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Internet Freedom in Vladimir Putin's Russia: the Noose Tightens

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Internet Freedom in Vladimir Putin's Russia: the Noose Tightens Internet freedom in Vladimir Putin’s Russia: The noose tightens By Natalie Duffy January 2015 Key Points The Russian government is currently waging a campaign to gain complete control over the country’s access to, and activity on, the Internet. Putin’s measures particularly threaten grassroots antigovernment efforts and even propose a “kill switch” that would allow the government to shut down the Internet in Russia during government-defined disasters, including large-scale civil protests. Putin’s campaign of oppression, censorship, regulation, and intimidation over online speech threatens the freedom of the Internet around the world. Despite a long history of censoring traditional media, the Russian government under President Vladimir Putin for many years adopted a relatively liberal, hands-off approach to online speech and the Russian Internet. That began to change in early 2012, after online news sources and social media played a central role in efforts to organize protests following the parliamentary elections in December 2011. In this paper, I will detail the steps taken by the Russian government over the past three years to limit free speech online, prohibit the free flow of data, and undermine freedom of expression and information—the foundational values of the Internet. The legislation discussed in this paper allows the government to place offending websites on a blacklist, shut down major anti-Kremlin news sites for erroneous violations, require the storage of user data and the monitoring of anonymous online money transfers, place limitations on 1 bloggers and scan the network for sites containing specific keywords, prohibit the dissemination of material deemed “extremist,” require all user information be stored on data servers within Russian borders, restrict the use of public Wi-Fi, and explore the possibility of a kill-switch mechanism that would allow the Russian government to temporarily shut off the Internet. Changing Times for the Russian Internet The Internet has, until recently, successfully avoided Putin’s attention. Nikolay Petrov, an analyst at the Carnegie Moscow Center, stated in mid-2012: “Two months ago, Putin was saying that the Internet doesn’t deserve any real attention, and that it’s the place where pornography dominates.”1 At that point, the Internet was still a mostly deregulated and uncensored frontier for the Russian population to obtain information and share ideas. Since early 2012, however, the Russian government’s attitude toward the Internet has shifted from a general indifference to an evolving cyberphobia. We have witnessed a government campaign to gain complete control over the Russian population’s access to, and activity on, the Internet.2 Shortly after the parliamentary elections of December 2011, segments of the Russian population began voicing their disapproval of the election results, citing election rigging in favor of Putin’s party, United Russia. On December 10, 2011, tens of thousands of disillusioned Russian citizens congregated in Bolotnaya Square in Moscow; two weeks later, the number of participants swelled to 100,000.3 These protests were by far the largest antigovernment demonstrations to occur since the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991; previous protests had drawn at most 200 individuals.4 Social media—including Facebook, VKontakte (the Russian equivalent of Facebook), LiveJournal, and Twitter—was used as a medium to coordinate the times and locations of rallies and demonstrations while also facilitating the collection and distribution of funds that made the demonstrations possible. In addition, social media was an integral catalyst to the protests, as it allowed the Russian population to see electoral fraud and manipulation in favor of—and potentially orchestrated by—the party in power. Dozens of user-generated videos capturing electoral violations were posted online. Some videos depicted carousel voting, in which individuals were bussed between various polling places to cast votes in favor of United Russia 2 under different names; other videos documented individuals stuffing stacks of ballots, already filled out with votes for United Russia, into ballot boxes.5 Konstantin von Eggert, a Russian journalist and political commentator who previously headed the BBC Russian Service’s Moscow bureau, summed up the role of the Internet in these protests by stating, “For the first time, really, the online presence has transformed offline politics.”6 These protests sparked a transformation in Putin’s attitude toward the network of networks. Since 2011, we have seen an onslaught of laws and initiatives aimed at eliminating Internet freedom and ensuring that the last form of free media in Russia is brought within boundaries dictated by the Russian government. Furthermore, it is likely that in the years to come, should economic sanctions continue to weigh heavily on the Russian economy, the Russian government will continue to expand its controls on the Internet to squash any opposition movements and ensure that the powers-that-be remain just that. The Putin Government Declares War on the Open Internet Since December 2011, Putin has tightened his grip on the Internet via numerous pieces of legislation. These laws were passed in rapid succession, and all used vague language to define the parameters for which sectors of the Internet they apply to and how they are enforced. The rapid implementation of legislation focused on constricting the Internet and the freedom of its users has been referred to as an initiative to create a domestic equivalent to the “Great Firewall of China” around web content in Russia. Putin has faced little resistance in this campaign, as the Moscow Times noted, “Russia’s government and its loyalist legislature have a track record of passing so-called ‘blitzkrieg’ bills that impose Internet restrictions within weeks and without consulting the web community or IT industry.”7 The Censorship Campaign Begins. President Putin’s increased interest in the Internet was evident in the implementation of Federal Law No. 89417-6.8 Formally titled “On the Protection of Children from Information Harmful to Their Health and Development” but more commonly known as the “Blacklist Bill,” it was signed on July 28, 2012, less than six months after the protests of late 2011 and early 2012. The law’s stated purpose is to block sites related to child pornography, materials on drug abuse or production, and suicide. 3 The law further states that a blacklist be instituted and maintained by the Federal Division Roskomnadzor, a government regulatory body roughly equivalent to the United States Federal Communications Commission.9 Under this law, Roskomnadzor notifies sites that they are on the blacklist, and if the offending content is not removed within 72 hours of the notification, the site may be blocked. This law also includes measures that allow Roskomnadzor to essentially censor individual URLs, domain names, and IP addresses. Additionally, it grants Roskomnadzor power to censor websites that would encourage “mass riots” or “participation in unsanctioned events.” The approval of the Blacklist Bill raised numerous concerns from critics on how government regulation would operate within the confines outlined in the bill. On July 10, 2012, as the bill progressed swiftly through the State Duma, many Russian websites went dark in protest. They cited lack of oversight of the government authority appointed to implement the new restrictions. Coupled with the vague language of the bill and the uncertainty about what content would be deemed harmful to children, many believed this law would open the door for the potential of misuse and excessive, unwarranted censorship. Despite protests, the bill was approved by an overwhelming majority within one week.10 The Blacklist Bill has been used on several occasions. In the first two weeks after the bill was passed, more than 180 websites were banned; by February 2013, after a mere four months, the number of websites banned under the Blacklist Bill reached 4,000.11 In March 2014, access to six websites—including those of dissident Alexei Navalny. individuals organizing protests against Russia’s annexation of Crimea, and pages of Ukrainian rights groups on Russia’s largest social media site—were shut off.12 A study by Freedom House, an independent watchdog organization, details that from January 2012 to February 2013, the number of websites that were blocked for containing what the Ministry of Justice deemed “extremist” material increased by approximately 60 percent.13 On February 1, 2014, Roskomnadzor gained even greater authority. The “Lugovoi Law”— named after the member of the State Duma who sponsored it, who also happens to have been accused of murdering a Kremlin critic in 2006—gave the communications regulator the power to block, without a court ruling, websites deemed extremist or a threat to public order.14 4 Additionally, the Russian government focused on major independent news sites. On March 13, 2014, Russia’s prosecutor general published a list that was sent to Russia’s Internet service providers (ISPs). The list included several information sites and social media accounts of opposition groups and leaders. It also included the newspaper Grani, a popular opposition news portal famous for publishing pieces highly critical of the Kremlin. The ISPs were instructed to shut down servers that deliver the offending content in an effort by the government to prevent unauthorized protests and ensure that house arrest standards were met.
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