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The Digital Counter-Revolution: Why the Kremlin Pursues a Sovereign Internet Author(S): Plattner, Antonin Publication Date: November 2019 Category: Analysis

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The Digital Counter-Revolution: Why the Kremlin Pursues a Sovereign Internet Author(S): Plattner, Antonin Publication Date: November 2019 Category: Analysis Title: The Digital Counter-Revolution: Why the Kremlin pursues a sovereign Internet Author(s): Plattner, Antonin Publication date: November 2019 Category: Analysis Keywords: Internet, sovereignty, authoritarianism, democracy, governance, technology, infrastructure, national security, Russia Cover page photo: People attend an opposition rally in Moscow, Russia, on 10 March 2019. Participants in the rally are protesting against the bill about sovereign RuNet and censorship on the Internet. EPA/Maxim Shipenkov/Scanpix Disclaimer: The views and opinions contained in this paper are solely those of its author(s) and do not necessarily represent the official policy or position of the International Centre for Defence and Security or any other organisation. ISSN 2228-2076 ©International Centre for Defence and Security 63/4 Narva Rd., 10152 Tallinn, Estonia [email protected], www.icds.ee in all modesty, thought he was the chosen one to avenge the insult of the “greatest geopolitical catastrophe of the 20th century”.2 Ever since, an unwavering spirit of restoration has animated his political views: restoring the Kremlin’s prestige and strength both domestically and internationally remains his only ideological driver. Thus, his political vision On 25 July 2019, the Select Committee on started out with an end in mind. Intelligence of the US Senate released a report The “colour revolutions” in Ukraine, Georgia on “Russian active measures campaigns and 1 and Kyrgyzstan (and the small-scale protests interference in the 2016 U.S. election”. Its they inspired in Moscow in 2005) convinced main finding is that “extensive activities” had Putin that his reactionary “project” could be been carried out “at least from 2014” until “at transcended by progressive forces, ready to least 2017” but that “Russian intentions break the spell of a country doomed to be ruled regarding U.S. election infrastructure remain unclear” since “no evidence that any votes If Vladimir Putin was a tsar, this is probably the way were changed or that any voting he would have told people he wanted to be praised machines were manipulated” was and remembered—the Restorer found. Quoting former Homeland Security adviser Lisa Monaco, the report makes the hypothetical assumption that by autocratic regimes. The Restorer had to take these “active measures” might have had as an the initiative back at any cost. That’s when the Kremlin started ringing the bells of a overarching goal “to sow distrust and discord 3 and lack of confidence in the voting process and “preventive counter-revolution”. the democratic process”. This analysis aims to This counterattack took shape through “the support this thesis by substantiating and elaboration of ‘sovereign democracy’ as a state contextualising the Russian state’s active ideology”, which quickly established itself as measures in the broader context of Putin’s the federal government’s new political mantra.4 domestic and international digital counter- However, the Kremlin’s “preventive counter- revolution. It argues that this campaign not only revolution” had to deal with a rather adverse sought to undermine public confidence in environment. The digital revolution had already democratic processes but also attempted to started to reshape the global and domestic erode our trust in the freedom of the internet balance of power by transforming information, in order to indirectly promote Moscow’s calls communication, production and power for “internet sovereignty”. paradigms. The internet quickly catalysed the government’s hysteria, which (temporary) reached its peak in 2014 when Putin called it a “CIA conspiracy”.5 If Vladimir Putin was a tsar, this is probably the way he would have told people he wanted to be praised and remembered—the Restorer. He 2 lived through the collapse of the USSR, which Andrew Osborn, “Putin: Collapse of the Soviet Union was ‘catastrophe of the Century’”, The Independent, 26 April he regards as a humiliation. He genuinely, and 2005 (accessed 7 August 2019). 3 Robert Horvath, Putin’s Preventive Counter-Revolution: Post-Soviet Authoritarianism and the Spectre of Velvet 1 U.S. Senate, “Report of the Select Committee on Revolution (Abingdon: Routledge, 2013). Intelligence, United States Senate, on Russian Active 4 Ibid., 1. Measures Campaigns and Interference in the 2016 U.S. 5 Vladimir V. Putin, “Mediaforum Nezavisimykh Election. Volume 1: Russian Efforts Against Election Regionalnykh i Mestnykh SMI” (Forum of Regional and Infrastructure With Additional Views”, Report 116-XX Local Independent Mass Media), Prezident Rossii, 24 April (Washington, DC, July, 2019) (accessed 7 August 2019). 2014, transcript (accessed 7 August 2019). Being intrinsically international, the internet of issues.8 This political iconography has been has become the most serious challenger to the popularised within Russia and widely projected authoritarian “sovereign democracy”. The abroad. However, there is a stark contrast restoration of the Russian federal state’s power between this rather unequivocal and media- and prestige needed a digital counter- friendly image of Putin’s absolute power and revolution. In 2015, Nikolay Nikoforov, Putin’s the polyphony, if not anarchy, of Russian zealous minister of communications, came up governance. Given the expertise of the with an original suggestion: that “sovereign country’s security services in this field, the democracy” be supplemented by the concept of image of the “new tsar” icon could even “internet sovereignty”.6 This brilliant idea has represent a successful long-running piece of maskirovka, the military doctrine of deception, denial Being intrinsically international, the internet has and disinformation inherited become the most serious challenger to the from Soviet times. Even if the authoritarian “sovereign democracy”. The restoration concept of “power vertical”, of the Russian federal state’s power and prestige which “defines the regime of needed a digital counter-revolution Russia as a system of faithfulness, loyalty and complete subordination to sought ever since to hijack the features that one person” is relevant in the have made the internet a success: its intrinsic realm of Russian tactical decision-making, it freedom and borderless nature. The move may be misleading when addressing issues constitutes a desperate attempt to restore related to the design and implementation of Moscow’s central power by imposing absolute long-term strategies.9 and unrestricted power over domestic information and communication technologies In reality, the Russian political sphere is a (ICT). Internationally, “internet sovereignty” largely informal bullring in which different aims ultimately to “digitalise” Moscow’s power factional and individual interests struggle for politics by enforcing a neo-Westphalian, state- primacy. Sam Greene, director of the King’s centric global internet governance. Moreover, Russia Institute, describes this political system to force the international community to as a “hybrid authoritarianism” that is “both support Nikoforov’s outstanding idea, Putin disengaged and deinstitutionalized, seeking to decided to enact his worst nightmare: a global minimize points of contact between the state internet-based campaign of disruption aimed at and its citizens and, where contact is necessary, failing to structure that engagement along sowing “distrust and discord and lack of 10 confidence” in the freedom of the internet.7 coherent, predictable patterns”. A specialist on Russian systemic corruption, Alena Ledeneva, named this murky and clientelist form of governance the Sistema. She describes Putin as the public face and central node of a Everybody knows Vladimir Putin—this complex assemblage of power networks that omnipotent, omnipresent and omniscient “new tsar” roaming ruthlessly around his kingdom, bare-chested on the back of his stallion and 8 See Steven Lee Myers, The New Tsar: The Rise and Reign exhibiting an inspirational will to resolve all kind of Vladimir Putin (Knopf, 2015). 9 Marius Laurinavičius, “Putin’s Russia: The Nature and Contradictions of the Regime”, Lithuanian Annual Strategic Review 14, (2015-2016): 121; The new National Defence Control Centre (NDCC), established in Moscow in 6 Anastasia Galtitsyna, Elizaveta Ser’gina, “Ministr Svyazi 2014 and supported by one of the most powerful Predlozhit Pravitelstvu Vsyat’ Runet Pod Kotrol’” (Minister computers in the world, functions as a “wartime of Communication proposes that government takes government” able to swiftly coordinate all spheres of control of Runet), Vedomosti, 26 March 2015 (accessed 7 Russian state power. August 2019). 10 Samuel A. Greene, Moscow in Movement: Power and 7 U.S. Senate, “Report of the Select Committee on Opposition in Putin’s Russia (Stanford, CA: Stanford Intelligence”. University Press, 2014): 220. “lock politicians, bureaucrats and businessmen characterises authoritarian and arbitrary into informal deals, mediated interests and regimes: its fear of information is nurtured by personalised loyalty”.11 its own deceitful use of the media. The main feature of the Sistema is that it Because the control of the so-called “traditional permits power to be exercised in an indirect media” was attracting most of the and opaque manner, thereby avoiding any kind government’s efforts during Putin’s first and of public scrutiny. This indirect governance second terms, the internet quickly revealed creates a protective “soft focus” for illegal and itself as a formidable platform for challenging arbitrary political practices
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