Weak Diasporas and the Mass Mobilization of Solidarity Activists

Mobilizing for Distant Rebels: Weak Diasporas and the Mass Mobilization of Solidarity Activists

David Zarnett

Thesis submitted in conformity with the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy Department of Political Science University of Toronto

Mobilizing for Distant Rebels: Weak Diasporas and the Mass Mobilization of Solidarity Activists

David Zarnett

Doctor of Philosophy

Department of Political Science University of Toronto

2017 Abstract This dissertation examines the causes of grassroots organizing in support of distant rebel groups. In most discussions of this kind of transnational activism, scholars often focus on the mobilization of ethnic kin, or diasporas. By contrast, I focus on the mass mobilization of grassroots activists who have no ethnic tie to the distant rebels they support. I refer to these mobilizations as “mass solidarity mobilizations.” The emergence of these mobilizations is puzzling given not only that those who make them up often have weak historical, cultural and material ties to the distant rebels they support, but also that only some rebels but not others receive this kind of external assistance.

Why do mass solidarity mobilizations form in support of some distant rebels but not others? This question matters since these mobilizations can shape distant intra-state conflicts by influencing third-party state policies and distant rebel resistance strategies.

Contrary to most recent scholarship which focuses on how distant rebels frame their cause internationally and on international gatekeeper NGO advocacy, I focus on rebel recruitment strategies abroad. Drawing on more than 150 interviews with solidarity

ii activists, a statistical analysis of an original dataset, and a comparative case of the grassroots solidarity organizing in North America and Europe for Palestinians and its absence for the Kurdish struggle in Turkey, I show that mass solidarity mobilizations are more likely to form for distant rebels that cannot rely on their ethnic kin abroad for meaningful support. In the absence of a strong external ethnic constituency, rebel activists are more likely to look beyond their ethnic kin and recruit non-diasporans instead. When they actively recruit non-diasporans, mass solidarity mobilizing on their behalf becomes more likely.

iii Acknowledgments

In completing this dissertation, I have many people to thank. I offer a sincere thanks to my supervisor Professor Wendy Wong, whose advice and guidance over the last 5 years has been invaluable. I could not have completed this degree without Wendy’s attentiveness and consistent encouragement when I struggled, as well as her ability to see the bigger picture when my thinking narrowed. In working with Wendy, I have a learned a lot about what it means to be a mentor and mentee.

I also owe a great deal of thanks to my committee members, Professors Matthew Hoffmann and Oded Haklai whose insights and guidance greatly improved the quality of this dissertation. I benefited significantly from Matt’s close reading of my theoretical arguments, his ability to breakdown causal processes into constituent parts, and his ability to clarify my central narrative. I also benefited immensely from Oded’s expertise on social movements as well as, most importantly, Israel-Palestine. His insights greatly improved my case study chapters. Beyond my committee, I also owe much thanks to my internal and external reviewers, Professors Lilach Gilady and Steve Saideman, both of whom have offered invaluable thoughts on what I need to do to turn my dissertation into a book manuscript.

I am also indebted to a number of faculty members who were willing to sit down with me on a number of occasions to help me think through my project and clarify my thoughts. I am especially grateful to Professors Peter Loewen and Chris Cochrane for their assistance on my quantitative chapters, Ron Levi for his insights on Qualitative Comparative Analysis and Jeff Kopstein who read early versions of my dissertation proposal and theory chapters. I am also grateful to Fahd Husain who helped me learn the basics of statistical reasoning and analysis. Although they did not have a direct hand in the dissertation, I have also learned a great deal from Professors Rod Haddow and Rob Vipond about the job market, book publishing, and the behind the scene workings of a university department. And last but not least, I owe a considerable amount of thanks to the departmental staff who made sure that all my administrative matters were in order – Mary-Alice Bailey, Carolynn Branton, Julie Guzzo, Elizabeth Jagdeo, Jennifer O’Reilly, Sari Sherman, and Louis Tentsos.

iv I am also deeply grateful to my many colleagues in Toronto and beyond, whose support and guidance was in abundance. I am fortunate to have seemingly unfettered access to an especially smart and ambitious group of friends, including Kiran Banerjee, Megan Dersnah, Souha Ezzedeen, Aarie Glas, Will Greaves, Jamie Levin, Joe McKay, Craig Smith. Their wisdom on all matters, academic or not, is indispensable. Beyond Toronto, I am especially indebted to Miriam Bradley who, whether in Oxford or Barcelona, was always there (via G-chat or email) to offer her thoughts on various aspects of my project, to read drafts, and to generally just listen without judgment as I struggled to make sense of what I was trying to do. And I also owe much thanks to my American Foxhound, Do(u)g, whose ability to discern patterns would put any social scientist to shame. He has taught me invaluable life lessons about bond, self-discipline, and being in the moment.

I have also benefited from having a strong family support network, who consistently reminded me that there is life beyond the dissertation. To my parents Ben and Susie, and my sister Dara, I could not have completed this without your support and ability to cultivate the traits in me I needed to see this through to the end. Thank you!

David Zarnett

Toronto, Canada

April 2017

Table of Contents Acknowledgments...... iv Chapter 1 Introduction ...... 1 1.1 Key Terms: Rebels, Mass Solidarity Mobilizations, and Diaspora Strength ...... 7 1.2 Central Argument ...... 9 1.3 Scope Conditions ...... 11 1.4 Alternative Explanations ...... 13 1.5 Scholarly Contributions ...... 16 1.6 Plan of the Dissertation ...... 21 Chapter 2 Explaining Mass Solidarity Mobilizations – Rebels, Recruitment and Diaspora Strength 23 2.1 The Three-Step Process of Mass Solidarity Mobilizations ...... 23 2.2 Grassroots Issue Adoption and the Importance of Recruitment ...... 32 2.3 Diaspora Strength and Entrepreneur Recruitment Strategies ...... 36 2.4 Conclusion ...... 40 Chapter 3 A Quantitative Test ...... 42 3.1 Universe of Cases: Amnesty International Campaigns ...... 42 3.2 Dependent Variable: Mass Solidarity Mobilization ...... 44 3.3 Independent Variable: Diaspora Strength ...... 45 3.4 Control Variables ...... 52 3.5 Results ...... 55 3.6 Robustness Checks ...... 58 3.7 Model Predictions ...... 62 3.8 Unpredictability and Agency in Mass Solidarity Mobilizing ...... 64 3.9 Conclusion ...... 66 Chapter 4 Why Compares Palestinians and Kurds? ...... 68 4.1 Palestinian and Kurdish Grievances: Ethnic Discrimination and Occupation ...... 70 4.2 Conflict Severity ...... 73 4.3 Western Complicity ...... 76 4.4 Extent of Violence Perpetrated by Palestinian and Kurdish Militants ...... 77 4.5 International Visibility ...... 78 4.6 Conclusion ...... 82 Chapter 5 Explaining Varying Levels of Western Grassroots Solidarity for Palestinians and Kurds 84 5.1 Mass Solidarity Mobilizing for Palestine ...... 84 5.1.1 The PLO’s International Diplomacy and the Origins of Mass Solidarity Mobilizing for Palestine ...... 87 5.1.2 Palestinian Diaspora Activism & the Recruitment of Non-Palestinians in the 1980s .. 93 5.2 The Absence of Mass Solidarity Moblizing for the Kurds ...... 109 5.2.1 The Emergence and International Diplomacy of the PKK ...... 110 5.2.2 The PKK’s Diaspora Mobilization Strategy ...... 113 5.2.2 Why Was the PKK Successful in Mobilizing the Diaspora? ...... 120 5.3 Conclusion ...... 122

vi Chapter 6 Hypotheses for Non-Mobilization Under Conditions of Rebel Diasporic Weakness 123 6.1 Mass Solidarity Mobilization Not Needed ...... 128 6.1.1 Human Rights Progress ...... 128 6.1.2 Western Sanctions ...... 131 6.2 Mass Solidarity Mobilization Not Asked For ...... 133 6.2.1 No Rebel Campaign ...... 133 6.2.2 Rebel Campaign But No International Diplomacy ...... 138 6.2.3 Campaigning Rebels Who Do Not Seek External Support ...... 139 6.2.4 Rebel Campaign and Diplomacy But No Targeting of Western Grassroots ...... 141 6.3 Conclusion ...... 144 Chapter 7 Conclusion ...... 146 7.1 Implications for Policy ...... 147 7.2 Theoretical Implication: Why Do Islamic State’s Foreign Fighters Have Weak Ties to Islam? ...... 148 7.3 Future Research ...... 150 7.3.1 Improving the Dataset ...... 150 7.3.2 Grassroots Non-Mobilizations ...... 151 7.3.3 Rebel Diplomatic Strategies ...... 152 7.4 Conclusion ...... 152 Appendix A: Correlation Matrix ...... 153 Appendix B: Coding of Dependent Variable ...... 154 Appendix C: Measuring Diaspora Civil Society Mobilization ...... 202 Appendix D: Description of Amnesty Campaigns ...... 224

vii Chapter 1 Introduction

In 2004, the plight of the Darfuris became an international cause célèbre . In North America and Western Europe, thousands of grassroots activists with no ethnic tie to Darfur mobilized to call for an international intervention to save Darfuris from what they claimed to be the genocidal policies of the Sudanese government.1 They mobilized as if Darfur was more important than the many domestic issues affecting those much closer to home. And they mobilized as if their own elected governments were not guilty of severe rights violations abroad, namely in the two countries they had just invaded - Iraq and Afghanistan. 2 As Samantha Power put it, these Darfur activists were “people who were gathering to demand action about something that had nothing to do with them…” 3 From 2004 to 2007, hundreds of Darfur-focused NGOs formed, including the Save Darfur Coalition, which brought together approximately 180 member organizations, and Students Taking Action Now: Darfur, which included hundreds of local chapters across North American campuses. 4 In their campaigning, these NGOs adopted Darfuri political positions on the nature of the violence being committed. 5 They called for sanctions against the Sudanese government and they ran divestment campaigns that targeted multi-national corporations doing business in Sudan. 6 These efforts influenced the conflict in Darfur, although not only in positive ways.7 Their advocacy added to the international moral and economic pressure on the Sudanese government to change its

1 Gerard Prunier, Darfur: The Ambiguous Genocide (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 2005). 2 Mahmood Mamdani, Saviours and Survivors: Darfur, Politics, and the War on Terror (Cape Town, South Africa: HSRC Press, 2009). . 3 Samantha Power, ‘The Citizen Activism Phenomenon’, PBS Frontline available at: [http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/darfur/themes/citizen.html] accessed 27 May 2016. 4 Rebecca Hamilton, Fighting for Darfur: Public Action and the Struggle to Stop Genocide (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011) 5 Mamdani, Saviours and Survivors 6 Luke Patey, “Against the Asian Tide: The Sudan Divestment Campaign,” Modern African Studies , 47:4 (2009), pp. 551-573. 7 Alan Kuperman, “Darfur: Strategic Victimhood Strikes Again ,” Genocide Studies and Prevention 4:3 (2009), pp. 281-303.

1 domestic behaviour, contributing to its willingness to negotiate an end to the violence. 8 However, their advocacy also inadvertently encouraged Darfuri rebels to eschew compromise and remain committed to armed struggle.9 “Because of the Save Darfur movement,” Alan Kuperman has argued, “the rebels believe that the longer they provoke genocidal retaliation, the more the West will pressure Sudan to hand them control of the region.” 10 In this dissertation, I investigate the phenomenon of Western grassroots mobilizations for distant rebels. In particular, I investigate what I call “mass solidarity mobilizations” - the creation of a grassroots support infrastructure to promote a distant rebel cause. In most discussions of grassroots organizing for distant rebels, scholars often think of organizing on the grounds of ethnicity,11 such as Tamils in Toronto mobilizing for their ethnic kin in Sri Lanka 12 or Albanians in New York mobilizing for their kin in Kosovo. 13 Instead, my focus is on the widespread activation of grassroots activists who take up distant rebel causes to which they have no ethnic tie. I refer to these activists as solidarity activists 14 who mobilize for “the lives of others” 15 and engage in “activity for the sake of strangers who belong to other cultures” in distant countries. 16

8 Maria Gabrielsen Jumbert & David Lanz, “Globalised Rebellion: The Darfur Insurgents and the World,” Journal of Modern African Studies , 51:2 (2009). 9 Medina Haeri, “Saving Darfur: Does Advocacy Help or Hinder Conflict Resolution?” PRAXIS: The Fletcher Journal of Human Security Vol. XXIII (2008), pp. 33-46. 10 Alan Kuperman, “Strategic Victimhood in Darfur,” New York Times (May 31, 2006) “http://www.nytimes.com/2006/05/31/opinion/31kuperman.html 11 Nicole Watts, “Institutionalizing Virtual Kurdistan West: Transnational Networks and Ethnic Contention in International Affairs,” in Joel Migdal (ed.), Boundaries and Belonging: States and Societies in the Struggle to Shape Identities and Local Practices Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), pp. 127- 128. 12 Amarnath Amarasingam, Pain, Pride & Politics: Social Movement Activism and the Sri Lankan Tamil Diaspora in Canada (Athens, Georgia: University of Georgia Press, 2015). For a useful overview of the violence in Sri Lanka and international NGO engagement, see Jo Becker, Campaigning for Justice: Human Rights Advocacy in Practice (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 2013). 13 Maria Koinova, “Four Types of Diaspora Mobilization: Albanian Diaspora Activism For Kosovo Independence in the US and the UK,” Foreign Policy Analysis . Vol. 9, No. 4 (2013), pp. 433-453. 14 Eric Hirsch, “Sacrifice for the Cause: Group Processes, Recruitment and Commitment in a Student Social Movement,” American Sociological Review Vol. 55, No. 2 (April 1990), p. 243. William Gamson, “Commitment and Agency in Social Movements,” Sociological Forum Vol. 6, No. 1 (1991), p. 45. 15 Margaret Power & Julie Charlip, “On Solidarity,” Latin American Perspective Vol. 36 No. 6 (November 2009), p. 4. 16 Dieter Rucht, “Distant Issue Movements in Germany: Empirical Description and Theoretical Reflections,” in Guidry, A., Kennedy M. & Zald, M (eds.), Globalization and Social Movements: Culture, Power, and the Transnational Public Sphere . (Ann Arbor: Michigan: University of Michigan Press), p. 96. Eric Hirsch, “Sacrifice for the Cause: Group Processes, Recruitment and Commitment in a Student Social

2 These activists are not “slacktivists” who mobilize primarily online and through social media, with minimal effort or risk to themselves. On the contrary, they dedicate considerable personal resources to supporting distant rebels by creating organizations, and energetically running and contributing to campaigns. While solidarity activists often work closely with rebel activists and their diaspora supporters, and in many cases populate the same organizations, 17 mass solidarity mobilizations are distinct from diaspora mobilizations. The mass solidarity mobilizing that occurred for the Darfuris is just one case in a larger universe of cases. Since the end of the Second World War, a number of distant rebels demanding significant political change, ranging from equal rights and regime change to an independent state of their own, have been the recipients of widespread grassroots solidarity abroad. These include black South Africans resisting apartheid, 18 Chileans seeking the overthrow of Augusto Pinochet,19 Guatemalan, Nicaraguan, and Salvadorans battling US-backed governments and right-wing armed groups,20 and Palestinians,21 Tibetans, 22 and East Timorese seeking self-determination,23 among others. And yet, for all the distant rebels that garner significant external grassroots solidarity, numerous others with equally meritorious struggles have not. While solidarity activists mobilized for Darfuris, they did not for Congolese civilians despite the fact that

Movement,” American Sociological Review Vol. 55, No. 2 (April 1990), p. 243. William Gamson, “Commitment and Agency in Social Movements,” Sociological Forum Vol. 6, No. 1 (1991), p. 45. 17 Alexandra Cosma Budabin, “Diasporas as Development Partners for Peace? The Alliance Between the Darfuri Diaspora and the Save Darfur Coalition,” Third World Quarterly Vol. 35 No. 1 (2014), pp. 163- 180. 18 Rob Skinner, The Foundations of Anti-Apartheid: Liberal Humanitarians and Transnational Activists in Britain and the United States 1919-1964 (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2009). 19 Margaret Power, “The US Movement in Solidarity with Chile in the 1970s,” Latin American Perspectives Vo. 36, No. 6 (2009), pp. 46-66. 20 Christian Smith, Resisting Reagan: The US Central America Peace Movement (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996). Sharon Nepstad, Convictions of the Soul: Religion, Culture and Agency in the Central America Solidarity Movement (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004). 21 Paul Kelemen, The British Left and Zionism: History of a Divorce (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2012). Colin Shindler, Israel and the European Left (New York: Continuum, 2012). 22 John Roberts & Elizabeth Roberts, Freeing Tibet: 50 Years of Struggle, Resilience and Hope (New York: AMACOM, 2009). Stephen Noakes, “Transnational Advocacy Networks and Moral Commitment: The Free Tibet Campaign Meets the Chinese State,” International Journal (Spring 2012), pp. 507-525. 23 Brad Simpson, “Solidarity in an Age of Globalization: The Transnational Movement for East Timor and US Foreign Policy,” Peace & Change Vol. 29, No 3 & 4 (July 2004), pp. 453-479. Clinton Fernandes, The Independence of East Timor: Multi-Dimensional Perspectives – Occupation, Resistance, and International Political Activism (Brighton: Sussex Academic Press, 2011).

3 they faced violence that was more severe and, arguably, no more complex. 24 These same Darfur activists, purportedly animated by a desire to prevent mass atrocities, also did not mobilize for the Tamils when violence in Sri Lanka in 2009 spiked resulting in approximately 40,000 dead. 25 Similarly, while East Timorese rebels associated with the Revolutionary Front for the Liberation of East Timor and the National Council of Timorese Resistance received widespread grassroots solidarity in the West, the Acehnese independence struggle in northern Indonesia, led by the Free Aceh Movement, garnered very little despite the many similarities between the two struggles. 26 Other well-known rebel movements have also failed to secure widespread grassroots solidarity abroad, including the Kurdish movement in Turkey and the Kashmiri and Sikh movements in India. This variation in external support is not particularly puzzling if we were to compare highly visible political conflicts, such as Israel-Palestine, with more obscure conflicts about which information is hard to come by. However, this variation does become more puzzling when we focus only on the conflicts that have been made salient within the global human rights informational network. This begs the question that is at the heart of this dissertation: among the widely reported political conflicts around the world, why do mass solidarity mobilizations form in support of some distant rebels but not others? This question matters because mass solidarity mobilization can impact how distant intra-state conflicts play out. 27 Much like human rights NGOs and transnational

24 Alison Brysk, S peaking Rights to Power: Constructing Political Will . Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013). 25 Interview GI-NET, July 27, 2012. 26 Antje Missbach , Separatist Conflict in Indonesia: The Long-Distance Politics of the Acehnese Diaspora (New York: Routledge, 2012). William Nessen, “Why Not Independence?” Inside Indonesia 81 (January- March 2005). http://www.insideindonesia.org/why-not-independence-2. Lesley McCulloch, “Building Solidarity,” Inside Indonesia 81 (January-March 2005). http://www.insideindonesia.org/building- solidarity-2 27 There is a large literature on the effects of international interventions in domestic conflicts. On NGOs and transnational civil society, see Darren Hawkins, International Human Rights and Authoritarian Rule in Chile (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2002). Susan Burgerman, Moral Victories: How Activists Provoke Multilateral Action (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2001). Emilie Hafner-Burton, “Sticks and Stones: Naming and Shaming the Human Rights Enforcement Problem,” International Organization 62 (Fall 2008), pp. 689-716. Matthew Krain, “ J’accuse! Does Naming and Shaming Perpetrators Reduce the Severity of Genocides or Politicides?” International Studies Quarterly 56 (2012), pp. 574-589. Amanda Murdie & David Davis, “Shaming and Blaming: Using Events Data to Assess the Impact of Human Rights INGOs,” International Studies Quarterly 56 (2012), pp. 1-16. Cullen Hendrix & Wendy Wong, “When is

4 advocacy networks, these mobilization can exert significant agenda-setting and behavioural effects through their public awareness campaigns and lobbying. 28 By applying political pressure to their own governments, these mobilizations can help put a distant struggle on the domestic political agenda and influence third-party state foreign policy towards them, 29 which can in turn affect the distant rebel’s chances of success. 30 For example, the mass solidarity mobilizations for black South Africans and the African National Congress resisting apartheid influenced the Reagan administration’s decision to impose sanctions on South Africa in 1986, contributing to the end of apartheid in 1994. 31 The same is true in the case of East Timor in which significant grassroots pressure contributed to Western states, namely the US, downgrading its relationship with Indonesia and declaring their support for the East Timorese claim to independence. As Brad Simpson put it, East Timor solidarity activists were central in “severing the international sources of Indonesia’s diplomatic, economic and military support,” contributing significantly to the creation of an East Timorese state in 2002. 32 In the absence of this domestic pressure, Western government would have been far less likely to take an interest in the East Timorese struggle, preferring the status quo instead. 33 While mass solidarity in the West appears to have benefited black South Africans and the East Timorese, these mobilizations do not always have such positive effects, and in some cases can make conflicts longer, more severe, and harder to resolve peacefully. 34 But

the Pen Truly Might? Regime Type and the Efficacy of Naming and Shaming in Curbing Human Rights Abuses,” British Journal of Political Science Vol. 43, No. 3 (2013), pp. 651-672. 28 For instance, see Jutta Joachim, Agenda Setting, the UN and NGOs (Georgetown: Georgetown University Press, 2007). 29 Stephen Saideman, The Ties That Divide: Ethnic Politics, Foreign Policy, and International Conflict (New York: Columbia University Press, 2001). 30 On foreign state interventions see William Zartman, “Internationalization of Communal Strife: Temptations and Opportunities of Triangulation,” in Manus Midlarsky (ed.), The Internationalization of Communal Strife (New York: Routledge, 1992), pp. 27-44. Deepa Khosla, “Third World States as Intervenors in Ethnic Conflicts: Implications for Regional and International Security,” Third World Quarterly (December 1999), pp. 1143-1156. Patrick Regan, “Third-Party Interventions and the Duration of Intrastate Conflicts,” Journal of Conflict Resolution Vol. 46, No. 1 (2002), pp. 55-73. 31 Audie Klotz, Norms in International Relations: The Struggle Against Apartheid (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1995). Neta Crawford & Audie Klotz, How Sanctions Work: Lessons from South Africa (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1999). 32 Simpson, “Solidarity in an Age of Globalization,” p. 454. 33 On the importance of inertia in foreign policy see David Welch, Painful Choices: A Theory of Foreign Policy Change (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005). 34 Idean Salehyan, Kristian Skrede Gleditsch & David Cunningham, “Explaining External Support for Insurgent Groups,” International Organization 65 (Fall 2011), p. 710. Alan Kuperman, “The Moral

5 when they target states that are concerned with their international reputations, 35 or that have strong economic ties to the West, 36 they can increase the likelihood of progressive changes to domestic human rights practices. Beyond their policy influence, mass solidarity mobilizations can also shape an intra-state conflict by influencing the behaviour of the insurgent groups they support. Specifically, they can assist domestic groups materially and emotionally, bolstering their efforts to pressure their governments ‘from below.’37 Palestinian activists, for instance, credit their Western supporters with providing them with the motivation to carry on against a more powerful foe. 38 Over time, this type of moral support can have positive outcomes for the distant rebel, especially if their steadfastness imposes increasing costs on state authorities that ultimately force them to negotiate in good faith. 39 In fact, in the absence of domestic pressure, repressive states, even those under the most intense international pressure to reform, are less likely to enact meaningful policy reforms. 40 Importantly, however, mass external solidarity can also encourage behaviour that makes conflict resolution less likely, especially when it incentivizes rebels to stick to their core demands and eschew compromise, as was the case for Save Darfur movement’s effects on Darfuri rebels. 41 Given their potential effects, under what conditions are mass solidarity mobilizations more likely to form? I argue that among the distant rebel causes that are widely reported internationally, those that cannot rely on their ethnic kin abroad for meaningful support are the more likely recipients of widespread grassroots solidarity. That is, mass solidarity mobilizations are more likely to form for distant rebels that have weak diasporas – by which I mean, diasporas that are either small or politically inactive. The causal

Hazard of Humanitarian Intervention: Lessons from the Balkans,” International Studies Quarterly Vol. 52 (2008), pp. 49-80. 35 Joshua Busby, Moral Movements and Foreign Policy (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010). 36 James Franklin, “Shame on You: The Impact of Human Rights Criticism on Political Repression in Latin America,” International Studies Quarterly Vol. 52, (2008), pp. 187-211. 37 Amanda Murdie & Tavishi Bhasin, “Aiding and Abetting: Human Rights INGOs and Domestic Protest,” Journal of Conflict Resolution Vol. 55 No. 2 (2011), pp. 163-191. 38 For example, see here: https://www.greenleft.org.au/node/59935 39 Marwan Darweish & Andrew Rigby, Popular Protest in Palestine: The Uncertain Future of Unarmed Resistance (London: Pluto Press, 2015), p. 7. 40 Murdie & Davis, “Shaming and Blaming.” Thomas Risse, Stephen Ropp & Kathryn Sikkink (eds.), The Power of Human Rights: International Norms and Domestic Change (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999). 41 Jumbert & David Lanz, “Globalised Rebellion: The Darfur Insurgents and the World.”

6 mechanism has to do with recruitment. In the absence of sufficient support from their ethnic kin, rebel entrepreneurs and their supporters are more likely to look beyond the diaspora and recruit non-diasporan supporters. When they recruit in this way, these entrepreneurs contribute to the diffusion of participation opportunities through the social and organizational networks on which they focus. This creates the conditions for the activation of new supporters and expanding mobilizations over time. As such, when non- diasporans are actively recruited, mass solidarity mobilizing becomes increasingly likely. Contrary to the existing scholarship on solidarity activism, which focuses on the psychological and ideological characteristics of the solidarity activist, 42 this dissertation puts rebel recruitment strategies at the center of the analysis. The rest of this introductory chapters proceeds in five main sections. First, I define what I mean by “rebels,” “mass solidarity mobilizations,” and “diaspora strength.” Second, I outline my central argument in more detail and specify the scope conditions of my argument. Third, I distinguish my argument from other prevailing explanations found in the existing literature. Fourth, I specify the contributions this dissertation makes to the existing literatures on transnational activism, social movements, the transnational dimensions of intra-state conflict, and diaspora politics. I then conclude with an outline for the rest of the dissertation.

1.1 Key Terms: Rebels, Mass Solidarity Mobilizations, and Diaspora Strength Rebels are actors in conflict with their state. Similar terms include “insurgents” or “local challengers”, but I use rebels in order to situate this dissertation within the growing literature on rebel diplomacy. 43 Following on Clifford Bob, I define rebels as “domestically based social currents and organizations that oppose governments, elites, and other powerful institutions chiefly using protest and pressure outside conventional political channels.” 44 Rebels can vary in goals. Some, like the Liberation Tigers of the Tamil Eelam, are secessionists, 45 while others, like the African National Congress, may

42 Smith, Resisting Reagan. Nepstad, Convictions of the Soul . 43 See for instance Bridget Coggins, “Rebel Diplomacy: Theorizing Violent Non-State Actors’ Strategic Use,” in Ana Arjona, Nelson Kasfir & Zachariah Mampilly (eds.), Rebel Governance in Civil War (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2015), pp. 98-118. 44 Bob, The Marketing of Rebellion , p. 8. 45 Neil Devotta, “The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam and the Lost Quest for Separatism in Sri Lanka,” Asian Survey Vol. 49 No. 6 (November/December 2009), pp. 1021-1051.

7 seek regime change and the overthrow of an authoritarian government but not a state of their own. 46 They can also vary in strategy, with some employing violence and others preferring non-violent methods. 47 Further, some may focus their efforts primarily on the domestic front, while others may also seek to internationalize their struggle and secure external support for their domestic objectives. 48 Mass solidarity mobilizations form to support distant rebel movements, and are the outcomes this dissertation seeks to explain. By “mass” I mean widespread, involving a significant number of activists and organizations. By “solidarity” I mean the involvement of activists who mobilize for distant others with whom they share no ethnic tie. Despite lacking an ethnic tie to the struggle, solidarity activists are often partisans, taking sides with rebels against their enemies and employing nationalistic or ideologically inspired advocacy frames.49 In this respect, solidarity activism is distinct from the advocacy style of the leading human rights NGOs, such as Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch, that seek to present themselves as politically impartial and neutral observers of all forms of human rights abuse, regardless of the identity of the perpetrators and victims. 50 By “mobilization,” I refer to individuals and groups taking action, which can include organizing and attending public protests and demonstrations, fundraising, lobbying elected officials, among others. I use this term, rather than ‘network’ or ‘movement,’ which assume ties between nodes, in order to capture a wider set of cases that may vary in terms of tie strength and in terms of organizational or network structure.51 It is often the case that solidarity NGOs supporting the same rebel group are connected to each other in some way, but I do not require that such ties exist for a mass solidarity mobilization to occur and I do not theorize about the

46 Scott Thomas, The Diplomacy of Liberation: The Foreign Relations of the African National Congress . (London: I.B. Tauris Publishers, 1996). 47 Erica Chenoweth & Maria Stephan, Why Civil Resistance Works: The Strategic Logic of Nonviolent Action (New York: Columbia University Press, 2011). 48 Reyko Huang, “Rebel Diplomacy in Civil War,” International Security Vol. 40, No. 4 (Spring 2016), pp. 89-126. Awet Tewelde Weldemichael, Third World Colonialism and Strategies of Liberation: Eritrea & East Timor Compared (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013). 49 Patrick William Kelly, “The 1973 Chilean Coup and the Origins of Transnational Human Rights Activism,” Journal of Global History (2014) 8, pp. 167-168. 50 Ann Marie Clark, Diplomacy of Conscience: Amnesty International and Changing Human Rights Norms (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001). 51 Emilie Hafner-Burton, Miles Kahler, & Alexander Montgomery, “Network Analysis for International Relations,” International Organization Vol. 63 (Summer 2009), pp. 559-592.

8 networked-ness of the actors that make up these mobilizations. I leave it to future research to probe the variations between cases of mass solidarity mobilizing, across dimensions such as size, structure, and effectiveness. Diaspora strength is the main independent variable in this study. It refers to the extent to which a rebel movement’s ethnic kin abroad is able to provide it with meaningful support. Drawing on Martin Sokefeld, I define a diaspora as an imagined ethno-national community that exists outside of the borders of the conflict zone (or ‘homeland’) but retains some degree of connection to it. 52 Diaspora formation is not the inevitable result of migration. Rather diasporas must be socially constructed and maintained over time by entrepreneurial agents. 53 Accordingly, diasporas not only vary in size and material wealth, but also in ability and willingness to engage in political activism for the purposes of influencing the homeland conflict. 54 The diaspora strength variable aims to captures these variations that, I argue, impact the likelihood of mass solidarity mobilizing in support of distant rebels.

1.2 Central Argument Mass solidarity mobilizations form through a three-step process in which rebel recruitment of non-diasporan supporters abroad is central. In the first step, rebel entrepreneurs, whether operating from the conflict zone or in exile, establish single-issue NGOs abroad in order to organize their transnational advocacy efforts. An example of such rebel-linked NGOs include the International Campaign for Tibet, around which much grassroots organizing for Tibetan self-determination in the US has taken place. In

52 Also see Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origins and Spread of Nationalism (London: Verso Books, 1983). 53 Martin Sokefeld, “Mobilizing in Transnational Space: A Social Movement Approach to the Formation of Diaspora,” Global Networks Vol. 6 No. 3 (2006), pp. 265-284. It is true that the meaning of the term ‘diasproa’ is hotly contested. See Roger Brubaker, “The ‘Diaspora’ Diaspora,” Ethnic & Racial Studies Vol. 28 No. 1 (2005), pp. 1-19. For a useful overview see Bahar Baser, Diasporas and Homeland Conflicts : A Comparative Perspective (Surrey, England: Ashgate, 2015), chapter 2. 54 Maria Koinova, “Can Conflict-Generated Diasporas be Moderate Actors During Episodes of Contested Sovereignty? Lebanese and Albanian Diasporas Compared,” Review of International Studies Vol. 37 (2011), pp. 437-462. Maria Koinova, “Four Types of Diaspora Mobilization: Albanian Diaspora Activism for Kosovo Independence in the US and the UK,” Foreign Policy Analysis Vol. 9 No. 3 (2013), pp. 433- 453. Stephen Saideman, Erin Jenne & Kathleen Gallagher Cunningham have begun to build a dataset to explain variations in diaspora mobilizing, however their data collection efforts appear to have stopped. See Saideman, Jenne & Gallagher, “Diagnosing Diasporas: Understanding the Conditions Fostering or Blocking Mobilization, Preliminary Analyses,” Paper for the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association (2014).

9 the second step rebel entrepreneurs, and a primary group of supporters, begin to reach out for wider public support. To do so, they recruit non-diasporan supporters from their social and organizational networks to participate in concrete activists tasks. As they recruit successfully, entrepreneurs contribute to the emergence of new supporters and organizations. This contributes to the diffusion of participation opportunities through the networks on which they focus, creating the conditions for expanding mobilizations over time. It is this step that is crucial – if entrepreneurs do not recruit at all, or fail to recruit effectively, mass solidarity mobilizations will not occur. In the third step, these recruitment and mobilization processes continue to unfold until a threshold is reached that signals the existence of a grassroots organizational infrastructure of some significance in support of a distant rebel movement. My focus on rebel recruitment strategies, and in particular the decision to recruit non-diasporans, stems from the fact that the personal narratives solidarity activist often provide justifying their activism fail to adequately explain why they mobilized for one distant group but not another. Activists may take up causes for a variety of personal reasons. 55 For some, participation may be driven by material incentives, such as improved career prospects, 56 while for others it may be more emotional in nature given the benefits one can accrue from building close bonds with like-minded people and putting into practice deeply-held beliefs and values. 57 A focus on individual motivations, however, leaves unanswered the question of why an individual would select one distant cause to support over others since participation in any number of causes and movements would provide very similar benefits. Further, activists may also justify their mobilization by reference to the specific attributes of the issue itself, which may involve non-violent resistance to an authoritarian state (as in Tibet), foreign occupation and Western complicity (as in East Timor and Israel-Palestine), racial and ethnic discrimination (as in apartheid South Africa), or mass atrocities (as in Darfur), among others. Yet, like personal motivations, these issue-

55 Eric Hirsch, “The Creation of Political Solidarity in Social Movement Organizations,” Socioligical Quarterly Vol. 27 No. 3 (Autumn 1986), p. 374. 56 Mancur Olson, the Logic of Collective Action (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1965). John McCarthy and Mayer N. Zald. “Resource Mobilization and Social Movements: A Partial Theory,” American Journal of Sociology (1977) 82:6, p. 1216. 57 Eric Hirsch, “Sacrifice for the Cause,” p. 244.

10 specific justifications also do not adequately explain why an individual mobilized around one distant rebel cause but not another. This is because these kind of justifications often fail to adequately distinguish one rebel cause from numerous others that the activist could have also mobilized to support. Rather than focusing on motivations or issue characteristics, I argue that the causes an individual takes up and those they ignore reflect what they distant causes they are recruited to support.58 Put simply, individuals are more likely to mobilize for the causes for which they are recruited and more likely to ignore those for which they are not. 59 Therefore, to explain mass solidarity mobilizations we need to identify the conditions under which non-diasporans are more likely to be recruited en masse to support a distant rebel’s cause. This dissertation identifies one such factor that increases the likelihood of rebel recruitment of non-diasporan supporters – the political weakness of the rebel’s diaspora. When rebels cannot rely on their ethnic kin, because of their small size or unwillingness to organize for political action, then they are more likely to recruit non-diasporans. This makes mass solidarity mobilizing on their behalf more likely. By contrast, when rebels are able to draw on a strong diaspora, they are less likely to actively recruit non- diasporans, in turn making mass solidarity mobilizing on their behalf a more remote possibility.

1.3 Scope Conditions Before proceeding to specify how the perspective I offer differs from prevailing explanations found in the existing literature, it is important to note the scope conditions of my central argument. Most importantly, my analysis is almost entirely focused on the structural conditions (diaspora strength) that influence rebel advocacy behaviour (the decision to recruit non-diasporans or not). While my emphasis on rebel recruitment draws on insights collected from more than 100 interviews with solidarity activists, this dissertation does not probe the decision-making process of these activists in any detail. Rather, the primary focus is on rebel recruitment strategies. This approach is consistent

58 McAdam & Paulsen, “Specifying the Relationship Between Social Ties and Activism.” 59 McAdam & Paulsen, “Specifying the Relationship Between Social Ties and Activism.” Schussman & Sarah Soule, ‘Process and Protest, p. 1086.

11 with Clifford Bob’s approach in The Marketing of Rebellion which “highlight(s) the action, innovation, and skills of [distant] movements themselves.” 60 Beyond my focus on rebel recruitment strategy, there are three additional scope conditions that are worth mentioning. First, as I noted above, my argument extends to all types of rebel movements and intra-state conflicts. It is not confined only to secessionist movements, such as the Palestinians or Kurds, but also movements seeking significant policy reforms including regime change, such as black South Africans under apartheid rule, Chileans resisting Augusto Pinochet or Egyptians protesting Hosni Mubarak. It also extends to all groups regardless of whether or not they employ violence, and thus includes conflicts that are civil wars but many that are not. My weak diaspora argument, therefore, is applicable to a wide set of domestic resistance using a variety of violent and non-violent strategies to achieve a wide set of goals. Second, my weak diaspora argument pertains primarily to those instances of domestic resistance and conflict that have already been placed on the international human rights agenda by the advocacy efforts of a gatekeeper NGO, in this case Amnesty International. In the quantitative tests I conduct in chapter 3, I define my universe of cases only to those that have been the subject of an Amnesty International campaign. While scholars have examined why gatekeeper organizations champion some causes but not others, my argument operates in large part after or alongside gatekeeper advocacy. It is not about explaining the gatekeeper advocacy decisions themselves but rather why among the issues gatekeepers do take up, some diffuse and receive wider grassroots support but not others. Therefore, in my comparative case study chapter in which I explain why a mass solidarity mobilization has occurred for the Palestinians but not the Kurds of Turkey, I justify my case selection on the grounds that both causes are widely publicized to transnational human rights networks, making them both the likely recipients of mass external solidarity. Third, my argument primarily holds in democratic settings. I test my arguments on evidence and data I collected from conditions and developments in Western democracies, but theoretically similar processes and dynamics may also play in non- Western democracies as well. I do confine my argument to democracies because in more

60 Bob, The Marketing of Rebellion , p. 4.

12 authoritarian settings, different mechanisms underpinning civil society mobilizing may be at play, such as the active role that such governments may play in directly setting the advocacy agenda and by setting the borders of what is considered to be legitimate issues to protest. They may do this in part to divert public attention away from more pressing domestic social problems.

1.4 Alternative Explanations My central argument, emphasizing rebel recruitment strategy and diaspora strength, differs from prevailing hypotheses about the conditions under which mass solidarity mobilizations will occur. Although scholars have not addressed mass solidarity mobilization through a comparative lens, the literature on transnational activism and transnational advocacy networks (TANs) does contain at least three implicit hypotheses that may account for why they form for some distant rebels and not others. The first hypothesis emphasizes the characteristics of the issue itself, or issue attributes , as affecting the probability that Western activists will take it up. In their seminal work on TANs, Margaret Keck & Kathryn Sikkink identify two types of issues that they suggest are more likely to gain the support of transnational activists: “issues involving body harm to vulnerable individuals, especially when there is a short and clear causal chain (or story) assigning responsibility” and “issues involving legal equality of opportunity.” 61 In this dissertation, and specifically in chapter 3, I argue that this perspective is unpersuasive in explaining mass solidarity mobilization. In fact, evidence suggests that the opposite of Keck & Sikkink’s expectation is true. I find that distant rebels in intra-state conflicts in which violence is ‘two-sided’ – that is, perpetrated by both state and non-state actors in a significant way and thus more complex – are more likely to gain widespread grassroots solidarity. Further, I also find that numerous struggles that involve the denial of legal equality of opportunity also fail to attract mass solidarity mobilizations support and thus cannot account for enough of the variance. A second hypothesis emphasizes issue framing . In this view, it is not just issue attributes that matter but rather the way in which the issue is presented or marketed to a particular audience whose support is requested. Successful frames help convince an

61 Keck & Sikkink, Activists Beyond Borders , p. 27.

13 audience to see an issue as a problem worthy of concern, who is to blame for it, and what can be done to solve it. 62 Effective advocacy frames motivate an audience to take action and convince them that their actions have a good likelihood of success. 63 Scholars have argued that when new issues are framed in ways that speak to, or can be grafted onto, existing norms, they are more likely to be adopted.64 In the case of East Timor, for instance, scholars and activists have suggested that the popularity of the East Timorese cause in the West was due to the ability of the East Timorese leadership to frame their struggle in Western-friendly terms, emphasizing self-determination, democracy and human rights. 65 I also challenge this perspective. I do not dispute the importance of advocacy frames that resonate with Western activists, but rather suggest that such frames alone are not enough to lead to mass solidarity mobilization. Good frames may engender sympathy but in the absence of recruitment, and the availability of participation opportunities, grassroots activists are not likely to mobilize. 66 For instance, in the late 1990s and the early 2000s, both the Acehnese 67 and Kurdish 68 leaderships began to more explicitly frame their struggle in the language of human rights. Yet, to date, they have both have failed to garner mass solidarity support. The reason for this, I argue, is that in these cases, as in others I identify in chapter 6, mobilizing grassroots non-diasporans was not an explicit goal. Acehnese and Kurdish transnational advocacy strategies did not involve

62 Robert Benford & David Snow, “Framing Processes and Social Movements: An Overview and Assessment,” Annual Review of Sociology (2000), pp. 611-639. William Gamson, Talking Politics (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992). 63 Bert Klandermans, The Social Psychology of Protest (Cambridge: Blackwell Publishers, 1997). 64 Richard Price, “Reversing the Gun Sights: Transnational Civil Society Targets Landmines,” International Organization 52 (Summer 1998). Bob, The Marketing of Rebellion, p. 4. 65 Geoffrey Robinson, “Human Rights History from the Ground Up: The Case of East Timor,” in Steve Stern & Scott Straus (eds.), The Human Rights Paradox: Universality and Its Discontents (Madison, Wisconsin: The University of Wisconsin, 2014). David Webster, "Non-State Diplomacy: East Timor 1975-99." Portuguese Studies Review Vol. 11, No. 1 (2003): 1-28 , Interview, ETAN, March 26, 2015. 66 Doug McAdam & Ronnelle Paulsen, “Specifying the Relationship Between Social Ties and Activism,” American Journal of Sociology Vol. 99, No. 3 (November 1993). 67 Missbach, Separatist Conflict in Indonesia . 68 Vera Eccarius-Kelly, “Political Movements and Leverage Points: Kurdish Activism in the European Diaspora,” Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs Vol. 22, No. 1 (2002). Nicole Watts, “Institutionalizing Virtual Kurdistan West: Transnational Networks and Ethnic Contention in International Affairs,” in Joel Migdal (ed.), Boundaries and Belonging: States and Societies in the Struggle to Shape Identities and Local Practices Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), p,130; Leila Berkowitz & Liza Mugge, “Transnational Diaspora Lobbying: Europeanization and the Kurdish Question,” Journal of Intercultural Studies Vol. 35, No. 1 (2014), p. 84.

14 recruiting non-diasporan supporters, something that is crucial for the mass solidarity mobilization process to move forward successfully. This is not to suggest that all attempts to generate a mass solidarity mobilization succeed, but only that such mobilizing is made possible when active recruitment attempts are made. A third hypothesis emphasizes issue adoption by gatekeeper NGOs. A number of scholars have argued that the patterns of Western activism for distant causes is in large part determined by the advocacy choices made by these gatekeepers who control what issues “make it” and which do not. 69 According to this view, when gatekeepers champion a rebel movement, it becomes more visible to the transnational human rights community and thus more likely to attract donor attention and the resources of smaller NGOs looking for new issues to add to their agendas. 70 The influence of these gatekeepers is said to come from their perceived credibility within the human rights community, 71 their organizational structure, namely their ability to centralize agenda setting and decentralize campaign implementation, 72 and their central location with wider advocacy and policy networks. 73 As Bob puts it, “central to [transnational] network formation are gatekeepers , whose decisions to back a movement activate other organizations and individuals across the world.” 74 My findings generally support this claim. I find that many of the mass solidarity mobilizations I identify focus on distant rebels whose cause has been championed by Amnesty International. However, I also qualify this argument and demonstrate that many of the distant rebels whose plight is championed by Amnesty fail to gain mass solidarity mobilizations support. 75 Gatekeeper advocacy may improve the chances of mass solidarity mobilization, but additional factors, namely the recruitment of non-diasporan supporters, must also be present.

69 Bob, The Marketing of Rebellion . 70 Charli Carpenter, “Governing the Global Agenda: “Gatekeepers” and “Issue Adoption” in Transnational Advocacy Networks,” in Deborah Avant, Martha Finnemore & Susan Sell (eds.), Who Governs the Globe? (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), p. 210. 71 Bob, Marketing of Rebellion , p. 18. 72 Wendy Wong, Internal Affairs: How the Structure of NGOs Transforms Human Rights . )Ithaca: Cornell University Press. 2012). 73 Charli Carpenter, Lost Causes: Agenda Vetting in Global Issue Networks and the Shaping of Human Security (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2014). 74 Bob, The Marketing of Rebellion , p. 18. 75 Bob, The Marketing of Rebellion , p. 18.

15 1.5 Scholarly Contributions In addition to advancing a new perspective on the causes of mass solidarity mobilization, this dissertation also contributes to the literatures on transnational activism, social movements, the transnational dimensions of intra-state conflict, and diaspora politics. First, I extend the growing literature on ‘issue selection’ in transnational civil society. Issue selection refers to why transnational activist organizations and advocacy networks mobilize around some issue areas but not others. The main thrust of this research has been on explaining the advocacy choices of multi-issue NGOs, or ‘gatekeepers’, working on human rights, 76 arms control,77 health, 78 the environment, 79 and children in armed conflict.80 In the area of human rights advocacy, which is most relevant for this dissertation, scholars have focused primarily on explaining why Amnesty International devotes more advocacy attention to the abuses committed by some states but not others, despite its assumed impartiality and commitment to universalist principles. 81 Conflict severity is not the only determinant of Amnesty’s advocacy choices. 82 Research has shown that Amnesty focuses more attention on the states that have closer economic and military ties with the West, 83 that are featured more prominently in the Western press, 84 and that have more local NGOs able to document instances of abuse. 85

76 James Ron, Howard Ramos & Kathleen Rodgers, “Transnational Information Politics: NGO Human Rights Reporting, 1986-2000,” International Studies Quarterly 49 (2005), pp. 557-587. James Meernik, Rosa Aloisi, Marsha Sowell & Angela Nichols, “The Impact of Human Rights Organizations on Naming and Shaming Campaigns,” Journal of Conflict Resolution Vol. 56, No. 2 (2012), pp. 233-256. Cullen Hendrix and Wendy Wong, “Knowing Your Audience: How the Structure of International Relations and Organizational Choices Affect Amnesty International’s Advocacy,” Review of International Organizations (March 2014), pp. 29-58. 77 Charli Carpenter, “Vetting the Advocacy Agenda: Network Centrality and the Paradox of Weapons Norms,” International Organization 65 (Winter 2011), pp. 69-102. 78 Jeremy Shiffman, “A Social Explanation for the Rise and Fall of Global Health Issues,” Bulleting of the World Health Organization Vol. 87, No. 8 (August 2009), pp. 608-613. 79 Amanda Murdie & Johannes Urpelainen, “Why Pick on US? Environmental INGOs and State Shaming as a Strategic Substitute,” Political Studies Vol, 63, No. 2 (2015), pp. 353-372. 80 Charli Carpenter, “Setting the Advocacy Agenda: Theorizing the Emergence and Nonemergence in Transnational Advocacy Networks,” International Studies Quarterly Vol. 51 (2007), pp. 99-120. 81 Clark, Diplomacy of Conscience. 82 Ron, Howard Ramos & Kathleen Rodgers, “Transnational Information Politics.” 83 Cullen Hendrix & Wendy Wong, “Knowing Your Audience.” 84 Ron, Howard Ramos & Kathleen Rodgers, “Transnational Information Politics.” 85 Meernik, Rosa Aloisi, Marsha Sowell & Angela Nichols, “The Impact of Human Rights Organizations on Naming and Shaming Campaigns.”

16 To date, however, this literature has not systematically engaged with solidarity activism at a more grassroots level and has not offered an explanation for why mass solidarity mobilizations mobilize for some distant rebels but not others. While some have studied specific mass solidarity mobilizations, including the Central America solidarity movement,86 the anti-apartheid movement, 87 the transnational Zapatista mass solidarity mobilizations, 88 among others, 89 this work is largely descriptive and single-case. It is useful for identifying potential hypotheses but it does not provide a systematic and comparative treatment of mass solidarity mobilization across a wider universe of cases. This dissertation provides such a study. Second, this dissertation contributes to the literature on social movement formation. Specifically, it speaks to debates surrounding the role of structure and agency in explaining episodes of collective action. Important perspectives in the study of social movements have focused on the structural conditions that make collective action more likely. In one perspective, significant increases in grievances and social dislocation contribute to social movement formation. 90 In another, it is not grievances that matter, which are a constant, 91 but rather macro-level political developments that incentivize mobilization. These developments include war, elite divisions or the emergence of new elite allies, economic downturns and fiscal crises, among others. Under these conditions, individuals are more likely to mobilize because they believe their efforts have a greater chance of success. 92 Proponents suggest that this perspective is said to better explain the

86 Smith, Resisting Reagan. Nepstad, Convictions of the Soul . 87 Skinner, The Foundation of Anti-Apartheid . Roger Fieldhouse, Anti-Apartheid : A History of the Movement in Britain: A Study in Pressure Group Politics (London: Merlin, 2005). Hakan Thorn, Anti- Apartheid and the Emergence of Global Civil Society (Basingstoke: Palgrave-MacMillan, 2006). 88 Thomas Olesen, International Zapatismo: The Construction of Solidarity in the Age of Globalization (London: Zed Books, 2005). 89 On Darfur see Hamilton, Fighting for Darfur . On East Timor see Clinton Fernandes, The Independence of East Timor . On Chile see Power, “The US Movement in Solidarity with Chile in the 1970s,” 90 For instance, see William Kornhauser, The Politics of Mass Society (Glencoe, Illinois: Free Press, 1959). 91 Charles Tilly, From Mobilization to Revolution (Reading, Massuchusetts: Addison-Wesley Publishing Co, 1978). 92 Sidney Tarrow, Power in the Movement: Social Movements, Collective Action and Politics (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994). Theda Skocpol, States and Social Revolutions: A Comparative Analysis of France, Russia and China (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1979). Doug McAdam, John McCarthy & Mayer Zald (eds.), Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements: Political Opportunities, Mobilizing Structures and Cultural Framings (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996). Mark Beissinger, Nationalist Mobilization and the Collapse of the Soviet State (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002).

17 timing of social movement formation. Whether the focus is on grievances or political opportunities, both perspectives favour structure over agency in explaining social movement formation. 93 In this dissertation, I push back against these structural accounts of collective action. Instead, I emphasize the role played by agents, namely recruiting entrepreneurs, who play an active role in mobilizing individuals, networks and organizations to support a distant rebel cause. In the absence of these entpreneurs, even with permissive structural conditions, mass solidarity mobilization becomes far less likely. 94 In advancing this view, this dissertation builds on more agentic recruitment-based accounts of collection action found in resource mobilization theory 95 and micro-structural accounts of activism. 96 It also adds a transnational dimension to these perspectives. 97 Third, this dissertation also contributes to our understanding of the transnational dynamics of intra-state conflict. Scholars working in this area have demonstrated the extent to which internal conflicts need to be understood as transnational in nature,

93 Jeff Goodwin & James Jasper, “Caught in a Winding, Snarling Vine: The Structural Bias of Political Process Theory,” Sociological Forum Vol. 14, No. 1 (1999), pp. 27-54. Doug McAdam, “Beyond Structural Analysis: Toward a More Dynamic Understanding of Social Movements,” in Mario Diani & Doug McAdam (eds.), Social Movement and Networks: Relational Approaches to Collective Action (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003). Nepstad, Convictions of the Soul . 94 In her account of the US-Central American Peace & Solidarity Movement, Sharon Nepstad also stresses the role played by individual activists, although her emphasis is on more on framing than recruitment. Nepstad, Convictions of the Soul . 95 Charles Perrow & J. Craig Jenkins, “Insurgency of the Powerless: Farm Worker Movements (1946- 1972), American Sociological Review Vol. 42, No. 2 (April 1977), pp. 249-269; Jeffrey Berry, Lobbying for the People: The Political Behaviour of Public Interest Groups (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1977); J. Craig Jenkins, “Resource Mobilization Theory and the Study of Social Movements,” Annual Review of Sociology Vol. 9 (1983), pp. 527-553. For an overview see Doug McAdam, Sidney Tarrow & Charles Tilley, “Comparative Perspectives on Contentious Politics,” in Mark Lichbach & Alan Zuckerman (eds.), Comparative Politics: Rationality, Culture and Structure (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009). 96 Bert Klandermans & Dirk Oegema, “Potentials, Networks, Motivations, and Barriers: Steps Towards Participation in Social Movements,” American Sociological Review Vol. 52, No. 4 (August 1987), pp. 519- 531. Doug McAdam & Ronnelle Paulsen, “Specifying the Relationship Between Social Ties and Activism,” American Journal of Sociology Vol. 99, No. 3 (November 1993). Florence Passy, “Social Networks Matter, But How?” in Mario Diani & Doug McAdam (eds.), Social Movements and Networks: Relational Approaches to Collective Action (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003). Alan Schussman & Sarah A. Soule, "Process and protest: Accounting for individual protest participation." Social Forces 84, no. 2 (2005): 1083-1108. 97 This perspective is also central to Hector Perla’s account of the US-Central American Peace & Solidarity Movement. See Hector Perla, “Si Nicaragua Vencio, El Salvador Vencera: Central American Agency in the Creation of the US-Central American Peace and Solidarity Movement,” Latin American Research Review Vol. 43, No. 2 (2008), pp. 136-158.

18 including the involvement of foreign states, 98 international organizations, 99 diasporas, 100 and refugees. 101 These actors have been identified as playing a role in conflict onset, duration, intensity, renewal and diffusion. 102 This dissertation contributes to our understanding of rebel diplomacy, or how non-state belligerents seek to attract external support for their domestic objectives. To date, scholars have described the content of rebel diplomatic efforts 103 and have sought to explain why some rebel groups engage in diplomacy but not others. 104 However, scholars have only begun to examine variation in rebel diplomatic strategies. 105 This study contributes to this literature by drawing attention to the role that diaspora politics can play in influencing what strategies rebel groups adopt to secure external assistance. This dissertation also contributes to the literature the looks at the causes of external support for insurgent groups. This literature has focused primarily on explaining why third-party states support some ethnic groups in conflict but not others. Stephen Saideman emphasizes the role that domestic politics, namely the presence of a domestic ethnic constituency, plays in shaping how governments intervene in foreign conflicts. 106 Salehyan, Gleditsch & Cunningham argue that variations in external state support has much to do with the organizational capacities of rebel groups themselves, pointing out that those that are moderately strong are more

98 Kristian Skrede Gleditsch, “Transnational Dimensions of Civil War,” Journal of Peace Research Vol. 44 No. 3 (2007), pp. 293-309. 99 Carrie Booth Walling, All Necessary Measures: The United Nations and Humanitarian Intervention (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2013). Also see Michael Doyle & Nicolas Sambanis, Making War and Building Peace: United Nations Peace Operations (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006). 100 Yossi Shain, “The Role of Diasporas in Conflict Perpetuation or Resolution,” SAIS Review 22:2 (2002), pp. 115-144; Hazel Smith & Paul Stares (eds.), Diasporas in Conflict: Peace-Makers or Peace-Wreckers? (New York: United Nations University Press, 2007). 101 Idean Salehyan & Kristian Skrede Gleditsch, “Refugees and the Spread of Civil War,” International Organization Vol. 6 (2006), pp. 335-366. 102 Idean Salehyan, Rebels without borders, Transnational Insurgencies in World Politics. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2009. 103103 For instance see Scott Thomas, The Diplomacy of Liberation: The Foreign Relations of the African National Congress Since 1960 (New York: IB Tauris Publishers, 1996). 104 Reyko Huang, “Rebel Diplomacy in Civil War,” International Security Vol. 4 No. 4 (Spring 2016), pp. 89-126. 105 Awet Weldemichael, Third World Colonialism and the Strategies of Liberation: Eritrea and East Timor Compared (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012). 106 Stephen Saideman, “Discrimination in International Relations: Analyzing External Support for Ethnic Groups,” Journal of Peace Research Vol. 39, No. 1 (January 2002), pp. 27-50.

19 likely to secure external state support than those that are weak or very strong. 107 Like issue selection in transnational civil society, scholars studying external support for insurgent groups have not examined mass solidarity mobilizations. This is an important gap because, as I suggested above, mass solidarity mobilizations can impact Western foreign policy and can shape insurgent behaviour, thereby influencing how intra-state conflicts play out. By studying mass solidarity mobilizations, this dissertation extends this line of research to consider foreign non-state support for distant rebels. Fourth, this dissertation also contributes to the growing literature on ethno- national diasporas. Scholars have primarily treated these diasporas as troublemakers who play an active role in causing, sustaining and renewing civil wars. 108 They do this through the moral and ideological support they provide to their ethnic kin, 109 through the money and recruits they send abroad, 110 and through their influence on their host state’s foreign policy. 111 A smaller body of work has shown that some diasporas can also have more pacific effects and contribute to conflict resolution. 112 This dissertation contributes to the study of diasporas in two ways. First, it adds to our understanding of the effect that diasporas can have on the politics of their host states. Scholars have primarily examined the domestic effects of diasporas by focusing on ethnic lobbying. 113 I consider the effects that diasporas can have

107 Idean Salehyan, Kristian Skrede Gleditsch & David Cunningham, “Explaining External Support for Insurgent Groups,” International Organization 65 (Fall 2011), pp. 709-744. 108 Paul Collier & Anke Hoeffler, “Greed and Grievance in Civil War,” Oxford Economic Papers 56 (2004), pp. 563-595. Idean Salehyan, Rebels without borders, Transnational Insurgencies in World Politics. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2009 . Mary Kaldor, New and old wars: Organised violence in a global era (John Wiley & Sons, 2013). Sarah Wayland, “Ethnonationalist Networks and Transnational Opportunities: The Sri Lankan Tamil Diaspora,” Review of International Studies 30 (2004), pp. 405-426. 109 Feargal Cochrane, "Civil society beyond the state: The impact of diaspora communities on peace building." Global Media Journal: Mediterranean Edition 2, no. 2 (2007), p. 21. Shain, Yossi. "The role of diasporas in conflict perpetuation or resolution." SAIS Review 22, no. 2 (2002): 115-144. Benedict Anderson, "Long-distance nationalism." The Spectre of Comparisons: Nationalism, Southeast Asia and the world (1998): 58-74. William Safran, "The Jewish diaspora in a comparative and theoretical perspective." Israel Studies 10, no. 1 (2005): 36-60. 110 Paul Hockenos, Homeland calling: exile patriotism & the Balkan Wars . Cornell University Press, 2003. 111 Stephen Saideman, The Ties That Divide: Ethnic Politics, Foreign Policy, and International Conflict (New York: Columbia University Press, 2001). Tony Smith. Rubenzer. 112 Hazel Smith & Paul B. Stares. Diasporas in Conflict: Peace-makers or Peace-wreckers? , (United Nations Publications, 2007). Antje Missbach, "The Acehnese diaspora: hawks and doves?: Conflict- support, peace-finding and political opportunity structures." Journal of Human Security 5, no. 3 (2009): 22. 113 Trevor Rubenzer, "Ethnic minority interest group attributes and US foreign policy influence: A qualitative comparative analysis." Foreign Policy Analysis 4, no. 2 (2008): 169-185. David Paul & Rachel Anderson Paul. Ethnic lobbies and US foreign policy . (Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2009).

20 on the mobilization of Western activists for distant struggles that are not, at least in ethnic terms, their own. Some have suggested that such a relationship does exist, but they do not probe their claims in any detail. 114 Second, this dissertation also adds to the study of variations in diaspora mobilization in terms of scale and substance. 115 Although I do not offer an explanation for why some diasporas are more politically active than others, I do provide the first dataset that might be used for this purpose. Specifically, I offer a way to measure diaspora mobilization quantitatively and provide data on more than one hundred diaspora communities in North America and Western Europe.

1.6 Plan of the Dissertation This dissertation proceeds in four main chapters. In chapter 2, I outline the logic of why distant rebels with weak diasporas in the West are more likely to receive mass solidarity in North America and Europe. In this chapter, I first explain how mass solidarity mobilizations occur, emphasizing the importance of rebel recruitment of non- diasporans in this process. I then outline how the strength of a distant rebel’s diaspora impacts the likelihood that it will engage in non-diaspora recruitment, thereby affecting the likelihood of mass solidarity mobilizing. Specifically, I explain how weak diasporas incentivize rebel entrepreneurs to recruit non-diasporans while strong diasporas do not. In chapters 3 and 5, I conduct empirical tests of this argument. In chapter 3 I conduct a quantitative test of my main argument. I use an original dataset that consists of 128 Amnesty International campaigns from 1975 to 2004, 22 of which correlate with mass solidarity mobilization. Using a series of controls and robustness checks, I find fairly robust support for my hypothesis that rebel diasporic weakness increases the chance of mass solidarity mobilizing on their behalf. This chapter also identifies the limitations of my argument. While distant rebels with weak diasporas have a greater likelihood of gaining mass solidarity, many such groups do not receive such support. In chapter 6, I analyze these non-mobilization cases and offer tentative hypotheses that may account for the absence of mass solidarity mobilizing.

114 Bob, The Marketing of Rebellion , p. 44. Samantha Power, “ A Problem from Hell”: America and the Age of Genocide , (London: HarperCollins Publishers, 2003), p. 376. Gail Lapidus, "Contested sovereignty: The tragedy of Chechnya, " International Security 23, no. 1 (1998), p. 28. 115 Koinova, “Four Types of Diaspora Mobilization: Albanian Diaspora Activism for Kosovo Independence in the US and the UK.”

21 In chapter 4 I introduce the Palestinian and Kurdish cases and justify my case selection. In chapter 5 I show how the weakness of the Palestinian diaspora in the West encouraged Palestinian activists to engage in non-diaspora recruitment and thus enabled mass solidarity mobilizing on their behalf. I also show how the strength of the Kurdish diaspora resulted in Kurdish activists focusing their efforts on their ethnic kin, thereby reducing the chances of mass solidarity mobilizing on their behalf. In chapter 6, I turn to the unexplained negative cases – cases in which the distant rebel had a weak diaspora in the West but did not receive mass solidarity. I conduct a qualitative analysis of these cases to find some general patterns that can account for the variance. In particular, I find that mass solidarity mobilizations are less likely to form in response to conflicts that experience meaningful human rights progress or when Western governments impose sanctions on the rights-abusing state, obviating the need for grassroots mobilizing. I also find that mass solidarity mobilizations are less likely to form in support of distant rebels that lack the domestic capacity and opportunity to ask for such support, who have access to domestic channels for reform, who decide against seeking external support, and who seek external support but not from Western civil society. In the concluding chapter, I summarize the main findings of my dissertation and suggest how these findings may be useful to human rights activists. I then discuss how my main findings may be extended to help explain the foreign fighter phenomenon and why Islamist recruiters have focused their efforts on mobilizing vulnerable populations. I then conclude with suggestions for future research on mass solidarity mobilizations.

22 Chapter 2 Explaining Mass Solidarity Mobilizations – Rebels, Recruitment and Diaspora Strength

In this chapter I outline the logic for why rebels who cannot rely on their ethnic kin in the West for meaningful support are the more likely recipients of mass grassroots solidarity. I first describe the three-step process in which mass solidarity mobilizations form. I then illustrate why this process is more likely to occur under conditions of rebel diasporic weakness. To do so, I show how individuals are more likely to take up the distant causes for which they are recruited and that rebels with weak diasporas in the West are more likely to recruit non-diasporans en masse to compensate for the absence, or limitations, of a more ‘natural’ constituency for their struggle.

2.1 The Three-Step Process of Mass Solidarity Mobilizations I depict the mass solidarity mobilization process in three relatively discrete steps. First, entrepreneurs mobilize and establish solidarity NGOs in order to organize their advocacy efforts. Second, entrepreneurs begin to reach out for non-diasporic support not only by raising awareness but by actively recruiting from their social and organizational networks. This step is the lynch pin in the mobilization process. If recruitment efforts fail, the process breaks down. If they succeed, the process moves forward as new supporters and organizations form. In the third step, as these recruitment and mobilization processes unfold, a threshold point is hit signaling the existence of a mass solidarity mobilization. I visualize these three steps in Figure I below.

Figure 1: Three-Step Mass Mobilization Process 116

Entrepreneurs Entrepreneurs Mass emerge recruit Mobilization Step 1 Step 2 Threshold Step 3 point

116 The structure of this figure is adapted from Finnemore & Sikkink, “International Norm Dynamics and Political Change,” p. 896.

23 Step 1: Entrepreneurs Emerge In the first step of the mass mobilization process, entrepreneurs mobilize and establish their own single-issue solidarity NGOs to help organize their advocacy efforts. While the presence of entrepreneurs does not make a mass mobilization inevitable, it does make it possible. As with social movements, in the absence of entrepreneurs mass solidarity mobilizing will not occur.117 Two types of entrepreneurs play a central role in the early phases of mass solidarity mobilizing. The first are those from the rebel group itself who engage in international diplomacy and reach out for Western non-diasporan grassroots support for their struggle.118 Examples include the Zapatista Army of National Liberation 119 and the Revolutionary Front for the Liberation of East Timor,120 both whom were the recipients of widespread solidarity in North America and Western Europe. These rebels tend to be motivated by feelings of group solidarity and a desire to restore their rights and sovereignty, but in some cases can be driven by greed and material self-interest. 121 Some of these rebels operate from within the conflict zone. In these cases, rebels need to work through third-party channels to secure access to non-diasporans. To do so, they may activate their ethnic kin abroad to mobilize on their behalf, 122 and they may connect with other rebel groups in order to gain access to their contacts and support networks. 123 They may also seek to establish ties with international NGOs, such as the Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organizations, that can connect them to a wider audience. 124

117 Sharon Nepstad, Convictions of the Soul: Religion, Culture and Agency in the Central America Solidarity Movement (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004). 118 Margaret Keck & Kathryn Sikkink, Activists Beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in International Politics (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1998). Bridget Coggins, “Rebel Diplomacy: Theorizing Violent Non-State Actors’ Strategic Use,” in Ana Arjona, Nelson Kasfir & Zachariah Mampilly (eds.), Rebel Governance in Civil War (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2015), pp. 98-118. Reyko Huang, “Rebel Diplomacy in Civil War,” International Security Vol. 40, No. 4 (Spring 2016), pp. 89-126. 119 Thomas Olesen, International Zapatismo: The Construction of Solidarity in the Age of Globalization (London: Zed Books, 2005). 120 David Webster, "Non-State Diplomacy: East Timor 1975-99." Portuguese Studies Review 11, no. 1 (2003): 1-28. 121 Paul Collier & Anke Hoeffler, “Greed and Grievance in Civil War,” Oxford Economic Papers 56 (2004), pp. 563-595. Mary Kaldor, New & Old Wars (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999). Stathis Kalyvas, The Logic of Violence in Civil War (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006). 122 Maria Gabrielsen Jumbert & David Lanz, “Globalised Rebellion: The Darfur Insurgents and the World,” Journal of Modern African Studies , 51:2 (2009). 123 Antje Missbach , Separatist Conflict in Indonesia: The Long-Distance Politics of the Acehnese Diaspora (New York: Routledge, 2012). 124 Bob, The Marketing of Rebellion , p. 76.

24 Other rebels may operate in exile, 125 whether in neighbouring states that offer them safe haven 126 or in the West itself. 127 Compared to the rebels in the homeland, rebels with an international base of operations may have an advantage in securing external support given their ability to more directly connect with international audiences.128 For instance, in the late 1980s from their base in Dharamasala, India, the Tibetan leadership initiated an international campaign to put pressure on the Chinese government to grant Tibetans self-determination rights. 129 In 1987, benefiting from the freedom afforded to him by the Indian government, the Dalai Lama travelled to the US where he proposed a five-point peace proposal to the Congressional Human Rights Caucus. 130 In the following year, the Tibetan leadership, with the help of Tibetans in the US, established the International Campaign for Tibet (ICT), a Washington-based NGO founded to build American support for Tibetan autonomy. 131 Part of the ICT’s work focused on elite lobbying, but it also engaged in grassroots recruitment to buttress its lobbying efforts inside Congress. Accordingly, the formation of the ICT was a crucial first step in the mass solidarity mobilization process for Tibet. It is important to note that not all rebels seek to internationalize their struggle. Although scholars have documented the transnational dimensions of intra-state conflict,132 including a long history of rebel diplomacy 133 as well as transnational

125 Yossi Shain, The Frontier of Loyalty: Political Exiles in the Age of the Nation State. Middletown, Connecticut: Wesleyan University Press, 1989). 126 Idean Salehyan, Rebels without borders, Transnational Insurgencies in World Politics. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2009. 127 Jose V. Fuentecilla, Fighting From A Distance: How Filipino Exiles Toppled A Dictator . (University of Illinois Press 2013). 128 Awet Tewelde Weldemichael, Third World Colonialism and Strategies of Liberation: Eritrea & East Timor Compared (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013). 129 Robert Barnett, “Violated Specialness: Western Political Representations of Tibet,” in Thierry Dodin & Heinz Rather, Imagining Tibet: Perceptions, Projects & Fantasies (Boston: Wisdom Publications, 2001). 130 For a full text of this address see: Dalai Lama, “Five Point Peace Plan,” September 21, 1987. Available at: http://www.dalailama.com/messages/tibet/five-point-peace-plan [Accessed November 28, 2016]. 131 John Kenneth Knaus, Beyond Shangri-La: America and Tibet’s Move into the Twentiy-First Century (Durham, North Carolina: Duke University Press, 2012). 132 Jeffrey Checkel (ed.), The Transnational Dynamics of Civil War (New York: Cambridge University Press). Kristian Skrede Gleditsch, “Transnational Dimensions of Civil War,” Journal of Peace Research Vol. 44, No. 3 2007), pp. 293-309. 133 Huang, “Rebel Diplomacy in Civil War.” Bridget Coggins, “Rebel Diplomacy: Theorizing Violent Non-State Actors’ Strategic Use of Talk,” in Ana Arjona, Nelson Kasfir & Zachariah Mampilly (eds.), Rebel Governance in Civil War (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2015), pp. 98-118.

25 connections between rebel groups, 134 it is not a given that a rebel group will engage in international diplomacy. In fact, the majority of rebel movements (~60%) will not seek external support,135 for a variety of strategic and resource-based reasons. 136 As I argue in chapter 6, these domestic-oriented rebels are not likely to be the recipients of widespread grassroots solidarity in the West since they do not seek to initiate the mass mobilization process. In addition to rebels, Western activist entrepreneurs who share no ethnic tie to the rebel group they support can also spur the mass solidarity mobilization process on. In the case of Darfur, for instance, some of the key activist organizers were not of Darfuri descent. 137 The motivations of these activists are idiosyncratic and highly varied, but generally include a combination of anger, shame, altruism, and ideological commitment, 138 although some may also be motivated by more careerist incentives. 139 In many cases, these entrepreneurs mobilize around instances of distant suffering that in some ways resonate with their personal background and political identity. 140 For instance, many leading Darfur entrepreneurs were of Jewish descent with family that had been affected by the Holocaust and, thus, were motivated by the anti-genocide mantra of ‘Never Again.’ 141 While these entrepreneurs tend to mobilize independently of rebel requests for support, their sustained engagement with the issue is influenced by the actions of the rebels themselves. For instance, in the case of Tibet some of the leading non-Tibetan entrepreneurs were those who in the late 1980s had spent time in the region as tourists

134 Idean Salehyan, Rebels Without Borders, Transnational Insurgencies in World Politics. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2009. 135 Reyko Huang, “Rebel Diplomacy in Civil War,” International Security Vol. 40, No. 4 (Spring 2016), p 39. 136 Victor Asal, Justin Conrad & Peter White. "Going abroad: Transnational Solicitation and Contention by Ethnopolitical Organizations," International Organization 68, no. 4 (2014). 137 Hamilton, Fighting for Darfur. 138 Nepstad, Convictions of the Soul . 139 Interview, STAND, August 24, 2012. Interview, International Solidarity Movement, January 16, 2013. Mancur Olson, the Logic of Collective Action (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1965). 140 Christian Smith, Resisting Reagan: The US Central America Peace Movement (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996). 141 Shaul Magid,. "The Holocaust and Jewish identity in America: Memory, the Unique, and the Universal," Jewish Social Studies 18, no. 2 (2012): 100-135. Interview, Sudan Divestment Taskforce, September 6, 2012.

26 where they witnessed Chinese government crackdowns against Tibetan protesters. 142 As one American entrepreneur explained, “I went to Tibet a tourist and came home a human rights activist.” 143 Upon their return home, many of these activists linked up with rebel- inspired organizational initiatives, such as the ICT in the US 144 and the Tibet Support Group in the UK.145 Without these rebel-linked organizations ready and wiling to channel and sustain the energies of these new activists, their commitment to the cause may have dissipated. Similarly, in the case of Darfur, while many of the activists had no direct ties to the rebels, some of the key organizers did, including John Prendergast, who played a role in forming the Save Darfur Coalition and the Enough Project, as well as Eric Reeves, whose speaking tours across US college campuses played an important role in convincing many students to mobilize, contributing to the formation of the Genocide Information Network and Students Taking Action Now for Darfur. 146 In sum, the first step of the mass solidarity mobilization process involves the emergence of rebel entrepreneurs, and in some cases diasporan and non-diasporan supporters, who create solidarity NGOs to organize their advocacy efforts. Step 2: Entrepreneurs Recruit In the second step, after establishing a solidarity NGO, entrepreneurs begin to build wider support for their struggle. Part of this outreach includes raising awareness of their cause. Social movement scholars describe this as “consensus mobilization”, or efforts by entrepreneurs “to obtain support for its viewpoints.” 147 To do so, entrepreneurs lobby journalists, write op-eds, issue press releases, and organize public seminars and conferences. Consensus mobilization alone, however, is not enough to secure active supporters, as awareness and sympathy do not inevitably lead to action. 148 To translate

142 Ronald Schwartz, “Travellers Under Fire: Tourists in the Tibetan Uprising,” Annals of Tourism Research Vol. 18, No. 4 (1991), pp. 588-604. 143 John Ackerly, “Reflections on 25 Years as a Human Rights Activist,” Paper presented to Casa Tibet, Barcelona. November 27, 2012. Obtained through email correspondence with author. 144 Interview, International Campaign for Tibet, December 11, 2012. 145 Interview, Tibet Information Network, December 2, 2012. Interview, Tibet Support Group, December 17, 2012. 146 Maria Gabrielsen Jumbert & David Lanz, “Globalised Rebellion: The Darfur Insurgents and the World,” Journal of Modern African Studies , 51:2 (2009). Hamilton, Fighting for Darfur, p. 45. 147 Bert Klandermans, “Mobilization and Participation: Social Psychological Expansions of Resource Mobilization Theory,” American Sociological Review Vol. 49 (October 1984), p. 586 . 148 Klandermans & Oegema. "Potentials, networks, motivations, and barriers: Steps towards participation in social movements."

27 sympathy with a distant struggle into active participation in support of it, entrepreneurs must also recruit. They must solicit non-diasporans to participate in standard social movement activities, such as organizing and attending protests, helping with campaign strategizing and implementation, fundraising, and establishing ties with government officials, among others. When entrepreneurs recruit and provide individuals with participation opportunities, actual participation becomes increasingly likely. 149 Without exposure to participation opportunities, individuals are most likely to remain inactive. 150 Accordingly, the recruitment of grassroots non-diasporans for active participation is thus central to the mass solidarity mobilization process. When they recruit, entrepreneurs tap into their own social and organizational networks. 151 Unlike the media or other impersonal mediums of communication, network ties provide entrepreneurs with the opportunities to engage in more direct forms of recruitment, including face-to-face requests, which are often more successful. 152 As a result, as is the case in other forms of collective action, 153 many solidarity activists came to their cause after being recruited, or pulled in, by a friend or partner. As one British activist recalled, “[Tibet] was what I ended up being roped into because my friends were there and I knew people that were doing it.” 154 Beyond social networks, entrepreneurs also use their organizational ties to recruit supporters. In the 1980s, Central American entrepreneurs recruited participants from American churches and left-wing organizations, such as the United Farm Workers, a US-based labour organization. 155 In the 1990s,

149 Alan Schussman & Sarah A. Soule, "Process and protest: Accounting for individual protest participation." Social forces 84, no. 2 (2005): 1083-1108. 150 Doug McAdam & Ronnelle Paulsen, “Specifying the Relationship Between Social Ties and Activism,” American Journal of Sociology Vol. 99, No. 3 (November 1993). 151 Florence Passy, “Social Networks Matter, But How?” in Mario Diani & Doug McAdam (eds.), Social Movements and Networks: Relational Approaches to Collective Action (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003). 152 Alan Gerber & Donald Green, “The Effects of Canvassing, Telephone Calls, and Direct Mail on Voter Turnout: A Field Experiment,” American Political Science Review Vol. 94, No. 3 (September 2000), pp. 653-663. Donald Green, Alan Gerber & David Nickerson, “Getting Out the Vote in Local Elections: Results from Six Door-to-Door Canvassing Experiments,” Journal of Politics Vol. 65 No. 4 (December 2003), pp. 1083-1096. 153 Lee Ann Fuji, Killing Neighbors: Webs of Violence in Rwanda (Cornell University Press, 2011). Marc Sageman, Understanding Terror Networks (University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004). Donatella Della Porta, "Recruitment processes in clandestine political organizations: Italian left-wing terrorism." International Social Movement Research 1 (1988): 155-169. 154 Interview, Students for a Free Tibet UK & Edinburgh Tibet Society, December 14, 2012. 155 Christian Smith, Resisting Reagan. Interview, North Shore Colombia Solidarity Committee, October 29, 2013.

28 British Tibet entrepreneurs used to their ties to Buddhist organizations to recruit. 156 And in the early 2000s, Darfur entrepreneurs in Canada drew on their ties to student club organizations to access potential supporters. 157 It is at this point, when entrepreneurs begin to reach out for wider support, where the mass solidarity mobilization process hits a critical juncture. 158 In fact, the mass solidarity mobilization process hinges on the ability of the entrepreneurs to recruit effectively. If they fail, the process breaks down. If they succeed, however, the prospects of mass mobilizing increase significantly. There are a number of factors that influence recruitment campaign outcomes. These include the advocacy frames deployed and to extent to which they resonate with the target audience, 159 the type of empirical details used in the frames 160 and their credibility,161 the degree of consistency between the frames and rebel group behaviour, 162 the ‘costliness’ of the recruitment asks, 163 and the amount of resources entrepreneurs have available to them to sustain recruitment campaigns over time in the face of setbacks and rejection. 164 When they recruit successfully, entrepreneurs not only expand the material base of their own solidarity NGOs. They also contribute to the diffusion of participation opportunities through their wider networks, creating the conditions for others to mobilize. Among these newly mobilized supporters, some will join existing organizations and contribute to their actions. Others will embrace an entrepreneurial spirit and create new organizations. They do so either because there is no local solidarity NGO in their area

156 Interview, Tibet Support Group, December 17, 2012. 157 Interview, The Sentinel Project, October 27, 2012. 158 Paul Pierson, “Increasing Returns, Path Dependence, and the Study of Politics,” American Political Science Review Vol. 94, No. 2 (June 2000), pp. 251-267. 159 Robert Benford & David Snow, “Framing Processes and Social Movements: An Overview and Assessment,” Annual Review of Sociology Vol. 26 (2000), pp. 611-639. Bob, Marketing of Rebellion . Also see Thomas Olesen, International Zapatismo: The Construction of Solidarity in the Age of Globalization (London: Zed Books, 2005). 160 Mcentire, Leiby & Krain, “Human Rights Organizations as Agents of Change: An Experimental Examination of Framing and Micromobilization.” Paul Slovic, “”If I Look at the Mass I Will Never Act:” Psychic Numbing And Genocide,” Judgement and Decision Making Vol. 2 No. 2 (April 2007), pp. 79-95. 161 James Jasper & Jane Poulsen, “Recruiting Strangers and Friends: Moral Shocks and Social Networks in Animal Rights and Anti-Nuclear Protests,” Social Problems Vol. 42 No. 4 (November 1995), pp. 493-512. 162 Zuo Jiping & Robert Benford, “Mobilization Processes and the 1989 Chinese Student Movement,” Sociological Quarterly Vol. 36 No. 1 (1995), pp. 131-156. 163 Pamela Oliver, ““If You Don’t Do it, Nobody Else Will”: Active and Token Contributors to Local Collective Action,” American Sociological Review Vol. 49 (1984). 164 John McCarthy & Mayed Zald, “Resource Mobilization and Social Movements: A Partial Theory,” American Journal of Sociology Vol. 82, No. 2 (May 1977)

29 around which they can organize their efforts or because they have a campaign idea that is currently not being implemented by the existing organizations. For instance, the NGO Dream for Darfur, which in the run up to the Beijing Olympics in 2008 campaigned to name and shame China for its support of the Sudanese government, was formed by a small group of Darfur activists in part because Save Darfur had rejected their requests to run a China-focused campaign. 165 The emergence of new activists and organizations contributes to the further diffusion of opportunities to take action. In the early 1990s, for instance, Canadian activists in the East Timor Alert Network used their ties to the War Resisters League to solicit their American counterparts to form their own pro-East Timor NGOs. This contributed to the creation of the East Timor Action Network, which became a hub of grassroots organizing in North America and Europe for East Timorese independence.166 Step 3: Threshold Point and Mass Mobilization In the third phase, as these recruitment and mobilization processes continue to unfold, a threshold is hit in which numerous single-issue NGOs have formed in support of a distant rebel cause. It is at this point that a mass solidarity mobilization can be said to exist. Following on Stephen Saideman, Erin Jenne & Kathleen Cunningham, 167 I use organizations, rather than protest events data that are susceptible to media bias,168 as an indicator of a mass solidarity mobilization. The presence of these organizations suggests that an infrastructure of support of some significance has been established. I suggest that a reasonable threshold is met when we can find evidence of at least ten solidarity NGOs dedicated to a distant rebel cause. While some of the more prominent mass solidarity mobilizations, such as the Anti-Apartheid Movement 169 and

165 Ilan Greenberg, “Changing the Rules of the Games,” New York Times Magazine (March 30, 2008). Available here: http://www.nytimes.com/2008/03/30/magazine/30olympics-t.html [Accessed November 28, 2016] 166 Interview, ETAN Canada, July 13, 2015. Interview, ETAN US, March 26 2015. 167 Saideman, Jenne & Gallagher, “Diagnosing Diasporas: Understanding the Conditions Fostering or Blocking Mobilization, Preliminary Analyses,” Paper for the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association (2014). 168 John McCarthy, Clark McPhail & Jackie Smith, “Images of Protest: Dimensions of Selection Bias in Media Coverage of Washington Demonstrations, 1982 and 1991,” American Sociological Review Vol. 61, No. 3 (June 1996), pp. 478-499; Jennifer Earl, Andrew Martin, John McCarthy & Sarah Soule, “The Use of Newspaper Data in the Study of Collective Action,” Annual Review of Sociology Vol. 30 (2004), pp. 65-80. 169 For a list of the anti-apartheid NGOs see here: https://www.nelsonmandela.org/images/uploads/aama- azlist.pdf

30 the US Central America Peace & Solidarity Movement,170 have included hundreds of solidarity NGOs and thousands of activists, a threshold of ten errs on the side of inclusiveness in order to capture a wider set of cases. At the same time, this threshold also distinguishes mass mobilizations from cases of smaller mobilizations that include one or two organizations but little more. In the statistical analysis I conduct in chapter 3, I also test my arguments on a relaxed threshold of five or more solidarity NGOs. While many of the mass grassroots mobilizations follow the same three-step process as outlined above, once they emerge they can diverge in important ways in terms of size, as just noted, and in terms of structure. In some cases, the actors involved in a mass solidarity mobilization may be bound together primarily by informal personal ties, as seen in Palestine solidarity mobilizing in the US in the late 1980s. 171 In other cases, institutionalized forms of interaction and cooperation may form. In 1974 Chile solidarity activists in the US established the National Coordinating Committee in Solidarity with Chile in order to improve coordination between the dozens of Chile solidarity NGOs that had formed to support the anti-Pinochet resistance.172 In other cases still, mass mobilizations may develop transnational coordinating structures as well. In 2000, Tibet activists created the International Tibet Network to strengthen ties between the dozens of Tibet solidarity NGOs that had formed around the world since the late 1980s. 173 Thus, like advocacy networks and social movements, 174 the shape mass solidarity mobilizations can take once they have formed can also vary significantly. I leave the causes of these variations in organizational or network structure to future research.

170 Hector Perla, “Si Nicaragua Vencio, El Salvador Vencera: Central American Agency in the Creation of the US-Central American Peace and Solidarity Movement,” Latin American Research Review Vol. 43, No. 2 (2008), pp. 136-158. 171 Interview, SUSTAIN and the US Campaign to End Israeli Occupation, August 24, 2015. 172 Margaret Power, “US Movement in Solidarity with Chile in the 1970s,” Latin American Perspectives Vol. 36 No. 6 (November 2009), pp. 54-55. 173 Interview, International Tibet Network, November 9 2012. See http://tibetnetwork.org/about- us/network-membership/ 174 Noha Shawki, “Organizational Structure and Strength and Transnational Campaign Outcomes: A Comparison of Two Transnational Advocacy Networks,” Global Networks Vol. 11 No. 1 (2011), pp. 97- 117. Wendy Pearlman, Violence, Nonviolence and the Palestinian National Movement (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011).

31 2.2 Grassroots Issue Adoption and the Importance of Recruitment Why does this mass solidarity mobilization process occur around some distant struggles but not others? To begin to answer this question it is important to first understand why a grassroots activist would mobilize for one distant rebel cause but not others. In what follows, I argue that grassroots issue adoption is a function of recruitment, or exposure to participation opportunities through network ties. In other words, an individual activist is more likely to mobilize in support for distant rebel causes for which they are recruited and will not mobilize for those distant rebel causes for which they are not recruited. When asked, individuals often provide two types of justifications for their activism, neither of which adequately explain grassroots issue adoption. The first has to do with the emotional payoffs of solidarity activism. In this view, mobilizing for a distant cause alongside other like-minded folks can provide an individual with a sense of belonging, which can be especially beneficial to those who feel marginalized by their own personal and familial networks or by society at large. 175 It can also offer individuals the chance to put into practice identities and values they care deeply about, which can also contribute to an overall sense of wellbeing.176 While the psychological benefits of solidarity activism are important, a focus on them alone cannot account for why an individual would select one cause over numerous that could also provide them with similar benefits. In addition to psychological benefits, some activists describe their mobilization as a result of the nature of the distant struggle itself, depicting it as a just cause that demands their attention and support. I refer to these as ‘issue-specific’ justifications. For example, Tibet solidarity activists stress how the Tibetan use of non-violent modes of resistance makes their struggle particularly worthy of support. Non-violence, one activist explained, “makes the Tibetan struggle something which non-Tibetans can easily identify with as it is clear which side is in the right.” 177 While non-violence may make Tibetan

175 For a brief review of the alienation literature see Doug McAdam, “Beyond Structural Analysis: A More Dynamic Understanding of Social Movements,” in Mario Diani & Doug McAdam (eds.), Social Movement Analysis: A Network Perspective (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002). 176 Christian Smith, Resisting Reagan: The US Central America Peace Movement (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996), p. xv. 177 Interview, Students for a Free Tibet UK, November 28, 2012.

32 rebels attractive to some Westerners, it does not make them unique. Throughout the second-half of the twentieth-century, non-violent resistance campaigns have been fairly common and, in some decades, more common than violent campaigns. According to Erica Chenoweth and her colleagues, from 1945 to 2006 40% of the domestic resistance campaigns they identified were non-violent in nature.178 If non-violence is particularly attractive to Western activists, why have those who mobilized for Tibet on these grounds not done so for other such groups? For their part, Palestine solidarity activists often justify their focus on Israel by emphasizing its practice of foreign occupation, yet the Palestinians are not unique in suffering under foreign rule. A number of observers have drawn direct parallels between Israel’s occupation of the Palestinians and Morocco’s occupation of the Sahrawis. 179 If these similarities have merit, why mobilize for Palestine but not Western Sahara, or, for that matter, the dozens of other groups around the world that claim to suffer from foreign occupation? 180 Further, Palestine solidarity activists also justify their focus on Israel because of the support it receives from Western governments, namely the US, which is said to create a degree of Western complicity in Palestinian suffering. 181 Yet, the Israeli- Palestinian conflict is just one of many political conflicts around the world where feelings of Western complicity may be legitimately felt. A number of states with poor human rights records, such as Egypt and Turkey, among others, receive some of the most US military aid in the world.182 If close ties to the West have motivated some solidarity

178 Erica Chenoweth & Orion Lewis, “Unpacking Nonviolent Campaigns: Introducing the NAVCO 2.0 dataset,” Journal of Peace Research Vol. 50, No. 3 (2013), pp. 419-420. 179 Rana Khoury, “Western Sahara and Palestine: A Comparative Study of Colonialisms, Occupations, and Nationalism,” New Middle Eastern Studies Vol. 1 (2011), pp. 1-20. Available here: http://www.brismes.ac.uk/nmes/wp-content/uploads/2011/06/NMES2011Khoury.pdf Stephen Zunes, “Western Sahara: The Other Occupation,” Tikkun (January/February 2006). Available at: http://www.tikkun.org/article.php/Zunes-westernsahara-the-other-occupation . 180 Robert Pape, Dying to Win: The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism (New York: Random House, 2006). Also see Oded Haklai & Neophytos Loizides (eds.), Settlers in Contested Lands: Territorial Disputes and Ethnic Conflicts (Stanford California: Stanford University Press, 2015). 181 Interview, Students for Justice in Palestine Edinburgh, November 28, 2012. Jack McGinn, “Israel and Palestine: A Conflict for the Left?” Available at: https://socialjusticefirst.com/2012/02/27/israel-and- palestine-a-conflict-for-the-left/ 182 Marc Lynch, “Arab Americanisms in the Arab World.” In Peter Katzenstein & Robert Keohane (eds.), Anti-Americanisms in World Politics (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2007), 208. Human Rights Watch, Weapons Transfers and Violations of the Laws of War in Turkey (1995), p. 2. Accessible here: https://www.hrw.org/legacy/reports/1995/Turkey.htm [Accessed February 9, 2016]

33 activists to focus their ire on Israel, what explains their non-mobilization for the Egyptian pro-democracy movement or the Kurdish national movement in Turkey? Network-based Accounts for Grassroots Issue Adoption Rather than looking to the emotional or issue-specific justifications individuals provide, I emphasize the importance of recruitment and the exposure to participation opportunities through the interpersonal networks in which an individual is embedded. Networks feature prominently in the literature on collective action. 183 They have helped to facilitate Italian and Islamist militancy, 184 ethnic violence in Rwanda, 185 peace activism in the Netherlands, 186 and local neighbourhood and high-risk civil rights activism in the US. 187 Networks contribute to collective action by creating and fostering group identities that enable individuals to overcome collective action dilemmas. 188 In addition to facilitating collective action, networks also shape what causes an individual is likely to take up and which they will ignore. They do this by exposing individuals to participation opportunities around some causes but not others. The availability of these participation opportunities is a function of the recruitment efforts of activist entrepreneurs. When requests for active participation are made, individuals are more likely to mobilize. In fact, being asked to participate has been found to be a reliable predictor of participation. 189 As Alan Schussman & Sarah Soule put it, “individuals rarely participate in social movement activities (such as protest) unless they are asked to do so…” 190

183 See Mario Diani & Doug McAdam (eds.), Social Movement Analysis: A Network Perspective (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002). 184 Donatella Della Porta, "Recruitment processes in clandestine political organizations: Italian left-wing terrorism." International Social Movement Research 1 (1988): 155-169Marc Sageman, Understanding Terror Networks (University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004). 185 Lee Ann Fuji, Killing Neighbors: Webs of Violence in Rwanda (Cornell University Press, 2011). 186 Bert Klandermans and Dirk Oegema. "Potentials, networks, motivations, and barriers: Steps towards participation in social movements." American sociological review (1987): 519-531. 187 Oliver, “If you don’t do it, Nobody else will,” p. 608. Doug McAdam. Freedom summer . (Oxford University Press, USA, 1990). McAdam & Paulsen, “Specifying the Relationship,” p. 654-655. 188 Klandermans, “How Group Identification Helps to Overcome the Dilemma of Collective Action.” 189 Alan Schussman & Sarah A. Soule, "Process and protest: Accounting for individual protest participation." Social forces 84, no. 2 (2005): 1083-1108. 190 Schussman & Soule (2005), p. 1086.

34 Consistent with the findings of participation in other forms of collective action, 191 many solidarity activists were recruited through their organizational and social ties. Friendship networks appear to be especially important. American student activism on Darfur, for instance, was initially organized in large part through friendship and extended social networks.192 In fact, numerous others activists who have taken up other causes, such as Bosnia, 193 East Timor, 194 and Tibet 195 report the significant role that friends played in pulling them into action. Given the effects of network ties, when asked to reflect on their activism some acknowledge its seeming randomness. Some activists referred to their mobilization around one cause but not another as the result of happenstance or “a huge amount of random chance” 196 by virtue of who the individual knew and the participation opportunities that came out of that interpersonal tie. As one activist put it: I didn't really feel like it was a choice…It was kind of right in front of my nose, but I wasn't choosing between one [cause] and another. I think it was just that Darfur was right there. 197

Another put it similarly: I didn’t sit down with a list. I didn’t sit down at any point and think, ‘Oh maybe that is more important than this.’ [Tibet] was just what was there and what was accessible I think. 198

The importance of network ties in shaping what causes an individual will take up and which they will ignore has an important implication, namely that it is possible that these activists could have mobilized around a different distant rebel cause altogether had they been recruited for it. “It could have been another conflict,” one activist reflected. “It could have been Rwanda, it could have been Congo, it could have been Israel.” 199

191 Della Porta, "Recruitment processes in clandestine political organizations: Italian left-wing terrorism." p. 158. 192 Interview, Save Darfur Coalition, October 14, 2012. 193 Quoted in Sherri Fink, “The Anti-Genocide Movement on American College Campuses: A Growing Response to the Balkan War,” in Thomas Cushman (ed.), This Time We Knew: Western Responses to Genocide (New York: New York University Press, 1996), p. 318. 194 Interview, ETAN Canada, July 13 2015. 195 Interview, Tibet Society, October 25, 2012. 196 Interview, ETAN Canada, July 13, 2015. 197 Interview, US Holocaust Museum Committee on Conscience, February 4, 2013. 198 Interview, Students for a Free Tibet UK & Edinburgh Tibet Society, December 14, 2012. 199 Interview, Students for a Free Tibet UK, January 24, 2013.

35 If an individual’s location within interpersonal networks influences what distant causes they will take up and which ones they will not, then to explain mass solidarity mobilizations we need to identify the conditions under which non-diasporans are more likely to be recruited en masse to support distant rebels. In the next section I argue that distant rebels and their primary supporters in the West will recruit in this way when they cannot count on strong diasporic support.

2.3 Diaspora Strength and Entrepreneur Recruitment Strategies In their efforts to build a support base in the West, rebel entrepreneurs often first seek out the support of their ethnic kin. 200 Pre-existing ethnic, cultural and historical ties to a struggle, as well as community feelings of guilt for living safely abroad, can make diasporans receptive audiences to their rebel kin’s recruitment efforts.201 Further, diasporas may also be attractive to rebel entrepreneurs because of the existence of prior social and organizational ties that help to facilitate the recruitment process. These ties are often the result of the transnational friendship, familial or political ties that form through the migration process. These ties, cultivated by transnational brokers moving in and between homeland and diasporic environments, help rebels to connect diaspora communities with resistance organizations and networks in the homeland. 202 For these reasons, diasporas are often the first port of call for rebel entpreneurs seeking external support for their struggle. Not all diasporas, however, are able to provide their rebel ethnic kin with the type of support they require. Some may be too small or politically disinterested to provide meaningful assistance to a homeland struggle. In this way, the strength of the diaspora influences whether or not group entrepreneurs decide to focus their attention and resources primarily on their ethnic kin or if they decide to look beyond the community to secure a wider base of support. Two specific characteristics of a diaspora influence this

200 Yossi Shain, The Frontier of Loyalty: Political Exiles in the Age of the Nation State. Middletown, Connecticut: Wesleyan University Press, 1989). 201 Klandermans, “How Group Identification Helps to Overcome the Dilemma of Collective Action.” Daniel Byman, Peter Chalk, Bruce Hoffman, William Rosenau & David Brannan, Trends in Outside Support for Insurgent Movements (Santa Monica, California: RAND, 2001). 202 Fiona Adamson, “Mechanisms of Diaspora Mobilization and the Transnationalization of Civil War,” in Jeffrey Checkel (ed.), Transnational Dynamics of Civil War (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), p. 75.

36 decision: size and level of political mobilization, at the level elite and grassroots levels. Specifically, entrepreneurs with large and politically active diasporas are more likely to focus their efforts on their ethnic kin while those with small or politically inactive diasporas are more likely to look beyond their ethnic kin in search of non-diasporic support. When this outreach occurs in a sustained way, mass solidarity mobilization becomes more likely. Size Matters One component of diaspora strength is the size of the community. Large diasporas tend to become the focal points of rebel recruitment efforts since they can provide rebel entrepreneurs with material and human resources that can be useful in waging their homeland struggle. 203 Further, large diasporas may also be able to exert political influence in their host states and impact foreign policy towards the homeland government. 204 From the perspective of these rebels, large diasporas can obviate the need for non-diasporan support, making mass solidarity mobilizing far less likely in these cases. When a rebel group has a large diaspora in the West, it is likely to focus its international diplomacy efforts on the states in which their ethnic kin resides, and much less attention elsewhere. In the 1970s and 1980s South Korean pro-democracy activists targeted the large Korean community in the US, which numbered approximately one million members, a quarter of which were American citizens. 205 Through their efforts, South Korean dissidents “established a network within the US Korean community to influence American politicians and media organizations to exert pressure for reform on the South Korean government.” 206 Similarly, in the 1980s, Tamil insurgents led by the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam in Sri Lanka (LTTE) tapped into large diasporic communities in Canada and Europe. The Tigers established a number of offices around the world but dedicated the vast majority of their resources to securing and maintaining the support

203 Collier & Hoeffler, “Greed and Grievance in Civil War,”, p. 575. 204 Saideman, The Ties That Divide 205 Chung-in Moon, “Complex Interdependence and Transnational Lobbying: South Korea in the United States. International Studies Quarterly Vol. 32, No. 1 (1988), p. 79. 206 Yossi Shain, The frontier of loyalty: political exiles in the age of the nation-state . University of Michigan Press, 2010, p. 53.

37 from large Tamil communities in the West. 207 The support they received, which included approximately $80 million annually, enabled the LTTE continue their secessionist struggle for more than two decades. 208 Other rebel groups, such as the Democratic League of Kosovo and the Kosovo Liberation Army, have also focused much of their transnational advocacy energies on securing support from their sizeable diasporas in Europe and North America. 209 In these cases, these rebel entrepreneurs focused less of their efforts on recruiting non-diasporan supporters. There simply was less of a need for them. As a result, in the absence of sustained recruitment campaigns targeting non- diasporans, the chances of mass solidarity mobilization reduced considerably. By contrast, rebels with small diasporas in the West are more likely to seek out non-diasporan assistance in order to augment their support base. As I noted above, in the 1980s the Tibetan leadership launched an international campaign to increase the pressure on the Chinese government to grant self-determination rights for Tibet. Part of this campaign included the recruitment of non-Tibetans in the West. The Dalai Lama sent directives to Tibetan lamas in the West to start mobilizing their non-Tibetan students for political action. He also toured Buddhist centers across North America and Western Europe to directly solicit political support. 210 This strategy, in part, reflected the small size of the Tibetan diaspora in the West which numbered no more than a few thousand members. 211 As one Tibetan activist put it, strategies were adopted to “overcome our size and become a real force in the international community.” 212 Similarly, East Timorese rebels adopted a similar strategy to compensate for the small size of the Timorese diaspora in the West..213 Accordingly, one Canadian activist put it, “they built much of their strategy around Western [grassroots] solidarity.” 214 Other rebel entrepreneurs have also engaged in similar non-diaspora outreach practices to compensate for the small size of their diasporas in the West, such as the Chileans in the

207 Byman et al, Trends in Outside Support for Insurgent Movements, p. 44. 208 Wayland, “Ethnonationalist Networks and Transnational Opportunities.” 209 Paul Hockenos, Homeland calling: exile patriotism & the Balkan Wars . Cornell University Press, 2003. 210 Interview, Tibet Support Group, December 17, 2012. 211 Carole Samdup, “A Canadian group fights to ensure success of Tibetan Freedom Struggle,” Tibetan Bulletin (1996), p. 21. 212 Samdup, “A Canadian group fights to ensure success of Tibetan Freedom Struggle,” p. 21. 213 Juan Federer. The UN in East Timor: building Timor Leste, a Fragile State . (Charles Darwin University Press: 2005). 214 Interview, ETAN Canada, July 13, 2015.

38 early 1970s, 215 the Saharawis in the 1980s, 216 and the Burmese in the mid-1990s.217 In all of these cases, the efforts by rebel entrepreneurs to recruit non-diaspora grassroots supporters made mass mobilizing possible and increasingly likely. Ability & Willingness for Diaspora Political Action In addition to size, the ability and willingness of diaspora members to engage in activism on homeland politics also impacts rebel diplomatic strategy. Diasporas able to organize themselves politically are more likely to be the targets of rebel recruitment efforts as it is these groups that are more likely to respond positively to requests for help. As I describe in more detail in chapter 4, when Kurdish activists associated with the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) began moving to Europe in the late 1970s and 1980s they were able to draw on a diaspora that had begun to organize themselves for homeland politics. The presence of diaspora mobilizing structures within the community made the work of these PKK entpreneurs much easier. 218 In this case, as in others, Kurdish entrepreneurs had less of a reason to look beyond their ethnic kin for support, making mass solidarity mobilizing less likely. As such, politically organized diasporas, especially those that are large, become the focal point of rebel diplomacy. If a community is unable organize politically, due to concerns about deportation, past traumas from direct exposure to state violence, political illiteracy, poverty, political and religious divisions, linguistic barriers, geographic dispersion, among other factors, rebel entrepreneurs are more likely to look elsewhere for support. When rebels are unable to overcome these obstacles to mobilization, non-diasporan outreach becomes an increasingly attractive recruitment strategy. In the early 1970s Filipino exiles launched a campaign to build international support against the Marcos regime. They first sought support from the large Filipino- American community, which at the time numbered in the hundreds of thousands. As Jose

215 Thomas Wright & Rudy Onate Zuniga. “Chilean Political Exile.” Latin American Perspectives , Vol. 34, No. 4 (2007), p. 70. 216 See http://www.smalgangen.org/files/dated/2014-08- 28/history_of_the_western_sahara_campaign_uk.pdf [Accessed February 9, 2016] 217 Ardeth Maung Thawnghmung, "Recycling Home Politics: The Burmese Diaspora in North America." In Unpublished paper presented at the American Political Science Association Annual Meeting, Washington, DC, September . 2005 218 Olivier Grojean, “Bringing the Organization Back-In: Pro-Kurdish Protest in Europe,” in Marlies Casier and Joost Jongerden (eds.), Nationalisms and Politics in Turkey: Political Islam, Kemalism and the Kurdish Issue (New York: Routledge, 2011), pp. 182-196.

39 Fuenticilla explains, the exiles “had assumed that their compatriots in the United States would empathize with their experience and respond readily to appeals for money, membership, and participation.” Community support, however, was not forthcoming. 219 Many of the newer immigrants had more immediate and pressing concerns, and were unable to devote any of their meager resources to homeland politics. The Marcos regime also took measures to dissuade Filipinos in the US from supporting anti-government campaigns in exile by threatening the lives of family members who remained in the Philippines. Embassy and consular offices closely monitored the community and reported on the diaspora’s actions. 220 This strategy was effective as the exiles were largely unsuccessful in securing mass support from the community.221 With diasporic channels resistant, the anti-Marco exiles turned their focus towards non-diasporic networks. In 1973, a group of exiles and American activists set up the solidarity NGO Friends of the Filipino People, which over time would come to include approximately seventeen chapters across the US. Suggestive of the status of the Filipino diaspora at the time as a political actor, its work was underpinned by the view that “U.S. voters should take the main responsibility for changing Washington’s policy towards the Philippines.” 222 Due to a general level of political apathy, the Filipino community, despite its size, was no longer seen as the main agent of change. Non-Filipinos were recruited to fill the void.

2.4 Conclusion In sum, this chapter has outlined the logic for why rebel groups with weak diasporas in the West are the more likely subjects of mass solidarity mobilizing. The main reason is because it is these rebels who are more likely to look beyond their ethnic kin for support and recruit non-diasporan supporters en masse . When they recruit in this way, they make mass solidarity mobilizations increasingly likely. In the next two chapters I empirically test this argument. In chapter 3 I conduct a quantitative test of this claim. In chapter 5, I test this claim qualitatively using a paired

219 Jose V. Fuentecilla, Fighting From A Distance: How Filipino Exiles Toppled A Dictator . (University of Illinois Press 2013). 220 Fuentecilla, Fighting from a Distance. 221 See here: http://www.press.uillinois.edu/wordpress/?p=11857 222 See here: http://escholarship.org/uc/item/95z8f0v4 [Accessed February 9, 2016]

40 comparison of Western activists responses to the Palestinian and Kurdish struggles, only the former of which has attracted widespread grassroots solidarity. I show how the weakness of the Palestinian diaspora in the West encouraged non-diaspora recruitment, while the strength of the Kurdish diaspora did not.

41 Chapter 3 A Quantitative Test

In chapter 2 I argued that mass solidarity mobilizations in North America and Western Europe are more likely to form in support of distant rebels with weak diasporas in the West than those with strong diasporas. Weak diasporas create permissive conditions for this kind of mobilizing because they encourage rebels to recruit non- diasporans to their cause. When they recruit in this way successfully, rebels contribute to the diffusion of participation opportunities around their cause, resulting in expanding mobilizations until a threshold point is hit. Therefore, I argue, under these conditions of diasporic weakness, mass solidarity mobilization becomes more likely. In Chapter 2 I laid out the logic of this argument, referring to select cases to demonstrate the processes and mechanisms at play. In this chapter, I test the correlation between diaspora strength and the probability of mass solidarity mobilization occurring on a broader universe of cases, using an original dataset built for this dissertation. In the concluding chapter I discuss ways in which this dataset can be improved.

3.1 Universe of Cases: Amnesty International Campaigns The world is replete with oppressed groups, yet not all can be considered likely recipients of support from Western solidarity activists. I define the universe of relevant distant rebels to include those whose plight has been publicized by an Amnesty International campaign. Scholars have identified Amnesty as a gatekeeper human rights NGO whose advocacy decisions influence the agenda of the Western human rights community. 223 While Amnesty is not the only gatekeeper, it is particularly influential. 224 I use Cullen Hendrix and Wendy Wong’s dataset on Amnesty International’s reporting from 1975 to 2004 to identify Amnesty campaigns. 225 This dataset includes

223 Clifford Bob, The Marketing of Rebellion: Insurgents, Media and Transnational Activism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), p. 18. 224 Wendy Wong, Internal Affairs: How the Structure of NGOs Transforms Human Rights (Ithaca: Cornell University Press. 2012). 225 Cullen Hendrix and Wendy Wong, “Knowing Your Audience: How the Structure of International Relations and Organizational Choices Affect Amnesty International’s Advocacy,” Review of International Organizations (March 2014), pp. 29-58.

42 counts of the urgent actions, press releases, and reports published by Amnesty and categorized by country target. I identify four types of Amnesty campaigns across two dimensions – time period and group type. In terms of time period, a campaign can be either multi- or single-year. A multi-year campaign begins when Amnesty publishes at least twelve advocacy items on a particular country in a single year and ends when there are two successive years in which fewer than twelve advocacy items are published. For single-year campaigns, Amnesty publishes at least twenty advocacy items on a country in a single year. 226 Single-year campaigns can occur within multi-year campaigns, but when this happens I include it only as a single campaign. After identifying all multi-year and single-year Amnesty campaigns, I then disaggregate them into national-level and minority-level campaigns. For national-level campaigns, I expect to see mass solidarity mobilizations in support of pro-democracy movements seeking broad national goals such as the overthrow of an authoritarian leader or regime change. This type of campaign corresponds to the mass solidarity mobilizations that formed to support the Chilean struggle against Augusto Pinochet. Identifying national-level campaigns is straightforward and requires investigating the content of Amnesty’s advocacy on a particular country. For minority-level campaigns, I expect to see mass solidarity mobilizations in support of a minority group seeking particularist goals, such as self-determination. These types of campaigns correspond to the mass solidarity mobilizations that occurred in support of the Tibetans and East Timorese, among others. To classify minority-level campaigns, I use the Minorities at Risk (MAR) dataset to identify the politically relevant minority groups in each state targeted by an Amnesty campaign. According to MAR, politically relevant minority groups are those that are politically mobilized and who suffer from systematic discrimination. 227 I then searched the Amnesty website to determine the frequency with which the organization’s coverage of a country referred to these groups. A minority-level campaign occurs when Amnesty refers to a minority group in at least 10% of its publications during its national-level campaign on a country. This threshold follows on

226 For a multi-year campaign I select 12 advocacy items as a threshold as it would amount to one advocacy item per month. For single-year campaigns I select 20 advocacy items as a threshold in order to identify significant short bursts of attention given to a country. 227 See http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/mar/definition.asp [Accessed February 9, 2016]

43 Clifford Bob’s analysis of the Zapatista movement, which received approximately 10% of Amnesty’s total coverage of rights abuses in Mexico from 1994 to 2003. 228 Table I below summarizes the four types of Amnesty campaigns. In total, I identify 128 campaigns from 1975 to 2004. I use this list of Amnesty campaigns to guide my search for instances of mass solidarity mobilization. In the majority of cases I find, mass solidarity mobilizations form during or within a few years of an Amnesty campaign. In a few cases, I find mass solidarity mobilizations that formed before 1975.

Table 1: Amnesty International Campaign Types

Campaign length Group type Single-year campaign Majority group (eg. (20+ items in single year) Chinese, Sudanese) Minority group (eg. Tibetans, Darfuris) Multi-year campaign Majority group (Begins with 12+ items in two successive years. Ends with two successive years of Minority group less than 12 items each)

3.2 Dependent Variable: Mass Solidarity Mobilization The dependent variable in this study is binary and refers to either the presence or absence of a mass solidarity mobilization. These mobilizations consists of a significant number of grassroots activists in North America and/or Western Europe who organize to support a distant rebel’s struggle to which they have no ethnic tie. Accordingly, these mobilizations are distinct from diaspora or ethno-national mobilizations. Examples of such mobilizations include the Save Darfur and Free Tibet movements, which consisted of a significant number of non-Darfuri and non-Tibetan Western activists. To operationalize mass solidarity mobilizations, I follow on Saideman et al and use organizations, or in this case single-issue solidarity NGOs, as the key indicator of non-diaspora mobilization in support of a distant rebel.229 Solidarity NGOs are often

228 Bob, The Marketing of Rebellion . 229 Stephen Saideman, Erin Jenne & Kathleen Gallagher Cunningham have begun to build a dataset to explain variations in diaspora mobilizing, however their data collection efforts appear to have stopped. See Saideman, Jenne & Gallagher, “Diagnosing Diasporas: Understanding the Conditions Fostering or

44 comprised of both diaspora and non-diasporan activists, and in some cases only the latter. The central argument is that these types of organizations will form to compensate for diasporic weakness. I suggest that a mass solidarity mobilization has occurred when I find evidence of at least ten solidarity NGOs focused on a distant rebel. To avoid spurious findings, in my robustness checks below I include a sensitivity analysis that relaxes the threshold to five or more NGOs. I construct this variable as binary (1 = mass solidarity mobilization; 0 = no mobilization) due to the absence of sufficiently precise data on the presence of solidarity NGOs. To identify cases of these mobilizations I examine each Amnesty International campaign entry, which make up the rows of my dataset, using four data sources. First, I consulted the Yearbook of International Organizations (YIO) archive, which includes records and details of 66,000 international organizations and international NGOs since 1907. Second, I conducted Google searches using four specific search terms for each group to identify the websites of solidarity NGOs that had mobilized in support of a single group. 230 Third, I consulted two directories of NGOs in North America and Western Europe in the early 1980s, which include listings of geographically focused NGOs. 231 And fourth, I consulted scholarly sources for each of the political conflicts covered by an Amnesty campaign. I also use these data to estimate an approximate start date of the mass solidarity mobilizations, which I use in my measurement of the independent and control variables described below. In total I identify 24 cases of mass solidarity mobilization. Appendix A includes details on how each of the 128 Amnesty campaigns was coded.

3.3 Independent Variable: Diaspora Strength The main independent variable in this study is the strength of a distant rebel’s diaspora in the West. I draw on Martin Sokefeld’s understanding of diaspora as a

Blocking Mobilization, Preliminary Analyses,” Paper for the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association (2014). 230 The four search terms used are: “[Distant rebel] Support Group”, “[Distant rebel] AND Solidarity”, “Save [Distant rebel]”, “Friends of [Distant rebel]”. 231 Lauri Wiseberg & Harry M. Scoble, North American Human Rights Directory 1980: Human Rights Internet (Maryland: Human Rights Internet, 1980). Laurie S. & Hazel Sirett. North American Human Rights Directory . (Maryland: Human Rights Internet, 1984).

45 socially constructed transnational ethno-national community of individuals who share a similar ancestry and connection with a distant homeland. 232 Emphasizing the socially constructed nature of a diaspora enables us to think about variations between diasporas, in terms of the willingness of its members to engage in homeland politics. If diasporas are socially constructed, then migrant communities do not always mobilize into diasporas, and diasporas do not all mobilize to the same degree or in the same way for homeland politics. 233 Scholars have examined variations in the levels of diaspora mobilizing but to date no quantitative data has been collected that can facilitate systematic cross-case comparisons. 234 I construct a new index variable that combines three indicators that capture different aspects of a diaspora’s political strength. These include the diaspora’s size across Western states, its level of civil society or grassroots political organizing in the West, and whether or not it has a foreign policy lobby in the US. I describe the rationale for these indicators in more detail below. In the statistical analysis I combine these three indicators to create an index. I score each group’s diaspora on a scale of 0 to 1. I give each indicator an equal weighting (0.33) in the absence of good theoretical reasons to weigh one more than another. I use an additive index, rather than multiplicative interaction terms, due to a lack of variability in the data, in particular the prominence of zeros. The reason I combine these indicators is to develop a more complete picture of the status of a distant rebel’s diaspora in the West. None of the indicators on their own capture diaspora strength sufficiently. For instance, a diaspora can be large but if it is unable to mobilize politically, then, I argue, rebel entrepreneurs are likely to look to

232 Martin Sokefeld, “Mobilizing in Transnational Space: A Social Movement Approach to the Formation of Diaspora,” Global Networks Vol. 6 No. 3 (2006), pp. 265-284. 233 Bahar Baser & Ashok Swain, “Stateless Diaspora Groups and their Repertoires of Nationalist Activism in Host Countries,” Journal of International Relations Vol. 8, No. 1 (2010), p. 40. 234 Much of the diaspora comparative work is qualitative. See for example Maria Koinova, “Can Conflict- Generated Diasporas be Moderate Actors During Episodes of Contested Sovereignty? Lebanese and Albanian Diasporas Compared,” Review of International Studies Vol. 37 (2011), pp. 437-462. Maria Koinova, “Four Types of Diaspora Mobilization: Albanian Diaspora Activism for Kosovo Independence in the US and the UK,” Foreign Policy Analysis Vol. 9 No. 3 (2013), pp. 433-453. Stephen Saideman, Erin Jenne & Kathleen Gallagher Cunningham have begun to build a dataset to explain variations in diaspora mobilizing, however their data collection efforts appear to have stopped. See Saideman, Jenne & Gallagher, “Diagnosing Diasporas: Understanding the Conditions Fostering or Blocking Mobilization, Preliminary Analyses,” Paper for the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association (2014).

46 mobilize non-diasporan grassroots supporters. As noted in chapter 2, this was the case with the anti-Marcos rebels and the Filipino-American community in the 1970s. Similarly, a diaspora can be mobilized, whether at the grassroots or elite lobbying levels, but if it is too small to provide meaningful political or material support, then I also expect entrepreneurs to seek out non-diaspora grassroots assistance. This is the case with the Tibetan diaspora in the West that had organizational structures in the West prior to the emergence of mass solidarity mobilizing in support of Tibetan self-determination, but it did not have the size to provide the Tibetan leadership with adequate resources to wage its campaign against the Chinese state. 235 My unit of analysis for measuring diaspora strength is the ‘West’ rather than specific countries. I do this because of how I assume rebel entrepreneurs think about their international diplomacy. If distant rebels have a strong diaspora (large and politically organized) in a single Western state, then I expect that state to become their advocacy target. In turn, I expect them to pay less attention to other states, decreasing the chances of mass solidarity mobilizations there. The same would be true if distant rebels have a diaspora that is strong but dispersed across a number of states. For example, the PKK’s transnational advocacy focused on Europe because of the large and politically organized Kurdish communities there, and less so on the US where the Kurdish diaspora was far weaker. As a result, these Kurdish rebels did not initiate the mass solidarity mobilization process in the US given the extent of the support they were receiving from their own kin in Europe. Measuring Diaspora Size The first component of diaspora strength is the size of the diaspora in the West. 236 All things being equal, distant rebels with smaller diasporas in the West are more likely to target their ethnic kin in their recruitment campaigns and less likely to target non- diasporan grassroots activists.

235 Margaret McLagan, Mobilizing for Tibet: Transnational Politics and Diaspora Culture in the Post-Cold War Era . PhD Dissertation. Department of Anthropology, New York University (1996). 236 In the measurement of diaspora size, the countries I use include are: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Finland, Greece, Germany, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Switzerland, United States and the United Kingdom.

47 Measuring diaspora size is not straightforward. No official census data exists on the size of many of the communities studied here.237 To estimate a diaspora’s size in the West, I draw on a number of sources. The first is the World Bank’s bilateral migration data. 238 These data do not disaggregate by ethnicity as it only provides data on the total number of people leaving a particular country. As such, these data are more useful for estimating the size of ‘state-linked’ diasporas, such as the Chinese or Indian diasporas, but not for estimating ‘state-less’ diasporas, such as the Tibetan or Kashmiri diasporas. To estimate the size of state-less diaspora groups, preferred estimates came from scholarly sources. When scholarly estimates could not be found, which was the case for twenty-three groups, I used Minorities at Risk (MAR) data on population proportion. Using MAR data, I estimated the size of a diaspora by first calculating the total number of migrants out of that country that went to Western states. I then divided that total number by the percent of the total population in the home country that are members of the distant rebel. For example, to calculate the size of the Mon (a minority group in Burma) diaspora across Western states, I first calculated the total number of migrants out of Burma to Western states (111,677). I then divided this number by the proportion of Burma’s population that MAR data suggests is Mon (2%), which suggests that the size of the Mon diaspora in the West is approximately 2,233. One problem with this estimation technique is that it relies on the assumption that the patterns of migration from a given country fit that country’s demographic breakdown. That is, in the case of Burma it assumes that Mons are no more likely to migrate than others. While this may be true in some cases, it may be erroneous in others, especially where only some groups are the victims of state oppression and thus more likely to emigrate. In the absence of more reliable data, however, adopting this assumption is necessary. In future research to improve this dataset, more accurate measures of diaspora size may be gleaned from interviews with community activists and leaders. For all the data sources used to estimate size, the time period used is from 1960, when World Bank migration data begins, to either the year when the mass solidarity

237 Gabriel Sheffer. Diaspora politics: At Home Abroad (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), p. 100. 238 See here: http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/global-bilateral-migration-database [Accessed February 9, 2016]

48 mobilization occurs for positive cases or to the end date of the Amnesty campaign for negative cases. After each estimate was calculated, the diaspora was then given a score from 0 to 1 as outlined in Table 2 below. This transformation does involve some loss of information, although using 0.1 increments minimizes the loss. This loss is necessary to build an additive index. Table 2: Coding of Diaspora Size

Score Estimated diaspora Score Estimated diaspora assigned size assigned size 0 0 – 99,999 0.6 600,000 – 699,999

0.1 100,00 – 199,999 0.7 700,000 – 799,999

0.2 200,000 – 299,999 0.8 800,000 – 899,999

0.3 300,000 – 399,999 0.9 900,000 – 999,999

0.4 400,000 – 499,999 1 1,000,000+

0.5 500,000 – 599,999

Measuring Diaspora Grassroots Political Organizing The second indicator of diaspora strength is the extent to which the diaspora is politically mobilized at the grassroots level. This type of mobilization can entail public protests and demonstrations, as well as NGO and church lobbying. I use the existing scholarly literature on each of the distant rebel’s diasporas to approximate their level of political mobilization in the West. Where scholarly sources suggested a highly active and demonstrative diaspora, a score of 1 was given. Where these sources suggested some degree of mobilization, but that the community was either nascent or highly fractured, the diaspora was given a score of 0.5. If no scholarly sources on a diaspora were found, or if scholarly sources mentioned that the diaspora was more of a migrant community rather than a political community, then the case was given a score of 0. The scores assigned to distant rebels who have been recipients of mass solidarity mobilizations support are based on the time prior to mass solidarity mobilization. Table 3 outlines the coding method used for this indicator. Appendix B indicates the sources used to assign these measures to each group.

49 Table 3: Coding of Diaspora Civil Society Activism Indicator

Score Condition 1 If scholarly sources indicate mobilized and active diaspora. 0.5 If scholarly sources indicate nascent diaspora mobilization or highly fractured community. 0 If no scholarly sources on diaspora found, or if scholarship suggests no diaspora exists.

Measuring Diaspora Elite Lobbying The third indicator of strength is whether or not the diaspora has a lobby in the US. Diasporas who have created a lobby indicate that the community has a political leadership and sufficient resources to engage with the political establishment on matters important to them, including the fate of their ethnic kin back ‘home’. I select the US for theoretical and empirical reasons. Theoretically, given the openness of its political system to ethnic lobbying, as well as its superpower status during the second half of the 20 th century, I expect a politically engaged diaspora, regardless of size, to set up a lobby in the US.239 Empirically, I focus on the US because an authoritative list of ethnic lobby organizations is readily available. I do not include ethnic lobbies in Europe because up until the early 2000s, there has been relatively little ethnic lobbying at the EU. 240 A diaspora is given a score of 1 if it was found to have a lobby in the US. For mass solidarity mobilizations cases, a score of 1 was only assigned if the diaspora established the lobby prior to mass solidarity mobilization. This periodization ensures that the causal arrow is pointed in the right direction. Data for this indicator was taken from the list of US ethnic lobbies found in David Paul and Rachel Anderson Paul’s Ethnic Lobbies and US Foreign Policy .241 Table 4 below outlines the coding of this variable.

239 Trevor Rubenzer, “Ethnic Minority Interest Group Attributes and US Foreign Policy Influence: A Qualitative Comparative Analysis,” Foreign Policy Analysis Vol. 4 (2008), pp. 169-185. 240 Adrian Favell & Andrew Geddes, “Immigration and European Integration: New Opportunities for Transnational Mobilization? in Ruud Koopmans & Paul Stathan (eds.), Challenging Immigration and Ethnic Relations Politics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), pp. 407-428. 241 David Paul & Rachel Anderson Paul. Ethnic lobbies and US foreign policy . (Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2009), pp. 124-125.

50 Table 4: Coding of diaspora lobby indicator

Score given Condition 1 For negative cases, if diaspora has lobby in US at any time. For positive cases, if diaspora has lobby in US prior to mass solidarity mobilization. 0 For negative cases, no lobby in the US. For positive cases, no lobby in US or if lobby created after mass solidarity mobilization.

I combine these three indicators – size, grassroots organizing and elite lobbying in the US - to create an index variable of diaspora strength and score each group’s diaspora on a scale of 0 to 1. A bivariate look at the data provides preliminary support for the proposition that mass solidarity mobilizations are more likely to form in support of distant rebels with weak diasporas. As seen in Table 5 below, of the 128 Amnesty campaigns that make up the dataset, 35 focused on groups with strong diasporas while 93 focused on groups with weak diasporas. In only 6% of the cases with strong diasporas does a mass solidarity mobilizations form, while in 22% of the cases with weak diasporas do we see a mass solidarity mobilizations form. This is a significantly higher proportion that suggests a relationship between low levels of diaspora strength and mass solidarity mobilization, although the possibility of confounding must also be considered before more confident conclusions can be made. The data also show that the relationship between diaspora strength and mass solidarity mobilization is not deterministic. Numerous rebels with weak diasporas in the West have not received widespread grassroots solidarity. These cases are the focus of chapter 6.

Table 5: Diaspora Strength and Mass Solidarity Mobilization

Mass Solidarity Mobilization

Diaspora No Yes Total Strength Weak 71 (76%) 22 (24%) 93 (<0.5) Strong 33 (94%) 2 (6%) 35 (>=0.5) Total 104 24 128

3.4 Control Variables The analysis below also includes a number of controls. I first control for Christianity. Distant rebels that are Christian may be more likely to attract the support of Western activists because their plight may resonate more deeply with Christian westerners who may be more likely to support their co-religionists abroad than, say, Muslim or Hindu distant rebels with whom they presumably have less in common. Further, Christian distant rebels, regardless of denomination, can leverage transnational networks of churches through which they can send information and requests for support. 242 The religion of a distant rebel was identified using the CIA World Factbook and the MAR dataset. Second, I control for how far the distant rebel is from the West. Geographic proximity can impact the extent to which a distant rebel is known to Westerners and the extent to which the group is able to situate themselves within transnational networks of Western activists and NGOs. 243 More proximate countries may be easier for Westerners to access, thus making it more likely that they will come into direct contact with those suffering abuses. . I determine geographic proximity by measuring the distance (in kilometers) between the distant rebel’s location and either Washington D.C. or London,

242 Geoffrey Robinson “If You Leave Us Here, We Will Die”: How Genocide Was Stopped in East Timor (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010). 243 Steven Levitsky & Lucan Way, “International Linkage and Democratization,” Journal of Democracy . Vol. 16, No. 3 (2005), pp. 20-24.

52 England, whichever is closer. I use Washington and London as reference points since the US and UK have been geographic centers for a number of mass solidarity mobilizations. Third, I control for whether or not the distant rebel in question is involved in a conflict that can be characterized as a civil war. I expect groups in civil war conflicts to be less likely to attract mass solidarity mobilizations support. Civil war may proxy two different aspects of a distant conflict. First, it can say something about the complexity of the conflict. Conflicts where there is more than one armed actor may be less appealing to Western activists because it in these situations where foreign observers find it harder to distinguish between the “good guys” deserving solidarity and the “bad guys” deserving censure. 244 Second, civil war may also proxy the severity of the conflict. Conflicts characterized by multiple armed actors may involve higher levels of abuses than domestic conflicts that are primarily characterized by governmental repression alone. I use Nicolas Sambanis & Michael Doyle’s data that defines civil war as an internal conflict in which both state and non-state actors are engaged in considerable levels of violence. 245 According to this definition, an internal conflict is not a civil war if the targeted group does not mount a meaningful armed resistance. 246 Fourth, I control for conflict severity more directly by using political terror scores. If human rights activists are principled actors, then we might expect them to mobilize in response to cases of the most severe repression.247 In this view, distant rebels facing genocide, ethnic cleansing, and other extreme forms of violent abuse, will attract more attention than those who are the victims of ‘lesser’ abuses, such as the denial of religious freedoms and basic democratic rights. Data for this variable is taken from the Political Terror Scale (PTS) dataset. These data assess the extent to which a country’s population is subjected to personal integrity rights violations including torture, arbitrary detention, and extrajudicial killing.248

244 Margaret Keck & Kathryn Sikkink, Activists Beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in International Politics (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1998), p. 27. 245 Michael Doyle & Nicolas Sambanis, Making War and Building Peace: United Nations Peace Operations (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006). 246 Sambanis, Nicholas. “What is Civil War? Conceptual and Empirical,” Journal of Conflict Resolution , Vol. 48, No. 6 (2004) p. 830. 247 Clifford Bob (ed.), The International Struggle for New Human Rights (University of Pennsylvania Press, 2011). 248 See here: http://www.politicalterrorscale.org/About/FAQ/ [Accessed February 9, 2016]

53 Fifth, I control for media attention. In publicizing distant conflicts and in fostering solidarity, the mainstream media can play a vital role. 249 For this analysis a new measure of media coverage was constructed. Existing studies have sought to explain why Western media outlets devote more attention to some countries and not others, 250 however their focus is on country-to-country variations not group-to-group variations. The latter is more useful here. To capture the salience of a distant rebel in Western media coverage, I count the number of articles published in the Globe & Mail, New York Times , and London Times that refer to the distant rebel in question. I use these three newspapers as proxies of Western coverage not only because of their national and international prominence but also because they cover the left-right political spectrum, given that the London Times tends to skew to the right while the Globe and New York Times are left- leaning. 251 Two time lags are used - one from 1950 to either the year of mass solidarity mobilization or the year in which the Amnesty campaign ends, and another that captures the 10-year period prior to the relevant end date. The total number of articles found in each newspaper is summed and then divided by the total number of years searched. Lastly, I control for Western arms transfers to the target state. While individuals may not closely follow to whom their government sells military equipment, close military ties between states allows activist entrepreneurs to use advocacy frames and recruitment strategies that emphasize their own government’s complicity in the suffering of a distant rebel. This can have powerful motivational effects on an audience. To measure arms transfers, I used the Stockholm Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) arms transfers database on the military exchanges between the US and UK and the states targeted by an Amnesty

249 Howard Ramos, James Ron & Oskar Thoms, “Shaping the Northern Media’s Human Rights Coverage, 1986-2000,” Journal of Peace Research Vol. 44, No. 4 (2007), pp. 385-386. Gary Bass Freedom’s Battle: The Origins of Humanitarian Intervention (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2008). Pp. 25-26 250 Ramos, Ron & Thoms. “Shaping the Northern Media’s Human Rights Coverage, 1986-2000.” 251 I do not use The Guardian in my measure of media coverage, despite its prominence on the Western Left, primarily for data availability reasons. Unlike the archives available for the Globe & Mail, New York Times and London Times , The Guardian’s online archive is not free. Further, the archive’s search function does not permit one to conduct searches within a previously specified set of articles requested. For instance, among all the articles referring to Afghanistan, I cannot search within these articles to determine how many refer to the Hazaras. Given that I include Amnesty International minority level campaigns that refer to groups that may live in a number of different states, this limitation of the archive is a problem and would mean removing twenty-one cases in the statistical analysis due to missing data. In a dataset with an already small universe (n = 128), removing 16% of the cases is not advisable.

54 campaign. 252 As with media attention, two time lags are employed - one from 1950 to the year of mass solidarity mobilization or when the AI campaign ends, and the other that captures the 10 year period prior to the relevant end date. Table 6 below summarizes the variables employed in the analysis below and their expected effect on mass solidarity mobilization

Table 6: Summary of Independent and Control Variables

Variable Operationalization Source(s) Expected effect on mass solidarity mobilization Diaspora 0-1 scale; 0 is World Bank bilateral migration data; strength (index) weakest, 1 is Minorities at Risk data; see supplementary strongest. material for additional sources used; Paul & - Paul 2009.

Christianity 1 for ‘yes’; 0 for no. CIA World Factbook; Minorities at Risk dataset +

Geographic Distance from distant http://www.distancecalculator.net/ proximity to rebel’s location to West Washington, DC or - London, UK, whichever is closest Civil war 1 for yes; 0 for no Doyle & Sambanis 2006 - Political terror 1-5 scale; 1 least Political Terror Scale oppressive, 5 most http://www.politicalterrorscale.org/ + oppressive. Media attention Average count of Globe & Mail, New York Times, London (logged) articles per year Times referring to distant + rebel in Globe & Mail, New York Times and London Times Western arms Arms transfers from SIPRI Arms Transfers dataset (logged) US & UK to state http://www.sipri.org/databases/armstransfers + targeted by Amnesty campaign

3.5 Results I fit a standard logit model to test the weak diaspora proposition on four baseline models that include the diaspora strength index variable plus all controls described above.

252 See http://www.sipri.org/databases/yy_armstransfers/background [Accessed February 9, 2016]

55 The civil war and political terror scores are highly correlated (p = 0.58) and cannot be included in the same model. Table 7 below provides the results. A correlation matrix is provided in Appendix A. I also ran these baseline models in which I separate the diaspora mobilization (civil society activism plus ethnic lobby) and diaspora size variables as opposed to treating them as part of the diaspora strength index. In this analysis, the coefficients for both variables are in the right direction (negative), thus providing some support for the weak diaspora hypothesis. However, both are largely insignificant (p > 0.1). Only in model 1a is the diaspora mobilization variable weakly significant (p = 0.089).

Table 7: Results for baseline models

DV = mass Model 1a Model 1b Model 2a Model 2b solidarity mobilization (1/0) Diaspora strength -3.394 (1.275)*** -3.071 (1.212)** -3.364 (1.324)** -2.998 (1.247)**

Christian 1.875 (0.586)*** 1.890 (0.589)*** 1.796 (0.578)*** 1.801 (0.583)***

Geographic 0.000 (0.0001) 0.000 (0.000) 0.000 (0.000) 0.000 (0.000) proximity

Civil War 2.121 (0.647)*** 2.244 (0.664)*** ______

Political Terror ______1.743 (0.511)*** 1.863 (0.523)***

Media attention 0.337 (0.177)* ______0.264 (0.176) ______1950 lag (logged)

Media attention ______0.318 (0.180)* ______0.232 (0.189) 10yr-lag (logged)

Western arms 1950 0.324 (0.164)** ______0.36 (0.174)** ______lag (logged)

Western arms 10-yr ______0.329 (0.133)** ______0.361 (0.144)** lag (logged)

N 128 128 128 128 Prob < chi 2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.0000 Pseudo R 2 0.2550 0.2532 0.2715 0.2767 % predicted 50% 50% 37.5% 41.6% correctly Log-odds are reported. Standard errors in parentheses. *p<0.1 ** p<0.05 ***p<0.01.

56 In all four models, diaspora strength is negatively associated with mass solidarity mobilization and statistically significant. The direction and significance of diaspora strength holds whether controlling for civil war or levels of political terror and when controlling for media attention and Western arms transfers using the two different time lags. This suggests fairly robust evidence in favor of the proposition that distant rebels with weak diasporas in the West are the more likely recipients of mass solidarity. The controls in each baseline model largely act as expected. Christian groups are more likely to attract mass solidarity than non-Christians. The civil war and political terror variables are also positively associated with mass solidarity mobilization and highly significant. The positive relationship between civil war and mass solidarity mobilization is worth noting as it suggests that distant rebels in conflicts where violence is “multi-sided,” and presumably where a conflict will be seen by outside observers as more complex, are more likely to attract mass solidarity mobilizations support than “simpler” internal conflicts characterized primarily by state repression alone. This may be the result of the fact that distant rebels who mobilize domestically, including for violence, are more likely to attract the attention of external actors. Another possible explanation is that civil wars are more severe and involve higher levels of human rights abuse than non- civil war internal conflicts. This view is supported by the results in models 2a and 2b, which indicate that increasing levels of political terror make mass solidarity mobilization more likely. Western arms transfers also matter as mass solidarity mobilizations are most likely to mobilize against states that receive higher levels of US and UK arms. Perhaps what is most surprising about these results is the finding that geographic proximity and media attention appear to play no significant role in mass solidarity mobilization. Media attention using both time lags is only weakly significant when the model includes civil war but insignificant when the model includes political terror scores. I now turn to examine the specific effects that diaspora strength has on mass solidarity mobilization. I use Michael Tomz, Jason Wittenberg and Gary King’s CLARIFY software to compute predicted probabilities for each of the four baseline models to measure the effect that increases in diaspora strength have on the likelihood of

57 mass solidarity mobilization.253 In these computations, I set the continuous variables to their means and the dichotomous variables (Christianity and civil war) to 0.

Figure 2: Predicted Probabilities of Mass Solidarity Mobilization at Each Value of Diaspora Strength

20% 18% 16% 14% 12% Model 1a 10% Model 1b 8% model 2a 6% model 2b 4%

% Probability of WSN Formation 2% 0% 0.00 0.03 0.07 0.10 0.13 0.17 0.20 0.23 0.27 0.30 0.33 0.37 0.40 0.43 0.47 0.50 0.53 0.57 0.67 0.80 0.83 0.90 1.00 Diaspora Strength Scores

Figure 2 shows that in each of the four models, as the strength of a group’s diaspora increases, the probability of mass solidarity mobilization decreases from a low probability to an even lower one. In models 2a and 2b, the drop is the most steep, from an approximately 15% chance of mass solidarity mobilization at a diaspora strength score of 0 to a 1% chance at a diaspora strength score of 1. In models 1a and 1b, the drop is less severe from a ~6% of mass solidarity mobilization at a diaspora strength of 0 to just 0.4% at a diaspora strength of 1.

3.6 Robustness Checks As a robustness check of the finding that decreases in diaspora strength increase the chances of mass solidarity mobilization, I include a series of regional and temporal controls to the four baseline models described above. It may be the case that the patterns we have observed so far in the data are being driven by a specific set of cases, unique to certain regions of the world or to a specific time period. To consider these possible

253 See http://gking.harvard.edu/clarify

58 effects, each baseline model was re-run with a regional dummy for Eastern Europe, Latin America, Asia-Middle East and Africa, and with a dummy for the Cold War (pre-1990). As Table 8 shows, including these regional and temporal controls provides further support for the weak diaspora hypothesis. Across all models, the diaspora strength variable retains its direction and significance.

59 Table 8: Results for baseline models with regional and temporal controls

DV = mass Model 1a Model 1b Model 2a Model 2b solidarity mobilization (1/0) Diaspora strength -3.496 (1.522)** -3.038 (1.427)** -2.959 (1.387)** -2.673 (1.324)**

Christian 1.292 (0.927) 1.203 (0.919) 1.399 (0.926) 1.319 (0.906)

Geographic 0.0000 (0.000) 0.0000 (0.000) 0.000 (0.000) 0.000 (0.000) Proximity Civil War 3.384 (0.978)*** 3.300 (0.947)*** ______

Political Terror ______1.607 (0.539)*** 1.641 (0.541)***

Media attention 0.271 (0.192) ______0.169 (0.186) ______1950 lag (logged)

Media attention ______0.277 (0.195) ______0.187 (0.196) 10yr-lag (logged)

Western arms 1950 0.275 (0.193) ______0.290 (0.188) ______lag (logged)

Western arms 10-yr ______0.210 (0.158) ______0.244 (0.162) lag (logged)

East Europe 1.695 (1.464) 1.258 (1.443) 0.490 (1.419) 0.266 (1.373) Latin America 3.200 (1.133)*** 3.121 (1.110)*** 1.488 (0.925) 1.414 (0.930)

Asia-Middle East 1.552 (0.987) 1.410 (0.987) 0.923 (0.966) 0.709 (0.994)

Cold War 1.105 (0.781) 1.030 (0.758) 0.563 (0.724) 0.434 (0.709)

N 128 128 128 128 Prob < chi 2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 Pseudo R 2 0.3779 0.3680 0.3106 0.3068 Log-odds are reported. Standard errors in parentheses. *p<0.1 ** p<0.05 ***p<0.01.

As a further robustness check, I conduct a sensitivity analysis of the 10+ NGO threshold for mass solidarity mobilization. I recode borderline cases – those that have evidence of 5+ solidarity NGOs – as mass solidarity mobilizations. Table 9 shows the results for the baseline models while Table 10 shows the results for the baseline models including regional and temporal controls. The inclusion of these cases does not undermine the weak diaspora hypothesis as the diaspora strength index retains its direction and remains statistically significant, albeit with some weakening (p < 0.1).

60 Table 9: Results for baseline models (5+ NGO threshold for mass solidarity mobilizations)

DV = mass Model 1a Model 1b Model 2a Model 2b solidarity mobilization (1/0) Diaspora strength -2.995 (1.184)** -2.624 (0.129)** -3.094 1.262)** -2.772 (1.190)**

Christian 1.781 (0.543)*** 1.786 (0.544)*** 1.878 (0.565)*** 1.908 (0.573)***

Geographic 0.000 (0.000) 0.000 (0.000) 0.000 (0.000) 0.0000 (0.000) Proximity Civil War 1.700 (0.581)*** 1.767 (0.591)*** ______

Political Terror ______1.790 (0.505) 1.932 (0.523)***

Media attention 0.327 (0.169)* ______0.292 (0.173)* ______1950 lag (logged)

Media attention ______0.282 (0.171) ______0.244 (0.186) 10yr-lag (logged)

Western arms 1950 0.250 (0.152) ______0.299 (0.167)* ______lag (logged)

Western arms 10-yr ______0.272 (0.126)** ______0.341 (0.141)** lag (logged)

N 128 128 128 128 Prob < chi 2 0.000 0.0001 0.000 0.000 Pseudo R 2 0.2260 0.2217 0.279 0.2865 Log-odds are reported. Standard errors in parentheses. *p<0.1 ** p<0.05 ***p<0.01.

61 Table 10: Results for baselines models with regional and temporal controls (5+ NGO threshold for mass solidarity mobilizations)

DV = mass Model 1a Model 1b Model 2a Model 2b solidarity mobilization (1/0) Diaspora strength -2.857 (1.490)* -2.441 (1.408)* -2.473 (1.394)* -2.232 (1.330)*

Christian 0.677 (0.923) 0.610 (0.916) 0.753 (0.885) 0.708 (0.872)

Geographic 0.000 (0.000) 0.000 (0.000) 0.000 (0.000) 0.000 (0.000) Proximity Civil War 3.242 (0.961)*** 3.152 (0.944)*** ______

Political Terror ______1.768 (0.575)*** 1.792 (0.578)***

Media attention 0.243 (0.188) ______0.1455 (0.182) ______1950 lag (logged)

Media attention ______0.236 (0.193) ______0.152 (0.193) 10yr-lag (logged)

Western arms 1950 0.191 (0.192) ______0.221 (0.196) ______lag (logged)

Western arms 10-yr ______0.132 (0.159) ______0.188 (0.169) lag (logged)

Europe 1.792 (1.495) 1.406 (0.1488) 1.090 (1.427) 0.867 (1.387) Latin America 4.062 (1.178)*** 3.990 (1.155)*** 2.475 (0.984)** 2.398 (0.988)**

Asia-Middle East 1.243 (0.981) 1.151 (0.987) 0.553 (0.973) 0.388 (1.009)

Cold War 1.412 (0.765)* 1.382 (0.757)* 0.972 (0.733) 0.866 (0.723)

N 128 128 128 128 Prob < chi 2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.000 Pseudo R 2 0.4040 0.3959 0.3624 0.3604 Log-odds are reported. Standard errors in parentheses. *p<0.1 ** p<0.05 ***p<0.01.

3.7 Model Predictions As a final look at the data, I now consider the predictive performance of the four baseline models considered above to assess how useful they are in telling us under what conditions we might expect a mass solidarity mobilizations to form. To do so, I use classification tables to see the number of cases that each model predicts accurately. For each case in the data, the models compute a probability of mass solidarity mobilization. The model makes an accurate prediction when it computes a probability of mass

62 solidarity mobilization that is greater than 50% in a case where such a mobilization is observed. Similarly, the model also performs well when the model computes a probability that is less than 50% for a case where a mass solidarity mobilizations is not observed. In terms of predictive power, the models accurately predict around only half of the cases of mass solidarity mobilization. Models 1a and 1b accurately predict 50% of the positive cases, while models 2a and 2b predict ~40% of the positive cases. Table 11: Classification Table for Model 1a

Observed Predicted Yes mass solidarity No mass mobilizations solidarity mobilizations Yes mass solidarity 12 5 mobilizations No mass solidarity 12 99 mobilizations

Table 12: Classification Table for Model 1b

Observed Predicted Yes mass solidarity No mass mobilizations solidarity mobilizations Yes mass solidarity 12 4 mobilizations ~No mass solidarity 12 100 mobilizations

Table 13: Classification Table for Models 2a

Observed Predicted Yes mass solidarity No mass mobilizations solidarity mobilizations Yes mass solidarity 9 5 mobilizations No mass solidarity 15 99 mobilizations

Table 14: Classification Table for Models 2b

Observed Predicted Yes mass solidarity No mass mobilizations solidarity mobilizations Yes mass solidarity 10 3 mobilizations No mass solidarity 14 101 mobilizations

The predictive limits of the four baselines models is a finding that is worthy of some consideration. As I argue in the next section, the poor predictive performance of the models suggests the limits of a structural account of mass solidarity mobilization. While the analysis so far has shed some light on the conditions under which mass solidarity mobilization is more likely, what is missing from this approach is the central role that agents play in generating collective action. Political opportunities for mass solidarity mobilization may exist but without individuals willing to take action and mobilize, collective action will not occur. As Sharon Nepstad put it, “even the best of conditions cannot produce a movement unless people choose to act.” 254

3.8 Unpredictability and Agency in Mass Solidarity Mobilizing According to the weak diaspora theory outlined in chapter 2, and supported here, weak diasporas create incentives for rebels to recruit non-diasporic supporters to their cause. For the theory to work as expected, however, a number of conditions need to be in place. These conditions reflect the contingent and agentic nature of mass solidarity mobilization that make it a hard-to-predict phenomenon. First, rebel entrepreneurs must be present. Conducive structural conditions for mass solidarity mobilization does not make this a given. For any number of reasons, entrepreneurs may not emerge. One may lack the time or resources to take on a leadership position, preferring others to do the job instead. 255 They may not be embedded

254 Sharon Nepstad, Convictions of the Soul: Religion, Culture and Agency in the Central America Solidarity Movement (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004). 255 Pamela Oliver, ““If You Don’t Do it, Nobody Else Will”: Active and Token Contributors to Local Collective Action,” American Sociological Review Vol. 49 (1984).

64 in social or familial networks that are supportive of activism, 256 and they may feel like they do not have the skills or connections to do the job successfully. For diasporans, fear of deportation and discrimination, as well as a lack of language and political skills, amongst others, may also act as obstacles to activist entrepreneurship. 257 While for some physical and emotional trauma experienced in the homeland conflict can spur activism, for others it can act as an obstacle. The same is true for distant rebels who must have the wherewithal to organize themselves and engage in transnational activism, which can be costly. 258 Levels of poverty and domestic repression impact the ability of a distant rebel to go abroad. Government authorities may block members of distant rebels from travelling, and may interrupt communications between them and potential external supporters. As Thomas Risse & Kathryn Sikkink have suggested, “very oppressive governments sometimes do not become the subject of international campaigns by the advocacy networks, because information gathering requires at least some minimal links between domestic opposition and the transnational networks if the latter is to gain access to the norm-violating state.” 259 Second, assuming rebel entrepreneurs exist, it is then not a given that they will engage in the types of advocacy strategies as expected by the weak diaspora proposition. Perception and interpretation shape how entrepreneurs respond to the conditions around them. 260 Rebels have to perceive their diasporic communities in the West as weak in order to recruit in ways expected by the theory. A diaspora or distant rebel entrepreneur who believes his or her diasporic community has the capacity to provide significant help to the homeland and play a significant political role in shaping Western policy, is less likely to seek out non-diasporic support. For this reason, the predictive capability of the

256 Doug McAdam & Ronnelle Paulsen, “Specifying the Relationship Between Social Ties and Activism,” American Journal of Sociology Vol. 99, No. 3 (November 1993). 257 Martin Sokefeld, “Mobilizing in Transnational Space: A Social Movement Approach to the Formation of Diaspora,” Global Networks Vol. 6 No. 3 (2006), pp. 265-284. Bert Klandermans and Dirk Oegema. "Potentials, networks, motivations, and barriers: Steps towards participation in social movements." American sociological review (1987): 519-531. 258 Victor Asal, Justin Conrad & Peter White. "Going abroad: Transnational Solicitation and Contention by Ethnopolitical Organizations," International Organization 68, no. 4 (2014). 259 Thomas Risse & Kathryn Sikkink, “The Socialization of International Human Rights Norms into Domestic Practices: An Introduction,” in Thomas Risse, Stephen Ropp & Kathryn Sikkink (eds.), The Power of Human Rights: International Norms and Domestic Change (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), p. 22. 260 Jeff Goodwin & James Jasper, “Caught in a Winding, Snarling Vine: The Structural Bias of Political Process Theory,” Sociological Forum Vol. 14, No. 1 (1999), p. 33.

65 statistical models is dependent on not only the presence of rebel entrepreneurs but also their ability to see their circumstances in a way that is consistent with what the model is suggesting. Third, even when rebel entrepreneurs interpret their surroundings in a way that is consistent with the theory, it is not predetermined that their recruitment efforts will be successful and that mass solidarity mobilization will follow. Successful recruitment is contingent on the use of advocacy frames that resonate and motivate an audience. Effective advocacy often involves presenting an issue in a way that makes the cause legible to an audience, helps them to identify with it in some way, and motivates them to take action. 261 When an issue is framed in a way that matches the values and interests of an audience, it is more likely to be taken up. 262 If rebel entrepreneurs fail to frame their cause in a way that makes sense to their audience, then it is less likely that a mass solidarity mobilizations will form. They may also fail to identify the right non-diasporic networks to recruit from, as some networks may be more likely to oppose their cause, or feel neutral about it, than others. Furthermore, issues beyond the control of the rebel entrepreneurs themselves impact the likelihood of successfully gaining non-diasporic support. To become an activist, an individual must not only be motivated but they must also be able to overcome any barriers that may exist to their participation in a social movement. 263 In some instances, regardless of how compelling a cause is and how savvy the rebels are, non-diasporans may simply lack the ability to add a new issue to their plate, despite their normative buy-in to the struggle. A rebel entrepreneur can do all the right things and still fail to attract much support.

3.9 Conclusion This chapter provided a quantitative test of the claim that mass solidarity mobilizations are more likely to form in support of distant rebels with weak diasporas in the West than those with strong ones. I found fairly robust evidence in favour of the proposition using a series of controls and robustness checks. Statistical tests, however,

261 Robert Benford & David Snow, “Framing Processes and Social Movements: An Overview and Assessment,” Annual Review of Sociology (2000), pp. 611-639. 262 Bob, The Marketing of Rebellion . 263 Klandermans & Oegema. "Potentials, networks, motivations, and barriers: Steps towards participation in social movements.”

66 only provide a partial examination of the hypothesized relationship between diaspora strength and mass solidarity mobilization. In the next two chapters I build on this analysis by conducting a qualitative test of the weak diaspora proposition in order to shed light on the causal mechanism that ties together lower levels of diaspora strength with an increased probability of mass solidarity mobilizing.

67 Chapter 4 Why Compares Palestinians and Kurds?

The quantitative results I presented in chapter 3 suggest a fairly strong statistical relationship between the strength of a distant rebel’s diaspora in the West and the probability that mass solidarity mobilizations will occur on their behalf. Specifically, distant rebels with weaker diasporas were found to be more likely to receive this kind of external support than those with stronger diasporas. Quantitative methods, however, only allow for a partial test of the existence of a causal relationship between diaspora strength and mass solidarity mobilizing. To avoid spurious correlation, we still require evidence of the causal processes or mechanisms, outlined in chapter 2, that tie rebel strategy, diaspora strength and mass solidarity mobilization together. In the next two chapters I provide qualitative evidence of this causal process, illustrating how a weak diaspora can enable mass solidarity mobilizing, while a strong diaspora does not. Using a “most-similar systems” design, 264 I compare the cases of Western activist responses to the Palestinian and Kurdish struggles. I select these cases not only because they vary significantly in the level of support they have received from Western solidarity activists but also because of the number of theoretically relevant similarities between them. These similarities include not only statelessness but also the nature of the grievances involved, the severity of the two conflicts, the framing strategies and militancy of the Palestinians and Kurds, international visibility, and Western governmental support for Israel and Turkey. Given these shared characteristics, this case selection adheres to James Mahoney & Gary Goertz’s “possibility principle” in which the negative case selected (the Kurds) represents a case where the outcome being studied (mass solidarity mobilization) is possible.265 In other words, it is reasonable to suggest that we should have seen mass solidarity mobilizations in support of both distant rebel movements, even if conditions favoured even wider mobilizing for the Palestinians.

264 Sidney Tarrow, “The Strategy of Paired Comparison: Toward a Theory of Practice,” Comparative Political Studies Vol. 43, No. 2 (2010), p. 234. 265 James Mahoney & Gary Goertz, “The Possibility Principle: Choosing Negative Cases in Comparative Research,” American Political Science Review Vol. 98, No. 4 (2004), pp. 653-669.

68 I argue that what explains why a mass solidarity mobilization has occurred for the Palestinians but not the Kurds has to do with the differences between the Palestinian and Kurdish diasporas in North America and Western Europe which impacted the recruitment strategies of both rebel movements. Specifically, the weakness of the Palestinian diaspora, characterized by its small size, inaction and internecine conflict, has encouraged Palestinian activist organizers to recruit non-Palestinians to actively support their cause. By contrast, the strength of the Kurdish diaspora, characterized by large numbers and high levels of political organization, has encouraged Kurdish activist organizers to focus their recruitment efforts on the Kurdish communities in Europe, and less attention on recruiting non-Kurdish supporters. These distinct recruitment strategies, as a function of the diasporas, helps to explain the varying responses of Western grassroots activists to these two similar struggles. In this chapter I justify my selection of these two cases. Importantly, both groups differ markedly in terms of the extent of grassroots solidarity in the West they have received. I outline these mobilizations in more detail in chapter 5, but suffice it to say here that while hundreds of Palestine-focused solidarity NGOs have formed since the early 1980s, and especially in the 2000s, very few have formed for the Kurds. In fact, today Palestine is arguably a cause celebre in Western civil society, especially in light of the growing popularity of the Boycott, Divestment & Sanctions campaign that formally began in 2005. The extent of these mobilizations for Palestine is significant, with some suggesting that Israel is now the target of a widespread international campaign seeking to delegitimize its very existence. 266 Others note that within European civil society, if not Western civil society more broadly, Israel is widely considered to be a “state beyond the pale.” 267 By contrast, the Kurds in Turkey have not been the recipients of such widespread grassroots solidarity in the West and, relatedly, the Turkish state has not been

266 Gerald Steinberg, “Soft Powers Play Hardball: NGOs Wage War Against Israel,” Israel Affairs Vol. 42 No. 4 (October 2006), pp. 748-768. Efraim Karsh, “The War Against the Jews,” Israel Affairs Vol. 18 No. 3 (July 2012), pp. 319-343. Don Habibi, “Human Rights and Politicized Human Rights: A Utilitarian Critique,” Journal of Human Rights Vol. 6 No. 3 (2007). Efraim Sicher, “The Image of Israel and Postcolonial Discourse in the Early 21 st Century: A View From Britain,” Israel Studies Vol, 16 No. 1 (Spring 2011), pp. 1-25. 267 Robin Shepherd, A State Beyond the Pale: Europe’s Problem with Israel (London: Weidenfeld & Nicholson, 2009).

69 the targets of sustained grassroots campaigning against it in North America and Western Europe. As one British activist put it: The Palestinian cause is well known and many, all around the world, stand in solidarity with the Palestinian people. A people without a state who have been struggling for one for nearly 70 years. This support is generally underpinned by the principle of self-determination. Compare this, though, to the campaign for Kurdish independence and statehood and the support vanishes. It is important to note that the Kurds are the largest ethnic group in the world without a state of their own, not a well-known fact. Their struggle, furthermore, has been ongoing for a century since the fall of the Ottoman empire. Yet, despite this, the Kurdish cause is curiously neglected by those who campaign for Palestine. 268

Given the number of important similarities between the Palestinian and Kurdish struggle, this is a puzzling outcome. In the rest of this chapter I outline these similarities. In the next chapter I illustrate how variations between Palestinian and Kurdish diaspora strength in the West has contributed to these varied mobilization outcomes.

4.1 Palestinian and Kurdish Grievances: Ethnic Discrimination and Occupation Scholars have argued that the nature of a group’s grievances can impact their likelihood of attracting transnational activist support. Margaret Keck & Kathryn Sikkink, among others, argue that the violation of bodily integrity rights and the ability to trace these violations to a clear perpetrator make a group more likely to attract the support of transnational activists. 269 They also suggest that the denial of equal legal opportunity, as seen in case of apartheid South Africa, can also make a cause more attractive. 270 In this regard, the Palestinian and Kurds face similar conditions. Both have long suffered from repeated and severe bodily integrity rights violations that can be easily associated with the actions of a government and its armed forces, and also face political exclusion and

268 Zwan Mahmod, “Solidarity and Double Standards: Why Palestine but not Kurdistan,” Kurdistan Tribune (October 26, 2014). Available at: http://kurdistantribune.com/2014/solidarity-double-standards- why-palestine-but-not-kurdistan/ 269 Margaret Keck & Kathryn Sikkink, Activists Beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in International Politics (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1998). Diane Stone, “Think Tanks, Global Lesson Drawing and Networking Social Policy Ideas,” Global Social Policy Vol. 1, No. 3 pp. 338-360. 270 Keck & Kathryn Sikkink, Activists Beyond Borders .

70 ethnic discrimination. Further, they both suffer from colonial rule and foreign occupation. Since 1948, the Palestinian-Arab minority in Israel has held a precarious position. They face political marginalization and economic inequality, despite their formal status as citizens and the provision of basic civil rights as stipulated in Israel’s founding documents and Basic Laws. 271 Israeli political institutions, including the judiciary, often practice a strong bias in favor of the rights of Jewish citizens of the state at the expense of the Arab minority across a wide variety of public policy areas, including access to health care, education, transportation, housing and education. 272 In light of these practices, some claim that Israel is best understood as an ethnic democracy that privileges Jews over Arabs, 273 while others refer to it as an ‘ethnocracy’ engaged in attempts to “Judaize” Palestine 274 and remove any remaining vestiges of Palestinian identity and political claims to the land. 275 For the Palestinians who live under military and civilian occupation in the West Bank and Gaza, the situation is arguably much worse. In large part due to the creation and expansion of Jewish-only settlements, and the security infrastructure that surrounds them, many have likened Israeli policy in the occupied territories to apartheid rule in South Africa. 276 In light of their situation, Palestinians have not only called for policy reforms but also the restructuring of the Israeli state. Palestinian NGOs in Israel argue that Israel ought to abandon its identity as a ‘Jewish State’ and recognize the Arab minority as an indigenous population with collective rights. 277 Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza

271 Alan Dowty, The Jewish State: A Century Later (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998), p. 186. Oded Haklai, Palestinian Ethnonationalism in Israel (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2011). 272 David Kretzmer, The Occupation of Justice: The Supreme Court of Israel and the Occupied Territories (Albany, New York: State University of New York Press, 2002). Oded Haklai, “Religious-Nationalist Mobilization and State Penetration: Lessons From Jewish Settlers’ Activism in Israel and the West Bank,” Comparative Political Studies Vol. 40 No. 6 (June 2007), pp. 713-739. 273 Sammy Smooha, “The Model of Ethnic Democracy: Israel as a Jewish and Democratic State,” Nations and Nationalism Vol. 8 No. 4 (2002), pp. 475-503. 274 Oren Yiftachel, Ethnocracy: Land and Identity Politics in Israel/Palestine (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2006). 275 Baruch Kimmerling, Politicide: Ariel Sharon’s War Against the Palestinians (London: Verso Books, 2003). 276 Ben White, Israeli Apartheid: A Beginner’s Guide (London: Pluto Press, 2009). Uri Davis, Israel, an Apartheid State (London: Zed Books, 1987). 277 Dov Waxman, “Israel’s Other Palestinian Problem: The Future Vision Documents and the Demands of the Palestinian minority in Israel,” Israel Affairs Vol. 19 No. 1 (2013), pp. 214-229.

71 have called for the establishment of their own state alongside Israel, a position that is still supported by a majority of people on both sides. In recent years, however, some have more actively advocated for a one-state solution and the establishment of a bi-national state for both Jews and Arabs. 278 It is often argued that one reason for mass solidarity mobilization for the Palestinians has to do with the nature of the Israeli state not only as ethno-nationalist but also as colonial in nature, and thus illegitimate. 279 Many Palestine solidarity activists situate the founding of Israel within a history not of historical anti-Semitism culminating in the Nazi Holocaust, 280 but rather in the history of Western colonialism and European maltreatment of indigenous populations. 281 This has led many to call for the end of the Jewish State on the grounds that its founding and current policies are out of step with twentieth-century post-colonial values. 282 These characteristics, however, are also present in the Kurdish case, especially for those living in Turkey. Kurds have also faced decades of exclusion and systematic discrimination throughout the Middle East. Since the formation of the Turkish Republic in 1923, official state policy has denied the political legitimacy of Kurdish identity and has been one of coercive assimilation. 283 In official Turkish discourse, Kurds were not referred to as ‘Kurds’ but rather as “Mountain Turks”, “prospective Turks,” or “Turks to- be.” 284 Government institutions expressed a strong anti-Kurdish bias. The judiciary rejected Kurdish rights claims 285 and the state criminalized the use of the Kurdish language. 286 The state has also banned numerous Kurdish parties. In fact, Turkish law

278 For example see Omar Barghouti, “Organizing for Self-Determination, Ethical De-Zionization and Resisting Apartheid,” Contemporary Arab Affairs Vol. 2 No. 4 (October-December 2009), pp. 576-586. 279 Emanuel Adler, “Israel’s Unsettled Relations with the World,” in Emanuel Adler (ed.), Israel in the World: Legitimacy and Exceptionalism (New York: Routledge, 2013), p. 7. 280 Avi Bareli, “Forgetting Europe: Perspectives on the Debate about Zionism and Colonialism,” Journal of Israeli History (2001), pp. 99-120. 281 Edward Said, The Question of Palestine (New York: Times Books, 1979). 282 Tony Judt, “Israel: The Alternative,” New York Review of Books (October 23, 2003). http://www.nybooks.com/articles/2003/10/23/israel-the-alternative/ 283 Vera Eccarius-Kelly, The Militant Kurds: A Dual Strategy for Freedom (Santa Barbara, California: Praeger, 2011), p. 3. 284 Bahar Baser, Diasporas and Homeland Conflicts: A Comparative Perspective , (Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2015) p. 54-55. 285 Derya Bayir, “Representation of the Kurds by the Turkish Judiciary,” Human Rights Quarterly Vol. 35 (2013), pp. 116-142. 286 Welat Zeydanlioglu, “Turkey’s Kurdish Language Policy,” International Journal of the Sociology of Language (September 2012), pp. 99-125.

72 provides minority protections only to non-Muslim groups, including Armenians, Greeks and Jews, but not to Kurds. 287 Given what many see as its poor record in protecting Kurdish minority rights, Turkey, like Israel, has also been described as an ethnic democracy that privileges the rights of Turks over Kurds. 288 Others have taken it a step further, suggesting that Turkey’s Kurdish policy is not only discriminatory but genocidal.289 The Kurds have also claimed that their struggle is one against Turkish colonialism and occupation. 290 They too depict their struggle as resisting foreign rule. 291 For example, the Kurdish Parliament in Exile (now the Kurdish National Congress) has called for the end to the “foreign occupation”of Kurdistan. 292 Ismail Besikci, a Turkish sociologist, has argued that Kurdistan constitutes an “international colony.” 293 As such, like the Palestinians, the Kurds are not only seeking equal rights to Turks but have also asserted their right to self-determination, whether in an autonomous province in southeastern Turkey or in an independent state. 294

4.2 Conflict Severity Beyond grievances, the severity of the conflicts, namely the extent of state violence and repression, may also account for differing responses by Western activists. As I showed in the statistical tests in chapter 3, the more severe a conflict is the more likely a mass solidarity mobilizations is to mobilize in response to support the aggrieved. In the case of the Palestinians and Kurds, however, both conflicts are comparable in terms of severity. According to the Political Terror Scores data (presented in Figure 3

287 Leila Berkowitz & Liza Mugge, “Transnational Diaspora Lobbying: Europeanization and the Kurdish Question,” Journal of Intercultural Studies Vol. 35, No. 1 (2014), p. 78. 288 Mustafa Saatci, “Nation States and Ethnic Boundaries: Modern Turkish Identity and Turkish-Kurdish Conflict,” Nations and Nationalism Vol. 8 No. 4 (2002), p. 552. 289 Desmond Fernandes, “Modernity and the Linguistic Genocide of Kurds in Turkey,” De Gruyter Mouton (2012), pp. 75-98. 290 Ismail Besikci, Kurdistan & Turkish Colonialism: Selected Writings (London: Kurdistan Information Centre, 1991). Ismail Besikci, International Colony Kurdistan (London: Taderon Press, 2004). 291 Cengiz Gunes, The Kurdish National Movement in Turkey: From Protest to Resistance (New York: Routledge, 2012), p. 74. Baser, Diasporas and Homeland Conflicts 292 Henri Barkey & Graham Fuller, Turkey’s Kurdish Question (Lanham, Md: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 1998), p. 36. Robert Pape, Dying to Wing: The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism (New York: Random House, 2006). 293 Ismail Besikci, International Colony Kurdistan . 294 Gunes Murat Tezcur, “When Democratization Radicalizes: The Kurdish Nationalist Movement in Turkey,” Journal of Peace Research Vol. 46 No. 7 (2010), p. 775.

73 below), from 1975 to 2006 both conflicts received an average score of 3.5 out of 5 (1 being the best, 5 being the worst). Figure 3: Levels of Political Terror in Israel-Palestine and Turkey 1975 - 2006

5.0 4.5 4.0 3.5 3.0 2.5 2.0 Turkey 1.5 1.0 Israel-Palestine 0.5 Level of Politilal Terror (1 = lowest; (1 lowest; = = 5 highest) 0.0 1976 1978 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 Year

From 1948, the Israeli government’s impact on Palestinian life has been significant. The creation of the Jewish state resulted in somewhere between 600,000 and 750,000 refugees, 295 as well as hundreds of Arab villages destroyed, 296 although it is important to note that historians disagree on the causes of these developments. 297 Many of these refugees have not been allowed to return to their homes. 298 The 1967 war resulted in approximately 300,000 Palestinian refugees, many of whom were displaced for a second time. 299 From 1967 to the Gaza war (Operation Cast Lead) in 2009, it is estimated that Israeli forces have killed more than 8000 Palestinians in the occupied territories, including Gaza. 300 Displacement and death tolls, however, only capture a part

295 Efraim Karsh, “How Many Palestinian Arab Refugees Were There?” Israel Affairs Vol. 17, No. 2 (2011), pp. 224-246. 296 Ilan Pappe, The Ethnic Cleansing of Palestine (Oxford: OneWorld, 2007). 297 Efraim Karsh, Fabricating Israeli History: The “New Historians” (London: Frank Cass, 1997). Efraim Karsh, Palestine Betrayed (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2010). Benny Morris, The Birth of the Palestinian Refugee Problem Revisited (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004). Benny Morris, 1948: A History of the First Arab-Israeli War (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2008). Pappe, The Ethnic Cleansing of Palestine . Eugene Rogan & Avi Shlaim (eds.), The War for Palestine: Rewriting the History of 1948 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007). 298 Simon Waldman, Anglo-American Diplomacy and the Palestinian Refugee Problem, 1948-1951 (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2015). 299 Nur Masalha, “The 1967 Palestinian Exodus,” in Ghada Karmi & Eugene Cotran (eds.) The Palestinian Exodus, 1948-1998 (Reading: Ithaca Press, 1999) , p. 63. 300 This number combines B’Tselem data from 1987 to 2009 available here: http://www.btselem.org/statistics/first_intifada_tables and Neve Gordon’s estimate of 650 Palestinian

74 of the picture. In the West Bank, a system of checkpoints and roadblocks has made Palestinian movement as well as social and political cohesion increasingly difficult. 301 Furthermore, thousands of Palestinian homes in the West Bank have been demolished and many more are under demolition orders. According to the Israeli Committee against House Demolitions, since 1967 the Israeli army has destroyed more than 46,000 Palestinian civilian structures in the occupied territories. 302 Turkish repression of the Kurdish minority has also been significant, dating back the founding of the modern Turkish republic in the early 1920s. In 1925, during a government crackdown of a Kurdish uprising, British ambassador to Turkey Sir Ronald Lindsay stated that it is “difficult to imagine how the net of [state] repression could have been thrown out more widely…” 303 Through the 1970s, and especially after the 1980 military coup, the repression of the Kurds increased significantly. In 1982 Turkish lawmakers included bans on the use of the Kurdish language and the establishment of Kurdish political parties in the constitution. 304 In 1988, a Turkish parliamentary fact- finding mission reported that Turkish security forces had turned the Kurdish regions of the country into “a sort of concentration camp where every citizen is being treated as a suspect and where oppression, torture and insult by the military are the rule rather than the exception.” 305 Part of the government’s strategy to crush Kurdish resistance included the destruction of villages, especially those suspected of supporting Kurdish militants. By 1994, it is estimated that more than 2000 villages had been destroyed. 306 Torture, extrajudicial killings, and the burning of forests also characterized government policy, so

deaths from 1967-1987. Neve Gordon, Israel’s Occupation (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2008), p. xvii. 301 Gordon, Israel’s Occupation . Marwan Darweish & Andrew Rigby, Popular Protest in Palestine: The Uncertain Future of Unarmed Resistance (London: Pluto Press, 2015). 302 See http://icahd.org/ 303 David Romano, The Kurdish National Movement: Opportunity, Mobilization, and Identity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), p. 36. 304 Adamson, “Mechanisms of Diaspora Mobilization and the Transnationalization of Civil War,” p. 74. Eva Ostegaard-Nielsen, Trans-state Loyalties and Policies: Turks and Kurds in Germany (New York: Routledge, 2003), p. 60. 305 Quoted in Romano, The Kurdish National Movement , p. 80. 306 Romano, The Kurdish National Movement , p. 81.

75 much so that observers have referred to this period as a “dirty war.” 307 Since 1984, it is estimated that 40,000 have been killed and three million have been displaced. 308

4.3 Western Complicity

In addition to grievances and conflict severity, the extent of Western governmental complicity in the rights abuses of both Palestinians and Kurds is also similar. As I noted in chapters 2 and 3, Palestine solidarity activists often claim that their work is motivated by the ‘special relationship’ that exists between Israel and the West, namely the US government. As one activist put it in a letter to the New York Times : “we target Israel for boycott not because we believe Israel is the worst human rights violator (we don’t), but because Israel is the single largest recipient of American foreign aid, more than $3 billion a year.”309 Palestine solidarity activists are correct in describing a close relationship between the US and Israel. According to the Congressional Research Service, “Israel is the largest cumulative recipient of US foreign assistance since World War II, ” the vast majority of which comes as military aid. 310 Yet, Turkey, as a member of NATO, also tops the list of recipients of US military aid, receiving the third-most assistance of all states. 311 As in the Israel-Palestine case, this US aid has been widely described as enabling Turkey’s military repression of the Kurds.312 In 1995, for instance, a Human Rights Watch report found that “U.S weapons, as well as those supplied by other NATO members, are regularly used by Turkey to commit severe human rights abuses and violations of the laws of war in the [Kurdish] southeast.” 313 Other prominent voices have also picked up on this claim. In 1999, for example, Edward Said, whose writings on Israel-Palestine have contributed greatly to pro-Palestine sentiment in the West, wrote in

307 Baser, Diasporas and Homeland Conflicts , p. 60.. 308 Adamson, “Mechanisms of Diaspora Mobilization and the Transnationalization of Civil War,” p. 72. 309 “Is a Boycott of Israel Just?” New York Times (February 18, 2014). http://www.nytimes.com/2014/02/19/opinion/the-case-for-the-israel-boycott.html?_r=0 310 Jeremy Sharp, “US Foreign Aid to Israel,” Congressional Research Service (June 10, 2015). Available here: https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/RL33222.pdf 311 Romano, The Kurdish National Movement , p. 53. 312 Tamar Gabelnick, “Turkey: Arms and Human Rights,” Foreign Policy in Focus Vol. 4 (1999). 313 James Ron, Weapons Transfers and Violations of the Laws of War in Turkey , Human Rights Watch (1995), p. 2.

76 the New Left Review decrying Turkish policy towards the Kurds. He referred to Turkey as “a US ally whose policies [towards the Kurds] are in fact abetted by the US.” 314

4.4 Extent of Violence Perpetrated by Palestinian and Kurdish Militants Beyond grievances, conflict severity, and Western complicity, the strategies the aggrieved adopt to advance their interests are also said to matter in shaping their attractiveness to Western activists. 315 Some activists suggest that non-violent groups are more likely to secure the support of Western activists than those who adopt violent methods. 316 Yet, both the Palestinian and Kurds have made armed struggle a central pillar of their strategies for change. Leading Palestinian organizations including the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), Hamas, and Islamic Jihad, among others, have long engaged in armed resistance to Israel, which has included attacks on both military and civilian targets. Since 1984 the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) has been the main armed insurgent group resisting the Turkish state. 317 Both the US State Department and European Union have labeled these groups as terrorist organizations. 318 These groups have also perpetrated a similar level of violence, albeit with vastly different distributions (see Figure 4 below). 319

314 Edward Said, “Protecting the Kosovars,” New Left Review (1999), p. 74. 315 Keck & Sikkink, Activists Beyond Borders . Bob, The Marketing of Rebellion . Idean Salehyan, Kristian Skrede Gleditsch & David Cunningham, “Explaining External Support for Insurgent Groups,” International Organization 65 (Fall 2011), pp. 709-744. 316 Interview, NGO Forum on Sri Lanka/US Counsel on Sri Lanka, October 1, 2012. 317 Gunes Murat Tezcur, “When Democratization Radicalizes: The Kurdish Nationalist Movement in Turkey,” Journal of Peace Research Vol. 47, No. 6 (2010), pp. 775-789. 318 See http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/other/des/123085.htm 319 All data is available here: http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/

77 Figure 4: Palestinian and Kurdish Attacks 1970 - 2005

400 350 300 250

200 Palestinian Attacks (n = 873) 150 Kurdish Attacks

Number Number of Attacks 100 (n = 1119) 50 0 1970 1973 1976 1979 1982 1985 1988 1991 1994 1997 2000 2003 Year

4.5 International Visibility The similarities so far described between the Palestinian and Kurdish struggles may be of little relevance in explaining mass solidarity mobilizations mobilization if information about them is not readily available. While the Palestinian struggle has been widely documented and garnered significant international attention, leading some to suggest that “Israel is among the most common targets of the global spotlight,” 320 the Kurdish struggle has also received considerable international attention making mass solidarity mobilizing in this case also possible, even if less widespread. From 1986 to 2000, Israel and Turkey were among the top-ten most frequent targets of Amnesty International’s reports and press releases. 321 In fact, from 1975 to 2000, Amnesty devoted more attention to Turkey than it did to any other state. 322 Through the 1990s, both countries were among the top-ten recipients of attention from Human Rights Watch. 323 Both conflicts also hold a prominent place in the agendas of

320 Emilie Hafner-Burton, “Sticks and Stones: Naming and Shaming the Human Rights Enforcement Problem,” International Organization 62 (Fall 2008), pp. 691. 321 James Ron, Howard Ramos & Kathleen Rodgers, “Transnational Information Politics: NGO Human Rights Reporting, 1986-2000,” International Studies Quarterly 49 (2005), p. 568. 322 Cullen Hendrix & Wendy Wong (2012), ‘When is the Pen Truly Mighty? Regime type and the efficacy of naming and shaming in curbing human rights abuses’, British Journal of Political Science , Vol. 43, No. 3, pp. 1-22. 323 Ron, Ramos & Rodgers, “Transnational Information Politics. p. 574

78 leading international organizations. It has been well documented that the UN General Assembly and Human Rights Commission/Council have paid more attention to Israel and the Palestinians than they have to most other states, including those with comparable or worse records of human rights abuse. 324 While Turkish abuses are not particularly salient within UN human rights discourse, they are prominent in European regional institutions, including the European Parliament and the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR). 325 In 1995, for instance, the European Parliament awarded Leyla Zana, a prominent Kurdish politician in Turkey who had been arrested on the grounds of promoting separatism, the Sakharov Prize for Freedom of Speech. 326 From 1959 to 2011, Turkey topped the list of countries subject to a judgment issued by the ECHR. In fact, Turkey received approximately 500 more judgments than the court’s second most-frequent target, Russia. 327 For good reason, Bahar Baser refers to the Kurdish struggle as “highly visible in world politics” 328 while Nicole Watts describes it as an “international cause celebre.” 329 The Palestinians and Kurds have also received considerable attention from the Western press. As Figure 5 below shows, from 1950 to 2002, the New York Times has paid more attention to the Palestinians than the Kurds but also that the Kurds have been far from absent from its pages. 330

324 Thomas Franck, Nation against Nation: What Happened to the UN Dream and what the US Can Do About It (New York: Oxford University Press, 1985) , ch. 11-12. Jack Donnelly, “Human Rights at the United Nations 1955-1985: The Question of Bias, ” International Studies Quarterly Vol. 32, No. 3 (September 1988), p. 290. Steven Seligman, “Politics and Principle at the UN Human Rights Commission and Council,” Israel Affairs Vol. 17, No. 4 (2011), pp. 526-527. 325 Marlies Casier, “The Politics of Solidarity: The Kurdish Question in the European Parliament” in Marlies Casier & Joost Jongerden (ed.), Nationalisms and Politics in Turkey: Political Islam, Kemalism, and the Kurdish Issue (New York: Routledge, 2011), p. 199-200. 326 Casier, “The Politics of Solidarity,” p. 201 327 See http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/2012/03/14/turkey-echr/ 328 Bahar Baser, Inherited Conflicts: Spaces of Contention Between Second-Generation Turkish and Kurdish Diasporas in Sweden and Germany, PhD Dissertation Department of Political Science, European University Institute (2012), p. 40. 329 Watts, “Institutionalizing Virtual Kurdistan West: Transnational Networks and Ethnic Contention in International Affairs.” 330 The specific search terms used were: “Palestinian,” “Palestinians,” ”Kurd,” “Kurds,” “Kurdish”

79 Figure 5: New York Times Reference to Palestinians and Kurds 1950-2002

2000 1800 1600 1400 1200 1000 Palestinians 800 Kurds 600 400 200 0

1950 1954 1958 1962 1966 1970 1974 1978 1982 1986 1990 1994 1998 2002 In the Palestinian case, a number of spikes in media coverage correlate with episodes of Western activist mobilization. These include Israel’s invasion of Lebanon in 1982, the start of the first intifada in the late 1980s, and the start of the second intifada in the early 2000s. As can be seen in Figure 2, the Kurds have also been subject of media spikes that could have resulted in Western activist mobilizations. In 1963, and then again in the mid-1970s, the New York Times reported consistently on the negotiations and fighting that occurred between the Iraqi government and Kurdish leaders on the matter of regional autonomy. In 1979, greater attention was paid to the Kurds in Iran in the context of the Islamic revolution. That year, William Safire penned a largely sympathetic portrait of the Kurds, observing that “no voice is raised in that entire establishment (the United Nations) for the legitimate rights of an ancient people now being denied by Iraq, Iran, Turkey and Syria.” 331 1988 also saw an increase in attention to the Kurds after the Iraqi government’s use of poison gas against them and their flight en masse to the Turkish border. That year Safire wrote that “a classic example of genocide is under way, and the world does not give a damn.” 332 Others at the time also described the conditions facing the Kurds as genocidal. 333 The first Gulf War in 1990-1991 also saw increased attention to the Kurds, including reports of Iraqi and Turkish strikes against Kurdish

331 William Safire, “The Kurdish Question,” New York Times , September 19, 1979, p. 23. 332 William Safire, “Stop the Iraqi Murder of the Kurds,” NYT, Sept 5, 1988, p. 21. 333 “Poison Gas: Iraq’s Crime,” New York Times , March 26, 1988, p. 30. “Hardly a Peep on Poison Gas,” New York Times , September 10, 1988, p. 26. “Murder within Sovereign Borders,” NYT , September 5, 1988, p. 20.

80 positions. The coverage throughout the rest of the 1990s continued to cover the Kurds in northern Iraq as well as the situation of the Kurds in Turkey. 334 Both struggles have also been salient within Western left-wing networks. The Western-left has long engaged with the question of Zionism and Palestine, well before the creation of the State of Israel. 335 While some segments of the left were supportive of the Zionist project, many were hostile. In the late 19 th and early 20 th centuries, many Western Marxists, including those of Jewish descent, argued that Zionism was not the answer to pervasive anti-Semitism. 336 In their view, Jews ought to assimilate, join socialist organizations, and work towards a revolution that would create a classless society built on socialist principles. The Zionist attempt to sway European Jews towards nationalism was seen as a threat to those Marxists seeking to convince those very same Jews that their interests would be better served in a European-wide socialist movement. The experiences of the Nazi Holocaust did generate some left-wing sympathy for Jewish nationalism,337 but this was relatively short-lived. By the 1960s and 1970s, the emergence of the ‘New Left’ signaled a new phase in the Western left’s opposition to Zionism and Israel. 338 Zionism in this phase became identified as a form of Western colonialism and Israel was labeled a settler-colonial state. 339 This sentiment has helped facilitate mass solidarity mobilizations in support of the Palestinians. The struggle of the Kurds has also featured within Western left-wing discussions. 340 This is especially true of the journal MERIP: Middle East Research & Information Project . Founded in 1971 by anti-war activists in the US,341 MERIP has been described as “the foremost US magazine of critical analysis on the Middle East” and as one of the most widely read publications on the region, including by those working in

334 “Political Intolerance in Turkey,” NYT, Aug 3, 1996, p. 18. 335 Yohanan Petrovsky-Shtern, Lenin’s Jewish Question (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2010). 336 Shlomo Avineri, The Making of Modern Zionism: The Intellectual Origins of the Jewish State (New York: Basic Books, 1981), p. 94. 337 Philip Mendes, “The Australian Left’s Support for the Creation of the State of Israel,” Labour History No. 97 (November 2009), p. 137. 338 Paul Kelemen, The British Left and Zionism: History of a Divorce (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2012). Colin Shindler, Israel and the European Left (New York: Continuum, 2012). 339 Maxine Rodinson, Israel: A Settler-Colonial State (New York: Monad Press, 1973) 340 See http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2012/10/201210975353819725.html http://rudaw.net/english/yourrudaw-26062013000624 341 See http://www.brown.edu/Departments/Swearer_Center/Literacy_Resources/peace.html

81 human rights organizations. 342 Through the 1970s until the early 1980s, MERIP highlighted the situation facing the Kurds in Iraq, and to a lesser extent in Iran. 343 In the 1980s, MERIP turned their attention to the Kurds in Turkey. In 1984, they dedicated an entire issue to what the editors called “state terror in Turkey.” 344 The 1990s also saw a number of articles on the Kurds as well as an issue in 1994 focusing on the ‘Kurdish experience Readers of MERIP would have undoubtedly picked up on the significance of the Kurdish cause. Beyond MERIP , some leading figures on the Western left have also been out- spoken on the oppression of the Kurds. For instance, Noam Chomsky, whose writings on a variety of issues have been widely influential among certain segments of the Western left, has on numerous occasions written about the plight of the Kurds and the need for a solution to the Turkish-Kurdish conflict. 345 In 2002 Harold Pinter described Chomsky as someone who has “never ceased to call attention to the persecution of the Kurdish people in Turkey… 346

4.6 Conclusion In light of these similarities, why is it that only the Palestinians have attracted widespread solidarity in the West while the Kurds have not? One possible reason may have to do with the religious breakdown of the two groups, yet this view is not persuasive. While both groups are overwhelmingly Muslim, 347 the Palestinian community does have a Christian minority. Some Palestinian Christian leaders, such as those associated with the Sabeel Ecumenical Palestinian Liberation Theology Center, have been active in mobilizing their counterparts in the West for solidarity work and have played an important role in recent years in the passing of sympathetic resolutions by Western church organizations, such as the World Council of Churches, Presbyterian

342 See http://www.jstor.org/journal/middleeastreport 343 See John Galvani, “The Baathi Revolution in Iraq,” MERIP Reports 12 (1972). “Iraq and Kurdish Autonomy,” MERIP Reports (1974); “The Kurds Trust a Bad Ally,” MERIP Reports (1975); “Iraq and War in the Gulf,” MERIP Reports (1981). 344 Martin von Bruinessen, ““The Kurds in Turkey”, MERIP Reports (1984). 345 Noam Chomsky, “Foreword,” in Yildiz & Muller, The European Union and Turkish Accession: Human Rights and the Kurds (London: Pluto Press, 2008). 346 See http://www.haroldpinter.org/politics/introtochomskyspeech.html 347 According to Minorities at Risk data, 90% of Palestinians are Muslim.

82 Church USA, the United Methodist Church, and the Church of England. 348 The ties between Palestinian and Western Christians may partially explain the Christian contingent of the mass solidarity mobilizations on Palestine but it does not provide an explanation of the mass solidarity mobilizations as a whole, which includes numerous secular activists as well as those unaffiliated with Christian networks or organizations. In the next chapter, I argue that this variation is explained by the fact that the Palestinians have actively recruited non-Palestinians to compensate for the weakness of their diaspora while the Kurds have not because their diaspora was strong.

348 Naim Ateek, Cedar Duaybis & Maurine Tobin (eds.), Challenging Christian Zionism: Theology, Politics, and the Israel-Palestine Conflict (London: Melisende, 2005). Stephen Sizer, Christian Zionism: Road Map to Armageddon? (Leicester, England: Inter-Varsity Press, 2004). Paul Merkley, Christian Attitudes Towards the State of Israel (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2001).

83 Chapter 5 Explaining Varying Levels of Western Grassroots Solidarity for Palestinians and Kurds

In the preceding chapters I have argued that rebel groups and movements with weak diasporas in the West are the more likely recipients of mass solidarity than rebels with strong diasporas. In this chapter I provide more fine-grained empirical evidence in support of this claim. To do so, I focus on the variations in Western solidarity for the Palestinians and Kurds in Turkey. I first show how the weakness of the Palestinian diaspora in the West incentivized Palestinian rebels to recruit non-Palestinians, contributing to their mass mobilization. I then show how the strength of the Kurdish diaspora incentivized Kurdish rebels to focus their recruitment efforts on mobilizing their ethnic kin rather than non-Kurds. Due to the absence of sustained recruitment attempts by Kurdish rebels to mobilize non-Kurds, a mass solidarity mobilization in support of the Kurds has, to date, not occurred. This chapter proceeds in two main sections. In the first section I focus on the Palestine case, while in the second I turn to the Kurds.

5.1 Mass Solidarity Mobilizing for Palestine Well before the creation of Israel in 1948, Western observers had long expressed concern about what a Jewish state in Palestine might mean for the local Arab population. 349 In the late 1970s and early 1980s in North America and Western Europe, this concern translated into active grassroots support for the Palestinian struggle for self- determination. As one British activist explained, “until the 1980s there was no real [solidarity] movement. There were groups of people and Palestinian students in universities, but there was no Palestine solidarity movement as such.” 350 Some of the activists who mobilized at this time were of Palestinian descent and thus had a direct connection to the struggle. Many, however, were not. These non-Palestinians came from

349 Colin Shindler, Israel and the European Left (New York: Continuum, 2012). 350 Interview, Palestine Solidarity Campaign & J-BIG, February 6, 2013.

84 broader left-wing networks, including the labour movement in the UK 351 and the peace movement in the US. 352 Israel’s invasion of Lebanon in 1982 to root out PLO strongholds, and the violence and Palestinian casualties that ensued, served as a ‘moral shock’ that led many activists to take action. In Canada, the US and the UK, the first step many activists took was to create solidarity NGOs to help organize their advocacy and to facilitate more widespread mobilizations. These entrepreneurs then began to reach out into various advocacy and social networks in search of supporters. By the outbreak of the First Intifada in the late 1980s, they had established an institutional base on which wider mobilizing could take place. This base facilitated the formation of hundreds of groups and committees across North America and Europe dedicated to supporting the Palestinian struggle from afar.353 The structures of Palestine solidarity that had formed through the 1980s began to demobilize in 1993 when Israeli leader Yitzhak Rabin and Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat signed the Oslo Peace Accords. At the time, some activists believed the conflict was effectively over, and thus turned their attention to seemingly more pressing matters, such as the independence struggle in East Timor. 354 Others, including those who were skeptical of what the Oslo peace process might mean for the attainment of Palestinian rights, demobilized on the grounds that it was unclear whether the Palestinians still required their support and, if they did, what this support might entail. 355 Through much of the 1990s, as a result, Western grassroots mobilizing for Palestine largely ground to a halt. 356 When the peace process collapsed in 2000 and the Second Intifada began, many activists who had previously been active a decade earlier started to re-engage with the

351 Colin Shindler, Israel and the European Left (New York: Continuum, 2012). 352 Hilton Obenzinger, “Palestine Solidarity, Political Discourse, and the Peace Movement, 1982-1988,” CR: The New Centennial Review Vol. 8, No. 2 (Fall 2008), p. 234. 353 Interview, SUSTAIN, August 24, 2015 354 Simpson, “Solidarity in an Age of Globalization,” Peace & Change Vol. 29, No. 3 & 4 (July 2004), p. 459. 355 Interview, SUSTAIN, August 24, 2015. 356 Joseph Massad, “Palestinians and the Dilemmas of Solidarity,” The Electronic Intifad (May 14, 2015). Available here: https://electronicintifada.net/content/palestinians-and-dilemmas-solidarity/14518. Rafeef Ziadah & Adam Hanieh, “Collective Approaches to Activist Knowledge: Experiences of the New Anti- Apartheid Movement in Toronto,” in Aziz Choudry & Dip Kapoor, Learning From the Ground Up: Global Perspectives on Social Movements and Knowledge Production (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2010),

85 issue. The structures of solidarity that had been established in the 1980s were re- activated. In the 2000s, through the dedicated work of Palestinian and non-Palestinian activist organizers, grassroots mobilizing for Palestine grew considerably and became more increasingly cohesive. 357 Within a few years, a loosely connected mass solidarity mobilizations came to consist of hundreds of supporting organizations across North America and Europe able to organize large-scale protests involving thousands of demonstrators. 358 Since 2004 and 2005, many of these solidarity activists and their organizations have united around a call from Palestinian civil society for an international boycott campaign against Israel, modeled on the international anti-apartheid movement. This call initiated the Boycott, Divestment & Sanctions (BDS) campaign, whose goals are to end Israel’s occupation of land occupied in 1967, to grant Palestinian-Arab citizens of Israel equal rights, and to allow Palestinian refugees to exercise their right to return to their homes in accordance with UN resolutions. 359 These mobilizations have increasingly drawn the ire of the Israeli government and its main supporters abroad, who have been drawn into what Richard Falk has described as a “legitimacy war.” 360 What explains this mass solidarity mobilization for Palestine? Why have so many activists mobilized for the Palestinians despite having no ethnic tie to the struggle? I show how the political weakness of the Palestinian diaspora in North America and Western Europe, due to its relatively small size and inability to organize politically, encouraged Palestinian organizers to recruit non-Palestinians, creating the conditions for their mass mobilization. I make this case by drawing on original interviews with activists, as well as relevant secondary and online materials.

357 Ziadah & Hanieh, “Collective Approaches to Activist Knowledge: Experiences of the New Anti- Apartheid Movement in Toronto,” p. 90 358 Abigail Bakan & Yasmeen Abu Laban, “Palestinian Resistance and International Solidarity: The BDS Campaign,” Race & Class Vol. 51, No. 1, pp. 29-54. 359 Omar Barghouti, BDS: Boycott, Divestment, Sanctions: The Global Struggle for Palestinian Rights (Chicago: Haymarket Books, 2011), p. 6. 360 Richard Falk, “The Palestinian ‘Legitimacy’ War,” Al-Jazeera (December 24, 2010). Available here: http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2010/10/20101021113420124418.html

86 5.1.1 The PLO’s International Diplomacy and the Origins of Mass Solidarity Mobilizing for Palestine

The founding of the Palestine Liberation Organization and its decision to look for external support constitute an important first step in the mass solidarity mobilizing in the West that took place for Palestine. Palestinian resistance to Zionism can be dated back to the 1880s with the arrival of the first wave of Jewish migrants from Europe to the area. 361 Through the 1920s and 1930s, the Palestinian national leadership was weak and divided between rival clans. 362 In some accounts, this weakness contributed to the collapse of Palestinian society in 1947-48 during its war with the Zionist movement. 363 After the founding of Israel in 1948, stronger Palestinian-led organizations began to emerge. In the 1950s, Fatah was formed and advocated for the notion that Palestine could be liberated by Palestinians themselves rather than by the Arab states. In 1964, the PLO was created by the Arab League in an effort to rival Fatah. Among Palestinians in the 1960s, the PLO was the predominant organization given a widely held faith in the abilities of the Arab states to liberate Palestine.364 This faith in the Arab world among Palestinians changed in 1967 when the combined efforts of the Egyptian, Syrian and Jordanian armies not only failed to defeat Israel but also lost significant territory. Israel nearly tripled in size. It also became the occupier of hundreds of thousands of Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza, many of whom had been displaced once before during the 1947-48 war.365 It was in this context that Fatah emerged as a potential leader of Palestinian nationalist movement, drawing not only on growing skepticism about the commitment of the Arab world to liberating Palestine but the ability of its guerillas to successfully attack Israeli military targets. By the late 1960s, Fatah had become the more popular organization. In 1969, in internal

361 Rashid Khalidi, Palestinian Identity: The Construction of Modern National Consciousness (New York: Columbia University Press, 2010). 362 Marwan Darweish & Andrew Rigby, Popular Protest in Palestine: The Uncertain Future of Unarmed Resistance (London: Pluto Press, 2015). 363 Wendy Pearlman, Violence, Nonviolence and the Palestinian National Movement (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011). 364 Kemal Kirisci, The PLO and World Politics: A Study of the Mobilization of Support for the Palestinian Cause (London: Frances Pinter, 1986), p. 36. 365 Michael Oren, Six Days of War: June 1967 and the Making of the Modern Middle East (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002). Also see Gershom Gorenberg, The Accidental Empire: Israel and the Birth of the Settlements, 1967-1977 (New York: Times Books, 2006).

87 elections that took place in Cairo, the PLO came under the control of Fatah and Yasser Arafat was appointed chairman. 366 In its efforts to liberate Palestine, the PLO not only worked to mobilize Palestinians, namely those in the refugee camps in the region. It also devoted considerable resources to the international community. From its birth, Fatah and other Palestinian groups linked to the PLO had long recognized the importance of securing international support. Part of this reflected their worldview as well as the broader international context of the 1950s and 1960s, a time that featured a number of prominent national liberation struggles in Asia and Africa. These struggles provided Palestinian rebels with inspiration and models of resistance to emulate. 367 The PLO’s interest in international diplomacy also reflected the fact that being part of the Arab world provided it with transnational organizing opportunities, beyond the reach of the Israeli state. In particular, from their local bases in neighboring Arab states, including Jordan in the 1970s and Lebanon in the 1980s, the PLO leadership was able to travel around the world, facilitating their efforts to build connections with external leaders and other potential supporters. 368 Furthermore, the PLO’s interest in diplomacy also reflected material realities on the ground, given the imbalance between Israeli and Palestinian capabilities. From a position of relative weakness, and in an effort to balance the playing field, the PLO engaged in vigorous international campaigning to secure external support for their domestic objectives. 369 In their international advocacy efforts, the PLO employed two main strategies. The first involved the use of violence against Israel as well as abroad, included a spate of airplane hijackings and the killing of Israeli athletes at the Munich Olympics in 1972. 370 These attacks led some to label the group as international terrorists and thus unworthy of support. But for others, especially those who understood that armed struggle and national

366 Kemal Kirisci, The PLO and World Politics: A Study of the Mobilization of Support for the Palestinian Cause (London: Frances Pinter, 1986). 367 Chamberlin, The Global Offensive: The United States, the Palestine Liberation Organization and the Making of the Post-Cold War Order , p. 26. 368 Idean Salehyan, Rebels Without Borders, Transnational Insurgencies in World Politics. (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2009). 369 Augustus Richard Norton, “Introduction,” in Augustus Richard Norton & Jerrold Green (eds.), The International Relations of the Palestine Liberation Organization (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1989), p. 2. 370 Bruce Hoffman, Inside Terrorism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998), p. 75.

88 liberation often go hand in hand, PLO actions contributed to their activism. This was largely because of the effect these attacks had on Israeli policy. This can be seen most clearly in 1982 when consistent PLO attacks across Israel’s northern border provoked increasingly harsh Israeli reprisals and, subsequently, the full invasion of the country. 371 Israel’s invasion received widespread international attention and condemnation, including from Israeli civil society. 372 This also served as an important contributing factor to the grassroots solidarity organizing for the Palestinians that took place at the time in North America and Western Europe. 373 The PLO’s second strategy involved international diplomacy. Part of this diplomacy entailed building ties with other rebel groups around the world, such as the National Liberation Front in Algeria and the South Vietnamese National Liberation Front. 374 It also entailed securing third-party state and United Nations support. The focus on the UN made strategic sense. As seen in Figure 6 below, from 1945 to 1980 the proportion of the UN’s member states that were Asian and African, as well as those that were associated with the Non-Aligned Movement, increased significantly. In 1950 the Asian-African bloc comprised only 28% of all UN members. In 1960 this proportion rose to 46%. By 1980, 58% of all UN member states were either from Asia or Africa. In part because of their recent history with colonialism and decolonization, as well as their reliance on Arab oil, many of these states were more predisposed to pro-Palestinian sentiment than Western bloc states, which included those that had friendly relations with Israel and that tended to see the Palestinian issue as a refugee problem requiring a technical fix rather than as a matter of injustice.375

371 Avner Yanic & Robert Lieber, “Personal Whim or Strategic Imperative? Israel’s Invasion of Lebanon,” International Security Vol. 8 No. 2 (Fall 1983), pp. 67-83. 372 “100,000 Demonstrate in Tel Aviv Against War in Lebanon,” Jewish Telegraphic Agency (July 6, 1982). Available here: http://www.jta.org/1982/07/06/archive/100000-demonstrate-in-tel-aviv-against-war- in-lebanon 373 Obenzinger, “Palestine Solidarity, Political Discourse, and the Peace Movement, 1982-1988,” p. 233. Colin Shindler, Israel and the European Left (New York: Continuum, 2012). 374 Chamberlin, The Global Offensive . 375 Avi Beker, The United Nations and Israel : From Recognition to Reprehension (Lexington, Mass: Lexington Books, 1988).

89 Figure 6 The Changing Distribution of UN Member States 1945-1980

45 40 35 Latin America 30 25 Western Europe 20 Eastern Europe 15 Asia 10 Africa 5 0 1945 1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980

The changing nature of the UN’s membership provided the PLO with an opportunity to secure significant external support for their cause. To do so, it framed its struggle in terms that many of these states could understand, using the language of anti- imperialism, anti-colonialism, and anti-racism. This approach paid dividends. In 1973 the Non-Aligned Movement declared the PLO to be the “sole representative of the Palestinian people.” 376 In 1974, the UN granted the PLO permanent observer status allowing it access to the General Assembly and all of its related organs. In 1975, the PLO was invited to participate in all UN efforts related to addressing problems in the Middle East. That same year the UN General Assembly declared the Palestine problem a threat to international peace and established the Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People. 377 Since this time, key UN human rights bodies, including the General Assembly and the Human Rights Commission/Council have devoted more attention to the question of Palestine than most other issues, the overwhelming majority of it critical of Israel and Zionism. 378 For instance, UN resolutions decried “the unholy alliance between South African racism and Zionism” and declared “Zionism is a form of racism and racial discrimination.” 379 This echoed the language found in PLO pamphlets published in the 1960s, one of which stated that “racism is not an acquired trait of the Zionist settler-

376 Kirisci , The PLO and World Politics , p. 153. 377 Kirisci , The PLO and World Politics , p. 143. 378 Seligman, “Politics and Principle at the United Nations Human Rights Council.” 379 See UN General Assembly Resolution 3379 here: https://documents-dds- ny.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/000/92/IMG/NR000092.pdf?OpenElement

90 state…it is inherent in the very ideology of Zionism and in the basic motivation for Zionist colonization and statehood.” 380 These UN resolutions also created the broad conditions for grassroots mobilizing for Palestine in the West by legitimizing the Palestinian struggle and situating it within widely accepted international norms. 381 In the mid-1970s the PLO also engaged in direct diplomacy with Western states. Its ability to connect with Western officials, namely those in Europe, was in part facilitated by their ties to the Arab states who allowed a PLO delegation to take part in the Euro-Arab Dialogue, which began in 1973. Through this initiative, the PLO was able to secure direct access to Western officials. In light of this access, the PLO leadership largely adopted an elite-oriented diplomatic style targeting state policy-making channels directly.382 While much of its diplomatic efforts was elite in orientation, the PLO did work to some extent with the Palestinian diaspora in the West. However, unlike the PKK, its efforts to turn their diaspora community into a political actor of some significance were minimal. It is true that the PLO was a diaspora organization. It was led by Palestinians living outside of Israel and the occupied Palestinian territories, and drew significantly on the Palestinian population living in the refugee camps throughout the Middle East. 383 Its organizational structure enabled, to some degree, the Palestinian global community to access its decision-making channels. Palestinians living in the West were linked to the PLO through a variety of associations, such as the General Union of Palestine Students, the General Union of Palestinian Women, and the General Union of Palestinian Workers, amongst others. Diaspora Palestinians could also sit on the Palestine National Council,

380 Fayez Sayegh, Zionist Colonialism in Palestine (Beirut: Research Center, Palestine Liberation Organization, 1965), p. 21. 381 David Cesarani, “Anti-Zionism in Britain, 1922-2002: Continuities and Discontinuities,” Journal of Israeli History Vol. 25 No. 1 (March 2006), p. 146. Suzanne Morrison, “The Emergence of the Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions Movement,” in Fawaz Gerges (ed.), Contentious Politics in the Middle East: Popular Resistance and Marginalized Activism Beyond the Arab Uprisings (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2015). 382 Morgan Kaplan, “Strategies of Insurgent Diplomacy: Evidence from the Iraqi Kurdish Liberation Movement,” unpublished manuscript (August 3, 2016), p. 2. For further insights into the content of PLO elite diplomacy towards Western states see: Kirisci, The PLO and World Politics , chapter 7. Rory Miler, “The PLO Factor in Euro-Israeli Relations, 1964-1992,” Israel Affairs Vol. 10 Nos.1-2 (2004), pp. 123- 155. Mohamed Rabie, US-PLO Dialogue: Secret Diplomacy and Conflict Resolution (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 1995). 383 Kirisci , The PLO and World Politics .

91 which served as the PLO’s legislature. 384 The quality of this access was low and arguably had little effect on PLO policy. 385 In addition to providing diasporans with institutional affiliation, the PLO also sent activists abroad “whose job was to organize, recruit, solicit funds, marshal support, stage demonstrations, and the like.” 386 These PLO operatives, however, often demonstrated little commitment to mobilizing the community for political action. They were not experienced political organizers, knew little of Palestinian history and generally expressed a lack of interest in community politics.387 This was indicative of the low priority that the PLO gave to mobilizing its Western diaspora, which reflected the diaspora’s political weakness. In the late 1970s and 1980s, during the PLO’s heyday, the Palestinian diaspora in the West was not only small, numbering approximately 25,000 people, and unlikely to have much electoral significance. 388 It was also divided on political grounds between the various factions within the PLO that had different visions for how to liberate Palestine as well as for what a liberated Palestine might look like. At this time, and until today, internal factional Palestinian politics made organizational efforts difficult and short-lived.389 The PLO also adopted a relatively detached and disinterested approach to non- diaspora activist networks as well. It did publish materials geared towards an English- audience, 390 but it also rejected the efforts of prominent Palestinian academics in North America, including Edward Said and Iqbal Ahmad, who had asked it to devote more resources to establishing a grassroots solidarity movement similar to the international

384 Shain, Marketing the American Creed Abroad . 385 As’ad Ghanem, Palestinian Politics after Arafat: A Failed National Movement (Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University Press, 2010). 386 Turki, Exile’s Return , p. 195. 387 Turki, Exile’s Return , p. 197. 388 In 1977, the Palestinian community in the US was approximately 25,000 people. Kirsci, The PLO and World Politics , p. 35. 389 Turki, “The Passions of Exile: The Palestine Congress of North America.” 390 Paul Chamberlin, “The Struggle Against Oppression Everywhere: The Global Politics of Palestinian Liberation,” Middle Eastern Studies Vol. 47 No. 5 (January 2011), p. 29. Also see Paul Chamberlin, The Global Offensive: The United States, the Palestine Liberation Organization and the Making of the Post- Cold War Order (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012).

92 anti-apartheid movement that was cultivated by the African National Congress (ANC). 391 One American activist explained this in some detail: [Edward] Said and Iqbal Ahmad actually met with Arafat on two different occasions and tried to convince him that he needed an international solidarity movement and to try to explain to him how central this had been in the case of South Africa. But the Fatah leadership of the PLO, and all of the leadership of the PLO, were initially sold on armed struggle and were focused on the Arab states in supporting that. In Oslo, they were convinced that negotiations and diplomacy were going to work. This has always been incredibly frustrating. When we were doing South African divestment work, the ANC would send representatives from South Africa to every little college to meet with you, to be encouraging, to tell you how important your work was, to talk about the ANC, what its goals were, what the strategies were, treating you as part of the movement. There was never anything like that with the PLO. The PLO never prioritized protests and international solidarity, and all of these things. 392

5.1.2 Palestinian Diaspora Activism & the Recruitment of Non-Palestinians in the 1980s

Given the PLO’s reluctance to engage in sustained grassroots organizing, many Palestinian diaspora activists moved in to fill the void. Had it not been for these activists and their sustained attempts to mobilize non-Palestinians, mass solidarity mobilizing would have most likely not occurred. The recruitment campaigns of these activists were central to the grassroots mobilizations in the 1980s and through the 2000s. While many of them did look to first mobilize their own community, they eventually moved beyond their kin and started to seek out non-Palestinian supporters. They did this because of the political weakness of the Palestinian communities, in terms of both size and political organizing. In Canada in the 1970s and 1980s, Rezeq Faraj, who has been described as a “leading Canadian activist for Palestinian human rights,” 393 played a central role in recruiting non-Palestinian supporters. Faraj was born in Palestine, was displaced in the 1948 war, and grew up in the Daheisha refugee camp, located just south of Bethlehem.

391 Interview, General Union of Palestinian Students, September 28, 2016. On the ANC’s international diplomacy see Scott Thomas, The Diplomacy of Liberation: The Foreign Relations of the African National Congress . (London: I.B. Tauris Publishers, 1996). 392 Interview, SUSTAIN, August 24, 2015. 393 See http://rabble.ca/news/2010/06/rezeq-faraj-legacy-man-without-childhood

93 As part of a UN program, Faraj was able to leave Palestine to study electrical mechanics. After making stops in the Gulf Arab states and then in Germany, he arrived in Canada in 1966. 394 In 1973, Faraj and a group of his supporters founded the Quebec-Palestine Association (QPA), whose objective was to establish stronger links with Canadian civil society. It sought to build support for Palestine within trade union circles and to develop ties with Jews and non-Jews, including anti-Zionists and those otherwise critical of Israeli policy. According to one Palestinian-Canadian activist who supported Faraj’s work at the time: What is very clear from this period is that there was the beginning of Palestinian activism and that this Palestinian activism was really non-sectarian in the sense that it wasn’t just Palestinians. They were trying to link up with the Jewish community, with anti-Zionist individuals, and with the trade unions in Quebec…. 395

This strategy of non-sectarianism and cultural outreach reflected the values of the Palestinian-Canadian activists. “We just didn’t think in sectarian terms,” one activist put it. 396 Yet, this strategy also reflected the status of the Palestinian community in Canada. Through the 1970s and 1980, there was no real Palestinian community to speak of in a political sense, which arguably decreased these activists’ sectarian-ness. The Palestinian community at the time was very small including, according to Canadian census data from 1991, only 6000 members. 397 Further, it was largely inactive, unable to establish a community infrastructure to facilitate sustained community activism. “There was no hope of getting the Palestinian community active,” one activist put it” because there was no such thing as the Palestinian community.” 398 The first intifada in the late 1980s did generate some mobilization among Palestinian-Canadians, including the formation of organizations like Solidarity for Palestinian Human Rights. These efforts, however, were short-lived and involved only a small set of Palestinian students. 399 According to one Palestinian-Canadian:

394 Dave Himmelstein, “Rezeq Faraj: the legacy of a man without a childhood,” Rabble.ca (June 3, 2010). http://rabble.ca/news/2010/06/rezeq-faraj-legacy-man-without-childhood 395 Interview, Palestinian-Canadian, Aug 18, 2015. 396 Interview, Palestinian-Canadian, August 18, 2015. 397 Canadian Census 1991. 398 Interview, Palestinian-Canadian, August 18, 2015. 399 Karma Nabulsi, Palestinians Register: Laying Foundations and Setting Directions: Report of the Civitas Project . (Nuffield College 2006). p. 74. Interview, Canadian academic, August 11, 2015.

94 [During the First Intifada], Palestinians [in Canada] had a sense that something needed to be done, but nothing was really done. They lobbied here and there and had a few events here and there, and tried to collect money to send. The community reacts to the act, but once that is done, you don’t hear anything. There are no organizations anywhere, like a lobby organization or a Palestinian organized movement, no such thing. 400

Faraj and his supporters could have decided to focus the bulk of their energies on mobilizing the Palestinians that did live in Canada by adopting a more ethno-national advocacy approach conducive to building a politically active diaspora. However, easier targets at the time included those non-Palestinian Canadians already hostile to, or at least deeply critical of, Zionism and Israeli policy, as well as those in the trade unions who travelled within a leftist milieu that had long expressed doubts about Jewish nationalism and the creation of a Jewish state in Palestine. Thus, Faraj’s strategy reflected what channels of possible support were available to him. Faraj’s recruitment efforts in Canada did much to increase the accessibility of the Palestinian cause to non-diasporans. The QPA’s work with trade unions appears to have been particularly effective as it was in the 1970s that Canadian union leaders began to express their solidarity with the Palestinians. 401 The QPA was not the only group to forge such links with Canadian civil society. Other groups included Medical Aid for Palestinians that also worked closely with the trade unions in Quebec as they sought to compensate for the political weakness of the Palestinian community. These early efforts contributed to more significant mobilizations in the late 1980s, which included a strong contingent of francophone activists in Quebec. 402 In the early 1980s, Palestinian-American activists were also employing a strategy of non-diaspora recruitment. The first Palestinians to arrive in the US after 1948 did not profess a broad Palestinian identity. They mobilized culturally and socially around family and village affiliations, rather than along broader national lines. 403 According to one community member reflecting on Palestinian identity in the US at the time, “we knew we were from Ramallah; we didn’t really know whether it was Jordan or Palestine

400 Interview, Palestinian-Canadian, Feb 26, 2015. 401 Interview, Palestinian-Canadian, August 18, 2015. 402 Interview, Canadian academic, August 11, 2015. 403 Yossi Shain, Marketing the American Creed Abroad: Diasporas in the US and their Homelands (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999).

95 or what.” 404 After 1967, Palestinians in the US began to think about becoming a more active political force. In the 1970s, for instance, the Ramallah Federation, founded in 1958, added ‘Palestine’ to its name. 405 In 1978, a group of Palestinians came together to form the Palestine Congress of North America (hereafter, the Congress) “to represent the Palestinian community in America, to disseminate information about the cause, and to help Palestinians become acquainted with their constitutional rights.” 406 The Congress, however, did not last very long and did not have a meaningful impact on Palestinian- American mobilization and community advocacy. 407 This was largely due to internal community divisions that made organizing difficult. 408 “It never got off the ground because of infighting,” one Palestinian activist explained. 409 While there were isolated instances of community mobilizing and the occasional protest, the extent of community participation was low. By the late 1980s, activist organizers found that although members of the Palestinian-American community strongly identified with the struggle and plight of their ethnic kin abroad, they nevertheless remained politically inactive. 410 Part of this was a result of political divisions within the community, but it was also the result of hostile public perceptions of the Palestinian cause among the American public, which had far more sympathy for Zionism and Israel. As one American activist observed: There was general apprehension [among Palestinian-Americans] about what it means to speak out. It was very hard for Palestinians to be involved in any political or electoral work. There was no place to go. Talking about Palestine was forbidden. 411

In light of these conditions, Palestinian-American activists began to reach out more broadly beyond their community to mobilize a wider audience. 412 In 1981, for instance, Palestinian-American activists associated with the General Union of Palestinian

404 Christison, “The American Experience: Palestinians in the US,” p. 30. 405 Shain, Marketing the American Creed Abroad . 406 Fawaz Turki, Exile’s Return: The Making of a Palestinian American (Toronto: Maxwell Macmillan Canada, 1993) , 196. 407 Turki, Exile’s Return. 408 Nabulsi, Palestinians Register , p. 172-3. 409 Interview, Palestinian-American activist, September 28, 2015. 410 Christison, “The American Experience: Palestinians in the US,” p. 29. 411 Interview, November 29 th Coalition for Palestine, July 9 2015. 412 James Zogby & Joe Stork, “’They Control the Hill, but We’ve Got a Lot of Positions around the Hill,” MERIP: Middle East Report , No. 146 (1987), P. 24.

96 Students (GUPS), an organization linked to the PLO, helped form the November 29 th Coalition for Palestine, later renamed the Palestine Solidarity Committee (PSC). 413 According to one PSC founder, this outreach “was one of the first efforts [by Palestinian- Americans] to reach beyond the [Palestinian] community…This was reaching out more broadly.” 414 The reason for this outreach stemmed from their frustration with what they saw as their community’s inaction and inability to effectively organize to assist their kin back home. According to one activist: [we] got so frustrated with the formalities of the Palestinian community which were not moving [our cause] forward, so we activated ourselves locally… When the PLO, whether through GUPS or the Congress, wasn’t able move forward, we found what was local and we linked in to it.” 415

Part of the PSC’s outreach included linking to local peace councils in an attempt to put Palestine on the agenda and to recruit individuals to support the cause. It also involved working within broader advocacy networks to build organizational relationships and alliances, and to gain access to new recruits. In 1982, for instance, the PSC participated in demonstrations in Washington, DC against the Ku Klux Klan. 416 In focusing on non-Palestinian recruitment, these activists did not disengage from the Palestinian community. Rather, they simply re-oriented their advocacy towards a wider American audience. We still had an affiliation with what was going on [in Palestine] and we had a desire to remain connected someway but [the Palestinian community] wasn’t serving the appetite that we had. We saw in front of us an open country….And we saw that nobody was addressing it. So we found these local entities to help us move through that and address the potential we saw in front of us. 417

Through their recruitment efforts, the PSC was able to grow significantly. By the late 1980s it included several chapters across the country. 418 Beyond organizational growth, the PSC also played an important role in organizing the larger mobilizations that would occur in response to the outbreak of the First Intifada in 1987-88. In the US this

413 Obenzinger, “Palestine Solidarity, Political Discourse, and the Peace Movement, 1982-1988,” p. 238.. 414 Interview, November 29 th Coalition for Palestine, July 9, 2015. 415 Interview, Palestinian-American activist, September 28, 2016. 416 Courtland Milloy & La Barbara Bowman, “Turner urges public to avoid Klan’s rally,” Washington Post (November 27, 1982), p. A1. 417 Interview, Palestinian-American activist, September 28, 2016. 418 “Critics Question a Plan to Send Students to Gaza,” New York Times (July 29, 1990), p. 37.

97 period saw the creation of dozens of small organizations and committees that formed in solidarity with the Palestinians. 419 Under the auspices of the PSC, local peace networks in Ohio and Pittsburgh helped to organize a campaign targeting the US-based Federal Laboratories, which was producing and selling tear gas canisters to the Israeli military. Drawing on their peace movement contacts, these activists recruited a few hundred supporters to engage in letter-writing campaigns, public protests and acts of civil disobedience. This campaign received institutional support from the Centre for Constitutional Rights, who in 1992 sued Federal Laboratories in a court in Pennsylvania. 420 After two years of campaigning, Federal Laboratories agreed to stop sending teargas shipments to Israel, however it is unclear if this decision was the result of advocacy pressure or the winding down of the First Intifada. When the Second Intifada began, the shipments of the canisters resumed, but this time without the “Made in the US” label. 421 Like their counterparts in Canada and the US, Palestinian activists in the UK adopted a similar strategy of non-diaspora recruitment to compensate for the weakness of their own community. Ghada Karmi was central to these efforts. Karmi was born in Jerusalem in 1948 and fled with her family to England a year later. In the 1970s, as a university student, she decided to become politically active, seeing around her widespread pro-Israel sentiment and a general ignorance of Palestinian suffering and grievances. As she put it: The accumulated frustrations, humiliations, and sense of being misunderstood as a Palestinian in Britain had reached a climax. I was determined to reverse this dismal fate by action that would counter such ignorance and contempt. 422

Upon deciding to take action, Karmi initially reached out to her fellow Palestinians. “I began to look for what I thought were like-minded Palestinians,” she wrote, “but with little result.” 423 Among the Palestinians in the UK at the time, Karmi was unique. Most were first generation migrants who “lived on their memories and

419 Interview, November 29 th Coalition for Palestine, July 9, 2015. 420 “US Teargas Manufacturers,” Adalah-NY: The New York Campaign to Boycott Israel. Available here: https://adalahny.org/campaign-main-document/564/us-teargas-manufacturers 421 Interview, SUSTAIN, August 24, 2015 422 Karmi, In Search of Fatima , p. 393. 423 Karmi, In Search of Fatima , p. 393.

98 consigned Palestine to an irrevocable past which it would be futile to reincarnate.” 424 The community was also comprised of Palestinian students whose presence in the UK was conditional on the good will of the British government and thus were largely unwilling to engage in controversial political work that may get them deported. Palestinian student unions in the UK did exist, Karmi observed, but there were “no cultural or lobbying groups, and no organized communal activities.” 425 In the absence of willing and able ethnic kin, Karmi turned to non-Palestinian channels. She recruited a small group of British activists, some whom were linked to the Young Liberals and the Labour Party. In 1972, they established Palestine Action, a solidarity NGO modeled on the Anti-Apartheid Movement and which called for the “total liberation of Palestine by political or armed means.” 426 Karmi and her supporters focused their recruitment efforts on the networks surrounding the British Labour Party, which were becoming increasingly critical of Israel and hostile to Zionism. Andrew Faulds, a Labour MP, who had taken an “unflinchingly brave and principled stand on the Palestine question,” became the group’s president. 427 In addition to recruiting through the labour movement, Palestine Action also ran advertisements in the British press soliciting new members and donations. 428 Through the 1970s, the organization grew considerably and came to consist of primarily of British activists, 429 including an “odd collection of left- wingers, communists and genuinely confused Jewish people, unhappy about Israel’s oppression of the Palestinians.” 430 Palestine Action’s work and recruitment within the British labour movement was significant. In 1982, in response to Israel’s invasion of Lebanon, it contributed to the formation of the Palestine Solidarity Campaign (PSC-UK), which became the central hub for Palestine solidarity organizing in the UK. 431 Through the 1980s, PSC-UK activists continued to work within labour networks to recruit and mobilize. These efforts were

424 Karmi, In Search of Fatima , p. 393. 425 Karmi, In Search of Fatima , 394. 426 “New Pals,” London Times (June 5, 1972), p. 14. Also see Paul Kelemen, The British Left and Zionism: History of a Divorce , p. 160-161. 427 Karmi, In Search of Fatima , p. 395. 428 “The Campaign Organiser,” London Times (May 11, 1973), p. 7. 429 Marion Woolfson, AE Carpenter, & Vanda Dawdry, “Origins of Israel,” London Times (May 19, 1973), p. 15. 430 Karmi, In Search of Fatima , p. 395. 431 Interview, LabourStart, February 27, 2015.

99 made easier given pre-existing shifts in thinking towards Israel and earlier mobilization efforts in support of the Palestinians, 432 such as the formation of Trade Union Friends of Palestine in 1980 and the first British Trade Union congress resolution condemning Israeli policy in 1982. 433 While a beneficiary of these changes, the PSC-UK also contributed to them. In particular, they brought a distinct organizational dimension that enabled pro-Palestine sentiment to be translated into concrete action. Through the 1980s, PSC-UK actively networked through the labour movement in order to establish a number of branches throughout the country. 434 The Palestine solidarity organizing that took place in the 1980s died down in the 1990s during the Oslo Peace Process. While some groups remained engaged with the issue and active, most demobilized. The PSC-UK, for instance, engaged in occasional advocacy efforts through media channels, most commonly in the form of letters to the editor, some of which included criticisms of the newly formed Palestinian Authority and what one Executive Committee member described as its “increasing authoritarianism.” 435 In 1996, for instance, it called for a boycott of Israeli produce, predating a central feature of its campaigning in the 2000s. 436 However, the PSC-UK’s actions in the 1990s were largely an exception. As Rafeef Ziadah & Adam Hanieh describe it, the effect [the Oslo peace process] had on the “older” Palestine solidarity movement during the 1990s was devastating. Networks that had developed over decades in the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s simply fell apart as confusion over the future of Palestine and the Palestinians caused disillusionment among a broad layer of activists. Oslo had acted to demoralize and weaken the earlier structures of Palestinian solidarity.437

Palestine Solidarity Mobilizing in the 2000s With the collapse of the Oslo Peace Process and the outbreak of the Second Intifada in the early 2000s, networks and organizations that had engaged in Palestine solidarity work in the 1980s sprung back into action. Part of this can be accounted for by the material conditions on the ground in Israel-Palestine, including not only a spate of

432 Daphna Baram, Disenchantment: The Guardian and Israel (London: Guardian Books, 2004). 433 Shindler, Israel and the European Left . See Chapter 15. 434 Interview, Palestine Solidarity Campaign, February 6, 2013. 435 R. J. Deed, “Letter: Police State in Palestine,” The Independent (June 18, 1996), p. 11. 436 “Calls for British Boycotts,” The Independent (November 18, 1996), p. 11. 437 Ziadah & Hanieh, “Collective Approaches to Activist Knowledge,” p. 88.

100 suicide bombings but also the increased Israeli military presence through the West Bank, which had been considerably scaled back in the 1990s. The outbreak of the Second Intifada alone does not fully explain the grassroots mobilizations that occurred during this period. As it was during the 1980s, central to the solidarity mobilization was the active recruitment of non-Palestinian supporters, who formed new solidarity groups and who came out to protest Israeli policy and declare their support for the Palestinian struggle. The extent of these mobilizations was in part a result of the fact that there already existed local and national networks of Palestine solidarity activists. When the Second Intifada broke out, key activists and organizations re-mobilized. In late 2000, two American activists, who had been linked to the PSC and the campaign against Federal Laboratories in the 1980s, formed the organization Stop US Tax-Funded Aid to Israel (SUSTAIN). Their re-mobilization was due in part because of the efforts of Palestinian activists in the West Bank who had begun to reach out again to American global justice networks in an effort to organize solidarity campaigns. 438 SUSTAIN’s objective was to build support for the idea of ending American military and economic aid to Israel. This aid was seen to be enabling the on-going occupation of the West Bank and Gaza and denial of Palestinian rights. For those in SUSTAIN, among others, US foreign policy was considered to be an obstacle to a just solution to the conflict. At the time of its founding, SUSTAIN’s focus on boycotts and sanctions was controversial. According to one of its founders, the organization “took shit” from other mainstream organizations working on Palestine who believed that such an approach was too divisive, unlikely to work, and would undermine any political capital they had established in policy circles in Washington. The Arab-American Anti-Discrimination Committee (ADC), for instance, denounced the group and refused to attend its meetings. The American Friends Service Committee was also hesitant about the idea of a divestment campaign. And the US Campaign to End Israeli Occupation (hereafter, US Campaign), which today is a leading advocate for US sanctions on Israel, decided to initially exclude SUSTAIN from their coalition. 439 Although some of the founders of the

438 Interview, Palestinian-American, September 28, 2016 439 Interview, SUSTAIN, August 24, 2015.

101 US Campaign were sympathetic to the idea of boycotts and sanctions, they saw the tactic as unduly divisive given their attempts to patch together a nation-wide coalition of highly diverse Palestine solidarity groups coming from distinct political and cultural backgrounds. 440 Other activists were concerned that a boycott call was too confrontational and would turn people away from a conflict that was already seen as hotly contested and complex. 441 What was needed, they argued, was ongoing public education and awareness-raising work. 442 SUSTAIN’s leaders were dissatisfied with these responses and began looking elsewhere to build support for their campaign. One option was the Palestinian-American community. The problem, however, was that the community lacked clear-cut entry points. As it was in the 1970s and 1980s, in the early 2000s there was no national representative Palestinian-American organization one could approach to galvanize community support. In 2006, Palestinian-American activists did attempt to build a national organization, named the US Palestinian Community Network (USPCN), in order to organize and coordinate the community and to amplify its voice to the Palestinian leadership in Ramallah. 443 Like the Congress, however, the USCPN has also been described as somewhat of a disappointment. This was largely the result of factional infighting and community divisions. As one of the main organizers explained: Because there is no authority, because there is no central body, you have this internal friction even amongst initiatives like the USPCN, that try to be fair to everybody, that suffered from internecine politics, the same that afflicts Palestinian society and politics abroad [in Palestine]. There were those who hated the fact that USPCN was too inclusive and included Fatah. They responded and said “if you include Fatah in this you are a collaborator and we don’t want to be a part of it.” And when the group didn’t condemn Hamas’ takeover in Gaza, the Fatah folks were really angry and said “you have shown your true colours.” 444

Accordingly, for SUSTAIN’s leaders, the Palestinian-American community did not present an easily accessible source of support. Instead, they drew on their pre-existing

440 Interview, SUSTAIN, August 24, 2015. 441 Rafeef Ziadah & Adam Hanieh, “Collective Approaches to Activist Knowledge: Experiences of the New Anti-Apartheid Movement in Toronto,” p. 90 442 Interview, Coalition Against Israeli Apartheid, Sept 7, 2012. 443 Noura Erakat, “Beyond Sterile Negotiations: Looking for Leadership with a Strategy,” Al-Shabaka: The Palestinian Policy Network (February 1, 2012). Available here: https://al-shabaka.org/briefs/beyond-sterile- negotiations-looking-leadership-strategy/ 444 Interview, Palestinian-American, July 25, 2013.

102 ties with the global justice network in the US that had been energized in 1999 during the anti-WTO protests in Seattle. They sought to draw on the momentum created from these protests. They drew on their contacts to attract people to join their fledgling organization. Some of these individuals were Palestinian-Americans, but many others were not. Their tactics included teach-ins and seminars across the country at various high schools, colleges, and activist organizations. From late 2000 to 2003, they organized approximately 300 events which contributed greatly to a groundswell of support for a boycott and divestment campaign of Israel, especially among more radically inclined college students. 445 In 2003, in large part due to this growth in support for more confrontational tactics, SUSTAIN joined the US Campaign. SUSTAIN’s early advocacy efforts, notably among student activist networks, created the conditions for more widespread mobilizing on campus. In 2002, Students for Justice in Palestine (SJP) at the University of Berkley circulated a divestment petition and hosted an annual conference. Their objective, according to Abraham Greenhouse, was “to build a national coordination mechanism for campus-based Palestine solidarity activists in the United States.” In April of that year, they organized large-scale demonstrations in which 1200 students demonstrated to protest the University of California’s investments in Israel and the Israeli military. 446 This lead to the formation of a coalition NGO, the Palestine Solidarity Movement, which held annual conferences at Ohio State University in 2003, Duke University in 2004 and Georgetown University in 2006. It campaigned around the idea of divestment and overtime came to be comprised of few hundred organizations, including some non-student groups and groups in Canada. 447 While SUSTAIN and its student supporters were actively recruiting at the campus-level, the US Campaign began recruiting from its own extended activist networks, which mainly included more established organizations. US Campaign leaders, for good reason, did not specifically target the Palestinian-American community for recruitment and mobilization. On the contrary, they sought to position Palestine within

445 Erakat, “BDS in the USA, 2001-2010.” 446 “Appear from Students for Justice in Palestine UC Berkely.” Available here: http://web.archive.org/web/20020525235530/http://justiceinpalestine.org/ 447 Abraham Greenhouse, “Palestine activism on campus and beyond: Overcoming Israel’s efforts to erase history,” The Electronic Intifada (November 8, 2012). Available here: https://electronicintifada.net/blogs/abraham-greenhouse/palestine-activism-campus-and-beyond- overcoming-israels-efforts-erase

103 broader advocacy networks. For instance, the US Campaign established close ties with the anti-war movement, namely the United for Peace & Justice (UFPJ) coalition that opposed the US invasions of Iraq and Afghanistan. The two organizations established a quid pro quo. In 2003, the US Campaign helped UFPJ “organize and mobilize for some of our country’s largest-ever protests.” In return, in 2003 the UFPJ network, which included 1000 member groups, began to actively oppose US policy towards Israel, providing the US Campaign with significant access to organizational resources and recruits. 448 During this time, in large part because of these outreach efforts, the US Campaign has grown significantly, from six members in 2001 to 378 in 2011 as shown in Figure 7 below. 449 Figure 7: Growth of the US Campaign to End the Israeli Occupation 2003 - 2011

400 350 300 250 200 150 100 50 0

Number Number of Member Groups 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 Year

As it was in the US, with the collapse of Oslo, Palestine solidarity NGOs and networks in the UK that had been active in the late 1980s re-mobilized and new organizations formed. In 2001, for instance, Scottish activists who had been active during the First Intifada organized a campaign to twin Edinburgh with Ramallah, tapping into what one described as Edinburgh’s “tradition of standing alongside cities which have faced oppression, such as those in South Africa during the apartheid regime.” 450 A few months later, in a meeting at Trinity College in Dublin, the Ireland-Palestine Solidarity

448 “Looking Back, Moving Forward: Lessons from 10 Years of Work,” The US Campaign to End Israeli Occupation . Available here: http://www.endtheoccupation.org/downloads/2011conference_lessonslearned.pdf 449 Data on the growth of the US Campaign is available here: http://www.endtheoccupation.org/downloads/2011conference_lessonslearned.pdf 450 Jill Stark, “Opposites Attract: Edinburgh may twin with West Bank City,” Daily Record (March 23, 2001).

104 Campaign was formed. 451 In 2002, British activists, some of whom had a long history of involvement in Palestine solidarity work dating back to the 1980s, issued a petition calling for an end to European research and academic collaboration with Israeli universities and institutions. Within a few days, the petition received the support of approximately 120 academics in the UK and across Europe. 452 This petition helped to spark wider mobilizing around a campaign to boycott Israel, ushering in what Omar Barghouti has referred to as a “new form of solidarity with Palestinian rights.” 453 New organizations were set up to support this campaign, such as the British Committee for Universities of Palestine, which has played an active role in British academic unions. 454 Boycott initiatives have also targeted British companies that sell Israeli goods and produce, such as Marks & Spencer, Selfridges, Safeway and Sainsbury’s. 455 Through the 2000s, the PSC-UK also grew considerably, expanding its institutional base across the country and developing ties to other advocacy networks in order to facilitate large-scale protests. Like SUSTAIN in the US, it largely focused on recruiting from non-Palestinian advocacy channels rather than from Palestinian diaspora networks. To be sure, the PSC-UK did work with the British-Palestinian community, including the Association of the Palestinian Community in Britain as well as the Palestine Return Centre, and drew on their support in demonstrations they organized. 456 Yet, mobilizing local Palestinians was not their main focal point. As it was the case elsewhere in North America and Western Europe, 457 the Palestinian community in Britain in the early 2000s was not only small in number but also not well organized, suffering from internal divisions and low levels of political participation. 458 Some British-Palestinians

451 “Appeal for (pounds) 100m Palestinian Aid,” The Irish Times (November 29, 2011). 452 The content of the letter can be seen here: http://commlist.org/archive/all/2002-04/msg00005.html . Also see Hilary Rose & Steven Rose, “The Choice is do noting or try to bring about change: why we launched the boycott of Israeli institutions,” Guardian (July 15, 2002). Available here: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2002/jul/15/comment.stevenrose 453 Barghouti, BDS , p. 19. 454 Barghouti. BDS, p. 19. 455 David Graves, “Two British West Bank protesters linked to Scargill,” The Daily Telegraph (April 4, 2002), p. 4. “Welsh campaigners build boycott of Israeli produce,” Morning Star (April 6 2002), p. 6. 456 “Campaigners announce Palestine march plans,” Morning Star (April 1, 2002), p. 6. 457 Nabulsi, Palestinians Register , pp. 73, 84, 122, 129, 130-131, 132-3, 140. 458 Lina Mahmoud, “British Palestinians: The Transformation of an Exiled Community,” in Shiblak (ed.), The Palestinian Diaspora in Europe , p. 100. Loddo, “Palestinian Transnational Actors and the Construction of the Homeland.” Nabulsi, Palestinians Register , p. 137. Maria Koinova, “Why Do

105 have remarked that the community lacks the political will to become a more effective political force. “We are too slow to do anything,” one community member put it. “It takes months for us to hold a conference and days to say anything. We must find the motivation within ourselves and become more effective.” 459 In the early 2000s, as we saw with Karmi’s outreach efforts in the 1970s and 1980s, these characteristics made the Palestinian community an unattractive site of recruitment and mobilization. As a result, Stephanie Loddo observed in 2006, “Palestinian groups are under-represented in pro- Palestinian activism in the UK…” 460 By drawing on national union networks, the PSC-UK encouraged the formation of local branches across the country. The purpose of these local branches was not only to demonstrate and raise public awareness. Rather, their main objective was to lobby their local trade union chapters to support their campaign for Palestine. 461 This focus reflected the fact that the British labour movement been supportive of the Palestinian struggle since the 1980s due in part because of the work of Palestine Action, 462 and the fact that the leadership of the PSC-UK was closely connected to many of the organizations that were active in internal union advocacy, including Communist Party of Britain, Militant Tendency, the Socialist Party UK, and the Socialist Workers Party. 463 Beyond the unions, the PSC-UK also recruited actively from within the British peace movement, capitalizing on the mobilizations that were occurring to oppose American and British military interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq in the wake of the September 11 th attacks. This strategy dates back to at least the early 1990s when the PSC-UK linked up with a number of anti-war organizations, such as the Committee to Stop War in the Gulf, protesting the war in Iraq. 464 In the early 2000s, the PSC-UK fostered close ties with the leaders of Campaign against Nuclear Disarmament in England

Conflict-Generated Diasporas Pursue Sovereignty-Based Claims Through Stated-Based or Transnational Channels?” European Journal of International Relations Vol. 20, No. 3 (2014). 459 Quoted in Nabulsi, Palestinians Register, p. 122 . 460 Loddo, “Palestinian Transnational Actors and the Construction of the Homeland. 461 “Campaign praises Star’s unrivalled coverage of rally.” Morning Star . May 21, 2002. 462 Shindler, Israel and the European Left . Ronnie Fraser, “The Academic Boycott of Israel: A Review of the Five-Year UK Campaign to Defeat It,” Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs (March 2, 2008). Available here: http://jcpa.org/article/the-academic-boycott-of-israel-a-review-of-the-five-year-uk-campaign-to- defeat-it/ 463 Interview, LabourStart, February 27, 2015. 464 Alex Renton, “Strange bedfellows in the fight for peace,” The Independent (January 23, 1991), p. 19.

106 & Wales (CND), as well as with other anti-war groups including Stop the War Coalition and Labour Against the War. 465 In late September 2001, it offered to share London’s Trafalgar Square with the CND to allow it to hold a rally protesting the proposed military intervention into Afghanistan. 466 By doing so, it helped to integrate Palestine into the peace movement and gained access to rank-and-file activists, many of whom would largely be receptive to their recruitment efforts. Similar outreach was conducted towards other advocacy networks as well, including solidarity networks. In 2002, for instance, the PSC-UK supported the efforts of the Colombia Solidarity Campaign to protest to a visit to the UK by Henry Kissinger. 467 This strategy of non-diaspora outreach and inter-movement alliance building was largely effective. In 2002, PSC-UK organizers were able to run large-scale protests across the country, attended by thousands chanting “Justice for the Palestinians” and “End to Israeli Occupation.” 468 The PSC-UK’s recruitment has also contributed to widespread campus mobilizing as well, seen notably in 2006 with the formation of Action Palestine, a national organization that linked together activist organizers across fifteen British campuses. 469 The Palestine solidarity mobilizations in Canada, the UK and the US that occurred in the early 2000s were given a significant boost in 2004 and 2005 when Palestinian activists and intellectuals in the West Bank formed the Palestinian Campaign for the Academic and Cultural Boycott of Israel (PACBI). PACBI called for an international boycott, divestment and sanctions (BDS) campaign of Israel modeled on strategies of the African National Congress and the international anti-apartheid movement. Omar Barghouti, a founder of PACBI and leading Palestinian activist,

465 Daniel Coysh & Andrian Roberts, “Stop the War! Benn urges resistance to new attacks on Iraq,” Morning Star (March 4, 2002), p. 1. 466 Mike Ambrose, “CND plans protest on military action; Demonstrators will march on Trafalgar Square,” Morning Star (September 25, 2001) 467 “Solidarity groups go all out to get Kissinger on British visit,” Morning Star (April 13, 2002), p. 5. 468 Adrian Roberts, “Stop the killings: thousands swell protests against Israeli terror,” Morning Star (May 6, 2002), p. 1. 469 Abraham Greenhouse, “Palestine activism on campus and beyond: overcoming Israel’s efforts to erase history,” The Electronic Intifada (November 8, 2012). Available here: https://electronicintifada.net/blogs/abraham-greenhouse/palestine-activism-campus-and-beyond- overcoming-israels-efforts-erase

107 describes BDS as the “South Africa strategy for Palestine.” 470 PACBI’s formation was based on a critique of the PLO and the Palestinian Authority (PA) for its failure to end the Israeli occupation and create the conditions for a Palestinian state. As noted above, the PLO had largely sought state-based solutions to the problem of Palestine. PACBI, by contrast, emphasized grassroots mobilizing abroad. Drawing explicitly on the precedent set by up the African National Congress during the anti-apartheid struggle, they have sought to harness the power of Western civil society in order to effect change in Palestine. According to PACBI activists, the call for BDS is “inspired by the struggle of South Africans against apartheid and in the spirit of international solidarity, moral consistency, and resistance to injustice and oppression.” 471 PACBI’s transnational advocacy strategy has been geared primarily towards non- Palestinians rather than the Palestinian diaspora in the West. In part, this reflected the weakness of the Palestinian diaspora. As one Palestinian activist explained: The [non-Palestinian activists] of this world are far more active than our own community. I hate to say it, but it’s the reality. It’s one of the things that keeps me up at night because I’m trying to make a case to Americans and the first question I get is “how about your own community, what are they doing?” I have to say we have a weakness…I don’t dismiss my people or drop them but I understand it’s a very long-term process and I can’t wait. The urgency is something that the Palestinian-American community doesn’t get. The [solidarity] activism community gets it. They understand there’s been and there continues to be urgency here. 472

Accordingly, PACBI has largely sought to connect directly with existing solidarity organizations and encourage them to organize themselves around the BDS campaign, in terms of tactics and goals. This strategy reflected the developments that were occurring in Western civil society, described above, which included long-standing calls for the boycott of Israel but which lacked Palestinian leadership. 473 Under the leadership of the BDS National Committee in Ramallah, the mass solidarity mobilizing in Palestine in

470 Barghouti, BDS: The Global Struggle for Palestinian Rights , see chapter 3. 471 “BDS Movement Call, July 9, 2005,” in Audrea Lim (ed.), The Case for Sanctions Against Israel (London: Verso, 2012), p. 24. 472 Interview, Palestinian activist, September 28, 2016. 473 Barghouti, “Putting Palestine Back on the Map,” p. 53.

108 North America and Europe has grown considerably in size and improved in transnational cohesion. 474

5.2 The Absence of Mass Solidarity Moblizing for the Kurds While the Palestinians have received widespread non-diaspora support in North America and Western Europe, the Kurds of Turkey have not. From the 1980s until the early 2000s, there have been only limited and small-scale instances of grassroots non- Kurdish mobilization for the Kurds. In 1983, for instance, French activists helped local Kurds establish the Institute Kurde de Paris, which today has become a leading organizaiton that promotes Kurdish culture, language and history. 475 In 1993, Irish activists established the Kurdish Information Network, which was later renamed Kurdistan Solidarity Ireland. 476 In 1994, a UK-based activist established the Peace in Kurdistan Campaign, which received declaratory support from prominent British politicians and left-wing figures, such as Noam Chomsky and Harold Pinter, among others. 477 And in 1995, German activists travelled to southeastern Turkey and held protests in support of Kurdish villagers. 478 The extent of these non-Kurdish mobilizations, however, pale in comparison to that seen in the case of Palestine. They do not reach either of the thresholds for mass soldiarity mobilizing that I use in chapter 3, whether five- or ten-plus solidarity NGOs. To date, no solidarity NGOs or coalitions similar to the Palestine Solidarity Campaign, with its 60 branches across the UK, or the US Campaign to End Israeli Occupation, with its 300-plus member groups, have formed for the Kurds. What explains this case of non-mobilization? Why have so few taken up the Kurdish cause despite the many similarities it has with the Palestinian struggle, described in chapter 4? In this section I argue that this instance of non-mobilization is due to the

474 Abigail Bakan & Yasmeen Abu Laban, “Palestinian Resistance and International Solidarity: The BDS Campaign,” Race & Class Vol. 51, No. 1, pp. 29-54. 475 Nicole Watts, “Institutionalizing Virtual Kurdistan West: Transnational Networks and Ethnic Contention in International Affairs,” in Joel Migdal (ed.), Boundaries and Belonging: States and Societies in the Struggle to Shape Identities and Local Practices Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), p. 136. 476 See http://homepage.eircom.net/~ksi/ 477 See http://peaceinkurdistancampaign.com/ 478 Fiona Adamson, “Mechanisms of Diaspora Mobilization and the Transnationalization of Civil War,” in Jeffrey Checkel (ed.), Transnational Dynamics of Civil War (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), p. 85.

109 fact that Kurdish rebels have not prioritized non-Kurdish recruitment abroad. On the contrary, the large size of, and high levels of political organization among, the Kurdish communities in Europe encouraged Kurdish rebels to adopt a diaspora mobilization strategy rather than one that focused on the mobilization of non-Kurds.

5.2.1 The Emergence and International Diplomacy of the PKK From the 1920s to the 1950s, Kurdish resistance to Turkey was largely subsumed within the broader Turkish socialist movement. In the 1960s, however, Kurdish activists began to assert their own ethno-national identity. They started to separate themselves from the Turkish Left and began to organize distinctly Kurdish organizations. This was the result of a number of domestic and international factors, including the relative openness of Turkish politics in the 1960s that allowed Kurds to organize cultural activities, the Kurdish engagement with the Left that introduced ideas of colonial oppression, and the emergence of a Kurdish national movement in Iraq.479 It was also a response to what many Kurds saw as the failure of the Turkish Left to recognize the Kurdish problem as anything more than an issue of economic underdevelopment that would be solved through a socialist revolution. The PKK emerged within this larger context of Kurdish ethno-national mobilizing in Turkey. The organizational history of the PKK began in 1975 when Abdullah Ocalan and a number of Kurdish students left Ankara and moved to the Kurdish regions of southeast Turkey. Their objective was to create an organization that would represent all Kurds. Drawing on Marxist-Leninist principles, they sought to mobilize the Kurdish masses for a revolution. 480 In terms of mobilization, they were remarkably effective. Through the 1980s, as a result of severe state repression and concerted PKK mobilization efforts that spoke more directly to Kurds feelings of oppression and their desire for cultural dignity, the PKK became the predominant Kurdish rebel group in Turkey. It sidelined numerous challengers that offered competing options for the Kurds, which included those who

479 Cengiz Gunes, The Kurdish National Movement in Turkey: From Protest to Resistance (New York: Routledge, 2012). Cengiz Gunes, “Explaining the PKK’s Mobilization of the Kurds in Turkey: Hegemony, Myth and Violence,” Ethnopolitics Vol. 12, No. 3 (2013), pp. 247-267. 480 Barkey & Graham Fuller, Turkey’s Kurdish Question . p. 22.

110 promoted non-violence, assimilation, further integration with the Turkish Left, and Islamism. 481 The PKK’s efforts in southeastern Turkey involved securing support from the Kurdish peasants, attacking state institutions, and diminishing state capacity in the region. 482 Their mobilizations provoked harsh Turkish state responses, notably after 1980 in the aftermath of the military coup. In 1981 the state took concerted action to undermine PKK structures, imprisoning and killings thousands of its members. This occurred in a larger context of government crackdowns on all forms of dissent, whether Turkish or Kurdish. Yet, arguably, the Kurdish regions of the country were hit the hardest. In 1983, the Kurdish language was official outlawed, “continuing policies of changing Kurdish place-names to Turkish ones and forbidding parents to give their children Kurdish names.” 483 In 1986, a Turkish parliamentary fact-finding mission referred to the creation of a concentration camp into the eastern parts of the country. And from 1987 to 1997 Kurdish provinces were placed under emergency rule. 484 During this period, David McDowall writes, “every Kurdish village learnt what the state meant by law and order.” 485 The PKK’s domestic mobilizations, as well as the state violence that ensued as a result, sparked international attention. While the Western press did not spend much attention on the Turkey’s Kurds through the 1980s,486 prominent international human rights NGOs did. As I show below in Figure 8, as violence intensified, Amnesty International paid an increasing amount of attention to rights abuses occurring inside Turkey. 487 Just as Israel’s invasion of Lebanon in1982 contributed to solidarity mobilizations in the US and UK, events in Turkey around the same time could have had a

481 Cengiz Gunes, The Kurdish National Movement in Turkey: From Protest to Resistance (New York: Routledge, 2012). 482 Romano, The Kurdish National Movement , p. 77. 483 Romano, The Kurdish National Movement , p. 80. 484 Romano, The Kurdish National Movement , p. 77-80. 485 David McDowall, A Modern History of the Kurds (London: IB Tauris, 1996), p. 425. 486 From 1980 to 1990 the New York Times and the London Times published approximately 35 articles per year referring to the Kurds in Turkey. 487 Data is from Cullen Hendrix & Wendy Wong, “When is the Pen Truly Might? Regime Type and the Efficacy of Naming and Shaming in Curbing Human Rights Abuses,” British Journal of Political Science Vol. 43, No. 3 (2013), pp. 651-672.

111 similar effect. The difference in the Kurdish case, however, was the absence of sustained recruitment efforts of non-diasporans by Kurdish activists. Figure 8: Amnesty International Coverage of Turkey 1976 - 1999

140

120

100

International International 40

20 Total Total Number Advocacy of Items Publishedd on Turkey by Amnesty 0 1976 1981 1986 1991 1996 Year

In addition to organizing within Turkey, the PKK was also active in securing external support for their struggle. Like the PLO, the PKK’s leadership operated from abroad. In 1980, predicting severe government crackdowns amidst an impending military coup, Ocalan and the PKK’s central command relocated to Syria and Lebanon where they were granted a safe haven. 488 In the Bekaa Valley, an area in Lebanon that was then controlled by Syria, the PKK was able to train with other rebel groups, including with the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine. 489 In 1985 the PKK’s relations with the Syrian government further improved, despite Turkish pressure on the Syrian government to expel the rebels, 490 Beyond Syria, the PKK also received support from the Kurds in northern Iraq and Iran, as well as from groups in Armenia, Russia, Greece and Cyprus. 491 In part because of this external support, the PKK was able to conduct hundreds of attacks through the 1980s until 1999, and then again after 2004. 492

488 Romano, The Kurdish National Movement , p. 79, 85. 489 Barkey & Graham Fuller, Turkey’s Kurdish Question . p. 22. 490 Aliza Marcus, Blood and Belief: The PKK and the Kurdish Fight for Independence (New York: New York University Press, 2007), p. 99. 491 Martin van Bruinessen, “Turkey, Europe and the Kurds after the Capture of Abdullah Ocalan,” in Martin van Bruinessen (ed.), Kurdish Ethnonationalism versus Nation-Building States (Istanbul: The ISIS Press, 2000). 492 Tezcur, “When Democratization Radicalizes: The Kurdish Nationalist Movement in Turkey.”

112 Beyond regional diplomacy, however, the PKK also actively looked to Europe for support. Unlike the PLO, they did not, however, adopt an elite-oriented approach to do so. This reflected the fact that while the PKK had state sponsors who supported its struggle against Turkey, none of them were interested in publicly backing the cause of Kurdish nationalism in international forums. Syria, for instance, had a restive Kurdish minority of its own and was thus unwilling to promote a cause that could potentially undermine its territorial integrity. Thus, Syria publicly denied supporting the PKK. In 1992, after a visit by a Turkish delegation, the Syrian government declared the PKK to be an “outlawed organization.” 493 Without strong state backers, the PKK was not able to gain access to the international institutions, such as the UN which provided rebels with direct access to Western officials, that the were available to the PLO through its ties to Arab states. In light of these conditions, the PKK had to go through grassroots channels to secure the external support it required to wage its campaign against the Turkish state more effectively. In pursuing a grassroots oriented strategy in the West, the PKK leadership had two options open to them. One option was to focus on the broader Western left, including Marxist and socialist organizations, trade unions, and peace groups. This strategy would have fit with PKK’s ideological identity as well as its understanding of the their struggle as anti-colonial in nature. Like the PLO, it also could have drawn upon Third Worldist themes of national liberation that were effective in mobilizing segments of the Western Left for the Palestinians.494 Further, the PKK could have also focused on the peace movement in the West, given Turkey’s membership in NATO and the significant amount of military support it received from the US. Had it adopted such an approach, the PKK would have made mass solidarity mobilizing on its behalf far more likely.

5.2.2 The PKK’s Diaspora Mobilization Strategy The PKK leadership, however, did not adopt such a strategy geared towards the mobilization of non-Kurds. On the contrary, they largely focused their grassroots efforts their ethnic kin. This strategy began in 1981 when the PKK’s Central Committee first

493 Bruinessen, “Turkey, Europe and the Kurds after the Capture of Abdullah Ocalan,” 494 Colin Shindler, Israel and the European Left (New York: Continuum, 2012).

113 deployed activists to Europe in response to the military crackdown that accompanied the 1980 coup in Turkey. 495 Their job was to organize the Kurdish community along PKK lines. In particular, they sought to turn community members into active protest participants and contributors to PKK operations inside Turkey. “By the mid-1980s,” Vera Eccarius-Kelly explains, “PKK representatives endorsed a protest campaign to empower Kurds to assert their ethnic background not only in Germany but throughout Western Europe or wherever Kurdish families had settled.” 496 To be sure, an important objective of this protest campaign was to raise awareness in the West of the Kurdish cause. It was designed not only to send messages of support back to the Kurdish communities inside Turkey, but also to pressure Western officials to care about the issue as well as the Western public. However, as I argued above, this strategy of consensus mobilization was insufficient to generating active non-Kurdish support for the West. Little was done in the way out of sustained recruitment towards non-Kurdish leftwing channels. Occasionally Kurdish activists would attend Marxist conferences in the UK and Europe each year to hand out leaflets to the participants, a strategy that generally has a low probability of success in recruiting and retaining active supporters. Unlike the Palestinian outreach efforts, these Kurdish efforts were brief and generally short-lived, and were not part of more sustained recruitment campaigns. This generally reflected the Kurdish leadership’s general disinterest in non-diasporan mobilization. As one Kurdish activist put it: a lot of these [diaspora] campaigns are centrally defined….It may work in Turkey but is it going to work in Britain or in France? Nobody asks that question. And those people who tend to make these decisions do not have a good understanding of Western society. 497

I argue that the PKK selected a diaspora mobilization strategy because of the already existing political strength, as well as the political potential, of the Kurdish communities in Europe prior to the arrival of the PKK in the early 1980s. It is true that the PKK did much to contribute to the extent and direction of Kurdish political organizing in Europe. However, I suggest that some scholars go too far in emphasizing

495 Adamson, “Mechanisms of Diaspora Mobilization and the Transnationalization of Civil War,” p 75. 496 Eccarius-Kelly, The Militant Kurds , p 8. 497 Interview, Kurdish activist, December 5, 2012.

114 PKK actions alone as the main driver of Kurdish diaspora mobilization.498 In fact, the PKK’s focus on the diaspora reflects two key characteristics of the community: its size and pre-existing levels of political organization due in part to the organizing efforts of other Kurdish groups active in Europe through the 1960s and 1970s.499 As resource mobilization scholars indicate, social movements, including diaspora-based movements, often form out of pre-existing networks and organizations that help to bring people together and expose them to mobilization campaigns by entrepreneurs.500 In the 1950s, Kurds began migrating to Europe in large numbers. Initially, Kurdish migrants were mainly students and intellectuals. In the 1960s and 1970s they were labourers, and in the 1980s and 1990s they were asylum seekers. Kurdish migration to Europe increased significantly after the coup in Turkey in 1980 that ushered in a period of severe repression and violence. During this time, many Kurdish activists relocated to Europe to evade repression and to pressure the Turkish state from abroad. 501 By the late 1970s, the Kurdish communities in Europe were estimated to include hundreds of thousands of members.502 Through the 1980s and 1990s, as violence inside Turkey spiked, the community grew considerably. There is no authoritative data on the size of the Kurdish diaspora, since ethnic background is not captured in European census data. However, estimates range from 850,000 to 1.5 million people, most of whom live in Germany, France, Sweden, and the UK, among other Western states. 503 Some Kurdish

498 Martin Van Bruinessen, “Shifting National and Ethnic Identities: The Kurds in Turkey and the European Diaspora,” Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs Vol. 18 No. 1 (1998), p. 45. Adamson, “Mechanisms of Diaspora Mobilization and the Transnationalization of Civil War,” p. 77. 499 Grojean, “Bringing the Organization Back-In.” Bahar Baser, “KOMKAR: The Unheard Voice in the Kurdish Diaspora. In Christou, A., & Mavroudi, E. (Eds.). Dismantling Diasporas: Rethinking the Geographies of Diasporic Identity, Connection and Development . (Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2015). 500 J. Craig Jenkins, “Resource Mobilization Theory and the Study of Social Movements,” Annual Review of Sociology Vol. 9 (1983), pp. 527-553. For an overview see Doug McAdam, Sidney Tarrow & Charles Tilley, “Comparative Perspectives on Contentious Politics,” in Mark Lichbach & Alan Zuckerman (eds.), Comparative Politics: Rationality, Culture and Structure (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009). 501 Baser, Diasporas and Homeland Conflicts , p. 56-57. 502 Andreas Blatte, “The Kurdish Movement: Ethnic Mobilization and Europeanization,” Paper Presented at the EUSA 8 th International Biennial Conference ( March 2003), p. 6. 503 Vera Eccarius-Kelly, “Nationalism, Ethnic Rap, and the Kurdish Diaspora,” Peace Review: A Journal of Social Justice Vol. 22 (2010), pp. 424-5. Also see population estimates here: http://www.kongrakurdistan.net/en/kurdistan/

115 leaders suggest that the population is closer to two million in Europe. 504 The size of the Kurdish communities made it an attractive target for the PKK. Size, however, is only one characteristic of the strength of the Kurdish diaspora. As I suggested above, large diasporas can be politically weak when they lack the capacity or willingness to mobilize for homeland politics. This was not the case for the Kurds in Europe. In fact, what made the Kurdish communities a focal point of PKK attention was the fact that well before the PKK had formed, Kurds in Europe had already begun to organize themselves. They created networks and associations to facilitate an active engagement in homeland politics. The PKK was aware of these developments and tailored their international diplomacy accordingly.505 In the 1950s and 1960s Kurdish activists began mobilizing Kurdish students in Europe who formed a significant part of the first wave of the Kurdish migrations. In 1956, the Kurdish Student’s Society in Europe was founded, followed by the National Union of Kurdish Students in Europe in 1965. While the two organizations were not explicitly political, their activities did have political undertones. They followed events in Turkey and the Middle East closely, and tended to espouse progressive political views. Further, by identifying as “Kurdish,” members of the two groups were engaging in an explicitly political act, given that such an identity at the time had no legal standing in Turkey. Kurdish mobilizations continued through the 1960s and 1970s, resulting in the formation of new organizations, such as Hevra and Bahoz, both of which worked to politicize Kurdish students arriving from Turkey (Grojean 2011: 184). Alongside the mobilization of students was the politicization of Kurdish workers who formed a significant part of the second wave of migrations from Turkey to Europe in the 1960s and 1970s. Initially, the Kurdish migrants joined Turkish worker associations, such as the Federation of Turkish Socialists in Europe. These organizations had connections to the left-wing parties inside Turkey who were growing increasingly critical of the state. The ties between the Kurdish workers and the Turkish left in Europe mapped on to the close connections between two groups inside Turkey. In the 1970s,

504 “Interview with Kemal Burkay,” Centre for Policy & Research on Turkey (April 7, 2013). Available here: 505 Alynna Lyon & Emek Ucarer, “Mobilizing Ethnic Conflict: Kurdish Separatism in Germany and the PKK,” Ethnic and Racial Studies Vol. 24, No. 6 (November 2001), p. 933.

116 however, as Kurds began to separate from the Turkish left in Turkey, similar processes occurred in Europe. Most notably, after the military coup in 1971, numerous Turkish and Kurdish political parties established bases in Europe, drawing on support from their respective communities there. By the end of the decade, all Kurdish parties in Turkey had an organizational presence in Europe, with the Kurdistan Socialist Party (PSK) being the most significant.506 Bahar Baser estimates that there were approximately thirty Kurdish organizations across Europe around this time. 507 In 1978, many of these organizations came together to create an umbrella organization known as the Federation of Kurdish Workers Associations (KOMKAR) that focused on supporting the Kurdish struggle in Turkey as well as promoting the rights of Kurdish workers in Europe. 508 KOMKAR and its affiliated group organized cultural events, including the celebration of Newroz, the Kurdish new year. They also organized political actions as well. In 1981, for instance, they organized a hunger strike to protest the military coup in Turkey and sent representatives to the Council of Europe to draw the attention of European officials to the Kurdish issue. 509 In light of these organizational developments, when the PKK began to look to the West for support, they were able to draw on not only a sizeable community of Kurds there but also one that was to some extent politically organized for homeland politics. This is not to suggest that all Kurds were politically active by the late 1970s. What it does suggest, however, is that the organizational efforts of various Kurdish groups in Europe in the 1960s and 1970s created a community infrastructure that the PKK could draw on to mobilize Kurds on their behalf. The presence of these organizations incentivized a diaspora mobilization strategy and lessened the chances of the PKK focusing on mobilizing non-diasporan networks. The PKK’s efforts to mobilize the diaspora on their behalf were highly successful. It was able to extract a significant amount of material assistance from the community. Through the 1990s, for instance, the Kurds in Germany are estimated to have given the

506 Grojean, “Bringing the Organization Back-In,” pp. 184-185. 507 Baser,, “KOMKAR: The Unheard Voice in the Kurdish Diaspora,” p. 117. 508 Ostegaard-Nielsen, Trans-state Loyalties and Policies , p. 62. 509 Baser, “KOMKAR: The Unheard Voice in the Kurdish Diaspora,” p. 118.

117 PKK 30-50 million Deutsch Marks annually.510 As Barkey & Fuller observe, the Kurdish diaspora has “contributed generously to the PKK”, although not all of their contributions have been entirely voluntary. 511 It was also able to recruit personnel from the European Kurdish communities. Some became fighters in the mountains of Kurdistan but many others became political operatives that were crucial to the strengthening of the PKK’s transnational network of information centres, associations, journals and advocacy groups.512 Beyond financial support and personnel, it also was successful in turning the diaspora into a highly active European-based social movement.513 Through the 1980s and 1990s, Kurds in Europe conducted more than one hundred and fifty protests each year, amounting to almost one protest every other day.514 It is estimated that many of these protests attracted more than 50,000 participants.515 Often, these protests were part of larger mobilizations taking place among Kurdish communities across Europe and beyond.516 In 1999, for instance, in response to the capture of Abdullah Ocalan, Kurdish communities erupted in protest across Europe, which one New York Times report described as indicative of the diaspora’s “extraordinary coordination.”517 In light of the extent of the community’s activism, Olivier Grojean describes the Kurdish diaspora as “probably the most demonstrative group in Europe…” 518 Furthermore, Kurdish diaspora activism has helped to open up Western policy channels to Kurdish lobbying. Through the 1990s, and especially after Ocalan’s arrest in 1990, this lobbying has sought to situate the Kurdish struggle within international human rights norms in an attempt to appeal to Western policy-making audiences. In 1992 the

510 Adamson, “Mechanisms of Diaspora Mobilization and the Transnationalization of Civil War,” p. 82. 511 Barkey & Fuller, Turkey’s Kurdish Question, p. 30. Adamson, “Mechanisms of Diaspora Mobilization and the Transnationalization of Civil War,” pp, 81-84. Eccarius-Kelly, The Militant Kurds , p. 4. 512 Martin van Bruinessen, “Turkey, Europe and the Kurds after the Capture of Abdullah Ocalan,” in Martin van Bruinessen (ed.), Kurdish Ethnonationalism versus Nation-Building States (Istanbul: The ISIS Press, 2000). 513 Vera Eccarius-Kelly, “Political Movements and Leverage Points: Kurdish Activism in the European Diaspora,” Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs Vol. 22, No. 1 (2002). 514 Grojean, “Bringing the Organization Back In,” p. 193n2. 515 Ostegaard-Nielsen, Trans-state Loyalties and Policies , p. 75. 516 Ostegaard-Nielsen, Trans-state Loyalties and Policies , p. 82. 517 Alessandra Stanley, “Top Kurd’s Arrest Unleashes Rioting Across Europe,” (February 17, 1999). New York Times . Available at: http://www.nytimes.com/1999/02/17/world/top-kurd-s-arrest-unleashes-rioting- all-across-europe.html 518 Grojean, “Bringing the Organization Back-In,” p. 182.

118 UK-based Kurdish Human Rights Project, which included non-Kurdish lawyers and was widely suspected to have PKK ties, was one such organization that brought cases of Turkish repression of Kurds to the European Court of Human Rights. They sought to take advantage of the fact that Turkey had signed on to the European Convention of Human Rights and thus fell under the mandate of the court.519 In the mid-1990s, the German government engaged in talks with the PKK leadership in an effort to quell Kurdish political actions inside Germany.520 Kurdish groups in Europe have also engaged in elite- level diplomacy within various European institutions. In 1995, the Kurdish Parliament in Exile was formed to serve as the Kurds formal diplomatic body in Europe, similar to the Algerian National Liberation Front and the African National Congress. The Parliament closely identified with the PKK and appointed Ocalan as its honorary chairman.521 In May 1999, the Parliament became the Kurdish National Congress. Through the 2000s, Kurdish political organizations have increasingly lobbied the European Parliament in an effort to insert themselves into the negotiations surrounding Turkey’s bid to become a member of the European Union. Groups like the Kurdish National Congress and the Association of Kurdish Organizations in Europe have used the accession process to increase their pressure on Turkey to grant Kurds the right to speak and be educated in their own language.522 In these efforts, Kurdish groups have established ties with various European political parities, including the Party of European Socialists, the European United Left/Nordic Green Left and the Greens/European Free Alliance. 523 During this period, the PKK leadership largely shifted away from its secessionist claims and demands for an independent state, and instead focused on what has been called “democratic confederalism,” which would entail Kurdish autonomy within a unified Turkey.

519 Nicole Watts, “Institutionalizing Virtual Kurdistan West: Transnational Networks and Ethnic Contention in International Affairs,” in Joel Migdal (ed.), Boundaries and Belonging: States and Societies in the Struggle to Shape Identities and Local Practices Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), pp. 130-133. 520 Van Bruinessen, “Turkey, Europe and the Kurds after the Capture of Abdullah Ocalan,” 521 Nicole Watts, “Institutionalizing Virtual Kurdistan West: Transnational Networks and Ethnic Contention in International Affairs,” p. 143. 522 Leila Berkowitz & Liza Mugge, “Transnational Diaspora Lobbying: Europeanization and the Kurdish Question,” Journal of Intercultural Studies Vol. 35, No. 1 (2014). 523 Vera Eccarius-Kelly, “Political Movements and Leverage Points: Kurdish Activism in the European Diaspora,” Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs Vol. 22, No. 1 (2002), pp. 91-92. Berkowitz & Mugge, “Transnational Diaspora Lobbying: Europeanization and the Kurdish Question,” p. 83.

119 5.2.2 Why Was the PKK Successful in Mobilizing the Diaspora?

The PKK’s ability to mobilize the diaspora so effectively was due to two main factors. First, it was able to establish itself as the leader of the Kurdish movement inside Turkey. The PKK’s ability to attack government targets and to withstand military assaults earned them the respect and admiration of Kurds abroad. Other Kurdish groups that had established a presence in Europe in the 1970s, including the PSK, tended to wilt in the face of increasing government repression. This undermined not only their organizational capacities, but it also raised questions among diaspora Kurds about whether or not the group represented a viable path towards Kurdish liberation. 524 The successes of the PKK inside Turkey were thus integral to its success in securing diaspora support. 525 Second, the PKK also devoted significant resources to “agitate the [diaspora] population ideologically.”526 They established journals and magazines to advance their perspectives on the Kurdish question. In these publications, the PKK employed a strategy of ethnic outbidding against its Kurdish rivals. Ethnic outbidding refers to an iterative process in which political actors depict themselves in increasingly radicalized terms, unwilling to compromise on aspects deemed central to their political identity. 527 For the PKK, this outbidding took two forms. It involved the use of violence and coercion against its competitors, undermining their capacity and willingness to mobilize. It also involved advocacy frames that depicted rival Kurdish groups as insufficiently Kurdish. These frames sought to question the commitment of non-PKK elements in the community to the Kurdish cause and to suggest that they might be willing to sell-out or compromise on the rights of their ethnic kin. These advocacy frames were made that much more powerful in light of the first factor noted above – the PKK’s ability to assert itself, often violently, against the Turkish state.528 In addition to outbidding, PKK advocacy frames also emphasized the “double marginalization” of the Kurds by the Turkish state and by Europe, namely Germany, both

524 Baser, B. (2015). KOMKAR: The Unheard Voice in the Kurdish Diaspora. In Christou, A., & Mavroudi, E. (Eds.). Dismantling Diasporas: Rethinking the Geographies of Diasporic Identity, Connection and Development . (Burlington, VT: Ashgate), p. 119. 525 Romano, The Kurdish National Movement . 526 Grojean, “Bringing the Organization Back In,” p. 188. 527 Neil Devotta, “From Ethnic Outbidding to Ethnic Conflict: The Institutional Bases for Sri Lanka’s Separatist War,” Nations and Nationalism Vol. 11 No. 1 (2005), pp. 141-142. 528 Adamson, “Mechanisms of Diaspora Mobilization and the Transnationalization of Civil War,” p. 80.

120 of which had failed to properly attend to their rights. In Germany, second- and third- generation Kurds were depicted as foreigners, denied citizenship and, thus, socially and economically marginalized.529 These conditions made the PKK’s version of Kurdish identity, as a form of resistance to both Turkish and European state power, that much more compelling. 530 It mapped on to the felt experiences of the Kurdish communities in Europe. In employing these tactics, the PKK was able to mobilize consensus around their particular vision of Kurdishness and resistance. When Western governments began to move against the PKK, including Germany’s 1993 ban of the organization and then the EU’s designation of the group as a terrorist organization in 2002, many in the community saw this as further evidence in support of the PKK’s message of Europe’s attempt to marginalize the Kurds, presumably at the bidding of the Turkish state. Far from weakening the political capacity of the Kurdish community, these bans and designations had an emboldening effect, leading to more protests in the following years. 531 Importantly, mobilizing sympathy and consensus around a cause or organization is not the same as mobilizing active support. Thus, in addition to consensus mobilization in the community, the PKK also set up organizational structures to facilitate action mobilization. 532 In 1985 it established a political wing in Europe – the National Liberation Front for Kurdistan (ERNK) – that worked to unite all pro-PKK associations abroad and to bring them together under a single European federation. 533 European countries with Kurdish populations were divided up into regions that were to be controlled by the ERNK’s Central Committee in Europe, which was headquartered in Germany (Cologne) and Belgium (Brussels), and which had national offices in England, France, Holland, Scandinavia, and Switzerland. 534 Cultural associations for artists, intellectuals, youth and women were founded to further strengthen community ties. The various national organizations and associations created were then tied in to an overall transnational network of umbrella organizations, including KON-KURD (Belgium), YEKKOM (Germany), FEYKA (France), FEDKOM (Holland), and FEYKURD

529 Adamson, “Mechanisms of Diaspora Mobilization and the Transnationalization of Civil War,” p. 78. 530 Vera Eccarius-Kelly, “Radical Consequences of Benign Neglect: The Rise of the PKK in Germany,” The Fletcher Forum of World Affairs Vol. 24 No. 1 (Spring 2000), pp. 161-174. 531 Lyon & Ucarer, “Kurdish Separatism in Germany and the PKK,” p. 935. 532 Barkey & Fuller, Turkey’s Kurdish Question , p. 22. 533 Grojean, “Bringing the Organization Back-In,” p. 188. 534 Adamson, “Mechanisms of Diaspora Mobilization and the Transnationalization of Civil War,” p. 75.

121 (Denmark). This structure enabled the community, under the leadership of the PKK, to coordinate its actions across borders and to make their claims known to European authorities. 535 In light of the willingness of the European Kurds to mobilize along PKK lines and to offer significant levels of assistance, Kurdish leaders have not focused their finite resources on securing grassroots non-diasporan support. This has made the likelihood of mass solidarity mobilizing for the Kurds far less likely.

5.3 Conclusion In this chapter I have argued that a reason why a mass solidarity mobilization has formed for the Palestinian but not the Kurds reflects distinct Palestinian and Kurdish rebel recruitment strategies. As a result of the political weakness of the Palestinian diaspora in North America and Europe, Palestinian activists have actively sought to recruit non-Palestinians, contributing directly to their mass mobilization. By contrast, the strength of the Kurdish diaspora in Europe encouraged Kurdish rebel activists to focus on mobilizing their ethnic kin rather than non-Kurds. Accordingly, non-diasporans have not mobilized to the same extent for the Kurds as they have for the Palestinians. This chapter offers one explanation (strong diaspora leading to diaspora-centric recruitment strategies) for why we do not see mass solidarity mobilizing for some distant rebels. But what about cases in which distant rebels have weak diasporas but still do not receive mass solidarity from non-diaspora activists? It is to this set of cases that I now turn.

535 Baser, “Kurdish Diaspora Political activism in Europe With a Particular Focus on Great Britain,” p. 17.

122 Chapter 6 Hypotheses for Non-Mobilization Under Conditions of Rebel Diasporic Weakness

In the previous chapters, I argued that rebel groups with weak diasporas in the West are the more likely recipients of widespread grassroots solidarity. These rebels are more likely to recruit grassroots non-diasporan supporters in North America and Europe, and thus more likely to receive their support. That said, the relationship between a weak diaspora and receiving this kind of external support is far rom deterministic. As I first reported in chapter 3, and again in Table 15 below, in my dataset the majority groups with weak diasporas in the West have not received widespread grassroots solidarity. What explains these instances of non-mobilization? Why, despite permissive conditions, have Western grassroots activists not taken up these rebel causes in a significant way? Table 15: Diaspora Strength and Mass Solidarity Mobilizations

Mass Solidarity Mobilization Formation Diaspora No Yes Total strength Weak 71 (76%) 22 (24%) 93 (<0.5) Strong 33 (94%) 2 (6%) 35 (>=0.5) Total 104 24 128

In this chapter I provide some tentative answers to this question. I identify two broad reasons for the absence of mass solidarity mobilizing. First, I argue that mass solidarity mobilizations will not form when non-diaspora activists do not see a real need for it. I suggest that this perceived lack of need can be the result of two conditions - when the human rights issue in question improves considerably or when Western governments take a meaningful response by imposing economic sanctions on the rights- abusing state. When at least one of these two conditions hold, I suggest that Western activist entrepreneurs are likely to focus their attention on what they deem to be more pressing matters. I use the Non-Violent and Violent Campaigns and Outcomes (NAVCO) and the Cingranelli-Richard Human Rights (CIRI) datasets to identify human

123 rights progress and conflict resolution. I use the Threat and Imposition of Economic Sanctions (TIES) dataset to identify instances in which Western states have imposed economic sanctions that include a human rights stipulation. Second, mass solidarity mobilization will not form when the rebels themselves do not ask for this type of support. A mass solidarity mobilization is not asked for when the aggrieved are unable to run a domestic campaign that Western solidarity activists can mobilize behind. I identify two reasons for the absence of such domestic campaigns – severe state repression or institutional openness, both of which shape the behaviour of dissidents but in different ways. A mass solidarity mobilization is also not asked for when groups are able to campaign domestically but either do not seek out external support for their struggle or if they do seek it out they do not ask for it from Western grassroots activists. I use the NAVCO dataset to identify which groups have campaigned and which groups have not. I use the CIRI and POLITY datasets to identify levels of repression and institutional openness, and the Minorities at Risk (MAR) dataset to identify which minority groups have sought external support for their struggle. I complement these data with research from secondary scholarly sources, NGO reports, as well as interviews I have conducted with solidarity activists. Table 16 below displays the distribution of cases across these categories. Appendix C includes a brief description of each case and how they were coded. Some of these categories are not mutually exclusive and some groups may appear in more than box. For instance, cases may fall within the human rights progress and economic sanctions sub-categories, given that sanctions may compel a state to reform its domestic practices. 536 Further, cases may also fall within the ‘Mass Solidarity Mobilization Not Needed’ categories and one of either the ‘No Domestic Campaign’ or ‘Yes Domestic Campaign’ sub-categories. Just like mass solidarity mobilization

536 The sanctions literature suggests that economic coercion tends to worsen the target’s state respect for human rights and can have unintended negative effects on the civilian population, but few studies examine the specific effects of human rights-inspired sanctions. Some studies outline how economic sanctions have lead to human rights disasters, as in Haiti and Iraq. See Dursun Peksen, “For Better or Worse? The Effect on Economic Sanctions on Human Rights,” Journal of Peace Research Vol. 46, No. 1 (2009), pp. 59-77. However, human rights criticism by foreign governments of states with strong international economic ties has lead to reductions in government repression, which may suggest that in some cases rights-inspired sanctions can have positive effects. See James Franklin, “Shame on You: The Impact of Human Rights Criticism on Political Repression in Latin America,” International Studies Quarterly Vol. 52, (2008), pp. 187-211.

124 formation, its absence in a particular case can be the result of a number of interacting conditions. This chapter proceeds in two main sections. In the first section I discuss the cases that fall into the ‘Mass Mobilization Not Needed’ category, focusing first on those in the human rights progress sub-category followed by those in the economic sanctions sub- category. In the second section I discuss those cases that fall into the ‘Mass Solidarity Mobilization Not Asked For’ category, first by examining the ‘No Domestic Campaign’ sub-category followed by the ‘Yes Domestic Campaign’ category. In each section I provide a broad overview of the cases. For the most part I seek breadth not depth, however I do probe some cases more closely. Due to the availability of data, I explore the pro-democracy movement in Egypt and the Acehnese struggle for independence from Indonesia more closely in order to elaborate on the explanatory utility of the category in question.

125 Table 16 Distribution of Amnesty Campaigns (years in brackets are Amnesty International campaign years).

*= state collapse **=tentative determination

Mass Solidarity Mobilization Not Needed (25) Mass Solidarity Mobilization Not Asked For (68)

No Domestic Campaign (49) Yes Domestic Campaign (20)

Human Rights Western Sanctions (12) Seeking External Progress (13) Support But Not Institutional Openness Not Seeking External State Repression (42) Mass Solidarity (6) Support (11) Mobilization Support (9) Acehnese (1985-2003) Acehnese (1985-2003) Ahmadiyya - Pakistan Brazilians (1988-2000) Bangladeshis (1985- Acehnese (1985- Bangladeshis (1985- Bangladeshis (1985- (1991-2000) Cypriots (1991-1995) 1988)** 2003) 1988) 1988) Bahrainis (1996-1996) Hondurans (1981- Bolivians (1980- Chechens (1991- Bolivians (1980-1982) Bolivians (1980-1982) Belarusians (1997- 1988) 1982)** 2000) Hondurans (1981- Cambodians (1997-1998) 2000) Indigenous – Mexico Egyptians (1989- Hutus – Burundi 1988) Indonesians (1985-2003) Burundi (1994-2000)* (1994-2003) 2002) (1994-2000) Indonesians (1997- Nigerians (1994-2000) Cambodia (1997-98) Roma (1993-1998) Indonesians (1997- Nepalese (1999- 1998) Ogonis (1994-2000) Congolese (1996- Sri Lankans (1985- 1998)** 2003) Kenyans (1991-1991) Soviets (1976 – 1990) 2000)* 2003) Karens (1988-2000) Ogonis (1994- Malawis (1992-1993) Southern Sudanese Darfuris (1989-1997) Malawis (1992- 2000) Nepalese (1991-1991) (1989-1997) Hazaras (1996-1999) 1993)** Romanians (1987- Nigerians (1994-2000) Sudanese (1989-1997) Hutus – DRC (1996- Nigerians (1994- 1989)** Ogonis (1994-2000) Sudanese (2002-2003) 2000)* 2000)** Shia – Iraq (1988- Paraguay (1985-1988) Togolese (1999) Indonesia (1985-1996) Pakistanis (1979- 1993) Romania (1989-1990) Uruguay (1975-1984) Kenya (1995-1998) 1988)** Southern Sudanese Russians (1990-1991) Zimbabwe (2000) Malaysians (1987- Romanians (1989-1997) Sierra Leoneans 1991; 1996-2000) Russians (1990- Tutsis – Rwanda (1998-2000) Mauritanian (1989-90) 1991)** (1990-1991) Sudanese (1983-1985) Mons (1988-2000) Tajiks (1996-1999)** Tutsis-Rwanda (1994- Nigerians (1988-91) Ugandans (1984- 2000) Nuba (1989-97; 2002- 1985)** 3)

126 Paraguay (1985-88) Romanians (1978- 1980) Russians (1976-1989; 1992-2000) Rwandans (1990-91; 1994-2000) Saudis (1989; 1998- 2000) Shans (1988-2000) Shia – Saudi (1998- 2000) Sierra Leoneans (1998- 2000)* Somalis (1988-2000)* Sudanese (1983-1985; 1989-97; 2002-03) Syrians (1985-2000) Thais (1986-1987) Togolese (1999) Tunisians (1986-87) Turkmenistan (1997- 1998) Tutsis – Burundi (1994-2000)* Tutsis – DRC (1996- 2000)* Uighurs (1986-2002) Uruguayans (1975- 1984) Uzbeks (1993-1995; 1996-2000) Zimbabwe (2000)

127 6.1 Mass Solidarity Mobilization Not Needed 6.1.1 Human Rights Progress

In many cases the rapid deterioration of rights and spikes in violence have correlated with the mobilization of Western solidarity activists. Indonesia’s invasion of East Timor in 1975 sparked activist mobilizations in Australia, Europe and North America, 537 as did Israel’s invasion of Lebanon in 1982, which lead to the creation of the Palestine Solidarity Campaign in the UK. 538 Similarly, the violence in Darfur in the early 2000s created considerable concern among a number of Western activists, which contributed to the creation of the Save Darfur Coalition. 539 As the quantitative results in chapter 3 show, mass solidarity mobilization are more likely to mobilize in support of distant rebels in particularly severe conflicts. If increasing levels of severity increase the likelihood of mass solidarity mobilization, the opposite also appears to be true. As one Bosnia activist put it, “when there’s no crisis, no one seems to care.” 540 As the severity of an issue lessens, Western activists may turn their attention elsewhere. The Central America Solidarity movement, Sharon Nepstad has observed, “began to subside in the late 1980s as the countries in the region signed peace accords and military regimes lost power.” 541 Many of these activists began to shift their focus elsewhere, including to Colombia where rights violations were becoming increasingly severe and to East Timor in response to the Santa Cruz Massacre in 1991. 542 One solidarity activist described the shift away from Central America to Colombia in the following way: After the 1990s, the Sandinistas were voted out of office, peace treaties were signed, and the revolutionary option seemed to subside in El Salvador and Guatemala…Colombia really came to the fore after the 1990s as being the focus of US policy and as the greatest recipient of US aid. Also, in terms of human rights violations Central American governments were receding and Colombia was surging forward in militarization and human rights violations. I think a lot of people who had been interested in Central America were turning their attention to Colombia because of that, because of its place in the hemisphere and in US foreign policy. 543

537 Geoffrey Robinson, “Human Rights History from the Ground Up: The Case of East Timor,” in Steve Stern & Scott Straus (eds.), The Human Rights Paradox: Universality and Its Discontents (Madison, Wisconsin: The University of Wisconsin, 2014). 538 Interview, Palestine Solidarity Campaign & J-BIG, February 6, 2013. Colin Shindler, Israel and the European Left (New York: Continuum, 2012). 539 Rebecca Hamilton, Fighting for Darfur: Public Action and the Struggle to Stop Genocide (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2011). 540 Quoted in Sherri Fink, “The Anti-Genocide Movement on American College Campuses: A Growing Response to the Balkan War,” in Thomas Cushman (ed.), This Time We Knew: Western Responses to Genocide (New York: New York University Press, 1996), p. 327. 541 Sharon Nepstad, Convictions of the Soul: Religion, Culture and Agency in the Central America Solidarity Movement (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), p. 137. 542 Brad Simpson, “Solidarity in an Age of Globalization: The Transnational Movement for East Timor and US Foreign Policy,” Peace & Change Vol. 29, No 3 & 4 (July 2004), p. 459. 543 Interview, North Shore Colombia Solidarity Committee, October 29, 2013.

128 In the 1980s, relative calm in Indonesia’s Aceh province is one reason for the limited international mobilization in support of the Acehnese struggle. 544 Similarly, during the Oslo Peace Process in the 1990s Palestine solidarity work in the West was put on hold as the conflict moved to formal negotiations of which many began to express some optimism. 545 Many solidarity activists who had worked on Palestine through the 1980s began to focus on other issues. 546 And as violence waned in Darfur, the Darfur solidarity NGOs began to shrink. At this time, rather than fold up, some Darfur NGOs, such as STAND, began to expand their mandate to include rights violations in the Democratic Republic of Congo and Myanmar. 547 Government attentiveness to domestic human rights problems, whether genuine attempts at reconciliation or strategic acts to weaken domestic and international pressures, 548 can reduce the urgency of solidarity work. This sentiment was expressed by some activists when asked to reflect on the lack of mass solidarity mobilization support for the aboriginal struggle in Australia, a situation that many have likened to apartheid 549 and cultural genocide. 550 Although Australia’s aborigines are not part of the 71 Amnesty campaigns examined here, the reasons some activists provide for the absence of a mass solidarity mobilization in this case is illustrative. Australia is widely seen to have made significant progress towards improving the human rights and socio-economic conditions of its aboriginal population. 551 For some, this progress has lessened the need for sustained solidarity work to pressure the Australian government to continue with its reforms. As one activist explained: The aborigines in Australia have received an apology. And there have been changes in terms of some of the laws [including]...terra nullius . I think we would have problems convincing people that Australia is in violation of the International Convention of Apartheid because…they’ve said that they’re trying to overcome it. 552

In some of the other 71 Amnesty campaigns, the absence of a mass solidarity mobilization may be attributable to human rights progress, real or perceived, on the ground. For example, during the anti-junta campaign in Bolivia from 1977 to 1982, to which Amnesty devoted considerable attention from 1980 to 1981, 553 each year the situation appears to have improved. In 1977, 1978, 1979 and 1980 the military

544 Interview, Amnesty International – East Timor desk, May 1, 2015. 545 To be sure, not all Palestine solidarity activists were optimistic about Oslo’s prospects. Interview, November 29 th Coalition for Palestine, July 9, 2015. Interview, SUSTAIN, August 24, 2015. 546 Interview, SUSTAIN, August 25, 2015. 547 Interview, STAND/GI-NET, August 24, 2012. 548 Emilie Hafner-Burton, “Sticks and Stones: Naming and Shaming the Human Rights Enforcement Problem,” International Organization 62 (Fall 2008), p. 710. 549 See http://johnpilger.com/articles/mandela-is-gone-but-apartheid-is-alive-and-well-in-australia 550 Damien Short, “Australia – A Continuing Genocide?” Journal of Genocide Research , Vol. 12 (March- June 2010), pp. 45-68. 551 See http://www.theaustralian.com.au/news/un-human-rights-envoy-james-anaya-nt-intervention-is- racist/story-e6frg6n6-1225767082240 552 Interview, Coalition Against Israeli Apartheid, September 7, 2012. 553 In 1980 AI produced 20 advocacy items on Bolivia. In 1981, the number doubled to 42.

129 government offered significant concessions to the opposition. Although in 1981 some observers referred to Bolivia as a possible new member of the “trio of regimes in Argentina, Chile, and Uruguay, that base their rule primarily on official and tolerated terror,” 554 the country did experience substantial improvements in the protections of human rights and civil liberties, most notably from 1981 to 1982 and especially in 1983. In 1982 the military government was overthrown, after which the country began the difficult process of democratization. 555 Western activists could have mobilized in support of the anti-junta campaign but, arguably, in light of the progress on the ground they may have reasoned their attention was best spent elsewhere, especially towards the violence occurring in Nicaragua, El Salvador and Guatemala, which began to spiral just as Bolivia appeared to be on the mend. Other cases in this group include pro-democracy campaigns that were successful within one or two years in overthrowing authoritarian leaders, as seen in Russia in 1990- 1991, the anti-Banda campaign in Malawi in 1992-1993, and the anti-Suharto campaign Indonesia in 1997-1998. At the time these regime transitions were seen as part of a global shift towards democracy and thus viewed optimistically. After the fall of Suharto in 1998, Indonesian student activists in Berlin demobilized, assuming that Indonesia was on the path towards democracy. 556 Western NGOs working on democratization held similar views. 557 Underpinning their optimism was what Thomas Carothers has referred to as the “transition paradigm.” This paradigm rests on a number of assumptions, such as the view that all political transitions away from authoritarianism are transitions towards democracy, that elections and related processes lead to and strengthen democracy, and that democracy requires no pre-conditions. 558 Taken together, these assumptions generated considerable enthusiasm. According to Carothers, “the new “no preconditions” outlook was a gratifyingly optimistic, even liberating view that translated across borders as the encouraging message that, when it comes to democracy, “anyone can do it.”” 559 For those activists in states to which Amnesty devoted so much attention, the appearance of progress towards the institutionalization of human rights protections lessened the urgency among Western solidarity activists to mobilize. Those searching for a cause looked elsewhere to more severe crises.

554 Christopher Mitchell, “The New Authoritarianism in Bolivia,” Current History , Vol. 80 No. 463 (1981), p. 75. 555 See http://carnegieendowment.org/files/democracy_bolivia.pdf 556 Syafiq Hyasim, “Challenging a Home Country: A preliminary account of Indonesian Student Activism in Berlin, Germany,” Austrian Journal of South-East Asian Studies Vol. 7 No. 2 (2014). 557 Mary Kaldor, “Deepening Democracy,” in David Held & David Mepham (eds.), Progressive Foreign Policy: New Directions for the UK (Cambridge: Polity, 2007), p. 40. 558 Thomas Carothers, “The End of the Transition Paradigm,” Journal of Democracy, Vol. 13, No. 1 (2002), pp. 7-8. 559 Carothers, “The End of the Transition Paradigm,” p.8

130 6.1.2 Western Sanctions Not only can the appearance or reality of human rights progress and democratization reduce the likelihood of mass solidarity mobilization, so too can the responses of Western governments to rights violations by other states. Scholars have shown that civil society activists not only mobilize to protest what governments do but also to protest what they do not do. Ronnie Lipschutz suggests that “state incompetence” is one driver of civil society mobilization. 560 When states show an unwillingness to respond to pressing problems, civil society is more likely to fill the void. 561 This has occurred in a variety of issues areas including refugee assistance, humanitarian aid, and global environmental governance. At a grassroots level, local civil society organizations and networks have mobilized to provide their communities with basic services, including security, when state authorities have shown themselves unable or unwilling to do so. 562 There is some evidence to suggest that Western solidarity activists tend to act in the same way. When states take action in response to rights violations, often by imposing embargos and terminating foreign aid, Western solidarity activists may see little reason to mobilize. For instance, some Palestine solidarity activists state that Israel is the focus of their work because of Western inaction to stop Israeli violations of Palestinian rights. 563 As one activist put it, “the problem with Israel is not about how many people they kill, how many people they put in jail, et cetera. It’s the fact that our governments in the West are actively supporting what Israel does.”564 Many of these same activists also note that since many other rights abusing states in the Middle East, and elsewhere, are under Western state pressure to reform, their efforts are better spent on other causes. 565 Haggai Matar, an Israeli activist involved in Palestine solidarity work, captures this sentiment well when he writes: One of the most common claims one hears against the BDS movement is that it is hypocritical. “Why don’t they boycott Iran/Syria/Hamas/ISIS?” is a question that comes up quite often. The answer? We actually do boycott other countries and groups. Iran and Syria are facing a harsh sanctions regime….Nearly every country in the West, the Mediterranean and the Arab world are fighting against the Islamic State. There are sanctions and boycotts on North Korea and Sudan, Cuba was

560 Ronnie Lipschutz, “Reconstructing World Politics: The Emergence of Global Civil Society,” Millenium – Journal of International Studies Vol. 21, No. 3 (1992), pp. 407-413. 561 Aseem Prakash & Mary-Kay Gugerty, “Advocacy Organizations and Collective Action: An Introduction,” in Aseem Prakash & Mary-Kay Gugerty (eds.) Advocacy Organizations and Collective Action (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010, p. 8). Ann Florini, The Third Force: The Rise of Transnational Civil Society (New York: Carnegie Endowment, 2000). For a top-down approach of civil society mobilization, see Kim Reimann, “A View from the Top: International Politics, Norms and the Worldwide Growth of NGOs,” International Studies Quarterly Vol. 50, No. 1 (2006), pp. 45-67. 562 David Lake & Donald Rothchild, “Containing Fear: The Origins and Management Ethnic Conflict,” International Security Vol. 21, No. 2 (1996), pp. 41-75. Neil Devotta, “From Ethnic Outbidding to Ethnic Conflict: The Institutional Base for Sri Lanka’s Separatist War,” Nations and Nationalism Vol. 11, No. 1 (2005), pp. 141-159. 563 Interview, Students against Israeli Apartheid, October 11, 2012. 564 Interview, Russell Tribunal, October 24, 2012. 565 See http://www.bricup.org.uk/documents/WhyBoycottIsraeliUniversities.pdf , p. 25.

131 under a U.S. embargo for decades, Russia is now being placed under sanctions, the list goes on. 566

Government inaction also played an important role in leading to the formation of the Save Darfur network. In September 2004, in a Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearing, then-Secretary of State Colin Powell declared that the Sudanese government and its Janjaweed proxy militia were guilty of genocide in Darfur. 567 This declaration is widely cited as the catalyst that led to the Save Darfur network, 568 but what mattered just as equally, if not more so, was Powell’s statement that despite the conflict being a case of genocide, US policy would not change. As Powell put it: No new action is dictated by this [genocide] determination. We have been doing everything we can to get the Sudanese Government to act responsibly. So let us not be too preoccupied with this designation. 569

For Darfur activists, this gap between government rhetoric and policy created a need for civil society mobilizing in order to shame the Bush administration to act. One leading Darfur activist described his mentality in 2004 and 2005 in the following way: “There is no interest in acting on genocide. No one has an interest in it…We have to create the interest.”570 In his view, a mass movement was required. 571 By contrast, when Western states punish rights violators, or take actions that Western activists deem sufficient, mass solidarity mobilization formation in support of the repressed appears to become less likely. In a number of cases in this category, the US and various European states have imposed sanctions to protest the human rights practices of various governments, especially crackdowns on pro-democracy activists. Western sanctions have been imposed on Uruguay from 1977-1981, Bolivia from 1979-1982, Togo from 1992-2007, Nigeria from 1993-1999, Cambodia from 1998-2007, and Zimbabwe in 2000. Often these sanctions involve the termination of foreign aid, but in other instances they can be more severe, including total economic embargos, export restrictions, travel bans and the freezing of assets. Concerted Western governmental action in these cases has reduced the need for Western civil society mobilizations and appears to have diverted activist attention elsewhere. The first main category, and its two sub-categories, capture some of the motivations that drive Western solidarity activists and thus which may help explain instances in which they do not mobilize. But equally as important for mass solidarity mobilizing are the actions of the aggrieved themselves. In these cases, discussed in the

566 See http://972mag.com/why-not-boycott-iran/107822/ 567 See: http://2001-2009.state.gov/secretary/former/powell/remarks/36042.htm 568 Rebecca Hamilton & Chad Hazlett, “Not On Our Watch: The Emergence of the American Movement for Darfur,” in Alex De Waal (ed.), War in Darfur and the Search for Peace (Cambridge: Harvard University Global Initiative, 2007) p. 343. 569 See http://2001-2009.state.gov/secretary/former/powell/remarks/36042.htm 570 Interview, STAND/GI-NET, July 27, 2012. 571 Samantha Power, “ A Problem from Hell”: America and the Age of Genocide , (London: HarperCollins Publishers, 2003).

132 next section, the absence of mass solidarity mobilizing is due to the fact that this kind of external support is not being asked for.

6.2 Mass Solidarity Mobilization Not Asked For 6.2.1 No Rebel Campaign Domestic campaigns occurring abroad have at times led to outpourings of support from Western activists. The beginnings of the anti-apartheid movement in the UK and the US, for instance, came in response to the early campaign work of the Africa National Congress (ANC) in the 1950s as well as government attempts to quash their efforts. In 1952, during the ANC’s First Defiance campaign, Christian activists in the UK created a fund to assist those black South Africans arrested for their involvement. American activists also mobilized to support the campaign by forming the American Committee on Africa, which established close ties to the ANC leadership. 572 In 1960 the government’s response to protests in Sharpeville, which led to the killing of sixty-nine protesters, also led to significant outpourings of support from Western activists and the expansion of the anti-apartheid movement. 573 A similar pattern appears in other cases of mass solidarity mobilization. In the case of the Tibet, demonstrations in Lhasa in 1987 by Tibetan monks encouraged many Westerners, including Western Buddhists who until then tended to eschew political action, 574 to take up the Tibetan cause for self-determination and religious freedom. In the case of East Timor, a campaign of sustained non-violent protests in the early 1990s also attracted considerable Western activist support. In November 1991 the Indonesian army fired upon a large non-violent demonstration of 1500 East Timorese marching to the Santa Cruz cemetery to commemorate the death of a young activist. Approximately 250 East Timorese were killed. Western activists responded quickly, organizing protests outside Indonesia’s permanent mission to the UN in New York. 575 By December the East Timor Action Network (ETAN) had been formed, 576 which came to be a leading NGO in the mass solidarity mobilization for East Timorese

572 Rob Skinner, The Foundations of Anti-Apartheid: Liberal Humanitarians and Transnational Activists in Britain and the United States 1919-1964 (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2009), p 11. Rob Skinner, “The Moral Foundations of British Anti-Apartheid Activism, 1949-1960,” Journal of Southern African Studies Vol. 35, No. 2 (2009), p. 405. 573 David Black, “The long and winding road: International norms and domestic political change in South Africa,” in Thomas Risse, Stephen Ropp & Kathryn Sikkink (eds.), The Power of Human Rights: International Norms and Domestic Change (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), p. 83. 574 See Christopher S. Queen, “Introduction: A New Buddhism,” in Queen (ed), Engaged Buddhism in the West (Boston: Wisdom Publications, 2000), pp. 1-31. 575 Clinton Fernandes, The Independence of East Timor: Multi-Dimensional Perspectives – Occupation, Resistance, and International Political Activism (Brighton: Sussex Academic Press, 2011). p. 91-92. 576 Simpson, “Solidarity in an Age of Globalization,” p. 459.

133 independence. 577 One of the founders of ETAN recalled that the “the Santa Cruz massacre catalyzed the re-emergence of a worldwide solidarity movement.” 578 While the campaigning of the ANC, Tibetans and East Timorese are all primarily instances of non-violent protest, violent action can also create the conditions for mass solidarity mobilization.579 For instance, when Darfuri rebels, led by the Sudan Liberation Army and the Justice & Equality Movement, mobilized an insurgency campaign in the early 2000s, the world also began to take notice and Western activists began to mobilize. 580 Not only did the rebels launch attacks against the Sudanese military, but they also began to seek out external support for their struggle from neighbouring Chad and Darfuri diaspora groups in Canada, the US and Norway. 581 The ability and willingness of Darfuri rebels to mobilize to take action, provoking a harsh government response, alerted the world to their existence and helped to create the conditions for the formation of the Save Darfur network in 2004 and 2005. If the domestic campaigns of distant rebels can increase their chances of attracting mass solidarity mobilization support, then their absence can help to partially explain why Western activists do not mobilize. Following Chenoweth & Lewis, a campaign is a continuous contentious episode that can last days, months or, in some cases, years. They involve actions that involve at least 1000 observed participants, that occur within a year of each other, and that show some degree of coordination. Campaigns can be violent or non-violent and can pursue a variety of aims including regime change, institutional reform, policy change, secession, autonomy, or the end of foreign occupation. 582 As seen in Table 16 above, numerous groups in the dataset that do not receive mass solidarity mobilization support fall within this category. That is, these groups have not run significant and sustained domestic campaigns. To make sense of some of these cases I identify two tentative reasons for the absence of a domestic campaign. The first points to the role that state repression can have on reducing the likelihood of domestic mobilizing. The second points to the role that institutional openness can play in directing grievances and political contention towards legal institutional channels and off of the streets. As I describe in more detail below, these reasons are not full explanations for the absence of a domestic campaign as campaigns have occurred in both highly repressive

577 Interview, ETAN, March 26, 2015. Carmel Budiardjo, “The International Solidarity Movement for East Timor,” in East Timor: A Testimony (Toronto: Between the Lines, 2004), p. 67. 578 Charles Scheiner, “Grassroots in the Field: Observing the East Timor Consultation.” See: http://www.etan.org/ifet/grassfield.html 579 Clifford Bob, The Marketing of Rebellion: Insurgents, Media and Transnational Activism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), p. 26. 580 David Lanz, “Why Darfur? The Responsibility to Protect as a Rallying Cry for Transnational Advocacy Groups,” Global Responsibility to Protect Vol. 3, No. 2 (2011), p. 227. 581 Victor Tanner & Jerome Tubiana, “Divided They Fall: The Fragmentation of Darfur’s Rebel Groups,” Small Victor Tanner, Jérôme Tubiana & Michael Griffin. “Divided They Fall: the fragmentation of Darfur's rebel groups”. (Geneva, Switzerland: Small Arms Survey, 2007), p. 20. Gerard Prunier, Darfur: The Ambiguous Genocide (Ithaca: Cornell University Press), p. 126. 582 Erica Chenoweth & Orion Lewis, “Unpacking Nonviolent Campaigns: Introducing the NAVCO 2.0 dataset,” Journal of Peace Research Vol. 50, No. 3 (2013), pp. 419-420.

134 states as well in open and accessible states. Rather, they are used to provide some additional clarity on why some groups may not engage in the type of behaviour conducive to them attracting widespread solidarity in the West. State repression generates some of the grievances that undergird protest movements, 583 but it can also act as an obstacle to the recruiting and mobilizing that opposition groups must engage in to organize mass public protest. 584 Scholars have identified the willingness of states to use violence against dissidents as one reason for the absence of social movements. 585 When dissidents are jailed and prevented from doing organizing work, domestic campaigns become much less likely. Scholars have also observed that when the coercive capacity of the state, as well as its willingness to use violence, diminishes, the chances of social movement formation increases, as seen in the French Revolution in the 1790s 586 and the nationalist campaigns in the Soviet Union in the 1980s. 587 Under these conditions, activists are more likely to act publicly, emboldening others to follow suit. 588 In a number of cases in this category, state repression, including that facing the Mons in Myanmar, the Hazaras in Afghanistan, or opposition activists in Uzbekistan or Zimbabwe, have made it difficult for dissidents to organize and run sustained anti-regime campaigns of the sort that would capture world attention and sympathy. Severe repression has also undermined the capacity and mobilizing efforts of anti-regime and democracy activists in Saudi Arabia and Syria, 589 and Uyghur insurgents in China. The case of Belarus provides a clear example of how state repression can undermine dissident mobilizations and in turn make mass solidarity mobilization formation less likely. Amnesty International began campaigning on Belarus in the late 1990s, reporting widespread government abuses of violations of freedom of speech and association, including the detention of opposition leaders and activists. During this period no sustained pro-democracy campaign formed. 590 Its absence was not due the popularity of the regime or the lack of democratic sentiment in the country. In fact, according to international survey data, Belarusians appear to be more committed to democracy than

583 Ted Robert Gurr, Why Men Rebel (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970). 584 Charles Tilly, From Mobilization to Revolution (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1978). 585 Doug McAdam, John McCarthy, & Meyer Zald, “Introduction: Opportunities, Mobilizing Structures and Framing Processes,” in Doug McAdam, John McCarthy, & Meyer Zald (eds.), Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements: Political Opportunities, Mobilizing Structures and Cultural Framings (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), pp. 1-20. 586 Theda Skocpol, States and Social Revolutions: A Comparative Analysis of France, Russi, and China (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979). 587 Mark Beissinger, Nationalist Mobilization and the Collapse of the Soviet State (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002). 588 Timor Kuran, “Now out of Never – The Element of Surprise in the East European Revolution in 1989,” World Politics , Vol. 44 No. 1 (1991), pp. 7-48:. 589 Eva Bellin, “The Robustness of Authoritarianism in the Middle East: Exceptionalism in Comparative Perspective,” Comparative Political Studies Vol. 36 No. 2 (January 2004), pp. 139-157. 590 Mark Beissinger, “Structure and Example in Modular Political Phenomenon,” Perspectives on Politics Vol. 5 No. 2 (2007), pp. 259-276.

135 many of their neighbours. 591 Rather, the absence of anti-regime campaigns is a result of what Vitali Silitski refers to as a state policy of preemption. Under Alyaksandr Lukashenka, no civil society space was given to anti-regime activists. The government preempted any form of resistance by targeting new political parties when they were still weak, removing potential challengers even before they gained public backing, and cracking down on even the smallest of civil society organizations. This policy had significant material and psychological effects on the opposition. According to Silitski, “such systematized repression instills in them a sense of hopelessness and imposes the perception that political change is far beyond reach.” 592 State repression makes domestic campaigning less likely but it does not make it impossible. 593 While the Uyghurs in Xinjiang through the 1980s and 1990s were unable to organize mass campaigns, the Tibetans have been able to, specifically in the late 1980s. While Darfuri rebels in Sudan were quiescent in the 1990s, their southern Sudanese counterparts were not, contributing to widespread Western activist mobilizations in their support. 594 In Belarus in 2006 in response to the announcement of the re-election of Lukashenka, thousands took the streets of Minsk to protest what they believed was a rigged election. These protests were comparable in size to those that occurred in Georgia and Kyrgyzstan where incumbents were successfully removed from power. 595 Such a mobilization of oppositional activity in Belarus could have sparked the solidarity of Western activists concerned with more than a decade of authoritarian rule. It did not. I discuss the reasons for this in the next section by looking at the decisions groups make about whether to seek external support for their struggle and, if they decide to do so, from whom. A second reason for the absence of a domestic campaign may be due not to government repression but rather the opposite - government openness to dissent. These conditions can lead to social movement formation and increased public protest, however in cases where institutions are open to the public and decision-making channels made relatively accessible, contention may occur primarily in the form of elite lobbying. This view underpinned an early perspective of social movement formation in the US in the 1950s and 1960s. At the time, pluralists argued that the American political system was highly accessible to the public. This made social movement formation and participation a

591 Vitali Silitski, “Preempting Democracy: The Case of Belarus,” Journal of Democracy Vol. 16 No. 4 (October 2005), p. 85. 592 Silitski, “Preempting Democracy,” p. 84. 593 Karl Dieter Opp & Wolfgang Roehl, “Repression, Micromobilization and Political Protest,” Social Forces Vol. 69, No. 2 (1990), pp. 521-547. Rabab El Mahdi, “Enough! Egypt’s Question for Democracy,” Comparative Political Studies Vol. 42 No. 8 (August 2009), p. 1028. 594 Allen Hertzke, Freeing God's children: The Unlikely Alliance for Global Human Rights (Rowman & Littlefield, 2004). Don Cheadle & John Prendergast, Not on Our Watch: The Mission to End genocide in Darfur and Beyond (Hachette Books, 2007). 595 Lucan Way, “The Real Causes of the Color Revolutions,” Journal of Democracy Vol. 19 No. 3 (July 2008), p. 59.

136 fundamentally irrational way for groups to seek redress for their grievances. Accordingly, social movements were depicted as means through which individuals dealt with feelings of social dislocation, alienation and frustration. The anti-war protests in the 1960s challenged the pluralist view of the American political system and ushered in new perspectives on the rationality of social movement participation. 596 Recent scholarship on protest supports the basic intuition that when decision- making channels are open extra-institutional advocacy becomes less likely. Keck & Sikkink suggest that local groups engage in transnational advocacy when domestic channels for reform are blocked, 597 a view supported by Asal, Conrad & White. 598 Maria Koinova finds a similar pattern among some UK-based diaspora groups suggesting that those who can gain access to the state are more likely to focus on lobbying work than civil society mobilization. 599 And Stephen Saideman and his colleagues find that groups in democracies with proportional representation are significantly less likely to protest and engage in violence. Where minority group members can have their concerns heard within existing political institutions “neither large-scale demonstrations nor violence is required for groups who have some say over their destinies.”600 Institutional openness may thus partially explain the absence of domestic campaigns by disaffected groups in the more democratic states targeted by Amnesty and thus help to account for the absence of a mass solidarity mobilization to help them secure their rights. In the 1990s, and mainly from 1993 to 1998, Amnesty paid close attention to the plight of the Roma in Romania. In Romania, and throughout Europe, the Roma have faced severe social and political exclusion, including unequal access to housing, education and employment. Their conditions arguably got worse after the fall of Communism. 601 According to the World Bank, a Roma child in Romania is three times as likely to be born into poverty than other Romanians, is likely to live in a slum, unlikely to finish high school, and have a life expectancy six years less than the average citizen. 602 Their living conditions are said to be comparable to those found in parts of Sub-Saharan

596 Doug McAdam, “Beyond Structural Analysis: A More Dynamic Understanding of Social Movements,” in Mario Diani & Doug McAdam (eds.), Social Movement Analysis: A Network Perspective (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002). 597 Margaret Keck & Kathryn Sikkink, Activists Beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in International Politics (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1998). 598 Victor Asal, Justin Conrad & Peter White. "Going abroad: Transnational Solicitation and Contention by Ethnopolitical Organizations," International Organization Vol. 68, no. 4 (2014). 599 Maria Koinova, “Why Do Conflict-Generated Diasporas Pursue Sovereignty-Based Claims Through Stated-Based or Transnational Channels?” European Journal of International Relations Vol. 20, No. 3 (2014). 600 Stephen Saideman, David Lanoue, Michael Campenni & Samuel Stanton, “Democratization, Political Institutions and Ethnic Conflict: A Pooled Time-Series Analysis, 1985-1998,” Comparative Political Studies Vol. 36 No. 1 (2002), p. 118. 601 Melanie Ram, “Interests, Norms and Advocacy: Explaining the Emergence of the Roma onto the EU’s Agenda,” Ethnopolitics Vol. 9, No. 2 (201), p. 198. 602 See http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/feature/2014/04/07/breaking-the-cycle-of-exclusion-for-roma- in-romania

137 Africa. 603 Despite significant and persistent grievances, however, there was no Roma domestic campaigning in Romania through the 1990s. In fact, through this decade the Roma remained largely politically inactive in both domestic and international advocacy.604 Part of the reason for this has to do with the institutional openness of the Romanian state to dissent, notably as a result of EU pressure to democratize and improve minority rights protections. In 1996 pro-Western reformers came to power in Romania. 605 Since then, Roma rights advocacy has been able to be conducted through existing institutional channels since according to Romanian law the Roma can hold at least one seat in the Romanian parliament and thus are able to voice their concerns at the governmental level. 606 The limited Roma domestic advocacy that did occur during this period focused mainly on government institutions and less on mass mobilizing. According to one activist, “we tried not to be too vocal in criticizing the government while working directly with them to administer projects.” 607 In the absence of domestic campaigning, mass solidarity mobilization for the Roma’s plight is less likely to occur.

6.2.2 Rebel Campaign But No International Diplomacy While those who do not campaign domestically are less likely to gain the support of a mass solidarity mobilization, the same is true for those who campaign but do not actively seek out mass solidarity mobilization support. Solidarity activists have often referred to the importance of requests for support that come directly from the aggrieved. Palestine solidarity activists stress how their work is in response to a Palestinian call. At a debate at the London School of Economics in 2011 on the merits of a boycott of Israeli academic institutions, one leading British activist explained: You asked why Israel and not China. [This is] because there has been a call from the Palestinians as there was from the South Africans for boycott. If there were a call from within China I would support that, but there has not been such a call. 608

In the context of Israel-Palestine, however, the validity of this kind of statement is questionable, given that Palestine solidarity boycott campaigns long predate the Palestinian call for BDS, as I show in chapter 5. Yet, according to this view, in the absence of rebel requests for support, mass solidarity mobilizations become less likely.

603 Ram, “Interests Norms and Advocacy,” p. 198. 604 Ram, “Interests, Norms and Advocacy,” pp. 200-201. See Zoltan Barany, The East European Gypsies: Regime Change, Marginality, and Ethnopolitics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), chapter 4. 605 Anna Milada Vachudova, Europe Divided: Democracy, Leverage, and Integration after Communism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005). 606 See http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/mar/assessment.asp?groupId=36003 607 Ram, “Interests, Norms and Advocacy,” p. 201. 608 Audio of the debate can be found here: http://www.lse.ac.uk/newsAndMedia/videoAndAudio/channels/publicLecturesAndEvents/player.aspx?id= 848 . Statement at 48m47s.

138 As one Canadian activist observed: “It’s not a question of the scale of the injustices. It’s a question of the movements, the call [for support], that kind of stuff.” 609 The absence of a call for support has been cited as one reason for the lack of mass solidarity mobilization support for Tamil self-determination in Sri Lanka. “The relative silence [among Western activists] is a real problem,” one activist put it, “[but] there has not been a widespread call by Tamil communities in Canada or in Sri Lanka itself for a boycott [campaign].” 610 In discussing Australian abuses against aborigines and the lack of Western solidarity they receive, another activist noted that “if aborigines were asking for an international exposure of continued Australian legacies of racism, and they wanted to call it Apartheid, I would consider it.” 611 As noted above, in 2006 the Belarusian opposition organized mass protests in an effort to remove Lukashenka from power. This type of domestic campaigning is what can galvanize Western activists, however no mass solidarity mobilization formed to support the Belarusian struggle for democracy. One reason for this is because Belarusian activists did not ask for grassroots solidarity from Western activists. On the contrary, they looked to activists in Serbia, Slovakia and Ukraine who had not only mobilized under similar repressive conditions but who were also successful in overthrowing authoritarian leaders. 612 In the eyes of the Belarusian opposition, it was these activists, rather than Western Europeans or North Americans, that could provide the support and guidance they needed to remove Lukashenka. I divide the groups who run domestic campaigns but who do not seek out external support into two sub-categories. The first includes those who campaign but do not seek out any external support. The second includes those groups that campaign and seek out external support but not from Western grassroots activists. I describe each in turn.

6.2.3 Campaigning Rebels Who Do Not Seek External Support Not all groups seeking rights seek external support. Organizing for contentious action is difficult and costly, with transnational advocacy being especially so. 613 Among terrorist groups, for instance, the overwhelming majority operate domestically, not transnationally. 614 The reasons for not seeking external support can include a lack of capacity, due to repression or poverty, or a lack of will due to either the availability of domestic channels for reform or strategic considerations. High levels of repression and poverty in Myanmar have undermined the ability of the Karen minority to reach out for external assistance, while concerns about being labeled pro-American, or in the pocket of

609 Interview, Faculty for Palestine, August 22, 2012. 610 Interview, Faculty for Palestine, August 22, 2012. 611 Interview, Coalition against Israeli Apartheid, September 7, 2012. 612 Way, “The Real Causes of the Color Revolutions,” p. 59. 613 Asal, Conrad & White, “Going abroad: Transnational Solicitation and Contention by Ethnopolitical Organizations." 614 Walter Enders, Todd Sandler & Khusrav Gaibulloev, “Domestic versus Transnational Terrorism: Data, Decomposition, and Dynamics,” Journal of Peace Research Vol. 48 No. 3 (2011) , pp. 319-337.

139 the CIA, has dissuaded some Pakistani and Egyptian democracy activists from seeking Western support. In the early 2000s Egyptian activists organized a series of protests that initially focused on Israeli policy in the Palestinian territories and the US invasion of Iraq but were then redirected towards the Egyptian state led by Hosni Mubarak. These activists, who mobilized under the name ‘Kifaya’, Arabic for ‘enough’, called for the end of one- party rule. 615 Kifaya was a broad based movement consisting of leftists, liberals, nationalists, and Islamists. Unlike the official Egyptian opposition parties that lacked a social base and were heavily constrained by establishment restrictions, Kifaya was far more radical as they called for regime change. 616 Kifaya’s emergence was unexpected, at least from a political opportunities point of view. Since the 1982 assassination of Anwar Sadat, Egypt had been placed under emergency law. While opposition parties sat in parliament, civil society opposition was suppressed. A set of highly restrictive laws were in place designed to quell Islamist militancy, namely from the Muslim Brotherhood, but these were also applied broadly to any form of anti-regime activity. 617 Although Kifaya was not successful in removing Mubarak from power, and they failed to meet their goal of mobilizing a 100,000- participant demonstration, their ability to mobilize at all was important. Their protests captured Western media attention, including coverage in the New York Times .618 They also laid the groundwork for future mobilizations in Egypt, including the April 6 th Youth Movement in 2008 and the Tahrir Square protests in 2011. Despite operating in a relatively closed political system, which tends to push dissidents to go abroad, 619 the Kifaya movement did not engage in any sustained outreach to Western activists. 620 There are at least three reasons why Kifaya opted not to internationalize their struggle. First, Kifaya activists were concerned about being seen as Western imperialist agents, supported by the US government and CIA. 621 In a 2004 Zogby survey, when Kifaya was mobilizing, 98% of the Egyptian public was found to hold unfavourable views of the US. 622 Receiving support from Western activists would have made it easier for the Egyptian government to delegitimize the movement in the eyes of the public by painting them as the stooges of the West. Second, Kifaya was an

615 El-Mahdi, “Egypt’s Quest for Democracy,” p. 1023. 616 Samer Shehata, “Opposition Politics in Egypt: A Fleeting Moment of Opportunity? Arab Reform Bulletin (2004). http://carnegieendowment.org/2004/10/14/arab-reform-bulletin-october- 2004/f12#opposition 617 El-Mahdi, “Egypt’s Quest for Democracy,” p. 1013. 618 See http://www.nytimes.com/2005/09/09/world/africa/egypts-metamorphosis-one-step-down-the-open- road.html ; http://www.nytimes.com/2005/03/27/magazine/kifaya.html 619 Keck & Sikkink, Activists Beyond Borders . Asal, Conrad & White, "Going abroad: Transnational Solicitation and Contention by Ethnopolitical Organizations.” 620 Email correspondence. 621 I thank Jean Lachapelle for pointing this out to me. 622 Marc Lynch, “Arab Americanisms in the Arab World,” in Katzenstein & Keohane (ed.) Anti- Americanisms in World Politics , (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2007), p. 208.

140 ideologically diverse coalition. 623 This made it difficult for them to agree on how to engage in transnational advocacy work, especially in regards to who should be sent abroad as Kifaya’s representative, and whose external support that representative should seek. Further, support from Western activists would have altered the balance of power within the coalition towards the leftists and liberals at the expense of the nationalists and Islamists, thereby increasing the chance of movement collapse. The third reason has to do with government repression of Egyptian civil society. While domestic repression can encourage dissidents to go abroad, it can also keep them in. 624 According to CIRI data, during Kifaya’s main mobilizing years in the early-mid 2000s the freedom of foreign movement of Egyptian citizens was severely restricted. Without the ability to freely travel to Western capitals and organize speaking tours, securing the support of Western civil society activists becomes difficult. What is interesting about the Kifaya case is that the movement could have secured Western activist support if they had asked for it. As a non-violent movement that campaigned for democracy, Western activist support may have been forthcoming. While violent groups with less democratic credentials have secured Western activist support, Kifaya’s commitment to these values would have made their recruitment efforts much easier. In addition, Kifaya advocacy could have also pointed to the close ties that exited between successive US administrations and the Egyptian regime since the of Camp David Accords in the late 1970s. 625 Egypt is among one of the largest recipients of US foreign aid, which includes approximately $1.2 billion in military support each year since 1975. 626 This fact could have been used as a framing device to convince Western activists, namely Americans, that they were indirectly complicit in the abuses committed by the Mubarak regime. This type of strategy has proved effective in other cases, namely in Palestine and East Timor where activists have stressed Western complicity in grave rights violations. Kifaya’s cause had many of the characteristics that would have made it a likely subject of mass solidarity mobilizing if only they had asked for it.

6.2.4 Rebel Campaign and Diplomacy But No Targeting of Western Grassroots Distant rebels who run domestic campaign and seek external aid but not from grassroots Western activists are also less likely to gain widespread solidarity. The importance of actively recruiting Western activists can be seen in a number of cases of mass solidarity mobilization formation. In the case of the anti-apartheid movement, the

623 Brian Doherty & Timothy Doyle, Environmentalism, Resistance and Solidarity: Politics of Friends of the Earth International (Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan, 2014), chapters 4-5. Jennifer Hadden, Networks in Contention (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015). 624 Thomas Risse & Kathryn Sikkink, “The Socialization of International Human Rights Norms into Domestic Practices: An Introduction,” in Thomas Risse, Stephen Ropp & Kathryn Sikkink (eds.), The Power of Human Rights: International Norms and Domestic Change (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), p. 22. 625 See https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/RL33003.pdf 626 Lynch, “Arab Americanisms in the Arab World,” p. 208.

141 ANC explicitly recruited grassroots activists in Europe and North America for solidarity work. In 1959, when the ANC sent out a call for an international boycott of South Africa, they also sent a number of their activists abroad to mobilize grassroots support and to coordinate boycott initiatives. 627 ANC engagement with Western civil society was central to their outreach efforts. Like the ANC, the Tibetan leadership has also dedicated resources to mobilizing grassroots Western activists. From 1985 to 1987 Tibetan elites in Dharamsala and the diaspora began discussing ways to build an international campaign to put pressure on Beijing to renew negotiations with the Dalai Lama. 628 Part of this internationalization strategy involved the Dalai Lama sending directives to Tibetan Lamas in Europe and North America asking them to mobilize their students for solidarity work for Tibetan independence. 629 These requests, combined with speaking tours by the Dalai Lama, led to the creation of a number of solidarity NGOs in the West, including the Tibet Support Group in London, which became a leader in the Free Tibet Network. 630 Unlike the ANC and the Central Tibetan Administration, not all dissident and insurgent leaders actively seek out Western grassroots support for their struggle. Shia groups in Iraq, as well as in Saudi Arabia and Afghanistan, have primarily geared their international advocacy efforts towards securing state support from Iran, whose foreign policy has sought to destabilize neighbouring Sunni states in order to create the conditions for a Shia-inspired Islamic revolution. 631 Similarly, Chechen insurgents have also not made a concerted effort to reach out to Western grassroots activists for support. On the contrary, the Chechen leadership has primarily sought the support from the Chechen diaspora in Moscow, 632 the US government, and the UN. 633 The extent of their outreach to Western civil society involved establishing ties with the Geneva-based Unrepresented People’s Organization as part of an effort to gain greater access to the UN circles. 634 In other cases in this category, some distant rebels have focused their international advocacy efforts primarily on securing the support of large international NGOs and less so on Western grassroots mobilizing. The Ogonis in Nigeria, led by Ken Saro-Wiwa’s Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People (MOSOP) primarily targeted leading INGOs rather than solidarity activists. MOSOP was able to secure the

627 Rob Skinner, The Foundations of Anti-Apartheid , p. 162. 628 Robert Barnett, “Violated Specialness: Western Political Representations of Tibet,” in Thierry Dodin & Heinz Rather, Imagining Tibet: Perceptions, Projects & Fantasies (Boston: Wisdom Publications, 2001). 629 Tibet Support Group UK Fact Sheet, “Appeal for Support by His Holiness the Dalai Lama,” Dated February 1989. Email correspondence. 630 Interview, Tibet Information Network, December 2012. 631 Hafizullah Emadi, “Exporting Iran’s Revolution: The Radicalization of the Shiite Movement in Afghanistan,” Middle Eastern Studies Vol. 31 No. 1 (January 1995), pp. 1-12. 632 Maria Koinova, “Diasporas and Secessionist Conflicts: The Mobilization of the Armenian, Albanian and Chechen Diasporas,” Ethnic and Racial Studies Vol. 34, No. 2 (February 2011), p. 345. 633 Gail Lapidus, "Contested sovereignty: The tragedy of Chechnya, " International Security 23, no. 1 (1998), p. 27. 634 Gail Lapidus, “Contested Sovereignty,” p. 30.

142 support from NGOs like Greenpeace and Friends of the Earth International, among others. 635 The importance of actively targeting grassroots Western activists for support can be seen perhaps most clearly in the case of the Acehnese separatist movement in Indonesia that actively sought to internationalize their struggle. Unlike their East Timorese counterparts, the Acehnese did not recruit and mobilize Western grassroots supporters. On the contrast, the Free Aceh Movement (GAM) adopted a more elitist international advocacy style that focused on securing the support of states. Through the 1980s it sought external state support to replenish its military stocks, which it was able to secure from Libya. 636 This support enabled GAM to re-emerge inside Aceh as a significant military actor.637 In the 1990s GAM shifted its focus towards the West. Through its ties with Moluccan separatists, the GAM leadership became active in the Unrepresented Peoples Organization (UNPO) where they described themselves as an indigenous people resisting settler colonialism and foreign military occupation by the Indonesian state. 638 GAM also lobbied at the UN, which was in part facilitated by their connections to the East Timorese leadership. Through the 1990s GAM coordinated their UN advocacy work with the other Indonesian separatist movements, 639 often issuing joint statements decrying Indonesian military atrocities. 640 During this period the GAM attended informal talks, sought press coverage, and worked to get mentions in UN documents. 641 They also lobbied Western governments, namely the British. They received support from Lord Avebury, a member of the British House of Lords who became an active supporter for Acehnese rights. GAM believed that Avebury’s support would help them secure British official recognition of the right of the Acehnese to a state of their own.642 Unlike the East Timorese, the Acehnese did not couple their government lobbying work with grassroots mobilizing. 643 The GAM leadership did not put much stock in the power of transnational civil society. 644 They did not attempt to build a transnational network of supporters. According to one observer, “Acehnese communities overseas

635 Bob, Marketing Rebellion , p. 119. 636 Louise Richardson, “Terrorists as Transnational Actors,” Terrorism & Political Violence Vol. 11 No. 4 (1999), p. 214. http://www.cfr.org/libya/libya-got-off-list/p10855#p1 637 Kristen Schulze, The Free Aceh Movement: Anatomy of a Seperatist Organization (Washington: East- West Center, 2004). 638 See UNPO Conference on Population Transfer (1992): http://unpo.org/downloads/Population-Transfer- 1992.pdf 639 Antje Missbach , Separatist Conflict in Indonesia: The Long-Distance Politics of the Acehnese Diaspora (New York: Routledge, 2012), p. 96. 640 Antje Missbach , “The Acehnese Diaspora: Hawks or Doves? Conflict-Support, Peace-Finding and Political Opportunity Structures,” Journal of Human Security Vol. 5, No. 3 (2009), p. 31. 641 Missbach , Separatist Conflict in Indonesia , p. 97. 642 Missbach , Separatist Conflict in Indonesia , p. 97. 643 Missbach, Separatist Conflict in Indonesia , p. 117. 644 Interview, Indonesia Human Rights Project, Nov 12, 2015.

143 don’t invest time and energy fostering relationships with local activists.” 645 Even in their efforts to secure British state support, no attempts were made to build a solidarity network that could be used to raise public awareness of Aceh and pressure British MPs from below. According to one activist, “the Acehnese have made very little attempt to build Western support. They haven’t tried to build a Western solidarity movement.” 646 As a result, the GAM presence within Western activist networks was thin,647 making them an unlikely recipient of widespread grassroots solidarity.

6.3 Conclusion In this chapter I have suggested possible reasons why Western grassroots activists do not mobilize in support of a distant struggle. I argued that in some cases Western grassroots mobilizing may not occur because the need for it is not readily apparent. Western grassroots mobilizing may not be needed when a distant struggle in question is seen to be improving, obviating the need for further action. In this case, Western activist entrepreneurs may be more likely to focus their attention on other more severe instances of rights abuse . Further, there may be little need for mass solidarity mobilizing when Western states adequately respond to a case of human rights abuse abroad, often by imposing economic sanctions on the rights-violating state. This too may divert the attention of grassroots activists to other causes on which their government is seen to be doing little or complicit in rights abuses. I also argued that mass solidarity mobilizations are less likely to occur when the distant rebels in question are not asking for this kind of support, either because they do not organize domestic protest campaigns that Western activists can get behind or because they do run such campaigns but do not include securing Western grassroots support as part of their overall strategy for change. The evidence to support these hypotheses for the absence of a mass solidarity mobilization is only suggestive. As I describe in more detail in the concluding chapter, future research on grassroots mobilizing and non-mobilizing ought to probe more closely the decisions making of these types of activists. What effect do perceptions of human rights progress and government action have on their propensity to mobilize? Under what conditions are these activists more likely to see a real need for grassroots work? Experimental surveys and focus groups with solidarity activists may help to identify how this sub-set of civil society thinks about the conditions under which their work is most needed. Further research is also required on the conditions under which distant rebels seek out Western grassroots support for their struggle. As I described above, a main reason for the absence of a mass solidarity mobilization may due to the fact that the aggrieved group in question is not asking for it. Why is it that some groups but not others

645 Lesley McCulloch, “Building Solidarity,” Inside Indonesia 81 (January-March 2005). http://www.insideindonesia.org/building-solidarity-2 646 Interview, ETAN Canada, July 13, 2015 647 Interview, ETAN Canada, April 9, 2015.

144 engage in the transnational solicitation of Western grassroots activist support? Some scholars have begun to study variations in transnational advocacy strategies, mainly between violent and non-violent strategies, but this work has not paid close attention to the mobilization of non-ethnic grassroots supporters in the West. Weak diasporas may incentivize this the recruitment of Western grassroots activists, but clearly they do not make it inevitable. What other factors beyond diaspora strength encourage this type of recruitment?

145 Chapter 7 Conclusion

Around the world myriad rebels struggle for rights. Only a select few, however, are recipients of significant levels of external support from solidarity activists. This dissertation offers an explanation for part of the variation in support that we see. In it, I focus on rebel recruitment strategies, and in particular the strategy of mobilizing non- diasporan activists to support the rebel cause. Drawing on insights from interviews with activists, as well as the micro-structural account of social movement participation found in sociology, I argue that when this kind of recruitment occurs mass solidarity mobilization in support of distant rebels becomes more likely. Further, I argued that rebels who could not rely on their ethnic kin abroad for meaningful support, whether due to their small size or inability to organize for ‘homeland’ politics, were more likely recruit supporters from outside of their diasporic networks. As such, the central argument this dissertation makes is that for reasons pertaining to rebel recruitment strategies, rebels with weak diasporas are the more likely subjects of mass solidarity mobilizing than rebels with strong diasporas. In chapters 3 and 5, I tested the empirical validity of this argument in two ways. In chapter 3 I tested it quantitatively on an original dataset, and found fairly robust evidence in favour of the proposition that mass solidarity mobilizations in North America and Europe are more likely to occur for distant rebels with weak diasporas in the West. In chapter 5, I tested it qualitatively by investigating why a mass solidarity mobilization had formed for the Palestinians but not the Kurds. In this chapter, I found evidence in favour of my proposed causal mechanism, which suggests that when rebel activists cannot rely on their diasporas for support, they are more likely to recruit non-diasporans. Specifically, the political weakness of the Palestinian diaspora in the West encouraged Palestinian activists to mobilize non-Palestinian supporters, thereby contributing directly to the mass solidarity mobilization on their behalf. By contrast, the strength of the Kurdish diaspora in Europe incentivized Kurdish activists to focus their efforts on their ethnic kin rather than on mobilizing non-Kurds. As a result, no mass solidarity mobilization for the Kurds has formed. In this concluding chapter I extend this analysis in three ways. First, I discuss the policy implications of my argument for activists looking to build wider support for their cause. Second, I apply my insights on rebel recruitment strategies to the phenomenon of foreign fighters travelling to Syria and Iraq to support the Islamic State’s (IS) insurgency. I show how the underlying strategic logic that encourages rebels to look beyond their presumed “natural” constituencies abroad can be used to explain why so many foreign fighters that have joined IS had previously only had weak or non-existent ties to Islam.

146 And finally, I outline three areas of new research that ought to be pursued to further our understanding of mass solidarity mobilizing for distant rebels.

7.1 Implications for Policy In the literature on transnational activism, scholars tend to focus on the importance of getting information out and framing a cause in ways that an international audience can understand. 648 The main suggestion is that individuals and groups seeking Western civil society support must tailor their message to resonate with the values and interests of a Western audience. 649 While it is true that messaging and advocacy frames matter, my analysis suggests that information dissemination alone, however savvy, is insufficient to mobilize support. What is also important is recruitment and related actions that make opportunities available for individuals to participate in concrete activist tasks. As social movement scholars have shown, being asked to participate is often a reliable predictor of actual participation. 650 This finding is not only applicable to political activism and movement participation, but also for encouraging charitable donations and in bringing out the vote. For instance, in their study of the determinants of voter turnout, Alan Gerber & Donald Green show that individuals are more likely to vote if they are exposed to personal canvassing than by direct mail or telephone calls.651 Similarly, my dissertation shows that rebels who adopt a strategy that focuses on recruiting non- diasporan supporters, often in person, are the one who are more likely to receive it. In practical terms, activists who want mass support must go out and ask for it. Issuing press releases, working on social media, lobbying journalists, and organizing public actions are often useful in raising awareness but are often not enough to mobilize action. Entrepreneurs ought to also ensure that they pursue and implement recruitment strategies as well. They should make formal and specific requests for support. They must make their presence known on university campuses, at trade union meetings, at global justice events, and at the appropriate religious events. They must leverage their personal connections with others in order to more increase the chances of mobilization on their behalf. As such, rebel activists, as well as other kinds of activists, seeking mass external support would be better off if they also devoted considerable resources to active recruitment campaigns, rather than just public awareness efforts.

648 Alison Brysk, Speaking Rights to Power: Constructing Political Will (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013). 649 Bob, The Marketing of Rebellion . 650 Alan Schussman & Sarah Soule, “Process and Protest: Accounting for Individual Protest Participation,” Social Forces Vol. 84, No. 2 (December 2005), pp. 1083-1108. 651 Alan Gerber & Donald Green, “The Effects of Canvassing, Telephone Calls, and Direct Mail on Voter Turnout: A Field Experiment,” American Political Science Review Vol. 94, No. 3 (September 2000), pp. 653-663. Donald Green, Alan Gerber & David Nickerson, “Getting Out the Vote in Local Elections: Results from Six Door-to-Door Canvassing Experiments,” Journal of Politics Vol. 65 No. 4 (December 2003), pp. 1083-1096.

147 7.2 Theoretical Implication: Why Do Islamic State’s Foreign Fighters Have Weak Ties to Islam? In addition to providing practical advice, my findings may also help us to explain additional phenomena as well. In this section I focus on one in particular – foreign fighter participation in the IS insurgency in Iraq and Syria. I suggest that the underlying strategic logic of rebel recruitment that I offer in this dissertation may shed some light on IS recruitment strategies in North America and Europe. That strategic logic suggests that when a rebel’s external and presumed “natural” constituency is not particularly forthcoming with support, rebel activists are likely to look beyond it in an effort to turn this weakness into a strength. This is what rebels with weak diasporas are doing when they recruit non-diasporans - compensating for the limitations, or absence, of their ethnic kin abroad. It is also what IS recruiters may be doing when they seek to recruit Westerners with weak ties to Islam - compensating for the unwillingness of mainstream Muslim organizations and mosques to actively contribute to their radical agenda. Foreign fighters are defined as individuals “voluntarily joining the rebels in an armed struggle outside of their own home country….”652 This practice has a long history, dating back to at least the Spanish Civil War in the 1930s. 653 It has become especially prominent in the last few decades, notably in the 1970s during the Afghan war against Soviet occupation, in the 1990s and early 2000s with the wars in Chechnya, 654 and today with the IS insurgency. Many of these foreign fighters are Western. According to one estimate, since 2011 approximately four to five thousand foreign fighters have travelled from Europe, Canada, and the United States to fight alongside the Islamic State in its effort to extend its territory and establish a global caliphate. 655 This is significant. As a number of studies have shown, the insertion of foreign fighters matters as they can increase the lethality of an insurgency and contribute to the collapse of governing structures leading to state failure, 656 they can dramatically reshape the ideological orientation of an insurgency to make it more intractable, 657 and they can return home prepared and willing to engage in terrorist violence. Who are these foreign fighters? According to one study that examined open source records on approximately 1200 IS foreign fighters, there is no single profile of the

652 Kristin Bakke, “Help Wanted? The Mixed Record of Foreign Fighters in Domestic Insurgencies,” International Security Vol. 38 No. 4 (Spring 2014), pp. 150-187. 653 R. Dan Richardson, “Foreign Fighters in Spanish Militias: The Spanish Civil War 1936-1939,” Military Affairs Vol. 40 No. 1 (February 1976), pp. 7-11. 654 Kristin Bakke, “Copying and Learning from Outsiders? Assessing Diffusion and Transnational Insurgents in the Chechen Wars,” in Jeffrey Checkel (ed.), Transnational Dynamics of Civil War (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013), pp. 31-62. 655 Michael Weiss & Hassan Hassan, ISIS: Inside the Army of Terror (New York: Regan Arts, 2015). 656 David Malet, “Why Foreign Fighters? Historical Perspectives and Solutions,” Orbis (Winter 2010), p. 97. 657 Jonathan Fox, “The Rise of Religious Nationalism and Conflict: Ethnic Conflict and Revolutionary Wars, 1945-2001,” Journal of Peace Research Vol. 41 No. 6 (2004), pp. 715-731.

148 foreign fighter. On the contrary, they vary considerable in terms of background. However, the study also found that the vast majority of foreign fighters had weak ties to Islam. The overwhelming majority had no formal religious education and “individuals who made the decision to become a foreign fighter tended not to be lifelong strict adherents to Islam, but also rarely recent converts.” 658 This is a puzzling finding given that IS insurgency is imbued with radical Islamist themes and that it has the goal of re- establishing an 8 th century Muslim caliphate, first in the Middle East and then globally. This begs the question: what explains why so many foreign fighters with weak ties to Islam have joined the IS insurgency? The strategic logic that I ascribe to rebel group recruitment strategies and their diasporas may help us to answer this question. In more general terms, this logic suggests that rebel activists will look beyond their presumed “natural” external constituency for supporters when that constituency shows itself unable or unwilling to offer the rebels the kind of support they need. For IS rebels, their ‘natural’ constituency is the wider Muslim diaspora, which offers them a vast network of possible external supporters. The challenge IS recruiters face, however, is that many Muslim communities around the world, especially in North America and Europe, actively oppose IS’ radical agenda and interpretation of Islam, and thus work to block IS recruitment efforts. As one American news report put it, “ever since ISIS stormed onto the world stage last year, prompting a US-led bombing campaign against the group in Iraq and Syria, Muslim scholars and community leaders have been on the front lines in the war against the group’s ideas, which are far from mainstream.” 659 In the UK, British Muslims have also organized to oppose the IS message. After the beheading of two American journalists – James Foley and Steven Sotloff - a number of leading Islamic organizations in the UK, including the Muslim Council of Britain, issued a press release referring to the Islamic State as “deceitful” and engaged in “actions [that] are far from the teachings of Islam.” The press release continued: we urge our youth not to contemplate going to Iraq or Syria or join IS or any similar groups that spread violence and hatred, nor give them any kind of support whatsoever . We call on all mosques and Islamic centres in the US to address this issue with their congregations during their Friday sermons. 660

658 Arie Perliger & Daniel Milton, From Cradle to Grave: The Lifecycle of Foreign Fighters in Iraq & Syria (West Point: Combating Terrorism Center, November 2016). Available here: https://www.ctc.usma.edu/v2/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/Cradle-to-Grave.pdf 659 Emily Feldman, “How Muslim Groups, Scholars Have Been Fighting ISIS,” NBC News Los Angeles (December 9, 2015). Available here: http://www.nbclosangeles.com/news/national-international/Muslim- Scholars-Groups-Against-ISIS-Speal-Out-361309791.html?amp=y 660 “Leading Islamic Centres Condemn So-Called ‘Islamic State,’ Muslim Council of Britain press release . Available here: http://www.mcb.org.uk/leading-islamic-centres-condemn-so-called-islamic-state/

149 In response, IS recruiters operating in North America and Europe have looked beyond the Muslim communities to recruit supporters. One strategy has been to target prison networks, given that they are “locations in which individuals are likely to be vulnerable and may thus be receptive to the appeal of violent extremists.” 661 In addition, they have also sought to mobilize those who feel frustrated and alienated from mainstream society. As one father of IS foreign fighter explained, describing IS recruiters: “Those people are professionals. They know exactly who their prey is. They pick on the easiest prey they can find that they can easily brainwash.” 662 By focusing on marginalized, frustrated and vulnerable individuals, 663 IS recruits have adopted a recruitment strategy that reflects the fact that their ability to mobilize from within mainstream Muslim networks is severely limited. In this regard, IS recruitment strategy may in part be shaped by a similar strategic logic that influences ethno-national rebel groups – when they lack a strong diaspora on which to rely, they are more likely to seek supporters from non-diasporic external networks.

7.3 Future Research Beyond offering a new line of research into the determinants of IS recruitment strategies, this dissertations opens up three additional lines of inquiry that can be used to improve our understanding of mass solidarity mobilizations and, perhaps, other related transnational activist phenomena as well.. The first seeks to contribute to the quantitative study of mass solidarity mobilization and calls for a further refinement of the dataset employed in chapter 3. The second focuses on the causes of issue non-adoption by grassroots activists and the absence of a mass solidarity mobilization. The third focuses more directly on rebel diplomacy and seeks to explain why some rebels opt to actively recruit Western grassroots activist support while others select different diplomatic strategies.

7.3.1 Improving the Dataset In chapter 3 I employed an original dataset to test the relationship between diaspora strength and the probability of mass solidarity mobilization formation. For some of the variables, including mass solidarity mobilization formation and diaspora strength, new data had to be collected. As is often the case with even the most well- established datasets, the dataset can be improved. I suggest a number of improvements. First, the universe of cases can be broadened to include not only Amnesty International

661 “Recruitment and Mobilisation for the Islamist Militant Movement in Europe,” p. 18. 662 Quoted from video in Lizzie Dearden, “ISIS: Islam is ‘not strongest factor’ behind foreign fighters joining extremist groups in Syria and Iraq – report,” The Independent (November 16, 2016). Available here: http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/isis-foreign-fighters-british-european-western- dying-radicalised-islam-not-strongest-factor-cultural-a7421711.html 663 Daan Weggemans, Edwin Bakker, and Peter Grol, “Who are They and Why do They Go? The Radicalisation and Preparatory Processes of Dutch Jihadist Foreign Fighters,” Perspectives on Terrorism Vol.8 No. 4 (2014), pp. 100–110.

150 campaigns but also those of Human Rights Watch. Second, a new variable that considers the tone or advocacy frames used in the NGO campaign could also be included, as it may have a causal effect on the willingness of grassroots activists to mobilize. As it exists now, the dataset treats all Amnesty International campaigns as equal observations. Third, measures of mass solidarity mobilization formation and diaspora strength can also be improved. For both variables, teams of undergraduate research assistants could be employed to check the validity of the measures used as well as to ensure some degree of inter-coder reliability. This is especially the case with the diaspora strength variable, which relied on my own assessments of the scholarly literature. In addition, the diaspora strength measures could be improved by soliciting the input of diaspora scholars to further assess the robustness of the measures of diaspora political mobilization. And additional data on ethnic lobbying in Canada and the European Union could be added to the lobby indicator, which as of now only includes US-based ethnic lobbying organizations.

7.3.2 Grassroots Non-Mobilizations A second line of research could focus more closely on the absence of a mass solidarity mobilization even under permissive or conducive conditions. As I described in more detail in chapter 5, the weak diaspora theory advanced here only captures a part of the story of mass solidarity mobilization formation. A number of distant rebels with weak diasporas in the West have not attracted mass solidarity mobilization support. Chapter 5 suggested possible explanations for the absence of a mass solidarity mobilization in these cases, however these reasons were not rigorously tested. A closer study of these instances of non-adoption is needed as they can tell us more about the conditions under which we might expect mass solidarity mobilizations to occur.664 To conduct this research, I suggest a similar approach to the one adopted by Charli Carpenter and her colleagues but adapted to the study of grassroots activists rather than NGOs. 665 In this study, focus groups with solidarity activists can be run to help to shed light on the conditions that they think mass solidarity mobilization will form and not form. Each focus group can include two distinct sessions. The first would including a more general discussion of mass mobilizing, while the second will offer a more guided discussion around specific cases of non-mobilization treated as thought experiments. These specific cases will be taken from the existing set of weak diaspora/No mass solidarity mobilization cases, analyzed in chapter 5. The data collected through these focus groups can then be used to assess the validity of the aforementioned hypotheses on

664 Charli Carpenter, “Setting the Advocacy Agenda: Theorizing the Emergence and Nonemergence in Transnational Advocacy Networks,” International Studies Quarterly Vol. 51 (2007), pp. 99-120. 665 Charli Carpenter, Sirin Duygulu, Alexander Montgomery & Anna Rapp, “Explaining the Advocacy Agenda: Insights from the Human Security Network,” International Organization 68 (Spring 2014), pp. 449-470.

151 non-mobilization, described in chapter 5, and to identify additional explanations that may also account for the absence of a mass solidarity mobilization.

7.3.3 Rebel Diplomatic Strategies A third line of research could probe in more detail the transnational advocacy strategies of distant rebel organizations and how they relate to mass solidarity mobilization formation. I suggested that distant rebels who actively seek out Western grassroots support are more likely to receive it. To date, however, scholars have not paid much attention to explaining variations in rebel diplomatic strategies.666 In this dissertation I suggested that rebel with weak diasporas in the West were more likely to engage in Western grassroots mobilizing than those rebels with strong diasporas. As we saw in chapters 4 and 5, however, diaspora strength is but one determinant of such a strategy. For example, the PLO eschewed grassroots mobilizing in the West while PACBI embraced it, despite the weakness of the Palestinian diaspora. The East Timorese made Western grassroots mobilizing central to their transnational advocacy work 667 but other groups with weak diasporas in the West, such as the Acehnese, have not, preferring to lobby Western government officials and large NGOs instead.668 What accounts for these variations in strategy? If a focus on mobilizing Western grassroots activists for solidarity work makes mass solidarity mobilization more likely, it is important to identify the causes of such a strategy.

7.4 Conclusion In sum, this dissertation has sought to explain why some distant rebels but not others secure mass external grassroots solidarity. It argued that rebels with weak diasporas are the more likely recipients of mass solidarity mobilization support because it is these group that are more likely to actively recruit non-diasporan supporters. The perspective I offer opens up a number of new areas of inquiry, including on phenomena that extend beyond the subject of solidarity activism. In particular, my analytical focus on rebel recruitment strategies, and the factors that shape those strategies, may provide important insights into how Islamist movements recruit to build up their stock of foreign fighters. This topic, among others, promises to keep scholars busy in the years to come.

666 One recent exception is Victor Asal, Justin Conrad & Peter White. "Going abroad: Transnational Solicitation and Contention by Ethnopolitical Organizations," International Organization 68, no. 4 (2014). 667 David Webster, "Non-State Diplomacy: East Timor 1975-99." Portuguese Studies Review 11, no. 1 (2003): 1-28. 668 Antje Missbach , Separatist Conflict in Indonesia: The Long-Distance Politics of the Acehnese Diaspora (New York: Routledge, 2012). Antje Missbach , “The Acehnese Diaspora: Hawks or Doves? Conflict- Support, Peace-Finding and Political Opportunity Structures,” Journal of Human Security Vol. 5, No. 3 (2009).

152 Appendix A: Correlation Matrix Diaspora Christian Geographic Civil Political Media Media Western Western strength Proximity War Terror attention attention 10 Arms Arms 1950 year year lag Transfer Transfer lag 1950 lag 10 year lag Diaspora strength 1 ______Christian -0.0359 1 ______Geographic Proximity -0.2770 -0.0765 1 ______

Civil -0.0817 -0.1351 0.1189 1 ______War Political Terror 0.0047 -0.1396 0.1728 0.5800 1 ______Media attention 1950 lag 0.4363 0.0092 -0.0194 -0.2488 -0.0551 1 ______

Media attention 0.4272 0.0297 -0.0700 -0.2137 -0.0424 0.9478 1 ______10 year lag

Arm transfer 1950 lag 0.1616 -0.2074 0.2582 0.0020 0.0947 0.3177 0.2417 1 ______

Western arm transfer 0.1283 -0.1412 0.1540 -0.1259 -0.0956 0.2894 0.2460 0.8514 1 10 year lag

153

Appendix B: Coding of Dependent Variable

Mass Solidarity Mobilization = 10+ solidarity NGOs

Yearbook of Google Searches 670 Human Rights Other sources Citations Estimated # mass mass International Directory North of NGOs solidarity solidari Organizations 669 America 671 & mobilizatio ty Western Europe 672 n? (10+) mobiliz Distant rebel (AI (year founded) ation campaign years) start date or AI campai gn end None None None Lesley McCulloch, “Building 0 No 2003 Solidarity,” Inside Indonesia (2005). http://www.insideindonesia.org/b Acehnese/ uilding-solidarity-2 1985-2003 Antje Missbach. 2012. Separatist Conflict in Indonesia: The Long- distance politics of the Acehnese diaspora . New York: Routledge. Afghanistan World Women for Afghan Franco-Afghan Terry Glavin. 2011. Come From 30 Yes 2001 Afghanis/ Foundation (2002 - Women (USA) Friendship (1980 – the Shadows: The Long & Lonely 1996-1999 USA) France) Struggle for Peace in Afghan Women’s Mission Afghanistan . Vancouver: Douglas

669 Online database here: http://ybio.brillonline.com.myaccess.library.utoronto.ca/ybio/ [Accessed through Robarts Library - http://search.library.utoronto.ca/details?9714790 ] 670 Search terms to use: “[Distant rebel] Support Group”, “[Distant rebel] AND Solidarity”, “Save [Distant rebel]”, “Friends of [Distant rebel]”. 671 Laurie S. Wiseberg & Harry M. Scoble, North American Human Rights Directory 1980: Human Rights Internet (Garret Park: Maryland, 1980). 672 Laurie S. Wiseberg & Hazel Sirett (eds.), Human Rights Directory: Western Europe (1982).

154 (2000) Afghan Voice (n/a - & McIntyre. UK) - diaspora Canadian Women for Rosemarie Skaine. 2002. The Women in Afghanistan Women of Afghanistan Under the (1996) – 13 chapters Taliban . Jefferson: McFarland.

Canada-Afghanistan Sunita Mehta (ed.). 2002. Women Solidarity Committee for Afghan Women: Shattering (2006) – 13 chapters Myths and Claiming the Future . New York: Palgrave MacMillan. Afghan Friends Network (2002) Ahmadis/ None None None 0 No 2000 1991-2000 None Irish Friends of Albania None 0 No 1996 Albanians/ (2002 – Ireland – medical 1991-1996 service NGO International Algeria Solidarity None Catherine Lloyd. 1999. 1 No 1999 Committee of Campaign (2011 – “Organising Across Borders: Solidarity with the London) – diaspora Algerian Women’s Associations Algerian Youth in a Period of Conflict,” Review (1961) - ? Comite des Droits de of African Political Economy , No. l’Homme et Libertes en 82, pp. 479-490. Algerians/ International Algerie (n/a – France) 1992-1999 Committee of Catherine Lloyd. 1999. Support to Algerian “Transnational Mobilizations in Intellectuals Context of Violent Conflict: The (~1990s – France) Case of Solidarity with Women in Algeria,” Contemporary Politics , Vol. 5, No. 4, pp. 365-377. None Support Group for the Argentine Marguerite Guzman Bouvard. 16 Yes 1977 Mothers of the Plaza de Commission for 1994. Revolutionizing Mayo (1978 – Holland, Human Rights (1976) Motherhood: The Mothers of the Argentinians/19 France, Germany) – diaspora/exile Plaza de Mayo. Wilmington, 75-1983 Delaware: Scholarly Resources Argentine Inc. Information Service

155 Center (n/a) Kathryn Sikkink. 1993. “Human Rights, Principled Issue- Chicago Committee Networks, and Sovereignty in for Human Rights in Latin America .” International Argentina Organization . Vol. 47, No. 3, pp. 411-441. Washington Committee for Human Rights in Argentina (1979)

No Candu for Argentina Committee (n/a – Canada)

Commission in Solidarity with the Relatives of Political Prisoners, the Disappeared and Killed in Argentina (1977 – Belgium, France, Italy, Spain, Switzerland, UK, et al)

Belgian Committee against Repression in Argentina (n/a – Belgium)

French-Argentine Solidarity Association (n/a – France)

Argentine Solidarity

156 Committee (n/a – Netherlands)

Committee in Solidarity with the Argentine People (n/a – Spain)

Committee for Human Rights in Argentina (n/a – UK) Armenians/ None None None 0 No 1995 1992-1995 Azerbaijanis/19 None None None 0 No 1995 92-1995 None Bahrain Solidarity None 0 No 1996 Campaign (~2013 – UK)

Bahrain Center for Human Bahrainis/ rights (2002 – Bahrain w/ 1995-1996 presence in Denmark since 2011)

Save Bahrain (2012) - ??? Bangladesh Australia Bangladesh None 0 No 1988 International Action Solidarity Network (2014 Group (~mid- – Australia) 1980s) – ??? Bangladeshis/19 Friends of Bangladesh (n/a 85-1988 International – Australia) Movement to Save Bangladesh (N/A) - ??? Belarus Republic Belarus Solidarity Conference of Free Steven Levitsky and Lucan Way. 0 No 2000 Belarusians League for Human Campaign (2010 – USA) – Byeolorussians 2010. Competitive /1997-2000 Rights (1992) – diaspora (1977) – diaspora Authoritarianism: Hybrid unclear nature Regimes after the Cold War . New

157 Belarus Free Theatre (2005 York: Cambridge University – Belarus with some Press. international support) Anti-Apartheid See list of anti-apartheid American Roger Fieldhouse. 2005. Anti- 100s Yes 1960 Movement (1959 – organizations here: Coordinating Apartheid: A History of the UK) https://www.nelsonmandel Committee for Movement in Britain: A Study in a.org/images/uploads/aama Equality in Sport & Pressure Group Politics . London: Artists and Athletes -azlist.pdf Access (1976) – a Merlin. against Apartheid coalition of (1983) organizations. Rob Skinner. 2010. The Foundations of Anti-Apartheid: Europeans Against Association of Liberal Humanitarians the Apartheid (n/a) Concerned Africa Transnational Activists in Britain Scholars (1977) and the United States, c. 1919- 1964 . New York: Palgrave Boston Coalition for MacMillan. the Liberation of Southern Africa (n/a) Hakan Thorn. 2006. Anti- - Apartheid and the Emergence of a Black South Global Civil Society . Africans/ Campaign to Oppose Basingstoke: Palgrave 1977-1995 Bank Loans to South MacMillan. Africa (1977) – a coalition of David Black. 1999. “The Long organizations. and Winding Road: International Norms and Domestic Political New York Change in South Africa.” In Committee to Oppose Thomas Risse, Stephen Ropp and Bank Loans to South Kathryn Sikkink (eds.). The Africa (n/a) Power of Human Rights: International Norms and Rochester Ad Hoc Domestic Change . New York: Committee Against Cambridge University Press, pp. Bank Loans to South 78-108. Africa (n/a)

Seattle Committee to

158 Oppose Bank Loans to South Africa (n/a) Stop Banking on Apartheid (n/a)

New England Committee on Southern Africa (n/a) - network

Episcopal Churchmen for South Africa (1956)

International Defense & Aid Fund for Southern Africa North American Committee (1972)

People for South Africa Freedom (n/a)

United Peoples Campaign Against Apartheid and Racism (n/a)

South Africa Action Coalition (n/a)

Toronto Committee for the Liberation of Southern Africa (n/a)

Action Committee on Southern Africa

159 (1972 – Belgium)

Boycott Outspan Action (1975 – Belgium)

Anti-Apartheid Denmark (n/a)

Anti-Apartheid Movement (1975 – France)

Anti-Apartheid Movement (1974 – West Germany)

Irish Anti-Apartheid Movement (1964 – Ireland)

Anti-Apartheid Movement (n/a – Netherlands)

Norwegian Council for Southern African (1967 – Netherlands)

World Campaign Against Military and Nuclear collaboration with South Africa (1979 – Norway)

Isolate South Africa Committee (n/a –

160 Sweden)

Anti-Apartheid Movement for German-Speaking Switzerland (1975 – Switzerland)

International Defence and Aid Fund for Southern Africa (1956 – UK) End Loans to South Africa (n/a – UK)

Anti-Apartheid Movement (1959 – UK) None Bolivia Solidarity Support Group for Caitlin Esch abnd Wes Enzinna, ~4 No – 1982 Campaign (n/a – UK) the Bolivian People’s “Groups Call for Solidarity with 1980s and Struggle (~1980 – Bolivia,” NACLA . late 2000s Toronto Bolivia Solidarity Sweden) https://nacla.org/news/groups- mobilizatio (2008 – Canada) call-solidarity-bolivia n too small. Canada Bolivia Action Bolivians/ Solidarity Network (n/a – 1980-1982 Canada)

Bolivia Information Forum (2006 – UK)

Friends of Bolivia (1983 – UK) – humanitarian service NGO None None From Fink: Sheri Fink. 1996. “The Anti- 18 Yes 1993 Bosnians/ Genocide Movement on 1993-1997 Students Against American College Campuses: A

161 Genocide Growing Response to the Balkan Coalition War,” in Thomas Cushman and Stjepan Mestrovic (eds.) This American Time We Knew: Western Committee to Responses to Genocide in Bosnia . Save Bosnia New York: New York University Press, pp. 313-349. Bosnia Support Committee at Cornell

Ad Hoc Committee on Bosnia at Carleton University

Bosnia Coordinating Committee

American Task Force for Bosnia

Americans for Bosnian Orphans

Bosnia Task Force San Diego

Bosnia Support Committee of DC

Ann Arbor Committee for Bosnia

162 Free Bosnia Action Group

California Coalition against Ethnic Cleansing

Friends of Bosnia

Greenwich Coalition for Peace in Bosnia

New York Committee to Save Bosnia

New England Bosnia Relief Committee

Bosnia Advocates of Metrowest

New Hampshire Committee for Peace in Bosnia- Herzegovina None None None American Friends James Green. 2003. “Clerics, 3+ Yes – 1969 of Brazil Exiles and Academics: Green Opposition to the Brazilian refers to American Military Dictatorship in the parallel Brazilians Committee for United States, 1969-1974.” Latin campaign /1975-1978 Information on American Politics and Society , in Europe Brazil Vol. 45, No. 1, pp. 87-117.

Committee James Green. 2010. We Cannot

163 against Remain Silent: Opposition to the Repression in Brazilian Military Dictatorship in Brazil the United States. Durham, North Carolina: Duke University Press. Brazilians None None None 0 No 2000 /1988-2000 Free Burma US Campaign for Burma None See list of orgs John Dale. 2011. Free Burma: 100+ Yes 1994 Coalition (1995 – (2003 – USA) ~78,000 here: Transnational Legal Action and USA) grassroots members, 100 http://burmacamp Corporate Accountability . chapters aign.org.uk/useful Minneapolis: University of International Action Burma Campaign UK -resources/links/ Minnesota Press. Committee for (1991 – UK) Democracy in Shanthi Kalathil. 2002. Burma (n/a) - ?? Burma Support Group ( - “Community and Communalism Australia) in the Information Age,” The International Burma Brown Journal of World Affairs , Campaign (n/a) - ?? Burma Action Group Vol. 9, No. 1, pp. 347-354. (Australia)

Canberra Network for Democracy in Burma Burmese/ (Australia) 1988-2000

Burma Solidarity Group (Australia)

Burma Campaign Sydney (Australia)

Australia Burma Network (Australia)

Burma Action Ireland (Ireland)

Swedish Burma Committee (Sweden)

164

Burma Action Committee (USA)

Burma Forum Los Angeles (USA)

New England Burma Roundtable (1994 – USA)

Canadian Friends of Burma (1991 – Canada)

Friends of Burma (1985 – USA)

Association Suisse-Birman (1992 – Belgium)

Oxford Burma Alliance (UK) None Friends of Burundi (2005 – None Steven Mufson. 2004. “How a 0 No 2000 UK) – Christian solidarity Tragedy Became a Cause,” Burundian Washington Post . /1994-2000 Burundi Friends http://www.washingtonpost.com/ International (2007) – anti- wp-dyn/articles/A64132- poverty org 2004Aug13.html None Cambodia Support Group Cambodian Caroline Hughes. 2007. 0 No 1998 (1983 – Canada) – Coordination “Transnational Networks, diaspora/charity Committee (n/a) – International Organizations and Save Cambodia (n/a – diaspora Political Participation in Cambodians USA) - ?? Cambodian Religio- Cambodia: Human rights, Labour /1997-1998 Cultural Association Rights and Common Rights,” Cambodia Action (1973 – of America (1975) - Democratization . Vol, 14, No. 5, UK) – Christian org, diaspora pp. 834-852. charity.

165

None Save Chechnya Campaign None John Laughland. 2004. “The 1 No 2000 (??) Chechens’ American Friends,” American Committee for Guardian (2004). Peace in Chechnya (1999 – http://www.theguardian.com/worl Chechens USA) - d/2004/sep/08/usa.russia /1976-2000 Gail Lapidus. 1998. “Contested Sovereignty: The Tragedy of Chechnya.” International Security . Vol. 23, No. 1, pp. 5-49. International Chile Committee for Margaret Power. 2009. “The US 32 Yes 1973 Commission of Human Rights (1976) Movement in Solidarity with Inquiry into the Chile in the 1970s.” Latin Crimes of the Chile Democratico American Perspectives , Vol. 36, Military Junta in (1973) – diaspora No. 6 (2009), pp. 46-66. Chile (1974) - ?? Chile Legislative Michael Wilkinson. 1992. “The International Center (n/a) Chile Solidarity Campaign and Friends of the British Government Policy Chilean Human National Chile Center Towards Chile, 1973-1990.” Rights Commission (n/a) – coalition of 22 European Review of Latin (n/a) - ?? local and national American and Caribbean Studies , Chileans/1975- orgs No. 52, pp. 52-74. 1992 Non-Intervention in Stephen Ropp and Kathryn Chile (n/a) – 9 Sikkink. 1999. “International chapter throughout Norms and Domestic Politics in US Chile & Guatemala.” In Thomas Office for Political Risse, Stephen Ropp and Kathryn Prisoners and Human Sikkink (eds.). The Power of Rights in Chile (n/a) Human Rights: International Norms and Domestic Change . Austin Committee for New York: Cambridge University Human Rights in Press, pp. 172-204. Chile (n/a)

166 Bay Area Ecumenical Council for Chile (n/a)

Bay Area Trade Union Committee of Concern for Chile (n/a)

Buffalo Committee for Chilean Democracy (n/a)

Chicago Committee to Save Lives in Chile (n/a)

Chilean Boycott Task Force (n/a)

Cleveland Chile Committee (n/a)

Committee for Chilean Inquirty (n/a)

Denver Chile Group (n/a)

Detroir Chile Group (n/a)

Eugene Free Chile Center (n/a)

Free Chile Center (n/a)

167

Kansas City Chile Solidarity Committee (n/a)

New England Chile Solidarity Committee (n/a)

New York Chile Solidarity Committee (n/a)

Pittsburgh Chile Solidarity Committee (n/a)

Portland Chile Coalition (n/a)

Franco-Chilean Friendship (1974 – France)

Action for the Release of Political Prisoners in Chile (1975 – West Germany)

Chile America (1974 - Italy) – diaspora?

Chile Solidarity Campaign (1973 – UK)

168 Chile Committee for Human Rights (1974 – UK)

Chileans None None None 0 No 2000 /1998-2000 Foundation for Initiatives for China (n/a – Chinese Americans 0 No 2002 Human Rights & USA) for Freedom and Democracy in Human Rights (1977) China (1989 – China Support Network – diaspora Chinese/ France) - ?? (1989 – USA) – 1986-2002 Chinese Human Free China Movement Rights Society (1975) (??_ – diaspora

Committee to Defend

169 Democratic Rights in China (1980 – UK) None Colombia Support US Committee Winifred Tate. 2009. “US Human 18 Yes 1994 Network (~1994, USA) – 6 against the Violation Rights Activism and Plan chapters of Human Rights and Colombia.” Colombia Democratic Liberties Internacional , No. 69, pp. 50-69. Colombia Solidarity in Colombia (n/a) Campaign (2001 – UK) – 8 chapters Colombian Committee for Sussex Colombia Human Rights (n/a – Solidarity (UK) UK) – diaspora? Colombians/

1981-2003 Justice for Colombia (2002 – UK)

North Shore Colombia Solidarity Committee (USA)

Colombia Action Solidarity Alliance (Canada) European NGO Friends of the Congo None Alison Brysk. 2013. Speaking 1 No 2000 Network on Congo (2004 – USA) Rights to Power: Constructing (1989) –coalition Political Will . New York: Oxford Congolese/ but not of single Congo Global Action University Press. 1996-2000 issue orgs (2006)

Congo Coalition (1998 – USA) - diaspora None Cuba Solidarity Campaign Of Human Rights Darren Hawkins. 2002. 14 Yes 1992 (UK) (1977) – diaspora? International Human Rights and Cubans/ Authoritarian Rule in Chile . 1991-2000 Canadian Network on Portuguese-Cuban Lincoln: University of Nebraska Cuba (2002 – Canada) Friendship Press. Association (n/a –

170 Canadian-Cuban Portugal) Darren Hawkins and Joshua Friendship Association Lloyd. 2003. “Questioning (Canada) – BC, Alberta, Comprehensive Sanctions: The Ontario Birth of a Norm.” Journal of Human Rights , Vol. 2, Issue 3, Cuba Edmonton Solidarity pp. 441-454. Committee (Canada)

Cuba Education Tours (Canada)

Friends of Cuba against the US Blockade (Canada)

Vancouver Communities in Solidarity with Cuba (Canada)

Manitoba-Cuba Solidarity Committee (Canada)

The Nova-Scotia Cuba Association (Canada)

Hamilton Friendship Association with Cuba (Canada)

Ottawa-Cuba Connections (Canada)

Rock Around the Blockade (1995 – UK) International European Solidarity Front Minnesota Friends of 4 No 1995 Cypriots/1991- Committee of for Cyprus Cyprus (1974) 1995 Solidarity with Cyprus (1974) - ?? Friends of Cyprus (1974) Solidarity with

171 Cyprus (n/a – UK) Darfuris/1989- None None 0 No 1997 1997 Save Darfur Students Taking Action None Rebecca Hamilton. 2011. 50+ Yes 2005 Coalition (2004/5 – Now Darfur (2003 - USA) Fighting for Darfur: Public USA) – 40 chapters, Canada Action and the Struggle to Stop Genocide . New York: Palgrave Dream for Darfur MacMillan.

Chicago Coalition to Save Rebecca Hamilton & Chad Darfur Hazlett. 2007. “The Emergence of the American Movement for Cincinnatians United to Darfur,” in Alex de Waal (ed.), Save Darfur War in Darfur and the Search for Peace . Cambridge: Global Connecticut Coalition to Equity Initiative, pp. 337-366. Save Darfur

Darfuris/ Darfur Alert 2002-2003 Help Darfur Now

Mason-Dixon Darfur Alliance

Masschusetts Coalition to Save Darfur

Pittsburgh Darfur Emergency Coalition

Western Massachusetts Darfur Coalition

24 Hours for Darfur East Timorese International East Timor Alert Network Emergency Brad Simpson. 2004. “Solidarity 37 Yes 1991 /1985-2003 Federation for East (1987 – Canada) – 12 Committee for in an Age of Globalization: The

172 Timor (1991 – chapters Human Rights in Transnational Movement for East USA) Indonesia and Self- Timor and US Foreign Policy,” East Timor International Determination in East Peace & Change . Vol. 29, No. 3- East Timor and Support Center (Australia) Timor (1978) 4, pp. 453-482. Indonesia Action Network (1991 – Easet Timor Relief Association in Clinton Fernandes. 2011. The USA) – 12 chapters Association (Australia) Solidarity with East Independence of East Timor: Timor (n/a – France) Multi-Dimensional Perspectives – Solidarity with East Brisbane East Timor Occupation, Resistance, and Timor (1976 – Office (Australia) Commission for the International Political Activism . France) Rights of the Portland: Sussex Academic Press. Campaign for an Maubere People (n/a Independent East Timor – Portugal) David Webster. 2003. “Non-State (Australia) Diplomacy: East Timor 1975-99,” British Campaign for Portuguese Studies Review , Vol. Australia-East Timor an Independent East 11, No. 1, pp. 1-28. Association (Australia) Timor (1975 – UK) Shane Gunderson. 2015. Australians for a Free East Momentum and the East Timor Timor (Australia) Independent Movement: The Origins of America’s Debate on Friends of East Timor East Timor . Lanham: Lexington (Australia) Books.

Hobart East Timor Committee (Australia)

Canadian Action for Indonesia and East Timor

East Timor Ireland Solidarity Campaign

British Coalition for East Timor

East Timor Scotland

173 Support Group None EgyPt Solidarity (2014 – None Yasmin Alibhai-Brown. 2011. 0 No 2002 UK) “Stop blaming Israel for every grievance in the Middle East,” Independent . Egyptians/ http://www.independent.co.uk/voi 1989-2002 ces/commentators/yasmin-alibhai- brown/yasmin-alibhai-brown- stop-blaming-israel-for-every- grievance-in-the-middle-east- 2277726.html None Anti-Martial Law Jose Fuenticilla. 2013. Fighting 20 Yes 1973 Coalition (1974) – from a Distance: How Filipino diaspora Exiles Helped Topple a Dictator . Chicago: University of Illinois Friends of the Press. Filipino People (1973) – 17 chapters Daniel Schirmer. 1994. “Standard Questions – Friends of the Friends of the Filipino People.” Filipino People – http://escholarship.org/uc/item/95 splinter group (1979) z8f0v4 Filipinos/ 1981-1993 Church Coalition for Human Rights in the Philippines (1978) – coalition of religious organizations.

Movement for a Free Philippines (1973)

Belgian Philippine Support Committee (1979) Greeks/ None Greece Solidarity None 3 No – orgs 1996 1991-1996 Campaign (2012 – UK) are

174 Greece- Australia-Greece focused, Solidarity Campaign (2014 not on – Australia) Greeks in Albania Greece Solidarity Movement New York (2012 – USA) None Guatemala Solidarity Association in Sharon Nepstad. 2004. 100s+ Yes 1980 Network (UK) Solidarity with Convictions of the Soul: Religion, Guatemala (1979) Culture and Agency in the Guatemala Solidarity Central America Solidarity Project (USA) Guatemala-El Movement . New York: Oxford Salvador Committee University Press. Guatemalans Network in Solidarity with (n/a – Sweden) /1979-2003 the People of Guatemala (1981 – USA) Guatemala Working Group (n/a – UK) Christian Smith. 1996. Resisting Reagan: the US Central America Peace Movement. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Solidarity Europe- Haiti Action Committee Friends of Haiti Committee in Tom Reeves. 2004. “Notes on the 10+ Yes 1992 Haiti (n/a) - ?? (1991 - USA) (1971) Solidarity with US-Haiti Solidarity Movement,” Canada Haiti Action Haiti (US) in Melinda Miles and Eugenia Network (2004 – Canada) Charles (eds.), Let Haiti Live: Committee to Unjust US Policies Towards the Haiti Support Group (UK - Support the Oldest Neighbor. Florida: Educa 1992) Popular Vision Inc. Haitians/ Movement in 1985-1994 Toronto Haiti Action Haiti (US) Committee (2004 – Canada)

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Let Haiti Live (USA)

175 Haiti Solidarity Ireland (Ireland) Hazaras/1996- None None None 0 No 1999 1999 None Honduras Solidarity None Sharon Nepstad. 2004. 4 No – not 1988 Network (2009 – US & Convictions of the Soul: Religion, part of Canada) Culture and Agency in the Central Central America Solidarity America Friends of Honduras Movement . New York: Oxford Solidarity (USA) University Press. Movement

Comite de Solidaridad Hondurans/ Seattle – Honduras (USA) 1981-1988 Colective Honduras USA Resistencia (USA)

Friends of Honduran Children (~1980 – Canada)

Friends of Honduras USA (2009 – USA) Hutus/1994- None None None 0 No 2000 2000 Hutus/1996- None None None 0 No 2000 2000 None Friends of India – Central None No 2000 Arkansas (USA) – Indians/1988- diaspora? 2000 Friends of India (Switzerland) Indigenous None None None No 2003 Peoples/1994- 2003 Indonesians/ East Timor & Indonesia Human Rights Emergency Pip Hinman, “Organising 8 No 2003 1985-2003 Indonesia Action Network (1998 – USA) Committee for Australia – Indonesia Solidarity,”

176 Network (1991 – Human Rights in Inside Indonesia (2003). USA) Indonesia Solidarity Indonesia and Self- http://www.insideindonesia.org/or Action/Action in Solidarity Determination in East ganising-australia-indonesia- with Indonesia & East Timor (1978) solidarity Timor (1990 – Australia) TAPOL: US Campaign for the Release of Indonesian Political Prisoners (1975)

Committee for the Defense of Political Prisoners in Indonesia (1978 – TAPOL France)

Indonesia Committee (1968 – Netherlands) – diaspora?

Indonesian Documentation and Information Centre (1979 – Netherlands)

TAPOL UK (1973 – UK) Iranian Human Iran Solidarity (2009 – None No 2003 Rights Working UK) Group (n/a) - ??? International Campaign for Iranians/ Human Rights in Iran 1981-2003 (2008 – US)

Solidarity with Iran (2010 – Iran based, pro-gov’t)

177 European Iraq Solidarity Campaign None See: 20+ Yes 1997 Association for (2003 – diaspora?) Darren Hawkins and Joshua Peace & Solidarity Lloyd. 2003. “Questioning with the Iraqi Act Together: Women Comprehensive Sanctions: The People (n/a – Against Sanctions on Iraq Birth of a Norm.” Journal of Belgium) (UK) Human Rights , Vol. 2, Issue 3, pp. 441-454. International Britain against Sanctions Committee for a on Iraq (UK) Campaign Against Sanctions on Free Iraq (1991 – Iraq : UK) Campaign against http://www.casi.org.uk/about.html Sanctions in Iraqi (UK) International Organization for the Iraq Action Coalition Defense of Human Rights in Iraq (n/a) Committee for the Lifting - ??? of the Economic Sanctions on the Iraqi People (UK) Iraqis/1988-

1993 Iraqi People First (UK)

Sheffield Committee against War in the Gulf (UK)

Sussez Campaign Against Sanctions on Iraq (UK)

Voices for Justice in Iraq (UK)

Canadian Network to End Sanctions on Iraq (Canada)

The Committee for Lifting the Economic Sanctions on Iraq (Canada)

178

Nova Scotia Campaign to End Sanctions (Canada)

University of Western Ontario Movement to End the War Against Iraq (Canada)

Committee to End the Iraqi Sanctions (Ireland)

Committee to Save the Children in Iraq (Germany) National Network to End the War Against Iraq (2001 – USA)

Iraq Action Coalition (USA) Karens/1988- None None None 0 No 2000 2000 World Kashmir Kashmir Solidarity None Tavseef Mairaj, “Kashmir – The 0 No 2000 Freedom Network (2010) – Forgotten Solidarity,” World Movement (1990) – location?? Bulletin (2014). diaspora http://www.worldbulletin.net/new Kashmiris/ British Friends of Kashmir s-analysis/142459/kashmir-the- 1988-2000 International (2005 – UK) forgotten-solidarity Kashmir Alliance (2003 – UK) - diaspora None American Friends of None Hans Peter Schmitz. 1999. 0 No 1991 Kenya (2004) “Transnational Activism and Kenyans/ Political Change in Kenya and 1986-1991 Uganda,” In Thomas Risse, Stephen Ropp and Kathryn

179 Sikkink (eds.). The Power of Human Rights: International Norms and Domestic Change . New York: Cambridge University Press, pp. 39-77. None American Friends of None Hans Peter Schmitz. 1999. 0 No 1998 Kenya (2004) “Transnational Activism and Political Change in Kenya and Uganda,” In Thomas Risse, Kenyans/ Stephen Ropp and Kathryn 1995-1998 Sikkink (eds.). The Power of Human Rights: International Norms and Domestic Change . New York: Cambridge University Press, pp. 39-77. International Peace in Kurdistan Kurdistan Committee Nicole Watts. 2004. 3 - 4 No – fits 2002 Association for Campaign (1994 - UK) (1980– Netherlands) “Institutionalizing Virtual and starts Human Rights in – diaspora Kurdistan West: Transnational but never Kurdistan (1991 – Labour Solidarity with Networks and Ethnic Contention meets Germany) – Kurds (2014) – British British-Kurdish in International Affairs,” in Joel threshold. diaspora/inactive Labour Party members – Friendship Society Migdal (ed.), Boundaries and ISIS focus only (1980 – UK) - ?? Belonging: States and Societies in Kurdish Human the Struggle to Shape Identities Kurds/1980- Rights Project Nottingham Kurdish and Local Practice. New York: 2002 (Turkey) (1992 – UK) – Solidarity (2014 – UK) – Cambridge University Press, pp. inactive 2011 Scottish Solidarity with 121-148. Kurdistan (2014 – European Scotland) Organization for Human Rights in Kurdistan Solidarity Kurdistan (1992 - Ireland (1993 – Ireland) ??) – diaspora/inactive International Peace in Kurdistan International International Nicole Watts. 2004. No – fits 2000 Kurds/1985- Association for Campaign (1994 - UK) Association for Support Kurds in “Institutionalizing Virtual and starts 2000 (Syria) Human Rights in Human Rights in Syria Association Kurdistan West: Transnational but never Kurdistan (1991 – Labour Solidarity with Kurdistan (1991 – (2009 – UK) Networks and Ethnic Contention meets

180 Germany) – Kurds (2014) – British Germany) – in International Affairs,” in Joel threshold. diaspora/inactive Labour Party members – diaspora/inactive Migdal (ed.), Boundaries and ISIS focus only Belonging: States and Societies in Kurdish Human Kurdish Human the Struggle to Shape Identities Rights Project Nottingham Kurdish Rights Project (1992 and Local Practice. New York: (1992 – UK) – Solidarity (2014 – UK) – – UK) – inactive Cambridge University Press, pp. inactive 2011 Scottish Solidarity with 2011 121-148. Kurdistan (2014 – European Scotland) European Organization for Organization for Human Rights in Kurdistan Solidarity Human Rights in Kurdistan (1992 - Ireland (1993 – Ireland) Kurdistan (1992 - ??) ??) – – diaspora/inactive diaspora/inactive International Peace in Kurdistan Kurdistan Committee Nicole Watts. 2004. No 1993 Association for Campaign (1994 - UK) (~1980s– “Institutionalizing Virtual Human Rights in Netherlands) – Kurdistan West: Transnational Kurdistan (1991 – Labour Solidarity with diaspora Networks and Ethnic Contention Germany) – Kurds (2014) – British in International Affairs,” in Joel diaspora/inactive Labour Party members – British-Kurdish Migdal (ed.), Boundaries and ISIS focus only Friendship Society Belonging: States and Societies in Kurdish Human (n/a – UK) the Struggle to Shape Identities Kurds/1988- Rights Project Nottingham Kurdish and Local Practice. New York: 1993 (Iraq) (1992 – UK) – Solidarity (2014 – UK) – Cambridge University Press, pp. inactive 2011 Scottish Solidarity with 121-148. Kurdistan (2014 – European Scotland) Organization for Human Rights in Kurdistan Solidarity Kurdistan (1992 - Ireland (1993 – Ireland) ??) – diaspora/inactive None Friends of Lebanon (2006 None 0 No 2000 Lebanese/ – UK) 1997-2000

Malawis/ None Malawi Support Group - None 0 No 1993

181 1992-1993 ?? Christian focused

Friends of Malawi (USA) -

Malaysians/ None Friends of Malaysia (USA) None 0 No 1991 1987-1991 Malaysians/ None Friends of Malaysia None 0 No 2000 1996-2000 (USA) Coalition against None None 1 No 1990 Slavery in Mauritanians/19 Mauritania & 89-1990 Sudan (1995 – USA) Religious Task Mexico Solidarity None Kathryn Sikkink. 1993. “Human 3 No 1984 Force on Central Network (1998 – US) Rights, Principled Issue- America & Mexico Networks, and Sovereignty in Mexicans/ (1980) London Mexico Solidarity Latin America .” International 1982-1984 (UK) Organization . Vol. 47, No. 3, pp. 411-441. Cambridge-Mexico Solidarity (2014 - UK) Force on Central Mexico Solidarity None Kathryn Sikkink. 1993. “Human 3 No 2003 America & Mexico Network (1998 – US) Rights, Principled Issue- (1980) Networks, and Sovereignty in Mexicans/ London Mexico Solidarity Latin America .” International 1994-2003 (UK) Organization . Vol. 47, No. 3, pp. 411-441. Cambridge-Mexico Solidarity (2014 - UK) None Mon National League For None 0 No 2000 Mons/ Solidarity (USA) - 1988-2000 diaspora

182 Association for the Friends of Morocco (USA) Committee for Sieglinde Granzer. 1999. 3 No 1994 Support of Defense of Human “Changing Discourse: Committees against Rights in Morocco Transnational Advocacy Repression in (1979) – diaspora? Networks in Tunisia and Morocco (1972 – Morocco,” In Thomas Risse, Moroccans/ France) Coordinating Stephen Ropp and Kathryn 1990-1994 Committee against Sikkink (eds.). The Power of Repression in Human Rights: International Morocco (1972 – Norms and Domestic Change . France) New York: Cambridge University Press, pp. 109-133. None Canada Nepal Solidarity None 0 No 1987 for Peace (??) Nepalese/

1986-1987 Friends of Nepal (USA, Australia) None Friends of Nepal (USA, None 1 No 2003 Australia) Nepalese/

1999-2003 Canada Nepal Solidarity for Peace (??) Association National Network in Sharon Nepstad. 2004. 100s+ Yes 1979 Solidarity Solidarity with the Convictions of the Soul: Religion, Luxembourg Nicaraguan People Culture and Agency in the Nicaragua (n/a – (1979) – coalition of Central America Solidarity Luxembourg) 60+ groups in US Movement . New York: Oxford University Press. Nicaraguans/197 Canadian Action for 8-1979 Nicaragua (1979) – coalition of 25 orgs. Christian Smith. 1996. Resisting Reagan: the US Central America Nicaragua Solidarity Peace Movement. Chicago: Campaign (1978 – University of Chicago Press. UK) None We Stand in Solidarity None 0 No 1991 Nigerians/ with Nigeria (2015) 1988-1991

183 Friends of Nigeria (1996 – USA) None We Stand in Solidarity None 0 No 2000 with Nigeria (2015) Nigerians/

1994-2000 Friends of Nigeria (1996 – USA) None End Nuba Genocide None Samuel Totten and Amanda 0 No 1997 Coalition (??) Gryzb (eds.). 2015. Conflict in the Nuba Mountains: From Genocide Nuba Survival Foundation by Attrition to the Contemporary (UK) Crisis in Sudan . New York: Nuba/ Routledge. 1989-1997 Mark Bradbury. 1998. “Sudan: International Responses to War in the Nuba Mountains.” Review of African Political Economy . No. 77, pp. 463-474. None End Nuba Genocide None Samuel Totten and Amanda 0 No 2003 Coalition (??) Gryzb (eds.). 2015. Conflict in the Nuba Mountains: From Genocide Nuba Survival Foundation by Attrition to the Contemporary (UK) Crisis in Sudan . New York: Nuba/ Routledge. 2002-2003 Mark Bradbury. 1998. “Sudan: International Responses to War in the Nuba Mountains.” Review of African Political Economy . No. 77, pp. 463-474. None Ogoni Solidarity Network None Clifford Bob. 2005. The 2 No 2000 (Canada) Marketing of Rebellion: Ogonis/ Insurgents, Media and 1994-2000 Ogoni Solidarity Ireland International Activism . New (Ireland) York: Cambridge University Press.

184 None Movement for Solidarity Pakistan Committee 0 No 1988 and Peace in Pakistan for Democracy & Pakistanis/ (2011 – Pakistan) Justice (1979) – 1979-1988 diaspora coalition.

None Pakistan Committee 0 No 2000 Pakistanis/ for Democracy & 1991-2000 Justice (1979) – diaspora coalition. European Palestine Solidarity Palestine Human Ben White. 2009. Israeli 100s+ Yes 2001 Association for Campaign (1982 – UK) – Rights Campaign Apartheid: A Beginner’s Guide . NGOs Working on 62 Branches (n/a) London: Pluto Press. Palestine (1992 – http://www.palestinecampa Belgium) ign.org/get- Palestine Solidarity Abigail Bakan and Yasmeen Abu- involved/branches/ Committee (1975) – Laban. 2009. “Palestinian Al Awda – 12 affiliate groups Resistance and International Palestine Right of Coalition against Israeli Solidarity: the BDS Campaign,” Return Coalition Apartheid (Canada) Search for Justice & Race & Class , Vol. 51, No. 1, pp. (n/a – USA) Equality in Palestine 29-54. Students against Israeli (1976) Palestine Human Apartheid (Canada) Omar Barghouti. 2011. BDS: Rights Campaign International Boycott, Divestment, Sanctions: Palestinians/ (1977 – USA) US Campaign to End Committee on The Global Struggle for 1986-2000 Israeli Occupation - ~400 Palestinian Human Palestinian Rights . Chicago: International member groups: Rights (1975 – Haymarket Books. Committee of http://www.endtheoccupati France) – 6 chapters Solidarity with the on.org/groups.php?sortby= in Europe & Palestinian People &modin=&state=&bydate Australia. (n/a) =2012-09- 01&search=Search British Anti-Zionist Organization, Palestine Solidarity Australian Friends of (1975 – UK) Palestine

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185 British Committee for the Universities for Palestine

Ireland Palestine Solidarity Campaign

Scottish Palestine Solidarity Campaign Students for Justice in Palestine

Canadians for Justice & Peace in the Middle East Committee for the Free West Papua Committee for Self- Peter King. 2004. West Papua & 15 Yes 2004 Aid to West Papuan Campaign (Australia) Determination West Indonesia since Suharto : Refugees (1977) Papua/West New Independence, Autonomy or Freedom Flotilla for West Guinea (1961 – Chaos (2004). Sydney: UNSW Papua Netherlands) Press.

Australian West Papua Martin Pelcher. 2012. “Fear, Association Grief and Hope in Occupied West Papua,” IC Magazine . Free West Papua https://intercontinentalcry.org/fear Collective -grief-and-hope-in-occupied- Papuans/ west-papua/ 1985-2003 West Papua Solidarity Group (Australia) Jason MacLeod. 2013. “What Kind of Solidarity for West Australians for a Free Papua,” IC Magazine (2013). West Papua https://intercontinentalcry.org/wh at-kind-of-solidarity-for-west- Surfers for West Papua papua/ (Australia)

Free West Papua Action Group (Australia)

186 West Papua Action Network (USA)

East Timor & Indonesia Solidarity Network (USA)

Free West Papua Campaign Netherlands (Netherlands)

West Papua Action Network (Canada)

Free West Papua Campaign France

Free West Papua Campaign Germany

West Papua Action Ireland (1996) None Friends of Paraguay (1987 Paraguay Watch (n/a) 6 No 1988 – USA) – informal coalition

Solidarity Committee in Support of the People of Paraguay (1982 – France) Paraguayans/19 85-1988 Paraguay Working Group (1976 – West Germany)

Committee in Solidarity with the Paraguayan People (n/a – Sweden)

187

Paraguay Information and Solidarity Center (n/a – Switzerland)

Paraguay Committee for Human Rights (1978 – UK) None Peru Support Group (1983 Peru Solidarity See list of orgs James Brooke. 1991. “Shining 12+ Yes 1983 – UK) Committee (1979) here: Path Supporters Abroad Anger Peru,” New York Times . Solidarity Peru (2003 – http://www.larouc http://www.nytimes.com/1991/12/ USA) – humanitarian hepub.com/eiw/pu 18/world/shining-path-supporters- blic/1992/eirv19n abroad-anger-peru.html Canadian Friends of Peru – 39- humanitarian/development 19921002/eirv19n 39- 19921002_044- shining_paths_op eratives_abroad.p df

Peruvians Committee in /1983-2000 Defense of Human Rights in Peru (Belgium)

Committee in Support of the Peruvian People (Belgium)

French-Peruvian Committee against Repression (France)

188

Sol-Peru Committee (France, UK)

Movement for the Liberation of Peru (France)

International Solidarity Committee with the Struggle of the Peruvian People (France)

Support Group for the Liberation Struggle of the Peruvian People (Denmark)

Peru Popular Movement (Denmark)

Committee to Support the Revolution in Peru (USA)

Solidarity with Peru Group (USA)

Peru Popular Movement in

189 Switzerland (Switzerland) Polish Peace Polish Solidarity None Giles Hart. 1993. For Our 1 No 1986 Committee (n/a) - Campaign of Great Britain Freedom and Yours: A History of ?? (1980 – UK) the Polish Solidarity Campaign of Great Britain 1980 – 1994. Poles/ London: Polish Solidarity 1982-1986 Campaign.

European Roma Roma Support Group None Melanie Ram. 2010. “Interests, 1 No 1998 Rights Centre (1996 (1998 – UK) – Roma Norms and Advocacy: Explaining Roma/ – Hungary) migrants in UK; diaspora. the Emergence of the Roma onto 1993-1998 the EU’s Agenda,” Ethnopolitics , Vol. 9, No. 2, pp. 197-217. None Committee for 0 No 1980 Human Rights in Rumania (1976) - formed by Hungarian Americans

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Romanians/ None None 0 No 1990 1989-1990 Romanians/ None None 0 No 1998 1993-1998 None Committee for Matthew Evangelista. 1999. 1 No 1990 Soviets/ Defense of Soviet Unarmed Forces: The 1976-1990 Political Prisoners Transnational Movement to End (1972) – exile org? the Cold War . Ithaca, New York:

190 Cornell University Press. Scientists for Orlov & Shcharansky (1978) – national org of scientists Russians/ None None 0 No 2000 1991-2000 Rwandans/ None None 0 No 1991 1990-1991 None None Samantha Power. 2002. A 0 No 2000 Rwandans Problem from Hell: America and /1994-2000 the Age of Genocide . New York: Basic Books. None Western Sahara Campaign Saharan Peoples Maria Stephan and Jacob Mundy. 9 Yes 1984 (UK – 1984) Support Committee 2006. “A Battlefield (1977) Transformed: From Guerrilla Western Sahara Resource Resistance to Mass Nonviolent Watch Portuguese Struggle in the Western Sahara,” Committee to Journal of Military and Strategic Free Western Sahara Support the Polisario Studies , Vol. 8, No. 3. Network Front (n/a – Portugal) http://jmss.org/jmss/index.php/jm ss/article/view/132/148 Saharawis Western Sahara Solidarity Sarahan People’s /1990-1994 Group (Belgium) Support Committee Stephen Zunes. 2006. “Western of Switzerland (1977 Sahara: The Other Occupation,” Norwegian Support – Switzerland) Tikkun . Committee for Western http://www.tikkun.org/article.php/ Sahara (1993 – Norway) Zunes-westernsahara-the-other- occupation Western Sahara Action Ireland (

None Broad Movement of Sharon Nepstad. 2004. 100s+ Yes 1980 Solidarity with the Convictions of the Soul: Religion, Salvadorans/197 Salvadorean People Culture and Agency in the 7-1996 (1977) Central America Solidarity Movement . New York: Oxford

191 Committee for University Press. Progressive Salvadoreans (1975) Christian Smith. 1996. Resisting – diaspora Reagan: the US Central America Peace Movement. Chicago: Religious Task Force University of Chicago Press. for El Salvador (1980)

Salvadorean- American Human Rights Committee (1980) – diaspora

Guatemala-El Salvador Committee (n/a – Sweden)

El Salvador Solidarity Campaign (n/a – UK)

El Salvador Committee for Human Rights (1981/2 – UK)

Saudis/ None None 0 No 1989 1989-1989 Saudis/ None None 0 No 2000 1998-2000 Serbs/ None None 0 No 1998 1995-1998 Shans/1988- None None 0 No 2000 2000 Shi'is (Iraq) None None 0 No 1993 /1988-1993

192 Shi'is None None 0 No 2000 (Saudi)/1998- 2000 Sierra Leoneans/ None None 0 No 2000 1998-2000 None Sikh Coalition (2001 – None 0 No 2000 Sikhs/ USA) – diaspora 1988-2000

None Somali Solidarity None 0 No 1990 Somalis/1988- Campaign (2011 – 1990 Somalia) International Friends of the Korean 2 No 1983 Committee of People (1978) – Lawyers for diaspora? Democracy and Human Rights in North American South South Korean Coalition for Human Koreans/1982- (1976) Rights in Korea 1983 (1975) – coalition of 36 Canadian and US church groups & Synagogue Council of America International Friends of the Korean 2 No 1986 Committee of People (1978) – Lawyers for diaspora? Democracy and Human Rights in North American South South Korean Coalition for Human Koreans/1986- (1976) Rights in Korea 1986 (1975) – coalition of 36 Canadian and US church groups & Synagogue Council of America

193 Coalition against Sudan Advocacy Action None Allen Hertzke. 2004. God’s 4 No 1997 Slavery in Form Children: The Unlikely Alliance Mauritania and for Global Rights . Lanham: Sudan (1995) Canadian Aid for Southern Rowman & Littlefield. Sudan Southern Stephan Hamberg. 2013. Sudanese/ Canadians Against Slavery “Transnational Advocacy 1989-1997 Networks, Rebel Groups, and Demobilization of Child Soldiers in Sudan,” in Jeffrey Checkel (ed.), Transnational Dynamics of Civil War . New York: Cambridge University Press, pp. 149-172. Sri Lanka Campaign for None 1 No 2000 Sri Lankans/ Peace & Justice (2009 – 1985-2000 UK) Coalition against None 1 No 1985 Sudanese Slavery in /1983-1985 Mauritania and Sudan (1995) Coalition against None 1 No 1997 Sudanese Slavery in /1989-1997 Mauritania and Sudan (1995) Coalition against None 1 No 2003 Sudanese/ Slavery in 2002-2003 Mauritania and Sudan (1995) None Syria Support Group (USA None 1 No 2000 – State Department)

Syrians/ Syria Solidarity 1985-2000 Movemenet (2012)

Save Syria (USA) - diaspora

194 Tajiks/1996- None None 0 No 1999 1999 None Tamil Solidarity (UK – Eelam Tamils 1 No 2000 2009) Association of America (1979) – diaspora

Sri Lanka Information Group Tamils/1985- (1977 – Netherlands) 2000

Tamil Rights Group (n/a – UK)

Tamil Action Committee (n/a – UK) None Union of Democratic 0 No 1987 Thais (1976) – diaspora Thailand/ 1986-1987 Thailand Information and Solidarity Committee (1977 – West Germany) Tibet Justice Center Bay Area Friends of Tibet None See list here: John Roberts and Elizabeth 100+ Yes 1988 (1989 – USA) Roberts. 2009. Freeing Tibet: 50 Boston Tibet Network http://tibetnetwor Years of Struggle, Resilience and International k.org/find-a-tibet- Hope . New York: AMACOM. Campaign for Tibet Canada Tibet Committee group/ Tibetans (1988 – USA) Margarat McLagan. 1996. /1986-2002 Colorado Friends of Tibet Mobilizing for Tibet: International Tibet Transnational Politics and Network (n/a – UK) International Campaign for Diaspora Culture in the Post- Tibet (US, Europe) Cold War Era . PhD Dissertation, Committee of 100 New York University. for Tibet (1992 – San Diego Friends of Tibet

195 USA) John Powers. 2000. “The Free Students for a Free Tibet Tibet Movement: A Selective World Artists for (US, Canada, UK, France) Narrative,” in Christopher Queen Tibet (n/a) Western Colorado Friends (ed.), Engaged Buddhism in the of Tibet West . Boston: Wisdom Students for a Free Publications. Tibet International Free Tibet (1994 – USA) Les Amis du Tibet (Belgium, Luxembourg)

Save Tibet Austria

Tibet Support Group Adelaid

Tibet Support Group Western Australia Togolese/ None None 0 No 1999 1999-1999 Trinidad & None None 0 No 2000 Tobago/ 1998-2000 None US Committee For Sieglinde Granzer. 1999. 0 No 1987 Public Liberties in “Changing Discourse: Tunisia (1978) Transnational Advocacy Networks in Tunisia and Morocco,” In Thomas Risse, Tunisians/ Stephen Ropp and Kathryn 1986-1987 Sikkink (eds.). The Power of Human Rights: International Norms and Domestic Change . New York: Cambridge University Press, pp. 109-133. None US Committee For Sieglinde Granzer. 1999. 0 Tunisians/1991- Public Liberties in “Changing Discourse: 2000 Tunisia (1978) Transnational Advocacy

196 Networks in Tunisia and Morocco,” In Thomas Risse, Stephen Ropp and Kathryn Sikkink (eds.). The Power of Human Rights: International Norms and Domestic Change . New York: Cambridge University Press, pp. 109-133. Turkmenistani/ None None 0 No 1998 1997-1998 Turks/1980- None None 0 No 1998 2002 Tutsis/1990- None None 0 No 1991 1991 Tutsis/1994- None None 0 No 2000 2000 Tutsis/1994- None None 0 No 2000 2000 Tutsis/1996- None None 0 No 2000 2000 None None Hans Peter Schmitz. 1999. 0 No 1985 “Transnational Activism and Political Change in Kenya and Uganda,” In Thomas Risse, Ugandans/1984- Stephen Ropp and Kathryn 1985 Sikkink (eds.). The Power of Human Rights: International Norms and Domestic Change . New York: Cambridge University Press, pp. 39-77. Uighurs None Uyghur Human Rights None 1 No 2002 (Turkmen)/1986 Project (2004 – USA) - -2002 diaspora None Smoloskyp 0 No 1997 Ukrainians/ Organization for the 1995-1997 Defense of Human Rights in the Ukraine

197 (1968) – diaspora?

Committee for the Defense of Human Rights in Ukraine (1978) – diaspora?

World Congress of Free Ukrainians, Human Rights Commission (1976) - diaspora None Uruguay Information 7 No 1984 Group (1976)

Uruguay Information Project (1976) – diaspora?

Uruguayan Coordination o Solidarity in Italy (1977 – committees across the country) Uruguayans/

1975-1984 Uruguay Association (n/a _ Sweden) – diaspora?

Uruguay Committee (n/a – Sweden) – diaspora?

Uruguay Information and Solidarity Group (n/a – Switzerland)

198 Committee for Human Rights in Uruguay (n/a – UK) Uzbeks/1993- None None 0 No 1995 1995 Uzbeks/1996- None None 0 No 1999 1999 Uzbeks/1999- None None 0 No 2000 2000 International Committee for the 0 No 1993 Committee for a Defense of Political Free Vietnam (1986 Prisoners in Vietnam – Belgium) - ?? (1978) – diaspora Vietnamese/

1990-1993 Free Vietnam Movement for Alliance (1990 – Human Rights in France) - ?? Vietnam (1976) – diaspora? None Committee to Aid 1 No 1990 Yugoslavs/ Democratic 1981-1990 Dissidents in Yugoslavia (1979) None UK Zapatista Network – 7 Clifford Bob. 2005. The 11 Yes 1995 branches. Marketing of Rebellion: Insurgents, Media and Mexico Solidarity International Activism . New Network (1998 – US) York: Cambridge University Press. Canadian Solidarity Zapatistas/ Alliance for the Zapatistas Thomas Olesen. 2005. 1994-2003 International Zapatismo: The Edinburgh Chiapas Construction of Solidarity in the Solidarity Group Age of Globalization. London: Zed Books. Chiapas Coalition

199

None Association of David Black. 1999. “The Long 10+ Yes XXXX Concerned Africa and Winding Road: International Scholars (1977) Norms and Domestic Political Change in South Africa.” In Holland Committee Thomas Risse, Stephen Ropp and on Southern Africa Kathryn Sikkink (eds.). The (1961 – Netherlands) Power of Human Rights: International Norms and Norwegian Council Domestic Change . New York: for Southern African Cambridge University Press, pp. (1967 – Netherlands) 78-108.

International Defence and Aid Fund for Southern Africa (1956 – UK)

Zimbabweans/ Chicago Committee 1985-1986 for African Liberation Southern Africa Support Group

Southern Africa Organizing Committee

Southern Africa Committee

Lutheran Coalition on Southern Africa

Madison Area Committee on Southern Africa

200

Action Committee on Southern Africa (Belgium)

Zimbabweans/ None None 0 No 2000 2000-2000

201

Appendix C: Measuring Diaspora Civil Society Mobilization

Distant rebel Homeland Mobilization Sources Score Acehnese Indonesia 0.5 Antje Missbach. 2012. Separatist Conflict in Indonesia: The Long-distance politics of the Acehnese diaspora . New York: Routledge. Afghanis Afghanistan 0.5 Jennifer Brinkerhoff. 2004. "Digital Diasporas and International Development: Afghan-Americans and the Reconstruction of Afghanistan,” Public Administration & Development . No. 24, pp. 397-413. (internet mobilization)

Leila Jazayery. 2003. "The Migration-Development Nexus: Afghanistan Case Study" in Nicholas Van Hear and Ninna Nyberg Sorenson (eds.). The Migration- Development Nexus . Geneva: International Organization for Migration, pp. 207-232. (remittances)

Shah Mahmoud Hanifi. 2006. "Material and Social Remittances to Afghanistan.” In C. Wescott and J. Brinkheroff (eds.), Converting Migration Drains into Gains: Harnessing the Resources of Overseas Professionals . Manilla: Asian Development Bank, pp. 98-126.

Carolin Fischer. 2013. "Afghan Diasporas in Britain and Germany." In Tan Tai Yong and Md Mizanur Rahman (eds.), Diaspora Engagement and Development in South Asia . New York: Palgrave MacMillan, pp. 56-74. Ahmadis Pakistan 1 Marzi Balzani. 2006. “Transnational Marriage Among Ahmadi Muslims in UK.” Global Networks , Vol. 6 No. 4, pp. 147-157. Albanians Albania 1 Paul Hockenos. 2003. Homeland Calling: Exile

202

Patriotism and the Balkan Wars . Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press.

Maria Koinova. 2013. “Four Types of Diaspora Mobilization: Albanian Diaspora Activism For Kosovo Independence in the US and the UK,” Foreign Policy Analysis . Vol. 9, No. 4, pp. 433-453. Algerians Algeria 0.5 Michael Collyer. 2006. “Transnational Political Participation of Algerians in France: Extra-territorial Civil Society Versus Transnational Governmentality,” Political Geography , No. 25, pp. 836-849.

Michael Collyer. 2003. “Are there National Borders in Cyberspace? Evidence from the Algerian Transnational Community,” Geography , Vol. 88 No. 4, pp. 348-356.

Paul Silverstein. 2004 Algeria in France: Transpolitics, Race, and Nation . Bloomington: Indiana University Press. Argentinians Argentina 0.5 Benedetta Calandra. 2013. “Exile and Diaspora in an Atypical Context: Chileans and Argentinians in the United States (1973-2005), Bulletin of Latin American Research , Vol. 32, No. 3, pp. 311-324. Armenians Azerbaijan 1 Khachig Toloyan. 2000. “Elites and Institutions in the Armenian Transnation,” Diaspora: A Journal of Transnational Studies . Vol. 9 No. 1, pp. 107-136.

Yossi Shain. 2002. “The Role of Diasporas in Conflict Perpetuation or Resolution,” SAIS Review . Vol. 22 No. 2, pp. 115-144.

David King & Miles Pomper, “The US Congress and Contingent Influence of Diaspora Lobbies: Lessons from US Policy Toward Armenia and Azerbaijan,” Journal of Armenian Studies (2004). Azerbaijan Azerbaijanis 0 David King and Miles Pomper. 2004. “The US

203

Congress and Contingent Influence of Diaspora Lobbies: Lessons from US Policy Toward Armenia and Azerbaijan.” Journal of Armenian Studies Vol. 8, No. 1.

Sergey Rumyansev. 2012. “Diaspora-Building in Post- Soviet Azerbaijan,” CARIM-East Explanatory Note http://www.carim- east.eu/media/exno/Explanatory%20Notes_2012- 35.pdf Bahrainis Bahrain 0.5 Claire Beugrand. 2008. “The Return of the Bahraini Exiles (2001-2006): The Impact of the Ostracization Experience on the Opposition’s Restructuring,” BRIMES Annual Conference. https://halshs.archives- ouvertes.fr/file/index/docid/511588/filename/The_Ret urn_of_the_Bahraini_Exiles.pdf Bangladeshis Bangladeshi 0.5 David Garbin. 2005. “Bangladeshi Diaspora in the UK: Some Observations on socio-cultural dynamics, religious trends, and transnational politics,” Conference on Human Rights & Bangladesh . https://www.surrey.ac.uk/cronem/files/BE04B01Ed01. pdf Belarussians Belarus 1 Andrei Yeliseyeu. 2014. “Emigration and Diaspora Policies in Belarus,” Interact Research Report. http://cadmus.eui.eu/bitstream/handle/1814/33140/inte ract-rr-2014%20-%2027.pdf?sequence=1 Black South South Africa 0 Roger Fieldhouse. 2005. Anti-Apartheid: A History of Africans the Movement in Britain: A Study in Pressure Group Politics . London: Merlin.

Rob Skinner. 2010. The Foundations of Anti- Apartheid: Liberal Humanitarians the Transnational Activists in Britain and the United States, c. 1919- 1964 . New York: Palgrave MacMillan.

Hakan Thorn. 2006. Anti-Apartheid and the Emergence of a Global Civil Society . Basingstoke:

204

Palgrave MacMillan. Bolivians Bolivia 0 No sources found Bosnians Bosnia- 0 Hariz Halilovich. 2012. “Trans-local Communities in Herzegovina the Age of Transnationalism: Bosnians in Diaspora,” International Migration , Vol. 50 No. 1, pp. 162-178.

Sheri Fink. 1996. “The Anti-Genocide Movement on American College Campuses: A Growing Response to the Balkan War,” in Thomas Cushman and Stjepan Mestrovic (eds.) This Time We Knew: Western Responses to Genocide in Bosnia . New York: New York University Press, pp. 313-349. Brazilians Brazil 0 Beatriz Padilla. 2011. “Engagement Policies and Practices: Expanding the Citizenship of the Brazilian Diaspora,” International Migration . Vol. 49, No. 3, pp. 10-29.

James Green. 2003. “Clerics, Exiles and Academics: Opposition to the Brazilian Military Dictatorship in the United States, 1969-1974.” Latin American Politics and Society , Vol. 45, No. 1, pp. 87-117. Brazilians Brazil 0 Beatriz Padilla. 2011. “Engagement Policies and Practices: Expanding the Citizenship of the Brazilian Diaspora,” International Migration . Vol. 49, No. 3, pp. 10-29.

James Green. 2003. “Clerics, Exiles and Academics: Opposition to the Brazilian Military Dictatorship in the United States, 1969-1974.” Latin American Politics and Society , Vol. 45, No. 1, pp. 87-117. Burmese Myanmar 0.5 Ardeth Maung Thawnghmung. 2005. “Recylcing Home Politics: The Burmese diaspora in North America,” APSA Annual Meeting Conference Paper.

David Williams. 2012. “Changing Burma from Without: Political Activism Among the Burmese

205

Diaspora,” Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies , Vol. 19, No. 1, pp. 121-142. Burundians Burundi 0.5 Simon Turner. 2008. “The Waxing and Waning of the Political Field in Burundi and its Diaspora,” Ethnic & Racial Studies . Vol. 31, No. 4, pp. 742-765. Cambodians Cambodia 0 Elyda Mey. 2008. “Cambodian Diaspora Communities in Transitional Justice,” Briefing Paper for the International Center for Transitional Justice . New York. https://www.ictj.org/sites/default/files/ICTJ- Cambodia-Diaspora-Justice-2008-English.pdf Chechens Russia 0 Maria Koinova. 2011. “Diasporas and Secessionist Conflicts: The Mobilization of the Armenian, Albanian and Chechen Diasporas,” Ethnic & Racial Studies , Vol. 43, No. 2, pp. 333-356.

Gail Lapidus. 1998. “Contested Sovereignty: The Tragedy of Chechnya.” International Security . Vol. 23, No. 1, pp. 5-49 Chileans Chile 0.5 Benedetta Calandra. 2013. “Exile and Diaspora in an Atypical Context: Chileans and Argentinians in the United States (1973-2005), Bulletin of Latin American Research , Vol. 32, No. 3, pp. 311-324.

Mario Sznajder and Luis Roniger. 2007. “Exile Communities and their Differential Institutional Dynamics: A Comparative Analysis of the Chilean and Uruguayan Political Diasporas,” Revista de Ciencia Politica, Vol. 27, No. 1, pp. 43-66.

Thomas Wright and & Rudy Onate Zuniga. 2007. “Chilean Political Exile.” Latin American Perspectives , Vol. 34, No. 4, pp. 37-49. Chileans Chile 1 Thomas Wright and Rody Onate. 2005. “The Chilean (1998-2000) Diaspora.” In Melvin Ember, Carol Ember and Ian Skoggard (eds.) Encyclopaedia of Diasporas: Immigrant and Refugee Cultures Around the World, Vol. 1-2. Springer, pp. 57-64.

206

Chinese China 1 Gabriel Sheffer. 2003. Diaspora Politics: At Home Abroad . New York: Cambridge University Press.

Yossi Shain. 1999. Marketing the American Creed Abroad: Diasporas in the US and Their Homelands . New York: Cambridge University Press.

Jie Chen. 2014. “The Overseas Chinese Democracy Movement: An Exploration of Its Development, Impacts and Further Research, “ 11th International Conference of the International Society for Third Section Research.

Jie Chen. 2014. “The Overseas Chinese Democracy Movement after Thirty Years,” Asian Survey . Vol. 54, No. 3, pp. 445-470. Colombians Colombia 0 Michael Collier and Eduardo Gamarra. 2003 “The Colombian Diaspora in South Florida: A Report of the Colombian Studies Institute’s Colombian Diaspora Project,” Paper presented at Latin America Studies Association meeting. Dallas, Texas.

Virginia Bouvier. 2007. “A Reluctant Diaspora? The Case of Colombia,” in Hazel Smith and Paul Stares (eds.) Diasporas in Conflict: Peace-Makers or Peace- Wreckers? New York: United Nations University. Congolese DRC 1 David Garbin and Marie Godin. 2013. “’Saving the Congo’: Transnational Social Fields and Politics of Home in the Congolese Diaspora,” African and Black Diaspora: An International Journal , Vol. 6 No. 2, pp. 113-130. Cubans Cuba 0.5 Yossi Shain. 1994-5. “Ethnic Diasporas and US Foreign Policy,” Political Science Quarterly . Vol. 109, No. 5, pp. 811-841.

Trevor Rubenzer. 2008. “Ethnic Minority Interest Group Attributes and US Foreign Policy Influence: A

207

Qualitative Comparative Analysis,” Foreign Policy Analysis . Vol. 4, No. 2, pp. 755-777.

Maria de los Angeles Torres. 1995 “Encuentros y Encontronazos: Homeland in the Politics and Identity of the Cuban Diaspora,” Diaspora: A Journal of Transnational Studies . Vol. 4. No. 2, pp. 211-238. Cypriots Cyprus 1 Fiona Adamson and Madeleine Demetriou. 2007. “Remapping the Boundaries of ‘State’ and ‘National Identity’: Incorporation Diasporas into IR Theorizing,” European Journal of International Relations . Vol. 13, No. 4, pp. 489-526. Darfuris Sudan 0 Alexandra Cosima Budabin, “Diaspora as Development Partners? The Alliance Between the Darfuri Diaspora and the Save Darfur Coalition,” Third World Quarterly (2014) (notes that Darfur diaspora mobilization in the US did not take up place until 2003) Darfuris Sudan 0.5 Alexandra Cosma Budabin. 2014. “Diasporas as Development Partners for Peace? The Alliance Between the Darfuri Diaspora and the Save Darfur Coalition,” Third World Quarterly . Vol. 35, No. 1, pp. 163-180. East Timorese Indonesia 0.5 Amanda Wise. 2004. “Nation, Transnation, Diaspora: Locating East Timorese Long-distance Nationalism,” Sojourn : Journal of Social Issues in Southeast Asia. Vol. 19, No. 2, pp. 151-180.

Federer, Juan. 2005. The UN in East Timor: Building Timor Leste, a fragile state . Darwin: Charles Darwin University. Egyptians Egypt 0.5 Isik Kuscu. 2012. “The Egyptian American Diaspora During and in the Aftermath of the Egyptian Revolution of 2011.” Ortadogu Etutleri . Vol. 4, No. 1 pp. 121-142.

Omar Ashour. 2010. “El Baradei and the Mobilization

208

of the Egyptian Diaspora,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. http://carnegieendowment.org/sada/?fa=41631 . Filipinos Philippines 0 Fuenticilla, Jose. 2013. Fighting From a Distance: How Filipino Exiles Helped Topple a Dictator . Chicago: University of Illinois Press.

Greeks Albania 1 Yossi Shain. 1994-5. “Ethnic Diasporas and US Foreign Policy,” Political Science Quarterly . Vol. 109, No. 5, pp. 811-841.

Anastasia Panagakos. 1998. “Citizens of the Trans- Nation: Political Mobilization, Multiculturalism, and Nationalism in the Greek Diaspora,” Diaspora: A Journal of Transnational Studies Vol. 7, No. 1 pp. 53- 73. Greeks Greece 1 Yossi Shain. 1994-5. “Ethnic Diasporas and US Foreign Policy,” Political Science Quarterly . Vol. 109, No. 5, pp. 811-841.

Anastasia Panagakos. 1998. “Citizens of the Trans- Nation: Political Mobilization, Multiculturalism, and Nationalism in the Greek Diaspora,” Diaspora: A Journal of Transnational Studies Vol. 7, No. 1 pp. 53- 73. Guatemalans Guatemala 0 No sources found Haitians Haiti 0.5 Yossi Shain. 1994-5. “Ethnic Diasporas and US Foreign Policy,” Political Science Quarterly . Vol. 109, No. 5, pp. 811-841.

Yossi Shain. 1999. Marketing the American Creed Abroad: Diasporas in the US and Their Homelands . New York: Cambridge University Press. Hazaras Afghanistan 0 Zuzanna Olszweska. 2013. “Quetta’s Sectarian Violence and the Global Hazara Awakening,” Middle East Research and Information Project.

209

http://www.merip.org/mer/mer266/quettas-sectarian- violence-global-hazara-awakening

Alessandro Monsutti. 2005. War and Migration: Social Networks and Economic Strategies of the Hazaras of Afghanistan . New York: Routledge. Hondurans Honduras 0 Manuel Orozco. 2007. “Central American Diasporas and Hometown Associations,” in Barbara Merz, Lincoln Chen and Peter Geithner (eds.), Diasporas and Development . Cambridge: Harvard University Press, pp. 215-253.

David Paul and Rachel Anderson Paul. 2009. Ethnic Lobbies and US Foreign Policy . Boulder: Lynne Riener Publishers. Hutus Burundi 1 Simon Turner. 2008. “Cyberwars of Words: Exressing the Unspeakable in Burundi’s Diaspora,” Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies . Vol. 34, No. 7, pp. 1161-1180.

Simon Turner. 2008. “The Waxing and Waning of the Political Field in Burundi and its Diaspora,” Ethnic & Racial Studies . Vol. 31, No. 4, pp. 742-765. Hutus DRC 0 David Garbin and Marie Godin. 2013. “’Saving the Congo’: Transnational Social Fields and Politics of Home in the Congolese Diaspora,” African and Black Diaspora: An International Journal , Vol. 6 No. 2, pp. 113-130. Indians India 1 David Paul and Rachel Anderson Paul. 2009. Ethnic Lobbies and US Foreign Policy . Boulder: Lynne Riener Publishers.

Ajay Gandhi. 2002. “The Indian Diaspora in Global Advocacy.” Global Networks . Vol. 2, No. 4, pp. 357- 362. Indigenous Mexico 0 No sources found Peoples

210

Indonesians Indonesia 0.5 Hasyim Syafiq. 2014 “Challenging a Home Country: A Preliminary Account of Indonesian Student Activism in Berlin, Germany,” Austrian Journal of South-East Asian Studies , Vol. 7, No. 2, pp. 183-198.

Edward Aspinall. 2005. Opposing Suharto: Compromise, Resistance and Regime Change in Indonesia . Stanford: Stanford University Press. Iranians Iran 0.5 Kathryn Spellman. 2004. Religion and Nation: Iranian local and Transnational Networks in Britain . New York: Berghahn Books.

David Paul and Rachel Anderson Paul. 2009. Ethnic Lobbies and US Foreign Policy . Boulder: Lynne Riener Publishers. Iraqis Iraq 0.5 Gabriel Sheffer. 2003. Diaspora Politics: At Home Abroad . New York: Cambridge University Press.

Marwa Wael Alkhairo. 2008 Iraqi Diasporic Identity Across Generations, Struggle and War . MA Thesis, Georgetown University. https://repository.library.georgetown.edu/bitstream/ha ndle/10822/552815/alkhairomarwa.pdf?s .. Karens Myanmar 0.5 Ardeth Maung Thawnghmung. 2005. “Recylcing Home Politics: The Burmese diaspora in North America,” APSA Annual Meeting Conference Paper.

Kashmiris India 1 Martin Sokefeld. 2006. “Mobilizing in Transnational Space: A Social Movement Approach to the Formation of Diaspora,” Global Networks Vol. 6, No. 3 pp. 265- 284.

Patricia Ellis & Zafar Khan. 1998. “Diasporic Mobilisation and the Kashmir Issue in British Politics,” Journal of Ethnic & Migration Studies Vol. 24, No. 3 pp. 471-488.

211

Kenyans Kenya 0 Makumi Mwagiru. 2011. “Diplomacy of the Diaspora: Harnessing Diasporas in Kenya’s Foreign Policy,” Diaspora Studies . Vol. 4, No. 1 pp. 39-58.

Hannington Ochwada. 2011. “How Kenyans in the Diaspora are Shaping Their Motherland’s Destiny,” Daily Nation . http://www.nation.co.ke/oped/Opinion/- /440808/1156990/-/view/printVersion/-/42hlps/- /index.html Kurds Iraq 1 Adamson, Fiona. 2013. Mechanisms of Diaspora Mobilization and the Transnationalization of Civil War In Transnational Dynamics of Civil War edited by Jeffrey Checkel, 63-88. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Olivier Grojean. 2011. “Bringing the Organization Back-In: Pro-Kurdish Protest in Europe,” in Marlies Casier and Joost Jongerden (eds.), Nationalisms and Politics in Turkey: Political Islam, Kemalism and the Kurdish Issue , New York: Routledge, pp. 182-196.

Bahar Baser. 2015. Diasporas & Homeland Conflicts : A Comparative Perspective. Burlington: Ashgate. Kurds Syria 1 Adamson, Fiona. 2013. Mechanisms of Diaspora Mobilization and the Transnationalization of Civil War In Transnational Dynamics of Civil War edited by Jeffrey Checkel, 63-88. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Bahar Baser. 2015. Diasporas & Homeland Conflicts : A Comparative Perspective. Burlington: Ashgate.

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Kurds Turkey 1 Adamson, Fiona. 2013. Mechanisms of Diaspora Mobilization and the Transnationalization of Civil War In Transnational Dynamics of Civil War edited by Jeffrey Checkel, 63-88. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Bahar Baser. 2015. Diasporas & Homeland Conflicts : A Comparative Perspective. Burlington: Ashgate. Lebanese Lebanon 0.5 Maria Koinova. 2011. “Can Conflict-Generated Diasporas Be Moderate Actors During Episodes of Contested Sovereignty? Lebanese and Albanian Diasporas Compared,” Review of International Studies . Vol. 37 pp. 437-462. Malawis Malawi 0 No sources found Malaysians Malaysia 0 Graeme Hugu. 2011. “Migration and Development in Malaysia: An Emigration Perspective,” Asian Population Studies . Vol. 7, No. 3 pp. 219-241. Malaysians Malaysia 0 Graeme Hugu. 2011. “Migration and Development in Malaysia: An Emigration Perspective,” Asian Population Studies . Vol. 7, No. 3 pp. 219-241. Mauritanians Mauritania 0 No sources found Mexicans Mexico 0 T Trevor Rubenzer. 2008. “Ethnic Minority Interest Group Attributes and US Foreign Policy Influence: A Qualitative Comparative Analysis,” Foreign Policy Analysis . Vol. 4, No. 2, pp. 755-777. Mexicans Mexico 0 Trevor Rubenzer. 2008. “Ethnic Minority Interest Group Attributes and US Foreign Policy Influence: A Qualitative Comparative Analysis,” Foreign Policy Analysis . Vol. 4, No. 2, pp. 755-777. Mons Myanmar 1 Ardeth Maung Thawnghmung. 2005. “Recylcing

213

Home Politics: The Burmese diaspora in North America,” APSA Annual Meeting Conference Paper. Moroccans Morocco 1 Eva Ostergaard-Nielsen. 2012 “Political Liberalization and Contestation of Transnational Relations Between Morocco and Moroccans in Spain,” in Terrence Lyons and Peter Mandaville (eds.) Politics from Afar: Transnational Diasporas and Networks . London: Hurst & Co.

Sieglinde Granzer. 1999. “Changing Discourse: Transnational Advocacy Networks in Tunisia and Morocco,” In Thomas Risse, Stephen Ropp and Kathryn Sikkink (eds.). The Power of Human Rights: International Norms and Domestic Change . New York: Cambridge University Press, pp. 109-133. Nepalese Nepal 0 Prakash Khanal. 2013. “Diaspora Volunteering and Development in Nepal,” In Tan Tai Yong and Md Mizanur Rahman (eds.), Diaspora Engagement and Development in South Asia . New York: Palgrave MacMillan. Nepalese Nepal 1 Prakash Khanal. 2013. “Diaspora Volunteering and Development in Nepal,” In Tan Tai Yong and Md Mizanur Rahman (eds.), Diaspora Engagement and Development in South Asia . New York: Palgrave MacMillan Nicaraguans Nicaragua 0 Manuel Orozco. 2008. “The Nicaraguan Diaspora: Trends and Opportunities for Diaspora Engagement in Skills Transfers and Development,” Paper Commissioned by the Office for economic Co- operation and Development . Nigerians Nigeria 0.5 Sola Akinrinade and Olukoya Ogen. 2011. “Historicising the Nigerian Diaspora: Nigerian Migrants and Homeland Relations,” Turkish Journal of Politics , Vol. 2, No. 2, pp. 71-85.

Ben Lampert. 2009. “Diaspora and Development? Nigerian Organizations in London and the

214

Transnational Politics of Belonging,” Global Networks . Vol. 9, No. 2 pp. 162-184. Nigerians Nigeria 0.5 Sola Akinrinade and Olukoya Ogen. 2011. “Historicising the Nigerian Diaspora: Nigerian Migrants and Homeland Relations,” Turkish Journal of Politics , Vol. 2, No. 2, pp. 71-85.

Ben Lampert. 2009. “Diaspora and Development? Nigerian Organizations in London and the Transnational Politics of Belonging,” Global Networks . Vol. 9, No. 2 pp. 162-184. Nuba Sudan 0 Rogaia Mustafa Abusharaf, Wanderings: Sudanese Migrants and Exiles in North America Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press. Nuba Sudan 0 Rogaia Mustafa Abusharaf, Wanderings: Sudanese Migrants and Exiles in North America Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press. Ogonis Nigeria 0.5 Clifford Bob. 2002. “Globalization and the Social Construction of Human Rights Campaigns,” in Alison Brysk (ed.), Globalization and Human Rights Berkeley: University of California Press, pp. 133-147.

Nicholas Van Hear. 2004. “The Contribution of UK- Based Diasporas to Development and Poverty Reduction, COMPAS Report . https://www.compas.ox.ac.uk/media/ER-2004- Diasporas_UK_Poverty_Reduction_DfID.pdf Pakistanis Pakistan 0.5 Nadia Mushtaq Abbasi. 2010. “The Pakistani Diaspora in Europe and its Impact on Democracy Building in Pakistan,” International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance . http://www.idea.int/resources/analysis/upload/Abbasi_ low_2-2.pdf

Pnina Werbner, “Pakistani Migration and Diaspora Religious Politics in a Global Age.” In Melvin Ember, Carol Ember and Ian Skoggard (eds.) Encyclopaedia

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of Diasporas: Immigrant and Refugee Cultures Around the World, Vol. 1-2. Springer, pp. 476-486. Pakistanis Pakistan 1 Nadia Mushtaq Abbasi. 2010. “The Pakistani Diaspora in Europe and its Impact on Democracy Building in Pakistan,” International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance . http://www.idea.int/resources/analysis/upload/Abbasi_ low_2-2.pdf

Pnina Werbner, “Pakistani Migration and Diaspora Religious Politics in a Global Age.” In Melvin Ember, Carol Ember and Ian Skoggard (eds.) Encyclopaedia of Diasporas: Immigrant and Refugee Cultures Around the World, Vol. 1-2. Springer, pp. 476-486.

David Paul and Rachel Anderson Paul. 2009. Ethnic Lobbies and US Foreign Policy . Boulder: Lynne Riener Publishers. Palestinians Israel 0.5 Abbas Shiblak (ed.). 2005. The Palestinian Diaspora in Europe: Challenges of Dual Identity & Adaptation (2005). Oxford: Refugee Studies Centre, University of Oxford. http://www.rsc.ox.ac.uk/files/publications/other/palesti nian-diaspora-europe-2005.pdf

Kathleen Christison. 1989. “The American Experience: Palestinians in the US,” Journal of Palestine Studies . Vol. 18, No. 4, pp. 18-36.

Turki, Fawaz. 1980. “The Passions of Exile: The Palestine Congress of North America,” Journal of Palestine Studies Vol, 9, No. 4, pp. 17-43.

Maria Koinova. 2014. “Why do conflict-generated diasporas pursue sovereignty-based claims through state-based or transnational channels? Armenians, Albanians and Palestinian diasporas in the UK

216

compared,” European Journal of International Relations Vol. 20, No. 4, pp. 1043-1071.

Karma Nabulsi. 2006. Palestinians Register: Laying Foundations and Setting Directions , Report of the Civitas Project. http://www.forcedmigration.org/research- resources/thematic/palestinians-register-laying- foundations-and-setting-directions Papuans Indonesia 0 No sources found Paraguayans Paraguay 0 No sources found Peruvians Peru 0 Jorge Durand and Mariana Ortega Brena. 2010. “The Peruvian Diaspora: Portrait of a Migratory Process,” Latin American Perspectives Vol. 37, No. 5, pp. 12- 28. Poles Poland 1 Mary Patrice Erdmans. 1998. Opposite Poles: Immigrants and Ethnics in Polish Chicago . Pennsylvania: Pennsylvania State Press.

Helena Znaniecka Lopata. 1994. Polish Americans . New Brunswick, New Jersey: Transaction Publishers. Roma Romania 0.5 Melanie Ram. 2010. “Interests, Norms and Advocacy: Explaining the Emergence of the Roma onto the EU’s Agenda,” Ethnopolitics , Vol. 9, No. 2, pp. 197-217. Romanians Romania 0 Gabriel Popescu. 2005. “Diaspora Geopolitics: Romanian-Americans and NATO Expansion,” Geopolitics . Vol. 10 pp. 455-481. Romanians Romania 0.5 Gabriel Popescu. 2005. “Diaspora Geopolitics: Romanian-Americans and NATO Expansion,” Geopolitics . Vol. 10 pp. 455-481. Romanians Romania 1 Gabriel Popescu. 2005. “Diaspora Geopolitics: Romanian-Americans and NATO Expansion,” Geopolitics . Vol. 10 pp. 455-481. Russians Russia 0.5 David Paul and Rachel Anderson Paul. 2009. Ethnic Lobbies and US Foreign Policy . Boulder: Lynne Riener Publishers.

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Andy Byford. 2012. “The Russian Diaspora in International Relations: ‘Compatriots’ in Britain,” Europe-Asia Studies (2012). Europe-Asia , Vol. 64, No. 4, pp. 715-735. Russians Soviet Union 0 (1976-1990) Rwandans Rwanda 0 Simon Turner. 2013 “Staging the Rwandan Diaspora: The Politics of Performance.” African Studies . Vol. 72, No. 2, pp. 265-284.

Samantha Power. 2002. A Problem from Hell: America and the Age of Genocide . New York: Basic Books. Rwandans Rwanda 0.5 Simon Turner. 2013 “Staging the Rwandan Diaspora: The Politics of Performance.” African Studies . Vol. 72, No. 2, pp. 265-284. Saharawis Morocco 0 Andre Bank & Bas Van Heur. 2007. “Transnational Conflicts and the Politics of Scalar Networks: Evidence From Northern Africa,” Third World Quarterly , Vol. 28, No. 3 pp. 593-612. Salvadorans El Salvador 0 Manuel Orozco. 2007. “Central American Diasporas and Hometown Associations,” in Barbara Merz, Lincoln Chen and Peter Geithner (eds.), Diasporas and Development . Cambridge: Harvard University Press, pp. 215-253.

Saudis Saudi Arabia 0 No sources found Saudis Saudi Arabia 0 No sources found Serbs Croatia 1 Brad Blitz. 1996. “Serbia’s War Lobby: Diaspora Groups and Western Elites,” in Thomas Cushman and Stjepan Mestrovic (eds.) This Time We Knew: Western Responses to Genocide in Bosnia . New York: New York University Press. Shans Myanmar 0 Ardeth Maung Thawnghmung. 2005. “Recylcing Home Politics: The Burmese diaspora in North

218

America,” APSA Annual Meeting Conference Paper. Shi'is Iraq 0 No sources found Shi'is Saudi Arabia 0 No sources found Sierra Sierra Leone 0.5 Robert Tynes. 2007. “Nation-building and the diaspora Leoneans on Leonenet: a case of Sierra Leone in Cyberspace,” New Media Society. Vol. 9. No. 3 pp. 497-518. Sikhs India 1 Christine Fair. 2005 “Diaspora Involvement in Insurgencies: Insights from Khalistan and Tamil Eelam Movements,” Nationalism and Ethnic Politics Vol. 11, No. 1 pp. 125-156.

Martin Sokefeld. 2006. “Mobilizing in Transnational Space: A Social Movement Approach to the Formation of Diaspora,” Global Networks Vol. 6, No. 3 pp. 265- 284. Somalis Somalia 0 Nauja Kleist. “Mobilising ‘The Diaspora’: Somali Transnational Political Engagement,” Journal of Ethnic & Migration Studies, Vol. 34, No. 2 pp. 307- 232. South South Korea 1 Yossi Shain. 1994-5. “Ethnic Diasporas and US Koreans Foreign Policy,” Political Science Quarterly . Vol. 109, No. 5, pp. 811-841.

Moon, Chung-in. 1988. “Complex Interdependence and Transnational Lobbying: South Korea in the United States. International Studies Quarterly Vol. 32, No. 1, pp. 67-89. Southern Sudan 0.5 Alexandra Cosma Budabin. 2014. “Diasporas as Sudanese Development Partners for Peace? The Alliance Between the Darfuri Diaspora and the Save Darfur Coalition,” Third World Quarterly . Vol. 35, No. 1, pp. 163-180.

Rogaia Mustafa Abusharaf, Wanderings: Sudanese Migrants and Exiles in North America Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press.

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Sri Lankans Sri Lanka 0.5 Camilla Orjuela. 2008. “Distant Warriors, Distant Peace Workers? Multiple Diaspora Roles in Sri Lanka’s Violent Conflict,” Global Networks Vol. 8, No. 4 pp. 436-452. Sudanese Sudan 0 Alexandra Cosma Budabin. 2014. “Diasporas as Development Partners for Peace? The Alliance Between the Darfuri Diaspora and the Save Darfur Coalition,” Third World Quarterly . Vol. 35, No. 1, pp. 163-180.

Rogaia Mustafa Abusharaf, Wanderings: Sudanese Migrants and Exiles in North America Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press. Sudanese Sudan 0.5 Alexandra Cosma Budabin. 2014. “Diasporas as Development Partners for Peace? The Alliance Between the Darfuri Diaspora and the Save Darfur Coalition,” Third World Quarterly . Vol. 35, No. 1, pp. 163-180.

Rogaia Mustafa Abusharaf, Wanderings: Sudanese Migrants and Exiles in North America Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press. Syrians Syria 0 Mehrunisa Qayyum. 2011 “Syrian Diaspora: Cultivating a New Public Space Consciousness,” Middle East Institute Policy Brief. No. 35. http://www.mei.edu/content/syrian-diaspora- cultivating-new-public-space-consciousness

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Tajiks Afghanistan 0 No sources found Tamils Sri Lanka 1 Wayland, Sarah. 2004. Ethnonational Networks and Transnational Opportunities: the Sri Lankan Tamil Diaspora. Review of International Studies 30:405-426.

Amarasingam, Amarnath. 2015. Pain, Pride and Politics: Social Movement Activism and the Sri Lankan Tamil Diaspora in Canada . University of Georgia Press. Thais Thailand 0 Tibetans China 1 McLagan, Margaret. 1996. Mobilizing for Tibet: Transnational Politics and Diaspora Culture in the Post-Cold War Era . PhD Dissertation. Department of Anthropology, New York University. Togolese Togo 0 Adzele K. Jones. 2009. “Togo on My Mind,” in Isidore Okpewho & Nkiru Nzegwu (eds.) The New African Diasporas . Bloomington: Indiana University Press. Trinidad & Trinidad & 0 Tobagans Tabago Tunisians Tunisia 0 Teresa Graziano. 2012. “The Tunisian diaspora: Between ‘digital riots’ and Web activism,” Social Science Information Vol. 51, No. 14 pp. 534-550. Tunisians Tunisia 0.5 Teresa Graziano. 2012. “The Tunisian diaspora: Between ‘digital riots’ and Web activism,” Social Science Information Vol. 51, No. 14 pp. 534-550. Turkmenistani Turkmenistan 0 No sources found Turks Turkey 0.5 David Paul and Rachel Anderson Paul. 2009. Ethnic Lobbies and US Foreign Policy . Boulder: Lynne Riener Publishers.

Bahar Baser. 2015. Diasporas & Homeland Conflicts : A Comparative Perspective. Burlington: Ashgate. Tutsis DRC 0 David Garbin and Marie Godin. 2013. “’Saving the Congo’: Transnational Social Fields and Politics of Home in the Congolese Diaspora,” African and Black

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Diaspora: An International Journal , Vol. 6 No. 2, pp. 113-130. Tutsis Burundi 0.5 Simon Turner. 2008. “The Waxing and Waning of the Political Field in Burundi and its Diaspora,” Ethnic & Racial Studies . Vol. 31, No. 4, pp. 742-765. Tutsis Rwanda 0.5 Simon Turner. 2013 “Staging the Rwandan Diaspora: The Politics of Performance.” African Studies . Vol. 72, No. 2, pp. 265-284. Tutsis Rwanda 0.5 Simon Turner. 2013 “Staging the Rwandan Diaspora: The Politics of Performance.” African Studies . Vol. 72, No. 2, pp. 265-284. Ugandans Uganda 0 No sources found Uighurs China 0.5 Yu-Wen Chen. 2014. The Uyghur Lobby: Global (Turkmen) Networks, Coalitions and Strategies of the World Uyghur Congress . London: Routledge. Ukrainians Ukraine 1 Wsevolod Isajiw, “The Ukranian Diaspora,” in Allon Gal, Athena Leoussi & Anthony Smith (eds.), The Call of the Homeland: Diaspora Nationalisms, Past and Present (2010) Uruguayans Uruguay 0.5 Mario Sznajder and Luis Roniger. 2007. “Exile Communities and their Differential Institutional Dynamics: A Comparative Analysis of the Chilean and Uruguayan Political Diasporas,” Revista de Ciencia Politica, Vol. 27, No. 1, pp. 43-66. Uzbeks Afghanistan 0 Matteo Fumagalli. 2007. “Ethncity, state formation and foreign policy: Uzbekistan and ‘Uzbeks Abroad,” Central Asian Survey . Vol. 26, No. 1 pp. 105-122. Uzbeks Uzbekistan 0 Matteo Fumagalli. 2007. “Ethncity, state formation and foreign policy: Uzbekistan and ‘Uzbeks Abroad,” Central Asian Survey . Vol. 26, No. 1 pp. 105-122. Uzbeks Uzbekistan 0 Matteo Fumagalli. 2007. “Ethncity, state formation and foreign policy: Uzbekistan and ‘Uzbeks Abroad,” Central Asian Survey . Vol. 26, No. 1 pp. 105-122. Vietnamese Vietnam 0.5 David Paul and Rachel Anderson Paul. 2009. Ethnic Lobbies and US Foreign Policy . Boulder: Lynne Riener Publishers.

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Yugoslav Yugoslavia 0.5 Jan Hupkens, Melina Menguin-Layerenza and Bajro Muric. “Belonging and Not Belonging: The Yugoslav Diaspora in the Netherlands,” Humanity in Action . http://www.humanityinaction.org/knowledgebase/373- belonging-and-not-belonging-the-yugoslav-diaspora- in-the-netherlands Zapatistas Mexico 0 No sources found Zimbabweans Zimbabwe 0 Dominic Pasura. 2011. “A Fractured Transnational Diaspora: The Case of Zimbabweans in Britain,” International Migration Vol. 50, No. 1, pp. 143-161 Zimbabweans Zimbabwe 0.5 Dominic Pasura. 2011. “A Fractured Transnational Diaspora: The Case of Zimbabweans in Britain,” International Migration Vol. 50, No. 1, pp. 143-161

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Appendix D: Description of Amnesty Campaigns

Group Short summary From data sources: Final designation Acehnese (1985-2003) The Acehnese are seeking From Minorities at Risk: I put this group into 3 categories: independence from Indonesia. The Acehnese are led by the National Front for the 1. Human rights progress Liberation for Aceh-Sumatra (or 2. Western sanctions the Free Aceh Movement – 3. Group seeks external GAM) founded in 1976. GAM support but not mass solicits external support as a solidarity mobilization primary strategy. support

From NAVCO data: The Acehnese have campaigned for independence from 1976. This campaign has been violent. It has received external state support (Libya) and diaspora support. From 1998 to 2005 the Acehnese have received significant concessions from the Indonesian government.

From the TIES data: From 1975-1976 the US terminated foreign aid to Indonesia. From 1992-1994 it

224

terminated foreign aid and imposed an export restriction. From 1999 to 2005 the US imposed a partial economic embargo on Indonesia.

From POLITY data Indonesia is undemocratic from 1970 to 2000 (-6) before improving considerable after 2001. Religious minority in Pakistan Minorities at Risk: I put this group into 1 category: that suffers political exclusion The Ahmdiyya in Pakistan are and repression led by Ahmadiyya Jamaat (AJ). 1. No campaign due to state AJ was founded in Rabwah, repression Pakistan but has since relocated to London. They solicit external support as a secondary strategy.

Ahmadiyya (1991-2000) From NAVCO data: The Ahmadiyya have not run a domestic campaign.

From TIES data:

In 1977 the US imposed an export restriction on Pakistan.

From CIRI data: From 1991 to 2000 tehre was

225

significant decline in human rights protections. Protections of the freedom of association is low (avg = 1.1).

From Polity data (POLITY score: The 1990s in Pakistan is a period of factionalism. Dring this period Pakistan is a weak democracy (8) that experiences autocratic backsliding in late 1990s. From MAR: I put this group into 1 cateogory: No entry because not a minority 1. No campaign due to group government repression

From NAVCO: No campaign entry

From TIES data: Government repression of No Western human rights Bahrainis 1996-1996 activists and civil society sanctions

From CIRI data: No major improvements around AI campaign period. No election rights.

From POLITY data: Closed institutions. Very

226

repressive (below -8).

From MAR: I put this group into 3 category: No entry because not a minority 1. Human rights sanctions group imposed 2. Human rights progress From NAVCO: 3. Domestic campaign but From 1987 to 1990 there was not asking for it. the Anti-Ershad campaign against the regime. From 1976 to 1997 there was the Shanti Bahini autonomy struggle. No entry for pro-democracy movement.

From TIES data: Bangladeshis 1985-1988 In 1987 Canada imposed sanctions (N/A end date). From 1992-1994 US imposed sanctions. No data on sanction type.

From CIRI data: Minor human rights improvements during AI campaign period, regarding election rights and freedom of speech.

From POLITY data: Closed through the 1980s.

227

Significant improvements in 1990 but also period of severe factionalism.

From Minorities at Risk data: I put this group into 1 category No entry because not a minority group. 1. No campaign due to state repression From NAVCO data: No pro-democracy campaign during late 1990s. Mass protests occur in 2006 but this is beyond the period covered by the dataset.

From TIES data: The Belarusians face No sanctions during the government repression of all Belarusians 1997-2000 Amnesty International forms of opposition and campaign. In 2004 US imposes dissent. a partial economic embargo, freeze state assets, imposes travel ban and suspends economic agreements.

From CIRI data:

There is no significant human rights progress during the Amnesty campaign. Rights protections remain very low, if non-existent during this period.

228

Freedom of association is not respected at all (avg = 0).

From POLITY data:

From 1997 through 2000 Belarusia is very repressive (score of -7). From Minorities at Risk: I put this group into 3 categories:

No entry because not a 1. Human rights progress minority. 2. Western sanctions 3. Campaigns but does not From NAVCO data: seek external support (MORE RESEARCH From 1977 to 1982 Bolivians NEEDED) run an anti-junta campaign. It is non-violent and is seeking Bolivians struggle for regime change. The opposition Bolivians (1980-1982) democracy against military obtains limited concessions in

junta. 1977 but significant concessions in 1978, 1979 and 1980. The campaign is successful in 1982.

From TIES data:

From 1979 to 1982 the US terminated foreign aid to Bolivia.

From CIRI data:

229

There is a major improvement in rights protections form 1981 (2) to 1982 (9). No data pre- 1981.

From POLITY:

1980-81 sees improvement in democratic rights protections and continued progress towards democracy after 1982. From Minorities at Risk data: I put this group into 1 category: 1. No domestic campaign No entr y because not a due to institutional minority group. openness.

From NAVCO data:

Failure of government to live No campaign entry. up to ratified human rights

Brazilians (1988-2000) treaties and a justice system in From TIES data: crisis, which includes

government-backed death From 1977 to 1984 US squads and widespread use of terminates foreign aid. torture.

From CIRI data:

Fairly high rights protections during AI campaign years (10- 14). Freedom of Association

230

average = ~2.

From POLITY:

There is a significant improvement towards democracy from 1986 although it remains weak through the 1990s (8). From Minorities at Risk data: I put this group into 1 category:

No entry because not a minority 1. No domestic campaign group. due to state repression (* = case of state collapse) From NAVCO data:

No Burundian campaign against violence or for democracy. Widespread killings between Burundians (1994-2000) Hutu and Tutsis seeking to control state institutions. From TIES data: Civilians caught in between. No Western sanctions imposed. From 1996 to 1999, Kenya, Tanzania, Rwanda and Ethiopia impose partial economic embargo and a blockade.

From CIRI data:

No significant progress during

231

AI campaign years. Right to freedom of association is non- existent.

From POLITY:

Identifies period as one of state failure (interregnum). From Minorities at Risk data: I put this case into two categories:

No entry because not a minority 1. Western sanctions group. 2. No campaign because of state repression From NAVCO data: No domestic campaign during Amnesty campaign years. Khmer Rouge insurgency ends in 1997. Increasing level of government

Cambodians/1997-1998 repression of civil liberties From TIES data: (811) after period of democratization From 1988-2007 the US, beginning in 1993. Canada and Australia impose partial economic embargo, freeze assets, terminate foreign aid, impose travel ban, and suspend economic agreements.

From CIRI data:

Big improvement in 1993 (from 3 to 8) and fairly high scores (9

232

and above, maxing at 12) in the late 1990s. Freedom of Association average = 1.

From Polity data:

In 1997 there is a significant authoritarian backslide. In 2000 improvements but it never becomes democracy (~2). From Minorities at Risk data: I put this group into 1 category: 1. Campaigns and seeks The Chechen’s main groups are external support but not the Caucasian Independence mass solidarity Party (CIP), the Caucasian mobilization support People’s Federation (CPF) and Daymokhk CIP and CPF seek external support as primary strategy, while Daymokhk does not seek external support. They Chechens/1976-2000 The Chechens are seeking seek external support from (365) independence from Russia. Chechen diaspora, UN, US government, and UNPO (Koinova, Lapidus).

From NAVCO data: From 1994-2006 the Chechens waged a campaign for independence. It was violent. It was not successful and no

233

concessions were won.

From TIES data:

No Western human rights sanctions imposed on Russia duria Chechnya conflict.

From POLITY data:

Improvement in Russian democracy in early 1990s, but also period of factionalism. Weak democracy through the 1990s. But significant improvement from 1990-1991 from 0 to 5.

From Minorities at Risk dataset: I put this group into 1 category:

No entry because not a minority 1. No campaign due to group. repression Gross violations and use of

violence by DRC (Zaire in From NAVCO data: Congolese/1996-2000 1996) government under No campaign entry. (490) Kabila. Unarmed civilians

caught into the complex web From TIES data: of fighting in the country No Western sanctions imposed.

From CIRI data:

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Data suggests collapse of state authority

From POLITY: The 1990s are identified as period of interregnum (normal government is suspended) and state failure events occur in early 1990s.

From Minorities at Risk data: I put this case into 1 category 1. No domestic campaign There is an entry but due to state repression considerable missing data for (sanctions imposed are on this time period. Data suggest southern Sudan issue not through the 1980s and 1990s Darfur) Darfuris are led primarily by Black Muslims that face militant organizations. repression from Sudanese Arab government. Seeking From NAVCO data: Darfuris (1989-1997) self-determination rights and greater share of profits from No campaign in Darfur during resource extraction in the the 1990s. region. From TIES data:

In 1994 onwards US impose a partial economic embargo, asset freeze, termination of foreign aid, travel ban.

235

From CIRI Data: No rights protections at all in the 1990s.

From POLITY data: In 1989 autocratic backsliding occurs. Very undemocratic (-7) through the 1990s . From Minorities at Risk data: I put this group into 1 category:

No entry because not a minority 1. Domestic campaigning group. group not seeking external support. From NAVCO data:

From 2000-2005 Egyptian Kifaya activists run a pro- Government repression of all democracy campaign. It is a forms of dissent and non-violent campaign that seeks Egyptians/1989-2002 opposition. Egyptian activists major reforms and regime (651) seeking end of one-party rule. change. Achieves limited concession in 2000, then in 2003-4. Unsucessful by 2005.

Does not seek external support (El-Mahdi correspondence).

From TIES data:

No Western sanctions.

236

From CIRI data:

Declining rights protections during AI campaign years.

From POLITY data:

Highly autocratic (-6) during AI campaign years.

From Minorities at Risk data: I put this group into 1 category:

The Hazaras are led by Hizb-i- 1. No domestic campaign Wahdat, founded in 1989). because of state They seek external support as a repression secondary strategy, Largely Hazaras in Afghanistan face supported by the Iranians who repression under Sunni have used them as their Taliban government. Seek primariy Shiite-based client greater political rights, group in Afghanistan. (Emadi; Hazaras (1996-1999) minority rights protections, Rubin). religious freedoms. Targeted disproportionately by the From NAVCO data: Taliban. Victims of massacres in late 1990s. No Hazara campaign

From TIES data:

No Western sanctions.

From CIRI data:

237

No rights protections during AI campaign years. From POLITY:

1996-1997 is a period of interregnum (state collapse). From 1997-2000 the state is highly repressive (-7). From Minorities at Risk data: I put this group into 1 category

No entry because not a minority 1. No domestic campaign group. due to institutional openness. From NAVCO data:

No domestic campaign.

From TIES data:

Hondurans (1981-1988) No Western sanctions

From CIRI data: In the 1980s very strong rights protections (~13 – 14) Full protections of rights of freedom of association, speech, voting.

From POLITY data:

Transition period seeing

238

considerable improvement through early 1980s from -2 to 6 through to 1990. From MAR data: I put this group into 1 category:

The Hutus in Burundi are led by 1. Campaigning group three main organizations: 1) seeking external support The Front for Democracy (FD); but not a mass solidarity 2) Party for the Liberation of mobilization. the Hutus/National Liberation Forces (FLN); 3) National Council for Defence. FD and NCD do not seek external support. FLN seeks external support as primary strategy, Majority group in Burundi but mainly from Tanzania (Byman repressed by Tutsis. Face Hutus – Burundi (1994- et al). political, economic and social 2000) exclusion by Tutsi controlled From NAVCO data: government institutions.

From 1993-2002 the Hutus rebelled against the government seeking regime change. This campaign was violent.

From TIES data:

No Western sanctions imposed.

From POLITY:

239

POLITY defines this period as one of state collapse (interregnum).

From MAR data: I put this group into 1 category:

The Hutus main organization is 1. No domestic campaign the Catholic Church. It does not due to state repression seek external support for the Hutu struggle in the DRC.

From NAVCO data:

No campaign entry

Hutus in the DRC suffer From TIES data: economic exclusion and

Hutus – DRC (1996-2000) political restrictions, including No sanctions denial of citizenship and right

to vote. From CIRI data:

Data suggests collapse of state authority

From POLITY:

1990s are period of interregnum and state failure events

240

From Minoritis at Risk data: I put this group into 1 category: 1. No domestic campaign The indigena in Mexico are led due to institutional by two main organizations: 1) openness. National Indigenous Institute and 2) National Council of . Indigenous People. Neither group seeks external support.

From NAVCO data:

No campaign Indigena in Mexico face loss

of land due to gov’t policy and From TIES data: Indigenous Peoples – NAFTA, political exclusion,

Mexico (1994-2003) poor living conditions. They No sanctions seek regional autonomy,

government investments, and From CIRI data: removal of paramilitaries.

Strong rights protections during AI campaign years (8-12). Average 2 on freedom of associations, and ~ 1.5 from speech and electoral rights.

From POLITY

Periods of factionalism through the 1990s but steady improvements to democracy

241

from 1994 (0) to 2000 (6). From Minorities at Risk data: I put this group into 1 category:

The Karen are led by three main 1. Campaigning group organizations: 1) Karen State not seeking external National Organization (KSNO); support. 2) Karen National Union (KNU); and 3) Democratic Karen Buddhist Organization (DKBO). None seek external support.

From NAVCO data:

Seeks an independent state. The Karens have waged a Suffers from ethnic cleansing, Karens (1988-2000) violent campaign against the extrajudicial executions, state from 1948-2006. Until massacres, restrictions on 1983 they sought secession. movement, forced labour. Until 1987 they sought autonomy. They now seek regime change.

From TIES data:

In 1999 the US terminated foreign aid to Myanmar.

From CIRI data:

Very low protections of rights (0-2) during AI campaign years

242

From POLITY data: Very undemocratic during this period (-6).

From MAR data: I put this group into 1 category: 1. Human rights No entry because not a minority progress (campaign group success) 2. From NAVCO data: Anti-Arap Moi campaign from 1990-1991. Sucessful in 1991. Government repression of dissent and use of ethnic From TIES data: Kenyans (1991-1991) violence to justify crackdown No Western sanctions on human rights organizations From CIRI data: No major human rights progress after campaign

From POLITY data:

Repressive before and after campaign (-6 range) From Minorities at Risk data: I put this group into 1 category: Government repression of Kenyans (1995-1998) dissent and use of ethnic No entry because not a minority 1. No campaign due to violence to justify crackdown group. domestic repression on human rights organizations. From NAVCO data:

243

No campaign during AI campaign years (anti-Arap Moi campaign was in 1990-91).

From TIES data:

No Western sanctions

From CIRI data:

Poor rights protections for freedoms of association and speech, and voting.

From POLITY:

Undemocratic during the 1990s (-5).

From Minorities at Risk data: I put this group into two categories: No entry because not a minority 1. Human rights Government repression of civil group. Progress society, use of extrajudicial 2. Domestic campaign Malawis/1992-1993 executions, inhumane prison From NAVCO data: but does not seek (553) conditions, repression of mass solidarity labour activists and the church. In 1992-1993 there was the anti- mobilization support Banda campaign. It was non- (NEED MORE violent. It sought regime RESEARCH ON change. The campaign THIS)

244

achieved significant concessions in 199 and was successful in 1993.

From TIES data:

No Western sanctions.

From CIRI data: Clear progress from 1992 (3) to 1993 (7) to 1994 (9).

From POLITY:

Very repressive until 1992 then significant bump until by 1993- 5 when state becomes democratic (6).

From Minorities at Risk data: I put this group into 1 category: 1. No campaign due to No entry because not a minority domestic repression. group. Government use of torture and

Malaysians/1987-1991 imprisonment of political From NAVCO data: (820) prisoners including opposition

leadership and activists. No campaign entry during AI campaign.

From TIES data:

245

No Western sanctions

From CIRI data:

Fairly strong rights protections during AI campaign period.

From POLITY:

Period of factionalism. Not fully democratic during this period. From Minorities at Risk data: I put this group into 1 category: 1. No campaign due to No entry because not a minority domestic repression. group.

From NAVCO data:

Government use of torture and No campaign entry during AI Malaysians/1996-2000 imprisonment of political campaign. (820) prisoners including opposition leadership and activists. From TIES data:

No Western sanctions

From CIRI data:

Not horrible but not great on rights protections. No major

246

improvements during this period.

From POLITY:

Period of factionalism in late 1990. Barely democratic (~3) during this period. From Minorities at Risk data: I put this group into 1 category: 1. No domestic campaign No entry because not a minority due to state repression group.

From NAVCO data:

No campaign Extreme violence against black community and From TIES data: government repression of civil Mauritanians/1989-1990 society and dissidents, No sanctions (435) including secrete detention, torture, unfair trials, extrajudicial killing. From CIRI:

Very poor rights protections (~0).

From POLITY:

Very undemocratic (-7)

247

From Minorities at Risk data: I put this group into 1 category: 1. No campaign due to Mons are led by 2 main domestic repression. organizations: 1) Mon Nationalist Democratic Front (MNDF) and 2) New Mon State Party (NMSP). Both seek external support as secondary strategy, mainly from Thailand.

From NAVCO data: Mons suffer from land

dispossession, forced labour, No Mon Campaign Mons/1988-2000 political restrictions, no civil

(775) liberties, on-going state From TIES data: repression. Seeking

independence. US termination of foreign aid in 1999.

From CIRI:

Almost no rights protections. From POLITY data:

Very undemocratic (-6).

Government corruption and From MAR data: I put this group into 1 repression in context of Maoist Nepalese 1991-1991 category: insurgency. Use of torture and No entry because not a minority 1. Human Rights Progress extra-judicial killings by the group

248

state against opposition, due to campaign success. lawyers and activists. From NAVCO data: Campaign over in 1990. Anti- Regime (“The Stir”) - successful

From TIES data: No Western human rights sanctions

From CIRI data: Slight improvements (election rights, association) in 1991 but not major.

From POLITY data: Becoming more democratic in early 1990s, but weak (below 5)

From Minorities at Risk data: I put this group into 1 category: No entry because group is not a 1. Domestic campaign Government corruption and minority. seeking external support repression in context of Maoist but not mass solidarity Nepalese 1999-2003 insurgency. Use of torture and NAVCO data: mobilization support (790) extra-judicial killings by the state against opposition, Maoist (Community Party of lawyers and activists. Nepal) Campaign from 1996- 2006. The campaign was violent, seeking regime change. No concessions during AI

249

campaign years (only in 2006). It has been unsuccessful.

From TIES data:

No Western sanctions

From CIRI data:

No progress during AI campaign years. Fairly strong rights protections

From POLITY data: Weakly democratic during AI campaign years but significant decline in early 2000s.

From Minorities at Risk data: I put this group in 1 category: 1. No campaign due to state No entry because not a minority repression group. Government repression of civil Nigerians/1988-1991 society, including use of From NAVCO data: (475) executions, unfair trials, and detention of journalists. No campaign.

From TIES data:

No Western sanctions.

250

From CIRI data:

No major rights protection progress at the time.

From POLITY data:

Very repressive and undemocratic (~7) during this period. From Minorities at Risk data: I put this group into 3 categories: 1. Human rights progress No entry because group is not a 2. Economic sanctions minority. 3. Campaigning group but not seeking external From NAVCO data: support ( MORE RESEARCH NEEDED) Anti-military government campaign from 1993-1998. It Government repression of civil Nigerians/1994-2000 was non-violent and seeking society and democracy (475) regime change. Received activists. significant concessions in 1994 and 1995, and was successful in 1998.

From TIES data:

From 1993 to 1999 US, Canada, and the UK imposed import restrictions, asset freezes, and

251

travel bans.

From CIRI data:

No clear improvements in rights protections during AI campaign

FROM POLITY:

Very undemocratic until significant shift in late 1990s towards a weak democracy. From Minorities at Risk data: I put this group in 1 category: 1. No domestic campaigning The Nuba are led primarily by due to government the Sudan People’s Liberation repression. Army/Movement (SPLA). Repressed by government in Seeks external support from Khartoum. Face violent, even Ethiopia, Eritea, Uganda, Libya genocidal, pressure to convert (Lesch; Jalata) to Islam. Widespread use of Nuba - Sudan (1989-1997) rape as part of ethnic cleansing From NAVCO data:

campaigns. Denied international humanitarian aid. No Nuba campaign 100,000-200,000 dead since 1989. Seeking autonomy. From TIES data:

From 1994 US imposed partial economic embargo, asset freeze, travel ban.

252

From CIRI data:

No major improvement in rights protections.

From POLITY:

Very repressive through this period (-7).

From Minorities at Risk data: I put this group in 1 category: No domestic campaigning due to The Nuba are led primarily by government repression. the Sudan People’s Liberation • Repressed by Army/Movement (SPLA). government in Seeks external support from Khartoum. Face Ethiopia, Eritea, Uganda, Libya violent, even (Lesch; Jalata) genocidal, pressure to

convert to Islam. From NAVCO data: Nuba/2002-2003 Widespread use of rape

(625) as part of ethnic No Nuba campaign cleansing campaigns.

Denied international From TIES data: humanitarian aid.

100,000-200,000 dead From 1994 US imposed partial since 1989. Seeking economic embargo, asset freeze, autonomy. travel ban.

From CIRI data:

253

No major improvement in rights protections.

From POLITY:

Very repressive through this period (-7).

From Minorities at Risk data: I put this group into 3 categories: The Ogoni are led by the 1. Human rights progress Movement for the Survival of 2. Economic sanctions the Ogoni People (MOSOP). 3. Campaigning group They sought external support as seeking external a primary strategy, primarily support but not mass from leading INGOS (Bob). solidarity mobilization support Faced economic From NAVCO: Ogonis – Nigeria (1994- discrimination by state and 2000) MNCs (Shell) and suffer Ogoni campaigned form 1990 political exclusion. See to 1995. The campaign was autonomy. non-violent and it sought autonomy. They received significant concesions in 1993 but were not successful.

From TIES data: Fro 1993 to 1999 US, UK, and Canada import restriction, asset freeze, travel bans.

254

From CIRI data:

No significant improvement during this period.

From POLITY:

Very repressive through mid- 1990s with a shift in the late 1990s towards a weak democracy.

From Minorities at Risk data: I put this group into 1 category: No entry because not a minority 1. Campaigning domestic group. group but not seeking external support (MORE Increasing government From NAVCO data: RESEARCH NEEDED) repression, erosion of judiciary, weakening rights Pro-democracy campaign in protections, political parties 1983. It was non-violent and Pakistanis (1979-1988) banned, unions outlawed, sought regime change. Only government critics arrested, achieved very minor gains (less use of torture and executions. than concessions). Martial law in late 1970s and 1980s. From TIES data:

No Western sanctions.

From CIRI data:

255

No major rights protections improvements during AI campaign years.

From POLITY:

Very repressive and undemocratic period (-6). From Minorities at Risk data: I put this group into 1 category: No entry because not a minority 1. Human rights progress group.

From NAVCO data:

No campaign

From TIES data:

Government repression of civil Paraguayans (1985-1988) No Western sanctions society and opposition.

From CIRI data:

Severe repression of association, speech and voting rights. Significant improvement from 1988 to 1989 (from 4 to 10).

From POLITY:

256

Very repressive and undemocratic in 1985-1988 but sig improvement in late 1980s towards democracy by early 1990s.

From Minorities at Risk data: I put this group into 1 category: 1. No domestic campaign The Roma are led by the due to institutional Democratic Union. Does not openness. seek external support.

From NAVCO data:

No campaign Suffer from poor living Roma – Romania (1993- conditions, under-investment, From TIES data: 1998) social exclusion and discrimination, forced No Western sanctions assimilation. From CIRI data:

Strong rights protections during AI campaign (9-12).

From POLITY:

After 1990 strong democracy, especially by 1996 (8).

257

From Minorities at Risk data: I put this group in 1 category: 1. No campaign due to state No entry because not a minority repression group

From NAVCO data:

Government repression of No campaign human rights activists and critics. Use of force labour, From TIES data: Romanians (1978-1980) death penalty, and confinement in psychiatric No sanctions. institutions. From CIRI data: No data pre-1981

From POLITY: Very repressive and undemocratic (-8).

From Minorities at Risk data: I put this group into 1 category: 1. Human rights progress No entry because not a minority Government repression of group. human rights activists and

Romanians (1989-1990) critics. Use of force labour, From NAVCO data: death penalty, and

confinement in psychiatric Anti-Ceaucescu campaign from institutions. 1987-1989. Successful in 1989.

From TIES data:

258

From CIRI data:

Significant rights protections improvements 1989 (1) to 1990 (10).

From POLITY: 1990 is start of democratization process.

From Minorities at Risk data: I put this group into 1 category 1. No domestic campaign No entry because not a minority due to state repression. group From NAVCO data:

No campaign

Government violations against From TIES data: Rwandans/1990-1991 Tutsis and moderate Hutus in

(517) context of RPF invasion from No sanctions Uganda.

From CIRI data:

No huge improvement in rights protections during this period.

From POLITY:

259

Government is very repressive and undemocratic (-8). From Minorities at Risk data: I put this group into 1 category: 1. No campaign due to state No entry because not a minority repression group.

From NAVCO data: Repression of activists No campaign working on matters related to

genocide and rights violations From TIES data: in Rwanda. Increasing Rwandans/1994-2000 No sanctions violence resulting in unarmed (517) civilian deaths. Numerous From CIRI data: detained without charge, Slight improvements over this government use of period in rights protections (5- disappearances. 8)

From POLITY data: Government remains repressive and undemocratic during this period. From Minorities at Risk data: I put this group into 1 category 1. No campaign due to state No entry because not a minority repression group. Saudis (1989-1989) Government repression of civil

society and all dissent. From NAVCO data:

No domestic campaign

260

From TIES data:

No sanctions

From CIRI data: No significant improvement

From POLITY: Very repressive and undemocractic (-10) From Minorities at Risk data: I put this group into 1 category No campaign due to state No entry because not a minority repression group.

From NAVCO data:

No domestic campaign

Saudis/1998-2000 Government repression of civil From TIES data: (670) society and all dissent.

No sanctions

From CIRI data: No significant improvement

From POLITY: • Very repressive and undemocractic (-10) Shans -1988-2000 Shans victim of government From MAR data: I put this group into 1 category: repression. 1. No domestic campaign

261

The Shans are led by three due to government organizations: 1) Shan repression Nationalist League (SNL); 2) Mong Tai Army (MTA); 3) Shan State Kokang Democratic Party. None seek external support.

From NAVCO data:

No Campaign

From TIES data:

1999- US termination of foreign aid

From CIRI data:

No significant improvement (0- 2)

From POLITY: Very repressive (-8)

From Minorities at Risk data: I put this group in 1 category: 1. Domestic campaigning The Shia in Iraq are led by two seeking external Shi'is – Iraq (1988-1993) Severe government repression organizations: 1) Al-Da’wa support but not mass (AD) and 2) Supreme Council solidarity mobilization of the Islamic Revolution of support

262

Iraq (SCIRI). Both seek external support as primary strategy, namely from Iran (Byman)

From NAVCO data:

1999 Shia campaign for regime change. The campaign was violent and achieved no concessions.

From TIES data:

No Western sanction

From CIRI data:

No significant improvement in human rights protections.

FROM POLITY: Very repressive (-9)

From Minorities at Risk data: I put this group in 1 category: Shia – Saudi Arabia (1998- 1. No campaign due to 2000) Severe government repression. Shia in Saudi Arabia are led by government repression two main organizations: 1) Organization for Islamic

263

Revolution (OIR) and 2) Hizbullah OIR seeks external support as secondary strategy from Iran (Byman). Hizbullah does not seek external support

From NAVCO data:

No campaign

From TIES data:

No sanctions

From CIRI data:

No significant improvement improvement in rights protections

From POLITY: Very repressive (-10 score)

From Minorities at Risk data: I put this group into 1 category: 1. Human rights progress Military coup in 1997 leads to No entry because not a minority collapse of rule of law and group. Sierra Leoneans (1998-2000) widespread rights abuses,

especially of government From NAVCO data: opponents.

No domestic campaign

264

From TIES data:

No sanctions

From CIRI data: Significant improvement in rights protections in 2001 when state authority is re-established.

From POLITY: Signiciant improvements in democratic standing in early 2000s. From Minorities at Risk data: I put this group into 1 category: 1. No No entry because not a minority group.

From NAVCO data: Somalis (1988-1990) No mass campaign (only clan Government crackdown on faction campaigns). opposition

From TIES data:

No sanctions

From CIRI data:

No significant improvement in

265

rights protections during this period.

From POLITY:

State collapse (interregnum) From MAR data: I put this group into 1 category: No entry because not minority 1. Western sanctions group

From NACVO data: No campaign

From TIES data: US sanctions from 1972 to 1989 Soviets 1976 - 1990 Government repression with human rights stipulation.

From CIRI data: No human rights progress. Very repressive.

From POLITY data: Closed institutions. Very repressive (-7)

From Minorities at Risk data: I put this group into 1 Government repression of Sri Lankans (1985-2000) category: dissidents, use of emergency No entry because not a minority 1. No domestic campaign regulations, weak rule of law, group. due to institutional impunity for security forces. openness.

266

From NAVCO data:

No campaign

From TIES data: No sanctions.

From CIRI data:

Strong rights protections (8-12).

From POLITY:

A weak democracy (~5)

From MAR data: I put this group into X categories 1. Domestic campaign SPLM sought external support seeking external as tertiary strategy support but not mass solidarity mobilization From NAVCO data: support Civil war with central 2. Western sanctions Southern Sudanese (1989- government in Khartoum over SPLA-led campaign from 1983- 1997) matter of 2005. Violent. Seeking regime autonomy/independence. change. Not successful. No major progresses made.

From TIES data: US sanctions imposed in 1994

From CIRI data:

267

Very repressive

From POLITY data: Closed institutions,. Very repressive. From Minorities at Risk data: I put this group into 2 categories: 1. No domestic campaign No entry because not a minority due to government group. repression 2. Human rights progress From NAVCO data:

No domestic campaign.

From TIES data:;

Sudanese (1983-1985) No santions.

From CIRI data: Weak rights protections in mid- 1980s (4-7).

From POLITY: Very repressive and undemocratic at this time but significant improvement in 1985 towards democracy until 1989.

Sudanese (1989-1997) 1989 coup ushering in severe From Minorities at Risk data: I put this group in to 1 category: rights violations by the 1. No domestic campaign

268

government. No entry because not a minority due to government group repression

From NAVCO data:

No campaign From TIES data;

In 1994-onwards US imposes partial economic embargo, asset freeze, termination of foreign aid, and suspension of economic agreements.

From CIRI data:

Very poor rights protections and no significant improvement during this period.

From POLITY: Authoritarian backslide in 1989. Very repressive through the 1990s. From Minorities at Risk data: I put this group into 2 categories: 1. Western sanctions Sudanese (2002-2003) No entry because not a minority 2. No campaign due to Government repression of civil group state repression society and dissent.

From NAVCO data:

269

No campaign

From TIES data:; In 1994 US imposes partial economic embargo, asset freeze, termination of foreign aid, suspension of economic agreements.

From CIRI data:

No rights protections and no significant improvements.

From POLITY:

Very repressive and undemocratic (-7) From Minorities at Risk data: I put this group into 1 category: 1. No campaign due to No entry because not a minority state repression group

Syrians (1985-2000) From NAVCO data: Government repression of civil No campaign society and dissent.

From TIES data: No sanctions

From CIRI data: Poor rights proteections. No

270

significant improvement during this period.

FROM POLITY: Very repressive and undemocratic (-7 to -9) From Minorities at Risk data: I put this group into 1 category: No entry because not a minority 1. Campaigning group not group seeking external support (MORE RESEARCH From NAVCO data: NEEDED).

Campaign from 1992-1997 by United Tajikistan Opposition. IT was violent and sought regime change. 1993 and 1995 visible gains but short of Government repression of civil Tajiks (1996-1999) concessions. 1995 limited society and dissent in context concessions and in1996 of internal violent conflict with significant concessions. It was opposition. not successful.

From TIES data:

No sanctions

From CIRI data Weak rights protections (5-7). No significant improvement during this period.

271

From POLITY: Repressive, no democracy and factionalism. • scores around -2 to 0 From MAR data: I put this group into X categories: 1. No campaign due to Not a minority group government repression

From NAVCO data: Thai communist rebel campaign ends in 1981. No other campaigning through the 1980s.

Thais 1986-1987 Government violations From TIES data: No Western sanctions

From CIRI data No major improvements.

From POLITY data: 1970s – 1990s lots of regime instability and transitions.

From Minorities at Risk data: I put this group into two No entry because not a minority categories: group 1. Western sanctions Government abuses against 2. No campaign due to state Togolese (1999-1999) opposition. From NAVCO data: repression

No campaign

From TIES data:

272

From 1992-2007 US, France Germany terminate foreign aid

From CIRI data: Weak rights protections (~5) and no sig improvement around this time.

From POLITY data: Very repressive and undemocratic (-2). Period of factionalism From Minorities at Risk data: I put this group into 1 category: No entry because not a minority 1. No campaign due to state group. repression

From NAVCO data: No campaign

From TIES data: Tunisians (1986-1987) No sanctions

From CIRI data: Weak-Medium rights protections (6-8). No significant improvement during this period.

From POLITY Very repressive and

273

undemocratic (-7)

From Minorites at Risk data: I put this group into 1 No entry because not a minority category: group. 1. No campaign due to government repression. From NAVCO data: No campaign

From TIES data: No sanctions Government abuses, including

Turkmenistani (1997-1998) use of death penalty From CIRI data:

Poor rights protections (3-4) and no significant improvement during this period.

From POLITY

Very repressive and undemocratic (-9)

From MAR data: I put this group into 1 category: 1. Campaigning group Tutsis in Rwanda are led by the seeking external support Government repression of Tutsis - Rwanda (1990-1991) Rwandan Patriotic Front. RPF but not mass solidarity Tutsis in context of RPF sought external support as mobilization support invasion. primary strategy (Byman)

From NAVCO data:

274

Tutsi campaign to overthrow Hutu government. Goal was regime change. Violent campaign.

From TIES data: • No sanctions

From CIRI data: Medium rights protections and gradual improvements.

FROM Polity: Repressive period and undemocratic (-7).

From MAR data: I put this case into 1 category: 1. Human rights progress Tutsis in Rwanda are led by the because Tutsis campaign Rwandan Patriotic Front. RPF wins and they assume sought external support as control of the government Tutsis –Rwanda(1994-2000) Faced genocidal violence in primary strategy (Byman) under Kagame. 1994. From NAVCO data:

RPF campaign ends in 1994 and is successful.

275

From CIRI data: Medium rights protections (~7) during this period.

From Polity: Very repressive and undemocratic (~ -6).

From MAR data: I put this group into 1 category: 1. No domestic campaign The Tutsis are led by the due to state repression National Union Party which does not seek external support.

From NAVCO data: No campaign Minority group in Burundi but Tutsis – Burundi (1994- controls some state From TIES data: 2000) institutions. Struggle with

Hutu for control of the state. From 1996 to 1999 Kenya, Tanzania, Ethiopia and Rwanda impose partial economic embargo and blockade

From CIRI: Weak rights protections (4-6). No significant improvements.

276

FROM POLITY:

Period of interregnum

From MAR data: I put this group into 1 category: The Tutsis are led by the 1. No campaign due to state Catholic Church. It does not repression. seek external support.

From NAVCO data: No campaign Subject to severe political and Tutsis – DRC(1996-2000) economic discrimination. Seek From TIES data: political rights. No sanctions

From CIRI data: Collapse of central authority

FROM POLITY: Period of interregnum

From MAR data: I put this group in 1 category: 1. Domestic campaign not Government violations in No entry because not minority seeking external support Ugandans (1984-1985) context of “Bush war” group. (NEED MORE between government and RESEARCH) rebels. From NAVCO data:

From to 1986 the National Resistance Army led a

277

campaign led by Musseveni against the Okello regime. The campaign was violent and sought regime change. It was successful in 1986.

From TIES data: No sanction

From CIRI data: Medium rights protections and improvement from interregnum (-77) to 1986 (9).

From POLITY: • period of factionalism • score around 3.

From Minorities at Risk data: I put this group into 1 category: The Uighurs are led by the East 1. No campaign due to state Turkistan Islamic Party. It does repression not seek external support.

Uighurs (Turkmen)/1986- Repressed Muslim minority in From NAVCO data: 2002 China seeking self- • No campaign

determination rights. (710) From TIES data: In 1989-1990 US, UK, France, Germany and Japan imposed export restriction and suspension of economic

278

agreements (Tiananmen square issue, not Uighurs)

From CIRI data: Very low rights protections. No significant improvements.

From POLITY: Very repressive and undemocratic (-7) From Minorities at Risk data: I put this group into 1 category: No entry because not a minority 1. Western sanctions group From NAVCO: No campaign

From TIES data: From 1977 to 1981 the US terminated foreign aid

Uruguayans (1975-1984) Government repression civil From CIRI data: society and opposition. Medium protections in 1984 and improvement in 1985 onwards.

From Polity:

Very repressive and undemocratic but big improvement in 1985 towards democracy to score of 9 in late

279

1980s.

From Minorities at Risk data: I put this group into 1 category: No entry because not a minority 1. No domestic campaign group because of state repression

From NAVCO: No campaign

Uzbeks (1993-1995) From TIES data: Government repression of civil No sanctions society and opposition.

From CIRI data: Poor rights protections. No significant improvements.

From POLITY data: Very repressive and undemocratic (-9) From Minorities at Risk data: I put this group into 1 category: No entry because not a minority No domestic campaign because of group state repression

Uzbeks (1996-1999) From NAVCO: Government repression of civil No campaign society and opposition.

From TIES data: No sanctions

From CIRI data:

280

Poor rights protections. No significant improvements.

From NAVCO: No campaign

From TIES data: Uzbeks (1999-2000) Government repression of civil No sanctions society and opposition.

From CIRI data: Poor rights protections. No significant improvements.

From POLITY data: Very repressive and undemocratic (-9)

281

From Minorities at Risk data: I put this group into 2 categories: No entry because not a minority 1. Western sanctions group 2. No domestic campaign due to government From NAVCO: repression No domestic campaign

From TIES data: In 2000 US, Canada, Australia Japan impose partial economic Zimbabweans/2000-2000 Government repression of embargo, asset freezes, opposition during election termination of foreign aid, (552) campaigning. travel bans.

CIRI data: Weak rights proteectios (3-5). No significant improvement.

From POLITY: Very repressive and undemocratic (-4)

282