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Press Conference of Alexander Novak, Russian Minister of Energy and Alexey Miller, Chairman of Gazprom Management Committee

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Press Conference of Alexander Novak, Russian Minister of Energy and Alexey Miller, Chairman of Gazprom Management Committee Press Conference of Alexander Novak, Russian Minister of Energy and Alexey Miller, Chairman of Gazprom Management Committee Gas supply to Ukraine June 16, 2014 MODERATOR: The Press Conference of Alexey Miller, Head of Gazprom and Alexander Novak, Minister of Energy, dedicated to gas supply to Ukraine is about to begin. I suppose that we’d like Mr. Alexander Novak to give his opinion on the matter from the outset, without needless long opening statements. ALEXANDER NOVAK: Good afternoon, dear colleagues. Mr. Alexey Miller, Chairman of the Gazprom Management Committee and I have just met with our Prime Minister. The meeting involved a detailed report on the current situation with gas supply to Ukraine and gas supply to European consumers. Today we are ready to answer all of your questions. First, I’d like to say a few words about the current situation. I want to remind you that today’s pressing problems were identified by the Russian party way back. You know that on April 10 Russian President Vladimir Putin addressed the leaders of eighteen European countries which consumed Russian natural gas transited via Ukraine. In his address he squarely pointed out the problems that might emerge in the gas market due to Ukraine’s failure to settle the debt for supplied gas and the necessity of injecting gas into underground storages to supply European consumers in the winter period. Throughout this period – from May 2 to June 15 – there have been seven rounds of trilateral consultations: on the levels of Russia, the European Union and Ukraine. In addition, corporate talks were held between Gazprom and Naftogaz of Ukraine. You know that the latest talks have taken place just these days in Kiev. And surely within these talks the Russian party made every effort and took all the necessary steps to reach a compromise and arrive at solutions that could settle the situation. It’s known that the Russian party made rather constructive proposals to the Ukrainian party. That is to say, a whole package of compromise proposals which, in our opinion, could help to settle the current situation. Among other things, this package agreement included a pricing proposal, a debt settlement schedule for supplied gas as well as the terms and conditions of payment for future supply. Unfortunately, here is what we have achieved by now during the whole period of consultations: as a matter of fact, we received only the payment for February and March to settle the outstanding debt in the amount of USD 786 million. In April and May Ukraine’s debt for supplied gas grew by USD 2.2 billion. Moreover, the debt for November and December gas deliveries hasn’t been paid off yet. Our proposal, that is, the package agreement we proposed, was totally rejected by the Ukrainian party. In our opinion, the Ukrainian party has been unconstructive right from the beginning of the talks. It was actually impossible to discuss compromise solutions. The Ukrainian party insisted upon the only condition – a totally unreasonable price of USD 268.5 for one thousand cubic meters of gas with the demand to revise the existing contract. Therefore, within the consultations held the compromise hasn’t been reached. I’d like to point it out once again, the Russian party offered the most favorable package of agreements, considering the discount in the amount of USD 100 guaranteed by the Russian Federation Government. I’d also like to note that the European Commission supported our proposal and displayed its readiness to find a compromise based on the proposals made by the Russian Federation. In this context, we pointed out the eagerness to find the solutions that would settle this situation. But unfortunately, as I’ve already said, the 1 Ukrainian party totally rejected all our proposals. We suppose it is an absolutely unconstructive approach considering the contract that has been in force since 2009 and its main terms and conditions, they have become effective now. And starting from today Gazprom made a decision to supply Ukraine with the amount of gas actually paid for. But as the Ukrainian party didn’t pay for a single cubic meter of gas either for June, or for November and December, or for April and May, starting from today gas will be supplied only to European consumers. I am ready to answer any additional questions of yours. QUESTION: Dina Khrennikova, Platts Information Agency. Mr. Miller, Mr. Novak, could you, please, say what volumes of gas are transited to European consumers? And do you have an action plan in case less gas than you planned is transited due to some reasons, to some actions on the Ukrainian part? ALEXEY MILLER: At 10 a.m. Gazprom switched Naftogaz of Ukraine to prepayments for gas supply to Ukraine. A special task force started operating in Gazprom, its meeting will be held every day. In particular, at the task force meeting we certainly analyzed the situation with gas supply to European consumers. And we’ll be delivering as much gas to the Russian-Ukrainian border as will be demanded by our European partners. At present, the request for gas transit via Ukraine amounts to a little more than 185 million cubic meters. As for our future actions, in case we observe that gas stays in Ukraine – it may be called siphoning off gas, or it may be referred to in rougher terms – in this case we’ll increase the supply volume via the Nord Stream gas pipeline, the Yamal – Europe gas pipeline. We’ll boost the volumes of gas injected into European UGS facilities. And of course we’ll go on constructing the South Stream gas pipeline. I’d like to stress that it is being constructed in strict compliance with the schedule. In December 2015 first gas will be delivered to Bulgaria. QUESTION: Svetlana Savateeva, Interfax Information Agency. Mr. Miller, you mentioned that the task force has already been created. Could you, please, tell us if there is any current data whether gas transit towards Velke Kapusany and towards Romania is affected or not. And two more questions at once, if I may. Originally, sometime in June, Gazprom offered Naftogaz a discount both in terms of an export duty and in the form of a direct discount from Gazprom. But then this offer was refused. Could you, please, explain why it was so? And my third question. Do you consider a possibility of filing a lawsuit against Ukraine and levying a distraint upon its belongings? ALEXEY MILLER: Let us start from the end. As for our actions this morning, once we switched Ukraine to prepayments. We filed a lawsuit to the Stockholm Arbitration at once to enforce Naftogaz of Ukraine to pay off its debt in the amount of USD 4.5 billion. It is not impossible that in future we will also file other lawsuits against Naftogaz of Ukraine. As for the export duty: it is the issue of price formation. Right from the beginning of the talks, during trilateral consultations the subject of talks has been substituted. I’d like to draw your attention that the subject of the negotiations and the topical issue was the consistent non-payment of Naftogaz of Ukraine for gas supply. By now, the total volume of gas supplied to Ukraine that hasn’t been paid off amounts to 11.5 billion cubic meters. And the Russian party, that is Gazprom, appealing to the European Commission, within our bilateral relations addressed Naftogaz of Ukraine, relevant Ukrainian ministries and the Ukrainian Government, stressing that the debt issue had to be settled and solved. Otherwise, under the existing contract, the prepayment scheme would be introduced. As you know, Gazprom could have introduced the prepayment scheme a good while ago. And we had enough ground for that. But we made concessions to our Ukrainian colleagues and didn’t 2 introduce the prepayment scheme. We made concessions to the European Commission that promised that the next day, then again the next day and once more – the next day we would be paid. Ukraine would receive this kind of support, that kind of help from here, there and elsewhere. And the money was about to be transferred, and the debts would be paid off. But we told them that this situation couldn’t last forever. But during the talks our Ukrainian colleagues simply substituted or at least made an attempt to substitute the subject of talks. They redirected the talks to the price issue. And as a matter of fact, the logics of the talks they’ve been trying to impose all along (among other things, in the media) was the following: give us an extra-low price – at the level of gas sales to the Eurasian Economic Union. Why would we offer them such prices? But if you don’t give us such prices, we won’t pay off our debts. We will offtake your gas for free. We will offtake as much gas as we want. But that’s not it. The Russian party says – fine, we are ready to meet your wish and reduce the price. And just fancy what the Ukrainian party replies – you know, you have no right to cut down the price by means of adjusting the export duty. You have no right. And we are totally against the Russian Federation Government adopting any bills to reduce the export duty. But, excuse me, this is a sovereign right of the Russian Federation, of the Russian Federation Government to fix the export duties it finds necessary. We have a special scheme with respect to Ukraine. These export duties may be preferential or protective.
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