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Technology, History and the Revolution in Military Affairs

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Technology, History and the Revolution in Military Affairs by Commodore Daniel McNeil Imperial War Museum Imperial War HMS Dreadnought, the most feared maritime weapon at the time of her launch in 1906. TECHNOLOGY, HISTORY AND THE REVOLUTION IN MILITARY AFFAIRS Historical examples clarify everything and also provide every level, and it was a conflict that was won.”3 I the best kind of proof in the empirical sciences. This is enter this debate as a warrior – not a historian. My aim particularly true of the art of war. is not to prove one side of the case or the other. Rather, my aim is to draw lessons from the past, selecting a Karl von Clausewitz strategic moment with parallel possibilities and insights, so as to inform the present debate on the ohn Keegan wrote a marvellous book for the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA). Barbara Frum Lectureship, The Battle For History – Re-Fighting World War Two.1 He To this end, this paper will begin by examining the claimed that the real history of the Second World history of a naval Revolution in Military Affairs that War cannot be written until all of the wounds and had its genesis one hundred years ago: the rise of many Jpassions have fully abated. It may never be written. industrial age technologies that found their focus and History is open to interpretation – which is why it is an legend in the production of the Dreadnought battle- important tool for fostering strategic thinking. This ship.4 The naval part of this RMA included the devel- paper is heavily influenced by the analysis of Barry opment of submarines, aircraft, long-range torpedoes, Hunt, especially his view on war aims and measures of wireless telegraphy, long-range gunnery, intelligence success in the First World War.2 Nobody really ‘won’ services and mine warfare. This historical analysis will that war, but others do not share this view. Colin Gray, encompass the relationships and complex interplay for example, claims that many historians of British per- formance in the First World War “get the big business Commodore Daniel McNeil is Director Force Planning and Program wrong.” “It was a conflict conducted innovatively at Coordination at National Defence Headquarters. Winter 2000-2001 G Canadian Military Journal 7 among technologies, strategic concepts, professional Schurman’s The Education of a Navy: The Development training and education, personalities, government, pub- of British Naval Strategic Thought 1867-1914 (1965) lic expectations and, ultimately, events. This example and Barry Hunt’s Sailor-Scholar: Admiral Sir Herbert will then be used to provide some informed speculation Richmond 1871-1946 (1982) are mandatory readings in about our current Information Age RMA to help under- all naval colleges. These studies examined the central stand the present and plan for the future. Finally, the naval strategists and writers of the period and dared to analysis will support current efforts to enhance the challenge the stature of the American ‘evangelist of sea Vision for the Canadian Officer Corps of 2020 by high- power’, Alfred Thayer Mahan. Mahan’s famous 1889 lighting the value of the ‘historical’ rather than the piece, The Influence of Sea Power Upon History, ‘material’ school of strategic thought, and thus the provided the layman’s explanation for Trafalgar and importance of a liberal arts education for the nation’s for the historical success and predominance of the military leaders.5 The analysis will also support mech- Royal Navy (RN). It was an immutable fact, Mahan anisms, such as the Canadian Military Journal, to foster argued, that the RN delivered and maintained the British intellectualism and educated debate throughout the Empire. Mahan provided the ‘bible’ that described how Canadian Forces. this feat was accomplished. THE DREADNOUGHT RMA Mahan’s work emphasized the critical relationship between sea powers (those with big navies), commerce aritime strategic and technological developments and colonies. Success in naval war was founded, in his M in Britain from 1900 through to the First World view, on employing a concentration of firepower from War marked a defining period of the Industrial Age. battleships in decisive battles. He generalized from the Ironclad leviathans propelled by steam and armed with Royal Navy’s experience in the age of sail, and was dis- long range cannons replaced the age of fighting sail. missive of other approaches to naval warfare. In partic- Accordingly, naval planners were confronted with the ular, he gave short shrift to the potential impact of a daunting task of revising the theory, doctrine and prac- guerre de course doctrine. He became the most widely tice of traditional maritime warfare which, while large- acclaimed naval writer of his time, and his work gener- ally reinforced social Darwinism and imperial proclivities. Education of a Navy and Sailor-Scholar were radical depar- tures, even though neither Schurman nor Hunt were critical of Mahan, treating him more as a historical actor than as a historian. Schurman and Hunt pointed out that as good as Mahan’s ideas were, they were focused on ‘time- less lessons’ and ‘immutable prin- ciples’ of sea-power that supported “command of the sea” as the only strategy worth pursuing. Drawing www.raven.cc.ukans.edu his lessons from the Age of The British Home Fleet, 1914. Fighting Sail, and seldom appreci- ly ‘unwritten’, had been thoroughly ingrained through ating the significance of innovations such as sub- centuries of experience. The vast scale of this challenge marines, Mahan’s teachings were in reality more useful gave great scope both for grand success and for grand as a primer on geopolitics than as a guide to future fleet failure – much the same as our current transition into structure. He was, however, an inadvertent ‘catalyst’ the Information Age. for applying old ideology to new technology, and Mahan’s ideas were used as guidelines for force struc- This period of naval history gave rise to significant ture. They thus contributed significantly to the rise of developments in naval strategic thought and in the liter- the ‘material school’ of strategic thought which placed ature supporting this ‘revolution’. Kingston’s Royal emphasis on battleships and the decisive battle. Military College (RMC) has established itself as a Mahanian idealism failed, however, to illustrate how world-renowned authority on maritime strategy. Donald this new force of battleship technology could be proper- 8 Canadian Military Journal G Winter 2000-2001 ly used as a modern ‘instru- ment of national policy’.6 Schurman and Hunt both showed how other historians and naval strategists of the time had better ideas, but consider- ably less influence. A useful starting point in following the thinking that led to the Dreadnought RMA can be found in Karl von Clausewitz’s 1832 treatise, On War, which pioneered modern strategic analysis. Clausewitz wrote about the nature of war, the interplay of theory and practice, the relationship between war and politics, the object of strat- National Maritime Museum egy, the relationship between Artist’s depiction of HMS Royal Oak at the Battle of Jutland. civilian and military leadership, and the psychological aspects of war, battles and tactics. Empire based on sea-power. Despite this, the British Clausewitz’s ideas, however, came to be interpreted in a contribution to contemporary naval strategy was more variety of ways as societies and technology changed through example than theory. In fact, the Royal Navy profoundly over the course of the 19th century, but his faced many problems in maintaining ‘Pax Britannia’ aphorism that war will “conform to the spirit of the age during a period of shifting international relationships and its general character,” proved to be prophetic. Many and rapidly evolving maritime technology. Most histori- early 20th century [admirals and] generals believed that ans agree that the long ‘peace’ began to fall apart in 1900. the new technologies were too complex for politicians to understand, that the connection between war and pol- The RN in this era of transition (1900-1914) was an icy was now anachronistic, and that therefore “a gener- organization that was not especially responsive to gov- al should be left free to conduct it [war] at his own dis- ernment direction and control, but rather was an institu- cretion.”7 Clausewitz’s stress on the importance of an tion that for years had thrived on the brilliance and ‘offensive spirit’, ‘decisive battle’ and the ‘annihilation eccentricity of its class-oriented officer corps. Admiral of the enemy’ were emphasized and highlighted. This “Jacky” Fisher, an iconoclast who did not fit the usual highly selective embrace of ‘Clausewitzian’ principles mould of an RN officer, thus became an instant legend dovetailed well into Mahan’s focus on the concentration with his appointment as First Sea Lord in 1904. He of firepower, and the work of these theorists on the use immediately began instituting his personal plans for of military force permeated the materialist strategic increasing the capability of the Royal Navy at a time of thought of early 20th century military leaders. diminishing resources and growing commitments. Admiral Fisher had a policy one might today call ‘trans- There were, however, theorists willing to question formational innovation’: he was intent on exploiting the established orthodoxy. A leading British naval historian new technology in capital construction – heavily focused of the period, Sir Julian Corbett, the Royal Navy’s on the Dreadnought battleship and the submarine – while, ‘Admiralty’ historian from 1900 until his death in 1923, much like the Canadian Forces of 2000, he cut force took a more scholarly approach to build constructively structure that did not provide fighting capability to the on the depth and breadth of On War.8 Corbett’s Some nation. The practical contribution of Admiral Sir John Principles of Maritime Strategy (1911) used On War to Fisher, in terms of technical innovation and strategic and explain naval warfare and expand on the concept of lim- tactical readjustment, far outweighed the contribution of ited war.
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