Proportional Election As a Way to Stabilize Democracy in Bangladesh

CHAPTER 5

Proportional Election as a Way to Stabilize Democracy in Bangladesh

5.1 Introduction An important political reform idea, inspired by the institutional approach, is to switch to “Proportional Election” (PE). Contrary to the general view in Bangladesh, PE is widely practiced across the world. Given Bangladesh’s particular circumstances, PE could be of considerable help in stabilizing democracy. This chapter examines the merits and demerits of this proposal.1 Bangladesh currently follows what is often called the “Majority System” (MS) of election. It is sometimes also known as the “Winner Takes All” system or the “First Pass” system. Under this system, the candidate who gets the majority votes claims the entire constituency. The remaining candidates are left with nothing, even though some of them might have obtained only a few votes less than what the winning candidate did. Such a system leads to volatile and often unfair outcomes of election and thus works against stability and accommodation of each other by competing political parties. PE, by contrast, allows all parties to get a share in the outcome in accordance to the percentage of votes they receive. PE thus produces stable and fair outcomes and hence can promote accommodation and peace. The chapter begins (Section 5.2) by providing some international perspective on the two systems of election. It shows that most of the developed countries follow PE. Furthermore, most of the “new democracies” chose PE instead of MS. Section 5.3, the main section of the chapter, presents the potential merits of PE for Bangladesh. It shows that, in the particular case of Bangladesh, whose political scene is dominated by two political camps of comparable electoral strength, a switch to PE may help to stabilize democracy because of its capacity to (a) prevent large and perverse fluctuations in electoral outcomes

S. N. Islam, Governance for Development © S. Nazrul Islam 2016 116 ● Governance for Development arising from small shifts in parties’ vote shares, (b) reduce the objective scope and subjective incentives for manipulation and abuse of the voting process, (c) promote better quality of candidates for the parliament, (d) make elections more educative and enlightening, (e) strengthen political parties, (f) create better conditions for functioning of local governments, (g) be more inclusive of minority groups and small political parties, and (h) be more just and hence more conducive to peace. Section 5.4 discusses some of the potential shortcomings of PE. Among these are: (a) uncertainty about ensuring geographic representation, (b) pos- sibility of frequent changes in the government, and (c) the danger of “piggy- backing” and nomination trade. The section shows that, given its small physical size and relatively homogeneous population, the issue of geographical representation may be less of a problem for Bangladesh. Furthermore, additional measures may be taken to overcome this problem, such as application of the system at the divisional (instead of the national) level and conferring some role in national governance to a forum comprising Upazilla chairpersons. A review of the other arguments against PE shows that these are not that potent and apply equally, if not more, to MS. Section 5.5 offers some concluding observations.

5.2 Proportional Election: The International Perspective There are many variations in the way democracy is practiced across the world and even in developed capitalist countries. One of these variations concerns the system of representation (or election). Looking across the democracies, it is possible to observe a wide range of systems of election of representative bodies. These may be classified broadly into two types: the “Majority System” (MS) and the “Proportional Election” (PE). As noted above, under MS, the candidate winning the majority of votes gets the entire constituency, leaving nothing for the other candidates. Under PE, the seats are allocated among parties in proportion to votes they receive.2

5.2.1 Wide Prevalence of Proportional Election across the World Table 5A.1 in the appendix to this chapter provides information about the election system in countries across the world. In addition, it provides some information regarding their income level and economic growth rate. Figure 5.1 provides a partial summary of this information. A perusal of Figure 5.1 and Table 5A.1 leads to the following broad observations. First, countries following the PE system outnumber those following MS, particularly among developed countries. This may come as a surprise to Proportional Election as a Way to Stabilize Democracy ● 117

Figure 5.1 Prevalence of the two election systems across the world Source: Author, based on the information in Appendix Table 5A. many in Bangladesh, who are used to MS and therefore may think of it as the standard and most commonly practiced system of election. Bangladesh owes MS to the British, who imposed versions of their political system on the countries colonized by them. That is why a large number of countries practicing MS are actually British ex-colonies, including Bangladesh and other countries of South Asia. The impression in Bangladesh that MS is the standard has been strengthened by the fact that the United States, the country that currently dominates the international scene in many respects, also follows MS, at least in its general elections.3 Second, most of the “New Democracies”—former socialist countries of East Europe and republics of the USSR—have opted for PE. Unlike many other countries, whose choice was historically determined (such as of the former colonies, whose system, as mentioned above, was determined largely by the colonial rulers in accordance with what was practiced in their home countries), the New Democracies had the freedom and opportunity to choose based on the accumulated world experience. The fact that almost all of them chose PE is therefore very instructive. Third, many developing countries use the PE system. As Figure 5.1 shows, 35 percent of the developing countries already follow MS. In fact, a large number of low-income developing countries of Africa and Latin America are practicing this system. Some New Democracies of the developing world are also choosing PE. For example, Nepal, a country very close to Bangladesh, has now opted for a partial PE. Under the interim constitution, adopted in 118 ● Governance for Development

September 2015, Nepal’s House of Representatives will have 110 members elected through PE, and 165 members through MS.4 Fourth, there is a move toward the PE system even by countries that have been practicing MS so far. For example, New Zealand has recently switched from MS to PE. Even in the United Kingdom, there are now moves away from MS and toward PE. For example, the composition of the newly formed Scottish Parliament and of the Welsh and Northern Ireland Assemblies and also of local government bodies of Scotland and Northern Ireland are decided according to the PE system. In forming the previous coalition government headed by David Cameron in the United Kingdom, the Conservative Party had to agree to consider the Liberal Democratic Party’s proposal to switch to PE. In the United States too there is a growing interest in PE, in part because the Democratic Party primaries (for selection of presidential candidate), which follow PE, prove to be more interesting and meaningful than the Republican Party primaries, which follow MS.5 There is a growing movement for PE in Canada too.6 It thus seems that PE is emerging as the preferred system of future elections all across the world.

5.2.2 Variations in Proportional Election The international experience also shows considerable variation within the PE system. Some of the important dimensions of these variations are as follows.7 The first concerns whether the system is based on “Closed List” or “Open List.” Under the former, each party’s list is determined entirely by the party itself, and general voters cannot change the ranking of candidates within the lists through their votes. By contrast, the Open List variant allows voters to influence the ranking. The second dimension of variation concerns the level at which PE is applied. The simplest and most prevalent practice is to apply it to thenational level, that is, to consider the entire country as a single constituency to which all the seats of the parliament belongs. Under this system, the number of votes received by each party is tallied at the national level and the total number of seats of the national parliament is divided among parties according to their vote shares.8 The problem with the national-level PE is that it may not be able to ensure geographical representation (to be discussed in more detail later). Largely to address this problem, PE in some countries is applied to a subnational level (e.g., province or state). Under this arrangement, votes received by different parties are tallied at the chosen subnational level, and seats belonging to that level are allocated among political parties in proportion to their vote shares at that level. The higher the level at which PE is applied, the truer it is to the spirit of PE. On the other hand, the lower the Proportional Election as a Way to Stabilize Democracy ● 119 level at which PE is applied, the closer it becomes to MS. In the extreme case, PE applied to individual constituency level becomes equivalent to MS! There is some association between variations along the two dimensions above. For example, the subnational PE is usually associated with the Open List variant. This is because in order for voters to influence the ranking of candidates within the list, they ideally need to know well all the candidates within the list. This becomes difficult if the PE system is national, in which case party lists are long, containing as many names as are seats in the country’s parliament, and the voters may not have the information about all these candidates in order to rank them satisfactorily. Under PE applied to a subnational level, party lists are shorter, containing as many names as are seats belonging to that level, making it easier for voters to formulate their own ranking. Under the Closed List variant, however, citizens vote basically for the party, and hence it does not matter much whether the list is long or short, making it easier to apply the system at the national level. A third dimension of variation concerns whether proportional representation is supplemented by MS, so that what emerges is a combination of both (i.e., a hybrid). There may be many concrete variants of such a hybrid system. It depends in part on whether a country’s parliament consists of a single chamber or of two chambers. In the case of a single chamber, the hybrid system may arise just from addition of members elected through MS to those elected through PE. Nepal’s House of Representatives, noted earlier, is an example of such combination. Countries that have two chambers have more options about setting up a hybrid system. One relatively simple option is to have one chamber elected through PE and the other through MS. Another option is to have one elected entirely though either PE or MS and the other to be hybrid. The third option is to have both chambers be hybrid. Japan provides an example of the last option. Both chambers of Japan’s Parlia- ment (Diet) have mixed composition.9 Of the 500 members of the lower house (House of Representatives), 300 are elected through MS and the rest 200 through PE. Of the 242 members of the upper house (House of Councillors), only half (121) are elected at a time. Of them 73 are elected through MS and the other 48 through PE. A fourth dimension of the variation of the PE system concerns whether the representation is implemented in the form of single transferable vote (STV) or single nontransferable vote (SNTV) and cumulative voting. These are more complicated systems, which may not be too relevant for Bangladesh and hence are not discussed here.10 It is thus clear that the PE system is widely prevalent, growing in popularity, and offers a wide range of variation and flexibility, so that a country can customize the system according to its conditions and needs. However, before 120 ● Governance for Development going into the question of the specific form of PE that may be appropriate, it is first necessary to see in more detail the potential merits of the PE system for Bangladesh.

5.3 Potential Merits of Proportional Election for Bangladesh Proportional Election has many potential benefits for Bangladesh. Some of these are discussed below.

5.3.1 Prevents Large Impact of Small Changes in Vote Shares Bangladesh’s recent political history is dominated by the competition and rivalry between two political camps led by Awami League (AL) and Bangla- desh Nationalist Party (BNP). Information on vote shares and number of seats obtained by these parties and camps in different elections was already presented in Chapter 2 and is summarized here in Table 5.1. As noted earlier, in the historic 1970 elections Awami League obtained 160 of 162 seats of the National Assembly, implying 98.8 percent of seats from East Pakistan. However, in terms of vote share, it received 74.9 percent.11 In the 1973 election, Awami League received 73.0 percent of votes and 97.8 percent of seats (293 out of 300). Awami League fell into a crisis following the August 1975 coup, and its vote share decreased to 24.6 percent in 1979 election. However, Awami League has since recovered and increased its vote share in successive elections, getting 33.3, 37.4, 40.0, and 49.0 percent of votes in 1991, 1996, 2001, and 2008 elections, respectively. BNP, on the other hand, started off in 1979 with a vote share of 41.2 percent, which decreased to 30.8 percent in 1991, and then increased to 33.6 in 1996. In 2001 BNP contested as a part of the four-party alliance (Jote), which together won 47.0 percent of votes. BNP’s vote share decreased to 33.2 percent in 2008.12 BNP and its allies did not participate in 2014 election. The above situation of comparable electoral strength implies that under MS small changes in the vote share can lead to large and unexpected changes in election results in terms of seat shares, which determine which parties get into power. One outcome of this process is amplification. That is, relatively small changes in vote shares lead to very large changes in the number of seats. For example, between 2001 and 2008, Awami League’s vote share increased by 8.87 percentage points, yet its seat share increased by 50 percentage points (number of seats increasing from 62 to 230). Similarly, during the same period, BNP’s vote share decreased by 13.83 percentage points, but its seat share decreased by 62 percentage points (number of seats decreasing from 216 to 30). Proportional Election as a Way to Stabilize Democracy ● 121

Table 5.1 Share of votes and seats received by major parties in recent elections

Year Awami League Bangladesh Jatiya Party Other Nationalist Party Share of Share of Share of Share of Share of Share of Share of Share of votes (%) seats (%) votes (%) seats (%) votes (%) seats (%) votes (%) seats (%) 1979 24.50 18.00 41.20 69.00 — — 34.30 13.00 1991 30.10 29.33 30.80 46.67 11.90 11.67 27.20 12.33 1996 37.40 48.67 33.60 38.67 16.40 10.67 12.60 2.00 2001 40.02 20.67 41.00 64.33 7.22 4.67 18.98 15.00 2008 49.00 76.67 33.20 10.00 7.00 9.00 10.80 4.33 2014 79.14 78.00 — — 11.31 11.33 9.55 10.67

Source: Author, based on information in Chapter 2.

The second and more disturbing aspect is reversal; that is, the outcome in terms of number of seats often moves in opposite direction to that of the outcome in terms of vote share. In other words, MS not only amplifies the impact of small changes in vote shares, it does so in such a violent manner that even the direction of outcome sometimes gets reversed. For example, between 1996 and 2001, Awami League’s vote share increased from 37.4 to 40.1 percent, yet its number of seats collapsed from 146 to 62! Similarly, between 1991 and 1996, BNP increased its vote share from 30.8 to 33.6 percent, yet its number of seats decreased from 140 to 116. The mismatch between the vote shares and seat shares and the violent and irrational fluctuations in the seat share in response to small changes in vote share can be seen more vividly from the graphs presented in Figures 5.2 and 5.3. Figure 5.2 shows how the line representing vote share of Awami League has gone up steadily; yet the line representing its seat share has fluctuated violently, moving up and down across the vote share line several times. Similarly, Figure 5.3 shows BNP’s seat share line undergoing sharp changes in slope in response of much milder changes in the slope of the vote share line. The fact that MS accentuates instability of electoral outcome is thus clear from these graphs. In contrast, the PE system rules out any reversal, as it guarantees that the outcome in terms of number of seats will move in the same direction as do vote shares. Second, the PE system also rules out amplification. The changes in the number of seats will be exactly proportional to the changes in vote shares. Thus while MS exacerbates instability, PE promotes stability. Through its stabilizing influence, PE can also provide more predictability of outcomes, allowing all to adjust their expectations and actions. In the context of Bangladesh this means that rival political camps can be sure of 122 ● Governance for Development

100 Share of votes Share of seats 75

50 Percentage

0 1979 1991 1996 2001 2008

Figure 5.2 Share of votes and seats of Awami League in recent elections Source: Author, based on information in Table 5.1.

100 Share of votes Share of seats 75

50 Percentage

0 1979 1991 1996 2001 2008

Figure 5.3 Share of votes and seats of BNP in recent elections Source: Author, based on information in Table 5.1. continued robust presence of each other in the national parliament and hence accept the reality that neither will be able to marginalize (or wipe out) the other. Accordingly, they may be forced to share power, sequentially, depend- ing on election results, and also contemporaneously, within the framework of the parliament, through its various committees, as per the Constitution. In other words, rival political camps may be forced to accept the necessity of cohabitation and cooperation rather than trying to eliminate each other. The entire dynamic of Bangladesh politics may therefore change for the better. Proportional Election as a Way to Stabilize Democracy ● 123

As noted earlier, the changed geopolitical conditions have made it easier for such accommodation and cohabitation to take place. Though the oppos- ing political camps of Bangladesh differ with regard to their stance regarding nationalism and religion, they do not differ radically with regard to economic policy issues. Hence succession of one by the other in power would not result in fundamental changes in the socioeconomic direction of the country. How- ever, within the broadly agreed parameters of socioeconomic policies, oppos- ing political camps can make a difference in terms of implementing these policies, and they can therefore engage in a healthy competition with regard to their performance, and this competition can work for the betterment of the country.

5.3.2 Reduces the Objective Scope and Subjective Incentives for Manipulation and Abuse The very fact that PE prevents large changes in outcome arising from small changes in vote shares implies that it will reduce the objective scope for and benefit of manipulation. In general, the marginal cost (broadly defined) of manipulation and abuse increases very steeply, so that the total cost of large changes in vote shares may prove to be prohibitively high (Figure 5.4). Yet without large changes in vote shares it will not be possible to bring about appreciable changes in election outcomes. Thus the objective scope for manipulation of election outcome and abuse of the election system will decrease. Second, the subjective pressure for manipulation and abuse will also decrease, because PE severs the direct link between the local vote outcome and the (electoral) fate of the local political leaders, who may not be in the party lists, and even if they are, the outcome of the local vote will not determine

Cost of manipulation

Electoral benefit

Figure 5.4 Cost and benefit of manipulation under Proportional Election Source: Author. 124 ● Governance for Development whether or not they get into the parliament. As a result, local political actors will not have as much stake in the local voting outcomes as they have under MS. As a result, they may not be as desperate to influence the local voting outcomes as they are now (under MS). The decrease in the objective scope and the subjective pressure for manipulation and abuse of the voting process will undercut the importance of money and muscle power. PE therefore may not be as dependent on mastans (hooligans) and money as election under MS. An additional benefit of PE is that it removes the scope and incentive to manipulate election through gerrymandering. The latter refers to the practice of drawing constituency boundaries in a way that may facilitate the victory of one or the other party. Given the relative homogeneity of Bangladesh population, gerrymandering is less of a problem. However, the problem is not altogether absent, and a switch to PE will effectively eliminate it.

5.3.3 Promotes Better Quality Candidates A major potential benefit of PE is that it can lead to election of better, more qualified candidates to the parliament. The essential function of the parliament is enactment of laws concerning national issues. This function requires on the part of the parliament members certain special qualities, including breadth of knowledge, understanding of the national issues, ability to engage in national level discussion, and conviction and capacity to defend national interests. Unfortunately, the current MS is often leading to nomination and election of people who do not have these qualities. As noted above, MS is often making political parties hostages to local-level mastans who are assuring “delivery” of their constituencies. As a result, parochial and the wrong type of people are getting nominated and elected to the parliament. The corollary of the above is that good and qualified people are not getting nomination, not running for election, and thus not getting elected to the parliament. The situation is similar to what in economics is known as the Gresham’s Law, whereby “Bad Money Drives Out Good Money!” PE, by contrast, will create a greater scope and justification for nominat- ing better quality candidates. People of the entire country will vote for the party lists. Hence parties will feel pressured to include in their lists people with national reputation. It is generally people with exceptional qualities who are likely to be nationally reputed. Through a feedback process, PE may encourage people of better quality to join political parties and be active in them, because it will be easier for parties to provide recognition to such persons by including them in their lists of candidates for the parliament. Thus, while MS is conducive to debasement Proportional Election as a Way to Stabilize Democracy ● 125 and coarsening of candidate nomination process, the PE system can generate a reverse process that conduces to uplifting and refinement. Thus PE may help gather in the national parliament national talent from different spheres of life, as should indeed be the case.

5.3.4 Improves the Quality of Election Campaign Alongside improvement of candidates, PE can also improve the quality of election campaign. Instead of local, parochial issues, the campaign can focus on national issues. Under MS, election focuses on the local candidates and hence on local issues. PE, on the other hand, is conducted on the basis of party lists, drawn for the entire country. Local issues therefore cannot influence the election directly. In other words, while MS lowers the attention of the election campaign from the national to local, PE can raise the attention from the local to national. The importance of thorough debates on national issues will increase in PE. The campaign can thereby be uplifting rather than debasing.

5.3.5 Eliminates the Necessity of Pre-election Alliances The campaign and debates under PE can be sharper and more illuminating because of the further fact that PE also eliminates the necessity of pre-election alliances. Election under MS creates tremendous pressures for formation of pre-election alliances. This is because, as we saw, even small changes in vote share can change radically the outcome of the election in terms of number of seats. As a result, political parties feel pressured to form pre-election alliances with even small political parties, which may add a little to the vote share. However, this pressure often leads parties to “unholy” compromises, sacrific- ing important parts of their identity. As a result, differences among political parties become murky. Such compromises therefore do a disservice to both the political parties themselves and the nation. Bangladesh politics offers plenty of examples of such unwarranted and unholy compromises. To the extent that BNP claims itself to be a party of participants of the Liberation War, its electoral alliance of with Jamaat-e- Islami and other communal parties is difficult to justify. Similarly, the agree- ment between Awami League and Khelafat Majlish of 2006 went against Awami League’s secular principle. The alliance between Awami League and Jatiya Party, the party of the former military dictator Gen. Ershad, is also another example of incongruous pre-election alliances. PE changes the situation radically by eliminating the necessity for pre- election alliances. Alliance formation can become entirely a post-election 126 ● Governance for Development affair. During the election, the parties can therefore contest on the basis of their distinctive programs and manifestoes, feel free to highlight their differences from others, and test their true electoral strength without any restraint. Such a “clean” campaign can be more useful and illuminating and educative for the voters.

5.3.6 Strengthens the Political Parties An important merit of PE is that it can help strengthen the political parties. MS exerts a centrifugal force on the political parties, pulling them in as many directions as there are constituencies and thereby weaken them. PE can change the dynamics and generate a centripetal force strengthening the parties. Since PE will be on the basis of party lists, and not on the basis of individual candidates running in individual constituencies, parties will become the crucial theater of action, for both the party leadership and the rank-and- file of the party, particularly those party members who want to get elected to the parliament. So far as the party leadership is concerned, PE increases its responsibility. While under MS it is basically the responsibility of individual candidates to come out as winners from respective constituencies, under PE, the responsibility falls more on the party leadership to make the party list win by garnering more votes. However, in order to do so, the leadership has to choose a party list that can earn the support of the entire party, because unless the entire party is enthused and work for its campaign, it will be difficult for the party list to do well in the election. Therefore the party leadership cannot go by its whims and instead will have to obtain the consent of the entire party for the list that it proposes. In order for this consent to be genuine, the leadership has to adopt a democratic, transparent inner party process of selection of the list, so that the rank-and-file of the party gets meaningful participation in the nomination process. Thus, the party leadership will have to encourage inner party democracy. The practice of Bangladesh political parties to concentrate all nomination power in the hands of their supreme leaders may therefore not be sustainable under PE in the long run. So far as the party members are concerned, all those interested in becoming member of the parliament will have to not only get included in the party list but also occupy as high up a place in the ranked list as possible, because the higher is one’s place, the greater is the probability for him or her to be actually elected to the parliament. Thus, gaining recognition of the entire party will become important, instead of acquiring money and building muscle power at the local level. Accordingly, prospective candidates for the party Proportional Election as a Way to Stabilize Democracy ● 127 list will have to work harder for the party during the entire interelection period so as that party members agree to put them high up in the list. Finally, the rank-and-file members of the parties will also feel more empowered by PE, because it will give them a greater role in deciding who gets into the party lists. They will therefore take more interest in becoming delegates to the party conferences where the party lists will be determined. As a result of all these processes, the inner party life under PE will become more important than it is under MS. In particular, parties will have to con- vene, at least once during every election cycle, their national conferences/congresses, in which the party list of candidates (along with the party platform) will have to be determined. Determination of party lists will become a vital part of the election process. Party congresses will therefore become important part of the election process.13 Holding party national conferences every election year will be a big improvement over the current practice of not holding such conferences on a regular basis. PE will also undercut the tendency toward running as renegades by people who do not get nomination (i.e., get included in party lists), because people wanting to do so will now have to form a party, get registered by the Election Commission (EC) in time, and so on. It will be difficult and very late to cross these hurdles by the time parties make up their lists. The “nuisance” created by rival candidates from the same party will thus be minimized. By making the entire party work unitedly for the party list, PE can help increase cohesion within the parties. PE will also obviate the necessity of the same individual to be candidate from multiple constituencies. Currently, Bangladesh constitution allows a person to be candidate in as many as five constituencies. Individuals getting elected from multiple constituencies may retain one and vacate the others. To fill these vacant seats, the EC then has to hold by-elections. PE will do away with this unnecessary complication and additional source of strife.

5.3.7 Creates Better Conditions for Functioning of Local Governments An important potential merit of PE is that, by severing the direct link between parliament members and local constituencies, it can create more space and better conditions for functioning and development of local governments. One unintended negative consequence of MS is weakening of local governments. By linking MPs to individual constituencies, MS imparts a dual role to MPs. On the one hand, they have to deal with national issues, and on the other hand, they have to represent their constituencies. This dual role provides the objective basis for a conflict between MPs and local governments. While in more developed and law-abiding countries, this duality may not be 128 ● Governance for Development a problem, in countries such as Bangladesh, it has become a serious hurdle to the effective functioning of local governments. It is common in Bangladesh for MPs to use their leverage over the cen- tral government to marginalize local governments, usurping the power that should belong, not only in theory but also in practice, to elected local government officials. During the BNP-led government of 2001–2006, this de facto dominance of MPs over local governments was formalized and pro- moted to a great extent through enactment of rules of business conferring much power to MPs over local affairs. Awami League government has main- tained that practice. The conflict between MPs and local governments in Bangladesh most commonly takes the form of the conflict between MPs and elected Upazilla Parishad chairmen, with the latter complaining that local MPs encroach their jurisdictions and do not allow them to function independently. PE can bring about a radical change in this situation. By establishing a clear distinction between the roles of MPs and local governments, it can end the dual role of MPs and thus ease the current conflict between MPs and local governments. MPs elected through PE will assume more of a national personality, which accords well with their purported role of looking after national affairs. Local governments will thus be freed from the domination and suffocation by MPs.

5.3.8 Creates Level Playing Field and Is More Inclusive An important merit of PE is that it will be more inclusive, because it will create a more level playing field for minorities and small political parties to be represented in the parliament. By contrast, MS tilts the field in favor of larger parties and groups and thus discriminates against small parties and groups. MS makes it difficult for minority groups to be represented in the parliament, particularly if they are dispersed across the country. Similarly, the system prevents small political parties from being represented, if they do not have geographically concentrated support base. More generally, MS creates the “wasted vote” problem, which refers to the fact that under this system many do not want to vote for smaller parties, despite their support for them, because candidates of these parties do not have much chance to get elected (by getting the highest number of votes in a particular constituency), and hence, voting for them amounts to “wasting” of votes. MS thus deprives small political parties and minority groups from the opportunity to muster, test, and develop their electoral strength and get represented in the national parliament. Instead, it reinforces the importance of the bigger parties and groups. Unfortunately, exclusion of small and minority groups from representation in Proportional Election as a Way to Stabilize Democracy ● 129 the parliament for a prolonged period often leads to apathy, discontent, and even armed insurgencies. Under PE, small parties and minority groups may represent themselves in the parliament in accordance to their numerical strength, no matter whether they are geographically dispersed or concentrated. They can pursue their interests and demands more freely and directly, without having to depend on bigger parties. As a result, PE can encourage small parties and groups to chan- nel their grievances through the parliament rather than through unparlia- mentary means. The national parliament can therefore become truly national in terms of representation.

5.3.9 Being More Just and Conducive to Peace As a consequence of the above merits, PE system can prove to be more just and hence more peaceful. First, as noticed earlier, PE reduces the role of chance or fluke in election outcomes. The actual outcome is firmly based on vote shares, and there is no scope for a party to lose out even after getting more votes. Hence, the outcome will appear to be fair and easier to accept. Second, PE provides everyone with equal chance to be represented, no matter whether they belong to the majority or minority groups and to large or small political party. PE will therefore prove to be more just from this point of view too. A system that is more just is also likely to be more peaceful. As the slogan goes, “There is no peace without justice!”

5.4 Potential Problems of Proportional Election in Bangladesh Despite the merits above, PE has some potential demerits, and it is necessary to discuss them before arriving at a judgment.

5.4.1 Issue of Geographical Representation One of the problematic features of PE, as noted earlier, concerns geographical representation. Although an individual party, in drawing up its party list, is likely to include candidates from different parts of the country in order to draw votes from all its parts, it cannot be certain how many seats it will ulti- mately get. Hence individual political parties cannot guarantee uniform and comprehensive geographical representation through their lists. This applies no matter whether party lists are “closed” or “open.” It is quite possible that when elected MPs from all parties are taken together, the parliament may turn out to be geographically quite representative too. However, this outcome is not guaranteed. 130 ● Governance for Development

The problem of geographical representation, however, may not be that serious for Bangladesh because of its small physical size and relatively homog- enous population. PE applied at the national level can therefore work quite well for Bangladesh. However, if necessary, further measures may be taken to address the geographical representation issue. One of these, as noted earlier, is to apply PE to a subnational level. In Bangladesh, for example, such a subnational level may be the former divisions, such as Dhaka, Chittagong, Rajshahi, and Khulna divisions. Assuming that the divisions are of equal size in terms of number of voters, and assuming a parliament of 300 members, each division will have 75 seats. The votes can then be tallied at the division level and 75 seats of each division may be apportioned among parties in accordance to their vote shares in the division. Such a system will guarantee 75 representatives from each of these divisions. To the extent that the divisions also represent Bangladesh’s broad geographical regions, such a system may go a long way to ensure geographical representation in the parliament. One may feel tempted to go further in this direction and take districts as the subnational level. However, with about 60 districts, each will have just 5 seats. Application of the PE system to such a small number of seats will increase the importance of “rounding” in the election results and hence prove not satisfactory. More importantly, as mentioned earlier, the smaller the subnational unit that is chosen for application of PE, the more of its merits is lost. For example, the smaller the unit, the more tied the candidates become to the locality and the outcome of local votes, and hence stronger becomes the incentive for local political actors to manipulate and to resort to money, muscle power, and other malpractices necessary for such manipulation. Similarly, the smaller the subnational unit, the more limited becomes the system’s capacity to create space for effective functioning of local governments, to be inclusive, and so on. Thus application of PE to subnational level as a way to ensure geographical representation has its own problems. Another way to ensure geographical representation, as mentioned earlier, is to opt for a hybrid system that combines PE with MS. Essentially there is a trade-off between PE and MS, and different hybrid variants discussed earlier represent different compromise points along this trade-off. The more the system leans toward MS, the more it gains in terms of geographical representation but loses the benefits of PE. The converse is true when the system leans toward PE applied to the national level. It is for individual countries to consider their respective situation and decide. So far as Bangladesh is concerned, a switch to PE as a way to elect the main chamber of the parliament may indeed be counterbalanced by introduction of another chamber that will be elected following MS. However, this Proportional Election as a Way to Stabilize Democracy ● 131 may undercut much of PE’s stabilizing influence that provides the rationale for the switch from MS to PE in the first place. Hence, instead of creating a separate chamber and/or adding MS members to the PE members in the single-chamber parliament, Bangladesh may think of other options. One such option is to create a National Forum of Upazilla Chairpersons and use that forum as a complement to the parliament elected through PE. For example, it may be required that the budget receive the approval of this Forum. Such an arrangement may be more expeditious than creating a new chamber of the parliament. This option may help strengthen local governments and not create ambiguities in the role of MPs. In short, though PE has an issue regarding geographical representation, it may not be that serious for Bangladesh. Also, there are many ways around this problem, and Bangladesh can choose the solution that is appropriate for her, taking relevant international experience into account.

5.4.2 Issue of Frequent Changes in the Government Another argument that is often made against PE is that it may lead to more fractious parliaments, increase the necessity of alliances, and result in more unstable governments. This contention refers to the fact that by being more inclusive, PE may allow many small parties acquire seats, leaving no party gaining absolute majority. As a result, only coalition governments may be possible, and these may collapse frequently because of switch of allegiance by the small parties. As a result, the large parties may become hostage to small parties. In considering these arguments, it needs to be noted first that even MS may lead to fractious parliament with its consequences, if the underlying political realities creates the necessary scope. For example, India had strong single-party governments for a long time. However, since the 1980s many region- and caste-based parties gained prominence. As a result, the Indian parliament became fractured, allowing only coalition governments, which collapsed often. This change came about even though there was no change in the Indian election system, which continued to follow MS. Similarly, under the same election system, Bharatiya Janata Party gained absolute majority in the recent election, making it possible for it to form government without entering any coalition. This shows that the reason for coalition government and frequent changes in it lies more in the underlying correlation of political forces in the country, and less in the election system. Coalition governments are common in Bangladesh too, even though it follows MS of election. For example, Awami League in 1996 offered cabi- net posts to two very small parties in order to forge a majority and form a 132 ● Governance for Development government. Similarly, in 2001 the BNP formed a coalition government with Jamaat and a few other parties. The government formed following the election of the Tenth Parliament is also a coalition government. Second, as noted earlier, PE eliminates (at least reduces) the necessity for pre-election alliances. Sometimes, this may reduce the necessity of post- election alliance too. For example, the outcome of the election of the Tenth Parliament allows Awami League to form a government of its own (because it has won absolute majority). However, it had to form a coalition government because it had formed a pre-election alliance. Third, though it may prove to be necessary under both the election systems, post-election alliance forming under PE can be a better exercise than under MS, because in a parliament elected under PE, the seat shares of parties will accurately reflect their vote shares. By contrast, seat shares in a parliament elected through MS may not match the vote shares, which get murky by pre- election alliances. Fourth, coalition forming in a PE parliament is likely to be a better exercise because of the further fact that the parliament will be more inclusive, with representation of more groups and parties. Fifth, as noted earlier, unstable government is not the same as unstable democracy, and the former may be better than the latter. Frequent changes in government may not be too harmful if these changes take place in an orderly constitutional way with no violence and no disruption of economic activities. The example of Italy was cited earlier to illustrate the point. Rise and fall of coalition governments through changes in coalition implies that parliament functions as the main theater of action. This can be an improvement over the current situation in Bangladesh where the Opposition generally boycotts the parliament and resorts to harmful street agitation to topple the government from outside. PE can be of great help to the nation if it can bring all the deserving parties to the parliament and keep them there. Overall, PE may increase the incidence of coalition government and frequent changes in them, but they may actually prove to be a sign of improved politics rather than a cause of alarm.

5.4.3 “Piggy-backing” and “Nomination Trade” A third contention against PE is that it may encourage people to “buy” their way into party lists (often referred to as “nomination trade”) and “piggy back” on the popularity of the party and become member of the parliament without having to face the test of their personal popularity among the electorate. Several following points may be noted with regard to this contention. Proportional Election as a Way to Stabilize Democracy ● 133

First of all, “nomination trade,” whereby individuals get the party nomination in exchange of “offerings” (such as big donations to the party election fund) is an endemic problem with MS too. It may be argued, however, that under MS there is an outside check. The people “buying” nomination cannot automatically get elected to the parliament and instead have to prove their “popularity” by actually getting majority votes in their respective constituencies. PE, by contrast, lacks such a direct outside check, because a person included in the party list may “piggy back” on the popularity of the party and become a parliament member, even though she or he may not have much popularity among the electorate. It may be said that this opportunity to piggy back may strengthen incentives for “nomination trade” under PE. However, PE also provides some antidotes that may counteract nomination trade and piggy-backing. As noted earlier, PE increases the responsibility of the party leadership in making the party list win. A failure by the party list to garner expected share of votes will signify a failure of the party leadership in a much sharper way than it does now, when the responsibility of winning falls on the shoulder of individual candidates. Currently, the nomination decisions are taken by nomination boards set up by respective political parties, and the views of the supreme leaders reign in these nomination boards. Under PE, the party leadership will feel compelled to share this responsibility with the entire party, and for that purpose will find it necessary to follow a transparent, participatory, and democratic inner-party procedure for formu- lation of the party list, as discussed earlier. Second, even though members of the party lists will not face individual tests of popularity among the general electorate, they will certainly face such a test among the delegates of the party conference. As noted above, PE will require parties to hold pre-election conferences to formulate the party lists, and those garnering the highest votes of the conference delegates are likely to be included in the party lists. Thus PE does not obviate entirely tests of personal popularity. Third, PE also allows the Open List option whereby voters can express their preferences regarding the ordering of candidates within the party lists. Under this arrangement, voters will not only choose which party list they favor, but will also indicate what the ordering of the list should be. In this way, persons included in the party list will also face the test of popularity among the general electorate. The Open List variant of PE may be challeng- ing for Bangladesh to adopt now, given the general education level of its voters. However, that does not mean that Bangladesh cannot adopt in future more sophisticated versions of PE, as necessary. 134 ● Governance for Development

5.5 Concluding Remarks Switch to the Proportional Election (PE) from the current Majority System (MS) is an important political reform idea arising from the institutional approach. It has considerable potential to improve Bangladesh politics. A survey of the international experience shows that more of the developed countries practice PE; almost all new democracies have preferred PE over MS; almost half of developing countries follow PE; and some countries that have been practicing MS are now switching or considering to switch to PE. Thus PE seems to be the system of the future, and Bangladesh may move ahead of the curve (relative to many other developing countries) by switching to PE, which may help stabilize her democracy. PE offers many concrete variations, and Bangladesh may customize PE to fit its specific conditions. PE has some potential problems, however, which may be overcome or mitigated by appropriate customization. There is a view that PE may be difficult for Bangladeshi voters to under- stand and follow because of their long familiarity with MS and their affinity with the British system. However, Bangladesh voters are also known to have generally voted for party symbols instead of candidates.14 That being the case, the switch to PE may not present as big a psychological barrier as it is sometimes viewed. Voting for party lists may not be all that different from voting for party symbols, and in fact, party lists will come with party symbols. Thus PE may be more in sync with what the people of Bangladesh actually have been practicing and want to practice. So far as the British system is concerned, it was noted earlier the Great Britain itself is gradually moving away from the MS to PE. Moreover, Ban- gladesh has to find its own solution and not slavishly cling to whatever the colonial rulers introduced centuries ago.15 It may be noted that the switch from MS to PE is relatively easy. It does not require elaborate changes in the Constitution and can be done mostly through changes in the People’s Representation Order (PRO) and rules and regulations of the EC. Similarly, it will be easy to revert back to MS if PE does not prove to be suitable. What is more important to note is that the change from MS to PE has two aspects. The first concerns the “form” or the formal aspect of it; namely, the necessary changes in the Constitution and PRO. This is not too difficult a task once a consensus is reached. The second aspect concerns the “content,” which, as noted earlier, will be determined by how political parties and the people make use of the newly created form through their own actions. It may be hoped that the new form, if properly designed, will prompt the political parties to fill it with the right content through their changed conduct. Proportional Election as a Way to Stabilize Democracy ● 135

The switch from MS to PE will require consent of the major political parties. It is encouraging that many perceptive leaders of both Awami League and BNP have expressed their sympathies for PE. The Left parties of Bangladesh are generally in favor of PE. Many parties representing religious and ethnic minorities also support PE. Interestingly, Jatiya Party, regarded to be the third largest party of the country in the terms of electoral strength and currently the official Opposition Party, demanded introduction of PE on the eve of the election of the Tenth Parliament. Many prominent intellectuals and observers of Bangladesh politics have also voiced support for PE. Thus there is already significant expressed support for PE in Bangladesh. It is quite possible that, with further advocacy and campaign, more people will come out in favor of PE, and it will indeed get adopted in Bangladesh. 136 ● Governance for Development

Table 5A.1 Election systems across the world

Country Representation Initial per Per capita Average Comment system capita income income in annual 2000 growth rate Algeria PE 3,843 5,753 1.01 Party list Angola PE 1,975 Party list Antigua and Barbuda MS 5,143* 14,065 3.41 Austria PE 8,444 27,000 2.95 Party list Argentina PR 7,838 11,332 0.93 Party list Bahamas MS 16,911* 19,088 0.41 Bangladesh MS 1,348** 1,851 1.60 Barbados MS 7,039 16,086 2.09 Belgium PE 8,070 24,662 2.83 Party list Belize MS 3,439* 6,015 1.88 Bhutan MS 227* 828 4.41 Bolivia PE 2,431 2,929 0.47 Mixed Botswana MS 1,168* 7,257 6.28 Bulgaria PE 7,258 Party list Burkina Faso PE 768 933 0.49 Party list Burundi PE 677 699 0.08 Party list Cambodia PE 1086* 514 −2.46 Party list Canada MS 10,576 26,821 2.35 Cape Verde PE 1,417 4,983 3.19 Party list Chile PE 5,086 11,430 2.05 Party list Colombia PE 2,819 6,080 1.94 Party list Costa Rica PE 4,513 8,342 1.55 Party list Cyprus PE 5,413* 20,457 4.53 Party list Czech Republic PE 13,447*** 13,617 0.13 Party list Denmark PE 11,438 27,827 2.25 Party list Dominica MS 4,356* 8,197 2.13 Dominican Republic PE 2,080 6,497 2.89 Party list Equatorial Guinea PE 970 6,495 4.87 Party list Estonia PE 11,380*** 11,081 −0.27 Party list Ethiopia MS 400 725 1.50 Finland PE 7,785 22,741 2.72 Party list (Continued ) Proportional Election as a Way to Stabilize Democracy ● 137

Table 5A.1 (Continued ) Country Representation Initial per Per capita Average Comment system capita income income in annual 2000 growth rate Gambia MS 722 954 0.70 Germany PE 13,686* 25,061 2.04 Mixed Ghana MS 412 1,392 3.09 Grenada MS 2,937* 5,896 2.35 Guinea-Bissau PE 493 762 1.10 Party list Guyana PE 3,733 Party list Hungary PE 5,721* 11,383 2.32 Mixed Iceland PE 8,381 25,795 2.85 Party list India MS 892 2,644 2.75 Indonesia PE 1,071 3,772 3.20 Party list Ireland PE 5,294 24,948 3.95 Preference voting Israel PE 6,745 22,237 3.03 Party list Italy PR 7,167 22,487 2.90 Mixed Jamaica MS 3,477 4,521 0.66 Kenya MS 1,179 1,268 0.18 Latvia PE 8,998 Party list Lesotho PE 576 1,834 2.94 Mixed Liberia PE 2,004* 472 −4.71 Party list Liechtenstein PE Party list Luxemburg PE 12,920 48,217 3.35 Party list Malawi MS 461 839 1.51 Malaysia MS 1,801 11,406 4.72 Malta PE 2,997* 18,863 6.32 Preference voting Mexico PE 3,719 8,082 1.96 Mixed Micronesia MS 2,297* 3,782 1.68 Moldova PE 2,218 Party list Morocco MS 1,299 3,720 2.67 Nepal MS 800 1,421 1.45 New Zealand PE 12,063 20,423 1.33 Mixed Namibia PE 5,256* 5,269 0.01 Party list

(Continued ) 138 ● Governance for Development

Table 5A.1 (Continued )

Country Representation Initial per Per capita Average Comment system capita income income in annual 2000 growth rate Netherlands PE 10,463 26,293 2.33 Party list Netherlands Antilles PE 11,965* 14,014 0.53 Party list New Caledonia PE Party list Nicaragua PE 4,428 3,438 −0.63 Party list Nigeria MS 1,106 1,074 −0.07 Norway PE 9,473 33,092 3.18 Party list Pakistan MS 801 2,477 2.86 Palau MS 8,692** 9,357 0.37 Papua New Guinea MS 2,150* 4,355 2.38 Paraguay PE 2,510 4,965 1.72 Party list Peru PE 3,129 4,205 0.74 Party list Poland PE 3,973* 8,611 2.61 Party list Portugal PE 3,689 17,323 3.94 Party list Romania PE 1,276* 5,211 4.80 Party list Saint Kitts and Nevis MS 3,757* 14,393 4.58 Saint Lucia MS 2,877* 6,839 2.93 Saint Vincent and MS 2,540* 7,672 3.75 Grenadines Samoa MS 2,591* 3,071 0.57 San Marino PE Party list Sao Tome and PE 1,006 1,300 0.86 Party list Principe Singapore MS 4,219 29,434 4.98 Slovakia PE 9,874 9,697 −0.18 Party list Slovenia PE 15,202 18,206 1.82 Party list Solomon Islands MS 1,988* 2,013 0.04 South Africa PE 4,927 8,226 1.29 Party list South Korea MS 1,458 15,702 6.12 Spain PE 4,880 19,536 3.53 Party list Sri Lanka PE 866 4,047 3.93 Party list Suriname PE 3,704 4,753 0.84 Party list Swaziland MS 2,785* 8,517 3.80 (Continued ) Proportional Election as a Way to Stabilize Democracy ● 139

Table 5A.1 (Continued )

Country Representation Initial per Per capita Average Comment system capita income income in annual 2000 growth rate Sweden PE 11,065 25,232 2.08 Party list Switzerland PE 15,253 28,831 1.60 Party list Tanzania MS 502 817 1.23 Tonga MS 1,054* 3,398 3.98 Trinidad and Tobago MS 6,274 14,770 2.90 Turkey PE 2,250 5,715 2.36 Party list Tuvalu MS Uganda MS 873 1,058 0.48 United Kingdom MS 10,323 24,666 2.20 United States MS 12,892 34,365 2.48 Uruguay PE 6,143 10,740 1.41 Party list Venezuela PE 6,092 7,323 0.46 Mixed Wallis and Futuna PE Party list Yemen MS 974*** 1,082 1.06 Zambia MS 910 866 -0.12 Zimbabwe MS 2,298 3,256 0.88

Sources: Author, based on information regarding income from Penn World Tables, Version 6.2 compiled by Alan Heston, Robert Summers, and Bettina Atten at Center for International Comparison of Production, Income, and Prices at the University of Pennsylvania, September 2006 (http://pwt.econ.upenn.edu/php_site/ pwt62/). Information regarding representation system is taken from ACE Electoral Knowledge Network. See http://aceproject.org/epic-en/CDTable?view=country&question=ES005. Notes: 1. PE and MA stand for “Proportional Election” and “Majority System.” 2. Per capita income refers to the RGDPCH variable of Penn World Tables and refer to real GDP per capita measured as chain series in constant prices in terms of I$ of 2000. 3. Initial income refers generally to that of 1960. However, for some countries it refers to income in 1970, 1980, and 1990, and these are marked by *, **, and ***, respectively. 4. The growth rate is average annual compound growth rate for the respective periods. 5. Comments are mainly with regard to the type of Proportional Representation practiced in particular countries.