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ZEEB ROAD, ANN ARBOR, Ml 48106 18 BEDFORD ROW, LONDON WC1 R 4EJ, ENGLAND 8101521 P a r k s, Jim m y D w a in CULTURE, CONFLICT AND COEXISTENCE: AMERICAN-SOVIET CULTURAL RELATIONS, 1917-1958 The University o f Oklahoma PH.D. 1980 University Microfilms I nternétions!300 N. Zeeb Road, Ann Arbor, M I48106 THE UNIVERSITY OF OKLAHOMA GRADUATE COLLEGE CULTURE, CONFLICT AND COEXISTENCE: AMERICAN-4S0VIET CULTURAL RELATIONS, 1917-1958 A DISSERTATION SUBMITTED TO THE GRADUATE FACULTY in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY BY J. D. PARKS Norman, Oklahoma 1980 CULTURE, CONFLICT AND COEXISTENCE: AMERICAN-SOVIET CULTURAL RELATIONS, 1917-1958 APPROVED BY ; ; DISSERTATION COMMITTEE PREFACE On Thursday, July 17th, 1975, two small space craft maneuvered toward each other one hundred and forty miles above the Atlantic off Portugal's coast, joined, and locked. Three hours later a beaming Soviet cosmonaut pushed open a hatch and, as hundreds of millions watched on television belov;, clasped the hand of an equally beaming American astronaut. American-Soviet cooperation had literally and figuratively reached new heights. But the space spectacular was only the most visible instance of American-Soviet interaction. As the linked capsules circled overhead, thousands of American and Soviet citizens traveled, studied, performed and competed in the country of the other. Within proscribed limits, books, magazines and newspapers flowed back and forth across their borders, providing both objective knowledge and subjective insight to readers on both sides. Though lacking the spontaniety and latitude characterizing America's cultural relations with many countries, the interaction seemed to indicate that in matters cultural, at least, the two powers had found the key to co-existence. But not all was smiles and handshakes between Washington and Moscow. Immediately beneath the surface old fears and suspicions lay waiting, ready to 111 IV rise at the least prompting. Indeed, on the day that they reported the space extravaganza, a number of publications deemed it wise to run concurrent articles pinpointing the political problems dividing the two and detailing the sources of tension on each side. And in so doing, they unwittingly illustrated a basic theme in American-Soviet relations. While Washington and Moscow have carried on a long standing ideological feud, American and Soviet cultural representatives have, at the same time, carried on an active, thoi^h restricted, cultural intercourse. Only at the depths of the cold war did the political conflict become so intense as to almost entirely eliminate cultural connections as well, and then only for a short time. Within three years of the low point of their cultural relationship the two nations were again exchanging delegations, and within six years had signed a comprehen sive exchange agreement that propelled cultural contacts far above previous levels. This study traces the course of those contacts from the Bolshevik Revolution to that first official agreement, signed in 1958. In so doing it defines cultural relations in broad terms, including within its scope those activities normally considered "cultural" in nature—art, literature, music, etc.—as well as cooperative and competitive activities in the fields of science, technology, tourism, athletics and other areas in which the American and Soviet people associated as human beings rather than as ideological opponents. For regardless of their specific purposes, the people of both countries who dealt with each other on a human level necessarily reciprocated a degree of knowledge about them selves and the culture which helped form them. The character and conduct of the relationship between the two nations varied considerably over the four decades herein encompassed. On the American V side, Washington's entry into the cultural realm made the relationship a matter of official as well as private concern, while on the Soviet side Moscow's policies differed in important ways during the pre-Stalinist, Stalinist and post-Stalinist periods even as the fundamental principles underlying the Soviet concept of cultural relations remained the same. Though limited in comparison to the relations between American citizens and those of many other nations, the American and Soviet people maintained more extensive contacts during the twenties and early thirties than during any subsequent period prior to 1958. Though Moscow rarely permitted ordinary citizens to travel abroad, Soviet cultural representatives, technical delegations and various kinds of exhibits toured American cities throughout the pre-recognition period, and American tourists, technicians, business representa tives and cultural figures reciprocated the visits in large numbers. But as Stalin consolidated his power, purged the Party and waged an anti-foreign campaign during the late thirties, the free and easy contacts began to change; by the time of the Nazi-Soviet Pact had dwindled to a trickle. The exigencies of wartime partnership temporarily revived and extended the former friendly intercourse, but even before the fighting was over Stalin began rejecting all American overtures tendered under official auspices, and, in the immediate postwar years, resumed both the internal purges and the anti-foreign rhetoric of the earlier period. As the decade progressed the Soviet ruler, primarily for purposes of maintaining both Party and personal power, increasingly isolated the Soviet people from outside contacts, cleansed Soviet life of western influences and turned the nation's cultural organs into weapons to attack bourgeois civilization. The United States, perceiving a threat in Stalin's attitude at home, in his policies in eastern Europe, VI in his suspected designs in Iran, Greece and Turkey, and in such successive shocks as the Berlin blockade and the Korean War, responded by erecting its own barriers to contacts with the Soviets and conducting its own campaign of purification within, doubly insuring thereby the estrangement of the American and Soviet people. By the early fifties the cultural relationship had reached an impasse, but Stalin's death in early 1953 provided the possibility of change. Though official America remained reticent, individual Americans responded to overtures coming from the Soviet side during the months following the dictator's demise, and initiated contacts of their own. As the cultural climate slowly thawed, the hesitant first steps toward renewed relations slowly gave way to more formal A ccord at Geneva in 1955, continued through the middle of the decade, culminating ultimately in the formal exchange pact signed in early 1958. Throughout the course of the relationship the two nations proceeded from different principles and, for the most part, pursued different aims. From the mid-twenties forward, Moscow organized and controlled its cultural relations according to state policies and plans. Though individual Soviet citizens may well have relished the human contacts and the sharing of common interests on a personal level, Moscow viewed such contacts as assets to be manipulated for larger ends, or, if deemed advantageous, to be liquidated in the interest of serving those same ends. Cultural relations constituted a means, not an end, and that fact necessarily limited the extent to which the people of the two nations could enter into the kind of unfettered relationship that characterized the interaction between American citizens and those of nations less subject to state control. Washington's role, as befitted a government whose people prided themselves on their freedom