Juilliard V. Greenman, 110 US 421 (1884)
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LEGAL TENDER CASE. Statement of Facts. LEGAL TENDER CASE. JUILLIARD v. GREE:NMAI. IN ERROR TO THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR TEE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK. Submitted January 22d, 188.-Decided March 3d, 1884. ConstutionaZ Law-Legal Tender Notes-Statute8. Congress has the constitutional power to make the treasury notes of the United States a legal tender in payment of private debts, in time of peace as well as in time of war. Under the act of May 31st, 1878, ch. 146, which enacts that when any United States legal tender notes may be redeemed or received into the Treasury, and shall belong to the United States, they shall be reissued and paid out again, and kept in circulation, notes so reissued are a legal tender. Juilliard, a citizen of iNew York, brought an action against Greenman, a citizen of Connecticut, in the Circuit Court of the United States for the Southern District of New York, alleging that the plaintiff sold and delivered to the defendant, at his special instance and request, one hundred bales of cotton, of the value and for the agreed price of $5,122.90; and that the defendant agreed to pay that sum in cash on the delivery of the cotton, and had not paid the same or any part thereof, except that he had paid the sum of $22.90 on account, and was now justly indebted to the plaintiff therefor in the sum of $5,100; and demanding judgment for this sum with interest and costs. The defendant in his answer admitted the citizenship of the parties, the purchase and delivery of the cotton, and the agree ment to pay therefor, as alleged; and averred that, after the delivery of the cotton, he offered and tendered to the plaintiff, in full payment, $22.50 in gold coin of the United States, forty cents in silver coin of the United States, and two United States notes, one of the denomination of $5,000, and the other of the denomination of $100, of the description known as United States legal tender notes, purporting by recital thereon to be OCTOBER TERM, 1883. Argument for Plaintiff in Error. legal tender, at their respective facLe values, for all debts, public and private, except duties on imports and interest on the public debt, and which, after having been presented for payment, and redeemed and paid in gold coin, since January 1st, 1879, at the United States sub-treasury in New York, had been reissued and kept in circulation under and in pursuance of the act of Congress of May 31st, 1878, ch. 146 ; that at the time of offer- ing and tendering these notes and coin to the plaintiff, the sum of $5,122.90 was the entire amount due and owing in payment for the cotton, but the plaintiff declined to receive the notes in payment of $5,100 thereof; and that the defendant had ever since remained, and still was, ready and willing to pay to the plain- tiff the sum of $5,100 in these notes, and brought these notes into court, ready to be paid to the plaintiff, if he would accept them. The plaintiff demurred to the answer, upon the grounds that the defence, consisting of new matter, was insuffcient in law upon its face, and that the facts stated in the answer did not constitute any defence to the cause of action alleged. The Circuit Court overruled the demurrer and gave judgment for the defendant, and the plaintiff sued out this writ of error. Xr. George F. Edmunds and Xr. William Allen Butler for plaintiff in error.-The question presented by the assignment of errors are: 1st. That the act of May 31st, 1878, entitled "an act to prevent the further retirement of United States legal tender notes," cannot be construed as giving to the United States notes required by the act to be issued, paid out, and kept in circulation, the incident or quality of legal tender; and 2d, That if said act must be so construed, then it is, to that extent, unconstitutional and void. I.-The questions above stated, involving the construction and validity of the act of May 31st, 1878, are open questions in this court not controlled by the decision in the legal tender cases, which related solely to the legal tender clauses of the acts of 1862 and 1863, and upheld them solely in'view of the public exigency in reference to which they were enacted. The legal tender clauses of the acts of February 25th, 1862, July LEGAL TEN{DER CASE. Argument for Plaintiff in Error. 11th, 1862, and March 3d, 1863, applied only to the United States notes authorized by those acts to be issued by the Secre- tary of the Treasury as therein provided, and to be reissued by him from time to time as the exigencies of the pablio service might require. These clauses were enacted by Congress, were approved by the Executive, and were upheld by this court in the Legal Tender cases, 12 Wall. 457, as war measures, excep- tional in their character, not authorized by any express grant of power to Congress contained in the Constitution, but as not prohibited by its terms, and as justified in view of the great public exigencies which required their adoption. When the act of 1862, which first made treasury notes a legal tender, was under consideration, the committee of the House in charge of the bill consulted the Secretary of the Treasury, who replied: "It is not unkngwn to them that I have felt, nor do I wish to conceal that I now feel, great aversion to making anything but -coin a legal tender in payment of debts. It has been my anxioug wish to avoid the necessity of such legislation. It is, however, at present, impossible, in consequence of the large expenditures en- tailed by the war, and the suspension of the banks, to procure sufficient coin for disbursements; and it has, therefore, becom@ indispensably necessary that we should resort to the issue of United States notes. The committee, doubtless, feel the neces- sity of accompanying this measure by legislation .necessary to secure the highest credit as well as the largest currency of these notes. This security can be found, in my judgment, by proper provisions for funding them in interest-bearing bonds; by well- guarded legislation authorizing banking associations with circula- tion based on the bonds in which the notes are funded; and by a judicious system of adequate taxation." The proposed legal tender clauses of the bill provoked pro- tracted and earnest debate in the House of Representatives. They were vigorously opposed, on the ground of unconstitution- ality as well as impolicy, by leading representatives of both political parties. The provision for making the notes a legal tender was pressed by all its advocates as a war measure of imperative necessity; as a means of national self-preservation, OCTOBER TERM, 1883. Argument for Plaintiff in Error. justified and required by the end to be attained. The bill finally passed the House under pressure of impending ruin to the credit of the government, by a vote of 93 to 59. It then passed the Senate, with amendments, after a motion to strike out the legal tender clause had failed, by a vote of 17 to 22, and, as the result of conference, was again passed by the House of Representatives, February 25th, 1862, and on the same day was approved by President Lincoln. After noticing the acts of 1863 and 1864, counsel next re- ferred to the legislation of 1865 and 1866, as showing no authority to issue new legal tender notes, and as indicating a purpose of gradually retiring those outstanding, and to the legislation of 1868 as showing an intent to stop the reduction and to permit reissues in place of mutilated notes. They cited Lane Countyv. Oregon., 7 Wall. 71 ; Bronso,. v. Rodes, 7 Wall. 229; Butlee v. Horwitz, 7 Wall. 258; -Thompson,v. R ggs, 5 Wall. 663; Willard v. Tayloe, 8 Wall. 557, and Yeazie Bank v. Fenno, 8 Wall, 533; in which the court held that the tax on State bank circulation was constitutional. Shortly after this H~epburn v. Griswold,8 Wall 603, was decided. The discussion of the questions involved in that case embraced the whole sub- ject of the power of Congress under the Constitution to pass the Legal Tender Acts. The court as constituted at the time of the argument and of the announcement of the decision, under the operation of the act of July 23, 1866, was composed of a chief justice and six associate justices. The opinion of the court, delivered by Chief Justice Chase, Associate Justices Nel- son, Clifford, and Field concurring, and also Mr. Justice Grier, who ws a member of the court when the cause was decided in conference (November 27th, 1869), and when the opinion was directed to be read (January 29th, 1870), was adverse to the constitutionality of the legal tender clauses 8 Wall. 604. As- sociate Justices Miller, Swayne and Davis dissented. After the announcement of this decision a motion was made to this court by the Attorney-General to reconsider the question of the constitutionality of the Legal Tender Acts. The consti- tution of the court had, in the interval between the decision of Hl'pb 'n v. G riswoldand the application for a reargument, been ILEGAL TENDER CASE. Argument for Plaintiff in Error. changed by the act of April 10th, 1869, 16 Stat. 44, increasing the number of associate judges to nine, which took effect on the first Monday of December, 1869, and a motion for a recon- sideration of the question was made before the court as thus reconstituted.