In February 2005, Canadian Prime Minister Paul Martin Rejected Canada’S Participation in the Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) System Proposed by U.S
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HerEisendhower, Canada, and Continental Air Defense, 1953–1954 A “Common Appreciation” Eisenhower, Canada, and Continental Air Defense, 1953–1954 ✣ Alexander W. G. Herd In February 2005, Canadian Prime Minister Paul Martin rejected Canada’s participation in the ballistic missile defense (BMD) system proposed by U.S. President George W. Bush. Martin’s decision was based on domestic political calculations. He had promised that he would “vigorously” defend Canada’s sovereignty against unilateral U.S. action in Canadian airspace.1 The BMD proposal was not the ªrst time Canada had faced extensive U.S. plans for the missile defense of North America. In the 1980s President Ronald Rea- gan had proposed the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI).2 For many Canadi- ans, the U.S. BMD proposal exempliªed the Canadian-U.S. defense relation- ship formulated during the Cold War: U.S. pressure to coordinate Canadian defense policy with U.S. policy, Canadian concern for territorial sovereignty (particularly in the Canadian Arctic), an economic tug-of-war between U.S. and Canadian businesses, Canadian and U.S. public opinion on the extent of defense cooperation between the two countries, and the Canadian struggle for equal partnership with the United States in continental defense projects. For many scholars, the Canadian-U.S. defense relationship during the Cold War was characterized by Canada’s subordination, necessary or not, to 1. Daniel Leblanc and Paul Koring, “Canada Won’t Allow U.S. Missiles to Impugn Sovereignty, PM Vows,” The Globe and Mail (Toronto), 26 February 2005, p. 1. This news article notes that “sov- ereignty” does not extend into space, where missile interception would occur. Space is considered to begin 60 miles (100 kilometers) above the surface. 2. For historical arguments connecting the SDI with earlier Cold War continental air defense efforts, see Arthur Charo, “Continental Air Defense: A Neglected Dimension of Strategic Defense,” CSIA Occasional Paper No. 7, Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA, 1990; Stephen J. Cimbala, ed., Strategic Air Defense (Wilmington, DE: Scholarly Resources Books, 1989); and David Cox, Trends in Continental Defense: A Canadian Perspective (Ottawa: Cana- dian Institute for International Peace and Security, 1986). Journal of Cold War Studies Vol. 13, No. 3, Summer 2011, pp. 4–26 © 2011 by the President and Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology 4 Downloaded from http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdf/10.1162/JCWS_a_00140 by guest on 25 September 2021 Eisenhower, Canada, and Continental Air Defense, 1953–1954 U.S. continental defense plans.3 Conversely, a recent study based on declassi- ªed documents in Ottawa shows that Canada actively protected its national interests while cooperating with the United States on Cold War defense plans, speciªcally those related to Canadian nuclear weapons policy.4 This article demonstrates that much the same was true of Canadian-U.S. cooperation on continental air defense during the ªrst two years of the Eisenhower adminis- tration. Canadian political and military ofªcials curbed U.S. pressure and protected the Canadian government’s sovereign interests in the development of continental air defense plans. In general, during the Cold War Canada was “invisible and inaudible” to policymakers in Washington, DC.5 Most studies of Dwight Eisenhower’s for- eign policy focus on Europe, Asia, Latin America, and the Middle East.6 However, after the Soviet thermonuclear detonation on 12 August 1953, Canada was key to U.S. plans for early warning lines further north in Canada to detect incoming Soviet bombers. For U.S. ofªcials, the establishment of an early warning network was a matter of urgency. For their Canadian counter- parts, the issue was mainly a struggle for control over the U.S. presence on their soil. To accomplish their respective objectives, the two sides instituted secret, high-level consultative meetings. These meetings were informal and did not create policy commitments; rather they served as a forum for the ex- change of views on continental air defense. After World War II, continental defense projects had increased in quan- 3. Melvin Conant, The Long Polar Watch: Canada and the Defense of North America (New York: Harper, 1962); Brian Cuthbertson, Canadian Military Independence in the Age of the Superpowers (To- ronto: Fitzhenry & Whiteside, 1977); James Eayrs, Northern Approaches: Canada and the Search for Peace (Toronto: Macmillan, 1961); and James Eayrs, In Defence of Canada, Vol. 3, Peacemaking and Deterrence (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1972); Joseph T. Jockel, No Boundaries Upstairs: Canada, the United States, and the Origins of North American Air Defence, 1945–1958 (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1987); Dorothy W. Jones, “Canada’s Search for a Role in Conti- nental Defence since 1945,” M.A. Thesis, Carleton University, 1964; James M. Miniªe, Peacemaker or Powder-Monkey: Canada’s Role in a Revolutionary World (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 1960); John W. Warnock, Partner to Behemoth: The Military Policy of a Satellite Canada (Toronto: New Press, 1970); and Reginald Whitaker and Gary Marcuse, Cold War Canada: The Making of a National Inse- curity State (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1994). 4. Sean M. Maloney, Learning to Love the Bomb: Canada’s Nuclear Weapons during the Cold War (Washington, DC: Potomac Books, 2007). 5. Edelgard Mahant and Graeme S. Mount, Invisible and Inaudible in Washington: American Policies toward Canada (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1999). 6. The list of works is extensive and includes Warren I. Cohen and Akira Iriye, eds., The Great Powers in East Asia, 1953–1960 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1990); Robert A. Divine, Eisenhower and the Cold War (New York: Oxford University Press, 1981); John Lewis Gaddis, Strategies of Con- tainment: A Critical Appraisal of Postwar American National Security Policy (New York: Oxford Univer- sity Press, 1982); Richard H. Immerman, ed., John Foster Dulles and the Diplomacy of the Cold War (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1990); and Stephen G. Rabe, Eisenhower and Latin Amer- ica: The Foreign Policy of Anticommunism (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1988). 5 Downloaded from http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdf/10.1162/JCWS_a_00140 by guest on 25 September 2021 Herd tity and complexity. Central to this process was the tightening relationship between the U.S. Air Force (USAF) and the Royal Canadian Air Force (RCAF).7 With the Soviet nuclear detonation in 1949, Canada and the United States agreed to establish the Pinetree Line of radar stations approxi- mately along the 50th parallel for early detection of Soviet bombers coming from the north.8 In the ªrst half of 1953, Project Counterchange was initi- ated. Two joint bodies—the Canada–United States Military Study Group (MSG), consisting of air force planners; and the Canada–United States Scientiªc Advisory Team (CUSSAT)—were responsible for this project and sought to determine the operational requirements for a chain of Arctic radar stations called the Northern Detector Line (later known as the Distant Early Warning Line).9 Joint consultation was the next stage in continental air de- fense cooperation. From October 1953 to September 1954, when U.S. and Canadian ofªcials secretly consulted four times, they focused mainly on con- structing a third early warning line, the Southern Detector Line (later titled the Mid-Canada Line) along the 55th parallel. The Eisenhower administra- 7. In the winter of 1945–1946, the two countries undertook a joint defense exercise in the Arctic in- volving both air and ground personnel. In February 1946 the Military Cooperation Committee (MCC) was created, consisting of high-ranking U.S. and Canadian military ofªcers. The MCC for- mulated a revised Joint Canadian–United States Basic Security Plan in June 1946, in which a vital part was the defense of Canadian and U.S. territory against air attack. In the winter of 1947, jointly con- structed weather stations were established in northern Canada, and in February 1947 the two govern- ments publicly announced that they would continue continental defense collaboration in peacetime without a formal treaty. After the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) was founded in 1949, the Canada–United States Regional Planning Group (CUSRPG), one of ªve NATO regional defense groups, was responsible for planning to defend the Canadian-U.S. region against Soviet nuclear at- tack. At the end of the 1940s, the USAF began the construction of the “Permanent” early warning ra- dar network situated just south of the 49th Parallel. In the early 1950s, the USAF and RCAF made numerous joint plans, including for tactical cooperation in air defense training and the interception of enemy aircraft over North American territory. 8. This early warning line was the northward extension of the USAF’s “Permanent” line and included stations on the Atlantic and Paciªc coasts. The Pinetree Line became operational in 1954 and eventu- ally consisted of 44 long-range radar stations and six USAF-run smaller “gap ªller” radar stations. For more information, see Don Nicks, John Bradley, and Chris Charland (NBC Group), A History of the Air Defence of Canada 1948–1997 (North Bay, ON: Commander Fighter Group, 1997), pp. 33–34. 9. The ªrst Canadian studies of Arctic early warning were conducted in 1946, but the concept was disbanded because of