A EUROPEAN CRISIS Considering EU Institutional Framework in Light of the Migration Crisis in Greece

M.Sc. International Business & Politics

Master’s Thesis

Christine Ebert

Supervisor: Magali Gravier

Hand-in date 1st June 2016

Characters: 145.624

M.Sc. International Business & Politics

Copenhagen Business School, 2016

Abstract

Throughout 2015, more than one million migrants and refugees arrived in Europe. Most of those in Greece. Caught between the Schengen Agreement on the one hand, which tasks Greece with protecting its external borders, and the Dublin Regulation on the other, which places the responsibility for processing asylum application with the first country of entry, Greece was quickly overwhelmed. As migrants left Greece behind and travelled across Europe heading for countries such as Sweden and Germany, member states seemed at a loss. Agreement on how to effectively deal with the crisis proved hard to come by, and by the end of the year, six EU countries had reinstated border control as a response to the influx of migrants. This thesis seeks to assess how the crisis has affected the EU institutional framework for dealing with migrants and to surmise what the consequences thereof might be. The institutional framework selected concerns the Schengen Agreement and the Dublin Regulation, while Frontex will also be considered due to its involvement with EU’s external border. Securitisation is applied to the institutional frameworks, though no evidence is found that they represent a securitisation of migration within the EU. The theory of path dependence is applied to assess whether we might be dealing with a critical juncture. While the institutional frameworks contain some gaps, the biggest gap that has become apparent is the division between member states as to the purpose of the European Union.

2 List of Abbreviations

AFSJ Area of Freedom, Security and Justice

CISA Convention to Implement the Schengen Agreement

CEAS Common European Asylum System

CJEU Court of Justice of the European Union

ECHR European Convention on Human Rights

ECtHR European Court of Human Rights

ERF European Refugee Fund

JHA Justice and Home Affairs

MEP Member of the European Parliament

RABIT Rapid Border Intervention Team

TEU Treaty on European Union

TFEU Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union ¨

List of Figures

Figure 1 Eastern Mediterranean Migration Route, p. 7

Figure 2 From Induction to Deduction, p. 16

Figure 3 Combining Securitisation and Path Dependence, p. 29

Figure 4 Migration Route from Greece to Germany, p. 52

3 Table of Contents

1. Introduction 6 2. Methodology 9

2.1 Philosophy of science 9 2.2 Selection of topic 10 2.3 Terminology 11 2.4 Delimitation 13 2.5 Research approach 16 3. Framework 18

3.1 Securitisation 18 3.1.1 Securitisation and migration 20 3.2 Path Dependence 26 3.3 Combining securitisation and path dependence 29 4. Findings & Analysis 32

4.1 The European Union 32 4.1.1 The European Commission 33 4.1.2 The European Parliament 34 4.1.3 The Council of the European Union 34 4.1.4 The Area of Freedom, Security and Justice 35 4.2 The Schengen Agreement 36 4.3 The Dublin Regulation 42 4.4 Frontex 46 4.5 Summary 48 4.6 Greece 49 4.7 The 2015 Crisis 51 4.8 Path Dependence Applied 54 5. Discussion 56

4 5.1 The Schengen/Dublin Framework 56 5.2 Securitisation Assessed 61 6. Conclusion 65 7. References 68

5 1. Introduction

The concept of migration is a tale as old as time. People have forever left their homes in search of new places and the reasons for doing so are as manifold as the destinations reached; some have gone in search of new adventures, some looking for employment, some hoping for better quality of life, while others yet have been forced to leave by circumstances beyond their control. Historically speaking, European countries have provided a great source of emigrants, with an estimated 50 million people leaving for the US, Canada and South America between 1820 and 1914 (Diez & Pichelmann, 2006, p. 4). Since the 1950s, however, the trend has reversed with immigrants now heading towards European countries. In the 1950s and 1960s, it was primarily guest workers recruited by northern European countries (ibid., p. 5). By the late 1960s and into the 1970s the issue became more of a “public concern” (Huysmans, 2000, p. 754) and in 1974, the recruitment of foreign workers stopped as a consequence of the oil crisis and ensuing rise in unemployment (Diez & Pichelmann, 2006, p. 5). Despite this, immigration continued by means of family reunification throughout the 1970s, turning guest workers into permanent guests (Huysmans, 2000, p. 754).

From the early 1980s onwards, concerns began surfacing in several European countries about irregular migration (Boswell, 2007, p. 594). In more recent years, migrants trying to reach the EU have received international attention, partly due to the dangerous journey undertaken by some in order to reach the European Union, which, as we have seen off of the coast of both Italy and Greece can lead to disastrous events, some even resulting is deaths. Much attention has been paid to the Mediterranean countries, especially Spain and Italy. In fact, in 2012, “80,6% of irregular migrants detected at the EU’s external borders were detected at the Mediterranean” (Manrique Gil et al., 2014, p. 5). More recently, the focus has shifted to Greece and it has been suggested that the operations to combat illegal border crossings “may merely displace, rather than reduce, the volume of unauthorized crossings.” (Morehouse & Blomfeld, 2011, p. 1).

In 1985, five member states of the European Community came together to set up the Schengen Agreement, an arrangement which would do away with internal borders between member states and instead solidify one common external border. In conjuncture with the Schengen Agreement,

6 member states agreed on a common set of visa and immigration rules to be introduced, as entry into one country in effect meant access to all. Greece, located on the periphery of the Union, is, in this respect, fairly isolated, as none of its borders are shared with other Schengen countries. Moreover, due to its geographical location and shape the country “has become a common transit country for those seeking entry into Europe” (Kasimis 2012). In 2008, 50 percent of detected illegal border crossings to the EU were detected in Greece, making the country “the main European gateway for unauthorized immigrants” (MPI, 2010). By 2010, the number had gone up to 90 percent (ibid.). The main problem at the time was deemed the land border to Turkey in the Evros River region, where hundreds of people were (attempting to) cross each day. In 2010, the Greek government even requested the aid of Frontex’s Rapid Border Intervention Teams (RABIT) and two years later Greece erected a fence along its border to Turkey and increased patrol with the aid of Frontex. While the fence did cause a decrease in numbers of migrants trying to enter across the land border, an increase in entries by sea was soon detected instead (Spindler, 2015).

In 2015, an estimated 885,000 migrants reached the EU via the Eastern Mediterranean route (see figure 1), 17 times the amount of 2014 (Frontex, 2016a). Greece has been on the receiving end of a lot of blame throughout 2015 for ‘letting’ migrants enter its territory (Christides, et al., 2016). Unable to contain the crisis, migrants began heading towards other EU countries. A draft Schengen Evaluation Report based on observations made in November 2015 revealed “serious deficiencies in the management of the external border in Greece” (EC, 2016a) and at the end of 2015, several EU countries had reintroduced temporary border control, including Austria, France, and Germany, with Hungary even declaring a state of emergency.

Taking all these elements into account, I will try to answer the following research question: How has the “Greek migration crisis” impacted the EU’s institutional framework for dealing with migration?

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Figure 1: Map illustrating the Easter Mediterranean route passing using Turkey as a point of entry. SOURCE: National Geographic, 2015

1.1 Structure of thesis

This thesis will proceed in the following way: following the introduction, I will present the methodology (2). This will lead to a presentation of the framework (3). Afterwards, I will move on to the findings and analysis (4), before discussing some of these finding (5). Finally, I will conclude on the matter (6).

8 2. Methodology

In this section, I will explain the methodological choices made for this thesis; what I will attempt to do, how and why. I will present my philosophy of science, critical realism, and the assumptions inherent therein in section 2.1. In section 2.2 I will elaborate on my choice of topic as well as some of the thoughts that went with it. Section 2.3 will discuss the importance of terminology and why we must be aware of the concepts used by ourselves and others. In section 2.4 I will discuss the delimitation of this thesis, more specifically what has been selected and what has been excluded in terms of data. And finally, in section 2.5 I will present my research approach, which guides the rest of the thesis.

2.1 Philosophy of science

This thesis will be informed by critical realism, which focuses on “explaining what we see and experience, in terms of the underlying structures of reality that shape the observable events” (Saunders et al., 2016, p. 138). Thus it assumes a layered reality, where we see only a part of the whole, and the whole in turn illustrates only what goes on. Said in a different way, there is a world we can only partly grasp. Unlike the positivist, critical realists do not subscribe to the notion that that there is one trues reality that we can all observe. Rather, they distinguish between layers, which can be classified as empirical, actual and real (ibid, p. 139). The ‘empirical’ sphere concerns what the individual senses, what he or she sees directly. On this level, we are concerned with our own reality, which the critical realists acknowledge is subjective. There is also an awareness that we cannot fathom everything around us, that the empirical sphere holds only a fraction of what goes on in the ‘actual’ sphere. but we can try to learn more. We can ask around and thereby get a sense of the ‘actual’ sphere, which contains the events that surround us but which we may not have observed ourselves. This provides a much larger frame of reference that we could have achieved at the ‘empirical’ level. But the ‘real’ level is concerned only with what is, not why it is. For this, we move onto the ‘real’ sphere. Here, we can start investigating what happened to cause the outcome we were exposed to in the ‘actual’ sphere. Thus, critical realists believe that we what we experience

9 is merely “some of the manifestations of the things in the real world, rather than the actual things” (ibid., p. 139). In order to try and understand those actual things, we need to explore the underlying causes thereof. It is here that the results are explained. Saunders et al. explain that critical realists typically go through two processes when making sense of the world (p. 139); first there is observations (“sensations”) that are experienced. This is what happens in the ‘empirical’ sphere. Next, they “‘reason backwards’ from the experiences” to try and identify the “underlying reality” that could have led to the observation made. Thus, historical considerations play a part in the analysis done by critical realists.

This philosophy of science fits in well with the framework selected for this thesis, as it, too, looks to historical causes for explanations and assumes a certain amount of construction of reality.

2.2 Selection of Topic

The inspiration for the topic selected for this thesis came primarily from following the media coverage of the migration crisis. While it seemed clear that Greece was overwhelmed by the influx of people, it was much less clear who was going to step in and help out. It seemed like everyone was watching Greece while simultaneously holding their breath. Once the migrants started moving out from Greece and heading west, countries closed their borders. Throughout autumn, we witnessed a series of European countries reinstating border controls at their internal borders. Then, in the beginning of 2016, a draft report was brought forward by the Commission; a Schengen Evaluation Report assessing Greece’s response to the influx of third state nationals. The report concluded that Greece had, basically, failed. This seemed like an overly simplified conclusion in my mind. Was it really Greece’s fault? My research question thus arose from my confusion and, as a consequence thereof, my wish to better understand what was happening in Greece and what this meant for the EU. I was struck by the situation, in which Greece seemingly finds itself at the losing end of not one, but two sets of EU regulations, namely the Schengen Agreement and the Dublin Regulation. And how does the crisis reflect on these regulations? In order to better understand and

10 assess this issue, I will need to first look at the framework provided by the EU, which sets out rules and regulations pertinent to border control and immigration. Only by assessing its current structure, might we consider the limitations they entail, which can lead us to speculate about possible consequences. Although the criticism issued by the Commission referred to border control issues, the problem, it seems to me, is two-fold; it is not just a question of people crossing the borders, we also have to consider what to do with them once they are here, which is where the Dublin Regulation comes into the picture. This regulation determines which country is responsible for processing asylum applications, and, mostly, the duty falls on the country first entered by the asylum seeker. It would seem, therefore, that Greece is at a disadvantage in not just one, but two sets of EU regulations. By trying to understand the situation that has played out in Europe thus far, we might be able to explain why the situation was handled as it was.

2.3 Terminology

The debate on the situation in Greece (and the rest of the Mediterranean) is laden with loaded terminology; migration crisis; keeping Europe safe; floods of migrants. While this is not a study in rhetoric, it is still a point that needs to be addressed, as the words we use can easily affect our view of the situation and play to our sympathies or fear, or simply lead to misunderstandings. Repeating one set of terms might make people perceive of the situation in a given way, even if just subconsciously. Either way, considering some of the terms used and identifying some of the implications they bear, will help us navigate the debate more consciously. Overall, there are two areas, which we need to account for within the context of this thesis: the ‘phenomenon’ or situation that is playing out in Greece and the humans involved therein.

The situation in Greece is universally referred to as a crisis, either of migrants or of refugees. According to Pallister-Wilkins (2016, p. 314), however, we should be wary of referring to what is happening in Greece as a crisis; she argues that calling it a Mediterranean migration crisis is both too subjective and too specific in that that the issue is hardly contained to the particular area, that is the Mediterranean. We should moreover be careful of using the word crisis as it begs the question; crisis for whom? By referring to a European crisis, we are implying that we are victims,

11 that something horrible is happening to us. This ignores the reason why people are arriving at the EU borders. Namely, that there are crises elsewhere in the world that are significantly more severe. Moreover, there is the issue of how we react in face of a crisis; when dealing with a crisis, the emphasis easily becomes “restoring the status quo, not (…) changing it” (Jeandesboz & Pallister- Wilkins, 2016, p. 318). The notion of crisis carries with it a sense of something urgent, something that might require special measures to deal with. Thus, calling something a crisis might both shift the focus (and sympathy) and inform how we react thereto. If we could handle something with the usual instruments at our disposal, would it then be a crisis, or does the term imply a form or emergency response?

Throughout this thesis, the situation in Greece will be referred to as a crisis. I am aware that labelling it as a ‘crisis’ can be construed as a way of framing what is happening, but other words such as situation or incident, simply fail to capture the scale of what we are witnessing. Within the lifespan of the European Union, the scale of what is happening is unprecedented. The last time the European countries experienced anything like this in scope was during Second World War. Thus, in EU terms of reference, this is very much out of the ordinary.

The second issue, which we need to consider is how we refer to the migrants themselves. Are they refugees, migrants, or asylum seekers? Legal or illegal? The way in which we refer to the migrants can influence the way we consider them, and we must remain aware thereof. It must be pointed out that, according to UNESCO (UNESCO), there is no clear-cut definition of migration that is agreed upon internationally. Most countries operate with several different categories of migration and definitions thereof. This makes the debate only more confusing. There are some definitions, we can pinpoint, though. The way UNESCO explains it, a migrant is someone who lives in a country where he or she was not born, either temporarily or permanently (ibid.). Elaborating on this definition, the migrant is set apart from a refugee or asylum seeker in that he or she chooses to move, whereas the others are forced to. According to the European Migration Network’s Asylum and Migration Glossary 3.0, an asylum seeker is defined as “a person who has made an application for protection under the Geneva Convention in respect of which a final decision has not yet been taken” (EC, 2016b). An irregular migrant, meanwhile, is defined as “a third-country national present in the

12 territory of a Schengen State who does not fulfil, or no longer fulfils, the conditions of entry as set out in the Schengen Borders Code, or other conditions for entry, stay or residence in that Member State” (ibid.). Thus, a migrant is someone who has chosen to move; an asylum seeker is a potential refugee awaiting approval of his or her application, while an irregular migrant is present illegally. Now, these categories may not seem all that complicated, but in reality it can be quite the challenge. And to make it a little bit more challenging, a report was published in December 2015 by UK think tank ODI, which suggested that in reality, migrants and asylum seekers may have more in common than we assume; “[t]he reasons why people migrate are often multiple and changing, and the categories of ‘economic migrant’ and ‘asylum-seeker’ are too rigid to reflect reality. There are many shared motivations for regular and irregular migration” (Cummings et al., 2015, p. 24). They also assess migrants as being anyone on the move regardless of the motivation (ibid., p. 9).

What I am getting at is that we have to be aware of the implications that each of these terms carry. Using one term over the other can affect how the individual in question is portrayed. Case in point: When we talk of a migration crisis. If we consider migrants akin to the explanation set out by UNESCO above, the implication would suggest that the people arriving are not in need of protection but rather are traveling for, perhaps, economic reasons. If this is the case, then governments can rightfully deny them entry. If they are refugees, on the other hand, European states have an obligation under international conventions to provide them with asylum. Considering the sheer amount of people that arrived last year, it would be very difficult to assess them all and ‘categorise’ them but we should still consider from what perspective we approach them.

According to UNHCR estimates, the people arriving in Europe this past year represent a mix of the two; asylum seekers and migrants. However, they note that “[t]he majority of people arriving (…) in Italy and Greece especially have been from countries mired with war or which otherwise are considered to be ‘refugee-producing’ and for whom international protection is needed” (UNHCR, 2015). I will lean on this assessment for this thesis. So while I will refer to both migrants and refugees throughout this thesis, I am aware that the majority of the former are really latter, in line with ODI.

13 2.4 Delimitation

Greece is an interesting case study because it is still ongoing, because we do not yet know the outcome. In terms of writing a thesis, however, this can prove quite challenging. It is a definite disadvantage, trying to gather data while new information surfaces or new developments take place. Therefore, a cut-off date must be decided upon, a point in time past which new information is inadmissible. While it is very tempting to try and keep up to date on any new progress, it simply is not feasible. For this thesis, that cut-off date will be 31st December 2015. This date marks the end of a very challenging year for the EU, and perhaps it might mark the beginning of something better to come. With my deadline being the end of 2015, any proposals or agreements put forward or established in 2016 will not be considered for the analysis. Nor will the controversial deal with Turkey. It may have been initiated in 2015, but it did not come into effect until 2016 and it does not apply to any of those people who had already arrived in Greece by the end of 2015. Now, as with any rule, there will be an exception or two, depending on how the rules are interpreted. I will not cover things that have happened since the beginning of 2016, but I will accepts input from 2016 if it is strictly related to incidents in 2015. This means that the draft Schengen Report, which set me on this path, will be admitted into evidence. First of all, it is my catalyst, my reason for exploring this particular subject. Second of all, it is based entirely on observations made in 2015. The visits that informed the outcome of the report all took place last year. Likewise, I will also consider articles from 2016, but only if they are about what happened before the end of 2015.

My research question pertains to the ‘migration crisis’ as it unfolded in Greece and seeks to probe how this has reflected on and affected the institutional framework by which Greece is bound. In order to explore this issue, I need to define what is included and what is not. As mentioned earlier on, Greece seems to be stuck between a rock and a hard place at the moment in terms of its commitment and obligation as set out by the Schengen Agreement and the Dublin Regulation. Both the Schengen Agreement and the Dublin Regulation constitute a set of rules by which Greece has to abide, thus they place constraints on Greece in that they dictate certain requirements and behaviour which the country has to live up to. The Schengen Agreement is what formally establishes EU’s common external border vis-à-vis third country nationals and sets out the rules and responsibilities for external border control. It covers such topics as border policy, visa policy, and

14 the Schengen Information System. For this thesis, border policy will be the Schengen issue in focus. I accept the UNHCR’s assessment that the majority of incoming people are asylum seekers and it is this groups of people, whom I will focus on. Therefore, I will not consider visa policy within this thesis, as asylum seekers fall within another set of rules. This is where the Dublin Regulation comes in. This regulation has established the rules for determining responsibility with regards to asylum seekers within the Union, a responsibility which often lands with the first country an applicant enters. Frontex will also be considered with regards to its role in Greece over the past year(s). The agency has been called upon many times to provide assistance to Greece in terms of the management of external borders, twice it has even deployed its Rapid Intervention Teams to Greece. Frontex, an agency created to assist in upholding the regulations set out in the Schengen Agreement, can be considered an extension thereof; a way of upholding it in practice. Its role is to assess risk and coordinate and support missions to deal with issues concerning border security. Alas, the Schengen Agreement determines that Greece is in charge (and responsible for) keeping its external borders safe on behalf of the whole of the European Union, and Frontex is available for assistance with this endeavour. The Dublin Regulation, meanwhile, dictates that it also falls on Greece to process most of the claims filed by asylum seekers crossing its external borders.

Because the case in point is Greece, Italy will not be considered in this thesis, although it, too, struggled with a large influx of people in 2015. This is not to diminish the situation in Italy, but to say that it falls outside the scope of this thesis. The thesis is about the response to the situation in Greece and what we might learn from it. In that sense, the focus is less on the individuals who have arrived in Greece. The reasons for migration are plentiful and varied. This thesis will not attempt to assess why people are migrating to the European Union, nor will it consider the crises elsewhere in the world.

With regards to data collection for this thesis, I have relied primarily on secondary data. I have made use of articles from journals and materials by both the EU and various NGOs. I have also relied on news outlets for the gathering of data. I have tried to remain of the fact that any author has implicit assumptions and understandings of the way the world works. Although they may concern the same incidents, I would expect a report from Amnesty International to differ from one produced by an EU

15 institution, simply because the two would approach the issue from different standpoints. Moreover, they may be looking for different outcomes, which could also affect their understanding of the situation and shape their framing thereof. Scholars, too, have their bias, and as much as possible I have tried to assess their argumentation and not their convictions, although this is rarely 100 percent possible. (This point will be elaborated on in the next section, where I present the framework selected for this thesis.) Some scholars believe that almost any form of border is a restriction and an active attempt to shut other out, while others may view borders more as given and not pay much attention to them in their research.

2.5 Research Approach

The research approach selected for this thesis takes a blend of inductive and deductive techniques. I came up with the research question early on in the process and from there on I started reading up on the subject, gathering data as I went along and making note of the theories I came across during my research. Keeping my research question in mind, I selected the theories I felt would help illustrate and explain the situation, and thereby make sense of the data. By applying the framework of the theories to the situation in question, I sought to see if they could explain (part of) what we have witnessed in Greece. Thus I started out in an induction fashion, in that I first selected my case and then found the theories to help explain the question at hand. Once these theories were in place, however, I applied them in a deductive fashion, thus moving from an inductive to a deductive approach. This method is illustrated in figure 2.

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Theory Observation Pattern

Observation Confirmation

Figure 2: Tracing the progression from an inductive beginning to a deductive conclusion

This section has sought to justify the choices made in relation to the methods and data selected for this thesis. It should be clear how I will approach the subject at hand, as well as what data has been selected and what has been left out. Next, I will explain and justify the selection of framework and theory used, namely securitisation and path dependence.

17 3. Framework

This section will outline the framework and theory selected for this thesis. First, I will present the framework of securitisation (3.1). Next, I will consider some of the arguments put forward by scholars both in support of and against the notion of securitisation and immigration in the EU (3.2). Then, I will introduce path dependence as set out by historical institutionalism (3.3). And finally, I will explain why the two theories complement each other.

3.1 Securitisation

While issues of security have long been of concern and interest to scholars and researchers, the idea of securitisation is still fairly new on the scene. It was introduced by Ole Wæver in the mid-1990s and is usually identified as belonging to the Copenhagen School within the field of International Relations. In earlier decades, security had been viewed in fairly straightforward terms as having to do with the military affairs of the state. Moving away from this definition, scholars throughout the 1980s had begun using “security” to deal with much broader concepts challenging the idea that it was necessarily military-oriented. According to Wæver, a gap existed between the two camps, which, if filled, could offer more clarity on the issue; “an analytical as well as a political case [could] be made for developing an inbetween concept of security, somewhere between the narrow (always state, only military) and the wide (everything people worry about)” (Wæver, 1996, p. 106). From there on, he sets out to develop a more precise mode of application.

The result was an understanding of security being not so much about whether something is a threat, but rather whether it is socially constructed as such. The framework of securitisation is concerned with how specific issues are framed and what this framing allows actors to do. More specifically, “[s]ecurity discourse is characterized by dramatizing an issue as having absolute priority” (Wæver, 1996, p. 106). This issue must be presented as a threat, something so important that it has to be dealt with immediately and through extraordinary measures. Thus, there is a sense of urgency about the process; the threat is presented as imminent; something that must be taken care of now! The

18 issue in question is not required to be that far out of the ordinary, but successfully framing and presenting it as such elevates it to having top priority. This, in turn, creates an opportunity to react in drastic or extraordinary measures. In his study of securitisation, Wæver, places quite a bit of emphasis on the speech act, which is the act that gets the ball rolling. It is in the speech act that the dramatization is presented. It is in and through this act that the threat is made real and transformed into a security issue. This means that securitisation is in its nature self-referential (ibid, p. 107).

Boiled down to the basics, “securitization studies aims to gain an increasingly precise understanding of who securitizes, on what issues (threats), for whom (referent objects), why, with what results, and, not least, under what conditions (i.e. what explains when securitization is successful)” (Buzan et al., 1998, p. 32). Two (sets of) actors are needed for securitisation to be successful: One is the actor ‘doing’ the securitisation. The one who performs the speech act and convinces others of the gravity of the issue. It is not enough to have an individual ‘declare’ securitisation. He (or she) requires an audience that supports the act. Note that no performer of danger is required here. The issue is constructed as a threat. In this sense, securitisation is the construction of a danger. Not everyone can securitise an issue, however; it requires some form of authority. It has to be done by someone who is able to mobilise others and whose words will carry meaning. In the political arena, the securitising actors are often easily identified; states have their leaders, and even the EU has a “formal (though terribly complex) institutional structure,” according to Buzan et al. (1998, p. 146). The people who provide the aforementioned actor with authority must accept the argument put forward and its implications. In fact, an issue can only be considered securitised once the audience has accepted it as such. Its success thus depends on the shared understanding of danger between the securitising actor and the audience Otherwise, what we are witnessing is merely a “securitizing move” (Buzan et al., 1998, p. 25). Buzan et al. concede that the suggested extraordinary move does not necessarily have to become a reality. Rather, “the existential threat has to be argued and just gain enough resonance for a platform to be made from which it is possible to legitimize emergency measures or other steps that would not have been possible had the discourse not taken the form of existential threats, point of no return, and necessity” (ibid., p. 25). Alas, some consequence has to be felt, although it does not have to be the very extreme. According to Buzan et al. (1998, p. 27- 28), securitisation can be either ad hoc or institutionalised: “If a given type of threat is persistent or

19 recurrent, it is no surprise to find that the response and sense of urgency become institutionalized. This situation is most visible in the military sector, where states have long endured threats or armed coercion or invasion and in response have built up standing bureaucracies, procedures, and military establishments to deal with those threats.”

When considering securitisation, there are, according to Buzan et al., two ways of considering the issue at hand; homogeneous complexes and heterogeneous complexes (ibid., p. 16). The former deals with the issue of security specific to a sector, while the latter operates on the assumption that different actors operate together across sectors. Each has its advantages and disadvantages; dealing with the issue according to sector, for example, can provide the analyst with a fixed reference point, which might be easier to deal with. However, one might miss trends and connections across sectors, and it might well turn out to be quite tricky to ‘reassemble’ the sectors to get a general overview. The heterogeneous approach, meanwhile, allows the analyst to see the connections and spill over between actors and various sectors. According to Buzan et al., we don’t necessarily have to choose one or the other; “[i]n principle, both are possible, and the analyst needs to determine which alternative best fits the case under study” (1998, p. 16). For this thesis, the heterogeneous approach will be assumed. The issue of migration (and the potential securitisation thereof) can be placed into different categories, depending on what values are considered. Although “[s]ectors are distinctive arenas of discourse in which a variety of different values (sovereignty, wealth, identity, sustainability, and so on) can be the focus of power struggles” (ibid., p. 196), migration touches on several of those, including the political, societal, economy, and military sectors. Hence, the issue will not be isolated within specific sectors as laid out by Buzan et al.

3.1.1 Securitisation and migration

For years, scholars have debated amongst themselves whether or not we have witnesses the securitisation of immigration by the relevant authorities within the EU. Many scholars have explored the issue and reached different conclusion, with some coming out for and other against this line of argument.

20 According to Wæver (1996), who was amongst the group of scholars to introduce securitisation in the mid-90s, arguments based on security concerns are not new in the context of the EU. According to him, security arguments have been used before to further (or to at least to argue in favour of) integration within the Union (p. 121). The issue was framed in a way which portrayed integration as the only alternative to fragmentation, its absolute opposition. Thus, the survival of the union was presented as being dependent upon integration of the member states; “[b]y adding the security argument, integration gains urgency, because its alternative is ‘fragmentation’, a self-propelling process that by definition will destroy ‘Europe’ as a project” (ibid., p. 123). Hence, integration was not presented as an issue related to how the EU would develop, but whether or not it would develop. And it is this existential aspect which helps make it a security issue. Throughout the 1990s, while the European Union was in the process of developing a unified approach to migration, scholars began exploring the securitisation of the issue (Bermejo, 2009, p. 207). More recently, scholars have scrutinised the events of 11th September 2001 and discussed its effects on securitisation in the European Union. Indeed, according to Boswell (2007, p 590), “the received wisdom is that 9/11 provided an opportunity for the securitization of migration.” As already touched upon, the issue of securitisation is dealt with in different ways by different scholars. Therefore, there will be differences in the way in which they approach and argue on the subject even amongst those who support the notion that securitisation has taken place and those who oppose it.

Karyotis (2007) argues that the securitisation of migration in the EU can be traced back to the 1970 but that the key factor for its evolution was the establishment of the Single European Act. Just as the abolition of internal borders brought with it added focus on the solidification of the external ones, the “free movement of people within the European Communities led to increased attention to the movement of third-country nationals from outside the Communities to within” (Karyotis, 2007, p. 4). Karyotis agrees with the assessment the securitisation was visible after the events of 11th September 2001 but adds that this particular event did not create said securitisation. Rather, it reinforced the securitisation of migration already present within the EU.

Huysmans (2000, p. 758) supports the argument that securitisation has occurred in the EU and its member states, and he believes that it has occurred “on the basis of three relating themes: internal

21 security, cultural security and the crisis of the welfare state.” He argues that perceived threats to each of these policy areas have affected the securitisation of migration, which to an extent, is “aimed at excluding particular categories of people by reifying them as a danger” (ibid., p. 771). For example, he lays out how European integration is associated with the securitisation of migration by illustrating the securitisation of the internal market; ; “[i]ts central element is the assumption that, after the abolition of internal border controls, transnational flows of goods, capital, services and people will challenge public order and the rule of law. This link has been constructed so successfully that it has obtained the status of common sense” (Huysmans, 2000, p. 758). Thus he believes that a link has been forged between having freedom on the inside and security on the outside.

Two of the scholars who disagree with the aforementioned assessments are Neal and Boswell. While Neal agrees that there was evidence of securitisation in the immediate aftermath of 9/11, he argues that no link was forged for a security agenda. Boswell, meanwhile, dismisses the notion of any sort of securitisation on the topic.

Neal points to a couple of problems with determining securitisation at the EU level at all. He questions the ability of the EU to act as a securitising actor, pointing out that the link required between the securitising actor and the audience is difficult to identify when it comes to EU institutions; the communications and statements, he argues, are “not widely reported and they are often little debated beyond a very narrow specialist audience” (2009, p. 336). According to Wæver’s understanding of security (section 3.1), the interaction with the audience is important for the legitimisation of securitisation. However, as Neal argues, this might prove challenging to uphold in the context of EU, not only for the aforementioned reason, but also due to the large and diverse group of citizens that makes up the audience. He uses the example of maritime migration experienced by the southern member states to make his point; due to their experiences, southern European nations may very well consider what constitutes a threat quite differently from, say, northern member states, who have not witnessed such incidents first-hand (Neal, 2009, p. 336-7). Thus it could prove difficult to securitise the issue of migration in a way which would be equally accepted by all member states.

22 Neal accepts that securitising moves occurred by the EU institutions following 9/11 in the way what immigration was linked to threats; “[i]n the final months of 2001, the first part of a classical securitizing process was being played out. Securitizing speech acts linked migration with security, borders and terrorism. A ‘threat’ was defined with legitimate authority, an attempt was made to constitute political unity and the construction of the means to tackle the ‘threat’ was put under way” (Neal, 2009, p. 340). However, he argues that things died down quickly from there on, with the scenario losing its momentum; talks of a European Border Police came and went, and when the idea was resurrected in 2003, talk of security had mostly gone. According to Neal, there may have been made reference to “various security agencies, [but] the plans now lacked the sense of ‘urgency’ initially present in September 2001” (2009, p. 343).

Boswell agrees with Neal’s conclusion that issues relating to migration and borders have not been securitised in the EU since 9/11. However, she disagrees with him on whether the issue was even briefly securitised at all. She argues that while securitisation theory is a good way of exploring how public discourse can legitimise security practices, “it cannot adequately explain the more variegated patterns that have emerged since 9/11” (Boswell, 2007, p. 590). Boswell points out that issues can be viewed in a range of ways and that securitisation “denotes one particular way of framing migration issues” (2007, p. 592).

According to Balzacq & Guzzini (2015), the reason why Neal and Boswell disagree on the presence of securitisation in the immediate aftermath of 9/11 is because they approach the subject from different angles; “Neal privileged practices, which led him to answer positively, while Boswell emphasized language, which brought her to argue negatively” (p. 98). Balzacq himself identified securitisation within EU migration policies, but he did so by emphasising policy tools rather than language (speech act) in his analysis (2008).

Baele and Sterck (2015) echo the argument made by Balzacq: They argue that the reason why scholars cannot seem to come to terms on the issue of securitisation and migration is their “shared lack of methodological commitment in the practice” of securitisation theory, and that this in turn has “undermined the conclusion reached by its scholars on EU migration policies” (p. 1122). They

23 even call methods the “Achilles’ heel” of securitisation studies (ibid.). They note a tendency for securitisation scholars to “detect securitisation where they want, and not where it actually is” (ibid.). According to Baele and Sterck this is, in part, because scholars have a tendency to select the cases they want to base their analysis on, rather than “rigorously selecting” them (2015, p. 1123). And because said scholars also do not properly justify how the selected examples have been analysed, “the reader cannot be assured that the writer has not selected (or ignored) what suited him or her best in the texts or course of events” (ibid.). Moreover, Baele and Sterck point out that asking the question of whether or not migration has been securitised at the EU level, misrepresents the complexity of the issues at hand, both in terms of simplifying immigration and securitisation (ibid.) In turn, they make use of statistics and language analysis (via computer) of important documents related to EU immigration policy to identify security language. They sample texts within four categories of immigration (asylum, borders, illegal, and legal) and compare the results with two sets of reference samples to determine any distinctions. One reference sample consists of random texts while the other is made up of security texts on ‘hard’ security issues. In terms of language, all the sampled texts scored above the test sample of random texts but below that of security texts. From this, Baele and Sterck conclude that “EU immigration policy has an abnormally high – though not top-scale – presence of security language, but [they] also revealed the uneven intensity of this framing when the various subfields of immigration are distinguished” (2015, p. 1133).

Securitisation as a framework is not without its weaknesses nor its ambiguities. As one of the newer additions to the theoretical landscape, it is still being interpreted and mapped out by academics. Moreover, there is no formally agreed upon methodology in use, which can lead scholars to draw different conclusion from the same material, depending on how they approach the subject. Also, there is no guarantee that scholars are necessarily referring to the same material as they conduct their research. A repeated criticism of the framework is indeed that it might allow scholars to pick and choose which cases or evidence best fits the case, which they have set out to prove. Boswell points out that “[l]imiting the focus of research to processes of securitization may constrain observation of alternative trajectories in the framing of migration issues” (2007, p. 592). Thus, there is the inherent risk that scholars find securitisation, in part, because they go looking for it.

24 As already touched upon, migration is a wide-ranging topic within the EU, which covers a host of issue, initiatives and individuals. Given the focus of this thesis, only a very small and specific portion of this body of work will be considered. Given then focus of the Schengen Agreement and the Dublin Regulation, I will look at their specific framework, namely the conventions governing their setup. Each of these will be gone through looking for language which could reflect securitisation. As Buzan et al. pointed out, the EU setup is terribly complex and so I will place less emphasis on the securitising actor as well as the speech act itself that Wæver. However, I will, in my analysis emphasise language, as it is through language that securitisation and (possible) imminent threats are established. My reasoning for approaching the subject in this way is my belief that if these two agreements are part of an ongoing securitisation of immigration in the EU, then I would expect them to contain language that reflects the dramatisation of migrants as a security threat. In my approach to securitisation, I will adopt Wæver’s notion of urgency and elevation, which he presents as important parts of the framework; it is not just about deeming something a security threat, it should be direr than that. I will consider securitisation in the way in which it elevates issues to being of an existential threat. In my analysis, I will consider whether the framework allows for the securitisation in two ways; one, whether the language represent a particular framing of a specific group of people; and two, whether provisions are in place, allowing for the framework to be sidestepped. This is an integral part of securitisation: elevating an issue to a position where normal rules and regulation do not apply, and extraordinary measures must be taken instead. Now, Buzan et al. allow for securitisation to become institutionalised over time; “if a given type of threat is persistent or recurrent, it is no surprise to find that the response and sense of urgency become institutionalized.” As I understand this reasoning, it may be that securitisation of an issue becomes ‘standard practice’ if done repeatedly over time, however, this still requires securitisation at the outset. Securitisation does not grow slowly from within the system, but is incurred and may perhaps from there on become integrated into the institutions and thereby integrated into practices of how we deal with a particular issue. Thus, again, if (im)migration has been securitised on a larger scale, surely there would be traces thereof in some of the frameworks establishing European cooperation within (part of) this field.

25 Having established how I will apply and assess securitisation, I will now move on to present the theory of path dependence.

3.2 Path Dependence

Path dependence is an integral part of historical institutionalism, which in turn is a school of thought within the field of new institutionalism. As the name indicates, historical institutionalism stresses that “political development must be understood as a process that unfolds over time” (Pierson, 2000, p. 264-5). It argues that in order to properly understand a given institution, we have to consider the context in which it originated and developed; we have to “trace the processes behind the persistence of institutions and their influence on policies and other political outcomes” (Amenta, 2012, p. 47-8). This means that historical institutionalists take a specific situation as their starting point and work backwards from there, in order to explain the particular result that they are witnessing and investigating. Thus, they are “focused on explaining a specific set of outcomes, rather than theorizing about the general impact of individual or joint causes” (ibid., p. 53). This can make the research done quite focused, and indeed, scholars of path dependence have faced criticism for cherry picking those incidents that best explain the outcome they are studying, much like we have seen for securitisation.

Historical institutionalism explores the ways in which institutions achieve social and political outcomes. Institutions are defined as “emergent, higher-order factors above the individual level that influence political processes and outcomes and tend to produce regular patterns or stasis” (ibid., p. 48). The theory contends that “the institutional organization of the polity or political economy [is] the principal factor structuring collective behaviour and generating distinctive outcomes” (Hall & Taylor, 1996, p. 937). Historical institutionalism takes a rather broad view of what constitutes institutions; they can range from “the rules of a constitutional order or the standard operating procedures of a bureaucracy to the conventions governing trade union behaviour or bank- firm relations” (ibid., p. 941). In general, institutions are considered related to organisations and the rules these create (ibid.).

26 In order to properly understand the development of an institution and/or its framework, historical institutionalists rely on the concept of path dependence; being able to trace something back to a given starting point and following its sequence of events going forward. There is disagreement amongst historical institutionalist scholars as to the importance of path dependence, which reflects the different understandings of the concept that one might find within the field. According to Pierson (2000), usage of the term tends to veer between a broader and a narrower understanding. In the former, path dependence refers to “the causal relevance of preceding stages in a temporal sequence” (p. 252). Thus, the connection between the event leading from A to B are understood to be somewhat more casual than they are by those supporting a narrower understanding of path dependence would acknowledge. Those scholars in favour of a narrower understanding of the term argue that once a path has been initiated it is both difficult and costly to veer off it. This version of path dependency champions the argument of increasing returns, a process which Pierson explains as a situation in which “the probability of further steps along the same path increases with each move down that path. This is because the relative benefits of the current activity compared with other possible options increase over time. To put it a different way, the costs of exit – of switching to some previously plausible alternative – rise” (2000, p. 252). He notes that the concept of increasing returns can also be referred to as “self-reinforcing or positive feedback processes” (ibid.). Thus, those scholars who subscribe to the broad definition of path dependence, argue that a path, once begun, may not be all that difficult to abandon. Those who favour the narrower understanding disagree and contend that once a path is set upon it is not easily abandoned, at least not without incurring exponential difficulties and/or costs.

The events that make up a path cannot be considered in a random order, according to Pierson. In fact, he argues that the sequence in which these events occur are important for and help influence the final outcome (2000, p. 253). To illustrate his point, he refers to the mathematical example known as the Polya urn process. The example starts by asking its listener to imagine a very large urn with two ball inside, one red, and one black. One ball is then removed, only to be returned to the urn along with one more ball of the same colour. This process is then repeated until the urn is full, at which point we consider our knowledge of the eventual distribution of coloured balls. The experiment reaches three part-conclusions: (1) Even if done 100 times, the experiment would most

27 likely result in 100 different results. (2) An equilibrium will eventually be reached in every single trial, where the later draws in a given trial will only minutely affect the distribution. (3) Sequence is of the utmost important. The first draws in the trial can really affect the results. If a red ball is picked up on the first try, by the second try, the odd will be in favour of once more picking red the the colours will be split two to one. Thus, the Polya urn example demonstrates the concept of increasing returns and that “[e]arlier events matter much more than later ones, and hence different sequences may produce different outcomes. In these processes, history matters” (Pierson, 2000, p. 253).

Path dependence requires taking a long-term view of things in order to understand how a given sequence is brought on by initial conditions. However, there is some disagreement as to how far back we should go in order to make this argument. Some scholars like to look at the very big picture and for example make a case for centuries old legal institutions being causal factors of those that we see in much more recent times (Mahoney & Schensul, 2006, p. 460). Others, however, argue that initial conditions are less relevant; rather they argue that it is the critical juncture, which is of importance for the onset of path dependence (ibid., p. 461). Historical institutionalists talk of a “critical juncture” preceding a given institutional shift. It refers to the event that caused the beginning or onset of a new path. On a timeline, initial conditions occur earlier on than the critical juncture. You might say they provide the conditions for the critical juncture to occur; a point, at which a path can be abandoned and a new one set upon. A critical juncture, in a way, is like a crossroads. For many scholars of historical institutionalism, the events that define a critical juncture are contingent. What is happening is something unexpected, something out of the ordinary. To them, “the selection of a particular option during a critical juncture represents a random happening, an accident, a small occurrence, or an event that cannot be explained or predicted on the basis of a particular theoretical framework” (ibid., p. 462). These scholars hold that a critical juncture as a phenomenon is difficult to predict or control, if not impossible. Other scholars, however, such as Pierson, hold that while contingent events might cause path dependence, the former are not necessary for the latter to occur. Pierson does not dismiss the idea of contingency but to him the sequence of events matters more.

28 Path dependence can be considered as “abrupt moments of transformation followed by long periods of continuity” (Mahoney & Schensul, 2006, p. 466). The challenge thus lies in assessing what constitutes a period of continuity in terms of path dependence and what defines a moment of transformation. For this thesis, the concept of path dependence will be informed by Pierson’s views that a path set upon will become increasingly difficult to abandon. The theory of increased returns holds that each step down a given path increases the likelihood of the next step being taken. Thus a path is continued upon until it reaches the point of a critical juncture. This marks the beginning (or break) of path dependence. It represents an event that shakes up the system and introduces a crossroads, from which a new path might be set upon.

3.3 Combining Securitisation and Path Dependence

The framework of securitisation and the theory of path dependence complement each other well. If we do not subscribe to contingency, securitisation might shed some light on how a path came to be initiated. Path dependence, in turn, can provide securitisation with frame of perspective to illustrate how an occurrence of securitisation may set in motion a path, which moves forward according to the principles of increasing returns. When applied to the case in hand, the crisis as played out in Greece, these theories might help shed some light on both what has been going on and what might be to come. Said in another way, securitisation may provide a way of understanding the institutional framework constraining Greece, while path dependence could provide a way of assessing what we are seeing with this crisis as well as suggest what the consequences of the situation in Greece might be for the framework in question.

29 Critical juncture?

T∞ Securitisation? Path Dependence Greece, 2015 Figure 3: Combining securitisation and path dependence

Securitisation helps explain how issues can become elevated to the level of national security. The framework is about how an issue is constructed as an imminent threat and how this allows for extraordinary measures to be taken; measures outside the normal bounds. Thus, it advocates a constructed reality where danger is not necessarily something that is or is not, but rather something which is constructed as such. This framework is about a moment in time; a moment when something is constructed and accepted as an impending threat to our survival or way of life, something that is so urgent it must be dealt with immediately. The securitisation can lead either directly to emergency measures or it can lead to the creation of a platform from which such measures can be justified. In combining securitisation with path dependence, the former is integrated into an extended time horizon, where securitisation may be akin to a critical juncture or perhaps cause one, thereby instigating a path. Once this path is initiated, path dependence argues that it would be difficult to abandon, and increasingly so the further down the path we continue. In this thesis, the path is the EU immigration framework policies. Even if securitisation is not identified, we may still identify a path, in which case the crisis in Greece could potentially be construed as a critical juncture.

Both of these approaches rely on interpretation of event and scholars of both have, in the past, been criticised for cherry picking examples to fit the narrative. I do not see this criticism as an obstacle to the application of either securitisation or path dependence. First of all, the sheer scale involved with potentially proving or disproving securitisation in migration politics in the EU would require a massive amount of resources. And even then, it is not altogether clear might be gained by

30 such an undertaking. In its very essence, securitisation is about a perception of reality. The framework deals with how things are constructed as threats and the special actions this permits, not assessing whether these threats are valid and justified. Or, if they are real, which again depends on your perspectives and convictions. As scholars of securitisation have already proven, there are many different ways of approaching the framework and of testing it. Moreover, there are also varying ways of understandings of what even constitutes securitisation. As long as scholars are aware of the inherent limitations in the application of the the framework, I see no problem in applying it and discussing its potential merits.

Having presented the securitisation and path dependence and explained how they tie together as well as how I intent to make use of them, it is time to move on the analysis, which I will be carrying out in conjuncture the with presentation of my findings.

31 4. Data & Analysis

The European Union is a huge topic all on its own and its dealings could easily make up an entire study. It is far beyond the scope of this thesis to try and explain the entity that is the EU. Rather, I will provide a brief overview of its central institutions, their responsibilities and the ways in which they operate, so that we may get a sense of how the Union is run. First off, I will briefly present the European Union (4.1) and its main institutions, namely the European Commission (4.1.1), the European Parliament (4.1.2), and the Council of the European Union (4.1.3). This is followed by an introduction to the area of Freedom, Security and Justice (4.1.4), which is the legal ‘structure’ concerned with borders and immigration. This will provide the framework for presenting the constraint on Greece, namely the legal framework created by and for the European Union; first the Schengen Agreement (4.2) followed by the Dublin Regulation (4.3). Each of these will include an assessment of securitisation. Next, I will introduce Frontex (4.4.), an interstate agency set up to help enforce and administer the legal framework. Finally, I will apply the theory of path dependence.

4.1 The European Union

The European Economic Community became a reality in 1957 when the Treaty of Rome was signed. The Community started out with six members but soon grew in both size and scope. Today, the European Union has 28 member states, with a total of more than 500 million inhabitants and the Union is involved with numerous different activities ranging from human rights to space. According to Best (2016), the development of the European Union is “not the result of a coherent and consensual grand design. To the extent that the system does reflect political vision, it is the rather messy product of repeated negotiation and compromise between different interests and visions” (p. 2). He argues that “[t]he institutional system for EU decision-making has always been the result of an uneasy compromise between those who see it partly as a political objective in its own right, and those who have seen it mainly as a functional necessity, within the global system of multi-level governance, in order to achieve particular welfare goals in Europe” (ibid.). Thus he argues that member states have different expectation of what the Union is and what is should be.

32 The constitutional basis of the EU is made up of two treaties and one charter: The Treaty on European Union (TEU), the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) and the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. The TEU is also known as the Treaty of Maastricht. It was signed in 1992 and entered into force the following year. The Treaty of Maastricht established the ‘Three Pillars’-system which represented the structure of the Union: Pillar 1 was supranational and contained the original communities, Pillar 2 dealt with intergovernmental cooperation in foreign and security policy, and Pillar 3 contained justice and home affairs (JHA. Today this is referred to as the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice (AFSJ), which will be introduced in section 4.1.4). The TFEU was formally known as the Treaty of Rome of 1957, and it was this original treaty that established the European Economic Community now known as the EU. Article 80 of the TFEU stipulates that the policies of chapter 2 of the Treaty concerning policies on border checks, asylum and immigration as well as the implementation thereof “shall be governed by principle of solidarity and fair sharing of responsibility, including its financial applications, between the Member States.” The notion of solidarity amongst member states is a core principle of the EU. Both the TEU and the TFEU have been modified over the years, from the Treaty of Amsterdam in 1997 to the Treaty of Nice in 2001 to the latest modification, the Treaty of Lisbon, which came into force at the end of 2009. The Lisbon Treaty replaced what had previously been known as the European Communities with the European Union, doing away with the pillar-system used previously. Today, the European Union has seven institutions: The Commission, the Parliament, the Council of the European Union, the European Central Bank, the Court of Auditors, the Court of Justice, and the European Council. The latter is made up of the heads of state of the EU member states as well as the president of the Commission. Its main function is strategic, in that it determines the Union’s political path and overall priorities. The central institutions when it comes to law-making in and for the Union are the Council of the EU, the Parliament, and the Commission, which will be considered in the following sub- sections.

4.1.1 The European Commission

The European Commission is the official representative of the EU internationally. Internally, it represents the executive branch of the EU. It is in charge of drafting new legislation, as well as

33 implementing the legislation once it has been passed by the Parliament and the Council of the EU. It is also in charge of enforcing current EU law and making sure the Member States uphold the legal requirements of the Union. The Commission shares responsibility for the EU budget with the Council and the Parliament. The Commission is made up of 28 members (or commissioners), one from each Member State, one of whom serves as President of the Commission. The candidate for president is put forward by the Council and approved of by the Parliament via majority voting. Currently, Jean- Claude Juncker of Luxembourg serves as President of the Commission. After his election, he selected the rest of his team based on suggestions by member states (with the approval of both the Council and the Parliament required). The group selected serves a five-year period. The current Commission’s term end in 2019.

4.1.2 The European Parliament

The European Parliament has three main roles: legislative, supervisory, and budgetary. There are currently 751 members of the parliament, including the president, all of whom have been directly elected by voters for a five-year term. Currently, German Martin Schulz serves as president of the EP, a post to which he was elected by his fellow members of parliament (MEPs). Together the MEPs represent the EU’s 500 million inhabitants. The Parliament consists of 20 committees and two subcommittees, which each deal with separate policy areas. These committees review legislation proposed by the Commission, and once a month, all MEPs convene and vote to pass said legislation. Decisions are usually passed by absolute majority voting. Within the Parliament, the MEPs are grouped together according to political affiliation rather than nationality. Together with the Council of the EU, the Parliament is responsible for passing EU laws. It is also in charge of electing the Commission President as well approving the way in which the EU budget has been allocated. The Parliament can also request the Commission to present a legislative proposal to the Council.

4.1.3 The Council of the European Union

The Council of the EU represents the governments of the member states. Here, national ministers meet and coordinate policies amongst them. There is not one appointed representative per

34 member state. Rather, the minister most relevant to the issue at hand participates in the given meeting. Unlike the other two institutions discussed here, the Council of the EU does not elect a president. Rather, member states take turns holding the presidency for six months at a time. Currently, the role belongs to the Netherlands. Decision in the Council are passed by majority voting, although some topics, which can be considered delicate (for example taxation) will require unanimous votes. The ministers have the mandate to commit their governments to whatever is agreed upon during these meetings. Along with the parliament, the Council is responsible for passing EU laws and overseeing the budget.

4.1.4 The Area of Freedom, Security and Justice

Title V of the TFEU deals with the area of freedom, security and justice. It is located in Part Three of the Treaty, which is the part that deals with Union Policies and Internal Action. This section covers such policies as immigration and asylum. This area of concern was not addressed in the early days of the EC. In fact, it is one of the newest additions to the EU mandate. Broadly speaking, two things occurred which have set the wheels in motion for this area of policy to be elevated to EU level (Uçarer, 2013, p. 282): firstly, after the second World War, Western Europe saw an increase in immigration and cross-border activity, which became a challenge for authorities who feared cross- border crimes and recognised the need for judicial cooperation. Secondly, in 1986 the Single European Act was signed reinforcing the Community’s commitment to European integration. The first steps towards integration in Justice and Home Affairs matters were taken with the implementation of the Schengen Agreement (section 4.2). With the establishment of the Treaty on the European Union in 1993, issues concerning JHA were incorporated into EU framework in the form of the third pillar of the Union. As the issues were considered to be quite sensitive, cooperation has been “slow and difficult” (ibid.). Some of the areas identified as “common interest” in the TEU include (but are not limited to) asylum policy, rules pertaining to the crossing of the Union’s external borders, immigration policy, the handling of third-country nationals as well as police cooperation in tackling international organised crime. However, the execution of this treaty was not without its disagreements; overall, member states recognised the need to integrate JHA matters into Union affairs, but division occurred as to how this ought to be done; “[s]ome argued that JHA should be

35 handled within the first pillar, as a supranational policy; others preferred to keep this sensitive field as a largely intergovernmental dialogue” (ibid., p. 284).

A compromise was struck, and with regards to the third pillar, “the Treaty established an intergovernmental negotiating sphere that marginalised the Community institutions, particularly the European Commission, within the JHA decision-making process. This third pillar set-up diverged significantly from standard decision-making in the EC. The key decision-taking body became the JHA Council” (Uçarer, 2013, p. 284). The European Parliament was given the role of consulting but no more than that. Within the third pillar, all decisions had to be agreed upon unanimously. This often resulted in less than ambitious outcomes; when disagreements occurred, the compromises often amounted to the lowest common denominator (ibid., p. 285). Few were satisfied with the workings of the third pillar and as a consequence thereof, the JHA pillar was reconfigured in the Amsterdam Treaty of 1999, leaving it mainly with issues of criminal matters. One of the consequences thereof was the adoption of the Schengen framework into the Union’s acquis communitaire, while issues of immigration and asylum were transferred to the first pillar. The most significant (successful) attempt to overhaul this area came in the form of the Lisbon Treaty, which was signed in 2007 (ibid., p. 287). The treaty did away with the pillar system, creating instead the area of Freedom, Security and Justice. Within this new version of the system, the it is the Commission’s role to propose legislation. The Parliament acts as co-legislator, and the Council of the EU rests on majority voting. There has also been made room for enhanced cooperation (initially established by the Amsterdam Treaty), which lets member states integrate even further than strictly required by a given piece of legislation.

4.2 The Schengen Agreement

The Schengen Agreement cements the right to free movement throughout the European Union. It is an extension of the Single European Act in that it creates one common internal area, throughout which people can travel freely without having to present their passports or be subject to border controls. Although the Schengen Agreement reflects a commitment included in the Treaty of Rome, namely the removal of internal border controls, agreement on the details could not be reached unanimously with the Community as was required at the time. Some countries believed that free movement should only be applied/offered to EU citizens, meaning internal border checks would still

36 be required to distinguish between EU and non-EU citizens, while others argued that it should apply to everyone moving around within the union (EUR-Lex, 2009). Because of this disagreement, the Schengen Agreement was first introduced outside the bounds of the Union and only later adopted into Union framework. At its inception it was an agreement between five member states (Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Belgium, Germany, and France) to do away with internal border controls, allowing the residents of each country to travel freely within their combined territories. The first agreement was signed in 1985, which was followed up by the Convention to Implement the Schengen Agreement (CISA) in 1990, which entered into force in 1995.1 The agreement of 19852 contained 33 articles, two of which made references to security. Both of these articles also referred to illegal immigration. Firstly, article 7 refers to the need to implement common visa policies “as soon as possible in order to avoid the adverse consequences in the field of immigration and security that may result from easing checks at the common borders.” It goes on to mention that protection is needed “of the entire territory of the five States against illegal immigration and activities which could jeopardise security.” Secondly, the other article mentioning security, article 17, deals with checks at external borders and notes that the signatories must “take complementary measures to safeguard internal security and prevent illegal immigration by nationals of States that are not members of the European Communities.”

Early on, the Schengen Agreement covered a host of topics ranging from the surveillance of external borders to extradition and narcotics but today only three topics remain: visa policy, border policy and the Schengen Information System (Huybreghts, 2015). The agreement was made part of EU legislation in 1997 when it was incorporated into the acquis through the Treaty of Amsterdam, which came into force in 1999. Despite being part of the acquis, the Schengen Agreement does not apply to all EU member states. The United Kingdom and Ireland have opted to stay out of the passport-free zone, for example, while some of the new member states to the Union have yet to be approved for full Schengen membership by the other member states. Any new member state that joins the European Union must accept and incorporate the Schengen regulations nationally. However, they must fulfil certain conditions before border control is removed. One of these

1 This is sometimes referred to as the Schengen Convention but many continue to refer to the Schengen Agreement, myself included. 2 EU Document 42000A0922(01)

37 requirements is being able to control external borders on behalf of all member states. In order for new members to fully join the Schengen zone, all member states have to approve thereof. In total, there are 26 Schengen states, 22 EU member states as well as Iceland, Norway, Switzerland and Lichtenstein.

The implementation of the Schengen Agreement meant that anyone living and/or working within the Union could travel freely to any other union country without being checked at national borders. The same liberty applied to people visiting the Union, thus a common set of rules and regulations relating to immigration were established, as anyone entering one country would be free to travel from said country to any other within the Union. Hence, it was viewed as necessary to reach an agreement on matters of immigration, visa, as well as the right to asylum. Moreover, increased cooperation and coordination between national police forces and judicial authorities was agreed upon, and to help secure this, the Schengen Information System (SIS) was introduced; “a highly efficient large-scale information system that supports external border control and law enforcement cooperation in the Schengen States” (EC, 2015b). This way, more than just the borders were opened up for cooperation. The system set up allows police from different member states to share information using a shared database, which they can all access.

Creating one common external border was both an act of cooperation and of trust; the same rules and regulations had to be applied and enforced at all external border crossings, securing a uniformity. Entering one country was now equal to entering the Union. And entering the union means access to all member states. People who were crossing the border were no longer just entering a specific country; they were entering the EU; “[t]he abolition [of internal border controls] led to the need of co-operation between police forces and the judiciary in the Member States; the same abolition led to a need to define common rules for the entry of third country nationals to this borderless area and for their movement within the area” (Mathijsen & Dyrberg, 2013, p. 263). According to Mathijsen and Dyrberg, there may also have been external factors at play that reinforced the need for a solidified external borders such as the collapse of the Soviet Union (ibid.). Previously the Soviet Union had placed strict control along its borders. As this ceased to be, an entire region was in fluctuation.

38

The Schengen Borders Code, which sets out the rules concerning people crossing the external borders of the Union, states that “the primary responsibility of border control lies with those Schengen countries that have an external border” (Frontex 2016b). Thus, the countries along the EU frontier are responsible for granting (and restricting) access to all of the EU and have to do so on behalf of all member states. States themselves supply border guards (although special assistance can be requested of Frontex, as will be discussed in section 4.4). For Greece, this means regulating its 1110 km long border on land as well as being responsible for its 13,676 km long coastline, which brings us back to the element of trust when it comes to the Schengen arrangement: those countries with no external frontiers have to trust other countries to carry out proper inspections on their behalf. There is a regulation in place which specifies that, “[e]xternal borders may be crossed only at border crossing points and during the fixed opening hours” (EUR-Lex, 2014). In practice, however, ensuring that only the official border crossing points are being used, and preventing individuals from entering the country elsewhere is very difficult to implement. If (or when) the trust breaks down, countries are allowed to temporarily reinstate border controls. This may be done for a period of up to 30 days in case of “serious threat to public policy or internal security” (ibid.). This should only be done as a last resort, and when done, fellow member states as well as the Commission, the Council and the Parliament must be informed immediately, so that they may consult on the matter. The Commission cannot veto plans to reinstate temporary border controls as such a decision ultimately falls within the authority of the nation state. The 30 days of border controls can be renewed multiple times but must not exceed a total of six months. Moreover, more notice must be given when renewing the period than when first instating it.3 Examples of situations that have been deemed to warrant temporary border controls in the past include the Nobel Peace Prize ceremony in Norway, G7 summits in Belgium and Germany, as well as the Euro 2012 Football Championships in Poland. In 2015, six members of the Schengen area gave notice that they would be reinstating temporary border controls at their national borders, all citing “big influx of persons seeking international protection” or a variation thereof (EC, 2016c).

3 When renewing a period of border control, 4 weeks notice must be given to the Commission and other member states.

39 In 2013, the Schengen evaluation and monitoring mechanism was introduced as a means of overseeing the implementation of the Schengen acquis.4 This mechanism falls under the responsibility of the Commission. The aim of this new mechanism is to “ensure an effective, consistent and transparent application of the Schengen rules and regulations by the Schengen Member States, while at the same time maintaining a high level of mutual trust between those Member States” (EC, 2016c). Through both announced and unannounced monitoring visits, the Commission carries out evaluations of member states with the aid of experts from member states and Frontex, who participate in said visits. After these visits, a report is drafted, which identifies possible or potential failings and shortcomings. Based on this report, the Commission may issue recommendations, insofar as serious “deficiencies are identified in the carrying out of external border controls by an EU country” (EUR-Lex, 2014). In response to such recommendations, the member state in question has to submit an action plan laying out plans for rectifying the problems identified. In extreme cases, if the overall workings of the Schengen area are considered to be at serious risk, the Commission may put forward a proposal to the Council asking for it to recommend that one or more member states reinstate temporary border control. Such an extreme case would be justified only in the light of a “serious threat to public policy or internal security” stemming from enduring deficiencies regarding external border control (EC, 2016c).

Considering the development of the Schengen Agreement, it appears to have come about it in rather organic fashion. The emphasis of the original agreement from 1985 focuses on how to establish a common internal market. It does make a link between illegal immigration and internal security and stresses the importance of standardising visa policies both in the short-term (art. 7) and in the long-term (art. 17).5 Art. 17 states that parties must “take complementary measures to safeguard internal security and prevent illegal immigration by nationals of States that are not members of the European Communities.” Only illegal immigration is mentioned as a potential security risk, no other kinds of migration. There is no indication that all sorts of immigration are being constructed as as risk. When the Convention to Implement the Schengen Agreement was

4 This mechanism replaced the Standing Committee on the evaluation and implementation of Schengen, which had existed since 1998. 5 EU Document 42000A0922(01)

40 signed in 1990, its body was expanded.6 Some of the additional issues covered included asylum responsibilities (what later became the Dublin Regulation) as well as the option for reinstating temporary internal border control (art 2(2)). A declaration was added stressing the need for effective border control “in view of the risks in the field of security and illegal immigration.” Again, security is mentioned in relation to illegal immigration.

In the section on border checks, asylum and immigration, the TFEU promises that a common policy on asylum is to be developed which will respect the Geneva Convention. It shall include a “common status of asylum (…) valid throughout the Union” (TFEU, article 78:2(b)). Art. 78, however, also includes a paragraph which allows the Council to adopt “provisional measures for the benefit of the Member State(s) concerned” (based on a proposal from the Commission) should an emergency arise resulting from a large arrival of foreign nationals (TFEU, art 78: 3). With regards to immigration, article 79 of TFEU specifies that “[t]he Union shall develop a common immigration policy aimed at ensuring, at all stages, the efficient management of migration flows, fair treatment of third-country nationals residing legally in Member States, and the prevention of, and enhanced measures to combat, illegal immigration and trafficking in human beings.” The language in this section is interesting in terms of securitisation; making room for “provisional measures” in response to an “emergency” refers to a sphere out of the ordinary. That this emergency is triggered by the arrival of large groups of foreign nationals is worth noting. The term foreign national passes no judgement on who we might be dealing with; it could be migrants; it could be people in need of protection. Either way, they are identified as a potential threat by simply being large in numbers. Thus, provisions are made, by which a large amount of foreigners arriving at around the same can be constructed as an emergency allowing for a special response to be made. This does fit in with the securitisation framework.

Looking at these regulations, securitisation does not appear to have taken place in conjuncture with the Schengen Agreement. The language does not make much reference to the notion of security and when it is associated with migration it is not framed as an existential threat that must be dealt with immediately. It is recognised as being of concern and something to be taken seriously, yes,

6 EU Document 42000A0922(02)

41 maybe even as a threat, but not one that justifies being classified as securitisation. There are, however, one or two exceptions that we might consider. First, the right to temporarily reinstate internal border controls where “public policy or national security so require” (CISA 1990, art. 2:2). This leaves definite room for interpretation. Even though countries have to consult with the institutions, they can push this through as their national prerogative. If a threat is perceived, countries may close their borders, and here there is room for securitisation, as it is essentially up to each member state to define what constitutes such a threat. Moreover, this reflects the notion of urgency, which is required in securitisation. Second, paragraph 3 of article 78 of the TFEU likewise leaves leeway for interpretation. The paragraph allows the Council to respond to an “emergency situation” (created by large number of migrants) by adopting measures to aid the situation. This also contains an element of urgency, as an emergency situation required measures beyond what is normally done. These two paragraphs allow states and institutional respectively with room to invoke securitising actions.

4.3 The Dublin Regulation

The Dublin Convention of 1990 is considered a continuation of the Schengen Agreement.7 Since 2003, it has been known as the Dublin regulation. The Schengen Agreement established a common external EU border, which, once passed, would allow access to any and all EU countries. This meant that there was little done in the way of regulating people’s travels once past the external border. Basically, the Dublin Convention “reproduced the external border provisions on asylum that were already stipulated in the Schengen Agreement and came to replace it” (Thielemann & Armstrong 2013, p. 159). Thielemann & Armstrong elaborate on this point by explaining that from the outset, this new convention was considered vital for the progress of establishing a borderless internal area and that from the very beginning, “external border responsibilities and freedom of movement were viewed as necessary complements” (2013, p. 159). Thus, the Dublin Convention was a logical and natural consequence of the Schengen Agreement. It entered into force in 1997. In 1999, the EU

7 Since 2003, it has been known as the Dublin II Regulation (Council Regulation (EC) 343/2003). In 2013, it was given another upgrade, becoming Dublin III Regulation (Regulation (EU) No. 604/2013). I will be referring to it the Dublin Regulation following the introduction.

42 presented the Common European Asylum System (CEAS), of which the Dublin regulation is a part. CEAS aims to harmonise asylum standards and practices across the union, thereby “guarantee[ing] high standards of protection for refugees” (EC, 2015a).

The first Dublin Convention was signed in 1990 by all the member states at the time.8 The objective was to establish a system that could identify and determine which country bore the responsibility of processing a given application for asylum made by an asylum seeker. The rationale was two-fold: One the one hand, member states wanted to prevent asylum applicants from ‘shopping around’ and filing multiple asylum claims in various countries. This reflected a concern that the system might be taken advantage of by people wanting the best deal. Also, it reflected the frustration of having multiple countries ‘waste’ their resources by processing the same application. On the other hand, the system was also a way of making sure member states themselves fulfilled their responsibilities towards asylum seekers by processing claims rather than evading their obligations and “allowing (or even encouraging) individuals to move on to another Member State so that they will have their claim processed there” (Thielemann & Armstrong, 2013, p. 151).

The Dublin Regulation sets out the rules establishing which member state is responsible for examining a given asylum claim and the exceptions thereto. According to Art. 7(1),9 “the responsibility for examining an application for asylum shall be incumbent upon the Member State responsible for controlling the entry of the alien into the territory of the Member States.” So, whoever let them in, has to follow through with the paper work. According to Thielemann and Armstrong, this is “based on the rationale that the country that has allowed (or not prevented) the entry of an asylum seeker into the EU should be subsequently responsible for the processing of their application” (2013, p. 160). For asylum seekers this means that an application must be filed in the first country of entry. If an asylum seeker decides to move to another (secondary) EU country and apply for asylum there, said country may return the applicant to the first country of entry. One way in which first country of entry is ‘regulated’ by member states is through EURODAC, a database for registering the fingerprints of asylum seekers. There are exceptions to the rule of first entry, of

8 Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, and the United Kingdom. 9 EU Document 41997A0819(01)

43 course, for example if an applicant has close family living in another EU country or a is in possession of a visa already issued by another member state. Brouwer points out that the Dublin system is based on mutual trust between member states; each state trusts that the other states respect “the rights of asylum seekers in accordance with European and international law” (2013, p. 138). She elaborates on this by explaining that “[f]or the implementation of the Dublin Regulation, the presumption of trust more specifically implies that all Member States are safe countries for the asylum seeker” (ibid.). This, however, may not always be the case in as we shall see with Greece.

Incorporated into the Dublin Regulation is a reference to the 1951 Refugee Convention, and the importance thereof has been reinforced through a set of rulings made by the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) and the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) respectively. Both cases centred around the transfers of Afghan nationals from secondary countries to Greece, their first country of entry, and both concluded that trusting Greece to uphold its end of the 1951 Convention was not enough in and of itself. The secondary countries had a responsibility to protect the fundamental rights of the applicants (ibid.). The former case (M.S.S. vs. Belgium and Greece) dealt with an Afghan citizen who had passed through Greece on his way to Belgium, where he applied for asylum. Belgium, referring to the Dublin regulation, returned him to Greece, so that the latter could process his claim. However, based on the treatment he received in Greece, the asylum seeker took both countries to court. The court found that Greece had indeed violated articles 3 and 13 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), and that Belgium, too, was at fault for returning M.S.S. to Greece and should have been aware of the conditions there. It was found that while the Dublin regulation may have been applicable in the situation in theory, it could not trump the principles of the European Convention on Human Rights.

The rule of first entry has led to criticism that the “distributional consequences of the Dublin system are (…) predictable uneven with some of the external border countries of the EU forced to make the highest contribution, thereby facing disproportionate costs” (Thielemann & Armstrong, 2013, p. 151). This issue has not gone unnoticed amongst the member states. During negotiations for Dublin II, some of the southern Member States voiced their concerns about the ‘first country of entry’ principle and argued in favour of developing a different way in which to determine responsibility;

44 “[o]bjections were raised as early as the first draft reading and both Italy and Greece entered formal objections (vetoes) to the Council Regulation. The Italian objection was that ‘Member States’ duty to guard their borders should not be confused with determining the Member State responsible for examining an asylum application” (ibid., p. 160). In 2000, a European Refugee Fund (ERF) was established to help ease the financial burden of taking in and processing refugees, recognising that some countries receive a disproportional amount compared with other countries. One problem concerning the Dublin Regulation is that while it may determine which country is responsible for processing an asylum application, the member states do not share a common set of rules on how asylum ‘requirements’ are determined. For instance, currently it is up to each individual state to determine whether it is safe to return an applicant to his or her country of origin, and the various states are not completely in line with each other as to their assessments. Thus, applying for asylum in one country instead of another could make all the difference for a refugee. A Commission proposal was drafted in the fall of 2015 to establish a common list of safe countries for all EU member states. The aim of such a list is to have uniform modes of asylum procedures throughout the union and to facilitate faster processing of applications.

The Dublin Regulation in and of itself does not appear to be a result of securitisation. It grew out of the Schengen Agreement and has grown in scope since then, but its focus remains; it determines which country is responsible for handling an asylum claim and sets out the rules for how this is determined. When it was first introduced, it was believed by some that it would provide the solution to “asylum seekers in orbit”, a situation in which no member state took on the responsibility of handling an asylum claim (Ecre, 2013). The Regulation lacks the securitising language that was, at least somewhat, visible in the Schengen Agreement. The newest version of the Dublin Regulation,10 makes no mentions of emergencies and the only way urgency is referred to, is with regards to interstate communications, where a state may ask for an urgent reply to a request state. Article 33 of the regulation, an article not present in the former Regulation from 2003.11 The article is a ‘mechanism for early warning, preparedness and crisis management.’ However, it mainly specifies that if the application of the Dublin Regulation were to be at risk in a member state due to extra

10 Regulation (EU) No. 604/2013 11 Regulation (EC) 343/2003

45 pressure exercised on the system, then said member state may be invited to produce a preventive action plan. It is formulated without a sense of urgency, almost somewhat cautiously. This is not the means by which securitisation is exercised.

4.4 Frontex

After the Schengen Agreement was adopted as a EU regulation in 1999 under the Amsterdam Treaty, the European Union officially got a unified external border (Walters, 2002, p. 566). As already mentioned, this required both cooperation and coordination between Member States. Early on, this was covered by the External Border Practitioners Common Unit, which was made up of members of the Strategic Committee on Immigration, Frontiers and Asylum as well as heads of national border control services, who, collectively, were in charge of overseeing projects concerning the external borders. Deciding to take things a step further, and with the aim of “improving procedures and working methods of the Common Unit” (Frontex, 2016c), Frontex was introduced in 2004. The aim was to “reinforce and streamline cooperation between national border authorities” (Frontex, 2016d). Frontex operates in seven areas, which are as follows: training, risk analysis, joint operations, assisting member states in joint return operations, research, providing a rapid response capability, and information systems and information sharing environment. The agency is based in Warsaw, Poland, where it has approximately 300 members of staff. The executive director is Frenchman Fabrice Leggeri. He was appointed by the Frontex Management Board and began serving a five-year term in January 2015.12 In 2015 Frontex operated with a budget of 143.300.000 euro.13 The budget is made up of a subsidy from the Commission and contributions from Schengen countries.

Frontex is a civilian organisation, which is first and foremost responsible for coordinating border patrol and training border personnel. According to its own website, “Frontex’s role focuses on coordination of deployment of additional experts and technical equipment to those border areas

12 He replaced Finn Ilkka Laitinen, who had held the position from Frontex’s inception until his resignation in May 2014. 13 This was modified in response to the crisis. The original budget was for 114.053.000 euro.

46 which find themselves under significant pressure. Frontex also builds the capacity of the member states in various areas related to border control, including training and sharing of best practices” (Frontex, 2016b). The agency does not own its own equipment, rather it relies on contributions from members, which it then loans for the duration of a given operation. Frontex is a transnational border patrol agency and as such, it does not have authority over member states. Rather, it can be called upon to assist member states. Each year an annual risk analysis report is produced and in cooperation with member states, it is decided which projects require priority. Then, together with the host state (on whose behalf a given mission will be carried out), it is decided which equipment is required. At this point, a request is sent to other member states, and those who can (and want to) contribute. Once an operation is completed, it is evaluated by all Frontex itself and those states participating so as to improve any future co-operations.

In the Regulation establishing Frontex,14 the term emergency is only referred to once, when the point is made that some of the situations, in which Frontex is called upon, may “involve humanitarian emergencies.” Likewise, we don’t find much reference to security or crisis. The latter is not present at all, while the former is mostly referred to in reference to the area of freedom, security and justice. Only once is is put in any relation to immigration, and it is the illegal kind. The regulation includes a commitment to human rights, something which had not been mentioned in the original regulation. According to Pallister-Wilkins, “[t]hese changes, in line with humanitarian considerations, are what European human rights groups demand. Yet, these changes also exist alongside a hardened attitude to border policing among a large proportion of the European public demanding that border guards seal the border ever tighter against external threats embodied by the figure of the migrant. This tension between risk and rescue, this paradox of protection where the subject must be saved while the object is kept safe, therefore, exists in the wider European milieu in which the border guards and Frontex operatives carry out their work” (2015, p. 60). Thus, as she points out, the agency operates in a grey area where it not entirely clear what the objective is. Likewise, due to its consulting and coordinating nature, it is not always clear who Frontex represents and on whose behalf it operates. As already touched upon, the agency helps define the objectives of any operation and helps plan its execution. FIDH et al. point out that “[a]lthough the

14 Regulation 1168/2011

47 reformed Frontex mandate provides that the agency can “initiate” or “coordinate” an operation, there is no text defining the responsibilities of the agency in cases of irregularities or human rights violations” (FIDH at al. 2014, p. 43). This, they find, is further illustrated by the Code of Conduct, which applies to participants of Frontex operations. It states that participants are the themselves responsible for their actors, while “the liability of the agency as a body is not mentioned” (ibid, p. 44).

In 2007, the Rapid Border Intervention Teams (RABIT) were introduced. These teams are able to respond rapidly to assist states “under urgent and exceptional pressure” (Frontex, 2016e), usually from third-country nationals trying to cross the external border illegally. If Frontex is already present in a given country, carrying out an ongoing mission when a rapid intervention is launched, this mission will be temporarily suspended and all resources will be directed towards the rapid intervention. Once the intervention is concluded, the border guards will return to their original mission which will then be resumed. Member states can request the assistance of RABIT, and it is then up to the Executive Directive of Frontex to make a final decision. RABIT teams deliver short- term assistance and all member states are obliged to contribute guards, as opposed to the regular missions, where contributions are voluntary. There is an element of urgency about RABIT missions, which corresponds to securitisation. An emergency is identified, which needs to be dealt with immediately. Moreover, the fact that these missions take precedence over all else ties in well with securitisation. These teams are the measures that might be taken once securitisation has been established, in order to immediately respond. Otherwise, the regulation serving as the legal basis for the agency does not include provides that are in line with securitisation.

4.5 Summary Having considered the institutional framework of the Schengen Agreement, the Dublin Regulation, and Frontex it is not at all convincing that these are the results of securitisation. The assessment has been done on the basis of the regulations and agreements establishing the three, and therein the amount of language that might suggest or reflect securitisation is limited. Of the three, the Schengen Agreement offers the most room for securitisation by allowing for emergency situations in times of

48 crisis. It allows for states to, as a last resort, exercise their right to (temporary) border control if they believe they are under imminent threat. In and of itself, this does not guarantee securitisation, but it allows for it to be constructed, for a situation to be framed that warrants the actions out of the ordinary. Neither the Dublin regulation nor the Frontex one present much intent towards securitisation, nor do they reflect a state thereof. However, Frontex’s RABIT teams can do reflect what is necessary in situations of securitisation. In these instances, the RABIT teams are requested, and as such, Frontex is not in charge of securitising the issue at hand directly. All three sets of documents focus on providing the means by which to establish and secure the internal market, and an important part of this is dealing with the external border. Creating an external border to shut out everyone else was not the purpose based on my readings of these documents. This section has dealt with the legal foundation for each of these two frameworks and one agency, which is only one way of approaching the subject. Other ways might be to analysis of the results brought about by each of these, or the actions carried out justified by their statutes. One could also consider how member states make use of them, and in what ways they are used for justifying something or other. Although they may not reflect securitisation directly, they might be used as tools for such by others.

4.6 Greece

Greece applied to join the European Union in 1974. Although the Commission hesitated at the prospect, Greece succeeded in persuading the governments of the other member states and thus accession negotiations began leading to the country’s admission in 1981. Greece was the first country to apply for membership of the Community for political reasons ahead of economic considerations, despite the fact that once it joined, it was at a “substantially lower level of economic development than other EU states.” (Markou et al., 2001, p. 218). It was argued that “membership would help consolidate democratic practice and anchor the country firmly in the Western alliance” (ibid.). Greece was badly affected by the financial crisis in 2008 and has come close to bankruptcy a couple of times since then. The country has received three bail-out packages from the EU since 2010 with the latest bail-out package being agreed upon in September 2015. The first two, handed over in 2010 and 2012 totalled €240bn. These bail-outs were conditioned on tough austerity measures, including severe budget cuts and tax increases, which have led to several protests in the Greek

49 capital. Today, Greece is still very much dealing with the consequences of the financial crisis and currently has an unemployment rate of around 25 percent, having been at an all-time high of 27.88 percent in July 2013.

Greece became a signatory to the Schengen Agreement in 1992, with the agreement coming into effect for the country in 2000. Greece was and still is a geographical outlier in that it does not share a border with another Schengen country. Its neighbour Bulgaria has been a EU member since 2007 but it has yet to be accepted unanimously into the Schengen area by all other member states. The Schengen Border Code states that the “primary responsibility of border control lies with those Schengen countries that have an external border” (Frontex 2016b). For Greece, this means guarding its land borders which measure 1,110 km as well as its coastline, which extends 13,676 km. In accordance with the Schengen Agreement, Greece serves as a gatekeeper for the European Union. This role has been tried numerous times over the years. In 2008, 50 percent of detected illegal border crossings to the EU were found in Greece, making the country “the main European gateway for unauthorized immigrants” (MPI, 2010). By 2010, the number had gone up to 90 percent (ibid). The main problem at the time was deemed to be the land border to Turkey in the Evros River region, where hundreds of people were (attempting to) cross each day. In 2010, the Greek government requested the aid of Frontex’s Rapid Border Intervention Teams. This particular mission lasted four months, from November 2010 until March 2011. Frontex itself estimated that a 76 percent reduction in the number of migrants crossing the border had been achieved (Frontex 2016f). In 2012, a fence was erected along the Greek border to Turkey along with increased patrol with the aid of Frontex. While the fence did cause a decrease in numbers of migrants trying to enter across the land border, an increase in entries by sea was soon detected (Spindler, 2015).

Greece has previously received criticism over its treatment of asylum seekers by various NGOs. On 21 January 2011, the European Court of Human Rights ruled in the case of M.S.S. v Belgium and Greece in favour of the former (described in section 4.3). Following this ruling, several European countries suspended the return of asylum applicants to Greece under the Dublin Regulation. According to the think tank MPI, Greece had the “lowest positive-decision rate in the processing of asylum applications in Europe” (Kasimis, 2012) in 2012, at around just one percent. (The rate roughly

50 doubled if appeals are taken into account.) It was furthermore noted that “[d]ecisions on asylum often take more than a year to be issued in an initial case, and from one to seven years for appeals” (ibid.). In 2014, Doctors Without Borders warned that “[p]rolonged and systematic detention is leading to devastating consequences on the health and dignity of migrants and asylum seekers in Greece” (MSF, 2014). According to a recent report by FIDH et al. (2014), “[t]he main violations [in Greece] include inhuman and degrading conditions of detention, violations of the right to asylum, inceptions at sea by Greek coastguards and forced returns to Turkey.” Allegations which the Greek coast guard has denied.

In January 2015, the UNHCR repeated a recommendation previously issued in 2008: do not return asylum seekers to Greece. The main concerns were stated as follows: “difficulties in accessing the asylum procedure, a continuing backlog of unresolved cases under the old procedure, risk of arbitrary detention, inadequate reception conditions, lack of identification and support for individuals with specific needs, push-backs of people at the border, concerns of integration prospects and support for refugees, and xenophobia and racist violence” (Spindler, 2015). Reception conditions have even been described as “inhuman” (Amnesty International, 2016). Greece has relied on the assistance of Frontex numerous times since its inception. In 2015 alone, Greece and Frontex were involved in 11 operations ranging in duration from 1 day to most of the year. In fact, the agency has been active in Greece every year since 2006. RABIT teams were deployed to Greece for a second time, this time in late December 2015. This time its mission was aimed at handling the large influx of migrants on Greek islands.

In November 2015, unannounced visits were carried out in Greece, more specifically, along the Greek-Turkish land border as well as to the islands of Chios and Samos. The draft report drawn up by the Commission found that there was “no effective identification and registration of irregular migrants and that fingerprints [were] not being systematically entered into the system and travel documents [were] not being systematically checked for the authenticity or against crucial security databases” (EC, 2016a). All in all, the report concluded that “Greece is seriously neglecting its obligations and that there are serious deficiencies in the carrying out of external border controls that must be overcome and dealt with by the Greek authorities” (ibid.).

51 In terms of immigration, Greece has been struggling (and at times, failing) for years. Alas the influx of people in 2015 was a lot more than it was possibly capable of handling.

4.7 The 2015 Crisis

This past year, Greece received more than 800,000 refugees and migrants, according to the UNHCR (Clayton & Holland, 2015). According to Amnesty International (2016), more than 612 persons died or were unaccounted for as a result of boats capsizing in the Aegean Sea, while the UNHCR reports that as many as 4000 people have gone missing and are believed to have drowned in the Mediterranean (Clayton & Holland, 2015). There have been reports of push-backs both along the land border to Turkey and in the Aegean Sea. According to the UNHCR, the majority of people arriving in Greece are asylum seekers. As such, they have to be processed under the Dublin Regulation. After arriving in Greece, many have chosen to continue onwards across Europe to lodge their applications in other countries. From Greece, many moved along the Western Balkan route (Frontex, 2016a), going north through Macedonia and Serbia into Hungary (figure 4). Throughout 2015, six EU reinstated temporary border controls at their national borders as a response to the large influx of people. Germany was the first to announce added controls, with focus on its borders to Austria. Austria followed only a few days later, closing off its borders with Italy, Hungary, Slovenia and Slovakia. Next came Slovenia and Hungary, both reinstating controls at the border they share. Sweden and Norway both reinstated border controls in November. Hungary, especially, has received a lot of attention for its response to the crisis; it has erected razor-wire fences along its borders with both Serbia and Croatia as a means of blocking entry to its territory. It furthermore declared a state of emergency in September 2015 at its Serbian borders and passed a law increasing the punishment for entering the country illegally. The Hungarian prime minster has issued some controversial statements in response to the crisis; he has claimed that Muslim migrants are a threat to Christian societies and has blamed Germany of “encouraging the influx by welcoming so many migrants” (BBC, 2016).

52

Figure 4: Route from Greece. SOURCE: Independent.co.uk15

More than 1,2 million people applied for asylum in the EU in 2015, more than double that of 2014. Figures from Eurostat specify that more than 330,000 applicants were granted asylum in the EU in 2015, half of which were Syrians. (A little over 246,000 were granted refugee status). “Of those submitting asylum claims, Syrians and Eritreans are the most likely to be granted protection (more than 90 percent of both groups receive refugee status or another form of protection)” (Banulescu- Bogdan & Frantzke, 2015). At the EU level, the issue of relocating asylum seekers has caused tense debates and fierce disagreements. A scheme presented by the Commission to relocate 120,000 refugees across the Union was voted against by Romania, the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hungary.

In May of last year TFEU article 78(3)16 was triggered for the very first time in connection with the implementation of the scheme to relocate 40,000 refugees. In September 2015, a majority vote approved a relocation scheme for a further 120,000 refugees across the union by September 2017.

15 http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/refugee-crisis-six-charts-that-show-where-refugees-are- coming-from-where-they-are-going-and-how-they-10482415.html 16 TFEU article 78(3): “In the event of one or more Member States being confronted with an emergency situation characterised by a sudden inflow of nationals of third countries, the Council, on a proposal from the Commission, may adopt provisional measures for the benefit of the Member State(s) concerned.” The article was presented in section 4.2 on the Schengen agreement

53 In the initial proposal, 50,400 refugees would be relocated from Greece, 15,600 from Italy, and 54,000 from Hungary. However, Hungary has refused to be part of the scheme, perhaps because it fears becoming a distribution centre for asylum seekers (Robinson, 2015). The purpose of the schemes is to take some of the pressure off of Greece (and Italy) by relocating applicants and having other member states process their applications. Only people from countries which receive EU-wide refugee status in more than 75 percent of instances are admissible for this scheme. In September 2015, this covered Syria, Iraq and Eritrea (EC, 2015c). The agreement included a penalty against those, who fail to live up to their end of the deal; 0.002% of their national GDP.

4.8 Path Dependence Applied

When we look at the data presented in this section with regards to path dependence, we can make out a path at the EU level; starting with Single European Act, a path was set upon towards better EU integration. This was confirmed by the establishment of the Schengen Agreement, which created a common internal space free for all citizens to move around. As a means of insuring this space, more regulation had to be synchronised between member states, and elements that had previously been considered national interests became transferred to the EU. As mentioned earlier, this has not always been smooth sailing; countries have disagreed on various issues and have had to reach many compromises along the way. Nevertheless, we do see an increase in integration across various sectors, and as path dependence would have it, the further along a path you go, the more ‘set’ you become, as gets increasingly difficult to abandon said path. If we accept EU integration as a path, then we might disregard contingency. There was no random big bang to set the event in motion. Path dependence is interesting to consider in the current environment of the EU. According to the theory, continuing on the path would imply more investment into integration and cooperation between member states. Given some of the discrepancies with regards to asylum procedures, integrating asylum matters fully into EU could be a possibility. Likewise, the ambiguities relating to Frontex missions have also been criticised. Could we be heading towards EU control of the borders, rather than EU directives to be carried out (and interpreted) by member states? A different way to consider the situation would be to question whether the ‘migration crisis’ has the potential to become a critical juncture in EU integration. The failure of member states to approach the crisis

54 collectively, implies that member states have different understandings and expectations of what membership in the European Union implies. While we may be able to speculate on the implications of this migrant crisis in term of a critical juncture, we cannot conclude with any definiteness on the matter. A critical juncture in path dependence are is identified as a retrospective and as such, we cannot, at present, conclude on the matter. We may, however, speculate.

Thus far, I have looked at the institutional framework most relevant to the situation seen in Greece during 2015. I have considered both the Schengen Agreement and the Dublin Regulation, and whether they reflect a securitisation of immigration. Based on the documents establishing the two regulations, no convincing evidence was identified, although the Schengen Agreement did leave a window open for national governments to frame a crisis and thereby invoke securitisation. I have looked at Frontex, the agency in place to help with management of external borders, and I have considered its functions and ambiguities and surmised that its setup does not imply securitisation although its RABIT teams can assist others in doing so. Finally, I considered the so-called ‘migration crisis’ that we have seen unfold in 2015, when an unprecedented amount of migrants arrived in Europe. The crisis has challenged the EU as a collective and highlighted several discrepancies, some of which will be considered in the next section.

55 5. Discussion

The crisis as we have seen it unfold over the past year, has put pressure on not only Greece, but on the entire collective that is the EU. It has illustrated shortcomings in the institutional framework and caused rifts between member states. In this section, I will look more closely at these shortcomings, focusing on the Dublin Regulation, and the disagreements they have led to between states (5.1). Next I will consider the framework selected for this thesis, namely securitisation, and consider it applicability for EU politics (5.2).

5.1. The Schengen/Dublin Framework

Greece has been exceptionally challenged in trying to deal with the amount of people entering its territories over the last year. More than 800,000 migrants arrived in Greece last year, with the majority thereof being refugees. Any system would be hard pressed to adapt in time. To understand why, we need to consider both the Schengen Agreement and the Dublin Regulation. Greece came under pressure at its external borders when hundreds of thousands of people made their way to Europe seeking refuge. The country remained under pressure as it, in accordance with the Dublin Regulation, was responsible for processing any applications for asylum. The set-up of both the Schengen Agreement and the Dublin Regulation seem to leave certain countries (often those closest to the southern borders) at a distinct disadvantage compared to others (the countries further north). When the Schengen Agreement was first introduced in was on a much smaller scale than today, in the sense that there were only five signatories. All, except for Luxembourg, would be responsible for part of the external border, not unlike they were beforehand. And all of them bordered on each other. Greece is an anomaly to this cooperation because it is not part of this geographical neighbourhood. It has always been an outlier, and although its neighbour Bulgaria has joined the EU, it has yet to be accepted into the borderless Schengen area. This past year, Greece has faced are a lot of disadvantages, which raises the question, what it stands to gain from the cooperation. According to Thielemann and Armstrong (2013, p 159), “there is empirical evidence, which demonstrates that many of the EU’s external border countries at the Union’s periphery are

56 among the top ten nationalities whose citizens have benefited the most from the opportunities provided by Schengen and the EU’s free movement provisions and who have moved to take up residence in other Member States.” Thus, one explanation is that by joining the Schengen area, a country’s citizens are free to move around the EU, and that this has been especially utilised by citizens of those countries along the external borders. They furthermore argue that it might be exactly those countries with external borders that most benefit from a benefit from having their borders secured and thereby preventing “irregular migration, transborder crime, and other violation against the borders of a country” (ibid).

While member states may have agreed on a common approach to establishing responsibility for processing asylum application, they have not coordinated how these applications are to be processed. Each country has its own procedures and standards, which could make all the difference for an asylum applicant. A report recently published by the Dutch Justice Ministry found that some countries are more likely to grant asylum than others, while taking various factors into account (Boztas, 2016). Germany, for example, is much more likely to grant asylum than countries such as Hungary and Greece (ibid.) Thielemann (2003) has furthermore found that a country’s “willingness to receive refugees is positively related to its more general commitment to norms such as physical protection and distributive justice” (p 267-8). Taking into account overseas development aid, domestic social spending and recognition rates as indicative of state’s commitment to the aforementioned norms, he found evidence that “the variation of Member States’ norm-based commitment is positively correlated with their relative willingness” to take in refugees (ibid, p. 268). Thus, it would seem like it absolutely makes a difference where an application is submitted. Last year, both Germany and Sweden made a point out of welcoming refugees. Hungary, meanwhile, built a fence, which Hungarian Prime Minister Orban has argued will protect Europe. According to data from Eurostat, Germany received 441,800 first time asylum applications, which corresponds to 35,2 percent of the total amount of first time applications filed in EU28 in all of 2015; Sweden received 156,110 which amounts to 12.4 percent.

Thielemann has argued that, “[d]espite their frequent reference in the EU’s official documents and communications, there is so far little evidence that the norms of solidarity and equity have

57 significantly influenced the actions of Member States in moving towards a burden-sharing regime in the area of forced migration” (2003, p. 278). The crisis as we have seen it unfold this past year has shown that there is still no agreement between countries as to how the burden should be dealt with. As signatories to the Geneva Convention, all EU countries have committed to granting asylum to refugees. Yet, some have found ways to avoid this claim. The Geneva Convention is applicable to the territories of the signatories. Which makes sense; states commit on their own behalf and within their sphere of authority. However, this leaves room for the interpretation that people outside said sphere are outside the responsibility of said state. In order to apply for asylum (and thereby be granted the legal status of refugee), an individual must enter a country and file an application there. This could lead countries to try to deter entry in the first place; if they cannot enter, they cannot apply; and if they cannot apply, the cannot be granted refugee status. The Geneva Convention specifies that refugees entering a country illegally must not be punished; according to article 31 “[t]he Contracting States shall not impose penalties, on account of their illegal entry or presence, on refugees who, coming directly from a territory where their life or freedom was threatened (…), enter or are present in their territory without authorization, provided they present themselves without delay to the authorities and show good cause for their illegal entry or presence.” However, the paragraph pertains to situations in which this has already occurred; where the refugee has already crossed the border. Elements of the paragraph also leave room for interpretation: refugees must come directly from a territory “where their life or freedom was threatened.” Is this to be understood in the sense of where their journey began, or should it be taken literally? Some countries have taken the latter approach, which has resulted in asylum seekers being turned away across Europe on the grounds that by travelling through the union, the applicants have already entered and exited safe countries, where they could have applied for asylum.17 In theory, this is exactly the sort of problem the Dublin Regulation sets out to fix. The Regulation determines which country is responsible thereby eliminating the back and forth. However, it may have unintentionally created a new game, the blame-game, rather than the old not-it-game.

17 States refer to both safe countries of origin and safe countries of asylum. The latter covers countries where asylum seekers “have, or could have, sought asylum and where their safety would not be jeopardized, whether in that country or through return there from to the country of origin” (UNHCR, 1991)

58 In 2015, the Commission twice proposed relocation schemes for people in need of international protection. Once in May concerning 40,000 individuals and again in September, this time concerning 120,000. Although these were passed, progress has been very slow. The second scheme was opposed by Romania, the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hungary who refused imposed quotas, arguing that the the issue was one of national jurisprudence and that it was outside of EU authority to impose quotas on member states. In early January 2016, only 0,17 percent (272 individuals) had been relocated (Kingsley, 2016). By March, the number had risen to 937, a (lack of) progress referred to as an “unsatisfactory level of implementation” by the Commission and blamed partly on a “lack of political will of Member States to deliver in a full and timely manner on their legal obligations to relocate” (EC, 2016d). In order to establish where to relocate the individuals in question to, the Commission proposed a distribution key using “objective and quantifiable criteria” (EC, 2015d). The key was determined by factoring in 40% the size of the population, 40% of the GDP, 10% of the average number of past asylum applications, and 10% of the unemployment rate. The Commission also proposed the establishment of a EU list of safe countries. This would do away with the present confusion, where two EU countries may not assess the same countries as safe and thereby exercise differential treatment. According to Human Rights Watch, a fair method of determining the state responsible for handling an asylum claim should take into account both the capacity of a given member state as well as the wishes of the applicant, to the extent possible (Human Rights Watch, 2015).

The UNHCR was not impressed by the commitment settled on by the member states. In its response to the relocation scheme and general handling of the crisis, it questioned why the Temporary Protection Directive had not been activated or in any way referred to as the situation in Greece unfolded. The directive was established in 2001 as a consequence of the conflicts and consequent migration witnessed in the former Yugoslavia and in Kosovo during the 1990s. It is an “exceptional measure to provide displaced persons from non-EU countries and unable to return to their country of origin, with immediate and temporary protection. It applies in particular when there is a risk that the standard asylum system is struggling to cope with demand stemming from a mass influx that risks having a negative impact on the processing of claims” (EC, 2015a). This ‘mass influx’ is understood as a large number of displaced individuals arriving from a specific country or region (art.

59 2(d)). When invoked, the directive is in place for one year. In order to trigger this directive, a Council Decision based on qualified majority voting is required establishing “the existence of a mass influx of displaced persons” (Council Directive 2001/55/EC art 5). This is done on the basis of a proposal from the Commission. The latter can either initiate the proposal or act on a request to do so by a member state. In this proposal the Commission needs to specify both for whom this temporary protection is available and provide an estimate of the amount of displaced people expected to be covered by the directive. In practice, this should translate into less bureaucracy, which in turn should result in faster processing. Rather than having to establish whether someone is indeed in danger and should qualify for refugee status immediately, countries only have to establish where someone is from. The directive will already have established whether the country or region qualifies the individual for temporary protection. The directive furthermore includes a list of minimum standards that member states must provide for people granted temporary protection for the duration of the directive. These include, but are not limited to, access to suitable accommodation, right to work, social welfare and medical care. While under temporary protection, displaced persons can then apply for asylum. In terms of allocating displaced persons, the directive states that “Member States shall receive persons who are eligible for temporary protection in a spirit of Community solidarity.” (art. 25) In practice this means that they must give notice of their capacity to host displaced persons. This detail shall be included in the Council decision referred to earlier.

This directive seems to be a great solution to the ongoing crisis, so why has it not been brought up? Invoking the temporary protection, asylum seekers could be processed much faster and it should be able to ease the pressure on Greece. What is needed is for the Council to decide that what we are witnessing is indeed mass influx and to determine the specific origin thereof. This could, in the current situation, be Syria. According to Eurostat figures, 28,9% of first time asylum applicants in the EU in 2015 were Syrians. This amounts to 362,775 applications which could be fast-tracked. This would, at least, postpone a good deal of the asylum application procedures states are currently going through and let the focus be on relocation. By invoking TFEU article 78(3) last May, the EU has already established that “of one or more Member States [are] confronted with an emergency situation characterised by a sudden inflow of nationals of third countries.” Surely, no one would argue that things have improved since then? An emergency situation has already been established,

60 even one caused by the large arrival of migrant, many (if not most) of whom are refugee. Perhaps the problem with the directive would not be invoking it so much as enforcing it. The directive relies on member states to offer their support and volunteer to host the displaces persons. No one is being made to participate. And as we have already witnessed with regards to the relocation scheme of September 2015, states might not jump at the opportunity to volunteer for transfers. Based on the low numbers of transfers carried out since September, many states are dragging their feet.

One of the issues which became especially apparent during 2015 is that while the EU still has a way to go with regards to shouldering responsibility collectively. Throughout 2015, attempts were made to organise a collective response to the crisis, a way to try and relieve the pressure on Greece but results seemed hard to come by as EU member states fought over responsibility. As migrants started leaving Greece, making their way through Europe, a chain reaction was set off with countries closing borders and prioritising national interests. As already discussed, trust is an integral part of both the Schengen Agreement and the Dublin Regulation. Thus, once one country reinstated border controls, it should perhaps come as no surprise that others would follow. Chancellor Merkel has repeatedly called for solidarity amongst member states but many have hesitated to commit. The events of the past year have shown that there are ways in which the framework in place leaves room for improvement. But more importantly, the way in which the framework has been fought over shows that there is a political division within the Union. There is disagreement on how to handle the crisis and even what sort of crisis we are dealing with, with blame being pushed around between member states. Over the last year, the Union has not seemed all that unified.

5.2 Securitisation Assessed

As already established, scholars are still debating the application of securitisation to issues across the board – how it should be done, how to assess or measure securitisation, and what the limitations thereof are. In my assessment of the Schengen Agreement, the Dublin Regulation, and even Frontex, I found little evidence of securitisation. Granted, it was a limited application, but I did expect to find it represented to a more convincing extent. I thought that if the issues surrounding migration have indeed been securitised exactly as some scholars argue, then it would be reflected in the legal

61 documents. This was not the case. Although both the Schengen Agreement and Frontex included measures that might be utilised by member states for securitisation.

Perhaps, then, securitisation is better suited to the national level. Certainly, Wæver’s version fits better nationally, as the important elements of his framework can be easily identified at state level; the securitising actor would be a government representative and the population would make up the audience. It is much more confusing to try and distinguish these roles in relation to the EU. Firstly, it is not entirely clear what agent in the EU would be in a position to act as the securitising actor. The Commission’s President Juncker would be the most obvious candidate, but it is not entirely clear, who would make up his audience. We do not see televised press conferences, nor do we get nightly updates on EU proposals on the news, the way we might from our national governments. Representatives of the European institutions do not quite have the same direct contact and impact, making speech acts harder to identify. However, even if a speech act were presented, would that necessarily need to translate into law? Even if securitisation was at the root of all immigration policies in the EU, would they be strongly reflected in the legislation? Securitisation is an urgent act, an act of the moment, if you will, where an atmosphere is riled up and translated into action or provisions therefor. Securitisation is temporary in this sense, whereas laws are permanent. Therefore, would it not make sense to ‘sober up’ the language applied in the latter? To justify and ground it in more sombre context?

Another reason why the EU might be challenged in the role of securitising actor is its bureaucracy, which makes it difficult to image much actual immediate action taking place. (This is not to say that it cannot but it did not appear to be the case of neither the Schengen Agreement nor the Dublin Regulation.) The relocation scheme introduced in September of 2015, was passed with a timeline of two years for implementation, despite Greece (and Italy) needing immediate relief. And the Temporary Protection Directive of 2001 was only established after the fact and then never heard from again. The nature of securitisation is rather short-term or instant; actions lead to reactions. Because the proposed threat appeared imminent, immediate action is required. Yet, even six months later, only a tiny portion of refugees have been relocated according to the scheme. Last year

62 was the first time TFEU article 78(3) was invoked, and yet, the result only amounted to an agreement to relocate 40,000 people. This does not suggest that the EU might act as a securitising actor.

Wæver’s focus on the securitising actor and the speech act constructs a very narrow point of origin for securitisation. Assuming I had been able to detect securitisation in the frameworks studied, would this automatically frame the EU as a securitising actor? And would this assume the Union to have an agenda of its own? Might we not instead consider that laws and regulations passed in the EU could have been instigated in a bottom-up fashion? Thus, they would have originated elsewhere and passed on to the Union. Perhaps they could have resulted from spill-over from national initiatives. In this hypothesis, the securitisation would take place on a national level first and affect EU measures later. Over the last years, several European countries have seen a rise in political mandates going to right-wing parties. Many of these are anti-immigration and very vocal about it. While this does not mean that all of Europe is leaning to the right, it has had some consequences; “[q]uestioning (while not always decrying) immigration, integration, the euro, the EU and the establishment, while promoting a stiff dose of nationalist sentiment, is now entirely “salonfaehig”, as German-speakers would say” (Adler, 2016).

Related to the point made above, we might consider, not so much the intention of EU migration policies, but instead their application. What I mean is, although the Schengen Agreement and the Dublin Regulation may not have been created as securitising moves, they might be employed as such by national governments. In this situation, they are turned on their heads somewhat. For example, if a country is looking to close off its borders to asylum seekers, it might cite the Dublin Regulation as a justifying means for turning people away. This is done by referring the responsibility to another country. Thus, the framework can become party to securitisation, even if it were never intended as such.

The ‘original’ version of securitisation implied that securitisation either was or was not. The focus was not on the perceived threat as most anything can be constructed as such. Instead of considering it as an either/or situation, Baele and Sterck (2015) argue that securitisation should be understood as a process and that we should consider its outcomes in terms of intensity (p. 1123-4). This could

63 make the framework more applicable, although the outcome would leave a lot of room for interpretation. What does it mean if something is only a little securitised? I think the framework of securitisation is both interesting and relevant, but it is at a disadvantage when it is applied as loosely and freely as we might observe, in that scholars need to constantly explain and justify the ways in which they conceive of securitisation, how they apply it, and where they look for it.

64 6. Conclusion

2015 was a challenging year for Europe. Throughout the year, an unprecedented amount of migrants and asylum seekers reached the territories of the EU. While we have seen challenges to the institutional framework before, last year was on a different scale than we have seen previously, and that is why this incident could come to have binding effects on how we move forward from here. The sheer scale of the issue affected almost every single country in the union and as such it was a European crisis that unfolded in Greece rather than a Greek crisis.

This thesis set out to explore how the crisis impacted the institutional framework for dealing with migration. The way I approached the subject was by, first of all, establishing what the framework currently entails. I focused on the Schengen Agreement and the Dublin Regulation as these two frameworks came under particular strain in Greece last year. The former places the responsibility of external border control squarely on Greece, while the latter dictates that a refugee must apply for asylum in the first EU country, he or she enters, and that it is the responsibility of this country to process said application. I analysed each of these agreements looking for signs of securitisation, but very little was identified. The Schengen Agreement contained two provisions, which I argued had the potential to be used for securitisation. Both of which, in fact, we have seen applied this past year. The Dublin Regulation as well as the regulation instating Frontex were found to be without any securitisation references of importance, with the possible exception of Frontex’s RABIT teams.

Starting out, I expected to find more evidence of securitisation within the EU framework than was the case. My focus and analysis was quite limited in scope, however, because I had limited myself to such central framework, I did expect more reflections of securitisation than I was able to discern. This, however, does not mean that securitisation is not present in the area of migration. Rather than looking at legal framework, like I did, one might look at applications, and try to assess in what situations the various elements have been invoked. There might also be securitisation of migration going on at a different level than that of EU institutions. In fact, it is my opinion, having tried it out, that the framework is better applied to national settings. Thus, one could study what under what

65 situations or conditions the EU migration framework is invoked in national debates. Whether it might be used as a securitising tool, either to instigate securitisation or to help respond to it.

In order to assess the research question, I considered the crisis in Greece and the European response thereto. The inability to agree on how to handle the matter at an EU level meant that little action was taken collectively. Instead, this crisis illustrated a serious divide between countries arguing about how this ought to be handled. Some countries opened their doors, while others closed theirs. Some argued for increased cooperation in handling the crisis, while others deemed it outside EU provisions and argued that it should be treated as a national matter. It is likely, that these differences of opinion reflect as larger difference of expectations; expectations regarding what the EU is and what it could potentially become. Do we face crises collectively, or is it each to their own? If this event comes to mark a crossroads in EU history, as it might according to path dependence, it seems there are two solutions. Either we ‘settle,’ and agree on the lowest common denominator or more power is transferred to the EU institutions. Plans are in the works on common asylum procedures that should eliminate the discrepancies currently in place between states. This should make the process much easier for everyone involved. The suggested revisions to the Dublin Regulation would see its mandate become stronger that it is at the moment. Currently, Frontex can only go where it is invited. The proposal suggests changing this to make it possible to deploy Frontex guards in times of crisis, even if it is against the will of the country to which they are sent.

Being able to actively deploy guards to an external border, even if it means overriding the state usually in charge thereof, would, I imagine, be a very hard pillow to swallow for some. Although I imagine it will be wrapped in a couple of precautions requiring meetings and votes before being activated. On the other hand, this must mean that Frontex would get its own mandate and thereby represent itself when out in the field, removing some of the ambiguities currently surrounding the agency. However, if we continued with the line of though even further, we might suggest a permanent EU border agency, taking over border duties from national states. It seems unlikely, that member states will be willing to go this far, but it would certainly make border management a common project, more so than it is today. Greece, for example, is guarding its borders on behalf of all those in the Union. Yet, the responsibility falls entirely on Greece. It might request assistance

66 from Frontex, but it would still be in charge. Frontex helps and consults, it does not decide and as such cannot really be held accountable. I know that Greece receives money from the EU to help shoulder the burden, but money and responsibility are two very different things. It will be interesting to see how we move forward from this. Certainly, the crisis in not over yet. Now that there is an agreement in place with Turkey to return migrants, migration routes are once more shifting.

There are several things left which we might consider, on the matter. One could continue Thielemann’s line of research (2003), to try and assess why some countries are more willing to take in refugees and whether this is something we see reflected in other of their policies. Some considerations to keep in mind could be that the countries most opposed to quota regulation as imposed by the EU, are those, which have acted as transit zones between Greece on the one side and countries such as Austria and Germany on the other. Those who have been openly inviting refugees in are amongst the wealthier countries in the EU.

An interesting paradox on might consider for securitisation studies, is whether the EU member states have all accepted securitisation but disagree completely on the solution. In those situations, the argument might be that the Union is under threat by the pressure of migrants coming this way; only some see the solution as closing the borders while others believe the way to save the Union is by tackling the crisis as a European one, not a Greek one.

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