From Counter-Insurgency to Narco-Insurgency: Vietnam and the International War on Drugs Jeremy Kuzmarov Journal of Policy History, Volume 20, Number 3, 2008, pp. 344-378 (Article) Published by Penn State University Press For additional information about this article http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/jph/summary/v020/20.3.kuzmarov.html Access Provided by CAPES-Fundação Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de NÃ-vel Superior at 06/15/11 2:56AM GMT jeremy kuzmarov From Counter-Insurgency to Narco-Insurgency: Vietnam and the International War on Drugs If we have found we cannot be the world’s policeman, can we hope to become the world’s narc? —H. D. S. Greenway, Life Magazine, October 19721 In the January 1968 issue of the Washingtonian magazine, the son of the great American novelist John Steinbeck made his professional journalistic debut with the publication of a controversial article, “Th e Importance of Being Stoned in Vietnam.” John Steinbeck IV, who served as a roving correspondent for the Pacifi c Stars and Stripes, wrote that marijuana of a potent quality was grown naturally in Vietnam, sold by farmers at a fraction of the cost than in the United States, and could be obtained “more easily than a package of Lucky Strikes cigarettes.” He estimated that up to 75 percent of soldiers in Vietnam got high regularly. “Th e average soldier sees that for all intents and purposes, the entire country is stoned,” Steinbeck observed. “To enforce a prohibition against smoking the plant [in Vietnam] would be like trying to prohibit the inhalation of smog in Los Angeles.”2 Although his words were evocative, Steinbeck exaggerated the scope of drug abuse in Vietnam for political purposes. He had been arrested on marijuana charges upon return to his native California and wanted to point out the hypocrisy of government policies targeting those who had fought for their country in Vietnam.3 Military psychiatrists working closest to the situ- ation later determined that between 30 percent and 35 percent of American Th e author wishes to thank David C. Engerman, William O. Walker III, Michael Willrich, Clark Dougan, and the two additional anonymous reviewers for their excellent sugges- tions and insights in shaping this article, as well as Dr. Roger Roff man, Dr. Jerome H. Jaff e, and other veterans of the war who took time to speak with me. the journal of policy history, Vol. 20, No. 3, 2008. Copyright © 2008 Th e Pennsylvania State University, University Park, PA. JJPHPH 220-3_02.indd0-3_02.indd 334444 88/8/08/8/08 44:11:43:11:43 PPMM jeremy kuzmarov | 345 gis likely used marijuana—largely on an experimental basis and to escape the harrowing social conditions of the war.4 Th e media nevertheless largely bought into Steinbeck’s infl ated fi gures and became fl ooded with articles pointing to the ravaging eff ects of drug use in combat, even though predomi- nantly this was rare.5 Th ey oft en used sensationalistic rhetoric, including reference to “epidemics” and “plagues,” as well as Orientalist stereotypes depicting drugs as a foreign corrupting agent, resulting in a rise in public support for an escalation of federal drug-control measures—particularly in the international realm.6 In May 1971, Newsweek columnist Stewart Alsop went so far as to proclaim that drug use during the war was worse than the My-Lai massacre, which Senator Th omas J. Dodd (D-Conn.) had previously tried to blame on marijuana.7 Public hysteria over drug abuse in Vietnam—and its pronounced political consequence—has generally been ignored in the academic litera- ture on the War on Drugs, which has focused more on domestic political developments and the pathologies of the Nixon White House.8 Writing from a predominantly liberal disposition, many analysts reason that the drug war emerged as a product of the Conservative backlash toward the hippie coun- terculture and the sociocultural tensions of the 1960s.9 Others contend that conservatives manipulated public opinion on the drug issue through infl ated statistics in order to push forward a social agenda focused on expanding law enforcement at the expense of social welfare programs.10 Th ese arguments are compelling and demonstrate how the War on Drugs has been adopted to serve important political ends while ushering in what deputy drug czar, John Walters (1989–93), characterized as a “conservative cultural revolu- tion.”11 Th ey nevertheless neglect the broader global context and impact of the crisis in Vietnam in exacerbating popular anxieties over drugs and in shaping a shift in governmental priorities. On June 17, 1971, in the face of mounting domestic protest and the release of a congressional report claiming—exaggeratingly as it turned out—that 10 percent to 15 percent of gis were addicted to high-grade heroin supplied by cia allies, Nixon offi cially declared a War on Drugs. He called drug abuse “public enemy number one in America.”12 Escalating the budget for domestic treatment and enforcement, Nixon stepped up eff orts to train foreign police in the so-called Golden Triangle (encompassing northern Th ailand, Laos, and South Vietnam) and implemented aerial spraying and crop substitution campaigns more extensive in scope than in Mexico. Nixon further enacted a highly controversial urinalysis program in the military accompanied by a rehabilitation regiment for those caught with positive samples. Th ese initia- tives were all designed to curb the spread of addiction in the Armed Forces, JJPHPH 220-3_02.indd0-3_02.indd 334545 88/8/08/8/08 44:11:44:11:44 PPMM 346 | From Counter-Insurgency to Narco-Insurgency assuage public fears about the return of addicted gis to the United States, and silence charges of governmental complicity in the international drug traffi c, which had become the source of pronounced political embarrassment.13 Nixon’s policies also had broader implications in providing the groundwork for his “Vietnamization” program, which sought to shift the burden of fi ghting to the U.S.-dependent South Vietnamese allies. Although neglected by histo- rians, the Southeast Asian drug war of the early 1970s, intricately connected to America’s involvement in Vietnam, served in retrospect as a watershed in U.S. foreign narcotics policy in terms of the breadth of federal commitment and the scope of its programs.14 It further exposed the limits of American international policing and the nation’s universal approach to foreign policy more broadly by arousing popular animosity and resistance and failing to curb supply rates. the “addicted army” and escalation of the southeast asian drug war Since the beginning of the twentieth century, the United States had been at the vanguard among Western nations in promoting global drug- control eff orts through diplomatic means as well as the United Nations, largely as an extension of its domestic policing program. From 1930 until 1962, Harry J. Anslinger was particularly infl uential as head of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics (fbn) in making drug control an important aspect of American national security policy and in increasing the presence of U.S narcotic agents overseas.15 In 1962, in a deal that would set a precedent for the future, the Kennedy administration provided Mexico with $500,000 worth of heli- copters, light planes, jeeps, and rifl es through the Agency of International Development (aid) for a special narcotic destruction campaign targeting marijuana and opium growers.16 During the mid-1950s, the Federal Bureau of Narcotics (fbn) fi rst estab- lished bureau posts in Southeast Asia because of an interest in curbing the source of supply from the region. Following the French defeat at Dien Bien Phu in 1954, fbn agents began to investigate the alleged involvement of the Communist Viet Minh in traffi cking opium from Laos, which actually paled before the deeper participation of American allies in Th ailand.17 Th e infl ux of American troops in South Vietnam during the early 1960s reinforced administrative concerns about the availability of illicit narcotics. Th e most widely used intoxicant in Vietnam was marijuana of a high potency, which grew wild in the countryside.18 Many farmers sold the drug through local JJPHPH 220-3_02.indd0-3_02.indd 334646 88/8/08/8/08 44:11:44:11:44 PPMM jeremy kuzmarov | 347 retailing merchants, oft en in packs of Parker Lane and Kent cigarettes. Th ey could be purchased for 400 Vietnamese piasters or $1.50—an unheard of price by American standards. “Marijuana in Vietnam is cheap, easy to fi nd— and potent,” remarked one medical psychiatrist, as quoted in U.S. News & World Report. “Th e drug is everywhere. All a person has to do to get it is say the word Khan Sa.”19 Despite the easy availability, soldiers predominantly used drugs on a casual basis and away from the theater of combat. One study found that less than 10 percent of men admitted to the use of marijuana on duty at some time. Within the Air Force, the fi gure was only 2.6 percent.20 Having interviewed more than fi ve hundred military personnel, psychiatrist W. B. Postel found that “the usual habit was to smoke the drug aft er a battle to calm down. Only one person indicated that he smoked while fi ghting.”21 Frank Bartimo, assis- tant general counsel for the Department of Defense, similarly concluded, “We have very little, about no drug abuse among troops going into the fi eld. Guys who use it say they never do it when they’re going into combat.”22 Marvin Matthiak, an infantryman stationed with the Alpha First Battalion Cavalry Division added, “Th e press has done a tremendous disservice to this country in portraying grunts as being out there doing drugs.