Lebanon: a Remnant of the Carina Perelli Ottoman Empire Trying to Survive in a Region in Turmoil

Lebanon: A Remnant of the Carina Perelli Ottoman Empire trying to Survive in a Region in Turmoil

Courtesy The Daily Star, Lebanon, July 16, 2014

Lebanon is the only multi-confessional country left in a region that is experiencing the collapse of the post-Otto- man order, the failure of the variegated experiments and formulas to create and sustain Arab States in the Middle East, the centrality of non-State actors, the proxy fight for SERIES PEACE& SECURITY supremacy between Saudi Arabia and Iran (with other regional players such as Turkey, Egypt and Qatar vying for influence), as well as the periodic escalation of the intractable conflict between the Palestinians and the Israelis. SERIES PEACE& SECURITY

About the author:

CARINA PERELLI (RESDAL’s Member) Director of Silverkrieg Limited, she is a private consultant dedicated to confl ict and violence management, particularly in hostile environments. She performs tasks related to training, evaluation, auditing, regulation and facilitation. She is an expert in political negotiation, political analysis and designing institutional mechanisms to mitigate violence as well as in questions of political stability, security and defense in confl ict regions, whose fi eld of action includes Afghanistan, Haiti, Iraq, Mexico, Nigeria, Lebanon, Libya, Palestine and East Timor. Her experience also includes working in Latin American countries such as Argentina, Bolivia, Colom- bia, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Paraguay, Peru and Uruguay. She has held the position of Director of the Electoral Assistance Division of the Department of Political Affairs in the United Nations and UN International Commissioner ad interim, Indepen- dent Electoral Commissioner in Iraq for the Referendum of 2005. Former Executive VicePresident of IFES (International Founda- tion for Electoral Systems) in Washington DC and former Country Representative of IFES in Afghanistan (2009-2012).

Copyright RESDAL. Rights reserved. This report was carried out within the framework of the ‘Gender Perspective in Peacekeeping Operations: Cases and Lessons from Contributing Countries’ project, which receives ﬁ nancial support from:

Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation October 2014

Other RESDAL publications

https://www.facebook.com/resdal https://twitter.com/RESDAL_ http://www.resdal.org [email protected] Carina Perelli 1 Lebanon: A Remnant of the Ottoman Empire trying to Survive in a Region in Turmoil Lebanon is the only multi-confessional country left in a region that is experiencing the collapse of the post-Ott oman order, the failure of the variegated experiments and formulas to create and sustain Arab States in the Middle East, the centrality of non-State actors, the proxy fi ght for supremacy between Saudi Arabia and Iran (with other regional players such as Turkey, Egypt and Qatar vying for infl uence), as well as the periodic escalation of the intractable confl ict between the Palestinians and the Israelis.

A Region in Upheaval The arc of instability in which Lebanese re- Lebanon is the only multi-confessional country ality is immersed is characterized by the “de- left in a region that is experiencing the collapse mocratization of violence”5 and the presence of the post-Ott oman order, the failure of the var- of motley armed coalitions of de-territorialized iegated experiments and formulas to create and fi ghters, warring alongside the disgruntled and sustain Arab States in the Middle East1, the cen- disenfranchised, political opportunists, profes- trality of non-State actors2, the proxy fi ght for su- sional revolutionaries and militants, members premacy between Saudi Arabia and Iran3 (with of criminal organizations, engaging in combat other regional players such as Turkey, Egypt and other groupings of combatants that also control Qatar vying for infl uence), as well as the periodic pockets of territory. In asymmetrical warfare, escalation of the intractable confl ict between the the cost of disruption has decreased signifi - Palestinians and the Israelis. cantly for insurgent groups thanks to a variety The demise of the Arab State project and the of factors (a black market fl ush with weapons, retreat of State structures from everyday life use of low cost technology for urban warfare, ef- have pushed people to seek the protection the fi cient use of social media, availability of pools State can no longer provide in sectarian identi- of candidates for recruitment amidst the disen- ties and allegiances. The wreckage of the State franchised and the disgruntled in a region with has brought with it the implosion of the notion a signifi cant youth bulge and an endemic defi cit of “citizenship” – the elusive, faulty, but funda- of hope and opportunities, lack of legitimacy mental principle of political equality of all deni- of State structures, to quote but a few) whereas zens of a territory vis-à-vis the power of State the cost of addressing that disruption with the structures and institutions - replacing it with current institutional mechanisms (armed forces, the particularism of membership to a specifi c police, prison services, judiciary, State media, group, affi liation to a particular sect, belonging etc.) remains high not only in violence-related to a distinct ethnicity. Against this backdrop, expenditures but also in the risks associated the combination of pauperization, marginaliza- with the erosion of legitimacy. For strong States tion, demographic bulge, and denial of political with institutionalized armed forces, this fi ght is voice has proven lethal. In the Middle East to- the equivalent of att empting to kill mosquitoes day, what divides takes preeminence over what with missiles: costly, ghastly and with a lot of unites. In that sense, the current confl agration in collateral damage. For fragile States, or those the region is not about terror and extremism, fi t- that are crumbling, the choice is between admit- na4 and jihad in Islam, sectarian confrontations ting defeat and surrendering or becoming one or oil and economic interests: it is a foundational of the many parties of combatants vying for pre- dispute about political order. eminence in a geographical location. Lebanon: A Remnant of the Ottoman Empire trying to Survive in a Region in Turmoil

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The line of demarcation between non-State been emasculated in the peripheries, whilst in and State combatants in the violent clashes in large urban sett ings the demise of “hidden pro- Libya, Syria, Iraq has blurred, with the State fessional political operators” inserted in State security forces becoming just one more armed bureaucratic structures has deprived the Sunni protagonist fi ghting alongside militias and bat- of important mechanisms of articulation within tling other bands of gunmen at the same time, the State.12 This perverse cycle breeds resent- backed and funded by regional and internation- ment, helplessness and rage, and sets up a fer- al players engaging in their own proxy wars. Al- tile breeding ground for extremism, particularly though the number of combatants is relatively amongst the young, who have seen their expec- small6, this type of warfare presupposes a mas- tations and hopes quashed time and time again tery of PSYOP7, particularly in social media, and when intransigent and short-sighted elites seize AGITPROP8 among the population of the region control of government and institutional machin- or potential adherents and recruits. The Internet eries13 and become predatory and exclusionary has become another batt leground, at the same power-holders, depriving other groupings of le- time (as the dams and cities where physical gal forms of access to legitimate political space combat takes place, with Twitt er and YouTube and dignity. In the meantime, there has been a as the new frontlines. They allow for the staging role reversal with the Shia, perennial underdog of the grim “Theater of Terror”9, “performance of the Middle East, witnessing the rise of Iran, violence” as Juergensmeyer calls it, a macabre a Shia State, and Hezbollah, a Shia movement, succession of beheadings and shootings, forced and the doctrine of Political Islam, of the Shia conversions and exemplary punishments des- Ayatollah Khomeini, consolidated. Aside from tined to horrify, anger and fascinate the viewer, the objective conditions, there is an element of sap the enemy’s morale and destroy its “will humiliation at play that facilitates the polariza- to fi ght”, and, equally important, capture the tion of the confl ict between the two communi- imagination of – and hence att ract - potential re- ties. As Yezid Sayigh points out in his Op-Ed of cruits.10 August 21, 2014 in Al-Hayat,14 Islamism is tak- If the Islamic State (IS) seems now to be so ing hold predominantly among the growing un- successful, it is because it incarnates a possible derclass of societies that are quickly urbanizing “solution” to a phenomenon long in the making framed by States that have failed to evolve. It but that sweeps the Middle East nowadays: that is the result of the degradation and mutation of “a Sunni majority with a minority complex — of the structures of socioeconomic and political a powerful though confused feeling of margin- power of States controlled by elites that failed to alization, dispossession and humiliation. More respond to social change. and more Sunnis throughout the region experi- Divisions and fault lines are no less profound ence and express the feeling that they have been within the communities in the Middle East, in- deprived of their fundamental rights and are cluding amidst extremist groups, with frequent suff ering persecution.”11 The Sunni communi- secessions and accusations of treachery and ties are confronted by a history of past political apostasy15 and acts of violence going concomi- failures while “remembering” a Golden Era of tantly with the labels. The permanent depura- power and might, caught between the stark al- tion of the membership of these groups, the oc- ternatives of the fear of State authoritarianism casional opportunistic alliances that end up in and the fear of chaos, fl oating in a perceived new killings and divisions, the expurgation of vacuum of hopelessness. Unable to fulfi ll their “tainted” habits, interactions, and “deviation- traditional role as intermediaries between their ist approaches” against the backdrop of cowed communities and the State apparatus and deliv- populations strongly reminds us of other revo- er palpable goods, elders and tribal leaders have lutionary movements of a bygone era. The quest Lebanon: A Remnant of the Ottoman Empire trying to Survive in a Region in Turmoil

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for purity is particularly appealing to frustrated ia has lost half its population since the confl ict youth that have bought into the new narrative started, with more than 6 million people inter- and who have fallen prey to the “seduction of nally relocating within the country to fl ee inse- violence”16, even if their knowledge of Islam cure areas, and a massive infl ux of refugees into comes more from PDFs downloaded from the neighboring countries: Jordan, Iraqi Kurdistan, Internet than from mosque att endance. The Turkey and Lebanon absorbing the majority of “cult of heroism” in a grey world, the roman- the impact of the Syrian refugee crisis19. In Iraq, ticized version of the ISIL proclaimed the sectarianization of creation of the Is- politics where you lamic State (IS)20 on obliterate your en- 29 June 2013 as a emies, the myth of Caliphate. This in- the “noble death” strumentalization of has always reso- an obsolete political nated with potential construct transforms young recruits, and religious solidarities is particularly att rac- in the key axis of the tive to a generation political structure bred on videogames of government as a and superhero mov- matt er of doctrine21. ies17. It seems a lot IS has targeted every less appealing to group it considers regular people living apostate, heretic or in areas controlled infi del and uprooted by the revolution entire populations and subject to their of Christians, Sha- rule and violence: baks, and Yazidis, as these people either well as killing Shia, retrench from pub- moderate Sunni, lic space or fl ee the Turkmen and rep- territory. However, resentatives of State even ordinary peo- institutions such as ple view with relief Shatila, one of the main Palestinian refugee camp in Beirut. members of the Iraqi the semblance of “law and order”, rules and armed and security forces and the Kurdish Pesh- punishment systems that banish chaos from the merga, senior bureaucrats and State offi cials. streets and the arbitrary from their lives. One of These massive population movements, cou- the biggest challenges for IS will be to control/ pled with constant batt les and skirmishes, pett y administer not death but a territory, while con- crime and generalized breakdown of law and tinuing to have the same romantic appeal to re- order, have overwhelmed the social (and physi- cruit wannabes: there is nothing romantic about cal) infrastructure not only of the countries af- cleaning the sewage and directing traffi c, deal- fected by direct confl ict on their soil but also of ing with the drudgery of austere daily life and those countries that become hosts to the refugee fi ghting not for a cause but for your share of the infl ux. The vicious loop of armed confl ict and budget.18 refugees has put pressure on the sanitation, Continuous strife has led to massive popula- health care, water, employment and education tion displacements. The UN estimates that Syr- systems in all these countries. In Iraq, half the Lebanon: A Remnant of the Ottoman Empire trying to Survive in a Region in Turmoil

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provinces will have serious problems opening blocked, leading to the inability to access the Gulf schools this year, according to UNICEF, because markets and creating ripple eff ects in the econo- they have either fallen under the control of IS mies of the region. According to the World Bank24, or their buildings are used to house IDPs. In Lebanon – whose economic growth had already Lebanon, a signifi cant number of Syrian refugee slumped with the recession brought about by the children cannot att end classes because schools Arab Springs in the region - witnessed a sharp are already operating at full capacity or because growth reduction with the Iraq confl ict, cutt ing of diff erences in school programs and Lebanese down growth forecasts by half. bureaucratic requirements make it impossible A morose sense of doom prevails. The US has for Syrian children to follow the regular Leba- eff ectively retreated from the region after the nese coursework22. Prostitution, human traffi ck- disruptive invasion and occupation of Iraq: the ing, gangs, adult unemployment, child labor and Ghost of Mistakes Past colors its hesitant posi- early marriages are starting to become rampant. tions vis-à-vis confl ict in this part of the world.25 In a region with a signifi cant youth bulge, the After investing 25 billion dollars in building lack of schooling and institutionalized frames of the capacity of a conventional Iraqi Army that reference and containment of children will lead crumbled when confronted with a transnational to serious problems in the future, including a “insurgency”, the USG government is weary of deepening of some of the root causes of confl ict: moving beyond air strikes and the deployment disaff ection, resentment, hopelessness, and ac- of advisors to Iraq, even if that limited interven- tual lack of material prospects. If not addressed, tion has burned in 3 months 560 million dollars the maelstrom created by the disruption of so- of the 800 million the Pentagon plans to spend cial order will become the breeding ground for in this country for security in 2014.26 American future generations of extremists, nihilists and public opinion is not keen to support another the human fl otsam associated with anomic con- US foreign military intervention any time soon, ditions. There is only a slim chance that these as- particularly in Iraq. Even though air strikes have pects of the refugee question will be addressed already started against targets in both Syria and by international agencies and national govern- Iraq, there is a marked reluctance to engage ments as funds pledged in 2014 only cover a these groups on the ground and an insistence fraction of the budget required. Meanwhile, that only national and regional actors must en- private funds are being channeled via private gage in ground operations. Moreover, whilst charitable organizations that, in many cases, decision- and policy-makers are acutely aware continue to propagate the ideology of Salafi sm of the fact that the answer to the problems brief- and Wahhabism among refugee youths23, and in ly described above is not merely military, there an ironic turn of events, classes have restarted are no new ideas on the table in terms of gover- in the territories of Syria and Iraq controlled nance, diplomacy and international cooperation by ISIL…. using the offi cial Saudi curricula for to replace the much criticized doctrine of civil- math, science and Arabic. ian “nation building” and its military counter- The cost of confl ict is also refl ected in the econ- part, the COIN. With variants that place more or omy of the countries of the region. As the econo- less emphasis on military options and military mies of the region are intertwined not only by aid, the other Western countries fi nd themselves direct trade but also by geography, many of the in the same disconnect loop as the Americans27. achievements of the countries of the region have There is greater clarity in what not to do (inter- been derailed by the current state of confl ict. Iraq, vene directly) and on the length of the confl ict for instance, represents 7% of Lebanese exports (this is going to be a long and protracted fi ght but is also a transit route for Lebanon goods to and the prospects for near-term resolution are the Gulf. Many trade routes are thus currently bleak) than on what to do (the eff ectiveness of Lebanon: A Remnant of the Ottoman Empire trying to Survive in a Region in Turmoil

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La Corniche, the Mediterranean seafront. airstrikes and drones, the nature and conduct of between foreign intervention and sovereignty, operations in cyberspace against an enemy that trans-border alliances and violence. It is a coun- conducts a “virtual guerrilla” campaign, the try highly segmented, composed only of “mi- need and means to support local ownership of norities” that operate with high degrees of au- the confl ict in a region where local powers are tonomy, where no single religious group has the in confl ict with each other) and who that enemy majority, plagued by systemic instability and is (IS, Al Qaida, other extremist groups, global institutional weaknesses, privileging the crite- trends towards extremism and radicalization ria of pluralism and coexistence over effi ciency among youth). and effi cacy. As Augustus Norton aptly phrases it, “Lebanon is an anomalous state because so Lebanon: A Precarious Experiment much that constitutes politics in Lebanon is con- Gambling on the Survival of the Most ducted on the periphery of the State, if not out- Adaptive Systems side of it.30 It is also a country where the authori- A small country28 cradled at the crossroads of tarianism prevalent in the rest of the region has the Mediterranean and the Arab worlds, marry- been avoided and where things get done despite ing the coastal areas of the cosmopolitan Levant the lack of eff ective government institutions. with the rural realities of the Mountain and the In short, Lebanon is an example of adaptation hinterland, with a tumultuous history of con- more than effi ciency: the systems put in place fl ict and resurgence, the Republic of Lebanon have allowed it to survive or at least surmount embodies the att empts of seventeen faith-based the eff ects of the points of friction and confl ict communities to live together and share a com- in its environment but have acted as a brake mon national narrative. As Salibi puts it: “To impeding further political and social develop- create a country is one thing, to create a nation- ment. It has also facilitated the phenomenon of ality is another.”29 The history of Lebanon is the a country used as an arena for proxy regional quest for a common “we” in a perpetual tension confrontations, interventions, and clashes be- Lebanon: A Remnant of the Ottoman Empire trying to Survive in a Region in Turmoil

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tween third-party actors in “imported” confl icts walls, the recourse to migration is forestalled. that are also local ones. The pacts have also tried to disassociate or at Some authors have defi ned Lebanon as “a mi- least distance Lebanon – the permanent arena crocosm of the peoples, cultures and religions in whose territory regional confl icts are played found in the Middle East region as a whole”31, - from the upheavals of the region. In a sense, while others have highlighted the precarious- the Lebanese sectarian oligarchy at the com- ness32 of the institutional arrangements that al- mands of the country has operated eff ectively as low “this tiny replica of the [Ott oman] empire a Board of Administration of confl ict that pre- that ended ninety years ago”33 to exist and func- serves the integrity of the country at the price of tion. maintaining it in a state of stasis. Anything can The institutional arrangements of Lebanon unbalance the precarious equilibrium that keeps stem from the old millet system of the Ott o- Lebanon together: hence the slowness of change man Empire34, a system whose basis was later and the timorous att empts at reform in a world reinforced during the French mandate and en- which races into an uncertain future. Lebanon’s shrined in the 1926 Constitution, the 1943 un- elites have taken a page out of Il Gatt opardo39. writt en “National Pact”35 and the Taif Agree- Whether the rate of incremental change adopt- ment of 198936. An added layer of institutional ed will accommodate the rapid societal changes complexity was reached with the Doha Agree- taking place in a globalized world and economy ment of 200837. will probably dictate whether Lebanon can con- This recourse to pacts, dialogues and agree- tinue to exist under the current model. ments that institutionalize provisional “exit by Lebanon is also a country that has at times consensus” options in times of crisis that then be- had part or the whole of its territory occupied come more or less fi xed and permanent features by Israel and Syria and that survived a civil of the system is a fundamental trait of Lebanese war that threatened the very basis of coexis- politics. It shows the dexterity of a political es- tence, navigating confl ict through agreements tablishment conformed by interdependent and and trying to preserve the national unity of the intertwined confessional elites38 operating in a country from being torn apart by regional strife playing fi eld of rules that highlight rather than and alignments that resonate with and enhance obscure the cleavages and sectarian diff erences whatever fi ssure the Lebanese coexistence mod- and renders them functional to the precarious el presents. It is in this light that the Baabda Dec- stability of the country. It also points out a fun- laration of neutrality and dissociation, particu- damental contradiction at the core of the Leba- larly vis-à-vis the Syrian civil war, issued by the nese dynamics. On the one hand, pacts operate National Dialogue Committ ee on June 2012, has under the principle of “neither winners nor los- to be understood. ers” stemming from the National Pact and re- The resultant electoral system and institution- inforced throughout Lebanon’s modern history. al arrangements are among the most intricate in On the other, it is a profoundly exclusionary the world. Lebanon is a parliamentary Republic: society, not only in terms of class and gender, the Parliament is unicameral, with 128 seats won but also of nationality of origin. The consensus by direct election. All Parliamentary seats are can only be maintained by denying rights and divided equally between Muslims and Chris- disenfranchising large sectors of the population tians, with seats further subdivided between (Palestinian refugees, women, Syrian refugees, eleven confessions40. The right to stand for elec- the underclass, foreign “temporary” workers). tion is confessional although the law does not The pressure of their compounded demands require candidates to provide proof of their over the system was often relieved in the past by confessional status. The right to vote is non- emigration. In a globalized world of fences and confessional: voters can vote for all seats, even Lebanon: A Remnant of the Ottoman Empire trying to Survive in a Region in Turmoil

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Marks of the war can still be perceived on some buildings. if they do not belong to the same confession as net are required for “national issues” such as the the seat being contested. The electoral system is general mobilization of the army, calling a state based on multi-member district and voters have of emergency or establishing the annual nation- as many votes as there are seats elected in the al budget. district (block vote). However, voters use only a The whole design of the system is geared to- single ballot paper to vote and the ballot is not wards making the government function by annulled if it is not complete, that is, if there are inter-confessional consensus and not by either fewer names in the ballot than seats in dispute. order or imposition: a subtle and relatively ef- It is also a plurality/majority system: the candi- fective nudge towards practicing the art of com- dates that get the most votes win the seats. promise. However the system is also prone to The post of President is reserved for a Ma- stalemates and paralysis or, at least, bickering ronite Christian, the Prime Minister position for and a constant start and stop ﬂ ow that makes a Sunni Muslim and the role of Speaker of the decision-making on central issues slow and Chamber of Deputies for a Shia Muslim. The painful. Parliament indirectly elects the President for a Moreover, inter-confessional consensus often period of six years. The term is non renewable, obscures intra-confessional strife, with citizens while the mandates of the Members of Parlia- following leading families, patronage networks ment last 4 years. All institutions, starting with and leaders within the various confessions. the Cabinet of Ministers, are balanced in terms There is no political parties law: parties have of confessions and special majorities of the Cabi- to register under the old Law on Associations Lebanon: A Remnant of the Ottoman Empire trying to Survive in a Region in Turmoil

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of 1909 that comes from the Ott oman Empire41. ism is the norm, further enhancing the role of The system favored (and favors, at least in the the religious authorities and leadership of each language used in the Electoral Law) candidates community and reinforcing their collective role and confessions: elections, until 2005, were “su- as a “confessional oligarchy.”44 With no mod- per local elections” more than national events, ern institutions and a “semblance of a modern following the spirit of the Ott oman Common- State”, “the existing institutions cannot intro- wealth. The election took place over 4 Sundays duce needed reforms for fear that these changes as voters had to travel to the district where the would alter the status quo and the balance of family originated from. Citizens tended to vote interests among the communities. This makes it for local notables and well-known personali- almost impossible to devise a national agenda ties, and the platforms of the candidates related for political and economic reform.”45 more to community aff airs and local issues than Only two State institutions are perceived as to national aff airs. truly national: the Central Bank of Lebanon and 2005 was a pivotal year, marked by the as- the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF), both respon- sassination of Rafi k Hariri and the withdrawal sible for the stability of the country at diff erent of the Syrians: all of a sudden Lebanese voters levels. Although both are as subject to sectarian were confronted with truly national issues that allotment of posts and quotas as the rest of the went beyond the borders of localized interests State bureaucracies, they have reached a level of and intra-confessional debates. It has been said autonomy because of the centrality of their func- that the so-called “Cedar Revolution” was the tions and, at least in the case of the LAF, past awakening of Lebanon, the equivalent of the history and experience. However, particularly Arab Spring phenomenon with a bett er out- in the case of the LAF, the limits of technical come42. Two blocs emerged from the street mo- profi ciency are the presence or absence of what bilizations: the “March 14” and the “March 8”43 one senior Lebanese military offi cer called “po- movements; both of them are inter-confessional litical cover”, that is, clear and coherent politi- alliances, with a third bloc of more “indepen- cal decision-making that would allow for clear dent” minded politicians and technocrats (such and coherent decision-implementing. In the ab- as the President of the Central Bank) also play- sence of such “orders from above” at the level ing signifi cant roles in government. These two of the political class, the LAF is often forced to coalitions still dominate politics, leaving litt le deploy tactically profi cient measures but lacks space for the emergence of smaller groupings a perceived coherent strategy. Moreover, the within this framework. temptation to make use of an institution such as The Lebanese State is a fragile and weak en- LAF to shoulder more tasks at the national level tity. On the one hand, it is subject to the con- is always present, particularly in times of crisis, straints of confessional balance: positions are and for any crisis46. allott ed along sectarian lines. The civil service The matt er is further complicated by the co- and public administration are thus vulnerable existence and co-dependence of the LAF with to the same problems, including patronage, that Hezbollah. Created during the Israeli invasion plague the political system. On the other, whole of 1982 and offi cially founded in 1985 as a Shia areas of everyday life (all matt ers related to per- militant formation funded by Iran to resist the sonal and civil status, for instance) fall outside Israeli intervention and defend Lebanon’s na- its purview as they are adjudicated following tional territory, Hezbollah (“Party of Allah” or the religious codes, practices and processes of “Party of God”) is at the same time a political the diff erent confessional communities. There is party, a resistance movement, a social network no unifi ed code of law governing personal sta- of charities and programs for social develop- tus in Lebanon: legislative and judicial plural- ment47, a powerful telecommunications net- Lebanon: A Remnant of the Ottoman Empire trying to Survive in a Region in Turmoil

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A Syrian refugee woman wonders around the streets of Beirut, asking for help to car drivers. work, and an armed organization. It has been Due to the hybrid nature of Hezbollah, it also classifi ed in toto or in part as a terrorist group has what LAF lacks: political cover. The armed by the governments of the US, Canada, EU, UK, wing can count on the support of the powerful France, the Netherlands, Australia, New Zea- political wing to block, advocate and negotiate land, Bahrain, the Gulf Cooperation Council, (sometimes in a high-handed way) positions vis- and Israel. As a political party, it not only has à-vis its present actions and future endeavors. parliamentary representation, seats in Cabinet, It can also count on the political arm to curtail and the majority of the municipal mayoralties any progress of the LAF that would endanger in the South but also constitutes the backbone Hezbollah’s “right” to keep its arms for “na- of the 8 March Alliance and has had de facto veto tional defense” purposes; and it can also rely on power in Lebanon’s parliament since the Doha its powerful telecommunications network48 and Agreement. As an armed militia, Hezbollah has the mobilization of the “Arab Street” to maintain an almost endless supply of funds and weapons the legitimacy obtained by being perceived as a to rearm coming from Iran and Syria, a cadre resistance movement dedicated to the national of experienced and batt le-hardened fi eld com- defense of the integrity of Lebanese territory. manders, training centers with induction pro- However, Hezbollah’s claim to the title of “re- grams geared towards fresh volunteers ready to sistance movement” (in the street, it is common fi ght, as well as clearly delineated combat doc- to hear them referred to as just “The Resistance” trines and hierarchies. It is a highly disciplined at least by their followers) was damaged both military-like (or militia-like, at least) entity. inside Lebanon and within the Arab world by Lebanon: A Remnant of the Ottoman Empire trying to Survive in a Region in Turmoil

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the Party of God’s involvement in the Syrian ing counterpoint to the eff orts of confessional confl ict in defense of the Assad regime. Not only leaders to stem the rise and infl uence of more did the group open itself to criticism by the 14 extremist positions within their communities. March Alliance who accuses them of violating The return of Saad Hariri, the election of the Baabda Declaration and bringing the Syrian Sheikh Abdel-Latif Derian as the Gran Mufti of Civil War to Lebanon; it has also provided an Lebanon after a contested process that threat- opportunity for many in the Shia community to ened to divide the Sunni community even fur- express their discontent or at least their unease ther, can be seen as eff orts in this direction. The with Hezbollah’s foreign adventures49. The crisis Sunni confessional and political leaders are of popular legitimacy has also reached beyond caught in the anvil of having to manage the an- Lebanon’s borders to the broader Muslim con- ger and resentment of Lebanese Sunnis, on the stituency in the Arab world, who have started one hand, whilst still defending the State and its to dub them a paramilitary Shia group instead institutions on the other. This resentment might of the victorious resistance movement that de- deepen some of the inter-confessional fault feated Israel and made the until then invincible lines, as in the case of Tripoli. Perceived double Tsahal retreat back to its own borders. In the standards by the agents of order, particularly rarefi ed atmosphere of Shia/Sunni confronta- the army, only aggravate the sense of outrage of tions brought about by the unexpected rise of a Sunni underclass in the throes of very diffi cult IS and its temporary ally the Nusra Front (Jabhat economic circumstances. This feeling of being al-Nusra), Hezbollah fi nds itself in the uncom- the “laissés-pour-compte” (the cast-off s), the re- fortable position of being on the defensive in jected and outcast of a society where there is no the propaganda front. The problem is further space for them, subject to LAF repression while compounded by the role Hezbollah plays in the their Shia and Alawite neighbors thrive under current governance crisis Lebanon is facing to the protection of Hezbollah, might make those indirectly elect and appoint a new President. communities tilt to forms of Islamic extremism. Nonetheless, Hezbollah continues to be the It is to them that the Gran Mufti of Lebanon ad- strongest movement in Lebanon and a symbi- dressed as a matt er of priority with his words otic partner of the LAF. Hezbollah’s refusal to welcoming the Islamic New Year on October 25 disarm is contingent upon the strength of LAF 2014: “As [true] Lebanese, our program should as an internal stabilizing force and the relative be a united nation, a unifi ed state, a united weakness of the armed forces to face an exter- Army and a united living. I call on all the Leba- nal threat and defend Lebanon’s borders. In that nese to stick to the nation and the state regard- respect, the rise of the IS as an external threat, less of how much energy and eff ort it takes.”50 the operations of Arsal and Brital, the series of In the same speech, however, Sheikh Derian terrorist att acks inside Lebanon and the unrest also highlighted the need for a restoration of the in Tripoli, have only reinforced that symbiosis, role of moderate Sunnis in State administration although the outpouring of external fi nancial and lamented that the marginalization of Sunni and technical aid to the LAF might skewer the leadership from public aff airs since the assas- delicate point of equilibrium of this symbiosis. sination of Rafi c Hariri had been destructive to UNIFIL operates as a buff er instead of a tradi- coexistence and order. The next day, Lebanese tional peacekeeping force in the South, thus newspapers reported that fi ghting had erupted completing the triptych of the hybrid and very between the army and Islamic militants in the sui generis system of Lebanon’s external defense: city of Tripoli, leaving in its wake dead and a national military, an armed militia and a mul- wounded soldiers, civilians and Sunni militants tinational force guard the borders of the country after two days of clashes that quickly enveloped whilst the LAF operates as an internal stabiliz- the Old City51. The violence, the worst in several Lebanon: A Remnant of the Ottoman Empire trying to Survive in a Region in Turmoil

Carina Perelli 11

months in Sunni ar- avoir l’oreille de eas, was deemed by ce dieu-là et des all to be spillover of terroristes qui se le the Syrian confl ict. sont appropriés et Two members of quasiment pris en the LAF were kid- otage, y a-t-il en- napped, following core un dieu dis- a strategy that pro- ponible, libre de vided good results ses mouvements, to the Nusra Front pour protéger le in Arsal. The same Liban?” [Shia Fun- day, Saad Hariri damentalism ver- and the Sunni con- sus Sunni jihad- fessional and politi- ism: it is therein cal leadership pub- Courtesy The Daily Star, Lebanon, October 30, 2014. each for him/her- licly endorsed the LAF’s actions. self and an Allah created at the image of the The Christian confessional communities of new man: vindictive and full of hate. Between a Lebanon, for their part, are on edge. Lebanon Hezbollah that pretends to have the ear of that hosts the majority of the Headquarters and Sees god and terrorists who have appropriated that of the Christian Churches of Orient; those same god and taken him hostage, is there still a god churches that are under direct att ack in the re- available, free of his movements, to protect Leb- gion, particularly in Iraq and Syria where the anon?]54 Christians have started an exodus towards Leb- If the Christian communities continue to feel anon, the only country in the Middle East with threatened to this degree, they will retreat with- a Christian Presidency (despite the fact that the in the confi nes of their own confessions, a refl ex Presidential seat is vacant at the moment due to all too common in Lebanon when facing pres- lack of consensus among politicians) and where sures. Many observers have noted the increase they fi nd safety in numbers and leverage52. Their in the gulf separating the diff erent confession- congregations throughout the Middle East had al communities in 21st century Lebanon55. The already started to dwindle before these att acks, problem is further compounded by the looming the compounded result of urbanization, dispro- economic crisis, the spillover of the Syrian con- portionately high rates of emigration and de- fl ict and the burden of a mass of Syrian refugees mographic transition factors, as well as the pre- that, because of its volume, cannot be absorbed vailing violence and persecutions in the region. by a tiny country like Lebanon, which has yet Now, with their brethren fl eeing the threat of IS, to deal with the problem of the non-absorption the Christians of Lebanon are developing a bun- of half a million Palestinians parked into “is- ker mentality. Some of them are rearming for lands of (in) security”56. Xenophobia is mount- the fi rst time since the Civil War53 and there is ing, as are distrust and sectarianism. Lebanon, a note of despair, fear and impotence in the edi- that tiny remnant of the Ott oman Empire, might torials and columns of the Christian press. One implode. Or, against all odds, the adaptive re- of them, writt en by Nagib Aoun in the newspa- fl exes of a society and a political elite that have per L’Orient Le Jour on October 20 2014, reads: seen too much and have too much to lose might “Fondamentalisme chiite contre jihadisme sun- kick in. It the latt er happens, a new consensus nite: c’est désormais chacun pour soi et un Allah will emerge that reminds us of the words of Il créé à l’image de l’homme nouveau: vengeur Gatt opardo: For everything to remain the same, et haineux. Entre un Hezbollah qui prétend something has to change. Notes 12

1 Since the fall of the Ott oman empire, experiments in pan- 7 For a brief description of PSYOP actions, see the August 30, Arabism, nationalism, various milder forms of Islamism, so- 2014 New York Times article by Scott Shane and Ben Hubbard: cialism (not to speak of anti-imperialism and capitalism) have “Isis Displaying a Deft Command of Varied Media”. Elec- been launched (and failed) in the region. Professor Pierre-Jean tronic version in: htt p://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/31/world/ Luizard appropriately remarked at a Conference organized middleeast/isis-displaying-a-deft-command-of-varied-media. by IReMMO in Paris on September 14, 2014, that the Ott oman Empire was a transnational entity where identities, particular- 8 For an example of AGITPROP, see the way in which the family sectarian ones (with the notable exception of the Shia), were lies and neighbors of the Lebanese Armed Forces soldiers and recognized and benefi tt ed from legal and political guarantees NCOs that were made prisoner during the batt le of Arsal are and protection as well as a certain degree of autonomy under manipulated with the threat of beheading the soldiers to close the millet system. Today we are seeing a return to sectarian major arteries and roads in Lebanon. Covered in The Daily Star identities without the guarantees provided by the Ott oman (Lebanon) on August 29 and 30, htt p://www.dailystar.com.lb/ system, not as an early form of religious pluralism but as a News/Lebanon-News/2014/Aug-30/269059-families-of-captured- basis of divisive intransigence. soldiers-block-roads-in-lebanon. IS issued a video of captured soldiers calling for this measure to pressure the Lebanese govern- 2 The eruption into the political scene of ISIL (Islamic State of ment to swap prisoners after releasing a video of the beheading Iraq and Levant or al Dawla al Islamiyya f’il Iraq w’al Sham) is of two Western journalists, a Kurdish Peshmerga and a Lebanese the latest manifestation of that trend. The proclamation of an sergeant, followed by the execution by the Nusra Front of a Leba- Islamic Caliphate in a territory that shatt ers the Sykes-Picot nese Shia soldier and the threat of more executions to come. The original demarcations of areas of infl uence is a relatively new Nusra Front has also sent videos with messages directly to the phenomenon –preceded only by the att empts of AQMI to terri- families of captured Lebanese soldiers and policemen. torialize its rule in Mali. ISIL later became the self-proclaimed Islamic State (IS): there are political controversies surround- 9 Mark Juergensmeyer uses this expression in the book Terror ing the use of that name, as it means granting the territorial in the Mind of God: The Global Rise of Religious Violence (Berkeley: entity they control and administer the status of a State. The University of California Press, 2000 - revised in 2003,). For a US Government calls it ISIL and defi nes the entity they govern detailed analysis of religious violence, politics, and the secu- as a quasi-State, whilst the French have adopted the Arabic lar State, see Mark Juergensmeyer: “Religious Terror and the derogatory terminology of DAESH. In the region, the names Secular State”, Harvard International Review (Winter 2004). DAESH and takfi ris are usually employed to refer to them and their fl uid alliances with other extremist movements. See 10 See, for instance, the analysis by Rob Crilly of the execution Carina Perelli, ISI, ISIL, DAESH, IS…A Many-Headed Hydra, of journalists Foley and Sotloff in America Al-Jazeera, September A Chameleon of A Thousand Names and Appearances (RESDAL 3, 2014: “Islamic State’s execution videos are sly propaganda Newslett er, October 2014), www.resdal.org/ing/newslett er/ writt en in blood” in america.aljazeera.com/articles/2014/9/2/ nota-1-isis/parte1_eng.pdf). sotloff -executionsvideopropaganda.html.

3 That some, like Gregory Gauser III have dubbed the new 11 Peter Harling, “IS Back in Business”, Le Monde Diploma- Middle East Cold War. For the discussion and state of the de- tique (English Edition, September 2014). The author makes a bate on this concept, see Gregory Gauser, “Beyond Sectarian- compelling argument, worth reading in full, regarding all the ism: The New Middle East Cold War (Doha: Brookings Institu- vacuums IS has fi lled. tion, 2014). 12 Angelo Panebianco, Modelli di Partito (Bologna: Il Mulino, 4 The concept of fi tna is very complex. For the purpose of this 1982). Even though Panebianco uses the concept in the frame- paper, we are using it in the connotation of “dissension, sedi- work of party systems, it is still useful to refer to the profes- tion, civil war burning at the heart of Islam, within the com- sional operators of the diff erent communities that used to be munity of believers” to refer to the specifi cally Sunni/Shia, embedded in State structures and provided articulation and Sunni/Sunni and Shia/Shia aspects of the confl ict. See, for ins- voice, did favors and delivered tangible goods to their com- tance, Georges Kepel, Fitna: Guerre au Coeur de l’Islam (Paris : munities, sometimes inserted in complex networks of patron- Gallimard, 2004). age and linked to tribal elders and geographically-based elites. Processes like the De-Baathifi cation in Iraq that targeted a ma- 5 Fareed Zacharia used the concept in The Future of Freedom: Il- jority of Sunnis with lower level membership in the Baath par- liberal Democracy at Home and Abroad (New York: WW Norton, ty, for instance, purged these operators from State structures. 2007 – Revised Edition). 13 Iraq under the government of Prime Minister Maliki is a 6 It is estimated that ISIL has between 10,000 and 30,000 fi ght- prime example of this phenomenon. ers of 81 nationalities to carry out not only the batt le for ex- pansion of its area of infl uence but also to control a territory 14 Yezid Sayigh, “Arab States at a Tipping Point”, Al-Hayat that is fi ve times the size of Lebanon. For profi les of foreign re- (August 21, 2014). cruits, see for instance, “Inside ISIS: The Making of a Radical” 15 Hence the name takfi ris applied to extremists, as they often by Louise Stigsgaard Nissen, September 6, 2014 in Narratively dub their adversaries kafi r (infi del). Takfi ri is a Muslim who (narrative.ly/stories/inside-isis-the-making-of-a-radical); “For accuses another Muslim of apostasy. Jihad Recruits, a Pipeline from Minnesota to Militancy” by Jack Healy, The New York Times, September 6, 2014, available 16 The expression belongs to the recently deceased Hector at htt p://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/07/us/for-Jihad-recruits- Ricardo Leis, an Argentinian former Communist and former a-pipeline-from-Minnesota-to-militancy.html; and “De la pe- Montonero, who devoted his life to debunking the myth of tite delinquance a l’islam jihadiste en seulement 3 mois” par heroism associated with the South American guerrillas. He Anthony Samrani, September 1, 2014, L’Orient Le Jour, www. used the particularly apt phrase “administrators of death” to lorientlejour.com/article/883688. refer to the insurgent leaderships. Notes

17 It is quite telling that ISIL has released their own version of 26Pentagon’s Relatively Small Iraq Costs May Jump with Escala- a video game (Grand Theft Auto: Salil al Sawarem) from which tion (Washington DC: Center for Strategic and Budgetary they had not even removed the logo of the original Grand Assessments-CSBA, August 28, 2014) available at htt p://www. Theft Auto on which it was modeled, refl ecting not only the csbaonline.org/2014/08/28/pentagons-relatively-small-iraq- ideology of the group in the audio but also changing the land- costs-may-jump-with-escalation. According to a ballpark esti- scape and depicting the terrain in which they are fi ghting. For mate of the Pentagon provided to the website military.com on scenes from the game, see Paul Crompton, “Grand Theft Auto. September 26, 2014, the daily cost of the operation is $7.5 mil- Isis Militants Reveal Video Game”, Al Arabyia News (October lion (htt p://www.military.com/daily-news/2014/09/26/costs- 20, 2014). of-campaign-against-islamic-state-near-1-billion.html.) The recent fl urry of speeches by President Obama on the subject, 18 Testimonies of disenchanted foreign recruits point in that that culminated with the presentation he made at the General direction. Assembly of the United Nations in October 2014 have repeat- edly tried to reassure US public opinion that there will not 19 Syrian refugees exceed 3 million, as of 29 August 2014 ac- be “boots on the ground” and prepare it for a long confl ict in cording to UNHCR. There are 1.1 Million in Lebanon, 608,000 which the US will try to raise another US-led “coalition of the in Jordan and 815,000 in Turkey. 6.5 million are internally dis- willing” to fi ght ISIL and other extremist groups by “degrad- placed in Syria. Around 200,000 have fl ed to Iraq, particularly ing and eventually destroying them.” to the Provinces of Dohuk, Erbil and Sulaimanya in Kurdis- tan: those areas are now aff ected by the confl ict between the 27 The most concrete measures of consensus, aside from KRG and IS. According to UNHCR, the Syria operation is the pledging funds to refugee agencies and military aid, have to largest the agency has had to deal with since its creation, 64 do with foreign fi ghters. On October 24, 2014 an urgent session years ago. According to the Economic and Social Commission of the Security Council chaired by President Obama unani- for West Asia (ESCWA,) 50% of the world refugees nowadays mously passed the US-backed resolution on Foreign Terrorist are Arabs whilst Arabs represent only 5% of the total world Fighters (FTF). population. 28 Area: 10,452 square kilometers; Population: the UN esti- 20 This has resulted in internal displacement (with an estimate mated the population of Lebanon to be 4,822,000 inhabitants of around 1.8 million Internally Displaced People or IDPs liv- in 2012, prior to the infl ux of the 1.1 million Syrian refugees ing in 1,400 locations according to UNOCHA) as well as peo- that fl ed to Lebanon after the outbreak of hostilities in Syria. ple trying to fl ee the country altogether as refugees. As of 26 Registered Syrian refugees now constitute a quarter of the August 2014, there were more than 8 thousand Iraqi refugees, population in Lebanon, with the numbers going up at a rate mostly Christian, in Lebanon according to the Minister of So- of 12,000 a week. By the end of 2014, the UN estimates that cial Aff airs of Lebanon. Syrian refugees will become one third of the total population of the country. 21 For a brief overview of the concept of Caliphate, see Julia McQuaid, “Reviving the Caliphate: Fad or the Future?”, CNA 29 Kamal S. Salibi, A House of Many Mansions: the History of Occasional Papers (Arlington, Virginia: CNA, July 2014). More Lebanon Reconsidered (London: Tauris, 1988). in-depth historical studies in French can be found in the website Les cles du Moyen Orient (www.lesclesdumoyenorient. 30 Are Knudsen and Michael Kerr (eds.), Lebanon After the Ce- com) particularly the interview to Professor Henry Laurens, dar Revolution (London: Hurst, 2012), page XVI (Foreword). and the article by Nicolas Hautemaniere, “Vers un nouveau califat? Une mise en perspective historique” (July 14, 2014). 31 Tom Russell, A Lebanon Primer (Washington DC: Middle East Research and Information Project, MER 133, 1985). 22 For a description of the latt er problem, see Sarah E. Parkin- son, Educational Aftershocks for Syrian Refugees in Lebanon, (Mid- 32 Michael Hudson, The Precarious Republic: Political Modern- dle East Research and Information Project – MERIP: September ization in Lebanon (Boulder CO: Westview Press, 1985). 7, 2014), available at htt p://www.merip.org/educational-aftershocks-syrian-refugees-lebanon?utm_source=Sailthru&utm_ 33 Ambassador Frederic Hof, The Puzzle of Post-Ott oman Politi- medium=email&utm_term=%2AMideast%20Brief&utm_cam- cal Legitimacy in the Middle East/Levant Region (Beirut: Research paign=2014_The%20Middle%20East%20Daily_9.8.14 and Strategic Studies Center-Lebanese Armed Forces, 2010,).

23 Shadows of the Taliban? Talib means student in Pashtun 34 The system through which communities (confessional or and refers to the Afghans who, many of them as refugee chil- ethnic) governed their daily aff airs and adjudicated complaints dren, studied in the ultra-conservative madrassas of Pakistan and confl icts autonomously through their own religious-based and who later joined the anti-Western movement. laws and tribunals, with litt le interference from the Ott oman State. The system under which acts were judged was thus based 24 Predictions, Perceptions and Economic Reality - Challenges of on a person’s religious affi liation, granting religious authorities Seven Middle East and North Africa Countries Described in 14 enormous power and permitt ing (and privileging) the consoli- Charts, MENA Quarterly Economic Brief (Washington DC: dation of confessional elites and hierarchies that then mediated World Bank, August 2014). relationships between the members of the communities and the Ott oman authorities and State. Professor Henry Laurens has 25 In declarations to the New York Times, on August 30 2014, called this decentralized arrangement the “Ott oman Common- Dan Pfeiff er, Senior Adviser to the White House, stated: “We’d wealth”. From another angle, the evolution of the system that much rather do this right than do it quickly. We tried the op- bred sectarianism under the Ott oman Empire and the entangle- posite [during the Bush years] and it worked out very poorly.” ment of the colonial powers in the process is well analyzed by See Karen DeYoung and Dan Balz, “Obama sets his own pace Ussama Makdisi, The Culture of Sectarianism: Community, History in a world whirling with crises”, The New York Times (30 Au- and Violence in 19th Century Ott oman Lebanon (Berkeley, Califor- gust 2014). nia: University of California Press, 2000). Notes

35 Known as the “National Pact” (al-Mithaq al Watani), this 43 The name “March 14” derives from a large demonstration agreement is considered an exercise in Realpolitik that looked against the Syrian presence in Lebanon which took place on for the lowest common denominator shared by the Lebanese that date in 2005 while the name “March 8” comes from a large independence leaders and transformed it into a political for- demonstration in favor of the Syrian presence, to “express mula; at the time, those who participated in the Pact were not gratitude to the Syrians” that also took place in 2005. only Lebanese politicians but also Arab leaders (Syria and Egypt) and Western Powers (France and UK). See Farid el- 44 Julia Choucair, “Lebanon: Finding a Path from Deadlock to Kazem, The Communal Pact of National Identities: the Making and Democracy”, Carnegie Papers #64, (Washington DC: Carnegie Politics of the 1943 National Pact (Oxford: Center for Lebanese Endowment for International Peace, 2006). Studies, 1991). 45 Choucair, op. cit. 36 The Taif Agreement of 1989 is also referred to by the names of “Document of National Accord” and the “National Reconcilia- 46 The government threatened to deploy members of the LAF tion Accord.” It was reached in the city of Taif (Saudi Arabia) on to supervise the national exams during a strike of teachers in 22 October 1989 and aimed at ending the Lebanese Civil War, the education sector in 2014, for instance. accommodate the shifting confessional demographics of the 47 Hezbollah controls at least 4 hospitals, 12 clinics, 12 schools, country, reassert Lebanese sovereignty in Southern Lebanon 4 agricultural centers, an extensive social assistance program, still under Israeli occupation, and establish a timetable for the to mention the most salient endeavors in this ﬁ eld, not to men- withdrawal of the Syrians from Lebanon (that only happened tion its environmental programs, amusement parks and the in 2005). It enshrined the principle of “mutual coexistence” be- services it provides to communities. tween the sects in Lebanon, ensuring their proper representation by restructuring the National Pact arrangements. See Mi- 48 Hezbollah owns and controls Al-Manar TV, the satellite tele- chael Hudson, “Trying Again: Power Sharing in Post-Civil War vision station and the radio station Al-Nour. It also controls a Lebanon”, International Negotiation (Vol. 2: 1997, pp. 103-122) on weekly publication and several YouTube Channels and even the coexistence formula achieved and its eﬀ ects. launched a videogame, Special Force.

37 The agreement among rival sectarian factions, their re- 49 For a summary of these criticisms, see Eric Lob, Is Hezbollah gional backers (Iran, Saudi Arabia and Syria) and the Leba- Confronting a Crisis of Popular Legitimacy? (Brandeis University, nese Government, also known as the Lebanese National Dia- Crown Center for Middle East Studies, Middle East Brief # 78, logue Conference, reached in Doha on May 2008, to end the March 2014), for Internet version see www.brandeis.edu/pub- 18 month long political crisis that threatened to restart a civil lications/meb/MEB78.pdf. war in Lebanon. The UN Security Council and all major powers hailed the Doha Agreement. See the excellent analysis of 50 For coverage of the speech, see The Daily Star, Octo- Robert F. Worth and Nada Bakri published in the New York ber 25 2014: “Derian calls for Muslim Unity Ahead of the Times on May 22, 2008: Deal for Lebanese Factions Leaves Hezbol- New Year“, htt p://www.dailystar.com.lb/News/Lebanon- lah Stronger, available at htt p://www.nytimes.com/2008/05/22/ News/2014/Oct-24/275196-lebanon-mufti-marginalization- world/middleeast/22lebanon.html. of-sunnis-is-destructive.ashx?utm_medium=email&utm_ source=transactional&utm_campaign=Newslett er#ixzz3H7l2 38 For a good historical perspective on the Lebanese political hmfY establishment, see Kamal Dib, Warlords and Merchants. The Leb- anese Business and Political Establishment (Reading, UK: Ithaca 51 The headline of The Daily Star for October 26, 2014 was: Press, (2004). “Army pounds militant hideouts in North Lebanon” for instance while L’Orient Le Jour provided photos under the head- 39 Novel by Giuseppe Tomasi di Lampedusa that depicts line: “Samedi cauchemardesque à Tripoli” [Nightmarish Sat- the dilemmas faced by a Sicilian aristocrat facing the changes urday at Tripoli]. Tellingly, the same edition of the newspaper brought about in the class structure and society of Sicily by the off ers a Dossier called Quand les Chrétiens de Syrie organisent Risorgimento. The most famous quote from the book is prob- leur protection [When the Christians of Syria organize their ably “something needs to change so that everything can stay own protection]. the same.” See, Giuseppe Tomasi di Lampedusa, The Leopard (New York: Random House: 1966), originally published by 52 The offi cial position of the Christian Churches is that they’d Feltrinelli, 1958 in Italian under the title of Il Gatt opardo. rather receive Christian refugees in an overcrowded Lebanon than to see Christians emigrate farther away, because that 40 For a detailed explanation of how the system works, see The would mean the extinction of the Christian confessional com- Lebanese Electoral System (IFES Lebanon Briefi ng Paper, March munities in the Middle East. 2009) available at htt p://www.ifes.org/Content/Publications/Pa- pers/2009/~/media/Files/Publications/SpeechCommentary/2009 53 Reported by the Associated Press, “Some Christians arm and Assessment of the Electoral Framework: Election Law of 2008 as Mideast perils mount” (September 5, 2014, byline of Zena (Lebanon Democracy Reporting International & Lebanese As- Karam and Bassem Mroue). sociation for Democratic Elections, 2009) available at htt p:// democracy-reporting.org/fi les/report_lebanon_0902.pdf. 54 “Chacun pour soi et Allah à la carte”, La Chronique de Na- gib Aoun, 20/10/2014, in L’Orient Le Jour. 41 This loose requirement of mere notifi cation of existence is what allows Hezbollah to be registered as a political party 55 Knudsen & Kerr (op. cit.). while also operating as an active armed group. 56 Sari Hanafi , Enclaves and Fortressed Archipelago: Violence 42 Augustus R. Norton posits such a thesis in the Foreword and Governance in Lebanon’s Refugee Camps, in Knudsen & Ker of the book by Are Knudsen and Michael Kerr (eds.), Lebanon: (eds.), op. cit. After the Cedar Revolution (London: Hurst & Company, 2012).