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Ukraine NATO This paper was conducted by the New Europe Center under the USAID/ ENGAGE activity, which is funded by the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) and implemented by Pact. The contents of this paper are the sole responsibility of Pact and its implementing partners and do not necessary reflect the views of the United States Agency for International Development (USAID). The paper was prepared under the general coordination of Leonid Litra. The discussion paper was prepared on the basis of the New Europe Center’s expertise, as well as interviews with relevant stakeholders in Ukraine and abroad, conducted in April-May 2021. In particular, the authors of the paper express their special gratitude for valuable comments during the preparation of the document to Alexander Vershbow, Daniel Fried, William Taylor, Ben Hodges, Pavlo Klimkin, Hanna Hopko, Sergiy Sydorenko, Tor Bukkvoll, Mathieu Boulegue, Andri Veselovsky, Olena Halushka, Mykhailo Gonchar, Mykhailo Zhernakov, Wilfried Jilge, Oksana Osadcha, Stanislav Secrieru, Susan Stewart. The opinions expressed are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the experts mentioned. ROUTE TO MEMBERSHIP WHY SHOULD UKRAINE HAVE A ROADMAP TO NATO ACCESSION? Authors: Alyona GETMANCHUK Sergiy SOLODKYY Marianna FAKHURDINOVA 2021 TABLE OF CONTENTS SUMMARY ………………………………………………………………………………… 3 CONCLUSIONS ………………………………………………………………………… 4 INTRODUCTION ………………………………………………………………………… 7 1 REFORMS: MADE WITH NATO ………………………………………………… 10 2 UKRAINE IN NATO — THREAT OR ADDED VALUE TO TRANSATLANTIC SECURITY …………………………………………………… 20 3 RISKS OF NOT INVITING UKRAINE TO NATO …………………………… 28 4 ENHANCED PARTNERSHIP IS NOT AN OBSTACLE TO DEEPER INTEGRATION ………………………………………………………………………… 37 5 SUPPORT FOR NATO MEMBERSHIP AS A CONSCIOUS SOCIETAL CHOICE …………………………………… 40 6 TOWARD NATO VIA MAP OR WITHOUT IT? …………………………… 45 2 SUMMARY At the moment, there are good reasons space. It is also important to remember to give consideration not only to that Russia’s attack on Ukraine — and the Alliance’s open-door policy but occupation of 7% of its territory — the proposed roadmap for Ukraine’s happened when Kyiv was officially non- future membership (sort of Ukraine’s aligned. Compatibility plan with NATO) as NATO develops its Strategic Concept Such a roadmap might include a for 2030. Such a roadmap would Membership Action Plan, but given the confirm the destination point set within excessive toxicity of this instrument, the Bucharest Summit as to Ukraine and the overall uniqueness of the cases and Georgia’s future membership in of Ukraine and Georgia, it might be the the Alliance and allow the sides to self-sufficient document, created by determine Ukraine’s best route towards analogy with MAP or rely on another, this point through the implementation already existing instrument. This of a certain array of reforms. instrument could be a reinforcement of existing Annual National Programs, The approval of such a “route” is which were conceived as the basis important for several reasons. First of for the Membership Action Plan at the all, it will provide a powerful boost moment of its creation in 1999, and have to Ukraine’s pro-reform forces, just as similar structures to the MAP. NATO the Visa Liberalization Action Plan with could make a first step in this direction the European Union did years before, by recognizing that Ukraine has all the launching Ukraine’s most important practical tools for potential membership anti-corruption reforms. Ukraine’s recent in the Alliance, as was done in the experience in conducting reforms communiqué on Georgia following the demonstrates that even due to the 2016 Warsaw Summit. current level of partnership with NATO Ukraine managed to launch an array of Such a roadmap would not contain clear important transformations: from having time parameters, but it should prepare a civilian defense minister, to start of Ukraine to join the Alliance once the the first in the years of independence relevant political preconditions for this in-depth reform of special services. step arise both on the part of Ukraine Second, such a Compatibility plan would and, no less, on the part of NATO. It send a serious signal to Russia that its is high time the Alliance consider the policy of instigating conflicts in order risks not only of future NATO expansion, to block the integration of neighboring including Ukraine (and Georgia), but countries to NATO will no longer be especially the risks of future non- effective. Therefore, Russia will lose an inviting of these states to join the important argument for provoking and Alliance, which in the long-run may be maintaining conflicts in the post-Soviet no less serious. 3 ROUTE TO MEMBERSHIP Why should Ukraine have a roadmap to NATO accession? CONCLUSIONS It is time to determine Ukraine’s participation in all major NATO 1 path to membership. In 2008 at the missions, experience in combating Bucharest summit, Ukraine received hybrid threats, real and active a firm promise of its future NATO combat experience, defense membership. Russia’s aggression spending more than 2% of GDP, and a against Ukraine, begun in 2014, widespread Ukrainian commitment to exposed the futility of the “do not NATO’s democratic values. provoke Moscow” approach due to the lack of pathway forward to NATO as a driver of reforms. membership for Ukraine. As NATO 3 Providing Ukraine a clear roadmap develops its strategic concept for to Alliance membership (Ukraine’s the next decade, Ukraine deserves Compatibility plan with NATO) will to see the Alliance’s open-door increase the speed of adoption policy put into practice by receiving of the country’s reform agenda. a roadmap — sort of Ukraine’s NATO integration will allow Ukraine Compatibility plan with NATO1. Such to complete reforms launched as a roadmap could be based on clear a condition of its visa-free regime reform plan, whose implementation with the EU. Ukraine’s roadmap to would allow Ukraine to accede to the NATO could be at the heart of a Alliance — through the Membership new conditionality approach: with Action Plan or without it — as soon more successfully implemented as the appropriate preconditions reforms come increased chances of arise on the part of both Ukraine and membership. NATO. Rapid pace of military Ukraine in NATO adds value to 4 interoperability with the 2 transatlantic security. Today, neither Alliance. Ukraine is showing real Ukraine, nor NATO itself question momentum strengthening its the important role Ukraine plays military interoperability with NATO, in strengthening global security. evidenced, in particular by the overall Among Ukraine’s most important level of implementation of NATO contributions to global and Euro- standardization agreements. Today Atlantic security are the renunciation about 19% of all existing Alliance of nuclear weapons, pandemic agreements have been implemented assistance (air transportation), in Ukraine, close to or even more than 1 European Pravda, New Europe Center, Anti-Corruption Action Center, Network for the Advocacy of National Interests ANTS, Center for Global Studies Strategy XXI, “Compatibility plan with NATO. What the Alliance should do for real changes in Ukraine”, 20 May 2021, https://www.eurointegration.com.ua/articles/2021/05/20/7123357/ 4 CONCLUSIONS in some new NATO member states are nearly identical to Membership (for example, North Macedonia). Action Plan. New circumstances could prompt NATO to make a unique Ukrainians support NATO political decision allowing a country 5 membership. In the last seven to join the Alliance on the basis of years, the number of Ukrainians who the roadmap of reforms offered by support NATO has remained high us (Ukraine’s Compatibility plan with (roughly half of Ukrainians support NATO) or assessments of Annual NATO integration). This indicates National Programs, having previously a conscious, irreversible choice by significantly improved both the ANPs Ukrainians, rather than a temporary themselves as a reform plan with reaction in the face of Russia’s clear priorities and indicators, and external threat. In 2008, Ukraine was a mechanism for monitoring their denied a MAP, in part because of the implementation by NATO. low level of NATO support among its population. Russia will de-facto lose the NATO 8 veto power in the event of Ukraine Enhanced Opportunities Partnership (and Georgia) joining the Alliance. 6 does not stand in conflict with Indecision on the part of NATO as receiving a roadmap for membership. to Kyiv and Tbilisi’s membership Today, Ukraine sits on two parallel prospects only gives Russia the belief tracks with NATO — as a partner that it has a veto power over NATO’s country and as an aspirant country. borders now and in the future. The Enhanced Opportunities Partnership existence of occupied territories (EOP) is a format of cooperation on should not be an obstacle on the the partner track, which cannot stand path to membership, as it will only in the way of other formats that will encourage third parties to create bring Ukraine closer to membership artificial conflicts in other countries in the Alliance. Furthermore, the EOP pursuing cooperation with the envisages countries achieving military Alliance. Ukraine’s pursuing sufficient interoperability first, for Ukraine diplomatic efforts to resolve Russian- future membership in NATO political inspired conflicts should also be interoperability is similarly important. considered positively. To NATO not necessarily through NATO’s non-enlargement is no 7 MAP. The
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