Naval College Review Volume 68 Article 21 Number 3 Summer

2015 The .SU . Naval Institute on Naval Tactics, edited by Wayne P. Hughes Charles H. Lewis

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Recommended Citation Lewis, Charles H. (2015) "The .SU . Naval Institute on Naval Tactics, edited by Wayne P. Hughes," Naval War College Review: Vol. 68 : No. 3 , Article 21. Available at: https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol68/iss3/21

This Book Review is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Naval War College Review by an authorized editor of U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons. For more information, please contact [email protected]. 166 NAVAL WARLewis: COLLEGE The U.S. REVIEW Naval Institute on Naval Tactics, edited by Wayne P. Hug

China is, as Haddick agrees, achieving Hummingbird (MSC 192) and USS its objectives without risking war. Beijing Morton (DD 948). Notable authors ap- understands there is a threshold for U.S. pearing in On Tactics include Admiral response and will continue to Woodward, RN, who commanded operate below it. An American president British forces in the , and would be loath to fire the first shots over Giuseppe Fioravanzo, Admiral of the the Chinese occupation of an uninhab- Fleet, Italian . On Tactics is part ited island. Haddick therefore argues the of the U.S. Naval Institute’s new Wheel United States should develop policies to Books series, which is a collection of encourage China to follow the existing books containing some of the Naval international rules in letter and spirit. Institute’s most well-regarded articles Unfortunately, he does not detail these from Proceedings—and other sources— policies, leaving his strategy wanting. on such topics as naval leadership, Haddick states that strategy is about command, strategy, and cooperation. managing risk. While much of what On Tactics is well worth the reader’s Haddick proposes seems commonsensi- time, and appropriate for both junior cal, it is unfinished, and this poses risks. and senior officers. It benefits greatly Focusing only on punitive measures from Hughes’s insightful commentary against possible Chinese actions runs and tactful editing, which boils the com- the risk of ignoring the ways China bined length of the selected essays down has played by the rules while further- to a manageable 190 pages. Although the ing a mind-set where every develop- topic of tactics is broadly applicable to ment in the PLA’s modernization is all naval communities, perceived as a threat to U.S. regional officers will probably have the easiest interests—regardless of Chinese inten- time relating to the selected essays. tions. This book should be read as part Of the thirteen essays in the volume, a of an ongoing and equally unfinished favorite was “ Chess: A Parable,” debate on how to handle a rising China. written by Hughes himself. “Missile IAN T. SUNDSTROM Chess” describes a game created by Hughes in which players sit down to play a traditional game of chess but with a ma- jor twist: the players have a fixed number of “” that they must distribute Hughes, Wayne P., ed. The U.S. Naval Institute among their pieces as they see fit. The on Naval Tactics. Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute pieces still move according to the rules of Press, 2015. 192pp. $21.95 regular chess, but each time they capture The U.S. Naval Institute on Naval Tactics an opposing piece they expend one “mis- is a collection of thirteen essays as- sile.” Once a piece’s missile inventory is sembled by Captain Wayne Hughes, depleted a piece can still move but can no USN (Ret.)—author of several books, longer capture. After he walks us through most notably Fleet Tactics and Coastal several hypothetical scenarios, it is clear Combat and Military Modeling for Deci- that despite its simplicity, missile chess sion Making. Captain Hughes is also nicely elucidates some of the most vex- an accomplished naval officer, having ing operational challenges with which a served as commanding officer of USS modern naval commander must contend.

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My only criticism of On Tactics is following his untimely death in 2012. that some of the selected essays veer In what is widely considered one of his into areas that could more aptly be major scholarly contributions, through described as “strategy” or “enterprise this pithy, well-researched book—rightly management.” For example, “Toward considered a classic—Wachman engages a New Identity” chronicles Admiral in exceptional interdisciplinary analysis Luce’s struggle to keep the Atlantic fleet to offer provocative coverage of histori- together long enough to test the tactical cal episodes that have shaped Taiwan’s doctrines flowing out of the recently status fundamentally. Some events raise founded Naval War College. Although penetrating questions about what might this is a fine essay, it does not provide have resulted had they ended differently; the reader with any particular insight other factors inspire critical questions into tactics. Rather, it provides insight about East Asia’s future. Wachman de- into why new tactics can be difficult to velops a theme of the strategic salience develop. Similarly, “Creating ASW Kill- of “imagined geography” as the best ing Zones,” although an excellent piece explanation for the significant variation on antisubmarine warfare over time in the association of Taiwan operations and strategy, does not pro- as part of Chinese sovereign territory vide much in the way of tactical insights in the minds of the leaders, and even on how to defeat the threat. the populace, of mainland China. He The great advantage of this book, and does so through close examination of indeed the entire Wheel Books series, is key Chinese documents and terminol- that it makes many excellent articles and ogy as well as careful consideration of essays readily available to the reading their relative authority and reliability. public—essays that might otherwise Wachman suggests that Sun Yat-sen, have fallen by the wayside. Overall, Chiang Kai-shek, the Chinese Com- this volume is an excellent addition to munist Party, Mao Zedong, and even any personal library. The size of the possibly Deng Xiaoping did not initially book and length of the articles make consider Taiwan to be part of China in it an excellent work for professional the sense that it is understood officially development, wardroom discussion, today. This approach raises compelling and thought-provoking conversation. questions about state formation and national identity that are critical to the CHARLES H. LEWIS understanding of international relations. Indeed, it may be argued that “imagined geography” is a global phenomenon and hardly peculiar to China. It is important to remember that Taiwan was formally Wachman, Alan M. Why Taiwan? Geostrategic incorporated into Qing administration Rationales for China’s Territorial Integrity. Stan- ford, Calif.: Stanford Univ. Press, 2007. 272pp. in 1683, nearly a century before the $25.95 founding of the United States. One may contrast such historical events as the Tufts Fletcher School professor Alan American acquisition and incorpora- Wachman was a giant in the China, East tion of Hawaii and Alaska and conclude Asian studies, and international rela- that the factors Wachman considers do tions field who remains sorely missed

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