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London School of Economics & Political Science A THEORY OF NEED IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL THEORY: AUTONOMY, FREEDOM, AND A GLOBAL OBLIGATION Elizabeth O’ Casey A thesis submitted to the Department of International Relations of the London School of Economics for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, London, August 2012. 1 Declaration I certify that the thesis I have presented for examination for the PhD degree of the London School of Economics and Political Science is solely my own work other than where I have clearly indicated that it is the work of others (in which case the extent of any work carried out jointly by me and any other person is clearly identified in it). The copyright of this thesis rests with the author. Quotation from it is permitted, provided that full acknowledgement is made. This thesis may not be reproduced without my prior written consent. I warrant that this authorisation does not, to the best of my belief, infringe the rights of any third party. I declare that my thesis consists of 88,784 words. Elizabeth O’ Casey 2 ABSTRACT The thesis is concerned with the nature of human action presupposed by normative theory; it is about recognising and articulating the fragility of the human within the context of human needs and assumptions made by international ethical theory. The primary aim of the thesis is to establish the existence of two basic needs necessary for moral action, to determine a global obligation to enable the meeting of those needs, and to articulate a necessary reconceptualisation of the state system in line with the demands of that obligation. The thesis makes this argument in three parts. By exploring and revealing the vulnerability and finitude of the individual actor, looking at the notion and language of ‘need’, and demonstrating what is involved in being held morally responsible, Part One seeks to provide an objective and universalist account of the prerequisites of moral action, establishing two basic needs: autonomy and freedom. The second Part of the thesis is dedicated to showing why there is a corresponding obligation – a ‘Global Principle’ – to meet these needs, an obligation which is cosmopolitan in scope and source. In its attempt to articulate a rationally-derived core and primary principle of justice, the thesis hopes to contribute to the cosmopolitan discourse of IPT. Part Three shows in what way the international system, with an emphasis on the state, needs to be reconceived; it argues that the state needs to be reconceptualised as a transparent enactor of the derivative duties of the Global Principle (through political and socio-economic reform) ensuring identification of the individual as the primary actor of responsibility within the international. Overall, the thesis aims to identify and acknowledge the limitations of the human and the necessity of some external provisions in order to enable her to become a normatively accountable actor. It aims to highlight what normative theory both assumes and reinforces about human action, arguing that only once the discourse of IPT has recognised the uniquely needing nature of the individual can she become a meaningful and free actor within the international arena. 3 CONTENTS Declaration 2 Abstract 3 Introduction 7 --- PART ONE --- 1. The Nature of Human Action In Normative Theory and The Basic Needs 18 1. Action and the Basic Need for Autonomy 20 1.1.From Behaving to Acting: The Identification of Autonomy 20 1.2.The Conditions for Autonomy (I): The Psychological Capacities 23 1.2.1 The need for rationality 25 1.2.2 The need for competence 26 1.2.3 The need for (guidance) control 29 1.3.The Conditions for Autonomy (II): The Physiological Conditions 33 1.3.1 Freedom from coercive ill-health: absence of severe disease and injury 35 1.3.2 The need for working biological functions and survival 36 2. Action and the Basic Need for Freedom from External Control 38 2.1 Freedom from Compulsion 39 2.2 Freedom from Coercion 40 2.3 Freedom from Deception 42 2.4 The Relevance of Arbitrary Power 43 2.5 Moral Responsibility and the Need for Freedom from External Control 46 3. In Sum: The Two Basic Needs of Autonomy & Freedom from External Control 47 4. Problematic Issues Surrounding the Derivation of Autonomy/Freedom as Central to Action 49 4.1 Action as a Matter of Degree 49 4.2 Autonomy as Non-Rationalistic 51 4.3 Autonomy as Relational 53 4.4 The Socially Motivated Self 56 4.5 Communitarian Critique 58 4.6 The Two Basic Needs and the Problem of Exclusion 62 2. The Character and Logical Force of Basic Needs 67 1. Volition, Control & Necessity: The Instrumentality, Inescapability and Entrenchment of Basic Needs 68 1.1Logical necessity and the Characteristic of Instrumentality 68 1.2Non-Volition and the Characteristic of Inescapability 70 1.3Needs Conflated with Wants and the Charge of Paternalism 71 1.4The Characteristic of Entrenchment 74 1.5Contrived Needs and the Significance of Choice 76 1.6Need Theory and the Charge of Authoritarianism 79 2. Local Practice and the Universalism of Basic Needs 81 2.1The Characteristic of Universality 81 2.2Cultural Divergence and the Satisfaction of Needs 82 4 --- PART TWO --- 3. Universality of Need and Principle: Right or Obligation? 87 1. Universality of Need and Principle 88 1.1 The Principle: Universal in Source and Scope 88 1.2 The Naturalistic Fallacy 91 1.3 Argument for restricted Universalism 92 1.4 Impossibility of Morality Outside of the National Community 95 1.5 Summary 100 2. Needs and Rights 100 2.1 Some Context: Theories of Human Rights based on Needs 100 2.2 The Conceptual Difference between Rights and Subsistence Needs 102 2.3 The Positive/Negative Distinction 103 2.3.1 All Rights are Positive 103 2.3.2 Subsistence Rights as Negative 105 2.3.3 Review of the positive/negative distinction 109 2.4 Review of Rights Framework in General 109 3. Needs and Obligations 111 3.1 Types of Obligations 111 3.2 From Recipience to Agency 112 3.3 Imperfect Obligations 113 3.4 The Open Character of Imperfect Obligations 113 3.4.1 Pogge’s Imperfect Rights 115 3.4.2 Obligation-based principle and right-based principle: compared 116 3.5 General Critique of Obligation Theory 118 3.5.1 Agency as Problematic 118 3.5.2 Indeterminacy and potential for collective duties 119 4. The Needs-Based Global Principle of Obligation 123 1. A Kantian Conception of Needs-Based Obligations 123 1.1 O’Neill’s Theory of Needs-Based Obligations 124 1.2 Problems of Indeterminacy and the Need for Enforcement 127 1.3 The Role of Enforcement in Terms of Justice and Humanity 128 1.4 Imperfect Obligations and the Problem of Coercion 131 1.5 The Demands of Freedom: Enforcement versus Coercion 134 1.5.1 Requirements for freedom and autonomy as complementary 134 1.5.2 The difference between ‘enforcement’ and ‘coercion’ 136 2. Copp’s Basic Needs Principle 139 3. Barry’s Theory of Vital Interests 143 4. The Global Principle 147 5. Scarce Resources and Impartiality 149 5.1 The Impartialist Viewpoint as Impossible 150 5.2 Impartialism as Unrealistic 152 5.3 The Impartialist Accommodation of Partiality 152 5.4 Partialism and the Global Principle 153 5 --- PART THREE --- 5. Conceptual Implications of the Global Principle for the International System 158 1. Basic Needs and the Practical Role of the Nation-State 159 1.1 Distance and Knowledge 159 1.2 Efficiency, Motivation and Allegiance 161 1.3 The State and the Realisation of Autonomy 167 1.4 The State and the Necessary Political, Legal and Social Infrastructure to Meet Needs 169 1.5 Global Economy and the Problem of Sovereignty 172 2. Basic Needs and a Reconceptualisation of the State within the Context of the International 176 2.1 The State Reconceived: Enactor of Derivative Duties 176 2.2 The Role of Non-State Actors and Multilayered Power 182 6. Political and Socio-Economic Consequences of the Global Principle for the State and the International 186 1. Transparency and the Identification of the Individual: Democracy, Accountability & Low Corruption 187 2. Necessary Conditions For Enabling the Meeting of Basic Needs 192 2.1 Political Conditions Entailed by the Global Principle 192 2.1.1 Democracy and political rights & liberties: the basic need for freedom from external control 193 2.1.2 Democracy: the basic need for autonomy required and protected 197 2.1.3 National constitutional guarantee of the Global Principle 202 2.1.4 International institutional guarantee of the Global Principle 205 2.2 Socio-Economic Conditions Entailed by the Global Principle 207 2.2.1 Socio-economic development in response to needs, and the role of democracy 209 2.2.2 Global and domestic economic conditions 211 Conclusion 220 Bibliography 232 Acknowledgements 249 6 INTRODUCTION 7 “The absurd is born of this confrontation between human need and the unreasonable silence of the world” (Camus 1991, p28) 8 This thesis is about basic needs. It is about the basic needs required for normative action and the basic goods necessary to be a meaningful subject of any normative framework. It is about the capacity to act freely and autonomously, to have the capacity to author and own one’s action, to be in control both internally and externally of one’s body, one’s self. It is about ensuring that this control is possessed globally and about having a suitable international institutional realm to enable this. It is about trying to make consistent the expectations of moral theory with the finitude of human beings, with their vulnerability to succumb to the dictates of nature.