oversha dowed by more widely publicized eradication eff orts. In March 1972, the State Department contemplated bombing an opium refi nery near Ban Houei Sai, which was later destroyed in a mysterious fi re that embassy offi cials claimed was set by the cia. One agent commented, “With bombing, everyone would have known that we did it. With a fi re, people are not sure. It may be a business rival.”141 Th ese comments testify to the important balancing act played by American embassy offi cials, who hoped to placate American public opinion by promoting prohibition while minimizing Laotian popular dissent. Th e State Department likely leaked the fi re plot to the press for public relations purposes and to help exonerate the cia of charges of complicity in the international drug trade. In 1972, the aid began to relocate indigenous families to northern Laos to promote alternative crop development. Th e agency opened an agricultural center in the Phu Pha Dang province headed by community development specialist Gary Alex, where it trained Lao opium producers in vegetable, livestock, and fi sh production.142 Most people were resentful and hesitant to move from their ancestral homeland and farms, to which they were deeply attached. American Ambassador G. McMurtrie Godley, who had been a fer- vent supporter of the “cluster village” program and the extensive bombing campaign accompanying it, himself worried about the political ramifi cations of crop substitution. In a secret memo to Secretary of State William Rogers, he commented, “[Crop substitution] will cause the loss of livelihood, which will hurt us in an attempt to redress the losses caused by the war.”143 Godley nevertheless began to target opium fi elds as part of a vicious bombing campaign that he directed on areas controlled by the Pathet Lao. Th ese operations caused tens of thousands of civilian casualties and a mass exodus of refugees. In 1973, aft er lobbying by two International Voluntary

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Service workers, Fred Branfman and Walter Haney, Massachusetts senator Edward Kennedy chaired a congressional committee to expose the humani- tarian crisis.144 A number of refugees testifi ed that at least fi ft een people had been poisoned to death by chemical herbicides and defoliants sprayed directly on their opium crops by American military aircraft . Th e residue from the spraying had allegedly infested local livestock, papaya plants, and vegetables, which contributed to the spread of disease.145 Ambassador Godley vehemently denied these allegations, though the affi davits appeared convincing and consistent with mounting evidence surrounding the use of toxic defoliants like Agent Orange as part of the broader counterinsurgency campaign.146 By this point in the war, the local population had endured inor- dinately high casualty rates and massive social displacement from political violence, bombing, and the American “cluster village” resettlement program, which was modeled aft er the Strategic Hamlet prototype in South Vietnam.147 By spoiling their crops, threatening their livelihood, and causing more sense- less fatalities, the opium eradication campaign served as another source of both anxiety and peril—and added to the ravages of the “secret war.”

“there is no underworld stigma”: the failure of prohibition

Besides contributing to human rights abuses, the drug war ultimately failed to strike a dent in the fl ow of heroin. One aid offi cial observed that “despite our campaign in Laos being among the most aggressive in the world, there is no control of aircraft movement and the narcotics enforcement machinery cannot challenge senior generals or military politicians wishing to engage in narcotics traffi cking. Nothing could prevent them.”148 Apart from endemic corruption, the shortcomings of the counter-narcotics campaign were predi- cated on similar factors shaping the general failure of U.S. foreign policy, namely, its inability to win over the “hearts and minds” of the indigenous population. Th e State Department and federal enforcement agencies faced grave diffi culties in adapting to local circumstance and convincing local farmers that it was in their best interest to stop growing opium in a depressed wartime economy.149 Chao La, Yao chief of the opiate growing Nam Keung Province bordering Th ailand, told an American reporter that “what the Prot- estant ethic of American society sees as corrupt, others see as fair game. . . . It is hard for my people to understand why they should stop growing opium because they are told that it aff ects Americans thousands of miles away in a strange country.”150 Godley similarly observed that there was “no underworld

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stigma attached to any of the local principals or fetch and carry men who transported drugs through Luang Prabang [in Laos].” In a memo to Washington explaining the diffi culty of U.S. drug-control eff orts, he recoun- ted an incident, which he termed “pathetic,” where Laotian municipal offi cers gave opium to several men they had arrested on drug charges out of fear that they would develop painful withdrawal symptoms. Th e police chief subsequently told him: “We had to fi nd opium for them to smoke, otherwise, because of a strong craving for the drug they would scream, cry or raise a hue.”151 Th ese comments epitomize the deep barriers plaguing drug-control eff orts in Laos, which American policymakers could do little to alter. Th e same was true throughout Southeast Asia. A June 1972 cid staff report concluded that the fl ow of drugs was “so abundant and the distribution through local nationals so pervasive, that eff orts to cut off the supply, even within the military compounds, are like trying to imprison the morning mist.”152 In Th ailand, despite State Department pressure, a joint cia-bndd intelligence report in 1972 concluded that “offi cials of the Royal Th ai army and Customs at checkpoints along the route to Bangkok are usually bribed and protection fees prepaid by the smuggling syndicates. Th e Th ai government has little desire or power to stop this.”153 In Vietnam, the massive social dislocation bred by the war, the rural-to-urban exodus from the bombings and high profi tability of the black-market economy amid infl ationary pressures, and the infl ux of U.S. capital were major factors shaping the ineff ectiveness of Nixon’s programs and the pervasiveness of rampant governmental corruption.154 Despite embassy pressures, U.S. narcotic agents continued to suspect that high-ranking military personnel and jnid offi cers were skim- ming the profi ts of all drug seizures, which one ops adviser evidently concluded “presents a major problem in narcotics investigations.”155 When asked by a New York Times reporter about whether or not he had confi dence in the ability of his new staff at Tansonhut airport to curb smuggling, Colonel Cao Van Khanh tellingly replied with a prompt no.156 In 1973, Ingersoll resigned as head of the bndd because of the perceived futility of existing drug-control eff orts. He told a congressional committee that “a cultural problem in Indo- China” was involved and “entire cultures are not changed overnight.”157 Th ese comments conveyed a patronizing attitude toward Southeast Asian cultures, which lay at the root of the failure of American drug-control programs, as well as a universal belief in the utility of narcotics control that was not necessarily transcending. Th ey also display a disregard for the social circumstances of the war, fueling the durability of the black-market economy and the spread of corruption, trends that were magnifi ed at the end

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of the war as government offi cials (and no less than a few of their American advisers) stashed money in overseas bank accounts in preparation for life in exile.158 From a political standpoint, the War on Drugs was considerably more successful than it was in practice. It helped to bolster the drug- and crime-fi ghting image of the Nixon administration and won support from the so-called forgotten Americans, who were put off by the social upheaval of the previous decade and the nation’s declining global status.159 In August 1971, Krogh furnished a public list of Indochinese offi cials removed or shift ed as a result of investigations in drug traffi cking, which was intended to counter allegations of governmental complicity in the international traffi c.160 In October 1972, Nixon gave a campaign speech providing a point-by-point rebuttal to George S. McGovern’s 1972 campaign charge that the War on Drugs had become a “casualty of the Vietnam War.”161 Nixon frequently boasted further about the vast resources that his government was committing to halt the drug “epidemic” in Vietnam, and publicly claimed that the nation had “turned the corner on drug abuse, rolling up victory aft er victory.”162 Although the reality was far diff erent (the DEA admitted that it was only intercepting 15 percent of all drugs entering the country),163 the American public lacked the fi rsthand knowledge to contradict such statements.

conclusion

Popular fears surrounding the “addicted army” in Vietnam played a central role in shaping the expansion of the American international drug war during the late 1960s and early 1970s. Fearful of skyrocketing military addiction rates, American policymakers initiated a sustained campaign against drugs in South Vietnam and neighboring countries, which implemented an array of methods whose scope dwarfed previous eradication eff orts. Th ese included police training, aerial surveillance and defoliation, and rehabilitation as well as urinalysis and crop substitution. One unique aspect was the skilled use of regional allies to fulfi ll American political aims, which testifi ed in part to the powerful diplomatic leverage that it possessed as well as the dependent character of the regimes involved. In spite of all the expended energies and resources, the American War on Drugs in Southeast Asia ultimately fell short of its stated goals primarily due to economic and cultural factors as well as geopolitical constraints. Convinced of the moral righteousness of the campaign, as in other realms of their foreign policy, American government offi cials failed to account for the localized antipathy and resistance that their policies bred, including from members of their own armed forces. Th ey were also unable

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to recognize or address the sociopolitical factors and wartime conditions fueling the high rates of both supply and demand. From an administrative perspective, practical deﬁ ciencies and the exacerbation of anti-American sentiment were ultimately less important than the political value of the drug war policy in easing public anxieties over the addiction of U.S. soldiers, pav- ing the way for “Vietnamization,” and improving Nixon’s public image. Based on political considerations and the continued fear of drug abuse in the United States, Nixon’s drug-control formula was later adopted by successive admini- strations, which institutionalized the War on Drugs as a crucial dimension of American national security policy. Th is was in spite of the many shortcomings, including the link to extensive human rights violations and the ironic invocation of Vietnam analogies by critics because of a continued failure to curb supply rates.164 From one quagmire to another, one could surmise.

Bucknell University

notes

1. H. D. S. Greenway, “Th e Book the cia Couldn’t Put Down: A Review of the Politics of Heroin by Alfred W. McCoy” Life Magazine, 20 October 1972, cia ﬁ les, RDP80, 2000/05/15 (National Archives, College Park, Md.). 2. See John Steinbeck IV, “Th e Importance of Being Stoned in Vietnam,” Washingtonian Magazine, January 1968, 33–38. 3. John Steinbeck IV, In Touch (New York, 1969), 77. 4. Personal interview, Dr. Roger Roﬀ man, University of Washington, School of Social Work, November 2004 (telephone), M. D. Stanton, “Drugs, Vietnam, and the Vietnam Veteran: An Overview,” American Journal of Drug and Alcohol Abuse (March 1976): 557–70. 5. Jack Anderson, “gi Drug Report Kicks up a Storm,” Washington Post, 3 February 1971, B11; Gloria Emerson, “gis in Vietnam Get Heroin Easily,” New York Times, 25 February 1971, 39; Jack Anderson, “Combat Dangers of gi Drug Abuse Told,” Washington Post, 5 June 1971, D13. 6. Among sensational media pieces, see Arturo Gonzalez Jr., “Th e Vietcong’s Secret Weapon: Marijuana,” Science Digest, April 1969, 17–20, B. Drummond Ayres Jr., “Army Is Shaken by Crisis in Morale and Discipline,” New York Times, 5 September 1971, 1. 7. Stewart Alsop, “Worse than My-Lai” Newsweek, 24 May 1971, 108, Robert M. Smith, “Senator Says gi’s in Song-My Smoked Marijuana Night Before Incident,” New York Times, 25 March 1970, 14, “My-Lai Drug Question Raised” New York Times, 16 March 1970, 24. 8. See, for example, Edward Jay Epstein, Agency of Fear: Opiates and Political Power (New York, 1977); Christian Parenti, Lockdown America: Police and Prisons in an Age of Crisis (London, 1999); Dan Baum, Smoke and Mirrors: Th e War on Drugs and the Politics

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of Failure (Boston, 1996); Musto and Korsemeyer, Th e Quest for Narcotic Control (New Haven, 2002); Michael Massing, Th e Fix (New York, 1998). 9. See, for example, David Lenson, On Drugs (Minneapolis, 1995); James A. Inciardi, Th e War on Drugs: Heroin, Cocaine, Crime, and Public Policy (Palo Alto, 1984; rev. ed., 1996). 10. See, for example, Craig Reinarman and Harry G. Levine, Crack in America: Demon Drugs and Social Justice (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1997); Campbell and Reeves, Cracked Coverage: Television News, the Anti-Cocaine Crusade, and the Reagan Legacy (Durham, 1994); Noam Chomsky, “Drug Policy as Social Control,” in Prison Nation: Th e Warehousing of America’s Poor, ed. Herival and Wright (New York, 2003). 11. Baum, Smoke and Mirrors, 104. 12. Richard M. Nixon, “Special Message to the Congress on Drug Abuse Prevention and Control” 17 June 1971, Public Papers of the President of the United States (Washington, D.C., 1971), 744, Morgan F. Murphy and Robert H. Steele, “The World Heroin Problem,” Report of the Special Study Mission, 92nd Cong., 1st sess., 21 May 1971 (Washington, D.C., 1971), Drug Forum, January 1972, 98. 13. See “Th e cia’s Flourishing Opium Trade” Ramparts, 13 June 1968, 8; Alfred W. McCoy, Th e Politics of Heroin in Southeast Asia, with Cathleen Read and Leonard P. Adams (New York, 1972); “McGovern Calls War on Drugs a Casualty of the Indo-China War,” 18 September 1972, Press Release, Nixon Presidential Materials, Egil Krogh Papers (National Archives, College Park, Md.), box 32, folder 3. 14. One exception to this neglect is Daniel Weimer’s “Seeing Drugs: Th e American Drug War in Th ailand and Burma, 1970–1975” (Ph.D diss., Kent State University, 2003), which looks at these programs through the lens of modernization theory. 15. See John C. McWilliams, Th e Protectors: Harry J. Anslinger and the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 1930–1962 (Delaware, 1990); Walker and Kinder, “Stable Force in a Storm: Harry J. Anslinger and United States Foreign Narcotics Policy, 1930–1962” Journal of American History (March 1986): 908–27. 16. Records of the Presidential Advisory Commission on Narcotics and Drug Abuse, box 1, JFK Presidential Library, Boston; Richard B. Craig, “La Campana Permanente: Mexico’s Anti-Drug Campaign in the 1970s,” Journal of Inter-American Studies and World Aff airs (May 1978): 107–31. 17. “Th e Narcotics Traffi c in Indo-China,” American Embassy Saigon to Depart- ment of State, Washington D.C., 18 May 1954, Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs (National Archive, College Park, Md.), box 164, folder Vietnam, 1953–67 (hereaft er bndd); Wayland Speer to Harry J. Anslinger “Red China and the Narcotic Traffi c— Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia,” 7 July 1954. bndd, box 164, File Vietnam, “Vietnam—Dope Smuggling Mission Contract Plane,” Administrative Inquiry, International Cooperation Administration, Offi ce of Personal Security and Integrity, Inspectors Division, 18 October 1956. On Vietminh involvement, see Christopher E. Goscha, Th ailand and the Southeast Asian Networks of the Vietnamese Revolution, 1885–1954 (London, 1999), 201–4. 18. Steinbeck, In Touch, 132; “Monthly Drug Abuse Report,” Edward G. Lurie, Colonel, MPC, Deputy Provost Marshall, January 1972, Records of the U.S. Army Vietnam, Drug Programs & Plans Branch (National Archives, College Park, Md.) box 4, folder 12 (hereaft er DP&P), “Marijuana in Vietnam,” Major Anthony Pietropinto, Chief Mental Hygiene Consultation Services, Cam Ranh Bay, Vietnam, Drug Abuse, DP&P, box 4.

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19. “Fresh Disclosures on Drugs and gi’s” U.S. News & World Report, 6 April 1970, 32; Hearings on Drug Abuse in the Armed Forces, Part 21 (Washington, D.C., 1971), 278. 20. Allan H. Fischer, “Preliminary Findings from the 1971 Department of Defense Survey of Drug Use,” Human Resources Research Organization, Alexandria, Virginia (March 1972), 41. 21. Wilfred B. Postel, “Marijuana Use in Vietnam: A Preliminary Report,” USARV Medical Bulletin (September–October 1968): 57. 22. Washington Post, 9 August 1970, A3. 23. Interview with Pvt. Marvin Matthiak, Vietnam Archives, Douglas Pike Virtual Vietnam Archive, Texas Tech University, Oral History Project, www.vietnam.ttu.edu. 24. Roger A. Roff man, “Survey of Marijuana Use: Prisoners Confi ned in the USARV Installation Stockade as of July 1, 1967,” In Pike and Goldstein, “History of Drug Use in the Military,” Drug Use in America: Problem in Perspective (Washington, D.C., 1973), “Memo for the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Manpower),” 9 November 1967; DP&P (National Archives, College Park, Md.), box 4, folder 12. 25. Roff man and Sapol, “Marijuana in Vietnam: A Survey of Use among Army Enlisted Men in the Two Southern Corp,” International Journal of the Addictions (May 1970): 15–16; Personal interview, Roger Roff man, University of Washington School of Social Work, 1 November 2004 (telephone); “Drug Abuse—Game Without Winners: A Basic Handbook for Commanders,” Armed Forces Information Services, 1968, Department of Defense, “Report on Drug Abuse in the Republic of Vietnam,” Records of the U.S. Army Vietnam, DP&P, box 4, folder 12. 26. “Alleged Drug Abuse in the Armed Services,” Hearings Before the Special Senate Subcommittee, 91st Cong., 2nd sess., 1277; Personal interview, Dr. Roger R. Roff man, University of Washington School of Social Work, 1 November 2004 (telephone). 27. Casper et al., “Marijuana in Vietnam,” USARV Medical Bulletin, Pamphlet 40 (1968): 60–72; Captain Wilfred B. Postel, “Marijuana Use in Vietnam: A Preliminary Report,” USARV Medical Bulletin (September–October, 1968): 56–59; Black, Owens, and Wolff , “Patterns of Drug Use: A Study of 5,482 Subjects,” American Journal of Psychiatry (October 1970); M. Duncan Stanton, “Drugs, Vietnam, and the Vietnam Veteran: An Overview,” American Journal of Drug and Alcohol Abuse (March 1976): 557–70; Allen H. Fischer, “Analyses of Selected Drug-Related Topics: Findings from Interviews at 4 Armed Service Locations (Alexandria, Va., 1972). 28. Norman Zinberg, “Heroin Use in Vietnam and the United States,” Archives of General Psychiatry (April 1975): 955–96; Department of Defense, “Results of Urinalysis Screening,” Drug Abuse in the Military, Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Drug Abuse in the Military of the Armed Services, U.S. Senate, 92nd Cong., 2nd sess. (Washington, D.C., 1972). 29. Personal interview, Dr. Jerome H. Jaff e, 25 February 2005 (telephone). 30. See Michael Flamm, Law and Order: Street Crime, Civil Unrest, and the Crisis of Liberalism in the 1960s (New York, 2005); Stewart Alsop, “Th e Smell of Death,” Newsweek, 1 February 1971, 76. 31. “Th e New Public Enemy No. 1,” Time, 28 June 1971, 20; see also “Th e gi’s Other Enemy: Heroin,” Newsweek, 24 May 1971, 26; “Th e Heroin Plague: What Can Be Done?” Newsweek, 5 July 1971, 27. 32. See Paul Starr, Th e Discarded Army: Veterans Aft er Vietnam (New York, 1973), 23; Eric T. Dean, Shook Over Hell: Post-Traumatic Stress, Vietnam, and the Civil War (Cambridge, Mass., 1997), 12; Wilbur J. Scott, Th e Politics of Readjustment: Vietnam Veterans

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Since the War (New York, 1993); Louis Harris et al., Myths and Realities: A Study of Attitudes Towards Vietnam Era Veterans (Washington, D.C., 1980); Burkett and Whitley, Stolen Valor: How the Vietnam Generation Was Robbed of Its Heroes and Its History (Dallas, 1998), 72. On rising crime patterns, see Charles E. Silberman, Criminal Violence, Criminal Justice (New York, 1978), 81; Michael Flamm, “Politics and Pragmatism: Th e Nixon Administration,” White House Studies (Spring 2007). 33. See Jerry Lee Lembcke, Th e Spitting Image: Myth, Memory, and the Legacy of Vietnam (New York, 1998), 114; H. Bruce Franklin, “Th e Antiwar Movement We Are Supposed to Forget,” in Vietnam and Other American Fantasies (Amherst, 2000). For an emblematic article-quoting counter-demonstrators who question their credibility at an antiwar rally, see “Veterans Discard Medals in War Protest at Capital,” New York Times, 24 April 1971, 1. 34. Lee N. Robins, Th e Vietnam Drug User Returns (SAODAP Monograph Series) A, no. 2 (Washington, D.C., 1974); “Narcotic Use in Southeast Asia and Aft erwards: An Interview of 898 Returnees,” Archives of General Psychiatry (August 1975); Laurie Beth Michael, An Investigation of the Substance Abuse Behavior of Men of the Vietnam Generation (Ph.D diss., Columbia University, 1980); Rohrbaugh et al., “Eff ects of the Vietnam Experience on Subsequent Drug Use Among Servicemen,” International Journal of the Addictions (September 1974): 25–40; William Claiborne, “gi Drug Use Figure Raised, But Few Are Still Addicted,” Washington Post, 24 April 1973, A1. 35. See Barry Glassner, Th e Culture of Fear: Why Americans are Afraid of the Wrong Th ings (New York, 1999). 36. See, for example, BG Ursano, USARV to Headquarters, USARV, 26 September 1970, CIB, box 1, “Instructional Lesson Plan for Drug Abusers in Vietnam”; Department of the Army, USAV, 1971, Drug Abuse Game Without Winners: A Basic Handbook for Commanders, Department of Defense Information Service (Washington, D.C., 1968); “Why We Smoke Marijuana: An Interview with Frank Bartimo” Family, 18 March 1970. 37. “Th e World Drug Traffi c and Its Impact on U.S. Security,” Hearings Before the Select Subcommittee, Committee of the Judiciary, U.S. Senate, 2nd sess., Part 4, South East Asia (Washington, D.C., 1972), 125–26, pt. 1, 58; Daniel Weimer, “Drugs as Disease: Heroin, Metaphors, and Identity in Nixon’s Drug War,” Janus Head (June 2003): 273; “Interview with Lewis W. Walt,” cbs News, 14 September 1972 (transcript). 38. L.W. Walt to Marcus J. Gordon, Sr. Regional Representative, usaid, 1 July 1966, bndd, box 164, File Vietnam. See also Lewis W. Walt, Strange War, Strange Strategy: A General’s Report on Vietnam, foreword by Lyndon B. Johnson (New York, 1970). 39. Marcus J. Gordon, Regional Director, usaid Danang to Lt. General Lewis W. Walt, Commanding General III Marine Amphibious Force, Danang, RVN, 9 July 1966, ibid. 40. “Narcotics in Vietnam,” 15 November 1967, bndd, box 164, File Vietnam. 41. Wilbert Penberthy, District Supervisor, No. 16, to Commissioner of Narcotics, 30 November 1967, bndd, box 164, File Vietnam, 1953–1967; “Marijuana,” John D. Enright, Assistant Commissioner, Department of Customs to Mr. Lawrence Fleishman, Assistant Commissioner, Investigations, Bureau of Customs, 21 March 1967, bndd, box 164, File Vietnam. “Proposed Phases of Implementation of Plan to Expand the Narcotic Law Enforcement Eff ort of the National Police,” Major Frank W. McBee, CORDS to John F. Manopoli, 26 November 1968, Offi ce of Public Safety, Vietnam Division, Narcotics, box 110, folder 3 (hereaft er ops).

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42. Business of Marijuana,” Lt. Van Ngu, Head Police Offi ce, Quang Tri to National Police Service, Quang Tri, 6 October 1968, ops, Vietnam Division, box 110, folder 5; Jim Hougan, Spooks: Th e Haunting of America—Th e Private Use of Secret Agents (New York, 1979), 123–38; Douglas Valentine, Th e Phoenix Program (New York, 1991); Michael McLintock, Instruments of Statecraft : U.S. Guerrilla Warfare, Counter-Insurgency, and Counter-Terrorism, 1940–1990 (New York, 1992), 129. 43. “Historical Narrative—PSD Support of Narcotic Control,” Michael G. McCann, Director ops, Bureau to John Maopoli, Chief Vietnam Division, ops, Offi ce of the Assistant Chief of Staff , CORDS, Records of the U.S. Army Vietnam, Personnel Policy Division, Drug Abuse Programs, box 286, folder 2 (DAP). 44. “Drugs in Vietnam” USAV Provost Marshall Briefi ng, DP&P, box 4, folder 2. 45. Captain Howard McLendon, “Illegal or Improper Use of Drugs,” Department of the Army, 1 June 1968, DP&P, box 9, folder 6; Major General John H. Cushman, “Letter to be read to each serviceman in the Delta,” 28 June 1971, USAV, Criminal Investigation Division, box 5, folder 1 (hereaft er CIB); J. T. Wolkerstorfer, “General, Troops Put the Rap on Drugs,” Pacifi c Stars and Stripes, 6 August 1971, 7. 46. Letter Hanna Browning to Jerry Pettis, 27 January 1972, Records of the U.S. Army Vietnam, H.Q. USAV, Military Personnel Policy Division, Morale and Welfare Branch (National Archives, College Park, Md.), box 6, folder 1 (hereaft er M&W). 47. On the centrality of chemical defoliation to American counter-insurgency strategy, see Noam Chomsky, For Reasons of State (New York, 1970), 159; Dean Rusk, “Memo to the President—Defoliation Operations in Vietnam,” 24 November 1961, Papers of President Kennedy, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda (John F. Kennedy Presidential Library, Boston), box 332, folder—Defoliation Operations in Vietnam. 48. “Narcotic Destruction Report, Public Safety Division,” 6 July 1971, ops, Vietnam Division, Narcotic Control, box 112, folder Marijuana Destruction Program; Chief of Staff Memo, No. 70-104, 30 August 1970, box 110; B. Drummond Ayres, “Helicopters and Television in Suppression Drive,” New York Times, 21 September 1969, 1; Ayres, “Marijuana Is Part of the Scene Among gi’s in Vietnam” New York Times, 29 March 1970, 34. 49. “Marijuana Suppression,” macv, ops, Vietnam Division, Narcotics, box 111, folder Intelligence; Frank Walton, PSD/CORDS to H. W. Groom, PSD/CORDS,” “Re: Monthly Narcotic Bureau Report, August 1969,” 5 September 1969. 50. Richard Boyle, “U.S. Escalates War against Pot-Heads,” Th e Overseas Weekly, Pacifi c Edition, Saturday 30 August 1969, 7–8, ops, Vietnam Division, Narcotics, box 110, folder Marijuana Suppression. 51. “Cancellation of Rewards for Marijuana Plant Destruction Program,” B. Harry Wynn to Leigh M. Brilliant 9 June 1971, Minutes of CORDS/PS Narcotics Meeting, 25 September 1972, ops, Vietnam Division, Narcotics Control, box 112, folder—Marijuana Destruction Program. 52. On Vann’s ideas about accomplishing this task, see John Paul Vann, “Harnessing the Revolution in South Vietnam,” 10 September 1965, Francis Fitzgerald Papers, Mugar Library, Boston University Special Archives, box 9, folder—Vann, and Neil Sheehan’s brilliant biography, A Bright Shining Lie: John Paul Vann and America in Vietnam (New York, 1986). 53. Fact Sheet—“Marijuana Suppression,” John Paul Vann, Deputy for CORDS, May 1969, Records of the Agency for International Development, Offi ce of Public Safety, Vietnam Division, Narcotics Control (National Archives, College Park, Md.), box 110,

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folder 7; Howard Groom to Michael McCann, “Assessment of Hoa-Hao Problem,” 17 July 1969, Army Drug Abuse Program—A Future Model? Drug Abuse Council, 1973 Edward Jay Epstein Archive, Mugar Library, Boston University, box 12, folder 3 (hereaft er EJE) 54. “Fact Sheet for Brigadier General Timmenberg in Response to Some Sp.9 Heroin Detector Dogs” July 1971, Records of the U.S. Forces in Southeast Asia, Criminal Inves- tigations Branch (CIB), box 3; Louis Catalanotto, “Customs MP’s Combat Drugs,” Army Reporter, 6 December 1971, 12, “Dog Th warts Drug Traffi c,” Army Reporter, 1 June 1970. 55. Public Safety Directorate,” macv, 30 June 1972, CIB, box 1. Annual Narcotic Statistical Comparison,” Records of the U.S. Forces in Southeast Asia, CIB, box 2, folder 4. 56. Alvin M. Shuster, “gi Heroin Addiction is Epidemic in Vietnam,” New York Times, 16 May 1971, A1. 57. “Amnesty Plan Saves Another,” Army Reporter, 15 March 1971, 6; Samuel A. Simon, “gi Addicts: Th e Catch in Amnesty,” Th e Nation, 4 October 1971; Daniel Southerland, “How Army Helps gi’s Quit Drugs,” Christian Science Monitor, 18 June 1971, 7; Dr. Richard S. Wilbur, “Th e Battle Against Drug Dependency Within the Military,” Journal of Drug Issues (Winter 1974), 11–31; Correspondence Col. Bill Hart and Dr. Tom Robbins, Walter Reed Medical Museum Archives, audiotape 102-5, 4 July 1971. 58. Memo for Michael McCann, attn. Howard Groom, “Special Telephone Line,” 9 September 1971, ops, Vietnam, Narcotics Control, box 111, folder 3. 59. SP/4, Mike St. John, “Drug Booklet Distribution,” U.S. Army Vietnam, 9-67-71, Information Offi ce, Headquarters, U.S. Army Vietnam, APO San Francisco 96375, DP&P, box 4, folder 3; Donald Louria, Nightmare Drugs (New York, 1966), 49; Gabriel Nahas, Marihuana—Deceptive Weed (New York, 1973). 60. Vung Tau Recreational Center for Troop Morale,” Jack J. Wagstaff , Major General USA Commanding, to Lieutenant William J. McCaff rey, 29 July 1971, Records of the U.S. Army Vietnam, Military Personnel, Policy Division, M&W, box 13, folder 1. 61. “Sammy Davis Visit as Part of Drug Education Field Team for macv,” John K. Singlaub to General William McCaff rey, Deputy Commanding General, 12 April 1972, U.S. Forces in Southeast Asia, DP&P, box 2, folder 11 (Personal Paper fi les); Memo, John Ingersoll, bndd to Jeff rey Donfeld, Re: Sammy Davis Jr. Vietnam Trip, 31 August 1971, EJE, box 14, folder 7. 62. See Jerry Rubin, “An Emergency Letter to my Brothers and Sisters in the Movement,” New York Review, 13 February 1969, 27; Terry Anderson, “Th e Counter- Culture,” in Th e Movement and the Sixties (New York, 1995), 241. 63. See Robert Dallek, Partners in Power: Nixon and Kissinger (New York, 2007); Richard M. Nixon, “What Has Happened to America?” Reader’s Digest (October 1967), 50; Robert Mason, Richard Nixon and the Quest for a New Majority (Chapel Hill, 2004); Kevin Phillips, Th e Emerging Republican Majority (New York, 1970). 64. Richard M. Nixon, Republican National Committee, 17 September 1968, “LEN 13-3, Staff Papers on Drug Abuse, box 12, folder 4 (National Archives, College Park, Md.). 65. See Kate Doyle, “Operation Intercept: Th e Perils of Unilateralism,” National Security Archive, http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv. 66. Department of Inter-American Aff airs, telegram, 14 November 1969, Country Analysis and Strategy Paper, Department of State, National Archive, Record Group 59, NSA, Operation intercept, document 18; “Th e Mexican Connection,” Hearings Before the Subcommittee to Investigate Juvenile Delinquency, U.S. Senate, 95th Cong., 10 February 1978 (Washington, D.C., 1978); “Narcotics Control in Mexico: Environmental Analysis of

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Eff ects, Bureau of International Narcotics Matters,” April 1979 (Washington, D.C., 1979); Ricardo Vargas Meza, “Democracy, Human Rights, and Militarism in the War on Drugs in Latin America” (Washington, D.C., 1997). 67. John C. McWilliams, “Th rough the Past Darkly: Th e Politics and Policies of America’s Drug Wars,” in William O. Walker III, ed., Drug Control Policy: Essays in Historical and Comparative Perspective (University Park, Pa., 1992), 22; Epstein, Agency of Fear: Opiates and Political Power (New York, 1977). 68. Personal interview, Dr. Jerome H. Jaff e, 24 February 2005 (telephone). 69. “Th e Drug Problem in the Armed Forces,” Henry A. Kissinger Memo to Secretary of Defense, 1 June 1970, Th e White House, Nixon Presidential Materials, National Security Files (National Archives, College Park, Md.), box 807 (hereaft er NSF). 70. See Egil Krogh, “Heroin Politics and Policy under Nixon,” in One Hundred Years of Heroin, ed. David Musto (New Haven, 1999), 39. 71. “RN’s Identifi cation with the Drug War,” Egil Krogh to Jeb Magruder, Nixon Presidential Materials, Egil Krogh Papers, box 3, folder 1 (hereaft er EKP). 72. “Vietnam,” Egil Krogh to John Ehrlichman, 15 September 1970, EKP, box 3. 73. Morgan F. Murphy and Robert H. Steele, “Th e World Heroin Problem,” Report of the Special Study Mission, 92nd Cong., 1st sess., 27 May 1971 (Washington, D.C., 1971); “Shrinking the Drug Specter” Time, 9 August 1971, 21. 74. Alfred W. McCoy, Th e Politics of Heroin in Southeast Asia, with Nina Adams and Leonard P. Reed (New York, 1972), See also Felix Belair, “House Team Asks Army to Cure Addicts,” New York Times, 28 May 1971, 4; Murphy, “When 30,000 gi’s Are Using Heroin, How Can You Fight a War? An Interview with Representative Morgan Murphy, May 21, 1971” Drug Forum, October 1971. 75. Edmund Muskie, “A War Against Heroin,” Speech Before the New Hampshire Bar Association, Bretton Woods, 18 June 1971, Edmund Muskie Papers, Lewiston, Me., box 1789, folder 3. Also “McGovern Calls War on Drugs a Casualty of the Indo-China War,” 18 September 1972, Nixon Presidential Materials, EKP, box 32, folder 3. 76. Congressional Record, 26 July 1972, cia Files (National Archives, College, Park, Md.), approved for release, 2001/03/04. 77. “Statement of Hon. Seymour Halpern,” in Military Drug Abuse,” Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Alcoholism and Narcotics of the Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, U.S. Senate, 1st sess., 9 June 1971 (Washington, D.C., 1971), 5–31. 78. Memorandum for Bud Krogh to Donald Rumsfeld, Th e White House, 25 May 1971, Nixon Presidential Materials, EKP (National Archives), box 32, folder 6. 79. Alfred W. McCoy, Th e Politics of Heroin in Southeast Asia (New York, 1972); “Narcotics: McCoy’s Testimony Before the Senate,” G. McMurtrie Godley, American Embassy Vientiane to Secretary of State, 5 June 1972, ops, Laos, box 113, folder 3; “Harper’s to Show cia Proofs of New Book on Asian Drug Traffi c,” Publishers Weekly, 31 July 1972; Lawrence R. Houston, General Counsel, cia, to Mr. B. Brooke Th omas, 5 July 1972, cia declassifi ed documents (National Archives, College Park, Md.), RDP80-0160, 2001/03/04. 80. Don Schanche, Mister Pop (New York, 1970), 120; John Prados, Safe for Democracy: Th e Secret Wars of the cia (Chicago, 2006), 359; Douglas Blaufarb, Th e Counter-Insurgency Era: U.S. Doctrine and Performance (New York, 1977), 151. 81. “Th e Agency’s Brief” and “Th e Author Responds,” Harper’s, October 1972, 116–19; U.S. Senate, Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with respect to Intelligence Activities, 94th Cong., 2nd sess., Foreign and Military Intelligence, Book 1:

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Final Report (Washington, D.C., 1974), 57, 229–31; William E. Colby, “Letters to the Editor—Th e cia Responds,” Washington Star, 5 July 1972. 82. “Meeting August 3, 1971, Request for Executive Session Appearance of the Attorney General Re Alleged Involvement of South Vietnamese Offi cials in Drug Traffi c,” EKP, box 32, folder 2. 83. “Drugs” Egil Krogh to John Ehrlichman, 14 May 1971, EKP, box 32, folder 2. 84. Summary—Narcotics Meeting, State Dining Room, 3 June 1971,” EKP, box 11, folder 3. 85. Meeting with President and Top Civilian Leaders,” Memorandum Richard M. Nixon to Melvin R. Laird, 3 June 1971, EKP, box 32, folder—Drug Abuse. 86. Stuart R. Carlin, “Mass Urinalysis Started,” Army Reporter, 25 October 1971, 3; “10,000 gi’s Checked Daily for Heroin Addiction in Viet,” Pacifi c Stars and Stripes, 3 June 1972, 7; “Drug Abuse Fighter: Jerome Herbert Jaff e,” New York Times, 18 June 1971, 22. 87. Veterans Administration, Drug and Alcohol Dependency Program, FY 1973, House of Representatives, July 1973 (Washington, D.C., 1973); Drug Use in America— Problem in Perspective, II, Social Responses to Drug Use (Washington, D.C., 1973), Hearings Before the Special Subcommittee on Drug Abuse in the Armed Services on H.R 9503, House of Representatives, Committee on Armed Services, 12 October 1971 (Washington, D.C., 1971), 7543. 88. “gi Drug Abuse in Europe,’ Memo Jeff rey Donfeld to Jerome H. Jaff e, 14 December 1972, EJE, box 9, folder 9; “Urinalysis, Detoxifi cation and Discharge,” Dr. Jaff e to Richard S. Wilbur, 18 January 1973, ibid.; “gi Drug Abuse in Europe,” Richard Harkness to Egil Krogh, 5 December 1972, ibid. 89. “Drug Abuse Program: A Future Model?” New York, 1973, EJE, box 16, folder 2. 90. Dr. Richard S. Wilbur, Press Conference, “A Follow Up of Vietnam Drug Users,” Department of Defense, Department of the Army, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, U.S. Army audiovisual center (National Archives, College Park, Md.). 91. Gerald Nicosia, Home to War: A History of the Vietnam Veterans Movement (New York: Crown Press, 2001), 179. Robert Reinhold, “Army’s Drug Testing Program Stirs Sharp Dispute,” New York Times, 2 June 1972, 1. 92. Paul Starr, “Drug (Mis)Treatment for gi’s,” Washington Post, 16 July 1972, B1; Clinton R. Sanders, “Doper’s Wonderland: Functional Drug Use Among Soldiers in Vietnam,” Journal of Drug Issues (October 1973): 74. 93. Bob Spencer and Carol Spencer, “Abusing Drug Abusers: Th e Military Solution,” Civil Liberties, November 1971; “Correspondence Col. Bill Hart and Dr. Tom Robbins,” Walter Reed Medical Museum Archives, audiotape 102–5, 14 July 1971; Colonel John R. Castellot, Chief Drug Operations Center, USA Health Services Group, Vietnam, “Th eory and Practice in Drug Treatment from Chaplain Vantage Point” Department of the Army, U.S. Army Drug Treatment Center Long Binh, 25 May 1972, DP&P, box 1, folder 4; Personal interview, William Leary, 24 January 2004 (Revere, Mass.). 94. In Starr, “Drug (Mis)Treatment for gi’s,” Washington Post, 16 July 1972, B1. 95. See, for example, Stanford Garellek to President Richard M. Nixon, Drug Letters, Memo for Bob Haldeman, Chuck Colson, and Egil Krogh, 18 June 1971, Nixon Presidential Materials, Offi ce Files, box 12, folder—July 1971.

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96. See Tom Wells, Th e War Within: America’s Battle Over Vietnam (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1994); Larry Berman, No Peace, No Honor: Nixon, Kissinger and Betrayal in Vietnam (New York, 2001); Seymour Hersh, Th e Price of Power: Kissinger in the Nixon White House (New York, 1983). On Nixon’s murderous record in Laos and Cambodia, see in particular William Shawcross, Sideshow: Nixon, Kissinger and the Destruction of Cambodia (New York, 1979); Ben Kiernan, How Pol Pot Came to Power (New Haven, 1985); Alfred W. McCoy, ed. Laos: War and Revolution (New York); Noam Chomsky, At War with Asia (New York, 1970). 97. Joan-Hoff , Nixon Reconsidered (New York, 1994); Melvin Small, Th e Presidency of Richard Nixon (Lawrence, Kans., 1999); Abuse of Power: Th e New Nixon Tapes, ed. Stanley Kutler (New York, 1997). 98. See, for example, David Greenberg, Nixon’s Shadow: Th e History of an Image (New York, 2003); Allen J. Matusow, Th e Unraveling of America: A History of Liberalism in the 1960s (New York, 1984); Donald T. Critchlow, Phyllis Schlafl y and Grassroots Conservatism (Princeton, 2005); Godfrey Hodgson, Th e World Turned Right Side Up: A History of the Conservative Ascendancy in America (Boston, 1996). 99. See Jeff rey Kimball, Nixon’s Vietnam War (Lawrence, Kans., 2001); Henry Kissinger, “Vietnam Negotiations,” Foreign Aff airs (January 1969); Jeremi Suri, Power and Protest: Global Revolution and the Rise of Détente (Cambridge, Mass., 2003), 242. 100. For an excellent analysis of the political function of the anticorruption campaign, see Chomsky and Herman, “Saigon’s Corruption Crisis: Th e Search for an Honest Quisling,” Ramparts, December 1975, 23. 101. For exposés on Th ieu’s abysmal human rights record, see Jack Anderson, “Prisoners Tortured in South Vietnamese Jails,” Washington Post, 31 August 1970, B11; Don Luce and Holmes Brown, Hostages of War: Saigon’s Political Prisoners, Indochina Mobile Education Project, 1973, 14. 102. Edward Kennedy (D-Mass.) quoted in Stanley Millet, ed., South Vietnam: U.S. Communist Confrontation in Southeast Asia, vol. 3, 1968; Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–76, vol. 6, Vietnam, January 1969 to July 1970 (Washington, D.C., 2006), 32. See also William J. Lederer, Th e Anguished American (London, 1968). 103. “Foreign Assistance Act of 1971” (Washington, D.C., 1971), 296. 104. “Drugs and Smuggling,” Department of State Telegram; Saigon (National Archives, College Park, Md.), U.S. Special Forces in Southeast Asia, box 11, folder 3. 105. “Summary of Vietnam Cables—Drugs,” May 1971, Department of State Telegram, 070626, U.S. Special Forces in Southeast Asia (National Archives, College Park, Md.), box 11, folder 3; Memo for Bud Krogh, “Indo-Chinese Offi cials Removed or Shift ed as a Result of Investigations in Drug Traffi cking,” 3 August EKP, box 30, folder 5; “GVN Reorganizes Attack on Drugs and Smuggling,” American Embassy Saigon to Department of State, 8 July 1971, DP&P, box 286, folder 2. 106. McCoy, Th e Politics of Heroin: cia Complicity in the Global Narcotics Trade (New York, 2004); Father Tran Huu Th anh, “Indictment #1: Th e People’s Front Against Corruption for National Salvation and for Building Peace,” Letter from Vietnam, Hue, September 1974, Douglas Pike Archive, Texas Tech University Vietnam Center, www.vietnam.ttu.edu. 107. Quoted in Vietnam and Korea: Human Rights and U.S. Assistance, A Study Mission Report of the Committee on Foreign Aff airs, U.S. House of Representatives (Washington, D.C., 1975), 7–8; see also James Hamilton Paterson, Th e Greedy War (New York, 1971), 155.

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108. “Historical Narrative—PSD Support of Narcotic Control,” Michael G. McCann, Director ops, Bureau to John Maopoli, Chief Vietnam Division, ops, Offi ce of the Assistant Chief of Staff , CORDS, DP&P, box 286, folder 2. 109. Nelson Gross, “Bilateral and Multilateral Eff orts to Intensify Drug Abuse Control Programs,” Department of State Bulletin, 3 April 1972 (DEA Library, International Control on Narcotics folder, 1961–75); Peter Osnos, “U.S. Presses Saigon into War on Smuggling,” Los Angeles Times, 27 May 1971, 2. 110. “Antinarcotics Campaign in Viet-Nam,” Department of State Bulletin, 3 April 1972, 508 (DEA Library, Pentagon City, Va.), International Narcotics Control folder; “jnid Raids,” macv, Vietnam, box 12, folder 1; “Joint Narcotics Investigation Detachment,” macv Directive 190-4, Vietnam folder (National Archives, College Park, Md.), box 12, folder 1; Alfred W. McCoy, A Question of Torture: cia Interrogation from the Cold War to the War on Terror (New York, 2006). 111. “jnid Confi scations, July 1, 1971 to May 31, 1972,” HQUSARV, DP&P, box 36, folder 7; “Search and Destroy—Th e War on Drugs,” Time, 4 September 1972; Nelson Gross, “Bilateral and Multilateral Eff orts to Intensify Drug Abuse Control Programs,” Department of State Bulletin, 3 April 1972 (DEA Library, International Control on Narcotics folder, 1961–75). 112. Peter Jay, “Saigon Launches Narcotics Drive,” Washington Post, 1 May 1971, A10 “Translation Catalog Sheet—RVN Anti-Drug Suppression Campaign at Bien Hoa,” 6 May 1971, DP&P, box 6, folder 2. 113. “Decree Law No. 008/TT/SLU on the Eradication of Toxic Narcotic and Dangerous Substances, promulgated by President Th ieu”: Th e U.S. Heroin Problem and South East Asia: Report of a Staff Survey Team of the Committee on Foreign Aff airs, House of Representatives,” December 1972 (Washington, D.C., 1972), 85; “Th ieu Orders Death for Drug Pushers,” Washington Post, 14 August 1972, A17. 114. “Department of State Telegram,” American embassy, Saigon, to E.A. Drug Coordinator, 13 October 1972, ops, Vietnam, Narcotics Control, box 112, folder 8. 115. Anti-Drug Advertisements,” Army Criminal Investigation Files, DP&P, box 7, folder 1. 116. “Interview with Nguyen Cao Ky,” Th e Listener, 24 November 1977. See also Ky, How We Lost the Vietnam War (New York, 1976). 117. See Daniel Fineman, A Special Relationship: Th e United States and Military Governments in Th ailand, 1947–1958 (Honolulu, 1997); Surachert Bamrungsuk, U.S. Foreign Policy and Th ai Military Rule, 1947–1977 (Bangkok, 1988). 118. “Proposals for Increased Anti-Narcotics Assistance to Th ailand,” Johnson F. Munroe, Deputy Director, O.P.S. to Nelson Gross, 27 September 1971, ops, Th ailand, Narcotics Control, box 212, folder 1; Byron Engle, director public safety to Philip Batson, assistant director public safety, 17 March 1972, ibid. 119. “aid Infl uence in Law Enforcement Community,” Memo Egil Krogh to Byron Engle, Jack Caufi eld, Gordon Liddy, EKP, box 3, folder 2. 120. Roger Ernst, Director U.S. Operations, Mission Bangkok Th ailand, to Joe W. Johnson, Audit Manager, Bangkok Offi ce, Far-East Bureau, 3 October 1973, ops, Th ailand, Narcotics Control, box 212, folder 1; Lobe, U.S. National Security Policy and Aid to the Th ailand Police (Denver, 1977); “U.S. Police Assistance for the Th ird World” (Ph.D diss., University of Michigan, 1975).

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121. Southeast Asian Narcotics, Hearings Before the Select Committee on Narcotics Abuse and Control, House of Representatives, 95th Cong., 1st sess., 12–13 July 1977 (Washington, D.C., 1978), 2–3. On the human rights abuses of the Th ai regime under Th anom Kittikachorn, see Chomsky and Herman, Th e Political Economy of Human Rights: Th e Washington Connection and Th ird World Fascism (Boston, 1979), 222–25. 122. “Pramuan Case Linked to Foreign Aid Bill,” Department of State Telegram, American embassy Bangkok, to Secretary of State, 15 November 1972, American Agency for International Development, ops, box 212, folder 3; “Summaries of Recent Th ai language Press,” American Embassy Bangkok, to Secretary of State, Washington, D.C., 5 October 1972, ibid. 123. “Th e U.S. Heroin Problem in Southeast Asia,” 41; Th e Task Forces of Th ailand and Laos,” Drug Enforcement Magazine (Fall 1973): 17; “Talking Points for Th ailand Narcotics Action Control” to Interagency Working Group on Narcotics Control from Harriet Isom, EA Drug Control Coordinator, 1973, ops, Th ailand, Narcotics, box 212, folder 1; American Embassy Bangkok to Secretary of State, February 1973 “Narcotics: Police Training Advisors,” ibid. 124. See Clyde R. McAvoy, “Th e Diplomatic War on Heroin,” Journal of Drug Issues (Spring 1977): 163–79; “Capture of Lo-Hsing Han,” American Embassy Rangoon to Department of State, 25 July 1973, General Records of the Department of State, 1970–73, Th ailand (National Archives, College Park, Md.), box 3056, folder 1; “Narcotics,” Department of State Bulletin, 3 April 1972, 507 (DEA Library, Pentagon City, Va.), International Control folder. 125. William P. Delaney, “On Capturing an Opium King: Th e Politics of Lo Hsing Han’s Arrest,” in Drugs and Politics, ed. Paul E. Rock (New Brunswick, N.J., 1977), 67; Alfred W. McCoy, “Requiem for a Drug Lord: State and Commodity in the Career of Khun Sa,” in States and Illegal Practices, ed. Josiah McHeyman (New York, 1999). 126. Cabinet Committee on International Narcotics Control, World Opium Survey (Washington, D.C: September 1972), Congressional Record, 6 May 1975, International Control folder, 1961–75 (DEA Library, Pentagon City, Va.); “Proposals for Increased Anti- Narcotics Assistance in Th ailand,” Johnson F. Munroe, Deputy Director, ops to Nelson Gross, 27 September 1971, ops, Th ailand, Narcotics Control, box 212, folder 1. On broader economic development programs, see Robert Packenham, Liberal America and the Th ird World: Political Development Ideas in Foreign Aid (Princeton, 1973). 127. Ronald D. Renard, Opium Reduction in Th ailand, 1970–2000: A 30-Year Journey (Bangkok, 2001), 75–82. 128. See, for example, “Opium Production and Movement in Southeast Asia: Intelligence Report,” Directorate of Intelligence, cia Files (National Archives, College Park, Md.), approved for release, 2001/09/04; Daniel Fineman, A Special Relationship, 133. Fineman likens this failed reinvasion to an Asian Bay of Pigs. 129. “Narcotics—Kriangsak Proposal,” American embassy Bangkok to Secretary of State, 5 December 1971, Research and Development Th ailand (National Archives, College Park, Md.) box 3099 (hereaft er R&D Th ailand); “Th e Narcotics Situation in Southeast Asia: Report of a Special Study Mission by Lester Wolﬀ ,” January–February 1973 (Washington, D.C., 1973), 5; Jack Anderson, “Th ai Opium Bonﬁ re Mostly Fodder,” Washington Post, 31 July 1972, B11. 130. On these events, in which Kittakchorn’s security arm massacred student protestors, see E. Th adeus Flood, Th e United States and the Military Coup in Th ailand: A Background

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Study, Indochina Resource Center, 1976; Ben Anderson, “Withdrawal Symptoms: Social and Cultural Aspects of the October 6 Coup,” Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars (October 1977). 131. Wayland Speer to Harry J. Anslinger, “Opium Smuggling in Vietnam” January 14, 1957, bndd, box 164, File Vietnam, Roger Warner, Backfi re: Th e cia’s Secret War in Laos and its Link to the Vietnam War (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1995), 254. See also David Corn, Blond Ghost: Ted Shackley and the cia’s Crusades (New York, 1994), 148–50; Tom Robbins, Air America: Th e Story of the cia’s Airlines (New York, 1979); Dr. Charles Weldon, Tragedy in Paradise: A Country Doctor at War in Laos (Bangkok, 1999), 184–85. 132. See, for example, Sheldon B. Vance, “International Narcotics Control: A High Priority Program,” Department of State Bulletin, 27 January 1975 (DEA Library: International Control folder, 1961–75). 133. American Embassy Vientiane to Secretary of State, Washington D.C., 28 November 1971, Research and Development, Laos (National Archives, College Park, Md.), box 3075, folder 6 (hereaft er R&D); “Narcotic Law,” American Embassy Vientiane to Secretary of State, Washington, D.C., 27 August 1971, Records of the Department of State, 1970–73, Laos (National Archives, College Park, Md.), box 3075. 134. Joseph Westermeyer, Poppies, Pipes and People: Opium and Its Uses in Laos (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1982), 18; “Use of Alcohol and Opium by the Meo of Laos,” American Journal of Psychiatry (June 1971): 1019–23; Th omas Szasz, Ceremonial Chemistry: Th e Ritual Persecution of Drug Addicts and Pushers (Syracuse, 1974), 48. 135. John Everingham, “Th e Golden Triangle Trade,” Asia Magazine, 23 March 1975, 28; “Th e Task Forces of Th ailand and Laos,” Drug Enforcement Magazine (Fall 1973), 17. 136. “Th e U.S. Heroin Problem in Southeast Asia,” Report of a Staff Survey Team of the Committee on Foreign Aff airs, House of Representatives, December 1972 (Washington, D.C., 1972), 28. 137. “Narcotics Control,” American Embassy Vientiane to Secretary of State, Washington, D.C. 1972, R&D, Laos, box 3075; “Report on Completion of Phase 2,” Laos— Narcotics Control, box 1, folder 3; “U.S. Leads Global War on Drug Abuse,” Current Foreign Policy, Department of State Medical Services, DEA Library, International Control, 1961–75 folder. 138. Joseph Westermeyer, “Th e Pro-Heroin Eff ects of Anti-Opium Laws in Asia,” Archives of General Psychiatry (September 1976): 1136. 139. Offi ce of the Auditor General, Narcotics Control—Laos, box 1, folder 3; Joseph Westermeyer, “Methadone: An Orientation to Its Medical Uses,” Public Health Division, usaid Laos, March 1972. 140. “Methadone,” American Embassy Vientiane to Secretary of State, April 1972, R&D, Laos, box 3075; “Meeting with Dr. Jaff e,” Narcotics White House SAODAP, Narcotics Control—Laos, box 1, folder 3; “Shipment of Methadone HCL for Laos Rehabilitation Program,” American embassy Vientiane to Secretary of State, Washington, D.C., June 1972, ibid. 141. Arnold Abrams, “Lao Spies Help War on Opium,” Miami Herald, 18 April 1972, cia Files, RDP80-01601 (National Archives, College Park, Md.), approved for release, 2001/03/04; Michael Parks, “cia Reported Shift ing Attention in Laos from Communists to Opium,” Baltimore Sun, 13 March 1972, cia Files, RDP80-01601 (National Archives, College Park, Md.), 2001/03/04.

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142. “Opium Substitution eff orts in Laos—Phu Pha Dang Experimentation—Extension A Approach,” American embassy Vientiane to aid, 1 April 1974, “Pha Dang agri cultural sta- tion Vientiane A128—unclassifi ed” Narcotics Control, Laos, box 1, folder 3. 143. “Politics and Narcotics Control in Laos,” American Embassy Vientiane to Secretary of State, 11 October, R&D, Laos, box 3076, folder 2. 144. Edward Kennedy to John Hannah, 13 July 1973, Narcotics Control Laos, box 1, folder 3. On the general devastation of the air war, see Fred Branfman, Voices from the Plain of Jars: Life Under an Air War (New York, 1972); “Letter to Henry Kissinger,” Walter Haney, Fa Ngun School, June 1972, Nixon Presidential Materials, National Security Council Files, HAK, Henry A. Kissinger (National Archives, College Park, Md.), box 13, folder 4. 145. “Trip Report—Laos, February 7–10, 1973,” Memo from Ogden Williams to Robert Nooter, Narcotics Control—Laos, box 1, folder 3. 146. See, for example, Paul Cecil, Herbicidal Warfare (New York, 1986); Neilands et al., Harvest of Death: Chemical Warfare in Vietnam and Cambodia (New York, 1972); Barry Weisberg, ed., Ecocide in Indo-China: Th e Ecology of War (San Francisco, 1970). 147. McCoy, Laos: War and Revolution (New York, 1970), 125. 148. Harold Levin to Charles Mann, Director usaid, Chief Lao Desk, 24 June 1971, Narcotics Control, Laos, box 1, folder 5; Discussion with Minister of Justice on Narcotics, American Embassy Vientiane to Secretary of State, Washington, D.C., May 1974, Narcotics Control, Laos, box 1, folder 4. 149. John Everingham, “Th e Golden Triangle Trade,” Asia Magazine, 23 March 1975. 150. Fox Butterfi eld, “Laos’ Opium Country Resisting Drug Law,” New York Times, 16 October 1972, 12; John Finlator, Th e Drugged Nation: A Narc’s Story (New York, 1973), 127. 151. “Anti-Narcotics Legislation/Permits for Cultivation,” G. McMurtrie Godley to Honorable William Sullivan, Deputy Assistant Secretary, Department of State, 9 June 1971 RDS, Laos, box 3075. 152. “Drug Abuse Program: A Future Model?” (New York, 1973) EJE, box 16, folder 2, 32. 153. “Post-War Southeast Asia—A Search for Neutrality and Independence,” Report by Senator Mike Mansfield, Committee on Foreign Relations (Washington, D.C., 1976). 154. On social dislocation and the black market economy in particular, see, for example, Frances Fitzgerald, Fire in the Lake: Th e Vietnamese and the Americans in Vietnam (Boston, 1972); Civilian Casualties and Refugee Problems in South Vietnam, Committee on the Judiciary, 9 May 1968 (Washington, D.C., 1968). 155. “Army Criminal Investigation Division Report, June 1972,” CIB, box 1, folder 3. See also Jack Anderson, “Saigon Dope Dealers Riding High,” Washington Post, 30 December 1972, B11. 156. Henry Kamm, “Drive Fails to Halt Drug Sale in Vietnam,” New York Times, 30 August 1971, 1; “Alleged Corrupt Practices of Nguyen Huy Th ong, Chief, Narcotics Bureau,” Frank Walton to Charles Vopat, 31 March 1971, ops, Narcotic Control, Vietnam, box 112, folder 4. 157. Quoted in Mitchell Satchell, “U.S. Drug Reports Diff er,” Washington Star-News, 16 August 1972, 3. 158. Frank Snepp, Decent Interval (New York, 1977), 14; John Prados, Th e Hidden History of the Vietnam War (Chicago, 1995), 68; Valentine, Th e Phoenix Program, 409.

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159. See Michael Flamm, Law and Order: Street Crime, Civil Unrest, and the Crisis of Liberalism in the 1960s (New York, 2005). 160. Memorandum for Egil Krogh, “Indo-Chinese Offi cials Removed or Shift ed as a Result of Investigations in Drug Traffi cking,” 3 August 1971, EKP, box 32, folder 2. See also “Meeting August 3, 1971, Request for Executive Session Appearance of the Attorney General Re Alleged Involvement of South Vietnamese Offi cials in Drug Traffi c,” ibid. 161. “Senator McGovern and Drugs,” 31 July1972, EKP, box 32, folder 2. 162. Robert B. Semple Jr., “Nixon Says He Kept Vow to Check Rise in Crime,” New York Times, 16 October 1972, 1; John Finlator, Th e Drugged Nation: A Narc’s Story (New York, 1973), 321. 163. See as an emblematic article, “U.S. Losing Smuggler War,” Chicago Daily News, 7 June 1975, in Federal Drug Enforcement, Hearings Before the Permanent Subcommittee of Investigations of the Committee on Government Operations, U.S. Senate, 94th Cong., 1st sess., June 1975 (Washington, D.C., 1975), 111; John Finlator, Th e Drugged Nation: A Narc’s Story (New York, 1973), 321; O’Donnell et al., Young Men and Drugs: A Nationwide Survey (Washington, D.C., 1974), 59. 164. See, for example, Ted G. Carpenter, Bad Neighbor Policy: Washington’s Futile War on Drugs in Latin America (Washington, D.C., 2004); Christina J. Johns, Power, Ideology, and the War on Drugs: Nothing Succeeds Like Failure (New York, 1992); Douglas Stokes, America’s Other War: Terrorizing Colombia, foreword by Noam Chomsky (London, 2005).

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