Downloaded from Brill.Com09/30/2021 08:19:38PM Via Free Access Issn 1566–5844 / E-Issn 1569–9856 © John Benjamins Publishing Company 28 Alexis Kalokerinos

The justifying connection, mostly in Greek

Alexis Kalokerinos University of Crete

I examine in this article the discourse function of the Greek connectives jati, epiδi, and afu. After tracing a general theoretical framework for discourse connectives, I focus on the discourse function of jati and epiδi in compari- son with English because. On the basis of that examination, I then study the function of afu. My aim in this article is to expose the instructions that the aformentioned connectives carry for the articulation of discourse. This is a matter of how these small words contribute to the making of complex discourse units, oﬀering a conceptual core with particular procedural meanings and communicating cognition in particular linguistic ways.

Keywords: discourse connectives, Greek

. Theoretical preliminaries

The notion of cause is relevant in sentential semantics, where it participates compositionally in the making of simple (i.e. non-composite) propositions.1 The focus of this article lies beyond the making of simple sentences and ranges from the construction of complex sentences to the construction of complex discourse units.2 Particles that assume sentential connective (SC) functions are the optional formants of complex sentences. Particles that assume discourse connective (DC) functions are the optional formants of complex discourse units.3 Therefore, I diﬀerentiate three levels: a primary sentential level, where lexemes and syntax build up mono-clausal sentences; a secondary sentential level, where sentences are synthesized into a single complex sentence that will be interpreted as a single utterance; and an upper discourse level, where (at least two) utterances are synthesized into discourse units. On the third level the notion of justiﬁcation is to be substituted for the notion of cause.4 These three levels, with special reference to the domain of causal relations, may be schematized as follows:

Journal of Greek Linguistics 5 (2004), 27–80. Downloaded from Brill.com09/30/2021 08:19:38PM via free access issn 1566–5844 / e-issn 1569–9856 © John Benjamins Publishing Company 28 Alexis Kalokerinos

a. a…xcaus…b… → PROPi IF(PROPi) b. (PROPi) Wcaus (PROPj) → PROPi, j IF(Wcaus (PROPi, PROPj)) c. (UTi) Wjust (UTj) → UTi, j Wjust(IF(PROPi), IF (PROPj))

Sentential connectives (Wcaus) synthesize propositional contents (PROP) on a level prior to the advent of the utterance’s (UT) illocutionary force (IF). 5 Discourse connectives (Wjust) link utterances, that is, sentences that are intentionally interpreted, integrating them into complex discourse units (CDU).6 Schematically:

d. DC(UT1, UT2) → CDU e. DC(IFi(PROPi), IFj(PROPj)) → CDU Nevertheless, this is a somewhat simplistic picture. The arguments of DC functions are utterances the meaning of which has not been stabilized and may be enriched (that is, made precise) or modified in the CDU construction. This applies to both sides of any utterance, i.e. its propositional content and its illocutionary force.7 Both may be underspecified and revisable (that is, may be completed, made precise, or reinterpreted) during the construction of discourse. UTs so construed have at least an incomplete logical form and at least a generic illocutionary force (they are at least embryonic utterances, so to say). DCs do not directly bear on the completion of the incomplete logical forms of the utterances they link. Nevertheless, they may affect their illocutionary force. Illocutionary forces of the components of the CDU are visible to DCs. Within a broader scope, DCs may affect the intentional attitudes of the CDU components (see n. 6). In doing so, DCs assume a discourse modality function. I conceive of discourse modality as the integration of utterances into upper-level DUs by affecting the intentional attitudes of their components.8 This I take to be a constitutive property of DCs. DCs intentionally interpret the utterances they connect by integrating them into upper level DUs. From these assumptions it follows as a general prediction that DCs will tend to appear in coordinate (paratactic) constructions and articulate them. Among subordinate constructions, they will be precluded in positions introducing embedded clauses, such as V-bar attachments and complements. On the other hand, higher level (I-bar) attachments and complements allow modality to emerge inside the composite utterance.9 The same subordinating particles often appear in both lower and upper branching positions. Only in the latter case do they assume DC functions. In the former case they assume SC functions. Therefore, subordinating particles may function as DCs when they introduce non-restrictive clauses; otherwise, they act as SCs.10

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The bearers of justificatory DC function are subordinating particles. As we see in greater length in what follows, the sentence they introduce will carry intentional attitudes related to declarative illocutionary force only. The articulation they operate will specify the intentional attitudes of the main (‘nucleus’) sentence. The illocutionary force of the latter will be projected as the unique force of the whole DU, which will appear as a single (though composite) utterance. As a consequence, scheme (c) above has to be restricted to coordination and supplemented with the following, which covers hypotaxis: ′ c . IFi (Wjust(IA proto-i (PROPi), IAj (PROPj)) Among causal DMs, English because, French parce que, and Modern Greek επειδή (epiδi) and γιατί (jati) may assume the DC function of justification, but may also appear in restrictive clauses, assuming (as sentential connectives) their causal-proper procedural meaning, which is not a discourse meaning. As said above, cause does not belong to discourse, to which notions such as justification appertain. Justification is the exclusive function of expressions that may be called DC proper. These appear unable to introduce restrictive clauses. Among them, in the causal domain, are English since and for, French puisque and car, and the Greek αφού (afu). Table 1 recapitulates the above discussion.

Table . Level Notion Particle Particle function intra-sentence cause no – inter-sentence cause yes sentential connective inter-utterance justiﬁcation yes discourse connective

. An elementary DC chart

We may conceive of an aspect of discourse relations in the following way: Discourses are presented as purposeful; they are presented as tending towards conclusions.11 Discourses are presented as coherent; and coherence is regulated by an economy of purposes. Discourses are nesting arguments towards conclusions that serve as the horizon of coherence. They are thus presented as unfolding a coherent argumentative line. Alternatively, discourse may ostensively switch from one argumentative perspective to another. It may abandon one argumentative line in favor of another.

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From this perspective, there are two fundamental options in discourse formation: sustain or switch an argumentative line (see Kalokerinos 1993). The former option is pro-argumentation. The latter option is con-argumentation. These are two fundamental Discourse Relation (DR) types. Con-argumentation may be articulated by oppositive DCs. These include adversative and concessive. Pro-argumentation may be articulated by implicative DCs. These include inferential and causal. In this article I focus on Greek causal DCs as a subset of implicative DCs (IDCs).12 IDCs minimally relate two utterances, a supporting and a supported one. Following Kalokerinos & Fraser (forthcoming), I name the first Source Segment (SS) and the second Target Segment (TS). Inferential DCs (infDCs) introduce TSs; causal DMs (causDCs) introduce SSs. The two main varieties of IDMs realize the connection of utterances to a pro-argumentative Discourse Relation as follows: CAUSALS: {TS, DC-SS} INFERENTIALS: 〈SS, DC-TS〉 It is not possible to mark a UT as TS (i.e. introduce it with an infDC) and make it precede its SS (*〈infDC-TS, SS〉).13 Both positions are in principle available to causal DCs, which are basically subordinating particles (〈TS, causDC- SS〉, 〈causDC-SS, TS〉). The resulting three sequencing configurations correspond to different meaningful options in discourse organization. They realize varying degrees of argumentation, from more rigid to more flexible, as follows: 〈CausDC-SS, TS〉, 〈SS, InfDC-TS〉, 〈TS, causDC-SS〉 The most compact argumentation announces itself from the outset. Once DC is uttered, CDU is overtly predetermined: SS and TS are expected to follow in order. A less rigid argumentation provides an utterance and then character- izes it as SS by providing a DC continuation to the discourse. Finally, the most flexible argumentation provides first a TS whose central (target) discursive status is not altered by the addition of a DC continuation that only brings an SS. The resulting three possibilities for discourse sequencing are exploited for rhetorical purposes. Abstracting from other factors (intonation, syntactic devices) that also have bearing on the functional perspective of discourse, I contend that these different degrees of argumentative rigidity/flexibility are exploited to create different degrees of argumentative entrenchment, rigidity and entrenchment being positively correlated.14

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These ideas are put to trial in the following paragraphs. Here are some examples, from more to less entrenched argumentation: (1) Because there will be shortages in the future, buy your supplies now. (2) There will be shortages in the future, so buy your supplies now. (3) Buy your supplies now, because there will be shortages in the future.

.2 About the scope of discourse connectives

Proposals of domains or planes on which interpretation of discourse may take place range from five (Schiffrin 1987) to two (Sanders et al. 1992, Knott & Dale 1994). The most profligate includes planes relevant to the management of conversation, such as ‘Exchange Structure’ which is roughly equivalent to Redeker’s (1991) ‘Sequential Structure’.15 Since this level is too macroscopic for our concerns here, we leave it out of consideration. Instead we start from Sweetser’s (1990) proposal of three planes of discourse, which has served as the theoretical basis for previous approaches to Greek causal particles (Kitis 1996, forthcoming; Kalokerinos 1999, 2001), and which is illustrated below with her own examples (1990:77, examples renumbered): (4) John came back because he loved her. (5) John loved her, because he came back. (6) What are you doing tonight, because there is a good movie on? According to Sweetser, in (4) “real world causality connects the two clauses”. Under the most plausible interpretation of (5), “the speaker’s knowledge of John’s return (as a premise) causes the conclusion that John loved her”. Finally, in (6) “the because-clause gives the cause of the speech act embodied in the main clause” (ibid. — italics as in the original). Sweetser contends that the ap- parent meaning variation of because in the above utterances (4)–(6) is a case of “pragmatic ambiguity”, due to context management, rather than to the causal marker’s proper semantics. This assumption leads Sweetser to a tripartition of ‘domains of discourse’ into propositional content, epistemic, and speech-act domains.16 Other more parsimonious proposals collapse these three domains into two, generally named ‘semantic’ and ‘pragmatic’. According to Sanders: a relation is semantic if the discourse segments are related because of their propositional content (i.e., the locutionary meaning of the segments)… A relation is pragmatic if the discourse segments are related because of the illocutionary meaning of one or both of the segments. (Sanders 1997:122)17

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This proposal eliminates the intermediate ‘epistemic’ or ‘knowledge-based’ level, which appears to be absorbed into the ‘pragmatic’ level. From the point of view I have adopted here, in (4) because functions as a sentential connective, whereas in both (5) and (6) it functions as a discourse connective. This comes to subsume the Sweetserian epistemic and speech act domains under the same category. Indeed, I argue that epistemic modality as it is displayed on the discourse level is a presentation of psychological mode (i.e. an intentional attitude) and qualifies the utterance’s illocutionary force — although I do not suggest that epistemic modality is fully reducible to such a qualification. On the other hand, the scope of a causDC in CDUs containing non-assertive TS may also focus on the presentation of psychological mode (e.g. desire) underlying the ‘performative’ speech act, on a par with the epistemic attitude underlying the ‘constative’ speech act. I therefore wish to draw a double parallel (to encompass both aspects of intentional attitude, i.e. presentation of psychological mode and illocutionary force) to what Sweetser sees as successive discourse levels. I conclude that both presentation of psychological mode and illocutionary force appertain to her ‘epistemic’ as well as to her ‘speech act’ domains and are therefore aspects of discourse modality; as such they are visible to discourse markers. Note also that both ‘epistemic’ and ‘speech act’ readings are marked by an intonational break between TS and DC- SS, which Sweetser (ibid., pp. 82–86) calls ‘comma intonation’. Nevertheless, knowledge, as the intentional attitude of assertion, entertains a transparent relation to facts that other intentional attitudes lack. I therefore maintain a distinction between epistemic and non-epistemic within the discourse modality domain. Linguistic evidence for this distinction is presented at the end of this section. As far as (5) is concerned, it is obvious that DC-SS provides an epistemic qualification to TS. By uttering (5) the speaker asserts q (the propositional content of TS), endorses p (the propositional content of SS), and presents the relation between p and q as ‘Bq bc p’.18 The DC focuses on an outer layer of the meaning of TS. The status of this intentional attitude meaning (‘S believes q’) is still at stake in the endless discussion about ‘what is said’ and ‘what is impli- cated’, which bears also on the theoretical issue of the semantics–pragmatics distinction.19 The psychological mode of belief constitutes the sincerity condition of the declarative act. By bringing to the fore the ‘epistemic warrant’ of the TS content, the speaker reinforces the status of her assertion and establishes it clearly as a declarative speech act.20 Thus, the epistemic features that show up in the

Downloaded from Brill.com09/30/2021 08:19:38PM via free access The justifying connection, mostly in Greek 33 construction of the overall meaning (here, singled out by the DC function) are constitutive of the performance of discourse.21 Nevertheless, it might be theoretically useful to pay specific attention to the way beliefs are presented, and to the role this presentation of beliefs qua beliefs plays in the unfolding of discourse. From the point of view here exposed, such attention would help to characterize the individual contribution of DCs to the construction of meaning. In the unfolding of discourse, where the modifica- tion of a mutual cognitive environment is attempted (see Sperber & Wilson 1986/1995:38–46), it is important to know whether what is said originates in a belief presented in the same discourse as such, or whether it is introduced as a belief grounded on what is presented as the world. Indeed, this is so important that one would expect it to be done in a procedural way (i.e., beyond conceptual lexicalization).22 Thus, DCs would be expected to contribute to this process. As a matter of fact, this is the work of inferential DCs. They present the content of the discourse segment they introduce as the object of a belief produced within the same discourse. Schematically: 〈p, infDC- Bq〉. Within the same perspective, the ‘epistemic’ use of because in (5) may be schematized as 〈Bp, causDC- q〉 (see Table 2).23 The symmetry of the two forms may be considered as uncovering the motivation for because to enter the domain of epistemicity. The field exhibits complementarity in the formal means to linguistically retrace mental effect. It is also a noticeable fact that pre-positioning of DC-SS seems impossible in the epistemic use of because, reinforcing the aforementioned complementarity: (4′) Because he loved her, John came back. (5′) # Because he came back, John loved her. Let us now turn to Sweetser’s so-called speech act domain and ask what such a modality-free domain could be. In order to get a clearer picture, let us examine the author’s example (here, ex. 6). Her gloss of (6) is as follows: “I ask what you are doing tonight because I want to suggest that we go see this good movie” (ibid., p. 77). This gloss is defective: It merely presents a speech act (TS) as motivated by something that resembles a speech act (SS).24 But, more obviously, DC-SS is specifying the illocutionary force of TS and establishing

Table 2. Epistemicity DC type Constituent order inf 〈p, DC- Bq〉 caus 〈Bp, DC- q〉

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an indirect speech act of invitation. Therefore, the whole complex DU is to be construed as an indirect speech act of invitation. Clearly, this is a modality function of specifying an illocutionary force.25 In a slightly different reading, we might conceive of TS in (6) as a (semi- conventionalized) speech act of invitation. In that reading, SS provides the explicit fulfillment of the preparatory condition that the hearer has motives in order to be responsive to the invitation, and thus strengthens its illocutionary force (again, a modality function). Here, of course, the non-modal element of the propositional content enters the scene to specify that the invitation is an invitation to the movies. In any case, the whole complex DU is an act of indirect invitation. In her discussion of causal DCs, Sweetser contends that “if an utterance is imperative or interrogative in form, then it cannot reasonably be causally con- joined to another utterance except at the speech act level” (1990:78). Neverthe- less, the author concedes in a footnote that “it is not impossible for a content conjunction to occur in an imperative or interrogative speech-act, but such a conjunction must be interpreted as inside the scope of the imperative or interrogative force” (ibid., p. 155). As a matter of fact, there is ample evidence for propositional content (i.e. non-modal) readings of non-assertive because utterances. The following examples show that the SS-introducing causal particle because is able to access either the propositional content of non-assertive TSs, or their illocutionary force. Example (7a) and all others of similar type may take a propositional content reading, i.e. a non-modal one, whereas (b)-type utterances must take an intentional attitude, i.e. modal, reading: (7) a. Buy your supplies now because there will be shortages in the future. b. Buy your supplies now, because I care for you. The crucial point is that example (7a) may be confined to ‘transparent’ non-modal readings whereas example (7b) cannot but take a modal reading. In the latter reading the intentional attitude of TS is pointed at by elements of SS in a way prescribed by the DC. The following glosses, which collapse the complex DU into a single sentence, are revealing: (7) a. i. The reason why you have to buy your supplies now is that there will be shortages in the future. ii. The reason why {I advise you/I want you} to buy your supplies now is that there will be shortages in the future.26 b. i. # The reason why you have to buy your supplies now is that I care for you.

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ii. The reason why {I advise you/I want you} to buy your supplies now is that I care for you.27 a. iii. It is because there will be shortages in the future that you should buy your supplies now. b. iii. # It is because I care for you that you should buy your supplies now. Consider also the following extensions of (7a) and (7b): (7) a. iv. Don’t buy your supplies now because the prices are low but because there will be shortages in the future. b. iv. # Don’t buy your supplies now because I care for you but because I’m an expert in ﬁnancial prediction. Here the adverbial clause is placed under the scope of negation and hence is a restricted clause. This precludes modal interpretations. Sweetser’s speech act example (below, renumbered) with therefore can be treated in the same way, and hence classiﬁed as a modal (DC) case: (8) The rules cannot be broken therefore “No”. a. # The reason for your not doing X is that the rules cannot be broken. b. The reason for {my refusal/my unwillingness} to let you do X is that the rules cannot be broken. The point to stress is that some complex DUs (a-cases) may get a non-modal reading of their parts, whereas others (b-cases) require a processing of intentional meanings in order to achieve composition. In ‘transparent’ non-modal cases, particles behave as sentential connectives. When intentional attitudes enter the game of composition, particles assume DC functions. Epistemic utterances seem to behave in the same way as the rest of the modal cases. Below, Sweetser’s examples (renumbered) are put to the test: (9) John loved her, because he came back. a. # The reason why John loved her is that he came back. b. The reason why {I think/I believe/I conclude} that John loved her is that he came back. (10) The rules cannot be broken, therefore the Dean knew some way around them that allowed him to hire John. a. # The reason why the Dean knew some way around the rules is that they cannot be broken. b. The reason why {I think/I believe/I conclude} that the Dean knew some way around the rules is that they cannot be broken.

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It is nevertheless important to point out that though the two first options in (9b) and (10b) (i.e. paraphrases with think and believe) exemplify aspects of a presented psychological mode, the last one (conclude) does not exemplify an illocutionary force. Concluding is either a ‘mental act’ or a second-order speech act, not a primary illocutionary act.28 The asymmetry between assertive-epistemic and other modal cases appears also in the differing acceptability of the following full paraphrases of (7b) and (5): (7) b″. I advise you to buy your supplies now and the reason {I do so/I want you to do so} is that I care for you. (5″) I state that John loves her and the reason {#I do so/I believe so} is that he came back. (5″′) It is a fact that John loves her and the reason {I say so/I believe so} is that he came back. Obviously, the epistemic status of knowledge is bound to facts in a way that bypasses the illocutionary force of assertion. On the other hand, the illocutionary force of other modal utterances cannot be bypassed and figures in every faithful paraphrase.29 Therefore, there is a functional disparity between epistemic and non-epistemic modality. Epistemic modality (as far as belief is concerned) appears to enjoy a special status in discourse sequencing. This special status is due to the disparity between assertion and other speech acts, a disparity reminiscent of the constative–performative dichotomy. Indeed, this dichotomy appears to be more resistant than Austin has thought, as the importance of the “direction of fit” criterion in the Searlean speech acts taxonomy (Searle 1979:ch. 1) also indicates.30 Now, there are some cases where the (b)-type illocutionary paraphrases will not do. One such a case, which parallels example (5) above, is the following: (11) John loves her, because you have to know.31 Here what is justified by the content of SS is the act of assertion as an act of communication. This is not too far from the “epistemic” (5), yet the only rea- sonable paraphrases of it would be in the following lines: (11′) The reason why {I am telling you/I am informing you/I am asserting/ #I think/#I believe/#I conclude} that John loves her, is that you have to know. In both (5) and (11), because serves the vindication of one of the Gricean max- ims of communication. By using because, the speaker presents her assertion

Downloaded from Brill.com09/30/2021 08:19:38PM via free access The justifying connection, mostly in Greek 37 as grounded, respectively, on knowledge (Grice’s quality maxim,32 ex. 5) and on relevance (Grice’s relevance maxim, ex. 10). In the second case, the speaker goes one step further, a step encompassing and indeed presupposing compliance to the claim for veridicality.33 Nevertheless, there are cases where both content and intentional attitude are ‘invisible’ to the import of DC-SS. These focus exclusively on the situation of communication and pick up elements of the communicative setting to justify not an illocutionary act but a higher-order act of communication: (12) John loves her, because you didn’t hear it. (13) Does John love her? Because I didn’t hear anything. (14) Go! Because you didn’t hear it. In the above complex DUs, the marker introduces the justiﬁcation of the repetition of an illocutionary act, not of the illocutionary act that is being repeated. These are instances of a metacommunicative (we might say, metamodal) function of the DCs.34 As a matter of fact, there is one step further that a causal DC can take, namely comment on and justify etic aspects of the communicative act: (15) GO! Because we have to shout in this place. These are also, broadly speaking, DC instances, since the particle qualiﬁes ac- tantial aspects of the discourse segments that are synthesized into complex discourse units. The theoretical discussion so far may be summarized as follows. In the model proposed here, Sweetser’s ‘speech act’ level has been absorbed into the domains of modal and non-modal uses. Inside the modal domain, a distinction between epistemic and non-epistemic is being made. Finally, an upper level metacommunicative (metamodal) level is added. Table 3 recapitulates discussion in this section.

Table 3. Restrictive: Sentence Connectives Non-restrictive: Discourse Connectives Non-modal Modal Metamodal epistemic ‘saying that’ ‘saying how’ non-epistemic

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2. Greek particles for justiﬁcation

Generally speaking, both English and Modern Greek (MG) appear to have at least one general purpose causal particle that ranges from non-modal to metamodal uses. In contemporary spoken English, this is because. In spoken MG though, two DCs — epiδi and jati — appear to compete for the same position. Native speakers of MG are hardly able to tell any meaning difference between the two connectives. Indeed, these are interchangeable in most contexts. According to Kitis (1996), however, jati carries a mark of “subjectivity” which epiδi is lacking. An epiδi-clause can appear in first position, preceding the main clause, but jati is not acceptable in this position. Like English for, MG jati is confined to second position:35 (16) Gr. {Επειδή / *Γιατί} ο Γιάννης την αγαπούσε, γύρισε. {epiδi / *jati} o janis tin aγapuse jirise. Eng.{Because / *For} John loved her, he came back. This is summarized in Table 4. Table 4.

English Modern Greek 〈TS, because SS〉 〈TS, epiδi SS〉 〈because SS, TS〉 〈epiδi SS, TS〉 〈TS, for SS〉 〈TS, jati SS〉 *〈for SS, TS〉 *〈jati SS, TS〉

In what follows, I first attempt to track the behavior of epiδi and jati over all domains of use, in order to draw comparative semantic profiles. I then try to place these profiles against the prepositional background of jati, namely the preposition ja. Since a similar background is found in English (for, preposition and connective) and to some extent in French (pour), this correlation leads to some reflections on the constitution of the linguistic expression domain of justification across languages such as Greek, English, and French. Finally, I try to reveal the semantic identity of connective afu as compared to its English and French cognates, since and puisque.

2. epiδi and jati in the non-modal and modal domains

Both epiδi and jati support non-modal uses:

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(17) Ο Γιάννης γύρισε {γιατί / επειδή} την αγαπούσε. o janis jirise {jati / epiδí} tin aγapuse. “John came back because he loved her.” (18) Ο Γιάννης δεν γύρισε {γιατί / επειδή} την αγαπούσε o janis δen jirise {jati / epiδi} tin aγapuse αλλά {γιατί / επειδή} ήθελε λεφτά. ala {jati / epiδi} iθele lefta. “John didn’t come back because he loved her but because he wanted money.” At ﬁrst sight epiδi seems not to accommodate to modal uses (cf. 5 and 6 above): (19) Ο Γιάννης την αγαπούσε, {γιατί / ??επειδή} γύρισε. o janis tin aγapuse, {jati / ??epiδi} jirise. “John loved her, because he came back.” (20) Τι κάνεις το βράδυ; {Γιατί / ??Επειδή} έχει ένα καλό έργο. ti kanis to vraδi? {jati / ??epiδi} exi ena kalo erγo. “What are you doing tonight, because there is a good movie on.” Based on the examples above, epiδi appears to be limited in connecting propositional contents. Jati applies equally to both the epistemic and the non-epistemic side of the modal domain. When epistemicity or illocutionary force are made propositionally explicit, epiδi becomes acceptable (cf. Kitis 1994:312): (21) Ο Γιάννης την αγαπούσε. Το ξέρω επειδή γύρισε. o Janis tin aγapuse. to ksero epiδi jirise. “John loved her. I know that, because he came back.” (22) Τι κάνεις το βράδυ; Σε ρωτάω επειδή έχει ένα καλό έργο. ti kanis to vraδi? se rotao epiδi exi ena kalo erγo. “What are you doing this evening? I’m asking because there’s a good movie on.” But this simply (and trivially) amounts to a demodalization of the modal uses, by transforming modal functions into propositional contents. As also expected, in (21) and (22) jati can replace epiδi with no loss of acceptability. Thus epiδi seems to accomplish a proper subset of the discourse functions that jati (as well as because) can accomplish. But, as said above, there is something epiδi can do that jati cannot: an epiδi-clause can appear in ﬁrst position, preceding the main clause.

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Now, as observed by Kalokerinos (1999:143), it appears that by putting epiδi in front, one can accomplish more than a declarative speech act: (23) Επειδή δεν μπορώ να τα κάνω όλα μόνος μου, ασχολήσου λίγο και συ. epiδi δen boro na ta kano ola monos mu, asxolisu liγo ke si. “Because I can’t do everything alone, spend some time on it too.” (24) Επειδή είμαι κρυωμένος, μήπως μπορείτε να κλείσετε το παράθυρο; epiδi ime kriomenos, mipos borite na klisete to paraθiro? “Because I have a cold, can you close the window?” (25) Επειδή μας συνδέουν παλαιοί δεσμοί φιλίας, θα σας epiδi mas sinδeun palei δesmi filias, θa sas συμπαρασταθούμε μέχρι τέλους. simbarastaθume mexri telus. “Because old ties of friendship bind us, we will stand by you to the end.” (26) Επειδή δεν πάει άλλο, παραιτούμαι. epiδi δen pai alo, paretume. “Because I can’t take any more of this, I quit.” (27) Επειδή αποδείχθηκες άξιος, σου απονέμω το μετάλλιο του Φοίνικος. epiδi apodixθikes aksios, su aponemo to metalio tu finikos. “Because you have proved yourself worthy, I award you the Phoenix medal.” (28) Επειδή έχεις ταλαιπωρηθεί, είθε να σου έρθουν όλα δεξιά. epiδi exis taleporiθi, iθe na su erθun ola δeksia. “Because you have had a rough time, may everything turn out right for you.” The justified main sentence in (23) and (24) expresses a directive act in a direct and an indirect way respectively. (25) is a promise (a commissive speech act). (28) is a wish (an expressive act). (26) and (27) are declarations, the first accomplished with a performative verb. All five types of Searle’s (1979:ch. 1) speech act taxonomy are represented. Examples (23)–(28) above are ‘hybrid’ cases, which may receive non-modal or modal readings. The following examples are pure modality cases:36 (29) Επειδή ακούγονται πολλά, θα είστε τελικά υποψήφιος; epiδi akuγonde pola, θa iste telika ipopsifios? “Because so much has been said, will you in fact be a candidate?”

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(30) Επειδή σε νοιάζομαι, κάνε τις προμήθειές σου τώρα. epiδi se niazome, kane tis promiθies su tora. “Because I care for you, buy your supplies now.” A common trend in these constructions is the strong preference of epiδi for the initial position (〈DC-SS, TS〉 configuration). On the contrary, jati is limited to the second position (in non-declarative as well as in declarative contexts). Thus, there are two complementary propositional schemes: f. epiδi X, [non-declarative] g. [non-declarative], jati X Configuration (f) is strongly preferred for epiδi, while configuration (g) is oblig- atory for jati. The choice between (f) and (g) is one of argumentative strategy. (f), a configuration of ‘entrenched argumentation’ (see §1.1 above), is opted for in more formal or polemic discourse contexts. As remarked in Kalokerinos (1999:143), in circumstances where our utterances do not present our words as fitting the world and thus a de re warrant for our speech is missing, the possibility of placing a ‘cause’ in front of the non-declarative that carries the bulk of the utterance is welcomed. This is not a question of thematizing (‘topicalizing’) the content of the epiδi-clause (Kitis 1996:425–428), let alone a matter of ‘iconic syntax’ (Kitis, forthcoming).37 Nevertheless, some applications of the (g) scheme would appear to be problematic, including example (20), inverted, even though in this form it seems somewhat better (ex. 31 below). Variants of (31) such as (32) and (33) sound worse: (31) ? Επειδή έχει ένα καλό έργο, τι κάνεις το βράδυ; ? epiδi exi ena kalo erγo, ti kanis to vraδi? “Because there’s a good movie on, what are you doing tonight?” (32) (?)?Επειδή έχει ένα καλό έργο, έχετε κάτι για σήμερα το βράδυ; (?)?epiδi exi ena kalo erγo, exete kati ja simera to vraδi? “Because there’s a good movie on, have you got any plans for this evening?” (33) (?)?Επειδή έχει ένα καλό έργο, εξακολουθείται να είστε κλεισμένη (?)?epiδi exi ena kalo erγo, eksakoluθite na iste klismeni τα βράδια; ta vraδja? “Because there’s a good movie on, are you still busy every evening?”

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Note that jati, in its accepted (post)position, is totally unproblematic for the expression of the same content: (34) Έχετε κάτι για σήμερα το βράδυ; Γιατί έχει ένα καλό έργο. exete kati ja simera to vraδi? jati exi ena kalo erγo. “Have you got something for this evening? Because there’s a good movie on.” (35) Εξακολουθείτε να είστε κλεισμένη τα βράδια; Γιατί έχει ένα eksakoluθite na iste klismeni ta vraδja? jati exi ena καλό έργο. kalo erγo. “Are you still busy every evening? Because there’s a good movie on.” Problematic epiδi-examples (20), (31)–(33) are to be contrasted with unproblematic ones such as (22) and the following: (36) Επειδή έχει ένα καλό έργο, σας προσκαλώ να το δούμε μαζί. epiδi exi ena kalo erγo, sas proskalo na to δume mazi. “Because there is a good movie, I invite you to see it with me.” (37) Επειδή έχει ένα καλό έργο, ελάτε να το δούμε μαζί. epiδi exi ena kalo erγo, elate na to δume mazi. “Because there is a good movie, come and see it with me.” (38) Επειδή έχει ένα καλό έργο, τι θα λέγατε να το δούμε μαζί; epiδi exi ena kalo erγo, ti θa leγate na to δume mazi? “Because there is a good movie, what would you say to seeing it together?” (39) Επειδή έχει ένα καλό έργο, μπορείτε να το δούμε μαζί; epiδi exi ena kalo erγo, borite na to δume mazi? “Because there is a good movie, can you see it with me?” The difference between problematic (31)–(33) and the unproblematic (36)– (39) is one of (relative) explicitness. (36) is an explicit invitation and (37) is a ‘primary’ (grammaticalized) speech act. (38) and (39) are indirect but nevertheless quasi-conventionalized acts of invitation. These are almost fossilized generalized conversational implicatures. It appears that epiδi has some difficulty in accessing the particularized conversational implicature that is the meaning of the main sentences in (31)–(33). Example (31), which is less problematic, stands between the two cases. It carries a partly conventionalized conversational implicature. The difference between

Downloaded from Brill.com09/30/2021 08:19:38PM via free access The justifying connection, mostly in Greek 43 conventionalized and particularized conversational implicature is notoriously a matter of degree, since initially particularized implicatures, by reason of gen- eralization, get in the way of conventionalization (see Horn 1989:343–352; cf. Levinson 2000:134, 262–264). By the same token, utterances (23)–(29) carry the marks of their illocutionary force. (24) is similar to (39), a generalized conversational implicature (see Levinson 1983:104). Let us now turn to some cases where both epiδi- and jati-introduced clauses appear in postposition. The following examples provide an environment where jati and epiδi carry diﬀerent meanings: (40) Έλα, γιατί το φαγητό θα κρυώσει. ela, jati to fajito θa kriosi. “Come on, because the food will get cold.” (41) ? Έλα, επειδή το φαγητό θα κρυώσει. ? ela, epiδi to fajito θa kriosi. “Come on, because the food will have cooled down.” Utterance (40) is normally understood as meaning that the meal will get cold if the hearer doesn’t come in time. This meaning is not available for utterance (41), which can only be used to invite the hearer to get a cold (or, at least, cool) meal. This interpretation is also available for (40) but needs special contextual support. (The same contextual support is needed in order to make sense of (41).) Thus, (40) means preferentially (42): (42) Έλα (αμέσως), γιατί αν δεν έρθεις (αμέσως), το φαγητό θα κρυώσει. ela (amesos), jati an δen erθis (amesos), to fajito θa kriosi. “Come (right now), because if you don’t come (right now) the food will get cold.” The same construction with the same meaning is possible with epiδi: (43) Έλα (αμέσως), επειδή αν δεν έρθεις (αμέσως), το φαγητό θα κρυώσει. ela (amesos), epiδi an δen erθis (amesos), to fajito θa kriosi. The point is that, though (40) is preferentially understood as meaning (42/43), this is not even possible for (41). jati appears again to have access to elements of the overall meaning that are not expressed. Nikiforidou & Raptis think that directive utterance-types create “alternative mental spaces due to the possibility of compliance or non-compliance of the hearer they create” (1999:201, my translation). This explanation is inadequate

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for two reasons: First, it doesn’t say why jati is sensitive and epiδi insensitive to the alleged bipartition of mental spaces. Second, and more important, it disre- gards the fact that the sensitivity of jati extends beyond directive contexts, as the following example attests: (44) Φεύγω, γιατί θα με σκοτώσει. fevγo, jati θa me skotosi. “I’m leaving, because he’s going to kill me.” The preferential interpretation of the above is that “I am leaving, becauseother - wise he will kill me”, though a suicidal interpretation (“I’m going in order to be killed”) is acceptable in the appropriate context. The latter reading is the only one possible for: (45) Φεύγω, επειδή θα με σκοτώσει. fevγo, epiδi θa me skotosi. “I’m leaving because he’s going to kill me.” Utterances (44) and (45) are clearly declarative and non-modal. The problem with epiδi is not that it does not have access to the counterfactual meaning. The point is that in order to do so, it needs the appropriate grammatical support. Such support is provided by the irrealis tense/aspect of the verb in the subordinate clause of the following example: (46) Έφυγε γιατί θα τον έπιαναν. efije jati θa ton epianan. “He left because they’d have caught him.” (47) Έφυγε επειδή θα τον έπιαναν. efije epiδi θa ton epianan. “He left because they’d have caught him.” Here a counterfactual meaning has become grammaticalized and epiδi gains access to it.38 Some native speakers may prefer (46) to (47), but none reject the following utterance, where the grammatical means get lexical support: (48) Έφυγε επειδή θ’ αναγκαζόνταν να πληρώσει. efije epiδi θ anangazotan na plirosi. “He left because he’d have been forced to pay.” We therefore conclude that, in these non-modal cases, epiδi becomes acceptable if the clause it introduces incorporates the marks of an overall quasi- counterfactual reading of the constuction. Now, what about our initial modal

Downloaded from Brill.com09/30/2021 08:19:38PM via free access The justifying connection, mostly in Greek 45 cases? As the distribution of acceptability in the following examples indicates, the tendency for pre-positioning of epiδi-SS, following the (g) pattern above, is confirmed: (49) Επειδή το φαγητό θα κρυώσει, προσπάθησε να κάνεις πιο γρήγορα. epiδi to faγito θa kriosi, prospaθise na kanis pio γriγora. “Because the food will get cold, try to be quicker.” (50) Επειδή θα σε πιάσουν, ετοίμασε τα πράγματά σου και φύγε. epiδi θa se piasun, etimase ta praγmata su ke fiγe. “Because they’ll catch you, get your things ready and leave.” (51) ?? Προσπάθησε να κάνεις πιο γρήγορα, επειδή το φαγητό θα κρυώσει. ?? prospaθise na kanis pio γriγora, epiδi to faγito θa kriosi. “Try to be quicker, because the food will get cold.” (52) ?? Ετοίμασε τα πράγματά σου και φύγε, επειδή θα σε πιάσουν. ?? etimase ta praγmata su ke fiγe, epiδi θa se piasun. “Get your things ready and leave, because they’ll catch you.” Thus far we have seen that epiδi may enter non-epistemic modality contexts, provided that the SS it introduces appears in first position and the TS carries explicit (lexical or grammatical) illocutionary marks. On the contrary, jati (always introducing SS in second position) appears to steer the mind of the speaker/hearer towards handling information that goes beyond lexicogrammatical clues in both non-declarative and declarative contexts (such as (30), above). Here again, epiδi sticks to the explicit. Next we see that, despite first impressions again, epiδi can be used in epistemic contexts, provided that explicit epistemic marks are present. Compare example (19), repeated here as (53), to (54)–(55): (53) ?? Ο Γιάννης την αγαπούσε, επειδή γύρισε. ?? o janis tin aγapuse, epiδi jirise. “John loved her, because he came back.” (54) Ο Γιάννης την αγαπούσε, προφανώς, επειδή γύρισε. o janis tin aγapuse, profanos, epiδi jirise. obviously “John obviously came back because he loved her.” (55) a. Ο Γιάννης πρέπει να την αγαπούσε, επειδή γύρισε. o janis prepi na tin aγapuse, epiδi jirise. must subj

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b. Ο Γιάννης θα την αγαπούσε, επειδή γύρισε. o janis θa tin aγapuse, epiδi jirise. epist “John must have loved her, because he came back.” As we see, the addition of epistemic adverbs (54) or grammatical markers of epistemicity to the main clause (55a, b) renders (53) acceptable.39 Notice, however, that in spite of the strong preference for epiδi to occur in initial position in non-epistemic modal contexts, in epistemic ones this is, strictly speaking, impossible: (56) ?? Επειδή ο Γιάννης γύρισε, (προφανώς) θα την αγαπούσε. ?? epiδi o Janis jirise, (profanos) θa tin aγapuse. This fact is in accordance with a general tendency for functional differentiation of causal DCs vis-à-vis inferential DCs inside the epistemic domain (see above, §1.2). This tendency for differentiation between DC classes appears to over- ride the tendency for internal differentiation (i.e. inside the class of causals) which manifests itself in the modal non-epistemic domain (where there is no competition between causal and inferential DCs). The situation is schematized in Table 5.

Table 5. Modal domain Epistemic Non-epistemic causDCs epiδi 〈TS, causDC-SS〉 〈causDC-SS, TS〉 jati 〈TS, causDC-SS〉 〈TS, causDC-SS〉 infDCs ara, epomenos, sinepos, … 〈SS, infDC-TS〉 —

The above observations extend our description of the behavior of epiδi (‘sticks to the explicit’) to the totality of the modal domain. jati, in contrast, can go beyond the meaning supported by lexicogrammatical clues, to the inferential/implicit part of meaning. Furthermore, as the following examples indicate, epiδi needs a representational TS substratum in order to operate (even when its operation is steered towards (explicit) presentational TS aspects of meaning, as in epistemic modality cases).40 In contrast to jati, it is unable to introduce an SS justifying an expressive TS with no representational content:41 (57) A: Θα έρθει ο Τάκης. θa erθi o takis. “Takis is coming.”

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B: Ωχ, {γιατί / ??επειδή} μου είναι ανυπόφορος! ox, {jati / ??epiδi} mu ine anipoforos! “Oh [no], [DC] I can’t stand him!” (58) [Pulling some luggage from a conveyor belt:] Συγγνώμη, {γιατί / ??επειδή} είναι βαριά. siγnomi, {jati / ??epiδi} ine varja. “Excuse me, [DC] it’s heavy.” (59) Άντε, {γιατί / ??επειδή} βιάζομαι. ande, {jati / ??epiδi} viazome. “[HORT], [DC] I’m in a hurry.” (60) A: Η Μαρία προσλήφθηκε. i maria proslifθike. “Maria got the job.” B: Ωραία, {γιατί / ??επειδή} είναι ικανή. orea, {jati / ??epiδi} ine ikani. “Good, [DC] she’s skilled.” The overall picture we have gained so far is one of no conceptual difference between epiδi and jati. If we adopt the modularity-of-mind hypothesis, we can say that the same notional relation is linguistically embodied in two different ways by the two causal markers.42 That is, though the total meaning is the same, the markers carry different instructions as to its partition into linguistically expressed and conceptually recoverable meaning. epiδi carries an instruc- tion of explicitness on a representational TS base. More accurately, it steers its SS towards the explicit representational meaning of TS or towards the explicit presentational part of a construction endowed with representational content. Restriction in the use of epiδi is compensated for by its mobility. epiδi-clauses may precede or come after the main clause (TS). On the other hand, jati is much more liberal, since it has access, beyond the explicit and representational, to both presentational and implicit representational aspects of TS, without requiring a representational basis of the former.43 Nevertheless, it is restricted being postpositioned. Table 6 is a partial recapitulation of the above discussion.44

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Table 6. Focusing on presentational/ Requiring representational meaning representational meaning of TS of TS epiδi  explicit  yes jati ◊ implicit ◊ no

2.2 epiδi and jati in the metamodal domain

In the domain of metamodality, the acceptability of epiδi appears to follow the same pattern as revealed in our treatment of the modal cases: (61) ? Επειδή πρέπει να ξέρεις: Ο Γιάννης την αγαπά. ? epiδi prepi na kseris: o janis tin aγapa. “Because you have to know: John loves her.” (62) Ο Γιάννης την αγαπά. {Γιατί / ??Επειδή} πρέπει να ξέρεις. o janis tin aγapa. {jati / ??epiδi} prepi na kseris. Example (61) is far better with a clitic pronoun that is anaphoric to the following TS (i.e. is cataphoric): (63) Επειδή πρέπει να το ξέρεις: Ο Γιάννης την αγαπά. epiδi prepi na to kseris: o janis tin aγapa. The same is true for pure metacommunicative cases examined in §1.2 above. Here is an example: (64) Επειδή δεν το άκουσες: Ο Γιάννης την αγαπά. epiδi δen to akuses: o janis tin aγapa. “Because you didn’t hear it: John loves her.” (65) Ο Γιάννης την αγαπά. {??Επειδή / Γιατί} δεν το άκουσες. o janis tin aγapa. {??epiδi / jati} δen to akuses. It seems more diﬃcult to go further with epiδi to the etic aspects of the communicative act: (66) ?? Επειδή πρέπει να φωνάζουμε εδώ πέρα: ΠΗΓΑΙΝΕ! ?? epiδi prepi na fonazume eδo pera: pijene! “Because we have to shout in this place: GO!” (67) ΠΗΓΑΙΝΕ! {??Επειδή / Γιατί} πρέπει να φωνάζουμε εδώ πέρα. pijene! {??epiδi / jati} prepi na fonazume eδo pera. “GO: Because we have to shout in this place.”

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Inside the metamodal domain there is an area that appears inaccessible to epiδi. This is the quasi-analytic justification of a saying by rendering explicit a presupposed part of its content. jati appears to feel comfortable in this role also: (68) Μετάνιωσα που τον σκότωσα — {γιατί / ??επειδή} τον σκότωσα. metaniosa pu ton skotosa — {jati / ??epiδi} ton skotosa. “I regret killing him — for kill him I did/’cos I did kill him.”45 (69) Έπαψε να πηγαίνει — {γιατί / ??επειδή} πήγαινε. epapse na piγeni — {jati / ??epiδi} piγene. “He stopped going — ’cos he used to go regularly.” (70) Είδα το φάντασμα του Πύργου — {γιατί / ??επειδή} υπάρχουν iδa to fandasma tu pirγu — {jati / ??epiδi} iparxun φαντάσματα. fantasmata. “I saw the Pyrgos ghost — for ghosts do exist.” Here jati but not epiδi proves to fulfill the function of justifying a way of saying whatever is said in TS by rendering explicit in SS presuppositions carried by factive (68) or change-of-state verbs (69), or by existential presuppositions of definite descriptions (70). To the extent that justification goes beyond this analytical move to add content, epiδi also becomes (almost) acceptable: (71) Έπαψε να πηγαίνει — {γιατί / ?επειδή} πήγαινε τακτικά. epapse na pigeni — {jati / ?epiδi} pigene taktika. “He stopped going — [DC] he used to go regularly.” (72) Είδα το φάντασμα — {γιατί / ?επειδή} υπάρχουν φαντάσματα iδa to fandasma — {jati / ?epiδi} iparxun fandasmata στον Πύργο. ston pirγo.46 “I saw the ghost — [DC] there are ghosts at Pyrgos.” In a similar vein, epiδi is almost acceptable, along with fully acceptable jati, in justificatory commentaries of a previous utterance that are presented, in one way or another, as informative by themselves: (73) Ο φίλος μου — {γιατί / ?επειδή} μόνο ένα φίλο έχω — ερχόταν o filos mu — {jati / ?epiδi} mono ena filo exo — erxotan καθημερινά να με δει. kaθimerina na me δi. “My friend — [DC] I’ve only got one friend — came to see me every day.”

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(74) Ο Σταύρος — {γιατί / ?επειδή} έτσι τον έλεγαν — γύρισε και είπε o stavros — {jati / ?epiδi} etsi ton eleγan — jirise ke ipe με ύφος σοβαρό […] me ifos sovaro […] “Stavros — [DC] that’s his name — turned and said in a serious tone […]” (75) Ο Μάκης ή Κίλλερ — {γιατί / ?επειδή} πρόκειται o makis i kiler — {jati / ?epiδi} prokite για το ίδιο πρόσωπο — περίμενε τα θύματά του […] ja to iδjo prosopo — perimene ta θimata tu […] “Makis or the Killer — [DC] he is one and the same person — stalked his victims […]” (76) Ο δολοφόνος — {γιατί / ?επειδή} περί δολοφόνου πρόκειται — […] o δolofonos — {jati / ?epiδi} peri δolofonu prokite — […] “The murderer — [DC] he is a murderer — […]” Indeed, even the ‘core analytical’ examples (68)–(70) become acceptable, if a lexical mark of the speaker’s endorsement of the TS content is put inside the SS: (68′) Μετάνιωσα που τον σκότωσα — {επειδή / γιατί} {πράγματι/όντως} metaniosa pu ton skotosa — {epiδi / jati} {praγmati/ondos} τον σκότωσα. ton skotosa. “I regret killing him — [DC] I really did kill him.”47

2.3 jati in a broader frame The particlefor has an explanatory DC use in written English, similar to Greek jati. This is so also in sentence-initial position following an explanandum in the preceding sentence. Thus jati and ‘causal’ for both are always in second position. Here are two examples from contemporary scientific prose: (77) The best we can do […] is avail ourselves of the content of a sentence qua anchored; for it’s only qua anchored that a sentence has content. (Fodor 1987:50) (78) These findings alone, however, cannot prove the position that Lenneberg proposed, for they are consistent as well with other quite different conjectures about processes that underlie language learning. (Gleitman & Newport 1995:3)

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Similar uses are also abundant in 19th-century texts such as Darwin’s The Voy- age of the Beagle (1831–1836). Here are two examples:48 (79) I profited, however, by my acquaintance with the Portuguese padre, for on another occasion he gave me a fine specimen of the Yagouaroundi cat. (80) I confess, however, there is a very great difficulty in imagining any one spot to be the birthplace of the millions of millions of animalcula and confervae: for whence come the germs at such points? What is of more interest is that in Darwin’s text one finds occurrences of for similar to the metacommunicative comments on the utterance expressed by jati-clauses, as examined above. Here are some examples: (81) I heard one of his mad buffoons (for he keeps two, like the barons of old) relate the following anecdote. (82) At night I experienced an attack (for it deserves no less a name) of the “Benchuca”, a species of Reduvius, the great bug of the Pampas. (83) The numerous specimens shot either on Chatham or Charles Island (for the two sets were mingled together) all belonged to the two other species. There is a straightforward similarity or analogy between (81) and (68), between (82) and (76), and (83) and (75). Significantly, all of the Darwinian examples above contain for-clauses in parentheses, as commentaries on the speaker’s utterance which they make more explicit, by bringing to the fore whatever is meant to be conveyed but is not actually said. jati is the product of the composition of the preposition ja and the factual complementizer oti “that” (Andriotis 1988:66a). The Greek preposition ja is the rough equivalent of the English preposition for. Thus, the etymology ofjati could be transcribed in English as “for-that”. Now, we can extend the space of similarities by noticing that the French preposition pour, the rough equivalent of Greek ja and English for, has both a purposive and an etiological function (see Cadiot 1991:250). These are exhibited, respectively, in the following examples: (84) Il est là pour tuer sa femme. “He is there in order to kill his wife.” (85) Il est là pour avoir tué sa femme. “He is there for having killed his wife.”

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Both French pour and Greek ja contribute to the formation of the interrogative equivalents of English why: Interrogatives pourquoi and jati (a homonym of etiological jati) have as second parts the equivalents quoi and ti, which mean the same as the English what. These interrogatives are neutral between etiology and teleology. The questions they introduce are satisﬁed by both teleological and etiological answers: (86) Eng. A: Why did he come? B1: Because you were in need. B2: To help you. Fr. A: Pourquoi est-il venu? B1: Parce que tu l’avais besoin. B2: Pour t’aider. Gr. A: Γιατί ήρθε; jati irθe? B1: Γιατί το είχες ανάγκη. Β2: Για να σε βοηθήσει. jati to ixes anangi. ja na se voiθisi.49 Some Greek grammarians and linguists (e.g. Tzartzanos 1945, Petrounias 1984) choose to write για να (ja na) (“in order to”) as a single word: γιανά. Ac- cording to Tzartzanos, this is a “particle of purpose” (1945 II. 139).50 Indeed, ja na (i.e. ja + the mark of the subjunctive) appears to be able to express purpose in all three domains (non-modal, modal, and metamodal), as the following examples attest: (87) Ο Γιάννης ήρθε για να σε βοηθήσει. o janis irθe ja na se voiθisi. “John came to help you.” (88) Για να μη νομίζεις ότι δεν σε φροντίζω: Κάνε τις προμήθειές σου τώρα. ja na mi nomizis oti δen se frondizo: kane tis promiθies su tora. “Just so you don’t think I don’t take care of you: Buy your supplies now.” (89) [Accompanying a slap on the face:] Για να μάθεις! ja na maθis! “That’ll teach you!” Nevertheless, ja na introducing purpose leaves an empty space in Table 3 above; this is the space of epistemic modality. As a matter of fact, the contents of purpose as a goal to achieve and of belief as an achieved mental basis for infer- ence are conceptually incompatible. Therefore, we should not expectja na, as a marker of purpose, to carry epistemic meaning. The marker’s compositionality should, however, allow it to function in ways other than expressing purpose.

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Basically, as prepositions, English for, French pour, and Greek ja all carry the central meanings of intention, purpose, and cause. On the other hand, na-complements carry non-factual meanings. Now, it is predictable that a meaning of intention and cause, combined with a meaning of non-factuality — teleology precluded — could give a compositional meaning of non-factual epistemicity.51 This is the case in the following example, which is clearly epistemic: (90) Ο Γιάννης (θα) είναι εδώ, για να έχει το αμάξι του απέξω. o janis (θa) ine eδo, ja na exi to amaksi tu apekso. “John must be here for his car to be outside.” Clearly, (90) is understood as epistemic: John’s presence is inferred from the presence of his car. The overall meaning is similar to the same utterance with (epistemic) jati instead of ja na: (91) O Γιάννης (θα) είναι εδώ, γιατί έχει το αμάξι του απέξω. o janis (θa) ine eδo, jati exi to amaksi tu apekso. “John must be here, because his car is outside.” There is, however, a crucial difference between (90) and (91): Unlike the speaker of (91), the speaker of (90) does not necessarily endorse the propositional content of the subordinate clause as a fact. The factuality of the epistemic justification is not warranted in (90), which can be paraphrased with a hypotheti- cal “if his car is outside, then he must be here”.52 The non-commitment of the speaker to the truth of the proposition of the subordinate clause with ja na can be made explicit, as is shown in (92), which, incidentally, also exhibits the capability of ja na to occupy (again in contrast to jati) the first position of a sequence: (92) Για να έχει το αμάξι του απέξω — όπως διατείνεται η Μαίρη — ο ja na exi to amaksi tu apekso — opos δjatinete i meri — o Γιάννης θα είναι εδώ. janis θa ine eδo. “For his car to be outside, as Mary claims, John must be there.” The comparative semantic chart forja na and jati is given schematically in Table 7.53

Table 7. Non-modal Modal Metamodal Epistemic Non-epistemic ja na telic ‘causal’ [–factual]54 telic telic jati causal ‘causal’ [+factual] ‘causal’ ‘causal’

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Let us now recapitulate the findings of this section. English for, French pour, and Greek ja, as prepositions, carry a similar bundle of central meanings: intention, purpose, and cause. This interlingual grouping of meanings is obviously due to their conceptual affinity.55 Even though the three prepositions have similar semantic potentials, their fates diverge outside of the prepositional domain. Greek ja has moved towards discourse-marker functions in two ways: It accepts subjunctive (na) complements which carry basically non-factual meanings. This is in harmony with the preposition core meanings of intention and purpose, which are also non-factual. Furthermore, it accepts indicative complements (introduced by oti) which carry basically factual meanings. By so doing, it has formed a sentential connective marker that is basically factual, a marker of cause. Nevertheless, we could posit that the intentional potential of the preposition has survived by being mapped onto expressed intentional attitudes, thus producing a flexible discourse marker of justification. French pour took the first way, by accepting infinitival (non-past) constructions and que-complements, but only a small part of the second, by taking perfect infinitives.56 English for evolved semantically in a way parallel to the Greek preposition. Today’s retraction of for from meanings that are carried in Greek by jati might be attributable to its not having taken the steps that produced a new Greek grammatical particle. Greek discourse marker jati, but not its English counterpart, has gained stability (indeed, a new lexical identity) by incorporat- ing in the former preposition (ja) the factual complementizer (oti). For instead remained a polysemic expression and is now being assaulted in the territory of discourse markers by ’cos, a derivative of the main English causal particle because, whose ‘paratactic uses’ (see Schleppegrell 1991) are mostly instances of metacommunication.

2.4 jati, epiδi: A summary

The situation for the MG equivalents of because can be summarized as follows: In the non-modal (‘propositional content’) domain jati and epiδi are interchangeable as sentential connectives (given restrictions of position for jati, which can never have SS placed in first position). As discourse markers though, jati and epiδi appear to be complementary elements. In ‘epistemic’ readings, where no order other than TS-first is acceptable, epiδi requires at least some grammatical clues for the epistemic nature of TS.57 In the rest of the modal cases, the epiδi-introduced segment (SS) preferentially appears first, whereas

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Table 8. Non-modal Modal Metamodal declarative non-de- epistemic non-epis- ‘saying that’ ‘saying how’ clarative temic epiδi {TS, e-SS} 〈e-SS, TS〉 〈TS, e-SS〉 〈e-SS, TS〉 (〈e-SS, TS〉) (〈TS, e-SS〉) jati 〈TS, j-SS〉 〈TS, j-SS〉 〈TS, j-SS〉 〈TS, j-SS〉 〈TS, j-SS〉 〈TS, j-SS〉 ja + subj {TS, j-SS} because {TS, b-SS} {TS, b-SS} 〈TS, b-SS〉 {b-SS, TS} {TS, b-SS} (〈TS, b-SS〉) for 〈TS, f-SS〉 〈TS, f-SS〉 〈TS, f-SS〉 〈TS, f-SS〉 similar jati-introduced segments always appear second, in compliance with a general requirement of that DC. Moreover, epiδi tends to focus on explicit and representational aspects of the TS, whereas jati also embraces the implicit and the presentational aspects of TS. This complementarity gives rise to different functional perspectives and reflects different strategies of argumentation.58 Fi- nally, in metamodal uses, epiδi appears to be heavily restricted. A whole area of metacommunicative uses is occupied solely by jati. This discussion is recapitulated in Table 8.

2.5 afu

In what follows I take afu and its English and French cognates, since and puisque, as assuming the same core function in their respective languages inside the implicative domain. afu, since, and puisque (henceforth, the ASP group) exhibit a propensity for epistemic interpretations (93). In the classic example of direct propositional content etiology (see16 above; also Sweetser 1990:77, Kitis 1996:430) they seem odd (see ex. 94). If the same sequencing is epistemically modalized (95, 96), the sentences improve; put in dialogue (97), the result is perfect. (93) Gr. Ο Γιάννης την αγαπούσε, αφού γύρισε. o janis tin aγapuse, afu jirise. Eng. John loved her, since he came back. (94) Gr. ? Ο Γιάννης γύρισε αφού την αγαπούσε. ? o janis jirise afu tin aγapuse. Eng. ? John came back since he loved her. (95) Gr. Ο Γιάννης θα γύρισε αφού την αγαπούσε. o janis θa jirise afu tin aγapuse. Eng. John must have come back since he loved her.

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(96) Gr. Ο Γιάννης θα γυρίσει αφού την αγαπά. o janis θa jirisi afu tin aγapa. Eng. John will come back since he loves her. (97) Gr. A: Ο Γιάννης γύρισε. o janis jirise. B: Ε, βέβαια, αφού την αγαπά. e, vevea, afu tin aγapuse. Eng. A: John came back. B: Of course he did, since he loved her. Semantic definitions for the ASP group are, broadly speaking, epistemic, and most involve a notion of “constitutive alterity” (Ducrot 1984:168). The propensity for dialogic environments and epistemic interpretation must be taken into account when defining the procedural meaning of since, puisque, and afu as discourse connectives. According to Heinämäki (1975), “both the speaker and the hearer assume the proposition in a since-clause to be true”. Group λ-l (1975:278) claims that the speaker of a puisque-utterance “seeks to oblige the hearer to admit the speech act that is accomplished by saying [whatever the SS means]”. Ducrot (1984:158ff.) also argues that the responsibility of assertion of the content of a puisque-clause is projected onto the co-speaker (“al- locutaire”). According to Kalokerinos: afu introduces a proposition as a belief or the object of a belief which does not belong exclusively to the speaker, if indeed at all. Furthermore, the knowledge of this belief (i.e. the knowledge that this belief exists as someone’s belief) be- longs to the interlocutors’ mutual cognitive environment; it is mutually mani- fest to them. (2001:316) Finally, Wickboldt (1997:134) proposes that “the necessary and sufficient condition for a causal meaning [of since] is that the content of the clauses [i.e. TS, SS] allows inferring a causal relation, with the since-proposition as the reason”. I argue here that the last definition is somewhat weak and that the rest are too strong. In what follows, I contend that a function of backgrounding, together with a function of free epistemic anchoring, is at the kernel of the procedural meaning of afu, since, and puisque. ASP obviously stems from a temporal origin. Indeed, English and Greek members still are in a relation of complementary ambiguity with temporal meanings (see Kalokerinos 2001). Since and afu are ambiguous between a temporal sentence connective meaning (V-bar attachment) and a causal discourse

Downloaded from Brill.com09/30/2021 08:19:38PM via free access The justifying connection, mostly in Greek 57 marker meaning (I-bar attachment; see Wickboldt 1997 and §1.1 above). Obvi- ously enough, the non-modal temporal meaning is grammatically prior to the modal causal meaning. Representations of facts on the temporal non-modal level are upgraded to presentations of assumed facts on the implicative modal level.59 Assumptions of facts (i.e. facts that are presented as assumed) form a background. Therefore, I argue that what is conceived of as past providing a temporal framework for the main clause events in the non-modality sentential domain is transformed into background in the upper-modality domain of discourse. 60 Crucially, assumptions need to be made by someone; they require an anchoring in person. Though the default bearer of whatever is assumed is the bearer of the first person, I suggest that the background of assumptions in communication tends to assimilate to (or, to simulate) the established necessary mutual cognitive environment. This claim does not come to postulate mutual knowledge for the contents of the ASP clauses. Rather, it means that the default bearer of the backgrounded assumptions will not be the sole speaker.61 The anchoring of these assumptions remains semantically unspecified and becomes a matter of negotiation during the processing of ASP-articulated discourses. The backgrounding effect ofafu should be taken as responsible for the loss of the performative reading of performative verbs entering the ASP scope:62 (98) Δεν θα είμαι πια στα πόδια σας, αφού παραιτούμαι. δen θa ime pia sta poδja sas, afu paretume. “I will no longer be in your way, since I am resigning.” Let us now review some evidence about anchoring. As noted above, ASP preferentially does not anchor its content to the speaker exclusively (since this anchoring provides a more solid background). This tendency of ASP should materialize in constraints on monological uses of these markers and lead to a propensity for dialogue. As a matter of fact, this is what the following examples illustrate (taken from Kalokerinos 2001, translated and renumbered): (99) Gr. Έλα, {επειδή / ?αφού} το θέλω. ela, {epiδi / ?afu} to θelo. Eng. Come, {because / ?since} I want you to. Fr. Viens, {parce que / ?puisque} je le veux. (100) Gr. Έλα {αφού / ?επειδή} το θέλεις. ela, {afu / ?epiδi} to θelis. Eng. Come, {since / ?because} you want to. Fr. Viens, {puisque / ?parce que} tu le veux.

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(101) Gr. A: Έλα. ela. B1: Θα έρθω, {αφού / ??επειδή} το θέλεις. θa erθo, {afu / ??epiδi} to θelis. B2: Θα έρθω, {επειδή / ??αφού} το θέλω. θa erθo, {epiδi / ??afu} to θelo. Eng. A: Come. B1: I’ll come, {since / ??because} you want me to. B2: I’ll come, {because / ??since} I want to. Fr. A: Viens. B1: Je viendrai, {puisque / ??parce que} tu le veux. B2: Je viendrai, {parce que / ??puisque} je le veux. Nevertheless, one can find ASP utterances where the audience’s consent is not being solicited. As far as Greek and French are concerned, of the following pairs of utterances only the second requires external anchoring. (102) Gr. Δεν υπάρχει σωτηρία για τους Μαρμαγεδόνες, αφού ούτε στο δen iparxi sotiria ja tus marmajeδones, afu ute sto θεό πιστεύουν ούτε στους ανθρώπους. θeo pistevun ute stus anθropus. Eng. There is no salvation for Marmagedons, since they believe neither in God nor in man. Fr. Les Marmagedons vont périr, puisque ils ne croient ni en Dieux, ni en l’homme. (103) Gr. Αφού οι Μαρμαγεδόνες δεν πιστεύουν ούτε στο θεό ούτε afu i marmagoδones δen pistevun ute sto θeo ute στους ανθρώπους, δεν υπάρχει σωτηρία γι’ αυτούς. stus anθropus, δen iparxi sotiria j aftus. Eng. Since Marmagedons believe neither in God nor in man, there is no salvation for them. Fr. Puisque les Marmagedons ne croient ni en Dieux, ni en l’homme, ils vont périr. Utterances like (102) may be satisfied by an undefined (zero) anchoring which receives as a default value what French theorists such as Berrendonner (1981: ch. 2) and Ducrot (1984) name “on”, a sort of “public opinion”. Indeed, the SS’s content appears as anchored to an impersonal background. This is a pervasive and ever-increasing use of afu in journalistic writing. It appears much less in face-to-face interaction. In written discourse, where common background is

Downloaded from Brill.com09/30/2021 08:19:38PM via free access The justifying connection, mostly in Greek 59 not a matter of on-line negotiation, the producer of discourse may take the opportunity to present as established a content that she is simply not willing to focus on and back up. By the same token, she may focus on the TS only, i.e. the justified sentence. This is also important from a functional sentence-perspective point of view, since the ASP-introduced justifying sentence can never be focused. On the contrary, the use of particles such as because, epiδi, and parce que never precludes that possibility and thus cannot prevent readings that take the justifying sentence as the focus of discourse. The general discourse-functional tendency is forafu- introduced sentences to occupy non-focal positions (i.e. positions related to ‘topic’), for jati-introduced ones to occupy focal (non-topic) positions, and for epiδi to occupy both. However, in the 〈TS, e-SS〉 configuration, which carries mostly non-modal meanings, epiδi tends to introduce focal information: (104) A: Γιατί γύρισε; jati jirise? “Why did he come back?” B1: Γύρισε, επειδή την αγαπούσε. jirise, epiδi tin aγapuse. “He came back because he loved her.” B2: Επειδή την αγαπούσε, γι’ αυτό γύρισε. epiδi tin aγapuse, j afto jirise. “Because he loved her, he came back.” (105) A: Τι θα κάνει εξαιτίας της αγάπης του; ti θa kani, eksetias tis aγapis tu? “What will he do out of love?” B1: ?? Θα γυρίσει επειδή την αγαπά. ?? θa jirisi, epiδi tin aγapa. “He will come back, because he loves her.” B2: Επειδή την αγαπά, θα γυρίσει. epiδi tin aγapa, θa jirisi. “Because he loves her, he will come back.” This tendency embodies a default information structure; given that afu always introduces non-focal information by reason of its semantic background, the same tendency leaves room for it to assume a complementary function, i.e. to provide TS in 〈TS, DC-SS〉 order with focal value. By the same token, in this particular configuration afu gets a de-modalized reading, where the need for epistemic anchoring has faded away. In written discourse this even provides a stratagem for evoking new information while keeping it out of focus and

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reserving the focal position for TS information. The following utterances, which open and close newspaper articles respectively, are examples of this strategy: (106) Ρουκέτες εξαπέλυσε ο κ. Α. Τσοχατζόπουλος, αφού, όπως ανέφερε ruketes eksapelise o k. A. Tsoxatsopulos, afu, opos anefere μιλώντας σε συνεργάτες του, είναι πεπεισμένος πως [υπάρχει] ένα milondas se sinergates tu, ine pepismenos pos [iparxi] ena συντονισμένο σχέδιο για την πολιτική του αποδυνάμωση. sindonismeno sxedio ja tin politiki tu apoδinamosi. (TA NEA, 9/4/2001, front page, main article)63 “Mr. Tsohatzopoulos [Defense Minister] launched a full-scale attack, since, as he mentioned while talking to his associates, he is convinced that there is a co-ordinated plan aimed at weakening his political position.” (107) Τέλος η τιμή της την κάνει ακόμα πιο ενδιαφέρουσα αφού με telos i timi tis tin kani akoma pio enδiaferusa afu me 2.150.000 δρχ. αποκτάτε μια μοτοσυκλέτα […] 2.150.000 drx apoktate mia motosikleta […] (Auto NEA, 21/3/2001, p. 10). “Last of all, its price makes it even more attractive, since for 2.150.000 drs you get a motorbike […]” The functional discourse perspective in the non-modal domain is thus summarized in Table 9. Evidence for the situation schematized in Table 9 comes from the distribution of acceptability in the following examples: (108) Γύρισε, {επειδή / γιατί / αφού} την αγαπούσε. jirise, {epiδi / jati / afu} tin aγapuse. “He came back, [DC] he loved her.” (109) Γύρισε, ακριβώς {επειδή / γιατί / *αφού} την αγαπούσε. jirise, akrivos {epiδi / jati / *afu} tin aγapuse. “He came back, precisely [DC] he loved her.”

Table 9. 〈Topic, Focus〉 〈Focus, Topic〉 〈e-SS, TS〉 yes yes 〈TS, e-SS〉 yes no 〈TS, j-SS〉 yes no 〈TS, a-SS〉 no [yes]

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(110) {Επειδή / *Γιατί / #?Αφού} την αγαπούσε, γύρισε. {epiδi / *jati / #?afu} tin aγapuse, jirise. “[DC] he loved her, he came back.” (111) Ακριβώς {επειδή / *γιατί / *αφού} την αγαπούσε, γύρισε. akrivos {epiδi / *jati / *afu} tin aγapuse, jirise. “Precisely [DC] he loved her, he came back.” Generally speaking, fronting afu and puisque in Greek and French requires more speciﬁc anchoring. This is not true for English since, which does not require situated anchoring in either position. Nevertheless, there are several motivations for the Greek and the French stance. These motivations predict that if there is a diﬀerence in meaning between the two orderings (i.e. 〈SS, TS〉 and 〈TS, SS〉), fronting the SS will require broader grounding. First, simple epistemic 〈SS, TS〉 order is reserved for inferential DCs and cannot be realized by causal DCs. As said above, this is a matter of economy in discourse sequencing: Simple epistemic uses of causal and inferential DCs tend toward complementary distribution. Nevertheless, in Greek and French this distribution may be outweighed by a supplement of meaning brought by computable external epistemic anchoring. Second, being fronted places the marker, as noted above, in the position of entrenched argumentation. It is the most presupposition-like. Anchoring outside the subject of speech appertains to entrenched argumentation. An additional motivation, related to the latter, is that this position is the most favorable for the reprise of contents (explicit or implicit) of a previous discourse of another subject. Previous discourse provides an excellent source for external anchoring. Let us now explore some aspects of the metamodal (metacommunicative) behavior of the ASP group in both monologic and dialogic discourse, starting with monologic contexts.64 (112) Gr. Μετάνιωσα που τον σκότωσα — {γιατί / ??αφού} τον metaniosa pu ton skotosa — {jati / ??afu} ton σκότωσα. skotosa. Eng. I regret killing him — {for / ??since} kill him I did/ {’cos / ??since} I did kill him.

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(113) Gr. Έπαψε να πηγαίνει — {γιατί / ??αφού} πήγαινε. epapse na pijeni — {jati / ??afu} pijene. Eng. He stopped going — {’cos / ??since}he used to go. (114) Gr. Είδα το φάντασμα — {γιατί / ??αφού} υπάρχουν φαντάσματα. iδa to fandasma — {jati / ??afu} iparxun fandasmata. Eng. I saw the ghost — {for / ??since} ghosts do exist. ASPs sound very odd in these contexts. They are not eligible for retrieving presuppositions of factive and change-of-state verbs, or temporal presuppositions. The same is true for existential presuppositions of deﬁnite descriptions. But this is exactly what we should expect if indeed ASP group has a backgrounding function. Metacommunicative functions such as the ones examined here are designed to put aspects of the implicit to the fore. So, in a movement of second thought, they spell out the implicit by focusing on it. The ASP group has the reverse function, that is, to provide background. But in the above cases the background is already there as a presupposition. It can be retrieved and focused upon, but not given again as such, which is the function of the ASP group. In other words, it can be represented but not presented, since presentation has already taken place in presupposition. It is a noticeable fact that if the entity of (114) is not existentially presupposed but posited in TS, then it can be commented upon by an ASP clause, providing an (existential) background for it: (115) Gr. Αυτό που είδα ήταν φάντασμα — αφού υπάρχουν φαντάσματα. afto pu iδa ítan fandasma — afu iparxun fandasmata. Eng. What I saw was a ghost — since ghosts do exist. When the implicit is not already there, as in the aforementioned analytic cases, ASP goes well. (Here again there may be diﬃculties in accepting sheer ASP clauses as metacommunicative comments, but the situation improves with the addition of explicit external epistemic anchoring): (116) Gr. Ο Σταύρος — {γιατί / αφού} έτσι τον έλεγαν — γύρισε και o stavros — {jati / afu} etsi ton eleγan — jirise ke είπε με ύφος σοβαρό […] ipe me ifos sovaro […] Eng. Stavros — {for/since} that’s his name — turned and said in a serious tone […]

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(117) Gr. Ο Μάκης ή Κίλλερ — {γιατί / αφού} πρόκειται για το ίδιο o makis i kiler — {jati / afu} prokite ja to iδio πρόσωπο — περίμενε τα θύματά του […] prosopo — perimene ta θimata tu […] Eng. Makis or the Killer — {for/since} he is one and the same person — stalked his victims […] (118) Gr. Ο δολοφόνος — {γιατί / αφού} περί δολοφόνου πρόκειται —… o δolofοnos — {jati / afu} peri δolofonu prokite — … Eng. The murderer — {’cos/since} he IS a murderer — … It is to be noted that afu and epiδi present a quasi-similar distribution of acceptability in the two groups of examples above (see 68–76). Both appear unable to render explicit in SS what was implicitly contained in TS. But they do so for quite different reasons: epiδi cannot reach what is implicit in TS; afu has to assume a presentational function for SS and therefore cannot merely re-present what is implicit in TS. Beyond the ‘analytic implicit’ of TS, that is, in the second group of examples, both are more or less acceptable (though epiδi is less preferable than jati, and afu needs contextual backing). The ‘synthetic implicit’ does not belong to TS; it may be presented as additional information (epiδi) or as belonging to a common background (afu).65 Indeed, even examples (112)–(114) become acceptable if a lexical mark of what is now considered as common background is added: (114′) Gr. Είδα το φάντασμα — αφού, λοιπόν, υπάρχουν φαντάσματα. iδa to fandasma — afu, lipon, iparxun fandasmata. after all Such an utterance is more likely to appear in a dialogue, where the previous speaker assumes the existence of ghosts. As a matter of fact, things are much more flexible for ASP with respect to dialogic environments, concerning the retrieval of implicit information: The interlocutor has at least the following options (illustrated from ex. 119 on): 1. Retrieve explicit or implicit information of the first speaker’s speech in order to use it as a background for a new pro-argumentative sequencing. This is a pervasive use of the ASP group. 2. Undermine the first speaker’s speech by denying some implicit information upon which her argumentation is based. Somewhat surprisingly, this possibility is realized by afu, which appears in interjective utterances without TS, exposing a background that contradicts the one on which the former

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speaker’s speech appears to have been based. How is it possible to deal with sheer background (that is, a background without a foreground)? I argue that, due to the interjective character of the utterance, this contradicting background is not posited but exposed or shown, so that its character as a background is being respected. In this role afu may be headed by ma, which is a dialogic oppositive marker in Greek (see Kalokerinos 2001:320–321). English and French simply use but and mais. (119) A: Ο Λάκης έπαψε να καπνίζει μετά από 25 χρόνια. o lakis epapse na kapnizi meta apo 25 xronia. “Lakis gave up smoking after 25 years.” B1: [Ναι, αλλά] αφού κάπνιζε τόσα χρόνια, θα έχει μαυρίσει τα [ne, ala] afu kapnize tosa xronia, θa exi mavrisi ta πνευμόνια του. pnevmonia tu. “[Yes, but] since he smoked for so many years, he will have tarred up his lungs.” B2: Αφού δεν κάπνιζε ποτέ! afu δen kapnize pote! “[DC] he never did smoke!” (120) A: Μετάνιωσα που τον σκότωσα. metaniosa pu ton skotosa. “I regret killing him.” B1: Αφού τον σκότωσες, δεν υπάρχει σωτηρία. afu ton skotoses, δen iparxi sotiria. “Since you killed him, there is no salvation.” B2: Αφού δεν τον σκότωσες! afu δen ton skotoses! “[DC] you didn’t kill him!” (121) A: Είδα το φάντασμα. iδa to fandasma. “I saw the ghost.” B1: Αφού υπάρχουν φαντάσματα, θα πρέπει να κινούμαστε με προσοχή. afu iparxun fandasmata, θa prepi na kinumaste me prosoxi. “Since there are ghosts, we will have to move with caution.” B2: Αφού δεν υπάρχουν φαντάσματα! afu δen iparxun fandasmata! “[DC] ghosts do not exist!”

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As the (B2)-type replies suggest, afu is not, strictly speaking, a causal DC. Since and puisque have undergone grammaticalization so as to incorporate a basic causal relation to their core meaning. This is not the case with afu. Although this marker is preferentially invested with a causal meaning, this comes from a pragmatic processing that is still external to its meaning. If this line of reason- ing holds, then in the ASP case there might be no direct step from temporality to causality as is ordinarily assumed.66 Furthermore, realizing option 1 above, ASP may explicitly undertake elements of meaning that are now presented as entering the mutual cognitive environment, such as the interlocutor’s implicatures. Consider, for example, standard implicatures of quality in the following: (122) Gr. A: Ο Γιάννης είναι πολύ ικανός. o janis ine poli ikanos. B: Αφού νομίζεις ότι είναι τόσο ικανός, θα μπορούσες afu nomizis oti ine toso ikanos, θa boruses να δουλέψεις μαζί του. na δulepsis mazi tu. Eng. A: John is very competent. B: Since you think he is so competent, you could work with him. (123) Gr. A: Κέρδισε χθες ο Ολυμπιακός; kerδise xθes o olimbiakos? B: Δεν θα είσαι και πολύ φανατικός, αφού δεν ξέρεις το δen θa ise ke poli fanatikos, afu δen kseris to αποτέλεσμα. apotelesma. Eng. A: Did Olympiakos win yesterday? B: You can’t be much of a fanatic, since you don’t know the result. From the theoretical angle of speech acts, these represent the mention of the sincerity condition of a statement and a preparatory condition for a question respectively (Searle 1969:66).67 Furthermore (and indeed, one step beyond), ASP articulates dialogic environments containing understood conclusions (124, 125) as well as recognition of indirect speech acts (126, 127):

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(124) Gr. A: Ο φίλος μου ερχόταν να με βλέπει καθημερινά. o filos mu erxotan na me vlepi kaθimerina. B: Eίσαι τυχερός, αφού έχεις τέτοιο καλό φίλο. ise tixeros, afu exis tetio kalo filo. Eng. A: My friend came to see me every day. B: You are lucky, since you have such a good friend. (125) Gr. A: Ο καιρός ήταν υπέροχος, είχε ελάχιστο κόσμο και καλό o keros itan iperoxos, ixe elaxisto kosmo ke kalo ψάρι. psari. B: Αφού περάσατε τόσο καλά, θα ξαναπάτε του χρόνου. afu perasate toso kala, θa ksanapate tu xronu. Eng. A: The weather was excellent, there was hardly anyone else and good fish. B: Since you had such a good time, you’ll be wanting to go/ be going again next year. (126) Gr. A: Μήπως υπάρχει λίγο νερό; mipos iparxi liγo nero? B: Να σας δώσουμε, αφού το θέλετε. na sas δosume, afu to θelete. Eng. A: Is there perhaps some water? B: We’ll give you some, since you want it. (127) Gr. A: Θα έπρεπε ίσως να ξαναδοκιμάσεις. θa eprepe isos na ksanaδokimasis. B: Θα το κάνω, αφού με συμβουλεύεις. θa to kano, afu me simvulevis. Eng. A: You should perhaps try again. B: I will, since you advise me to. The same semantic features (i.e. backgrounding with free epistemic - an choring) render since and afu appropriate for the speech acts of concession and provocation. This depends on the respective endorsement or non-endorsement by the speaker of whatever she attributes (and projects) to the other side of the communicative exchange. The following examples illustrate the point: (128) Gr. A: Πέτα το. peta to. B: Αφού το θέλεις … afu to θelis …

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Eng. A: Throw it away. B: Since you want me to … (129) Gr. A: Έχω πάρει βραβείο στα μαθηματικά exo pari vravio sta maθimatika. B: Αφού είσαι τόσο καλός (όσο λες), ποια είναι η τετραγωνική afu ise toso kalos (oso les), pia ine i tetraγoniki ρίζα του 4594; riza tu 4594? Eng. A: I have an award in mathematics. B: Since you are so good (as you say), what is the square root of 4594? But only Greek afu can react to silent events, again exploiting interjection (where the background announces itself): (130) [In a car accident, one driver to the other, at the beginning of the verbal encounter:] Gr. Αφού είχα το φλας αναμένο, κόπανε! afu ixa to flas anameno, kopane! Eng. * Since I had my indicator on, jerk! Fr. * Puisque j’avais le clignotant allumé, espèce de connard! In a word, the retrieval of implicit information with afu — in order to create background that initiates a new turn — appears to be a very productive operation. Let us now summarize the findings of this section: I have argued that one DC from the causal group in English, French, and Greek specializes in the management of background presentation. Background is a set of assumed facts. The fixation of the subject of the assumption is a matter of negotiation and processing. Images of the other and personal speech strategy enter into the process. There is no need to postulate mutual knowledge instructions in the procedural meaning of ASP, since the independently running theory of mind is always there to do the job. Greek afu may present sheer background, so it is not strictly speaking a causal DC, though this is its main derivative (but not yet grammaticalized) discourse function. In the written it also enters the non-modal domain, filling an empty slot left byepi δi from a functional (topic- focus) discourse perspective. Given the above, Table 8 can be complemented as in Table 8a.

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Table 8a. Non-modal Modal Metamodal Epistemic Non-epist. ‘saying that’ ‘saying how’ epiδi {TS, e-SS} 〈TS, e-SS〉 〈e-SS, TS〉 (〈e-SS, TS〉) (〈TS, e-SS〉) jati 〈TS, j-SS〉 〈TS, j-SS〉 〈TS, j-SS〉 〈TS, j-SS〉 〈TS, j-SS〉 ja + subj {TS, j-SS} afu 〈TS, a-SS〉 {TS, a-SS} {TS, a-SS} {TS, a-SS} (〈TS, a-SS〉)

3. A short epilogue

This study is incomplete in many respects. It does not treat the totality of particles and locutions that function as sentential connectives of cause and as discourse connectives of justification. It is only selectively and variably comparative. Moreover, it simplifies the non-modal domain in order to focus on phenomena of discourse modality. Nevertheless, some methodological, theoretical, and empirical questions are brought to the fore. In this study I have had recourse to general frameworks in three respects: – a theory for the compositional construction of discourse (though an incomplete one). – a integrative (though elementary) cartography of the whole area of SC/DC particles based on argumentation theory. – a modular view of meaning production involving language, cognition, and interaction (still to spell out clearly). The proposed partitioning of the domains of meaningful units was put to trial in order to capture the variance of scope of SC/DC particles from inner to outer levels of meaning. Along the way, we saw that a combination involving a preposition underwent a shift (ja + oti → jati, presumably with ja losing its categori- cal status as a preposition per se in the combination) and a sentence connective developing into a discourse marker (afu, temporal SC → afu, causal DC). The main theoretical axes appealed to for the identification of the procedural meaning of the particles are (a) explicit/implicit68 and (b) representational/presentational.69 The main result of the investigation on epiδi and jati was that their distinction is significant in the discourse connective domains (not in the sentential connective domain). epiδi appeared to be restricted to the explicit and the representational; jati appeared to be positionally restricted (though in the domains of act — i.e. modal and metamodal — the two markers tend towards complementary positional distribution on functional grounds).

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Features of presentational meaning are shared by jati and afu. Neverthe- less, the potential of jati to capture presentational meaning is steered towards

TS, whereas that of afu is directed to SS. Schematically: PRESTS jati-SS Vs TS afu-PRESSS. afu appears to be an instance of discourse modality emergence, dealing, by linguistic procedural means, with the question of belief anchored within the interactive setting. The management of the belief-fact relation (what we named epistemicity) appeared to have a complex and subtle articulation. An army of connectives (afu, epiδi, jati, ja [na], and the whole legion of inferential DCs) appear to contribute with speciﬁc features (anchoring, factuality, direc- tionality) to the expression of that relation, a cornerstone for communicated cognition. On the whole, discourse connectives appear from our point of view as interface entities articulating the module of language with submodules of general cognition such as inferential mechanisms and the theory of mind. This articulation is carried out in the interactive perspective of communication. It should be stressed that DC particles cannot be conceived as ‘cognitive weapons’, i.e. as revealing something about cognition alone. They are tools of communicated cognition and hence mobilize cognitive mechanisms in their articulation with language. The function of the particles under investigation has been dubbed justiﬁcation. Indeed, so conceived, they belong to the realm of argumentation and their meaning is procedural in the strongest possible sense.

Notes

. This is not the place to tackle the philosophical underpinnings of the notion of cause, which go back to Aristotle, Hume, and Kant. It should, however, be noted that questions as to whether causation is reducible to a conditional conﬁguration (Mackie 1993 [1965]) or whether it is a primary notion (Scriven 1993 [1966]) may also be relevant for semantic linguistic analysis. For a recent overview of the philosophical literature on causation, see Psillos (2002).

2. For the lexical semantics of cause from a variety of perspectives, see Jackendoﬀ (1990: ch. 9), Pustejovsky (1995:ch. 9), Wunderlich (1997), Talmy (2000:ch. 8).

3. ‘Discourse markers’ in Kalokerinos & Fraser (forthcoming).

4. One could at this point expect a gradience in terms of cause/reason/justiﬁcation to be proposed. As a matter of fact, according to Grice, production of meaningnn necessitates the recognition of “a reason, not merely a cause” (Grice 1989:221, 92). Nevertheless, from the

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point of view adopted here reasons are classiﬁed as justiﬁcations or causes, depending on whether their bearer is an utterer or not.

5. Utterances are here to be conceived within a Searlean framework as instantiations of functions of illocutionary forces over propositional contents [IF(PROP) → UT] (Searle 1969:ch. 3).

6. We may thus think of DCs as the linguistic expression of functions that map n-uples (for simplicity, pairs) of utterances onto upper-level discourse units. Here ‘intentional interpretation’ has a broader meaning than ‘speciﬁcation of illocutionary force’. Utterances are illocutionary acts. As Searle puts it: “in the performance of each illocutionary act with a propositional content we express a certain Intentional state with that propositional content, and that Intentional state is the sincerity condition of that type of speech act” (1983:9). Searle conceives of intentional states as functions of psychological modes over representa- tive contents (ibid., p. 6). In what follows I subsume under the term intentional attitude the notions of illocutionary force and psychological mode as presented within the sincerity condition of the act. (Note that this is a question of communicatively presented rather than actual psychological state. As Tsohatzidis (1995:222) puts it: “One must present oneself as having those beliefs, desires and intentions, whether or not one actually has them”.)Therefore, I subsume under the term of intentional attitude the core non-propositional-content aspects of meaning, i.e. Searle’s essential and sincerity conditions of illocutionary acts (leaving aside ‘preparatory conditions’; see Searle, ibid.). This theory will prove useful for linguistic analysis in §1.2 below.

7. Broadly speaking, it applies to all aspects of meaning expressed by the utterance, i.e. propositional content and intentional attitude (see also n. 6).

8. Obviously enough no appeal is made here to the morphosyntactic (grammatical) category of mood. Our starting point is the semantic category of modality (cf. Bybee & Fleisch- man 1995:2). Therefore, whenever (non-)modal uses or functions are mentioned, reference is made to bearers or exempliﬁers not of mood, but of discourse modality.

9. These, in Hopper & Traugott’s (1992:169–170) and Mathiessen & Thompson’s (1988:282–283) terms are cases of ‘hypotaxis’. For a Functional Grammar (FG) gradience from parataxis to embedding, see Lehmann (1988:189).

0. For the distinction between restrictive and non-restrictive clauses, see Rutherford (1970). Cf. also Mathiessen & Thompson (1988), who relate ‘embedding’ and ‘hypotaxis’ to restrictive and non-restrictive relative clauses respectively.

. This approach is inspired by Anscombre and Ducrot’s argumentation theory. See Ans- combre & Ducrot (1983), Ducrot (1984).

2. For convenience, I keep the term ‘causal’, though it would be more accurate to dub them ‘justiﬁcatory’.

3. This discourse feature establishes the paratactic character of the infDCs.

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4. Cf. the discussion by Mathiessen & Thompson (1988) of the alleged “unchallengeable” character of hypotactic clauses. Though the authors reject this as an inherent trend of such clauses, they note (in their FG terms) that “[an unchallengeable] interpretation is especially likely when these satellites precede their nucleus” (1988:315).

5. For a concise comparative review of these proposals, see Fraser (1999:932–936).

6. These correspond to Schiﬀrin’s fact-based, knowledge-based, and action-based relations (see Fraser 1999:934), though it is not clear how these ‘relations’ relate to her ﬁve ‘planes of talk’. Interestingly, Iatridou (1991) came to a similar three-way partition of the domains of interpretation in her study of conditionals within a GB syntactic framework.

7. Sander’s bipartite division of discourse levels is also adopted by Knott & Dale (1994).

8. B is the belief-operator; bc abbreviates because.

9. See Carston (1988), Récanati (1989), Bach (1994). For a more recent discussion, see Turner (1999) and Levinson (2000:ch. 3).

20. For the notion of epistemic warrant, see Lyons (1977:808–809).

2. Additional evidence for this line of thought in the domain of modal verbs is put for- ward by J. Palmer: “The subjective (and performative) nature of epistemic judgments is emphasized by the fact that epistemic MAY and MUST have no past tense forms that are used to refer to past time … May have and must have occur, but make present time judge- ments about past events. It is the proposition, not the modality, that is past. A ‘performative’ expression of subjective modality can be made only at the moment of speaking” (Palmer 1986:60). The performative character of epistemicity is perhaps best captured by Lyons’s term epistemic commitment (Lyons 1995:254).

22. For the distinction between conceptual and procedural meaning, see Wilson & Sper- ber (1993).

23. For detailed argumentation for this meaning form, which is diﬀerent from Sweetser’s reading as far as the content of SS is concerned, see Kalokerinos (2000).

24. In a footnote Sweetser contends that SS is “a separate assertive speech act” (ibid., p. 155).

25. This description conforms to and exempliﬁes formula (c′), §1.1 above.

26. Of these intentional attitude options, the ﬁrst focuses on illocutionary force and the second on psychological mode.

27. The proper paraphrase should be longer: “I advise you to buy your supplies now, and the reason I do so is that I care for you”.

28. In Grice’s terms (1989:122), concluding is a “noncentral speech act”, the performance of which is dependent upon the performance of a “central speech act” (here, a declaration). An assertion may also be a conclusion, in the broader frame of discourse composition. Every

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utterance carries a primary illocutionary force and, on a higher level, contributes as a speech act to the construction of discourse. On that level it may be an argument or a conclusion.

29. In Dretske’s terms, epistemic operators are “semipenetrating” operators (2000:32). The rest of modality operators should be ranged among the author’s “nonpenetrating operators”.

30. Additional evidence for this resistance may be provided by Grice’s speciﬁcation of the

“effect” that meaningnn produces on the “audience”, namely belief or intention (1989:105, 123). Even if, according to Jackendoff (1985), believing and intending are “two sides of the same coin”, they are nevertheless two different sides.

3. A non-assertive parallel: (i) Buy your supplies now, because I must show that I care for you.

32. More speciﬁcally, the second submaxim (“Do not say that for which you lack evidence”), taken on the positive side.

33. Papafragou (2000) also denies the existence of a distinct speech act modality. Never- theless, the relevance-theoretical notion of ‘metarepresentation’ she invokes cannot help in handling example (11) here proposed.

34. Within a FG framework, Dik et al. (1990) make a distinction that is partially parallel to the one here proposed, between what they name proposition satellites and illocutionary satellites. Relevant examples of theirs are the following: (i) John’s at Sue’s house, because his car’s outside. [proposition sat., p. 37] (ii) Since you are interested, John is a catholic. [illocutionary sat., p. 39]. They rightly conclude that “propositional satellites specify the attitude of the speaker vis- à-vis the fact designated by the proposition” (ibid., p. 64) and contend that “illocutionary satellites … operate outside the illocutionary layer”. Nevertheless, they conclude, wrongly in my view, that “illocutionary satellites specify or modify the illocutionary force of the speech act in which the proposition is presented” (ibid., p. 64).

35. For is qualiﬁed as “dated or literary” by English dictionaries. Nevertheless, it is very common in written usage. I tackle the issue of that particle later on.

36. See the paraphrase test for the distinction between modal and non-modal readings, in §1.2.

37. For several reasons, iconicity fits very badly with causative discourse constructions. First, it reduces the cause/reason/justification complex to factual causality or else it presents a ‘subjective’ order as opposed to an ‘objective’ one. In the latter case, however, it is hard to figure out any conceptual reason why the allegedly ‘objective’ epiδi can in principle introduce clauses in either pre- or postposition for the TS, while the ‘subjective’ jati is confined to postposition. Second, causality is a non-iconic relation par excellence. In order to give it an iconic character, one has to evoke temporality, namely the non-anteriority of effects vis-à-vis causes. But this is a non-warranted reductive move. Third, in principle the subordinating nature of causal particles allows both preposition and postposition of the ‘satellite’

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38. Theθa + past continuous construction (‘imperfective past’; see Holton et al. 1997:228– 229) is not a genuine counterfactual. Rather than being an irrealis, it indicates that the base ‘mental space’ is distinct from the real world. Thus, although the content appears to spring from a source distinct from default reality, it can be made to map to reality. This is the case when the narration of a plan is supplemented with a statement about the accomplishment of a plan: (i) Πήγα, επειδή θα με πλήρωνε, όπως και έγινε. piγa epiδi θa me plirone, opos ke eγine. “I went because he was going to pay me, and that’s what happened.”

39. Notice that the epistemic utterance is TS, not SS; the latter merely provides the source of belief. Therefore, marks of epistemicity are to be carried by TS, not SS. (See also the discussion in §1.2.)

40. For a concise review of the presentational–representational distinction, which is coextensive to our modal–non-modal distinction, see Récanati (1981:43–48).

4. These examples are to be contrasted with example (28), an expressive utterance with representational content. Examples (57)–(60) are also unimaginable with an 〈e-SS, TS〉 con- ﬁguration.

42. For a linguistically oriented version of the theory, stemming from Fodor’s (1983) classic work, see Jackendoﬀ (1997, 2002).

43. jati’s access to the presentational aspect of meaning is another linguistic explanation for the feeling of subjectivity that this marker produces to native speakers. Notice also that implicit and presentational are not to be confused: Example (58) contains an explicit expressive speech act. Therefore it is both explicit and presentational. See also n. 41.

44. In Table 6,  stands for ‘necessarily’ and ◊ stands for ‘possibly’.

45. Translations reveal an interlingual aﬃnity between jati on the one hand and for and ’cos on the other hand. Here ’cos and for appear as variants in register. The question of this interlingual aﬃnity is discussed in the next section.

46. The utterance withepiδi is still better with an emphatic anteposition of an informative PP adjunct: (i) Είδα το φάντασμα — {γιατί / επειδή} στον Πύργο υπάρχουν φαντάσματα. iδa to fandasma — {jati / epiδi} ston pirγo iparxun fandasmata. “I saw the ghost — [DC] at Pyrgos ghosts do exist.”

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47. Compare these metamodal examples with the non-modal one (48). In both cases, epiδi-SS in second position appears in need of more explicit content than the homologous jati-SS expressions. Τhe possibility of these utterances with praγmati was brought to my attention by an anonymous reviewer.

48. Examples are taken from the electronic edition, published in 1997 by the Project Gutenberg Oﬃcial Web Site (http://promo.net/pg/).

49. Notice also that there is no simple way to ask about purpose only. Periphrastic ways in English, French, and Greek are what for, pour quoi faire, and ja pio skopo, respectively. One has to go to even greater lengths in order to ask about causes, excluding any teleological interpretation.

50. Nevertheless, since na is acknowledged as the marker of the subjunctive mood (see Veloudis & Philippaki-Warburton 1983, Philippaki-Warburton 1992), it is more accurate to say that particle ja, originally a preposition, assumes a DC function by introducing subjunctive clauses. We are thus faced with a twofold alteration of the preposition ja: (a) ja + oti + indicative (: Ø + V), giving jati + indicative; and (b) ja + subjunctive (: na + V), without further development. We return to these issues at the end of this section.

5. That is to say, of an epistemic TS based on a non-factual SS, the former inheriting the latter’s non-factuality (see also n. 39 above).

52. This is not to say that every propositional content introduced with jati or epiδi is presented as factual. The content of the subordinate clause may be non-factual if the clause carries by itself grammatical traces of its non-factuality.

53. For a uniﬁed account of ja na semantics within a cognitive grammar framework, see Veloudis et al. (2001).

54. [–FACTUAL] here does not mean ‘counterfactual’ but ‘bearing no commitment as to the factuality of the SS’s propositional content’. Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for help- ing to make this point clear by pointing out that between SS and TS, epistemically linked by ja na, there is a “purely inferential connection”.

55. One should, however, be cautious in talking about meaning fuzziness. Related meanings may receive a clear and discrete conceptual identiﬁcation. This is not an issue I tackle here.

56. Functions that are assumed in Greek by jati are assumed in French by car. The latter is a pure discourse marker (not a sentential connective) with a propensity towards epistemic and metacommunicative environments (it parallels jati in commentaries to the TS’s saying). Discussion of it cannot be extended here (see Group λ-l 1975:265ﬀ., Ducrot 1984:ch. 7).

57. Remember that an ‘external’ functional complementarity appears inside the implicative (pro-argumentative) domain here, between causal and inferential DCs (see Table 5 above).

58. Explicitness and DC-SS pre-positioning give rise to formal and entrenched argumentation (see also §1.1 above). Entrenched and formal argumentation may be felt as more objective than exposed and informal argumentation (jati-cases that place DC-SS last and

Downloaded from Brill.com09/30/2021 08:19:38PM via free access The justifying connection, mostly in Greek 75 give way to the implicit). As a matter of fact, the former aims towards objectivity, or better pretends to be objective. Judging from the feeling of native speakers, this aim is achieved.

59. Or, better, “presentations of assumptions of facts”.

60. Temporal semantics of since and afu diﬀer, but discussing that diﬀerence is not relevant for our topic.

6. It also leaves open the possibility that the speaker does not endorse the proposition at all: she may simply acknowledge it as a second order member of the mutual cognitive environment by presenting as mutually known the assumption that someone endorses it.

62. On the contrary, jati and epiδi maintain the performative character of the verb (see ex. 25 above).

63. As a matter of fact, this is a hybrid case, which also indicates a way of transition from modal to non-modal uses of afu. This isreported intentionality (see also Kalokerinos & Fra- ser, forthcoming): Information partaking of a common background that appertains to a reported situation is being transposed to the actual communication setting. Nevertheless, within this setting it is not assumed as given. A similar case, but one marshaling grammatical instead of lexical means to report an intentional setting, is the following: (i) Ο Κώστας ήρθε αφού θα τον πλήρωναν. o kostas irθe, afu θa ton plironan. “Kostas came, since they were going to pay him.”

64. In the following examples ASP is contrasted to the jati, ’cos/for, car rather than the because, parce que, epiδi group (see §2.2. above).

65. This analytic–synthetic distinction is schematic in several ways. The term ‘analytic -im plicit’ covers presuppositional phenomena (though the status of existential presupposition is a matter of debate; see e.g. Horn 1989:102ﬀ.). ‘Synthetic implicit’ covers implicatures, as well as identiﬁcation across mental spaces (see Fauconnier 1984). Of course, any analytic–synthetic distinction is liable to Quine’s famous objections (Quine 1953) and to the subsequent debate.

66. Notice also that afu may incorporate explicit information from the ﬁrst speaker’s speech into the background of the second speaker’s words. Nevertheless, it cannot boldly contradict such information, since, in such encounters, both aﬃrmation and denial are focused as rhemes. Presentation of background and direct denial of explicit information are incompatible operations: (i) A: Ήρθε ο Γιάννης. irθe o janis. “Janis is here.” B1: Αφού ήρθε, ας καθίσει να φάει. afu irθe, as kaθisi na fai. “Since he’s here, he may as well stay for lunch.”

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B2: *Αφού δεν ήρθε! *afu den irθe! “[DC] he’s not here.”

67. Yet the same also applies to implicatures arising from flouting the quality maxim (i), implicatures of quantity, whether standard (ii), or by flouting (iii), and implicatures of relevance (iv). For the sake of brevity examples are given only in English: (i) A: She has an iron will. B: Since / Afu she’s so persistent, she’ll succeed. (ii) A: Where does Harry live? B: Somewhere in France. A: Since / Afu you don’t know where he lives, how will we find him? (iii) A: Kids will be kids. B: Since / Afu you love them, you should take care of them too! (iv) A: Can you drop Katy off at home? B: I’m out of petrol. C: Since / Afu B can’t, I’ll drop you off.

68. Notice that this distinction is not fully coextensive with the linguistic–conceptual distinction, since there is an area of ‘analytical implicit’ that appertains to language (see also n. 46).

69. The ﬁrst distinction is related to, though not coextensive with, the one between the linguistically coded and the conceptually retrievable information (see also n. 43); the second is coextensive with the modal–non-modal distinction (see §2.1 above).

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Abstract in Greek

Στο άρθρο αυτό εξετάζεται η κειμενική λειτουργία των ελληνικών συνδέσμων γιατί, επειδή και αφού. Διαγράφεται ένα γενικό θεωρητικό πλαίσιο για τους κειμενικούς συνδέσμους και, στη συνέχεια, επιχειρείται η συγκριτική εξέταση των γιατί και επειδή με το αγγλικό because. Στη βάση αυτή τοποθετείται η μελέτη του αφού. Ο στόχος του άρθρου είναι να εντοπισθούν οι οδηγίες για την άρθρωση του συνεχούς λόγου που φέρουν τα υπό εξέταση συνδετικά, δηλαδή η συνεισφορά τους στην κατασκευή σύνθετων κειμενικών μονάδων, με ένα

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εννοιακό πυρήνα και ειδικότερες διαδικασιακές σημασίες, ώστε η νόηση να διαμεσολαβείται στην επικοινωνία με ιδιαίτερους γλωσσικούς τρόπους.

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