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Public Opinion Survey of Residents of Ukraine: Four Municipalities

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Public Opinion Survey of Residents of Ukraine: Four Municipalities Public Opinion Survey of Residents of Ukraine: Four Municipalities May 26–June 30, 2018 Methodology • The survey was conducted by Rating Group Ukraine on behalf of the International Republican Institute’s Center for Insights in Survey Research. • The survey was conducted in the cities of Kherson, Rivne, Severodonetsk and Slovyansk through face-to-face interviews at respondents’ homes between the following dates: • Kherson: May 26–June 17 • Rivne: May 26–June 15 • Severodonetsk: May 26–June 20 • Slovyansk: May 26–June 18 • The sample consisted of 1,200 residents of each municipality aged 18 and older and eligible to vote. It is representative of the general population by gender and age. The distribution of population by region of the city is based on statistical data from the Central Election Commission from the 2014 parliamentary elections, which divided the city into electoral districts. The distribution of population by gender and age is based on data from the State Statistics Committee of Ukraine from January 1, 2017. • A multi-stage probability sampling method was used with the random route and next birthday methods for respondent selection. • The margin of error does not exceed 2.8 percent. • The response rates for each municipality are as follows: • Kherson: 70.3 percent • Rivne: 70.8 percent • Severodonetsk: 66.7 percent • Slovyansk: 60.8 percent • Charts and graphs may not add up to 100 percent due to rounding. • The survey was financed by the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID). • For purposes of comparison, where applicable, the slides also contain data from IRI's national survey of Ukraine, conducted during the same fieldwork period. This data was publicly released by IRI on August 20, 2018. 2 National Mood Generally speaking, do you think that things in Ukraine are going in the right direction or wrong direction? Right direction Wrong direction Difficult to answer/No answer Kherson 18% 71% 10% Rivne 18% 61% 21% Severodonetsk 10% 70% 20% Slovyansk 14% 69% 17% Ukraine* 15% 70% 15% 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% *This data is from IRI’s national Ukraine sample. It was fielded from May 26-June 10, 2018, and was published on IRI’s website on August 20, 2018. 4 Generally speaking, do you think that things in your city are going in the right direction or wrong direction? Right direction Wrong direction Difficult to answer Kherson 25% 65% 10% Rivne 57% 21% 22% Severodonesk 12% 58% 31% Slovyansk 36% 41% 22% 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% 5 Over the last 12 months, how has the economic situation in Ukraine changed? Improved a lot Improved somewhat Stayed the same Worsened somewhat Worsened a lot Difficult to answer/No answer Kherson 5% 29% 41% 22% 3% Rivne <1% 8% 30% 36% 20% 6% Severodonetsk <1% 3% 30% 26% 40% 7% Slovyansk 1% 7% 15% 31% 38% 7% Ukraine* 8% 20% 30% 37% 5% 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% *This data is from IRI’s national Ukraine sample. It was fielded from May 26-June 10, 2018, and was published on IRI’s 6 website on August 20, 2018. Over the last 12 months, how has the economic situation of your household changed? Improved a lot Improved somewhat Stayed the same Worsened somewhat Worsened a lot Difficult to answer/No answer Kherson 1% 9% 33% 32% 21% 3% Rivne <1% 10% 41% 33% 11% 5% Severodonetsk <1% 4% 18% 34% 40% 4% Slovyansk 1% 7% 25% 30% 32% 4% Ukraine* 1% 9% 29% 7% 32% 2% 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% *This data is from IRI’s national Ukraine sample. It was fielded from May 26-June 10, 2018, and was published on IRI’s website on August 20, 2018. 7 In the next 12 months, how do you expect the economic situation in Ukraine to change? Improved a lot Improved somewhat Stayed the same Worsened somewhat Worsened a lot Difficult to answer/No answer Kherson 9% 38% 30% 12% 10% Rivne 3% 10% 42% 19% 6% 20% Severodonetsk <1% 9% 17% 17% 31% 26% Slovyansk 1% 12% 24% 21% 20% 22% Ukraine* 1% 11% 24% 20% 23% 20% 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% *This data is from IRI’s national Ukraine sample. It was fielded from May 26-June 10, 2018, and was published on IRI’s website on August 20, 2018. 8 Electoral Moods Do you intend to vote in the parliamentary elections scheduled for October 2019? Definitely yes Somewhat yes Somewhat no Definitely no Difficult to answer/No answer Kherson 31% 28% 20% 17% 5% Rivne 28% 39% 14% 13% 7% Severodonetsk 26% 31% 10% 22% 10% Slovyansk 31% 24% 9% 22% 13% Ukraine* 32% 36% 7% 6% 9% 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% *This data is from IRI’s national Ukraine sample. It was fielded from May 26-June 10, 2018, and was published on IRI’s website on August 20, 2018. 10 Kherson If parliamentary elections were held next Sunday and the following political parties participated, for which party would you vote? (All respondents) First choice Second choice Fatherland (Batkivshchyna) 10% 4% Bloc Petro Poroshenko (BPP) Solidarnist 8% 2% Opposition Bloc 8% 3% Civic Position 5% 5% For Life Party (Za Zhyttia) 5% 3% Servant of the People (Sluha Narodu) 5% 5% Radical Party 3% 4% Agrarian Party of Ukraine 2% 1% Self-Reliance Party (Samopomich) 2% 3% Justice 2% 3% Svoboda 1% 1% Movement of New Forces 1% 1% National Corps 1% OSNOVA 1% UKROP 1%1% Syla Liudey 1% 1% Right Sector 1% Khvylya 1% 1% Revival Party (Vidrodzennia) 1% Socialist Party 1% People' Movement of Ukraine 1% Democratic Alliance 1% Other 7% 8% I would not vote 25% 28% Difficult to answer/No answer 12% 21% 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 11 Kherson If parliamentary elections were held next Sunday and the following political parties participated, for which party would you vote? (Among likely voters; n=702) First Choice Second Choice Fatherland (Batkivshchyna) 16% 6% Bloc Petro Poroshenko (BPP) Solidarnist 13% 3% Opposition Bloc 12% 5% For Life Party (Za Zhyttia) 8% 5% Servant of the People (Sluha Narodu) 8% 8% Civic Position 7% 8% Radical Party 4% 7% Agrarian Party of Ukraine 3% 1% Self-Reliance Party (Samopomich) 3% 5% Justice 2% 5% National Corps 1% 1% UKROP 1%1% Movement of New Forces 1% 1% Svoboda 1% 2% Khvylya 1% 2% Syla Liudey 1% 1% Nash Krai 1% Revival Party (Vidrodzennia) 1% Socialist Party 1% Right Sector 1% People's Movement of Ukraine 1% OSNOVA 1% People's Front 1% DIYa of D. Yarosh 1% Other 9% 18% Difficult to answer/No answer 9% 24% 0% 5% 10% 15% 20% 25% 30% 35% 12 Rivne If parliamentary elections were held next Sunday and the following political parties participated, for which party would you vote? (All respondents) First Choice Second Choice Fatherland (Batkivshchyna) 12% 3% Bloc Petro Poroshenko (BPP) Solidarnist 9% 2% Civic Position 7% 3% Radical Party 4% 2% Servant of the People (Sluha Narodu) 4% 2% Self-Reliance Party (Samopomisch) 3%3% Opposition Bloc 3% 2% For Life Party (Za Zhyttia) 3% 2% Agrarian Party of Ukraine 2% 1% Svoboda 2% 2% Narodnyi Front 1%1% Justice 1% 1% National Corps 1% People's Movement of Ukraine 1% 1% Democratic Alliance 1% 1% Right Sector 1%1% UKROP 1% Movement of New Forces 1% Khyvylya 1% DIYa of D. Yarosh 1% Other 6% 5% I would not vote 16% 18% Difficult to answer/No answer 25% 47% 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 13 Rivne If parliamentary elections were held next Sunday and the following political parties participated, for which party would you vote? (Among likely voters; n=807) First Choice Second Choice Fatherland (Batkivshchyna) 15% 4% BPP-Solidarnist 12% 3% Civic Position 10% 5% Radical Party 6% 3% Samopomisch 5% 4% Sluha Narodu 4% 2% Opposition Bloc 3%2% Za Zhyttia 3% 2% Agrarian Party of Ukraine 3% 2% Svoboda 2%3% Justice 1%2% National Corps 1% People’s Movement of Ukraine 1% Democratic Alliance 1% 1% Right Sector 1% 1% DIYa of D. Yarosh 1% 1% Narodnyi Front 1% 2% Movement of New Forces 1% 1% Vidordzhennia 1% UKROP 1% Khvykya 1% Other 6% 7% Difficult to answer/No answer 26% 56% 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 14 Severodonetsk If parliamentary elections were held next Sunday and the following political parties participated, for which party would you vote? (All respondents) First Choice Second Choice Opposition Bloc 11% 2% For Life Party (Za Zhyttia) 10% 3% Fatherland (Batkivshchyna) 5% 1% Bloc Petro Poroshenko (BPP) Solidarnist 4% 1% Nash Krai 3% 2% Radical Party 2% Civic Position 2% 1% Servant of the Peolple (Sluha Narodu) 1%1% Justice 1% 1% Self-Reliance Party (Samopomich) <1% 1% Other 4% 6% I would not vote 27% 27% Difficult to answer/No answer 30% 55% 0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100% 15 Severodonetsk If parliamentary elections were held next Sunday and the following political parties participated, for which party would you vote? (Among likely voters; n=693) First Choice Second Choice Opposition Bloc 18% 3% For Life Party (Za Zhyttia) 15% 5% Fatherland (Batkivshchyna) 8% 2% Bloc Petro Poroshenko (BPP) Solidarnist 7% 1% Radical Party 3% 1% Nash Krai 3% 4% Civic Position 3% 2% Servant of the People (Sluha Narodu) 1% 1% Justice 1% 1% Self-Reliance Party (Samopomich) 1%1% Socialist Party 1% OSNOVA 1% Other 5% 7% Difficult to answer/No answer 35% 71% 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 16 Slovyansk If parliamentary elections were held next Sunday and the following political parties participated, for which party would you vote? (All respondents) First Choice Second Choice Opposition Bloc 10% 3% For Life Party (Za Zhyttia) 10% 4% Nash Krai 5% 2% Fatherland Party (Batkivshchyna) 5% 1% Radical Party 4% 1% Bloc Petro Poroshenko (BPP) Solidarnist 3% 1% Civic Position 3% 2% Servant of the People (Sluha Narodu) 2%2% Agrarian Party of Ukraine 1% Self-Reliance Party (Samopomich) 1% 1% Svoboda 1% 1% OSNOVA 1% 1% Democratic Alliance 1% 1%
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