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Survey of Residents of Ukraine

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Public Opinion Survey of Residents of Ukraine May 26-June 10, 2018 Methodology • The survey was conducted by Rating Group Ukraine on behalf of the International Republican Institute’s Center for Insights in Survey Research. • The survey was conducted throughout Ukraine (except for the occupied territories of Crimea and Donbas) from May 26–June 10, 2018, through face-to-face interviews at respondents’ homes. • The sample consisted of 2,400 permanent residents of Ukraine aged 18 and older and eligible to vote. It is representative of the general population by gender, age, region, and settlement size. The distribution of population by regions and settlements is based on statistical data of the Central Election Commission from the 2014 parliamentary elections, and the distribution of population by age and gender is based on data from the State Statistics Committee of Ukraine from January 1, 2017. • A multi-stage probability sampling method was used with the random route and next birthday methods for respondent selection. • Stage One: The territory of Ukraine was split into 25 administrative regions (24 regions of Ukraine and Kyiv). The survey was conducted throughout all regions of Ukraine, with the exception of the occupied territories of Crimea and Donbas. • Stage Two: The selection of settlements was based on towns and villages. Towns were grouped into subtypes according to their size: • Cities with populations of more than 1 million • Cities with populations of between 500,000-999,000 • Cities with populations of between 100,000-499,000 • Cities with populations of between 50,000-99,000 • Cities with populations of up to 50,000 • Villages Cities and villages were selected by the PPS method (probability proportional to size). The number of selected cities/villages in each region is proportional to the share of population living in cities/villages of a certain type in each region. • Stage Three: Households were selected by the random route method, and respondents were selected by the “last birthday” rule. • The margin of error does not exceed 2.0 percent for the full sample. • The response rate is 62.7 percent. • Charts and graphs may not add up to 100 percent due to rounding. • The survey was financed by the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID). 2 Geographical Key *Due to the Russian occupation of Crimea and the ongoing conflict in eastern Ukraine, residents of Crimea and the so- called separatist-controlled territories of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts (“the Donbas”) were not surveyed in this poll. 3 National Mood Generally speaking, do you think that things in Ukraine are going in the right direction or wrong direction? Right direction Wrong direction Difficult to answer/No answer 80% 76% 71% 72% 72% 71% 72% 70% 71% 71% 70% 69% 68% 70% 66% 68% 67% 64% 60% 51% 50% 48% 40% 34% 29% 30% 20% 18% 17% 18% 20% 16% 16% 17% 17% 15% 15% 13% 15% 15% 15% 15% 15% 20% 18% 17% 16% 15% 15% 15% 15% 14% 10% 13% 14% 13% 13% 14% 15% 13% 11% 11% 0% Nov May May Feb April Sept July Sept Nov Feb June Sept April June Sept Dec March June 2011 2012 2013 2014 2014 2014 2015 2015 2015 2016 2016 2016 2017 2017 2017 2017 2018 2018 5 Generally speaking, do you think that things in Ukraine are going in the right direction or wrong direction? (Disaggregated by age, region) Right direction Wrong direction Difficult to answer/No answer West 20% 65% 15% Center 16% 69% 16% Region South 12% 78% 11% East 10% 70% 20% 18-35 16% 66% 18% 36-50 17% 70% 13% Age 51+ 13% 74% 14% 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% 6 Over the last 12 months, how has the economic situation in Ukraine changed? Improved a lot Improved somewhat Stayed the same Worsened somewhat Worsened a lot Difficult to answer/No answer June 2018 <1% 8% 20% 30% 37% 5% March 2018 <1% 8% 20% 33% 36% 2% December 2017 1% 5% 24% 31% 35% 4% September 2017 <1% 5% 25% 35% 31% 3% June 2017 1% 6% 21% 33% 35% 3% April 2017 <1%3% 20% 36% 37% 4% September 2016 <1% 2% 20% 34% 40% 3% June 2016 2% 15% 33% 45% 4% February 2016 1% 10% 34% 54% 2% November 2015 2% 14% 37% 44% 3% September 2015 1% 2% 14% 31% 51% 1% July 2015 2% 8% 28% 60% 2% September 2014 1% 11% 29% 57% 2% 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% 7 Over the last 12 months, how has the economic situation of your household changed? Improved a lot Improved somewhat Stayed the same Worsened somewhat Worsened a lot Difficult to answer/No answer June 2018 1% 9% 29% 27% 32% 2% March 2018 <1% 10% 31% 31% 27% 1% December 2017 <1% 6% 26% 31% 33% 2% September 2017 1% 5% 27% 32% 34% 2% June 2017 <1% 6% 26% 31% 34% 2% April 2017 <1% 3% 23% 34% 37% 2% September 2016 <1%2% 23% 37% 36% 2% June 2016 2% 18% 38% 40% 2% February 2016 1% 15% 36% 47% 1% November 2015 2% 20% 36% 40% 2% September 2015 1% 2% 18% 34% 45% 1% July 2015 1% 14% 29% 55% 1% September 2014 2% 19% 37% 40% 2% April 2014 1% 4% 37% 34% 22% 3% March 2014 3% 46% 29% 18% 3% February 2014 1% 8% 44% 31% 14% 2% September 2013 1% 9% 41% 30% 17% 2% May 2013 1% 8% 46% 30% 14% 1% September 2012 1% 14% 37% 27% 15% 5% May 2012 9% 45% 30% 13% 3% March 2012 1% 6% 39% 34% 18% 3% November 2011 1% 6% 37% 36% 18% 2% 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% 8 In the next 12 months, how do you expect the economic situation in Ukraine to change? Improve a lot Improve somewhat Stay the same Worsen somewhat Worsen a lot Difficult to answer/No answer June 2018 1% 11% 24% 20% 23% 20% March 2018 1% 15% 30% 23% 17% 13% December 2017 1% 10% 27% 26% 16% 20% September 2017 2% 13% 27% 25% 16% 17% June 2017 1% 11% 26% 20% 23% 19% April 2017 9% 28% 25% 21% 16% September 2016 8% 24% 27% 27% 14% June 2016 1% 8% 21% 25% 27% 19% February 2016 1% 6% 21% 23% 31% 18% November 2015 1% 7% 21% 32% 23% 16% September 2015 2% 11% 25% 23% 27% 12% July 2015 1% 9% 19% 24% 27% 20% September 2014 1% 10% 14% 23% 35% 17% April 2014 1% 10% 13% 26% 43% 8% March 2014 1% 12% 16% 26% 35% 11% February 2014 1% 9% 20% 31% 28% 12% September 2013 2% 12% 27% 29% 17% 13% May 2013 1% 8% 38% 29% 12% 12% September 2012 2% 17% 31% 24% 11% 16% May 2012 1% 13% 35% 26% 11% 14% March 2012 1% 8% 32% 32% 15% 12% November 2011 1% 7% 30% 32% 17% 13% 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% 9 Electoral Moods Do you intend to vote in the parliamentary elections scheduled for October 2019? 9% Definitely yes 16% 32% Somewhat yes Somewhat no 7% Definitely no Difficult to answer/No answer 36% 11 Do you intend to vote in the parliamentary elections scheduled for October 2019? (Disaggregated by age, region) Definitely yes Somewhat yes Somewhat no Definitely no Difficult to answer/No answer West 28% 50% 6% 12% 4% Center 35% 36% 6% 12% 11% Region South 34% 26% 7% 23% 10% East 30% 27% 13% 18% 12% 18-35 26% 38% 11% 17% 8% 36-50 29% 34% 6% 20% 10% Age 51+ 38% 36% 5% 12% 9% 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% 12 Do you intend to vote in the parliamentary elections scheduled for October 2019? (Disaggregated by political party preference) Definitely yes Somewhat yes Somewhat no Definitely no Difficult to answer For Life Party (Za 2% Zhyttia) 56% 37% 4% 2% Bloc Petro Poroshenko (BPP) Solidarnist 55% 40% 2% 3% Opposition Bloc 46% 37% 6%2% 8% Svoboda 45% 53% 2% Civic Position 41% 47% 2%1% 8% Radical Party 41% 45% 3% 2% 9% Fatherland (Batkivshchyna) 39% 53% 3% 1%4% Servant of the People (Sluha Narodu) 39% 41% 7% 5% 9% Self-Reliance Party (Samopomich) 29% 61% 4% 2% 3% Undecided 31% 37% 6% 2% 23% 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% 13 If parliamentary elections were held next Sunday and the following political parties participated in the election, which party would you vote for? (All respondents) Fatherland (Batkivshchyna) 11% Civic Position 7% Opposition Bloc 6% Radical Party 6% Bloc Petro Poroshenko (BPP Solidarnist 6% For Life Party (Za Zhyttia) 5% Servant of the People (Sluha Narodu) 4% Self-Reliance Party (Samopomich) 4% Svoboda 2% Agrarian Party of Ukraine 1% UKROP 1% Revival Party (Vidrodzhennia) 1% Movement of New Forces 1% People's Front 1% Nash Krai 1% Other 6% I would not vote 18% Difficult to answer/No answer 20% 0% 5% 10% 15% 20% 25% 30% 14 If parliamentary elections were held next Sunday and the following political parties participated in the election, which political party would you vote for? (Among likely voters; n=1,630) Fatherland (Batkivshchyna) 15% Civic Position 9% Bloc Petro Poroshenko (BPP) Solidarnist 8% Opposition Bloc 8% Radical Party 8% For Life Party (Za Zhyttia) 7% Servant of the People (Sluha Narodu) 5% Self-Reliance Party (Samopomich) 5% Svoboda 3% Agrarian Party of Ukraine 2% UKROP 1% Movement of New Forces 1% Revival Party (Vidrodzhennia) 1% People's Front 1% Nash Krai 1% Justice 1% Right Sector 1% Other 6% Difficult to answer/No answer 19% 0% 5% 10% 15% 20% 25% 30% 15 If parliamentary elections were held next Sunday, which other political party would you vote for if the party that you have chosen above would not participate in the elections? (All respondents) For Life Party (Za Zhyttia) 4% Self-Reliance Party (Samopomich) 4% Fatherland (Batkivshchyna) 4% Servant of the People (Sluha Narodu) 4% Radical Party 3% Civic Position 3% Opposition Bloc 2% Justice 2% UKROP 1% Svoboda 1% People's Front 1% Revival Party (Vidrodzhennia) 1% Khvylya (Wave) Party 1% Bloc Petro Poroshenko (BPP) Solidarnist 1% Nash Krai 1% Movement of New Forces 1% Democratic Alliance 1% Socialist Party 1% Agrarian Party of Ukraine 1% National Corps 1% Right Sector 1% Diya of Yarosh 1% Other 5% I would not vote 21% Difficult to answer/No answer 37% 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 16 If parliamentary elections were held next Sunday, which other political party would you vote
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