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UMI'
UNIVERSITY of CALGARY
The Impact of Military Culture and Doctrine on Colombia's Counterinsurgency
by
Timothy S. Cake
A THESIS
SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES
IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE
DEGREE OF MASTER OF STRATEGIC STUDIES
Center for Military and Strategic Studies
CALGARY, ALBERTA
September 2009
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
ABSTRACT 1
INTRODUCTION 4
THE CHEQUERED RECORD OF THE COLAR 7
COMMENTATORS' PERSPECTIVES ON THE COLAR'S FAILED COUNTERINSURGENCY 18 THE COLAR'S CULTURE AND ITS RAMIFICATIONS LEAD TO FAILURE 22
CHAPTER 1 - CONCEPTS OF INSURGENCY, COUNTERINSURGENCY AND CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS 25
COLOMBIA -- INSURGENCY, COUNTERINSURGENCY AND TRADITIONAL WAR FIGHTING 26
CIVIC REPUBLICANISM AND MILITARY SERVICE 29 The Roman and American Traditions of the Citizen-Soldier 30 Praetorianism - The Degradation of Cincinnatus' Military Tradition 32
THEORETICAL NOTIONS OF MILITARY PROFESSIONALISM AND CIVILIAN SUPREMACY 35 Alexis de Tocqueville's Perspective 36 Loveman's 'Politics of Anti-Politics' 38 Samuel Huntington's Position on Civilian Control of the Military 39 The Yamashita Principle of Command Responsibility 42 Pion-Berlin's Ideas 44 Bruneau's Constructs 45
THE ANALYTICAL MATRIX 47
CHAPTER 2 - THE COLAR'S MILITARY CULTURE AND ITS IMPACT ON THE COUNTERINSURGENCY 53
MILITARY CULTURE AND ITS RELATION TO IBERIAN AND LATIN AMERICAN SOCIETY 53 The Iberian Hidalgo and la Reconquista 54 The Fuero de Guerra Militar and the Iberian Military Weltanschauung 56 Caudillismo - The Latin American Notion of Heroic Leadership 57 IV
EXTERNAL INFLUENCES ON THE COLAR 59 Chile's Prussianization of the COLAR 60 The United States' Factor 62 The United States' Military Leadership Doctrine 66 The United States Soldiers' Creed, Warrior Ethos and Army Values 69 The United States' COIN Doctrine 72
THE COLAR'S MILITARY DOCTRINE 77 Grand Strategy of the COLAR 77 The COLAR's Honor Code 79 The COLAR's Human Rights Doctrine 82
THE COLAR'S SPECTRUM OF NEGATIVE ACTIONS 86 The COLAR's Insolence and Insubordination of its Political Leaders 87 'Rogue Ops' Undertaken by the COLAR 108 The COLAR's Entrenched, Traditional War Fighting Methods and Resultant Operational Failures 128
MALAYA, VIETNAM AND COLOMBIA -- DIFFERENT WARS, SIMILAR CONCEPTS 139
CHAPTER 3 - COMPARISONS AND ANALYSES 151
THE POLITICAL PERSPECTIVE 151 The Mitigation of the Traditional FueroMilitar 155
ANSWERS TO RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND CONCLUSIONS 158
THE COLAR RE-ALIGNS FOR SUCCESS 164 Force Reallocation 166 Conversion of Regular Soldiers to Professional Soldiers 167 The Autodefensas Re-Engineered - The 'Town Soldiers' 169 COMMENTATORS' APPROACHES REVISITED 178
CONCLUSIONS 183
BIBLIOGRAPHY 193
PRIMARY SOURCES 193
SECONDARY SOURCES 198
MEDIA SOURCES 210 ABSTRACT
Via the prism of professional officership, this thesis shall examine Colombian military culture and doctrine in relation to that state's ongoing COIN.1 Although I shall make a few sojourns to other times, the main period under examination will be that of the 1980s to the present. In doing so, I shall answer the following research question: has the traditional military culture of the COLAR's2 officer corps been a significant factor in its lack of final victory in the COIN? It is my position that Iberian elitist traditions and Prussian-style militarism permeated the COLAR's officer corps and have caused certain members of that establishment to follow a philosophy called the 'politics of anti-polities'. While pursuing this philosophy, these officers have often behaved like members of a privileged estate that has failed to support unconditionally its civilian masters. When ordered by their civilian leaders to abandon both their cultural heritage of militarismo and focus on traditional war fighting methods, these officers have responded with a spectrum of behaviors that varied from insolence in the media, disobedience, and sometimes extending to outright
1 COIN is an acronym used to represent counterinsurgency.
2 COLAR is an acronym used to represent the Colombian Army. This paper shall use COLAR in the broader sense to represent the Colombian Armed Forces as a whole.
3 Militarismo is a political philosophy in which the military establishment sees itself as the supreme establishment within the state. It is the antithesis of civilismo, a philosophy that envisages the military establishment as subservient to the civilian rulers of the state. Among other issues, this thesis shall deal with the question of which politico-military philosophy is paramount in Colombia. 2 interference in the political sphere. These officers have often acted like caudillos4- they temporarily leased their military expertise and coercive capabilities to the central government when and if that institution met their corporate objectives. I assert the traditional Ibero-American Weltanschauung5 and military culture have resulted in an officer corps6 with certain members who were and still are: (1) politicized, publicly insolent and insubordinate of their civilian leaders; (2) focused on corporate interests instead of the public good; (3) mired in the traditional war fighting techniques of years past; (4) inflexible in the practice of their profession, exhibiting an adamantine refusal to employ the time- proven strategies, tactics and doctrines of COIN, and; (5) behaving like aristocratic knights from the days of la Reconquista1 and la Conquista? These facets of the officer corps' traditionalist military culture have impaired the COLAR's battlefield efficacy, hampered the government's efforts to negotiate a settlement, and thus have extended the life of the insurgency. In essence, the Colombian example of Thomas Bruneau's civil-military
4 A caudillo is a charismatic individual who leads a political movement based upon their personality and heroic image. Caudillos are often, but not exclusively active or retired military leaders. Caudillismo is the practice of leadership by a caudillo - it is a cult of personality called personalismo.
5 Weltanschauung is an all-encompassing worldview that permeates the depths of a person's soul.
6 The focus of this dissertation is the officer corps because it exerts command authority over the COLAR's non-commissioned officers and enlisted personnel. Using the Yamashita Principle, which appears later in this paper, I shall examine the responsibility of the COLAR's officer corps for the lack of victory over the insurgents.
7 Led by the kingdoms of Castile and Aragon, la Reconquista was the re-conquest of the Iberian Peninsula from the Muslim Moors. relations trinity9 has two of its three legs broken - democratic civilian control of the military and its effectiveness as a combat force. This military culture has often diluted the
COLAR's focus on COIN techniques and has led to its lack of overall combat victory against the FARC10 and the ELN.11
The research query shall be answered by: (1) providing an explanation of basic principles pertinent to the research question; (2) presenting selected case studies of the officer corps' insubordination and public insolence of the civilian government, its adherence to traditional war fighting techniques and resultant battlefield defeats; (3) offering a comparison of the case studies with the basic principles, and; (4) generating an analysis that provides sufficient information to answer the research question.
8 La Conquista was the conquest of the Americas by the Spaniards.
9 Please see the following for a theoretical discussion of the civil-military relations trinity: T. C. Bruneau and R. B. Goetze, Jr. "Civilian-Military Relations in Latin America". Military Review. (Sept.-Oct. 2006): 70-71.
10 FARC is a Spanish acronym for Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia.
11 ELN is a Spanish acronym for Ejercito de Liberacion Nacional, the National Liberation Army. INTRODUCTION
Colombia is of interest to the research community due to its illegal drugs trade, the actions of its paramilitary groups, and the various insurrections that have occurred within its borders. In the first half of the twentieth century, Colombia waged a war with Peru and suffered two massive internal conflicts - The War of a Thousand Days and la Violencia. '2
In the War of a Thousand Days,13 approximately one-hundred thousand people perished.14
This war started out with commanders from the elite cadres of the Liberal15 and
Conservative16 parties leading their military factions in set-piece battles against each other.
After the 1900 Conservative victory at the Battle of Palonegro, the Liberals chose to mount a guerrilla war against the government. President Jose Manuel Marroqufn issued Decree
112 on 18 February 1901 that stated the military could summarily try then punish guerrillas for both civilian and military crimes. Sentences handed down in the military tribunals were
12 D. M. Rempe offers a comprehensive description and analysis of la Violencia in his Ph. D. thesis. Please see: D. M. Rempe. "Counterinsurgency in Colombia: A U. S. National Security Perspective". University of Miami Publications — University Microfilms Inc. (May 2002).
13 The War of a Thousand Days began in mid-October 1899 and ended with a treaty signed onboard the battleship U.S.S. Wisconsin, on 21 November 1902.
14 J. Henao and G. Arrubla. Historia de Colombia, Tomo 2. Bogota: Plaza & Janes. (1984): 344.
15 The military leaders of the Liberal revolution were Generals Gabriel Vargas Santos and Rafael Uribe Uribe.
16 The leader of the Conservative government forces was General Manuel Casabianca y Prospero Pinzon. executed forthwith and could not be appealed. The only exception was capital crimes - they could be appealed to the appropriate military governor, who was to pass judgment on the appeal within forty-eight hours.17 This edict was a hallmark example in twentieth century Colombia of military tribunals judging civilian crimes and the government's brazen use of regimes of exception. This situation was to continue until the latter part of the twentieth century.
In 1933, a prominent leftist in the Liberal Party, Jorge Eliecer Gaitan Ayala started a political movement called the Union Nacional Izquierdista Revolucionaria.18 This movement supported the resolution of the issues plaguing Colombia's urban and rural poor.
On 9 April 1948, in the midst of a presidential campaign19 rally, Juan Roa Sierra assassinated Gaitan.20 Agitated crowds rioted in Bogota and caused severe damage to the
17 C. Bergquist. Waging War and Negotiating Peace in C. Bergquist, R. Penaranda and G. Sanchez G. Violence in Colombia 1990-2000. Wilmington: Scholarly Resources Inc. (2001): 196-197.
18 Revolutionary Leftist National Union.
19 Daniel Pecaut establishes that Gaitan was a serious contender for the Liberal nomination - he provides a table showing the nomination percentages of Gaitan versus Gabriel Turbay Abunader. The Liberal party split - it offered two presidential candidates, Gaitan and Turbay. The Conservative candidate, Mariano Ospina Perez, won the 1946 presidential election. D. Pecaut Orden y Violencia: Colombia 1930-1954 Vols. I and II. Bogota: Siglo Veintiuno de Colombia, Idta. (1987): 393-395.
20 This is the popularly accepted theory of Gaitan's death. For an optical scan of the May 1950 El Espectador story about the question of Roa Sierra, please see: F. Gonzalez Toledo. "Hasta la Saciedad se ha Comprobado que Roa Sierra fue el Asesino de Gaitan". El Espectador (May 1950). Downloaded from internet. (27 Apr. 2009).
COLAR and Colombian National Police23 acted for the most part, as agents of the ruling
Conservative Party - they used terror tactics during the administration of Laureano Gomez to quell the Liberal insurgency.24 One estimate of casualties25 in la Violencia is two-
Oft 01 98 OQ hundred thousand dead - the majority of whom were campesinos, llaneros, and other rural residents of the lower social strata.
21 This riot is called the Bogotdzo.
22 C. Bergquist, R. R. Penaranda and G. Sanchez G. Violence in Colombia - The Contemporary Crisis in Historical Perspective. Wilmington: Scholarly Resources, Inc. (1992): xi-xii.
23 The Colombian National Police are currently under the control of the Minister of Defense. They participated in some of the combat operations mentioned in this paper.
24 Ibid.
25 G. Sanchez G. Raices Historicas de la Amnistia o las Etapas de la Guerra en Colombia. Ensayos de Historia Social y Politico del Sigh XX. Bogota: El Ancora Editores. (1984): 222.
26 Daniel Pecaut provided a figure of 180,253 killed in la Violencia from 1946 to 1957. He has broken down the death figures by department, with Caldas suffering 24.6%, Tolima 17.2%, and Antioquia 14.5% of the casualties. D. Pecaut Orden y Violencia: Colombia 1930-1954 Vols. I and II. Bogota: Siglo Veintiuno de Colombia, Idta. (1987): 490.
27 Campesinos are rural agricultural workers of extremely modest financial means.
28 Llaneros are mainly pastoral workers. In Colombia, they have the reputation of tough cowboys who exhibit a predilection to machismo. They express this position in the 'manly art' of solving disputes via personal combat. The majority of this combat involves the use of long knives with the intent of scarring the face and body of their opponent. Very few of these 'honor fights' involve the use of lethal force.
N. Richani. Systems of Violence - The Political Economy of War and Peace in Colombia. Albany: State University of New York Press. (2002): 23. The Chequered Record of the COLAR
Since the 1950s, the Bogota government has waged war against a series of
Communist-inspired insurgencies30 that have claimed many lives and have shown the potential for the destabilization and possible overthrow of the state. The COLAR has been a significant factor in these scenarios and has exhibited a history of variable results when dealing with these opponents. Some of the groups that arose from this insurgent wellspring are still extant today and represent a significant threat to Colombian state viability.31 The
COLAR has engaged these groups in many battles -- it has enjoyed some victories and suffered some hallmark defeats.32 At the time of the writing of this thesis, the COLAR has failed to subjugate fully the insurgent groups; with this failure, it has not provided a reliable security infrastructure for Colombia's citizenry.33 In this paper, I shall provide evidence and analyses that show the COLAR's traditional martial culture
30 It is important to understand that Colombia has suffered multiple insurgencies prosecuted by many violent groups. Some entities coordinated with other groups to overthrow the Bogota government, while some operated in a quasi-independent fashion owing no allegiance to other factions. The insurgency in Colombia is truly a poly-faceted 'ambiguous war'.
31 A good example of this type of insurgent group is the FARC.
32 F. La Rotta and A. Chavez. "Colombian Armed Forces Restructuring Process". United States' Department of Defense Command and Control Research Program - Strata Publications. (Jun. 2005): 2. Downloaded from internet. (20 Mar. 2008).
'' The insurrectionists operate with relative freedom in various areas of the countryside. In many of these areas, they have instituted independent 'peasant republics' with their own governmental infrastructures. with its political and operational ramifications have been significant, yet ignored factors residing at the root of this failure.
During the 1950s, Colombia's nominally democratic civilian government suffered a coup d'etat at the hands of a national-scale military caudillo, General Gustavo Rojas
Pinilla. Repression, financial mismanagement, and his own political ineptitude marred
Rojas Pinilla's government.34 Daniel Pecaut asserts the civilian elite lubricated the political machine that brought Rojas Pinilla's coup d'etat to a successful fruition, and later they caused the political whirlwind that brought down his rule.35 Jonathan Hartlyn comments on this situation:
".. .Alberto Lleras [Camargo] sought out Laureano Gomez in exile in Spain in July 1956. Discussions between the two leaders led to the Declaration of Benidorm
34 Rojas Pinilla was enamored with the authoritarian-populist regime of Argentina's leader, Juan Domingo Peron. His Peronista-hke predilections caused significant consternation in the COLAR's ultra-conservative officer corps, as well as many of Colombia's elites. His communitarian policies caused the United States to register its concern that he was moving in a direction far too much to the political left. His lack of political acumen was one of the major factors contributing to the erosion of his regime's support base. A good example of this political bungling appeared during his 'forced re-election' as Colombia's chief executive. Please see the following link: Anonymous. "Colombia: The Strongman Falters". Time. (13 May 1957). Downloaded from internet. (2 May 2009).
35 D. Pecaut. Guerrillas and Violence, in C. Bergquist, R. R. Penaranda and G. Sanchez G. Violence in Colombia - The Contemporary Crisis in Historical Perspective. Wilmington: Scholarly Resources Inc. (1992): 218. 9
that called for a return to republican rule by means of one or more coalition governments".36
The pressure from the 'Civic Front'37was so great that Rojas Pinilla began formulating a way to transition himself from power and also to prevent retributions against him and his family. Rojas Pinilla decided to appoint a transition junta comprised mostly of former senior military officers and cabinet ministers. Rojas Pinilla then experienced a golpe at the hands of th\s junta?9 40 Rempe discusses the golpe thusly:
"On 10 May 1957, a five man military junta composed of former Ministers of War and Public Works, Major General Gabriel Paris and Rear Admiral Ruben Piedrahita, former Commanders of the National Police and Army, Major General Deogracias Fonseca and Brigadier General Rafael Navas Prado, and former Chief of the Intelligence Service Brigadier General Luis Ordonez, removed Rojas from office, forcing him into exile in Spain".41 42
36 J. Hartlyn. "Military Governments and the Transition to Civilian Rule: The Colombian Experience of 1957-1958". Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Ajfairs. Vol. 26. No. 2. (May 1984): 253.
37 The Civic Front was later renamed to the National Front.
38 Golpe is a Spanish word that means coup d'etat. Those persons who support a golpe are called golpistas.
39 W. Ward. "Bolivar or Escobar: The Nature of Colombian Guerrillas". School of Advanced Military Studies Publications, United States' Army Command and General Staff College. (May. 2001): 19.
40 T. Szulc. "Rojas is Ousted - Colombia Ruled by a 5-Man Junta". New York Times. (11 May 1957): 1.
41 D. M. Rempe. "Counterinsurgency in Colombia: A U. S. National Security Perspective". University of Miami Publications -- University Microfilms Inc. (May 2002): 82. 10
In July 1957, the leaders of the Liberal and Conservative Parties, Laureano Gomez and
Alberto Lleras Camargo, met in a Spanish town and issued the Declaration of Sitges. This document set down the general principles for the alternation of both political and bureaucratic office in a new regime.43 The interim military junta44 supported the two major political parties' declaration of a power-alternating 'closed condominium'45 called the
Frente National46. Due to Rojas Pinilla's unpopularity, the junta enjoyed public favor, and this manifested itself in a plebiscite on 1 December 1957 that validated the junta as a legitimate interim government and allowed for the alternation of power between the Liberal and Conservative parties.47 After this plebiscite, elections were held for the executive and the legislative branches of government.
42 Hartlyn asserts the golpistas were headed by elites who Rojas Pinilla chose for his transition junta of 1957-1958. Please see J. Hartlyn. "Military Governments and the Transition to Civilian Rule: The Colombian Experience of 1957-1958". Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs. Vol. 26. No. 2. (May 1984): 256.
43 Schmidt asserts the Frente Nacional consolidated the use of patronage bureaucracy in the government of Colombia. S. W. Schmidt. "Bureaucrats as Modernizing Brokers? Clientelism in Colombia". Comparative Politics. Vol. 6. No. 3. (Apr. 1974): 433^34.
44 Junta is a Spanish word that means committee.
45 T. P. Wickham-Crowley. Guerrillas and Revolution in Latin America: A Comparative Study of Insurgents and Regimes Since 1956. Princeton: Princeton University Press. (1992): 17-18.
46 The National Front.
F. Bachrach. "Colombian Junta Has Wide Support". New York Times. (16 Dec. 1957): 14. 11
Nonetheless, the return path to republican rule was not smooth - there were Rojistas48 conspiring to return the ousted strongman to power, while other political malcontents were plotting their own golpes. The Army's military intelligence branch was rife with Rojistas - hence the junta created a separate intelligence service headed by General Rafael Navas
Pardo. During the second half of 1957, junior military officers headed most golpe plots, and the junta quelled them all. On 2 May 1958, four of the five junta members and Alberto
Lleras Camargo were detained in an abortive golpe attempt headed by Lieutenant Colonel
Hernando Forero, commander of the Bogota Policia Militar. Forero said to a correspondent
"the golpe was a romantic movement in protest against the junta because it is weak government".49 The plot was thwarted and its leaders allowed to seek diplomatic asylum on the condition they release all of their captives in good condition.50 In short, the support of the military was necessary for Rojas Pinilla's rise to power, and also his ouster by the
Frente Nacional and the interim junto.
48 Rojistas were the supporters of Gustavo Rojas Pinilla and his military government.
49 Anonymous. "Bogota Smashes Attempted Coup". New York Times. (3 May 1958): 1.
50 J. Hartlyn. "Military Governments and the Transition to Civilian Rule: The Colombian Experience of 1957- 1958". Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs. Vol. 26. No. 2. (May 1984): 263-267. 12
After the downfall of Rojas Pinilla, the Liberal and Conservative political parties enjoyed an alternation of rule guaranteed by coercive support that was contingent upon the continued satisfaction of the COLAR. The Frente Nacional did not institutionally threaten the COLAR, and Colombia's civilian leaders ensured the concerns of the officer corps were satisfied in timely fashion.52 Therefore, the officer corps was happy to use their institution as a political enforcer during the Frente Nacional's administrations - the
COLAR ensured no political party except the Liberals or Conservatives could hold public meetings, rallies or mount campaigns for government office.53 54 In doing this, the COLAR conveniently obeyed the terms of the parity and equality laws that mandated the institution and continued existence of the Frente Nacional.
51 J. G. Cristy. "Colombia: A Risk-Prone Democracy". United States' Navy Postgraduate School Publications. (Dec. 1998): 17-18.
52 N. Richani. Systems of Violence - The Political Economy of War and Peace in Colombia. Albany: State University of New York Press. (2002): 37-38.
53 M. Donadio and M. de la Paz Tibiletti. A Comparative Atlas of Defence in Latin America: 2008 Edition. Buenos Aires: Red de Seguridad y Defensa de America Latina. (2008): 167.
54 This situation does not indicate a true political duopoly during the Frente Nacional — there were many factions inside the Liberal and Conservative parties that plied their own political agendas. Among them were the MRL and ANAPO. The Conservatives and Liberals both housed factions of ANAPO, while the Liberals subsumed the MRL (Movimiento Revolucionario Liberal). Inside the Conservative camp were the Gomez and Ospina factions. The facade duopoly of the Frente Nacional forced these elements to join one of the mainstream parties and then to work their political goals from the 'inside out'. Marco Palacios Rozo shows the distribution of sub-parties in the Conservative and Liberal delegations of the Senate and Chamber of Representatives during the Frente Nacional: M. Palacios Rozo. Between Legitimacy and Violence, A History of Colombia, 1875-2002. Durham: (2006): 186. 13
Another type of insurrectionist group appeared in the early 1970s - one that arose from
Rojas Pinilla's ANAPO,55 dissident COLAR officers, disenchanted Communists and ultra- right wing Falangists.5 This group, called the M-19,57 succeeded in some high-profile terror activities,58 but suffered a defeat at the hands of the COLAR during the Palace of
Justice siege in Bogota.59 In this action, a contingent of the COLAR, commanded by
Colonel Alfonso Plazas ° acted under the direction of the President, but these instructions
55 ANAPO is a Spanish acronym for Alianza Nacional Popular -the National Popular Alliance. Its supporters are called Anapistas.
56 The United States' Federal Bureau of Investigation considered Colombia at risk for Falangist penetration during the pre-and World War II years. Under the authorship of the bureau's director, J. Edgar Hoover, the FBI produced a document that examined a Falangist organization in Colombia. It highlighted the activities of a Spaniard, Antonio Valverde Gil, who was commissioned by the Falange in Spain to organize a sister organization in Colombia. The organization was the Jerarquia de la Falange Espahol y de las Jons en Colombia. Please see the following for an optical scan of the document: J. E. Hoover. Totalitarian Activities - the Spanish Falange in the Western Hemisphere Today. Washington: United States Department of Justice - Federal Bureau of Investigation. (Dec. 1943). Downloaded from internet. (15 May 2009).
57 M-l 9 is a Spanish acronym for Movimiento 19 de Abril, or the Movement of April 19. This name commemorates the day the national elections were allegedly 'stolen' from ANAPO. Frank Safford and Marco Palacios Rozo show the 1970 election results as follows: 1,561,468 votes for Gustavo Rojas Pinilla, and 1,625,025 votes for Misael Pastrana Borrero. The government censored broadcasts of partial election results that showed Rojas winning the race. The next day President Carlos Lleras Restrepo confirmed Pastrana's election and imposed a curfew in Colombia's large cities. F. Safford and M. Palacios Rozo. Colombia - Fragmented Land, Divided Society. New York: Oxford University Press. (2002): 330-331.
58 The activities included the theft of Simon Bolivar's Sword, the theft of five-thousand weapons from a COLAR arsenal, and the kidnapping of the U. S. Ambassador and fifty-one other people at the Dominican Republic's embassy in Bogota. Please see the following article for details: Anonymous. "For Starters, M19 Stole Bolivar's Sword". Washington Post. (11 Nov. 1985): A36.
59 C. A. Watson. "Civil-Military Relations in Colombia: A Workable Relationship or a Case for Fundamental Reform". Third World Quarterly. Vol. 21. No. 3. (Jun. 2000): 533.
T. Wells. "Bogota Rebels Annihilated in Assault on Justice Palace". The Washington Post. (8 Nov. 1985): Al. 14 did not mandate an 'annihilation operation'.61 The COLAR's all-out attack62 killed almost everyone involved in the standoff -- it led to a virtual coup d'etat with the military gaining prominence in the areas of defense, security, and peace negotiations. The peace initiatives of President Belisario Betancur Cuartas withered after the siege.63 The M-19 later merged into Colombia's legitimate political matrix via negotiations with civilian government officials as opposed to a terminal defeat by the COLAR.64 After the M-19's subsumation into Colombian civil society, another type of insurrectionist group rose to the national forefront — the Communist inspired guerrillas. Notable among these factions were the ELN and the FARC. These groups were to have a telling effect on Colombia's security and stability, while the COLAR's actions to suppress them would demonstrate that
61 President Belisario Betancur said that the massacre was "a terrible nightmare" and "I gave the respective orders to find a way out of this within the framework of the law". J. B. Treaster. "Colombia Troops end Court Siege; Dozens are Slain". New York Times. (8 Nov. 1985): Al.
62 It is possible that Betancur had acquiesced to the COLAR's demands to use force instead of negotiations. In 1980, President Julio Cesar Turbay Ayala arrived at a negotiated settlement with the M19 contingent that had kidnapped a group of fourteen ambassadors and thirty-six other people at a cocktail party in the Dominican Republic's Bogota Embassy. In this incident, Turbay Ayala steadfastly adhered to diplomatic methods irrespective of the COLAR's demands for a military solution. Turbay Ayala advised Betancur Cuartas to take a strategy of patience in the Palace of Justice siege. Please see: J. B. Treaster. "Colombia Debates Handling of Siege". New York Times. (10 Nov. 1985): 17.
63 N. Richani. Systems of Violence - The Political Economy of War and Peace in Colombia. Albany: State University of New York Press. (2002): 39.
64 Farah reported the M-19 surrendered on 10 March 1990, in Santo Domingo, Colombia. Commander of the M-19, Carlos Pizarro had a friendly meeting with President Virgilio Barco, thus marking the rebel group's re-entrance into civil society. D. Farah. "Colombian Rebels Turn In Their Guns". The Washington Post. (11 Mar. 1990): A29. 15 organization's cultural focus on militarismo, aristocratic estate privilege, and traditional war fighting techniques.
From pre World War II military and civilian aid programs, through John F.
Kennedy's Alliance for Progress to the continuing prosecution of Ronald Reagan's 'War on Drugs', the United States has poured billions of dollars worth of armaments, equipment, training, and advisors into Colombia. The W. J. Clinton and G. W. Bush Administrations expanded this aid to such a level that Colombia has received the third largest support level of any United States' ally to date.67 Despite the efforts of the COLAR, the lavish support of the United States, and the policies of the Colombian central government, the war against the insurgents has been an overall failure. The lack of victory is especially noteworthy when one considers the Bogota government has ceded parts of the southern departments to
65 These programs attempted to generate a defensive perimeter around the United States. For more information, please see: J. Child. "The Inter-American Military System: Historical Development, Current Trends and Implications for U.S. Policy — Military Issue Research Memorandum AD A047591". United States Army War College Publications Service. (23 Oct. 1977): 7.
66 Herbert Hoover and Franklin D. Roosevelt's 'Good Neighbor Policy' contained military and civilian aid programs targeted at Latin America. Franklin D. Roosevelt solidified the United States' non-intervention policy in Latin America. Replacing armed interventions typical of Theodore Roosevelt's 'Gunboat Diplomacy', the U.S. Government instituted what some commentators call 'Dollar Diplomacy". This liberal internationalism brought a significant influx of American funds into Colombia. The sale of Colombian Government bonds in the U.S. helped finance a plethora of projects designed to modernize that state. For further information on this form of diplomacy please see: S. J. Randall Financial Diplomacy in The Diplomacy of Modernization: Colombian-American Relations, 1920-1940. Toronto: University of Toronto Press. (1977): 55-72.
67 W. Aviles. "Institutions, Military Policy, and Human Rights in Colombia". Latin American Perspectives. Vol. 28. No. 1. (Jan. 2001): 39-40. 16 the FARC's control.05 The FARC leadership has said this area, the Zona Despeje,m m was an independent and sovereign peasant republic that owed no loyalty to the Bogota government. The ceding of central government control in an area of such a size as the Zona
Despeje speaks loudly to the failure of the COLAR's efforts to defeat the insurgents.
Have the COLAR's traditionalist culture and its politico-military ramifications been significant factors in its historical lack of victory in the counter-insurgency? I assert that
Iberian elitist traditions and Prussian-style militarism permeated the COLAR's officer corps and have caused that establishment to follow a philosophy called the 'politics of anti- polities'. Pursuing this philosophy, certain members of the COLAR's officer corps have behaved like a traditional, privileged estate that has often refused to support unconditionally its civilian government. When ordered by their civilian leaders to abandon their cultural heritage of militarismo and long-standing focus on traditional war fighting methods, these officers responded with a mosaic of behaviors that varied from insolence in
68 The Bogota government ceded this area to help bring the FARC to the negotiating table. In violation of its agreement with the government, the FARC used this area as a safe haven from which to stage attacks on government outposts elsewhere in Colombia.
69 P. A. Beckley. "Maintaining the Violent Status Quo: The Political Economy of the Colombian Insurgency". United States' Navy Postgraduate School Publications. (Jun. 2002): 2.
70 Parts of the President Andres Pastrana Arango's proposal to Manuel Marulanda, along with prisoner exchange details are available at the flowing link: Anonymous. "Pastrana, A La Zona Del Despeje" El Tiempo. (17 Oct. 1998). Downloaded from internet. (13 Apr. 2009).
School of the Americas, the John F. Kennedy Special Warfare School, la Escuela de
Lanceros,11 and other institutions. When one looks at the manpower allocations in the
COLAR, a decided lack of resources appears in the area of COIN. Before the late 1990s, only the COLAR's counter-guerrilla, counter-narcotics, ranger, and aviation brigades had any possible connection to COIN activities. All the other brigades were of either a traditional mobile warfare nature or, worse yet, were part of what Thomas Marks calls an
'Army of Socialization'72 that was and still is not legally required to engage in combat operations of any kind. This 'Army of Socialization'73 remains in the capital and other
71 La Escuela de Lanceros is the COLAR's Ranger School. The current curriculum in this school was modeled after that of the John F. Kennedy Special Warfare School at Fort Bragg, North Carolina and the U. S. Army Ranger School at Fort Benning Georgia. This training syllabus includes small unit tactics, weapons and systems cross training, orienteering, map reading, battlefield medical techniques, politics, and civil relations.
72 T. Marks. "Colombian Army Adaptation to FARC Insurgency". United States' Army War College Strategic Studies Institute Publications. (Jan. 2002): 12.
The ranks of the 'Army of Socialization' are mostly filled with soldados bachilleres - high school graduate conscripts who are legally shielded from taking part in combat duties. 18 large urban areas serving a publicity function — it shows the press and citizenry a military presence offering an illusory facade of security. The other part of the COLAR is the professional ranks — they do the fighting against the insurgents. Hence, Thomas Marks calls the COLAR a 'two component army'.74 From the overall perspective, this military culture has diluted the COLAR's focus on COIN techniques and has led to its historical lack of victory against the FARC and the ELN.
Commentators' Perspectives on the COLAR's Failed Counterinsurgency
Many commentators have posited plausible reasons for the COLAR's failure to suppress the insurrectionist groups and thereby ensure state and human security. Angel
Rabasa and Peter Chalk, in their seminal work, "Colombian Labyrinth: The Synergy of
Drugs and Insurgency and Its Implication for Regional Stability", point to a multitude of reasons for this failure. Among the reasons they posit as organic to the COLAR are lack of equipment, human rights violations, lack of troops, and logistical problems. They also highlight issues exterior to the COLAR such as the illegal drug and weapons trades, the paramilitaries, and general societal exhaustion. Nazih Richani's work, "The Political
Economy of Violence: The War-System in Colombia", posits a complex web of politics and economic considerations that maintains the insurgency. His main thrust is that the
Colombian central government does not have the economic resources necessary to
74 Ibid. 19 counteract the activities of the insurrectionists and the narcotrafwantes. Secondarily,
Richani also refers to the fact that some parties to the conflict view the situation as beneficial to their economic positions ~ in essence, he asserts Colombia's internal conflict has become a profitable enterprise for some of the combatant parties. Paul A. Beckley assumes a similar tack in his work entitled "Maintaining the Violent Status Quo: The
Political Economy of the Colombian Insurgency". Kim Cragin and Bruce Hoffman in
"Arms Trafficking and Colombia" posit the illegal arms trade as a significant enabling factor in the insurgency. Renssellaer Lee's work, "The White Labyrinth: Cocaine and
Political Power" points to the influence of the narcotrafwantes in all aspects of Colombian society, but focuses on the corrupting influence of the drug trade on the civilian government and its justice system. He also mentions the penetration of the COLAR by the narcotrafwantes' supporters and agents. Richard L. Maullin's work for the RAND
Corporation, entitled "Soldiers, Guerrillas, and Politics in Colombia" points to generalized reasons for the failure of the counter-insurgency in much the same manner as Rabasa and
Chalk's book, but with a much earlier perspective due to its date of publication. Thomas
Marks, in his work "Sustainability of Colombian Military — Strategic Support for
Democratic Security" assumes a military-centric position that states the Colombian government historically had abrogated its obligation to provide leadership to the COLAR
' Narcotraficante is a Spanish word meaning narcotics trafficker. In this paper and most strategic studies analyses, this word refers to large-scale narcotics cartels. 20 in its prosecution of the COIN. None of the above commentators makes any explicit mention of the COLAR's militarist culture interfering with the mechanisms of civilian governance or the operational ramifications of this culture contributing to the failure of the
COIN.
Brian Loveman and Thomas Davies published a theoretical framework for Latin
American militarization in "The Politics of Anti-Politics -- The Military in Latin America".
Loveman has published a corollary work entitled "For la Patria — Politics and the Armed
Forces in Latin America". Both of these works formulate and amplify schema that describe most Latin American military establishments as societal elite classes maintaining a stranglehold on advanced education and financial resources in the polities they are sworn to defend. Loveman and Davies hypothesize the 'politics of anti-politics' as a mindset held by
Latin American military professionals that envisages their officer corps as the only true citizens of the state, holding the exclusive mandate to uphold and defend their constitutions from enemies both foreign and domestic. The internal defense precept is notable as the
Latin American officer corps often views itself as the first, best, and last line of defence to protect their constitutions and states against the machinations of corrupt and incompetent politicians. Loveman and Davies show examples of this mindset and suite of practices in all
Latin American states, including Colombia. In their examination of Colombia, Loveman and Davies focus on the praetorian practices of General Gustavo Rojas Pinilla, and they finish their examination at that juncture. These two commentators go so far as to say that except for the dictatorship of Rojas Pinilla, the COLAR has been relatively apolitical — they assert it has exhibited the lowest level of praetorianism of any Latin American military 21 establishment. When one considers praetorianism as one of the outcomes of the COLAR's culture, the position of Loveman and Davies becomes clear — they infer in the overall perspective that the COLAR is not a politicized, privilege-based estate.
In this thesis, I maintain that the surveyed commentators, especially Loveman and
Davies, have overlooked pertinent facts in their examinations and assessments of the
COLAR. Their notion that the lack of coups d'etat is indicative of a de-politicized, professional, and effective COLAR is not in alignment with historical facts. Underpinning the COLAR is a traditionalist military culture that demands aristocratic entitlements from the society it defends. Whenever Colombian society failed to meet these demands, the
COLAR undertook a spectrum of actions that diminished unit cohesion, esprit de corps,16 and overall military efficacy. These actions ranged from those deeply engrained in
77 traditional Ibero-American civil society, to those practiced during various post-
•to independence administrations. As shown in upcoming sections, these practices disabled
T. C. Bruneau's CMR trinity, thus indicating a COLAR with impaired martial efficacy. I assert this traditionalist militarist culture has significantly diluted the COLAR's war
76 Esprit de corps is French term that means the fighting spirit of a military unit.
77 An example of this is the 'I obey but do not comply' tactic introduced during the Spanish colonies' wars of independence. Upcoming sections of this paper will discuss this tactic in more detail.
78 These practices include caudillismo, militarismo, 'operation turtle', and certain senior COLAR officers' fixation on traditional warfare methods. Upcoming sections of this paper will discuss these concepts in more detail. 22
fighting impetus ~ this is one of the contributing factors that explain why the FARC and
ELN are still extant at the time of this thesis.
The COLAR's Culture and Its Ramifications Lead to Failure
In this paper, I shall perform a series of examinations that define the COLAR's culture and how it has contributed to the lack of success in the COIN. In order to circumscribe the
COLAR's cultural boundaries, this paper shall examine Western military professionalism, showing a line of development from Aristotle's Greece, Cincinnatus in Rome, though
George Washington in the American Revolution, to the current practices and doctrines of the United States' Army.79 This line of inquiry shall generate the foundational statement as to how a professional military establishment should behave in relation to the civilian government of a liberal democratic polity.80 Secondly, this paper shall delineate praetorianism to demonstrate the origins and development of military politicization, insolence, and insubordination of civilian governmental leaders. The above concepts shall
79 The United States' Army is pertinent to this line of examination, as it has exhibited an ever-increasing doctrinal influence on the COLAR since their meeting as allies in the Korean War. In this meeting, America's strong anti-Communist bias diffused into the COLAR via collegia! interactions between members of each force's officer corps. Although the United States offered military missions to the COLAR since the late 1930s, I assert the tipping point for U. S. doctrinal influence occurred during the Korean War.
80 Robert Dahl posited that modern democracies are polyarchies. These polities have free and fair elections, elected officials, rights to run for office, inclusive suffrage, and freedom of expression, alternative information, and associational autonomy. Nonetheless, some commentators assert Colombia is a highly restrictive democracy, while others maintain it is a hegemonic oligarchy. For the purposes of argumentative simplicity, I shall treat Colombia as a polyarchy. For Dahl's definition of polyarchy, please see: R. A. Dahl. Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition. New Haven: Yale University Press. (1971): 3. 23 set the boundaries of an action spectrum one could expect from military establishment in the service of a democratic polity.
Next, I shall investigate the development of Iberian elitism and social estate competition with the objective of demonstrating a migration of militarismo from Spain to the New World. Subsequently, this paper shall examine the fuero militar81 in both Spain and the New World to cement the notion of the Colombian military estate's political impunity. This exercise shall then demonstrate that the culture of militarismo and estate privilege is still a powerful force in Colombia despite attempts to reform the fuero militar.
Following these discussions of militarismo and Western military professionalism, I shall pursue an historical survey that highlights incidents of top-level military friction with
Colombian civilian government. This survey shall demonstrate that serving generals in the
Colombian military assumed the role of Minister of Defense, indicating a possible politicization of the top-level echelons of the COLAR, perhaps diffusing its focus from civilian-mandated COIN activities. Following these concepts, I shall introduce the notion that certain senior COLAR officers have steadfastly adhered to traditional war fighting techniques — irrespective of combat exigencies or the COIN doctrines taught by the United
Fuero militar is a Spanish phrase meaning military privilege. The original term was fuero de guerra militar -it was shortened in common parlance to fuero militar. 24
States' Army School of the Americas, the John F. Kennedy Special Warfare School and la
Escuela de Lanceros. This exercise shall demonstrate the tactics and strategy of some of the COLAR's traditionally-minded officer corps are a poor fit in a COIN — the COLAR's use of these concepts is a significant factor in that organization's lack of success in its efforts to defeat the guerrillas. 25
CHAPTER 1 - CONCEPTS OF INSURGENCY, COUNTERINSURGENCY AND CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS
Colombia has suffered the ravages of internecine combat from the mid-1800's to the present. The combat occurring in Colombia has been of a type that is of a lower intensity and smaller scope than all-out warfare. This paper shall discuss this variant of combat from the perspective of that experienced by the United States in the Vietnam War — a conflict typified by a small power using a myriad of unusual tactics against an opponent lavishly endowed with an overwhelming preponderance of traditional military power. Next, I shall set forward some practical concepts to help describe the variant of combat in Colombia from the mid-twentieth century to the present. Following this discussion, I shall examine the concepts of civil military relations that are pertinent to the research question.
The study of civil-military relations82 covers many areas; among these are ethics, morals, and lawful, soldierly behavior. This paper uses William Aviles' notion that posits
CMR to be a framework of institutions behaving as political actors with standard operating procedures that define and protect communities of interests. Douglas L. Bland amplifies
82 Henceforth referred to as CMR in this paper.
83 W. Aviles, "Institutions, Military Policy, and Human Rights in Colombia". Latin American Perspectives. Vol. 28. No. 1. (Jan. 2001): 33. this perspective by stating that civilian control of the military is a framework of responsibility shared between civilian elites and the officer corps. These responsibilities
84 may merge from time to time but never fuse permanently with each other. Within this institutional framework, I shall examine the polar extremes of CMR in the sections covering civic republicanism and its construct of obedient military service, followed then by a discussion of praetorianism.
Colombia ~ Insurgency, Counterinsurgency and Traditional War Fighting
The insurrection in Colombia is at first examination, very difficult to understand.
Noted commentators such as Richard Downes have described the type of combat in
Colombia as 'ambiguous warfare'.85 Without a base of traditional combat arms capabilities, the insurgents have fought a 'poor man's war' against the central government. This sort of irregular warfare historically has featured low intensity, small unit activities, such as raiding ill-staffed government outposts for medical supplies, military equipment and other consumables.
84 D. L. Bland. "A Unified Theory of Civil-Military Relations". Armed Forces and Society. Vol. 26. No. 1. (Fall 1999): 9.
85 R. Downes. "Landpower and Ambiguous Warfare - The Challenges of Colombia in the 21st Century". United States' Army War College Strategic Studies Institute. (10 Mar. 1999): 1-21. 27
The early FARC combat engagements used 'hit and run' techniques that were quite similar to the methods employed by the Viet Cong86 during the early days87 of the Vietnam
War. Using these techniques, the Viet Cong guerrillas attacked and damaged the Republic of Vietnam88 and United States' centers of gravity.89 After each engagement, the Viet Cong simply disappeared into the rainforest or merged with the local civilian population. These tactics counterbalanced the Americans' traditional war fighting capabilities that focused on closing with and defeating well-defined enemy troop formations. In 1968, General Vo
86 Viet Cong is a term referring to the irregular fighters whose goal was the overthrow of the South Vietnamese government and the unification of the two Vietnams into a single Communist state. The official name for the Viet Cong is the National Liberation Front for South Vietnam — Mat trdn Dan toe Gidi phong mien Nam Viet Nam.
87 This is the pre-1968 period. The North Vietnamese Army did engage the Americans and their allies in some large-unit battles before 1968, such as the 1965 fight with the 7th U. S. Cavalry at Landing Zone X- Ray in the la Drang Valley. Before 1968, these large unit engagements were in the minority of the battles fought between the Communists and the USA — RVN forces. The official name for the North Vietnamese Army is the Vietnam People's Army — Qudn Doi Nhan Dan Viet Nam
! RVN is the American acronym for this state.
89 The United States operated in French Indochina (Vietnam) from nearly the onset of its involvement in World War II. Agents from the United States' Office of Strategic Services, such as Archimedes L. A. Patti, worked with noted Vietnamese persons such as Ho Chi Minh to fight against the Japanese. Following the end of World War II, and against Patti's recommendations, Harry Truman chose to support the reinstitution of French colonial hegemony in Vietnam. The United States provided military advisors (another notable example was Edward G. Lansdale), and weapons to the French colonial forces by way of MAAG (Military Assistance and Advisory Group). Following the fall of Dien Bien Phu, and the exit of the French, the United States continued with its MAAG efforts in the support of the South Vietnamese regime. Notably in the late 1950s and early 1960s, RVN President Ngo Dinh Diem so distrusted the United States' support efforts that he thought them to be a 'Trojan horse' for another colonial hegemony. Consequently, he would not allow complete penetration of the South Vietnamese security forces by American advisors. For a description of this situation, please see: Archimedes L. A. Patti. Why Viet Nam? : Prelude to America's Albatross Berkeley: University of California Press (1980). N.B. Patti submitted this book for publication at the height of the Vietnam War, but due to its controversial content, the Johnson and Nixon administrations suppressed its publication. 28
Nguyen Giap changed the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese Army's90 strategy from guerrilla warfare to that based upon mobile warfare spearheads supported by irregular harassment operations. In a similar fashion, the FARC changed its combat strategy in the early 1980s.
At its Seventh Guerrilla Plenipotentiary Conference in 1982, the FARC's military commander,91 Jorge Briceno Suarez,92 devised a new combat strategy in alignment with the insurgent training he received in the Marxist state of Nicaragua. With the assistance of
Daniel Ortega's government, Briceno Suarez and his top associates received training from
Vietnamese, Nicaraguan, and Salvadoran FMLN93 experts. All of these trainers, and especially those from the FMLN demonstrated high levels of irregular warfare expertise and military capability.94 This new strategy sprung from the battlefield-proven precepts of the NVA's commander-in-chief, General Vo Nguyen Giap. The FARC did not abandon
90 Henceforth referred to as NVA in this paper.
91 L. Berry et. al. "A Global Overview of Narcotics-Funded and Other Extremist Groups". United States' Library of Congress Federal Research Division Publications. (May 2002): 63.
92 His nom de guerre is el Mono Jojoy.
93 FMLN is a Spanish acronym meaning Frente Farabundo Marti para la Liberacion Nacional — the Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front. The FMLN formed as an umbrella entity for Salvadoran left- wing guerrillas on 10 October 1980. Upon the completion of the Chapultepec Peace Accords in 1992, the FMLN rejoined Salvadoran civil society and became a legal political party.
94 R. Ortiz. "Insurgent Strategies in the Post-Cold War: The Case of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia". Studies in Conflict & Terrorism. No. 25. (2002): 130. 29 guerrilla operations in this new plan ~ Bricefio Suarez simply used these operations to keep the COLAR off-balance. This tactic helped weaken the COLAR's capacity to muster its forces in response to the new strategy of battalion-level engagements. Bricefio Suarez designed these battles to destroy or damage COLAR units that were guarding significant government assets, such as townships, oil pipelines, power transmission facilities, and large presidios?5 The ultimate objective was to defeat the COLAR and seize governmental power.9 In some cases, Bricefio Suarez and his guerrillas lured COLAR units into set- piece battles by feeding them false intelligence about FARC block locations, coca processing facilities or prisoner detention areas. The guerrilla sections of the FARC acted as military 'noise generators' that fooled the COLAR's traditionally minded officer corps into significant command level errors that resulted in major battlefield defeats. I shall discuss some of these battles in upcoming sections of this paper.
Civic Republicanism and Military Service
One of the negative actions undertaken by the COLAR's officer corps has been non professional behavior with respect to the civilian leadership of the state. In order to analyze
95 A presidio is a blockhouse or a fortification.
T. Marks. "Colombian Army Adaptation to FARC Insurgency". United States' Army War College Strategic Studies Institute Publications. (Jan. 2002): 6. 30 this behavior I shall discuss the two polar opposites of military service — the loyal, apolitical citizen-soldier and the epitome of military politicization — praetorianism.
The Roman and American Traditions of the Citizen-Soldier
Aristotle put forward the notion of civic republicanism — a concept that stated citizens performed services for the polls91 because these tasks were the essence of personal virtue.
In the practice of civic republicanism, virtue predicated that citizens take an active role in managing and defending the polish The Roman and American notions of the citizen- soldier draw their foundations from this concept of civic republicanism and virtuous service.
The basis of western military professionalism resided in the Roman Republic's legend of the loyal citizen-soldier, Cincinnatus." In 457 B.C., the Roman polis found itself embroiled in a war with the Aequians. Due to poor leadership, the Romans initially failed in this conflict. In response to this situation, the Roman Senate acclaimed Cincinnatus dictator. Under Cincinnatus' command, the forces of Rome defeated the Aequians. After accepting the surrender of his enemies, Cincinnatus resigned the dictatorship and returned
The polis is the ancient Greek city-state.
98 A. C. Mason. "Citizenship Scarcity in Weak States' — The Colombian Experience". Department of Political Science Publications Service, Universidad de los Andes, Bogota, Colombia. (Sept. 2002): 4-5. 31
to his estate as a private citizen.100 His appointment as dictator101 had only lasted sixteen
days — he resigned immediately after the termination of the national emergency.
Cincinnatus was one of the more notable archetypes of martial duty and civic
republicanism in the western military tradition — he loved the polis more than personal
aggrandizement and political power. In the legend of Cincinnatus, military interference in
the political arena remained at an absolute minimum — it lasted no longer than the national
emergency.
Another example of Cincinnatus' type of behavior appeared in the career of General
George Washington during the era of the American Revolution.102 After his defeat of the
British, Washington refused to use his military power to interfere with the operations of the
Continental Congress — instead, he retired from the military to pursue a private life.103 As a
99 Lucius Quinctius Cincinnatus.
100 O. Gross. "The Concept of Crisis: What Can We Learn from the Two Dictatorships of L. Quinctius Cincinnatus". Centro Nazionale di Prevenzione e Difesa Sociale XVII International Conf. - Civil and Economic Rights in Times of Crisis, Stresa, Italy. (May 13-14. 2005): 2.
101 The Roman Senate appointed a dictator in times of national emergency. His term of office was six months, in which he wielded absolute power.
102 T. N. Winter. "Cincinnatus and the Disbanding of Washington's Army". The Classical Bulletin. Vol. 51. No. 6. (Apr. 1975): 84.
103 After the Revolutionary War, Major General Henry Knox formed the Society of the Cincinnati. This group extolled the virtues of Cincinnatus and promoted them throughout the United States' military establishment. Details are available at the following link:
The examples of Cincinnatus and George Washington form the foundation of
American military professionalism105 — it encompasses duty to country, support of the government of the day, and the keeping of the military at arm's length from the operations of civilian governance. This paper shall use the actions of Cincinnatus and George
Washington as baseline examples of military professionalism from which to analyze the behavior of the COLAR's officer corps. In the next section, I shall discuss the polar opposite military professionalism — praetorianism.
Praetorianism - The Degradation of Cincinnatus' Military Tradition
The Roman Republic prided itself on the practice of civic republicanism as espoused by Aristotle and exemplified in the actions of Cincinnatus. These ideals significantly degenerated during the first century of the Roman Empire. After the assassination of Julius
104 Other notable American examples are Presidents Andrew Jackson, Ulysses S. Grant and Dwight D. Eisenhower. All were U. S. Army Generals who became President after their retirement from active duty.
105 This notion is core to ethic of American military professionalism. This ethic is taught to junior COLAR officers at various United States' Army training schools, the COLAR's la Escuela Militar de Cadetes General Jose Maria Cordova (analogous to the U. S. Military Academy) and la Escuela Superior de Guerra (analogous to the U. S. Army War College). 33
Caesar,106 Octavian107 deemed necessary the creation and maintenance of an imperial bodyguard force. Upon his ascension to the imperial throne, Octavian108 instituted a force named the Praetorian Guard. As a precaution against army rebellions, its cohorts were the only military units legally permitted within Rome's city walls. A Patrician1 9 military officer called the Prefect commanded the Praetorian Guard.
During the reign of Augustus, the Praetorian Guard fulfilled its mandate by protecting the Emperor. After the death of Augustus, the Praetorian Guard became politically active - it often directly interfered in the process of governance by intimidating those who disagreed with the Emperor.110 The politicization of the Praetorian Guard first rose to the forefront during the reign of Tiberius,111 when the Emperor and Senate of Rome appointed
Lucius Aelius Sejanus112 as its Prefect. The political machinations of Sejanus caused
106 Gaius Julius Caesar
1 Gaius Octavius Thurinus
108 Upon acclamation by the senate as emperor, Octavian assumed the name Gaius Julius Caesar Augustus.
109 Patricians were the uppermost class of nobility in Roman society.
1' A. Perlmutter. The Military and Politics in Modern Times - On Professionals, Praetorians, and Revolutionary Soldiers. New Haven: Yale University Press. (1977): 89-90.
111 Born Tiberius Claudius Nero, he assumed the name of Tiberius Julius Caesar Augustus upon his ascension as Emperor of Rome.
112 D. C. A. Shotter. "The Fall of Sejanus: Two Problems". Classical Philology. Vol. 69. No. 1. (Jan. 1974): 42-46. 34
Tiberius to start a series of treason trials that resulted in a reign of terror."" In an attempted
coup d'etat, Sejanus attempted to co-opt the Praetorian Guard's loyalty from Tiberius. The
Emperor's loyalists discovered his treasonous behavior and subsequently killed him."4
During the reign of Nero,"5 this situation degenerated to its nadir when the Praetorian
Guard forced the Emperor's suicide. Subsequently, in the Year of the Four Emperors, the
Praetorian Guard successively supported and then assassinated Emperors Otho,"6 Galba,117
andVitellius.ll8119The new Prefect, Junius Priscus, and the Praetorian Guard supported the installation of Vespasian as Emperor after their assassination of Vitellius.120 The
Praetorian Guard, as the only organized coercive force allowed within the city walls, could,
113 A. Boddington. "Sejanus, Who's Conspiracy". The American Journal of Philology. Vol. 84. No. 1. (Jan. 1963): 5.
114 R. S. Rogers. "Tiberius' Reversal of an Augustan Policy". Transactions and Proceedings of the American Philological Association. Vol. 71. (1940): 535.
115 Born Lucius Domitius Ahenobarbus, he assumed the name of Nero Claudius Caesar Augustus Germanicus upon his ascension as Emperor of Rome.
116 Marcus Salvius Otho.
117 Servius Sulpicius Galba.
118 Aulus Vitellius Germanicus.
1 '9 Cornelius Laco was Prefect during the assassination of Galba, Licinius Proculus was Prefect during the assassination Otho, and Junius Priscus was Prefect during the assassination of Vitellius.
120 A. Ferrill. "Otho, Vitellius, and the Propaganda of Vespasian". The Classical Journal. Vol. 60. No. 6. (Mar. 1965): 267-269. 35 and often did force its choice of Emperor upon the Senate and people of Rome.121 The actions of the Praetorian Guard and its Prefects exemplified the polar opposite of military professionalism based on Aristotelian civic republicanism and Cincinnatus' ethos. These actions came to be known as the pejorative word praetorianism — the egregious interference of the military establishment in the mechanisms of civilian governance. I shall use praetorianism as a contrapuntal yardstick from which to analyze the historical actions oftheCOLAR.
Theoretical Notions of Military Professionalism and Civilian Supremacy
In this section, I shall survey some prominent theories of military professionalism — the notions of military subservience to the civilian government, military efficacy, and lawful behavior. As Colombia is nominally a liberal democracy, this work shall use the concepts put forward by theorists of military professionalism in a liberal democratic polity
— Alexis de Tocqueville, Samuel P. Huntington, Brian Loveman, David Pion-Berlin, and
Thomas C. Bruneau. The concepts put forward by these theorists shall act as benchmarks from which to gauge the actions of the COLAR's officer corps in this paper's upcoming sections.
A. Perlmutter. "The Praetorian State and the Praetorian Army: Toward Taxonomy of Civil-Military Relations in Developing Polities". Comparative Politics. Vol. 1. No. 3. (Apr. 1969): 383. Alexis de Tocqueville's Perspective
Alexis de Tocqueville offered some commentaries on the practice of professional officership in a liberal democracy — he used the United States of America as his example.
In his writings, de Tocqueville noted a curious separation of the military officer from civil society. In his pursuit of the career of arms, the military officer leaves civil society; he becomes a member of a separate and distinct military culture. Upon subsumation into this culture, the officer rises or sinks with the military; he has a myopia that moves towards bellicosity. The officer is a new man with little or no ties to civil society; he may desire war or revolution in his desire to advance the goals of his new culture — the military estate.122
De Tocqueville's comments shed some light on military officers in post-independence
Colombia — this situation was a dichotomy of civil and military society. As the officers moved into a quasi-separate sphere from their civilian counterparts, their worldviews morphed into that of military specialists. Their professionally induced social myopia was noteworthy as it contained the seeds of praetorianism. The professional officers' world was that of the barracks, with civil society as an estranged construct. According to de
Tocqueville, this scenario always made revolution a possibility. He also described the
A. C. H. C. de Tocqueville and Henry Reeve trans. Democracy in America Volume I. New York: Vintage Classics. (1990): 221. 37 professional officer's desire for promotion as the focal point in his life.123 In essence, the military officer in de Tocqueville's view was a new man, his life was divorced from civil society, and he governed his beliefs, desires, and actions accordingly. The army became a small, powerful nation within the overall democratic polity. I assert that the COLAR is just such a nation within the Colombian state.
In summation, de Tocqueville noted that in democratic polities, professional military officers had the tendency to generate their own sub-culture that divorced itself from society. When civil society did not offer the support and honors befitting the defenders of the body politic, the estrangement of the officers from society grew into a propensity for military coups d'etat. I assert that Colombia has continually displayed a mild form of this situation throughout its history — it exhibited a hallmark example of this practice during the rise and fall of General Gustavo Rojas Pinilla.124 Moreover, the estrangement of the
Colombian military estate from the overall body politic has been the norm in that state, and this situation will be more fully described in the following section that deals with Brian
Loveman's 'politics of anti-polities'.
Ibid: 216. 38
Loveman's 'Politics of Anti-Politics'
Brian Loveman generated the concept of the 'politics of anti-politics' in an attempt to
provide a theory that explained the propensity of Latin American military establishments to
interfere with the normal mechanisms of civilian governance. Loveman saw 'anti-politics'
and politics in a quasi-Hegelian fashion — he viewed them as opposite sides of the same
coin. This relationship of thesis and antithesis often resulted in violent and deadly clashes
between two or more factions vying for power in the political milieu of post-independence
Latin America. Loveman's view posited the origins of current Latin American politics to
be the populist movements in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. He described
these movements as demagogic appeals to the working classes that upset the state's
ordinary distributions of wealth and political power. These actions caused political strife,
and in some cases, a total upset of civil society. Latin American military establishments
viewed these movements as a threat they were duty-bound to expunge from the body
politic.125 The inherently conservative worldview126 of the Latin American officer corps
Another example of this type of situation was the rise and fall of President-General Rafael Reyes Prieto during the first decade of the twentieth century. Reyes' rise to power was not a textbook military coup d'etat — he perverted the election process, and with Conservative support, gained the presidency in 1904. Wielding the fusion of military and executive powers, he ruled Colombia by executive decree, dissolved Congress, and instituted a National Assembly — its members' sole purpose was to rubber-stamp his decrees. He was forced to resign the presidency 1909.
125 B. Loveman and T. M. Davies eds. The Politics of Anti-Politics - The Military in Latin America. Wilmington: Scholarly Resources. (1997): 3.
126 A. C. H. C. de Tocqueville and Henry Reeve trans. Democracy in America Volume I. New York: Vintage Classics. (1990): 220. 39 naturally aligned with these actions. One would expect this conservative worldview bearing in mind that most members of Latin American officer corps originated from the upper class
— the majority of the members of the COLAR's officer corps are no exception to this assertion.
Samuel Huntington's Position on Civilian Control of the Military
Samuel Huntington has provided some insights into the relationship between civilian governmental leadership and the professional military officer. Huntington's position stated that the professional military officer should use his training, expertise, bravery and other qualities to attain the policy goals of the civilian political leaders. In short, the professional military officer, although an independent subject matter expert must always be subservient to civilian policy goals. His ideal asserts the military must always maintain its professional expertise and political neutrality with respect to the state's civilian government.
The leaders of the civilian government exert objective control - they grant a relative degree of autonomy to the military in its sphere of expertise, but maintain overall control of the grand strategy and political goals of the military establishment. Moreover, the civilian leaders of the state should protect their military establishment from undue pressure exerted by the government in the area of domestic politics. This pressure constitutes subjective civilian control of the military. Huntington's conceptualization stated that the military was an autonomous profession of subject mater experts who retained political neutrality while accepting guidance from their civilian political leaders.127 This concept is especially noteworthy when one examines the relationship of the COLAR with the paramilitary groups operating in Colombia. This examination will appear in an upcoming section of this paper.
Huntington's position on objective civilian control of the military asserts that a fully professionalized military is a tool of the state, and that the opposite of a professional military was that of an organization institutionally entwined in various forms of politics.
Civilian control reinforces military professionalism, efficacy, and political neutrality -- it ensures that the military remains a tool of the state dedicated to fulfilling the goals set by the civilian government. Civilian control decreases as the military establishment becomes increasingly involved in institutional, class and constitutional politics.128 Moreover,
Huntington stated that a professional military establishment must be politically sterile and neutral, ready to execute the commands of the legitimate civilian political authority.129
Huntington amplified his position on military professionalism by using von Clausewitz's
S. P. Huntington. The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil Military Relations. Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press. 1959: 70-72.
129 Ibid: 84. 41 theorem that war was an extension of politics, and added that civilian control was essential for military professionalism:
"... War is the instrument of politics ... the military [is] the servant of the statesman and ...civilian control is essential [for] military professionalism. It exalts obedience as the highest virtue of military men".130
Huntington's position is clear — a professional military establishment must be apolitical, technically proficient, and ready to follow the edicts of the civilian government it serves. Huntingtonian objective control of the military forms the core of United States'
CMR policy - these dicta have exerted a significant doctrinal influence on the COLAR.131
His assertions are an important yardstick from which to measure the actions of the COLAR from the political perspective. These statements form a link to one of the underlying concepts that spawned the research question of this paper — what group ultimately controls the COLAR — the generals, or the state's lawfully elected civilian leaders?
131 The United States exerted this influence via military missions, advisors, collegial relationships, and training some of the COLAR's officer corps. 42
The Yamashita Principle of Command Responsibility
In this section, I shall introduce a concept that is foreign to most civilians — the notion of a commander's legal responsibility for the actions and inactions of his subordinates.
During World War II, a Japanese Army officer came to prominence due to his harsh tactics during the conquest of British and American possessions. This officer was General
Tomoyuki Yamashita, who because of his troops' violent actions directed towards prisoners of war and innocent civilians, came to be known as the 'Tiger of Burma'. After
'Victory over Japan Day', the Allied Powers in the Pacific Theater of Operations investigated the actions of the Japanese forces for violations of the Hague Conventions132 and other international 'customary laws' of warfare.133 On December 7, 1945, the
International Military Tribunal for the Far East134 found General Yamashita guilty of violating the 'customary laws' of war and the Hague Conventions. The tribunal sentenced him to death by hanging. This was the first post-World War II tribunal that
132 The Hague Conventions are international agreements designed to limit the horrors of war. The First Hague Convention was signed on 29 July 1899 and came into effect on 4 September 1900. The Second Hague Convention was signed on 18 October 1907 and came into effect on 26 January 1910. For a discussion on the Hague Conventions, please see: Anonymous. "The Avalon Project, Documents in Law History and Diplomacy, The Laws of War". Lillian Goldman Law Library, Yale Law School. (Undated). Downloaded from internet. (14 May 2009).
133 An international customary law of warfare is generally not codified by written agreement or treaty. This type of law is based on an intersubjective understanding of what is correct and legal in the prosecution of war. As an example, the prohibition on the intentional killing of innocent, unarmed non-combatants is a customary law of warfare. This customary law of warfare later became codified into the Hague and Geneva Conventions.
This tribunal was convened in the Philippines under the authority of General Douglas MacArthur. 43 found a commander legally responsible for failure to control his troops.135 The defense counsel for General Yamashita successfully moved to have the case heard before the
Unites States' Supreme Court. In this hearing, the charges preferred against General
Yamashita were as follows:
"Between October 9, 1944 and September 2, 1945, while Commanding General of the Fourteenth Army Group of the Imperial Japanese Army in the Philippine Islands, General Tomoyuki Yamashita failed to discharge his duty as commander to control the operations of the members of his command, thus permitting them to commit brutal atrocities and other high crimes against the people of the United States, its allies, and dependencies". "
On 4 February 1946, under Chief Justice Harlan F. Stone, the U. S. Supreme Court handed down a verdict on the Yamashita case — it upheld the verdict of the military commission. In accordance with the guilty verdict and the sentence of the military tribunal, the authorities executed Yamashita shortly thereafter. The Yamashita Principle is significant to this paper as it sets the legal precedent of a commander's responsibility for the inactions or actions of his subordinates. This precept has become a cornerstone of
135 R. Donihi. "War Crimes". St. John's Law Review. Vol. 66. (1992): 738. Donihi was a prosecutor employed by the United States' Departments of Justice and War in the above-mentioned tribunals.
Anonymous. "Re: Yamashita 327 U. S." United States' Supreme Court. (1946): 1. 44 customary human rights legislation, and touches intimately upon the COLAR's officer
1 "^7 corps and its relationship with the Autodefensas.
Pion-Berlin's Ideas
Pion-Berlin posited that in the general sense, Latin American states have not contended with a high degree of large-scale international wars, and this situation has led to minimal militarization. This lack of militarization generated a situation in which most Latin
American states had a dearth of civilian expertise in military affairs. The civilians found themselves in a situation in which they were not compelled to understand defense, its strategy, tactics, preparation, budgeting, deployment, doctrine, or training.138 In short, Latin
America's civilian leaders left all military policy matters to their officer corps.
Pion-Berlin asserts that Colombia has enjoyed a reasonably pacific relationship with its neighbors in the twentieth century — any military operations had been small-scale border skirmishes not amounting to full-scale war. Moreover, he states that even in today's environment, Colombia has managed to evade large-scale foreign wars via diplomatic efforts. Pion-Berlin also put forward the notion that civilian ignorance of defense affairs led
" Autodefensas translates to 'self defense' and is used as a generic term referring to a paramilitary self- defense group.
138 D. S. Pion-Berlin. "Political Management of the Military in Latin America". Military Review. (Jan.-Feb. 2005): 19. 45 to difficulties in the control of Latin American military establishments. In short, the civilian members of the ministries of defense, legislative committees, and even the chief executives themselves had such a shortage of military expertise that they failed to command respect from their officer corps. This lack of respect has caused significant difficulties for civilian political leaders attempting to execute objective control over their military establishments. In order to gain the respect of their officer corps, many Latin American
Presidents have resorted to the pragmatic practice of appointing serving military officers as
Ministers of Defense — this was the case from time to time in Colombia.
Bruneau's Constructs
Thomas C. Bruneau offered an interesting perspective based on Huntington's theory of civilian objective control of the military establishment. Bruneau posits the civilian political leaders to be foxes, and as democratically elected representatives of the people, they are adroit users of many skills. On the other hand, Bruneau sees the military as a hedgehog — a slow moving, stubborn animal with a near-impenetrable coat of spines that represents its complete technical mastery of national defense. The relationship between the fox and the hedgehog is complex, as the hedgehog has the power to overthrow the fox, while the fox, via its control of the national purse, has the power to starve the hedgehog into
139 Ibid. submission. Bruneau states the following about military officers' tactics with respect to
their civilian masters:
"It is impossible for civilians, lacking this background, to develop anything like the expertise of officers concerning things military. Often, the officers will utilize a hedgehog strategy and challenge the right of civilians to control the use of military power precisely because of their lack of familiarity with these issues".141
Although both entities presumably share the overall goal of state preservation, the hedgehog and the fox attempt to satisfy their corporate goals within the zero-sum game of national resource allocation. Bruneau's notion of competition posits the hedgehog needs only to master its own domain in order to stifle the position of the fox. In short, the hedgehog's highly specific defense and security platform trumps the general political power of the fox. Forthcoming sections of this paper shall show this scenario sometimes to be the case in Colombia.
140 T. C. Bruneau. "Civil-Military Relations in Latin America: The Hedgehog and the Fox Revisited". Revista Fuerzas Armadas y Sociedad. Ano 19. No. 1. (2005): 111-113.
Ibid: 112. 47
Bruneau also generated a new concept for civil-military relations — the trinity. Unlike
Carl von Clausewitz's trinity,142 Bruneau's trinity delineates its elements to be democratic civilian control of the military, its effectiveness, and efficiency. His notion of democratic civilian control aligns closely with Huntington's concept of objective civilian control of the military. Effectiveness is a simple concept that encompasses mission success. Efficiency revolves around the notion of mission success with the least possible expenditure of lives and materiel. In Bruneau's trinity, the civilian leaders must have the expertise necessary for the formulation of a successful grand strategy and the allocation of national resources necessary for the attainment of these goals.143 The lack of civilian defense expertise has appeared several times in Colombia, and has resulted in the appointment of serving military officers to the Minster of Defense portfolio. In subsequent sections of this paper, I shall examine this situation and its ramifications for the politicization and efficacy of the
COLAR.
THE ANALYTICAL MATRIX
In this paper's matrix of analysis, I shall focus on some key points in order to assess the impact of the COLAR's martial culture upon its prosecution of the COIN. In the first
The Clausewitzian trinity consists of the people, the general and his army, and the government. C. von Clausewitz, trans. J. J. Graham. On War 2nd Edition. London: N. Triibner and Co. (1873): 32.
143 T. C. Bruneau and R. B. Goetze, Jr. "Civilian-Military Relations in Latin America". Military Review. (Sept.-Oct. 2006): 70-71. 48 step, I shall examine the roots of the Latin American militarismo in the Iberian Peninsula during the period of Ferdinand and Isabella's Reconquista. This examination shall put forward the foundational notion of an officer corps raised from a system of aristocratic, class-based privileges and entitlements. Following this, I shall trace the migration of this martial culture to the New World during la Conquista, its consolidation during the colonial period, and its amplification during the independence wars of the nineteenth century. I shall then show how this military culture rose to its zenith in the practice of caudillismo during the post-independence period. I shall use the notion of caudillismo as one of the baseline comparators from which to analyze the actions of the COLAR in its war against the insurgents. Next, I shall employ the concepts propounded by CMR theorists such as de
Tocqueville, Huntington, Pion-Berlin, Loveman and Davies, and Bruneau in order to situate the COLAR within a spectrum of possible politicization levels defined by these scholars. Then I shall examine the actions of certain members of the COLAR's officer corps via the lens of the Yamashita Principle of command responsibility. Finally, I shall compare the COLAR's military culture and its insistence on traditional war fighting methods and opposition to field-proven concepts of COIN from both the British and
American doctrinal perspectives. This paper shall then consolidate all of these concepts and comparisons into an array that shall demonstrate the impact of the COLAR's traditionalist military culture on the counterinsurgency. Summary information from specific theorists appears in the following paragraphs.
De Tocqueville's position asserts that military cultures are inherently conservative ~ they are highly resistant to change of any sort. Moreover, military cultures are divorced 49 from civil society — they are a nation within the state, with corporate needs, desires, and perspectives that often run at cross-purposes from the societies they are mandated to protect.
Huntington provides a theoretical basis from which to analyze the professionalism of a military establishment in the service of a liberal democratic polity. In this foundation,
Huntington brings forward the notion of military professionalism and two contrapuntal forces that act upon it. The first of these forces is objective civilian control of the military.
In this scenario, the military acts as quasi-independent, yet institutionally subservient subject matter experts in the areas of state defense and security. Although allowed significant freedom in the pursuit of the civilian government's grand strategy, the professional military establishment must remain a politically sterile and aloof entity with no active participation in the domestic governmental processes of the state. Huntington puts forward another scenario in which the civilian government itself weakens the apolitical nature of an erstwhile professional military establishment. In this scenario, civilian politicians use the military as a tool of internal politics, thereby infecting that institution with the mandate and will to interfere with the state's internal political processes.
Huntington calls this scenario subjective control of the military. Huntington goes on to affirm that objective control of the military strengthens its efficacy by ensuring its focus remains on state defense and security, while subjective control weakens the military by diffusing its defense focus with the addition of political duties. Pion-Berlin establishes the notion of how a civilian government can maintain control of its military establishment. In his work, Pion-Berlin brings forward the notion of military respect for the decisions of civilian leaders and more specifically, how this respect is lost.
Key to this situation is the lack of civilian expertise in the military sphere - this situation is most critical in the Minister of Defense portfolio. Pion-Berlin asserts that military respect for, and subservience to the state's leadership will never coalesce until civilian expertise rises to an extent that directives and strategies emanating from the Ministry of Defense resonate as valid with the intersubjective understanding suite of the officer corps. In response to a civilian expertise deficit in military affairs, most Latin American polities have resorted to the pragmatic practice of appointing serving military officers to the post of
Minister of Defense, thereby opening the possibility to military politicization and de- professionalization.
Loveman and Davies offer a general theory as to the propensity of Latin American military establishments to interfere in their states' domestic political processes. In their general theory, Loveman and Davies describe Latin American officer corps as politically attuned, highly educated, and modernized far in advance of the societies they protect.
Dovetailing with de Tocqueville's positions, Loveman and Davies agree that military establishments are actually nations within states, exhibiting a professional myopia with respect to civil society. Expanding on this base, Loveman and Davies form a construct that posits Latin American military forces to be introspective, and in that position, these organizations view themselves as their state's only true citizens and defenders of the body politic. Moreover, these military establishments see themselves as the best defense against 51 the egregious machinations of inept and corrupt civilian politicians. Loveman and Davies describe this situation as the 'politics of anti-polities'.
I shall also use the Yamashita principle as a prism from which to examine and analyze the actions of the COLAR's officer corps. When one considers the power hierarchy extant in any military organization, it becomes apparent that superior officers enjoy significant authority over the subordinate ranks they command. This authority is so pervasive and powerful that commanding officers in time of war are legally entitled to execute subordinates they deem disobedient, derelict of their duty, or cowards. These instances are extreme cases indeed, but they highlight the primacy of duty and obedience in the profession of arms. With this authority also comes a high degree of command responsibility. This situation was first set as a legal precedent in the war crimes trial of the
Japanese General, Tomoyuki Yamashita. This precedent states that any military commander can be held legally responsible for the crimes of his or her subordinates. Even if the subordinates are legally culpable for their own criminal actions, it is the responsibility of the commander to control his or her troops, and with the execution of command authority, make all efforts to prevent the perpetration of their subordinates' criminal actions. This perspective on command authority will become more apparent when I discuss some case studies that outline the collusion of certain members of the COLAR's officer corps with the Autodefensas.
Consolidating these concepts, I shall perform an exercise to ascertain if the COLAR is the unconditional servant of Colombia's elected government. I shall then amalgamate the 52 notions put forward by the theorists with historical facts from both the military and political perspectives. This exercise shall point to the fragility or robustness of two legs in the
Colombian instance of Bruneau's CMR trinity. These two legs of Bruneau's CMR trinity shall serve as the overall decision-making nexus with respect to the research question — is the COLAR effective and victorious in its COIN efforts, and is it institutionally subservient to the civilian government of the state. 53
CHAPTER 2 - THE COLAR'S MILITARY CULTURE AND ITS IMPACT ON THE COUNTERINSURGENCY
This chapter shall discuss Iberian and IberoAmerican military cultures with the view of providing a baseline from which to compare and analyze the COLAR. In this section, I shall demonstrate that Iberian and Ibero-American military cultures were elitist — they demanded and for the most part, received special treatment from the societies and polities they normally served. Moreover, Latin American military establishments sometimes held hostage their own governments and citizens in an attempt to elevate their corporate positions. In subsequent sections, I shall demonstrate this situation to be sometimes the case in modern Colombia.
Military Culture and its Relation to Iberian and Latin American Society
Iberian society exhibited crosscutting lines of loyalty and reward that were not always delineated by political boundaries. Nobility in one part of the Iberian Peninsula could owe fealty to a monarch in another area — the domain of another nobleman sometimes separated these areas. Ferdinand and Isabella's consolidation of the Iberian principalities degraded this arrangement and eventually replaced it with a unified absolutist state. This unified kingdom featured a group of power centers within the polity — in this array were the royalty, the Roman Catholic Church, and the military noblemen. All of these estates vied for power within the Kingdom of Spain -- they resorted to intrigues, lobbying, force, and other machinations to attain their ends. After la Reconquista, the military-noble estate attained ascendancy over the Roman Catholic Church — it received the fuero de guerra 54 militar in exchange for its loyal service in the wars against the Muslim Moors. Although in a prominent position, the military-noble estate was periodically challenged by the Roman
Catholic Church and constrained in its power by various royal edicts. Competition between the other estates and the military migrated to the New World144 and found its way to
Colombia.
The Iberian Hidalgo and la Reconquista
Spain was not a united kingdom during the Muslim Moors' domination of the Iberian
Peninsula. This geographical area was an empire of disparate principalities and kingdoms under the domination of a Moorish Caliph. Each of these entities fielded its own army in an attempt to resist the Moors' martial onslaught. An interesting feature of these armies was the way in which they arose. Instead of central levy mandated by a king or regent, the rich landowners of the day,14 mustered these forces. In exchange for their estates, the hacendados pledged fealty to their local ruler via political and military support. They offered allegiance by way of political agreement and tribute, in which they shared a portion of their wealth with the ruler and supported his policies. The hacendados supplied military loyalty by helping raise, finance, equip, and train local military units to defend their ruler
4 C. I. Archer. "The Role of the Military in Colonial Latin America". The History Teacher. Vol. 14. No. 3. (May. 1981): 420.
* These landowners are hacendados — their estates are haciendas. 55 and his realm.146 In these military units were two major divisions, the infantry, and the cavalry. The infantry mostly consisted of commoners, both freedmen and serfs.147 The freedmen originated from the civic commerce guilds, and were in a relatively good financial position. These individuals formed a group that was analogous to the non commissioned officers in modern military organizations. The serfs were the rank and file members of the army — they were the soldiers who did the bulk of the fighting, followed orders and had no command authority. They were poor and generally suffered the brunt of the economic depredations and bloodshed incurred by war fighting.148
The cavalry units arose from the noble classes ~ their members were the caballeros.
These noblemen were the officer class in the Iberian armies. The social station of a caballero was much more than a mere cavalryman -- people often paired this word with the term hidalgo. The noble hidalgos-caballeros formed a class of martial knighthood that carried with it significant privileges within the Iberian social matrix. These privileges would migrate to the New World during la Conquista, and as upcoming sections will demonstrate, were a major factor in the military culture of Colombia.
146 F. G. de Leon. Soldados, Platicos, and Caballeros: The Social Dimensions of Ethics in the Early Modern Spanish Army, in D. J. B .Trim. ed. Chivalric Ethos and the Development of Military Professionalism. Boston: Brill. (2003): 236.
The high-ranking commanders in the infantry were noblemen. 56
The Fuero de Guerra Militar and the Iberian Military Weltanschauung
In order to maintain the loyalty and esprit de corps of their armies, the Iberian rulers used system of inducements called the fuero de guerra militar. This system of privileges gave the noble hidalgos-caballeros certain benefits, the most of important of which were the freedom from paying tribute and immunity from trial by either the ecclesiastical or the civilian courts. 9 The fuero de guerra militar enhanced the position of the noble hidalgos- caballeros to such an extent that only the royalty exceeded their power. The estate of military nobles had risen to a position of penultimate power in the Iberian Peninsula, and their proud and arrogant behavior was in alignment with their elevated position.150 The fuero de guerra militar became a long-standing feature of Iberian and Ibero-American culture — twenty-three states151 in nineteenth and twentieth century Latin America institutionalized these privileges.152 The, fuero de guerra militar made the military estate a separate and privileged society in Ibero-America that was for most purposes, above the law
148 Ibid.
149 A. J. Kuethe. "The Status of the Free Pardo in the Disciplined Militia of New Granada". The Journal of Negro History. Vol. 56. No. 2. (Apr. 1971): 109.
150 A. Perlmutter and V. P. Bennett. The Political Influence of the Military: A Comparative Reader. New Haven: Yale University Press. (1980): 211.
'"l Loveman's statement includes Colombia. The Colombian government mandates the fuero militar by way of executive decrees, making these privileges statutory as opposed to constitutional laws. Later sections of this paper will show how the Colombian Constitution of 1991 constrained these decrees.
152 B. Loveman. "Protected Democracies and Military Guardianship: Political Transitions in Latin America 1978-1993". Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs. Vol. 36. No. 2. (Summer. 1994): 152. 57 and free to act as it saw fit. " The underlying concept of the fuero militar was and still is a significant factor in the Weltanschauung of the COLAR — its officers have long resisted the reform or repeal of this suite of privilege decrees. As upcoming sections will demonstrate, this resistance has taken the form of public disagreement with and denigration of elected officials, insubordination, foot-dragging military operations and in some cases, illegal
'rogue' actions. This military culture also produced a unique form of political leadership — a heroic 'man on horseback' called the caudillo.
Caudillismo - The Latin American Notion of Heroic Leadership
Latin America has produced a unique type of strongman, the caudillo, in its progression from an array of Iberian colonies to a suite of independent states. This individual was a product of the independence wars in which the patriots fought against the royalists. Arguably, the first national caudillos in the newly formed republic of Gran
Colombia were Bolivar,154 Santander,155 and Sucre.156 These individuals gained fame, reputation, and renown as generals commanding patriot armies fighting to expel the royalists. The public perception of personal heroism and success in combat garnered these
"" D. E. Worcester. "The Spanish American Past - Enemy of Change". Journal of Inter-American Studies. Vol. 11. No. l.(Jan. 1969): 74.
4 Bolivar's full name is Simon Jose Antonio de la Santisima Trinidad Bolivar y Palacios Ponte Blanco.
15 Santander's full name is Francisco Jose de Paula Santander y Omana. 58 commanders tremendous influence in the new polities they helped create. They appeared as heroic 'men on horseback' who could steer their newly born states on a course of success, liberty, and prosperity. Bolivar, Santander, and Sucre led by way of personal dynamism, panache, and charisma — this modus operandi was the foundation of personalismo.158
Caudillos generally had a significant armed following from which to draw support and enforce their demands upon society. The political tools used by caudillos were co-optation, violence and its threat, patronage, clientelism and other forms of corruption.159 Many times a caudillo would form an ad-hoc alliance with a cacique, a gamonal, and a hacendado to construct apatria chica. This region acted as a small fatherland that usurped loyalty from the state in which it resided. Colombian national leaders often catered to the elites of the patrias chicas in order to cement their national power base. ' Colombia experienced a few national scale caudillos, and would continually suffer the depredations of local
156 Sucre's full name is Antonio Jose de Sucre y Alcala.
157 Mode of operation.
158 W. H. Beezley. "Caudillismo: An Interpretive Note". Journal of Inter-American Studies. Vol. 11. No. 3. (Jul. 1969): 349.
159 Ibid: 350.
160 A cacique is an Aboriginal chieftain.
1 ' A gamonal is a political boss. The top political boss is often called eljefe maxima.
162 S. Schmidt. "Bureaucrats as Modernizing Brokers? Clientelism in Colombia". Comparative Politics. Vol. 6. No. 3. (Apr. 1974): 431-432. 59 caudillos, such as the leaders of paramilitary groups, the narcotraficantes, and the violent revolutionary factions. Some of these local caudillos would rise to national prominence ~ most would continue their activities to co-opt and corrupt the organs of the state, such as the COLAR and the National Police.164 In upcoming sections, I will show caudillismo and the patrias chicas to be significant factors in the military culture of the COLAR.
External Influences on the COLAR
The military establishments of post-independence Latin American have developed under the tutelage and influence of Europe's great powers and the United States. In the nineteenth century, France and Prussia trained the armies of many Latin American states.
The influence of Prussia in Latin America came to its zenith after its victory in the Franco-
Prussian War — it would have a telling, yet indirect effect on the development of the
COLAR and its officer corps.
163 A. Ferreyra and R. Segura. "Examining the Military in the Local Sphere: Colombia and Mexico". Latin American Perspectives. Vol. 27. No. 2. (Mar. 2000): 26.
164 F. Tannenbaum "A Note on Latin American Politics". Political Science Quarterly. Vol. 58. No. 3. (Sep. 1943): 419-421. 60
Chile's Prussianization of the COLAR
In 1886, Captain Emile Korner of the Prussian Army arrived in Chile and instituted a
national war academy.165 This school trained Chilean officers in Prussian strategy and
tactics but also indoctrinated them with a highly conservative and military-centric
weltanschauung}ee During the late 1800s, the Chilean military became the envy of most
Latin American states. In 1904, President-General Rafael Reyes Prieto of Colombia requested a military mission from Chile.168 Under his military reform program, Reyes
attempted to enhance the proficiency of the COLAR.169 The COLAR's website comments thusly:
"Decree 434 of April 13, 1907 founded the Military Academy of the New Century, which began operations on 1 June of that year, led by the Chilean military 170 mission"...
F. M. Nunn. Yesterday's Soldiers - European Military Professionalism in South America, 1890-J 940. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press (1983): 51-52.
16 A. L. Atehortua Cruz, and H. Velez Ramirez Estado yfuerzas armadas en Colombia. Cali: Tercer Mundo Editores (1994): 198.
167 W. F. Sater and H. H. Herwig. The Grand Illusion: The Prussianization of the Chilean Army. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press. (1999): ii.
168 F. M. Nunn. "The Latin American Military Establishment: Some Thoughts on the Origins of its Socio political Role and an Illustrative Bibliographical Essay". The Americas. Vol. 28. No. 2. (Oct. 1971): 140.
169 R. L. Maullin. Soldiers, Guerrillas and Politics in Colombia. Santa Monica: RAND. (Dec. 1971): 4.
170 H. R. Duran. "La Escuela Militar de Cadetes General Jose Maria Cordova - Evolution Historica" Ejercito Nacional- Republica de Colombia Ministerio de Defensa. (1 Jun. 2007). Downloaded from internet. (31 May 2009).
The professionalization process partially worked -- the Chileans did for Colombia what the Prussians did for Chile. In its tutelage, the Chilean mission enhanced the technical proficiency of the COLAR, and concomitantly, the same military-centric worldview implanted by Korner in Santiago migrated to Bogota. In short, Colombian officers adopted
1T1 the Chilean military philosophy of the 'politics of anti-politics'. I assert this training and reform program resulted in a Colombian officer corps that was oriented towards Prussian- style, professional militarism instead of Huntingtonian military professionalism.
From an historical perspective, the influence of European military missions not only changed the Latin American officers' Weltanschauung but also caused them to envy the prestige, financial support, and equipment granted to Europe's military establishments. The
Latin American economies of the day were incapable of supplying their military establishments the levels of equipment and financial support comparable to the Europeans.
In some cases, their aristocracies viewed military personnel with contempt.172 Coupled with the economic failures persistent in Latin America, their officer corps viewed civilian politicians at best, as incompetent, and at worst, as criminal elements that the military must
171 The Chilean military adopted the traditions and practices of their Prussian instructors to such an extent the Captain Emile Korner became General of the Chilean Army. The military in Chile was so impressed with the Prussians that they adopted their honor code, military law, and uniforms, including the spiked pickelhaube helmet. After the Chilean military mission, the same situation ensued in Colombia. To this day, the dress uniforms of both armies are markedly Prussian in nature.
172 Please see this paper's section on A. C. H. C. de Tocqueville for a theoretical explanation of this type of situation. 62 apprehend and punish. The officers often viewed the civilian politicians as the source of their nation's problems, with the military establishment being the only practical cure for these ills.173 The combination of the traditional Iberian fuero de guerra militar, the advanced social standing of the officer corps, and the modernization caused by foreign military missions generated a sub-culture that was elitist, well armed, highly educated, and politically attuned. In many cases, military officers emerged as modern and professionalized well in advance of any other societal sector.174 The Colombian officer corps' philosophy of 'anti-politics' arose from sources such as the traditional fuero de guerra militar, the Iberian military Weltanschauung, their envy of the European armies, and the Prussianization of their military establishment. I shall show in upcoming sections that this military culture would contribute to the longevity of the Colombian insurgency.
The United States' Factor
The United States was one of the more significant influences on the Colombian military. The bulk of this influence started with Colombian involvement in the Korean
173 B. Loveman and T. M. Davies eds. The Politics of Anti-Politics - The Military in Latin America. Wilmington: Scholarly Resources. (1997): 4-5.
174 F. M. Nunn. "The Latin American Military Establishment: Some Thoughts on the Origins of Its Socio political Role and an Illustrative Bibliographical Essay". The Americas. Vol. 28. No. 2. (Oct. 1971): 137- 138. 63
War.175 In 1950, the North Koreans invaded the south of the peninsula and forcibly
attempted to merge the two states under Communist rule. The United Nations responded with military force and thus started the Korean War. President Laureano Gomez and the government of Colombia cooperated with the United Nations and sent an army battalion and three frigates to fight in that conflict.176 1771780n the home front, Gomez politicized the
COLAR by using it as an instrument of internal order and partisan repression.179 The
Colombian — American military alliance in the Korean War would not be their final contact — this and subsequent meetings between the two groups would have a significant effect upon the politico-military doctrine of the COLAR. The United States' military would have extensive contact with their Colombian counterparts throughout the Cold War, mainly
175 The United States and Colombia have enjoyed political and economic ties from the late 1800s up to the present. American military influence grew when the last Swiss military mission to Colombia ended in 1934 and when the Germans left in the late 1930s. Starting with a military mission in 1940, the United States exerted ever-increasing influence with the COLAR. For a summary of the European drawdown in Colombia, please see R. L. Maullin. Soldiers, Guerrillas, and Politics in Colombia. Santa Monica: RAND. (Dec. 1971): 23.
176 H. W. Velez. "Effects of the War on Drugs and Official Corruption in Colombia". United States' Navy Postgraduate School Publications. (Dec. 1995): 15.
177 For an official perspective on the COLAR's role in the Korean War, please see the following: A. Ruiz Novoa. El batallon Colombia en Corea. Bogota: Empresa Nacional de Publicaciones. (1956). For a more personal perspective on this subject see: A. Ruiz Novoa Ensefianzas de la camparia de Corea: Aplicables al Ejercito de Colombia Bogota: Imprenta Fotograbado. (1956).
178 Alvaro Valencia Tovar presented his perspective on the COLAR's Korean presence in the following works: A. Valencia Tovar. Corea: Resurgimiento de las cenizas. Bogota: Canal Ramirez-Antares (1977). and A. Valencia Tovar and J. Sandoval Franky. Colombia en la Guerra de Corea: La historia secreta. Bogota: Editorial Planeta Colombiana (2001).
179 J. F. Roman. "Guerrilla Violence in Colombia: Examining Causes and Consequences". United States' Navy Postgraduate School Publications. (June. 1994): 51-52. 64 by way of training programs at the United States' Army School of the Americas and cooperative arrangements such as 'Plan LAZO'180 and 'Plan Colombia'. By way of these contacts, the doctrine of the United States' military establishment diffused into its
Colombian counterpart by way of unofficial, collegial methods and by formalized training on the American perspective of CMR and professional officership. In addition to CMR training during the Rojas Pinilla administration, the United States helped the COLAR establish la Escuela de Lanceros to train Colombian soldiers in COIN tactics.181 One of the main points in question is whether the United States' military doctrine would assume paramountcy over the long-standing military culture of the COLAR.
The United States' military doctrine on CMR is quite strict with respect to the hierarchy between the military establishment and civilian governance. Constitutional clauses mandate the United States' President as commander-in-chief of the military establishment.182 All officers and other ranks are subordinate to him and must obey his
Some United States' sources call this program Plan LASO -- Latin American Security Operations. Colombian sources call this operation Plan LAZO, which in English means Plan Snare.
R. W. Drexler. Colombia and the United States - Narcotics Traffic and a Failed Foreign Policy. Jefferson: McFarland & Company. (1997): 74.
182 The same can be said of Colombia. The 1991 Constitution, Article 189, Subsection 3 states: "The President is the supreme commander of the Armed Forces of the Republic". Anonymous. "Political Constitution of 1991 through 2005 Reforms". Republica de Colombia (Nov. 2008) Articulo 189 - 3. Downloaded from internet. (18 May 2009).
Stanley R. Arthur, United States' Navy:
"No military institution in the world supports the principle of civilian control more strongly than the American military". 8
The American doctrine of CMR would have a telling affect on the COLAR in the latter part of the twentieth century, and would be in direct competition with traditional
Colombian military culture as exemplified by the fuero militar and militarismo. The question generated by this competition is whether Huntingtonian objective control of the
S. R. Arthur and V. Davis, ed. "The American Military: Some Thoughts on Who We are and What We Are" in "Civil-Military Relations in the Not Quite Wars of the Distant Future". United States' Army Strategic Studies Institute Publications. (30 Oct. 1996): 15. 66 military as contained in United States' doctrine has enjoyed supremacy over the COLAR's traditional culture of militarismo and the fuero militar.
I assert that mired in the culture of militarismo, the fuero militar, and traditional war fighting methods, certain members of the COLAR's officer corps have sometimes ignored the directives of Colombia's civilian leaders to pursue a grand strategy that depended upon the pacification of the countryside. Great Britain's Sir Robert Thompson codified these pacification concepts, and the United States' Army School of the Americas and John F.
Kennedy Special Warfare School taught this syllabus to selected COLAR officers. These concepts were also part of the training doctrine at the COLAR's Escuela de Lanceros. With this situation in mind, I shall now discuss the United States' doctrine in the upcoming sections.
The United States' Military Leadership Doctrine
The United States' Army states its leadership doctrine in the field manual entitled
"Army Leadership, Be, Know, Do". The Oath of Enlistment and the Oath of Office state the following prime directives:
"Oath of Enlistment
I do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will support and defend the Constitution of the United States against all enemies, foreign and domestic; that I will bear true faith and allegiance to the same; and that I will obey the orders of the President of the United States and the orders of the officers appointed over me, according to regulations and the Uniform Code of Military Justice. So help me God. 67
Oath of Office
I [full name], having been appointed a [rank] in the United States Army, do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will support and defend the Constitution of the United States against all enemies, foreign and domestic; that I will bear true faith and allegiance to the same; that I take this obligation freely, without any mental reservation or purpose of evasion, and that I will well and faithfully discharge the duties of the office upon which I am about to enter. So help me God".184
These oaths outline the duties and obligations of soldiers and officers in the United
States' Army. Of particular interest is the notion that the soldier defends the U. S.
Constitution and promises obedience to the orders of the President of the United States and the officers appointed above them. This is a personal affirmation of democratic, objective control of the military as set out S. P. Huntington. The U. S. Army employs an acronym for the qualities it demands of its officers: 'LDRSHIP'. Next, I shall deconstruct this acronym to discuss each concept.
"L stands for loyalty. - Bear true faith and allegiance to the US Constitution, the Army, your unit, and other soldiers... Since before the founding of the republic, the Army has respected its subordination to its civilian political leaders. This subordination is fundamental to preserving the liberty of all Americans.
Shinseki, E. K. Army Leadership - Field Manual 22-100. Washington: United States' Army Publications. (1999): 2-1. 68
D stands for duty. — Fulfill your obligations. The essence of duty is acting in the absence of orders or direction from others, based on an inner sense of what is morally and professionally right.... Duty begins with everything required of you by law, regulation, and orders; but it includes much more than that... [Leaders] take full responsibility for their actions and those of their subordinates.
R stands for respect. — Treat people as they should be treated... Respect for the individual forms the basis for the rule of law, the very essence of what makes America. In the Army, respect means recognizing and appreciating the inherent dignity and worth of all people... Effective leaders are tolerant of beliefs different from their own as long as those beliefs do not conflict with Army values, are not illegal, and are not unethical.
S stands for selfless service. — Put the welfare of the nation, the Army, and subordinates before your own. Selfless service means doing what is right for the nation, the Army, your organization, and your people — and putting these responsibilities above your own interests. The needs of the Army and the nation come first... Selfless service means that you do not make decisions or take actions that help your image or your career but hurt others or sabotage the mission.
H stands for honor. ~ This means living up to all the Army values... For you as an Army leader, honor means putting Army values above self-interest, above career and comfort. For all soldiers, it means putting Army values above self- preservation as well. This honor is essential for creating a bond of trust among members of the Army and between the Army and the nation it serves. Army leaders have the strength of will to live according to Army values, even though the temptations to do otherwise are strong, especially in the face of personal danger.
I stands for integrity. ~ [This is] doing what is right both morally and legally... People of integrity consistently act according to principles — not just what might work at the moment. Leaders of integrity make their principles known and consistently act in accordance with them. The Army requires leaders of integrity who possess high moral standards and are honest in word and deed. Being honest means being truthful and upright all the time, despite pressures to do otherwise. Having integrity means being both morally complete and true to yourself. As an Army leader, you are honest to yourself by committing to and consistently living Army values; you are honest to others by not presenting yourself or your actions as anything other than what they are. Army leaders say what they mean and do what they say. P stands for personal courage in the Face of fear, danger, or adversity (physical or moral) — Personal courage is not the absence of fear; rather, it is the ability to put fear aside and do what is necessary. It takes two forms, physical and moral. Good leaders demonstrate both. Physical courage means overcoming fears of bodily harm and doing your duty. It is bravery that allows a soldier to take risks in combat in spite of the fear of wounds or death... In contrast, moral courage is the willingness to stand firm on your values, principles, and convictions -- even when threatened. It enables leaders to stand up for what they believe is right, regardless of the consequences. Leaders, who take responsibility for their decisions and actions, even when things go wrong, display moral courage. Courageous leaders are willing to look critically inside themselves, consider new ideas, and change what needs changing".185
'LDRSHIP' forms a doctrinal honor code for the United States' Army Officer Corps -
- it will serve as a comparison suite when I analyze the COLAR's similar suite of dicta.
The United States Soldiers' Creed, Warrior Ethos and Army Values
The United States' Army is bound by the concepts set down in the "Soldier's Creed ~
Warrior Ethos", and the "Seven Army Values". Duty to country, bravery, honorable and selfless service, and ethical behavior are cornerstones of this doctrinal suite. The United
States' Army demands all members know practice and live the concepts shown below:
"The Soldier's Creed
Ibid: 2-3 - 2-9. I am an American Soldier.
I am a Warrior and a member of a team. I serve the people of the United States and live the Army values.
I am disciplined, physically and mentally tough, trained, and proficient in my warrior tasks and drills. I always maintain my arms, my equipment, and myself.
I am an expert and a professional.
I stand ready to deploy, engage, and destroy the enemies of the United States of America in close combat.
I am a guardian of freedom and the American way of life.
I am an American Soldier.
The Warrior Ethos
I will always place the mission first.
I will never accept defeat.
I will never quit.
I will never leave a fallen comrade".
Anonymous. "The Soldier's Creed". United States' Army. (24 Nov. 2003). Downloaded from internet. (17 May 2009).
"The Seven Army Values
Loyalty ~ Bear true faith and allegiance to the U.S. Constitution, the Army, and other soldiers. Be loyal to the nation and its heritage.
Duty -- Fulfill your obligations. Accept responsibility for your own actions and those entrusted to your care. Find opportunities to improve oneself for the good of the group.
Respect — Rely upon the golden rule. How we consider others reflects upon each of us, both personally and as a professional organization.
Selfless Service — Put the welfare of the nation, the Army, and your subordinates before your own. Selfless service leads to organizational teamwork and encompasses discipline, self-control, and faith in the system.
Honor — Live up to all the Army values
Integrity - Do what is right, legally, and morally. Be willing to do what is right even when no one is looking. It is our moral compass, [it is] an inner voice.
Personal Courage — [is] our ability to face fear, danger, or adversity, [it is] both physical and moral courage."187
The foundation of these principles is built on professionalism, honorable behavior, self-sacrifice, and always 'doing the right thing' from both moral and legal perspectives,
Anonymous. "The Seven Army Values". United States' Army. (10 Oct. 2003). Downloaded from internet. (27 May 2009).
The United States' COIN Doctrine
Military practitioners and civilian commentators often describe COIN as 'military operations other than war',188 asymmetric warfare, or unconventional warfare. COIN is not like traditional warfare — it has many more facets and restricted rules of engagement189 than ordinary war fighting. Although MOOTW and traditional war fighting share many of the same combat tools, they have widely differing goals and methods of operation.
Traditional war fighting focuses on the complete defeat of the enemy, encompassing the destruction of his martial capabilities, economy, and will to resist. Conversely, MOOTW places its impetus on the avoidance of total war. Moreover, MOOTW are extremely sensitive to political goals that follow a hierarchy of national objectives. In MOOTW, all military commanders must heed the supremacy of political goals and understand the possible negative ramifications of inappropriate actions.190 In its COIN doctrine, the United
States' has stated six overall goals for MOOTW. These goals are part of the training
Henceforth referred to as MOOTW in this document.
189 J. M. Shalikashvili. Joint Doctrine for Military Operations other than War - Joint Publication 3-07. Washington: United States' Department of Defense Publications. (16 Jun 1995): 1-1.
190 Ibid: vi. 73 syllabus taught to selected officers at the United States' Army School of the Americas, the
John F. Kennedy Special Warfare School, and the COLAR's Escuela de Lanceros. These goals are:
"(1) Direct every military operation towards a clearly defined, decisive and attainable objective.
(2) Unity of effort in every operation ensures all means are directed to a common purpose.
(3) Security is always important and depends on never permitting hostile factions to acquire a military, political, or informational advantage.
(4) MOOTW may require restraint in order to apply appropriate military capabilities prudently.
(5) Perseverance allows for measured, protracted application of military capability in support of strategic aims.
(6) Committed forces must sustain the legitimacy of the operation and the host government, where applicable".191
The first item summarizes the notion that a combatant commander must understand the strategic aims of MOOTW and be able to set appropriate objectives. These strategic aims
191 Ibid: viii. 74 and objectives must contribute to a unity of effort192 where the command structure ensures that elements of effort are working synergistically towards mission success. Inherent in this scenario is the necessity to understand the criteria of mission success 193
The third item relates to a COIN force's right to self-defense against hostile acts or intent. Moreover, this precept applies to both COIN combatant personnel and innocent civilian non-combatants.194 Item four is central to MOOTW operations — it is radically different from traditional war fighting. In MOOTW, the combatant commander uses force judiciously and prudentially. The use of excessive force can have serious political and civil repercussions, including the alienation of the local population from the COIN towards sympathy with the enemy. Thus, the rules of engagement in MOOTW are much more severely constrained than in traditional war fighting.19 Item five warns the combatant commander and the politician alike that MOOTW are more often than not, protracted exercises in the application of politically mediated force. MOOTW are not 'quick fixes' for intractable problems — these operations require the measured application of military
192 Unity of effort is item number two.
193 Ibid: TL-l.
194 Ibid: 11-3 - II-4.
195 Ibid: II-4. 75 capabilities in the pursuit of strategic political goals.196 Under item six, the United States'
MOOTW Manual states the "legitimacy of an operation depends upon the perception of a
1Q7 specific audience to the legality, morality or Tightness of a set of actions". From the
MOOTW manual:
"If an operation is perceived as legitimate, there is a strong impulse to support the action. If an operation is not perceived as legitimate, the actions may not be supported and may be actively resisted. In MOOTW, legitimacy is frequently a decisive element".198
Other precepts of asymmetric warfare appear in the United States' Department of
Defense manual entitled "FM 3-24, Counterinsurgency". This manual is the culmination of a long line of doctrinal publications that extends from the 1950s to the present -- this lineage forms the backbone of the syllabus taught to selected officers at the United States'
Army School of the Americas, the John F. Kennedy Special Warfare School, and the
COLAR's Escuela de Lanceros. In this manual, the United States' joint doctrine defines insurgency as an organized movement whose goal is the overthrow of a government via the tools of subversion and armed struggle. In other words, an insurgency is a struggle to
196/fo(V/: II-4-II-5.
197 Ibid: 11-5.
198 Ibid: II-5. 76 weaken the legitimacy of a government, political power, or occupying authority. COIN represents the spectrum of tools199 used to defeat an insurgency.200 The manual also touches on an important point pertinent to the COIN prosecuted by the COLAR. This point is the pivotal nature of intelligence in COIN operations.201 In upcoming sections, I will demonstrate the COLAR's failure to legitimize its operations with the rural population — this failure has caused a dearth of reliable and timely intelligence about the insurgents and has resulted in several of the COLAR's notable combat defeats.
All of the above factors make a COIN much more 'finesse driven' than traditional war fighting. An effective COIN command structure recognizes and capitalizes upon the trust and support of the local population on whose territories these operations take place. I assert the COLAR's aristocratic martial culture has ignored the above precepts and has focused on traditional war fighting methods, thereby damaging the possibility of local support in the countryside. This resultant situation has weakened the COIN and has significantly contributed to the longevity of the insurrection.
199 This spectrum of tools includes, but is not limited to combat.
D. H. Petraeus and J. F. Amos. Counterinsurgency FM 3-24. Washington: Department of the Army. (Dec. 2006): 1-1.
201 Ibid: 3-1 -3-2. 77
The COLAR's Military Doctrine
In the following sections, I shall discuss selected facets of the COLAR's overall military doctrine. Employing documents obtained from la Ejercito Nacional and the
Colombian government, I shall delineate the COLAR's military doctrine and use it as a contrapuntal point of comparison with the entrenched culture of that institution's officer corps.
Grand Strategy of the COLAR
The grand strategy of the COLAR appears on the Ejercito Nacional web site, under the sub-page entitled "Plan de Accion". This document is a set of generalized guiding principles drawn up by the President, his advisors, the Ministry of Defense and the top- level commanding officers of the COLAR — it serves as a roadmap from which the military establishment can fulfill its mandate to protect the Colombian state and its citizenry. This suite of guiding principles is an example of S. P. Huntington's objective civilian control of the military — it forms the compact between the civilian leadership and the military.202 The
"Plan de Accion" web page outlines a series of five binding strategic goals that were instituted under the auspices of Law 152 of 1994. These goals are as follows:
Please the S. P. Huntington section of this paper. 78
"Objective One deals with strengthening operational capacity and response to increase effectiveness via process improvement. Sub-goals within this objective are as follows:
Creation and activation of new mobile brigades, high mountain battalions, and continuation of the peasant soldiers; increased manpower development processes and human management; strengthening the processes of technical, strategic, and human intelligence; strengthening of institutional actions and values.
Objective Two mandates the COLAR to break the terrorist organizations' will to fight via their military defeat, to force their demobilization, thus contributing to the security of civilian populations and their resources. Sub-goals within this objective are as follows:
Neutralization of the armed capacity of the terrorists; weakening financial components such as drug trafficking, kidnapping and extortion; domination and control of strategically important areas; preservation of the security of the population and economic infrastructure of the country.
Objective Three directs the COLAR to achieve high levels of legitimacy, in this achievement it should act as an efficient and transparent institution that engages in the fight against corruption, while preserving and respecting human rights and international humanitarian law. This objective shall be achieved by the following measures:
Strengthening planning and control systems; optimization of recruitment and personnel administration; identification and neutralization of the hotbeds of corruption; exemplary actions against corruption; preservation and protection of human rights.
Objective Four mandates the COLAR to maintain sovereignty, border coverage, and integrity of national territory through increased operations, such as the following:
Enforcing ground control jurisdiction; maintaining deterrence force; developing strategic material and equipment maintenance; improvement of military operations areas. 79
Objective Five deals with the upgrading of professional staff by improving the processes of education, instruction, training, and retraining. Sub-processes in this objective are as follows:
Training of leaders prepared to win the war; update plans for instruction and training; analysis and dissemination of lessons learned; projection and implementation of education and strengthening the culture of anti- corruption".203
All of these goals are organic to a well-led, professional military establishment that has a top-level objective of maintaining of state and human security, while remaining as an institution committed to lawful behavior in the support of human rights. This grand strategy will serve as point of comparison when analyzing the actions of the COLAR in upcoming sections of this paper.
The COLAR's Honor Code
Inherent to any military institution is a set of ethical principles from which all actions its members must emanate. In the United States' Army, these principles are expressed in
" Anonymous. "Plan de Accion" Ejercito National, Republica de Colombia, Ministerio de Defensa. Downloaded from internet. (28 May 2009).
"As a soldier of the fatherland: I pledge solemnly to profess loyalty and allegiance to Colombia and my Army in defense of the Republic, freedom, and democracy.
Honor will be my first military virtue and my force of inspiration. I will observe discipline in all places and circumstances.
By vocation, I am and I will be a loyal soldier with a spirit of service. My Army will never be ashamed of me!
I will be fair in my decisions and prudent in the use of force.
I will cultivate honesty and sobriety, and constantly will be vigilant, frugal, and hard working in my duties and affairs.
I will never disclose information that has been entrusted to me, and will keep silent on the issues of service.
I will fight with courage, calm bravery, and spirit, and without [the desire for] further reward, knowing by the will of God, I will achieve greatness for my country and the glory of my Army.
I will not forsake my superiors, colleagues, or subordinates in action of war, or any other occasion.
Honor Code. 81
I will be magnanimous in victory, proud and honorable in defeat.
I will be modest, generous, and compassionate with a surrendered or captured enemy.
If I am taken prisoner or am kidnapped, I will continue to resist by all means available and will do everything possible to escape and regain my freedom". 90S 90fi
When one compares the COLAR's "Codigo de Honor with the U. S. "Soldier's Creed
— Warrior Ethos" and "Seven Army Values", a striking harmony appears. Although these soldiers promise loyalty to different polities, their doctrines of ethics and behavior are very similar - both revolve around the umbrella concept of 'duty, honor, integrity, and country' that is buttressed by bravery, magnanimity, and humility. The professional ethics of the
COLAR revolve around the doctrine of jus bellum207 that appears in the "Manual de Etica y
Honor para las Fuerzas Militares, Primera Edicion - FF - MM 3.22". In this doctrine, war is
205 A. Valencia Tovar, C. A. Ospina Ovalle, F. Padilla De Leon, and C. Pefia Visbal. "Codigo de Honor". Ejercito Nacional, Republica de Colombia, Ministerio de Defensa. Downloaded from internet. (28 May 2009).
206 The "Codigo de Honor" also can be found in the following publication: C. A. Ospina Ovalle and R. R. Rubianogroot. Manual de Etica y Honor para las Fuerzas Militares, Primera Edicion - FF - MM 3.22. Bogota: Republica de Colombia, Comando General de las Fuerzas Militares. (14 Oct. 2005): 190-198. Downloaded from internet. (8 May 2009).
207 This Latin phrase means just war. For a discussion and analysis of just war theory, please see the following work: M. Walzer. Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations. New York: Basic Books. (2006). 82 only acceptable as a form of self-defense, in order to prevent injury or death to one's self, family or friends.208 Moreover, in this document's section on the rules of war, adherence to the Geneva Conventions of 1949, and other internationally accepted limitations on combat operations are set forward.209 The doctrine of the COLAR with respect to military ethics and honorable war fighting practice are in alignment international agreements, conventions and customary rules of conflict. The precepts inherent to the "Codigo de Honor" and the
"Manual de Etica y Honor para las Fuerzas Militares, Primera Edicion — FF - MM 3.22" shall serve as a platform of comparison when analyzing the actions of the COLAR in upcoming sections of this paper.
The COLAR's Human Rights Doctrine
Beset by multiple accusations of human rights abuses by various non-governmental organizations such as Human Rights Watch,210 Amnesty International,21' and the
208 C. A. Ospina Ovalle and R. R. Rubianogroot. Manual de Etica y Honor para las Fuerzas Militares, Primera Edicion - FF - MM 3.22. Bogota: Republica de Colombia, Comando General de las Fuerzas Militares. (14 Oct. 2005): 165-170. Downloaded from internet. (8 May 2009).
209 Ibid: 170-174
210 To see one such report documenting human rights abuses and the COLAR's complicity with Autodefensas please follow this link: Anonymous. "Colombia: Overview of Human Rights Developments in 2001". (2002). Downloaded from internet. (13 May 2009).
International Committee of the Red Cross, the Colombian Ministry of Defense in concert with the Human Rights Inspectorate of the COLAR and National Police, produced a
"Comprehensive Human Rights and IHL Policy".212 This document is especially interesting in that it uses the following quote from Sir Robert Thompson as its dedication:
"There is a very strong temptation in dealing both with terrorism and with guerrilla actions for government forces to act outside the law, the excuses being that processes of law are too cumbersome, that the normal safeguards in the law for the individual are not designed for an insurgency and that a terrorist deserves to be treated as an outlaw anyway. Not only is this morally wrong, but, over a period, it will create more practical difficulties for a government than it solves. A government which does not act in accordance with the law forfeits the right to be called a government and cannot expect its people to obey the law. Functioning in accordance with the law is a very small price to pay in return for the advantage of being the government".213
Thompson's words set the tenor of the Colombian Ministry of Defense and the
COLAR's doctrine on the prosecution of its COIN ~ lawful behavior is mandatory even when the demands of battlefield and combat expediency demand otherwise. When
21' This is a typical report from Amnesty International outlining the human rights abuses of the Autodefensas. J. Tackaberry, "Colombia: Paramilitary Leaders Should Answer for Human Rights Violations". Amnesty International. (27 Dec. 2002). Downloaded from internet. (3 May 2009).
212 Anonymous. "Comprehensive Human Rights and IHL Policy". Republica de Colombia, Ministerio de Defensa Nacional. (Undated): 1-63. Downloaded from internet. (1 Jun 2009).
3 Ibid: 2. 84
President Alvaro Uribe Velez assumed power, he demanded that lawful behavior and
respect for human rights become the prime directives of Colombia's security forces. This
concept formed the underpinnings Colombia's "Democratic Security and Defense
Policy"214 -- it was fully supported by President Uribe Velez's then Minister of Defense
Juan Manuel Santos Calderon. In addition to regular Colombian legislation, Santos remarked that the Colombian Constitutional Court had mandated International
Humanitarian Law automatically be incorporated into domestic law. Moreover, the government enhanced the Justicia Militar Penal216 with Directive 10,217 which provided the infrastructure to identify and terminate any abuses in the use of military force. This infrastructure features cooperative links with the Procuraduria and the Oficina del
214 A. Uribe Velez and M. L. Ramirez Rincon. "Politica de Defensa y Seguridad Democratica". Republica de Colombia. (16 Jun. 2003): 1-68. Downloaded from internet. (29 May 2009).
215 Anonymous. "Comprehensive Human Rights and IHL Policy". Republica de Colombia, Ministerio de Defensa Nacional. (Undated): 5. Downloaded from internet. (1 Jun 2009).
216 The official website of the Justicia Militar Penal can be found at the following link: Anonymous. "Justicia Militar Penal". Direccion Ejecutiva Justicia Penal Militar - Ministerio de Defensa Nacional - Republica de Colombia. (26 Jul. 2005). Downloaded from internet. (2 May 2009).
217 Directive 10 is quite similar to the enabling legislation that created the Department of the Army Inspector General in the United States. Both entities allow for the confidential reporting of military abuses, their investigation, and punishment by military courts martial. 85
Inspector General.218 The official declaration of the COLAR's human rights mandate follows:219
"These two obligations - to protect and to respect - form the essence of the constitutional mandate for the National Security Forces with regard to human rights. The first of these derives directly from Article 2 of the Constitution: 'The authorities of the Republic have been created to protect the life, honor, property, beliefs and other rights and freedoms of all persons resident within Colombia'. Specifically to fulfill this 'duty to protect', the National Government introduced the Democratic Security and Defence Policy (DSDP), being convinced that security forms the basis for the protection of rights and freedoms. The argument is simple: without security there is no guarantee of the right to life and physical integrity and, 990 without those rights, there is no basis for the enjoyment of other rights"...
"There are two aspects of this mandate. First, it establishes the rules of IHL221 as the framework for and the limits on the conduct of operations, as expressed by the Constitutional Court on various occasions when interpreting Article 91 of the Constitution: "the jurisprudence has limited this principle [the duty of obedience] in the field of military discipline to compliance with the prohibitions enshrined in 999 99^ International Humanitarian Law".
218 Office of the Inspector General.
219 Anonymous. "Comprehensive Human Rights and IHL Policy". Republica de Colombia, Ministerio de Defensa Nacional. (Undated): 6-7. Downloaded from internet. (1 Jun 2009).
220 Ibid: 16.
221 International Humanitarian Law.
222 Ibid: 17. When one considers the above sections on the COLAR's institutional values, it appears this organization of driven by a similar set of military ethics as the United States'
Army. The COLAR's core values are set forward as 'Honesty, Loyalty, Respect and
Valor'.224 With this doctrinal suite as a source of comparison, I shall now inspect and analyze some of the COLAR's negative actions in its COIN.
The COLAR's Spectrum of Negative Actions
This section will provide historical evidence to support the assertion that Iberian military elitism, coupled with the culture of the fuero militar and Prussianization has led to a COLAR that was sometimes insolent if its civilian government. This martial culture has lent itself well to military clientelism — a situation in which the military establishment leased its obedience and coercive force to whatever patron it deemed would best support its purposes and ideology. Coupled with its inherent military conservatism, the COLAR's culture has impeded the Bogota government's efforts to end the insurgency. These sections shall examine (1) the COLAR's insolence and insubordination of its political leaders; (2)
223 Anonymous. "Sentencia C-431 (2004), Sentencia T-409 (1992), Sentencia C-578 (1995), and Sentencia C-225 (1995)". Corte Constitutional de Colombia. (Undated). Downloaded from internet (29 May 2009).
224 Anonymous. "Valores". Ejercito National, Republica de Colombia, Ministerio de Defensa. (2009). Downloaded from internet. (10 May 2009).
"rogue ops" undertaken by the COLAR, and; (3) the COLAR's entrenched, traditional war fighting methods and resultant operational failures.
The COLAR's Insolence and Insubordination of its Political Leaders
There was an attempted military golpe in the administration225 of President Alfonso
Lopez Pumarejo. The president's wife226 suffered from a chronic illness and was in the
United States for treatment — Lopez Pumarejo temporarily left Colombia to visit her.
Shortly after his 10 July 1944 return to Colombia, a military golpe attempt erupted in Pasto, the capital of the Narino Department. A group of COLAR personnel, led by Colonel
Diogenes Gil, attempted to capture Lopez Pumarejo. Loyalist military members, along with
Dario Echandia Olaya and Alberto Lleras Camargo quashed the golpe attempt. Under the strain of political opposition, the golpe attempt, and his wife's chronic illness, President
Alfonso Lopez Pumarejo resigned to Congress on 15, May 1944. Although the legislative body refused to accept the resignation, Lopez Pumarejo remained adamant and issued an
225 1942-1945.
226 Lopez Pumarejo's first wife was Man'a Michelsen de Lopez.
227 Echandia was named acting president in Lopez Pumarejo's absence. 88 irrevocable resignation on 19 July 1945. Alberto Lleras Camargo assumed the presidency on 7 August of that year.228 He served the remainder of Lopez Pumarejo's term until 1946.
After the restoration of civilian rule from the military dictator Rojas Pinilla, the Frente
Nacional arrived at a quid pro quo with the COLAR to help cement its continued support.229 During the 1958-1962 administration of Alberto Lleras Camargo,230 the president gave the COLAR a laissez-faire mandate from which to prosecute their campaign for internal security.231 This situation would solidify the COLAR's demands for enhanced autonomy and a continuation of the Colombian variant of the fuero militar. As shown in upcoming sections, this situation would cause problems for the COIN and Colombian
CMR in general. Even with a tacit agreement for military autonomy in hand, the Policia
Militar2312 hatched a plot to assassinate President Alberto Lleras Camargo during his second term of office. On 2 May 1958, the president's supporters discovered the assassination plot
228 S. Rojas Caballero. "Alfonso Lopez Pumarejo". Biblioteca Luis Angel Arango. (13 Dec. 2004). Downloaded from internet. (17 Apr. 2009).
229 N. Richani. Systems of Violence - The Political Economy of War and Peace in Colombia. Albany: State University of New York Press. (2002): 38.
230 J. F. Roman. "Guerrilla Violence in Colombia: Examining Causes and Consequences". United States' Navy Postgraduate School Publications. (June. 1994): 23.
231 T. C. Bruneau. "Civil-Military Relations in Latin America: The Hedgehog and the Fox Revisited". Revista Fuerzas Armadas y Sociedad. Ano 19. No. 1. (2005): 115.
232 The Policia Militar (Military Police) wears the uniform of the COLAR and is subject to its command structure, regulations, and laws. 89
— they foiled the plan and summarily punished the conspirators. '' The Policia Militar had decided to take direct political action in the attempt on Lleras Camargo's life — military interference in Colombia's civilian political sphere would not stop with this incident.
A vivid example of the COLAR's insolence occurred during the 1962-1966 presidency of Guillermo Leon Valencia Munoz. His administration was notable because it strengthened ties with the United States via President John F. Kennedy's Alliance for
Progress. Using this program, Colombia availed itself of the United States' funding for its military projects.234 The United States' support was so extensive that the Leon Valencia
Munoz administration did not have to rely on domestic levies for military appropriations.
This situation allowed the COLAR to chart its own course without civilian interference -
American assistance thwarted the Colombian Congress' power of the purse.235 The United
States' Military Assistance Plan gave the Colombian military financial independence from its civilian government masters, while the Military Assistance Training Plan 237
233 J. L. Helguera. "The Changing Role of the Military in Colombia". Journal of Inter-American Studies. Vol. 3. No. 3. (Jul. 1961): 357.
234 D. M. Rempe. "The Past as Prologue - A History of U.S. Counterinsurgency Policy in Colombia - 1958-1966". United States' Army Strategic Studies Institute Publications. (Mar. 2002): 4.
235 P. A. Beckley. "Maintaining the Violent Status Quo: The Political Economy of the Colombian Insurgency". United States'Navy Postgraduate School Publications. (Jun. 2002): 16-17.
235 Henceforth referred to as MAP in this paper.
237 Henceforth referred to as MATP in this document. 90 aligned the COLAR to the doctrine 238 taught at the U. S. Army Caribbean Training
Center.239 Under 'Plan LAZO'240, the COLAR initiated 'Operation Marquetalia'241 to suppress leftist insurgents.242 The independent peasant republic243 of Marquetalia was in the Department of Tolima — it was under the control of the leftist caudillo Manuel
Marulanda Velez, the future leader of the FARC. The suppression of the guerrillas was at the discretion of the military, with little, if any control exerted by Colombia's civilian
238 This doctrine stressed notions of hemispheric security and an anti-Communist paradigm.
239 In 1946, the U.S. Army created the Latin American Training Center at Fort Amador in the Panama Canal Zone. The mandate of the center was the training of military personnel from friendly Latin American states. Its first commandant was U. S. Army Colonel Enrique M. Benitez. In 1949, the name changed to the Caribbean Training Center and its home moved to Fort Gulick in the Panama Canal Zone. In the 1963, the facility was renamed the United States' Army School of the Americas. In the mid-1980s, the school moved to its current home in Fort Benning, Georgia. In 2001, the School of the Americas was renamed the Western Hemisphere Institute for Security Cooperation. For the purposes of clarity, I shall use the term School of the Americas when referring to this institution. For a monograph that examines the early history of the U. S. Army School of the Americas, please see: M. R. Menjivar, "The U. S. Army School of the Americas and its Impact on United States-Latin America Military relations in the 1980s". U. S. Army Command and General Staff College Publications. (8 Jun. 1979): 19-20.
240 Ruiz Novoa drafted 'Plan LAZO' in concert with U. S. advisors. Please see F. Leal Buitrago, El Oficio de la Guerra. Santafe de Bogota: Tercer Mundo - Institute de Estudios Polfticos y Relaciones Internacionales. (1994): 84.
241 Colombian Colonel Luis Alberto Pulido Villamarfn stated that in 1964, the COLAR did not have sufficient command and control capabilities to manage 480 counter-guerrilla troops, nor did it have proper logistical systems to support the troops in this operation. He goes on to mention the COLAR's paucity of manpower in relation to the insurgents contributed to the disappointing outcome of Operation Marquetalia. Please see the following El Tiempo article: L. A. Pulido Villamarfn. "Marquetalia: Desfiguracion proselitista de la historia del conflicto colombiano". El Tiempo. (9 Aug. 2007). Downloaded from internet. (30 May 2009). 242 G. Livingstone. Inside Colombia: Drugs, Democracy and War. New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press. (2004): 45. This was an example of a patria chica. government. The operation disrupted, but did not eliminate the power base of Marulanda Velez — this military failure would haunt the COLAR throughout the remainder of the twentieth and into the twenty first century. Moreover, these guerrilla suppression operations cemented the notion of military impunity and financial independence from the civilian leaders in Bogota. From these operations arose an explicit example of a top-level military officer engaging in public disagreements with his civilian masters. General Alberto Ruiz Novoa, who was also Minister of War, was responsible for the COIN campaign in Marquetalia. He increased the size and enhanced the proficiency of the COLAR during his tenure.244 Ruiz Novoa was a social and military reformer, and some media commentators assert he was a populist demagogue, in a nature somewhat similar to Jorge Eliecer Gaitan. Irrespective of the media's diatribes, Ruiz Novoa was a decorated combat officer - notably he received the United States' Bronze Star on 29 March 1953, for heroism in the Korean War's battle of 'Old Badly'.245 Promoting his reformist agenda, Ruiz Novoa invited progressive social scientists to lecture at the nation's military 4 J. M. Ruhl. "Civil-Military Relations in Colombia: A Societal Explanation". Journal of Inter-American Studies and World Affairs. Vol. 23. No. 2. (May 1981): 135. 245 Anonymous. "Colombian is Decorated - Chief of Battalion with Seventh Division Gets U. S. Award." New York Times. (29 Mar. 1953): 3. colleges. He also instituted the National Manpower Training Agency. In 1964 and 1965, D. M. Rempe cites General Ruiz Novoa's criticism248 of President Guillermo Leon Valencia Mufioz and his administration's lack of progress in the solution of Colombia's social problems.249 R. L. Maullin also notes Ruiz Novoa's works in Revista Fuerzas Armadas250 251 that spell out his "developmental war doctrine" This doctrine outlines the government's shortcomings in its prosecution of the COIN.252 He publicly stated253 that this situation exacerbated the insurrection and hamstrung the military's efforts to provide 246 J. Pearce. Colombia: Inside the Labyrinth. London: Latin America Bureau - Research in Action, Ltd. (1990): 202. 247 Servicio Nacional de Aprendizaje or SENA. Please see R. L. Maullin. Soldiers, Guerrillas, and Politics in Colombia. Santa Monica: RAND. (Dec. 1971): 69. 248 A. R. Novoa. El Gran Desafio. Bogota: Ediciones Tercer Mundo (1956): 53, 85- 249 D. M. Rempe. "Guerrillas, Bandits, and Independent Republics: US Counter-insurgency Efforts in Colombia 1959-1965". Small Wars & Insurgencies. No. 6:3. (1 Dec. 1995): 308. 250 A. Ruiz. Novoa "Doctrina de Guerra" Revista Fuerzas Armadas. Vol. 1. No. 1. (Apr. 1960): 25-31. 251 A. Ruiz. Novoa and A. Vanegas M. "Frente economico y defensa nacional". Revista Fuerzas Armadas. Vol. 1. No. 1. (Apr. 1960): 109-110. 252 Ruiz Novoa chose to unveil his controversial doctrine in the first issue of Revista Fuerzas Armadas, the magazine of the Colombian Armed Forces. 253 Ruhl comments on the public criticism offered by Ruiz Novoa - he also mentions that none of Ruiz Novoa's subordinate commanders offered resistance to the President when he sacked the general. J. M. Ruhl. "Civil-Military Relations in Colombia: A Societal Explanation". Journal of Inter-American Studies and World Affairs. Vol. 23. No. 2. (May 1981): 135. 93 internal security.254 J. Mark Ruhl states255 that President Leon Valencia forcibly removed Ruiz Novoa256 from office in 1965.257 Another notable example of military insolence occurred during the 1966-1970 Carlos Lleras Restrepo presidency. His administration suffered an instance of military interference when Major General Guillermo Pinzon Caicedo publicly demanded the removal of civilian oversight of the Colombian military budget.258 Maullin stated that Pinzon Caicedo was extremely resistant to civilian oversight of the COLAR's counterinsurgency efforts. His 254 This situation is similar to the insubordination incident of U. S. General Douglas MacArthur. During the Korean War, President Harry Truman expressly forbade MacArthur to make public statements concerning United States' grand strategy. MacArthur ignored Truman's orders and made comments critical of United States' grand strategy, thereby interfering in the civilian political sphere. Truman subsequently removed MacArthur from command. 255 Ibid. 256 Ruiz Novoa promoted a grand strategy similar to Sir Robert Thompson's COIN concepts. He based this strategy on a vision of citizen security and a modicum of social development. The first part of Novoa's strategy was to ensure the safety of Colombia's rural residents on an area-by-area basis. Following this accomplishment, the COLAR's engineer, medical and other assets would help the rural poor by the construction of civic works projects, and the provision of education and medical services. These concepts were antithetical to the ultra-conservative Weltanschauung of the traditionalist majority in the COLAR's officer corps. Although his position was probably the most effective way to fight and win the COIN, he made the cardinal error of public disagreement with his commander, the President of Colombia. 257 P. A. Beckley. "Maintaining the Violent Status Quo: The Political Economy of the Colombian Insurgency". United States' Navy Postgraduate School Publications. (Jun. 2002): 21-22. 258 A. Rouquie. The Military and the State in Latin America. Berkeley: University of California Press. (1987): 208. 259 R. L. Maullin. The Fall of Dumar Aljure - A Colombian Guerrilla and Bandit. RAND: Santa Monica. (Nov 1968): 22. 94 public statements stressed civilian control was hindering the COLAR's prosecution of the COIN. Lleras Restrepo forced the resignation and retirement of the insolent general.2 ° In June 1975, General Alvaro Valencia Tovar had a dispute with the Minster of War, General Abraham Varon Valencia, over an alleged insubordination incident involving two officers who publicly complained over duty assignments. Stephen J. Randall commented that Valencia Tovar was a highly respected COLAR officer with service under the United Nations' forces in both the Korean War261 and in the Suez Crisis of 1956.262 He then served under Minster of War-General Ruiz Novoa in the 1960s. Valencia Tovar was an important research associate, who by way of his internal report, facilitated Ruiz Novoa's document that advocated less civilian control of the military and a human-security263 based war 260 D. M. Hanratty and S. W. Meditz. eds. "Colombia: A Country Study - The Military". GPOfor the Library of Congress. (1988). Downloaded from internet (19 May 2009). 261 He served under General Ruiz Novoa. 262 S. J. Randall Alfonso Lopez Michelsen Su vida, su epoca. Bogota: Villegas Editores S. A. (2007): 395. 263 The politico-military concept of 'human security' was not coined until the 1980s. Ruiz Novoa and Valencia Tovar recognized that a COIN could not be successfully prosecuted without the central government providing security to not only its urban residents, but also their rural counterparts. 95 fighting strategy.264 265 He rapidly rose through the commissioned ranks and became commanding general of the COLAR in the early 1970s. The clash with the president started in April 1975 when General Efrain Vallejo Ardila's health issues precluded his promotion to Inspector General of the Fuerzas Armadas. General Puyana Garcia, head of the Brigade of Military Institutes in Bogota, was ordered to take the place of Vallejo Ardila as Inspector General. Although nominally a promotion, the Inspector General's position was purely administrative and removed Puyana Garcia from his recent promotion to commander of prestigious field unit. The change in career path irritated Puyana Garcia, and he petitioned his immediate superior, Valencia Tovar to help rectify the situation by lobbying the Minister of Defense, Varon Valencia. The efforts failed and the movement of Puyana Garcia to the administrative position remained as ordered. The situation began to spiral out of control as Puyana Garcia's subordinates in the BIM registered their displeasure with their commander's fate. The head 264 A. P. Maingot. Colombia, in L. N. McAlister, ed. The Military in Latin American Socio - Political Evolution: Four Case Studies. Washington: American Institute for Research. (1970): 167. 265 His strategy also included the notions of rural land reform. Please T. Butson. "Bogota to Combat Guerrillas, Promotes Rural Reform Through Cooperatives". New York Times. (21 Sep. 1975): 10. J. M. Ruhl. Colombia: Armed Forces and Society. Syracuse: Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs, Syracuse University Press. (1980): 36-37. 267 The Armed Forces of Colombia. 268 BIM. of the infantry school, Lieutenant Colonel Valentin Jimenez Caravajal, became extremely forceful in his public criticism of the Minister of War. Varon Valencia ordered the immediate sacking of both Puyana Garcia and Jimenez Caravajal. He also moved a number of reformist officers269 out of the BHVI and confined la Policia Militar and la Guardia Presidencial Cuadro210 to their barracks. Varon Valencia's actions prompted a Conservative Cali newspaper,271 to make speculative reports about possible golpe conspiracies among the officers dismissed in this affair.272 Responding to the media's reports, both Valencia Tovar and Varon Valencia issued press statements that denied the existence of any golpe conspiracies.273 Varon Valencia insisted that the two officers remain charged with 'grave indiscipline'. Valencia Tovar publicly defended Puyana Garcia and Jimenez Caravajal ~ he stated that they had never engaged in disloyal acts. President Alfonso Lopez Michelsen decided the statements 269 These officers subscribed to the theories set forward by General Alberto Ruiz Novoa. 270 Presidential Guard Cadre. 271 El Occidente. 272 The rumors of golpe conspiracies even belatedly reached the New York Times. Please see: D. Vidal. "Colombians, Hurt by Inflation, Express Discontent With Government". New York Times. (25 Oct. 1977): 3. The statements of Valencia Tovar and Varon Valencia were similar in content but differed in tone and style of delivery. 97 of Valencia Tovar and Varon Valencia were politically irreconcilable. Lopez dismissed Valencia Tovar on May 27 and replaced him General Luis Carlos Camacho Leyva.274 One media source stated that the sacking of the three officers was purely serendipitous. Other sources see a darker suite of circumstances surrounding these events. These sources report a deep philosophical divide in the COLAR's officer corps — two factions emerged, the conservative hard-line majority led by Varon Valencia, and the reformist minority. Valencia Tovar, Puyana Garcia and Jimenez Caravajal were vocal members of the reformist minority that supported the grand strategy set forward by Ruiz Novoa. President Lopez Michelsen may have been unsure that the reformist officers would use whatever force necessary to protect his administration from the societal unrest caused by his economic policies.276 In addition to Valencia Tovar, Puyana Garcia and Jimenez Caravajal, Varon Valencia sacked a few junior and mid-grade officers in the reformist 277 camp. 274 Anonymous. Latin America: Political Report. London: Latin American Newsletters Ltd. (30 May 1975). N.B.- This newsletter was formerly named Latin America. 275 Anonymous. "Vision". (15 Jun. 1975). KB. Queo has acquired Vision. 276 Anonymous. Latin America: Political Report. London: Latin American Newsletters Ltd. (13 Jun. 1975). J. M. Ruhl. Colombia: Armed Forces and Society. Syracuse: Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs. Syracuse University Press. (1980): 36-39. 98 The Ruiz Novoa and Valencia Tovar scenarios demonstrate a clear dividing line extant in the COLAR between hard-line Conservative officers bent on traditional war fighting methods and the reformists who were willing to adopt pragmatic strategies and tactics outside of mainstream military thought. The reformists had a quasi-liberal ideology about the COLAR ~ in it they saw that organization simply not as a combat arms force, but as a machine that should use social theory and practice as another weapon in their 978 armamentarium dedicated to national security. The notion of security for even the lowest social stratum of Colombian society was cornerstone to Ruiz Novoa and Valencia Tovar's war fighting philosophy ~ in it they developed what now seems to be a Thompsonian279 view of the Colombian COIN. The conservative majority of the COLAR's officer corps effectively held the inferred 9R(1 threat of military displeasure above the heads of the civilian government — this risk was 278 M. Howe. "Colombia - Form Lofty Aims to Siege". New York Times. (20 Jul. 1975): E4. 279 Please this paper's sections on the Malayan Emergency and the Vietnam War for a summary description of Sir Robert Thompson's COIN strategy. 280In New York City, May 2000, Nazih Richani interviewed a former Attorney General in the Samper administration — Alfonso Valdivieso. The former Attorney General said the following: "The military always had its way by less drastic measures than taking power... [It worked] through the application of the strategy of saber -rattling... The military were able to extract concessions from the presidents and avoided losing their privileges. In this manner, the threat of a coup was as effective as and less costly than a coup. N. Richani. Systems of Violence - The Political Economy of War and Peace in Colombia. Albany: State University of New York Press. (2002): 38. 99 real as evidenced by the attempted golpe in the Lopez Pumarejo administration,281 the rise to power of Rojas Pinilla, and the presidential assassination plot in the second term of Lleras Camargo. Without question, military insolence occurred in the Ruiz Novoa and Valencia Tovar incidents. Ruiz Novoa entered the political sphere via public derogatory comments about presidential policy. In the Valencia Tovar scenario, Puyana Garcia and Jimenez Caravajal dug their own professional graves via insubordination and public behavior unbecoming of an officer. Valencia Tovar however, did not fall into these traps ~ he simply requested a 'redress of grievance' for his subordinates via a hearing with Varon Valencia. This is exactly where the friction between the reformists and the conservative majority of the COLAR's officer crops came into play. Valencia Tovar lost his position and the President supported Varon Valencia's decision on this matter. Perhaps President Lopez Michelsen was being politically astute in that he chose to dismiss the junior officer who resided in the COLAR's reformist minority camp ~ Valencia Tovar. With this decision, it appears that President Lopez Michelsen helped cement the support of the COLAR officer corps' conservative majority, thus avoiding a repeat performance of armed military interference in the civilian sphere of government. Soldiers like Ruiz Novoa and Valencia Tovar were intellectuals whose war fighting strategies were out of step with the conservative majority of the COLAR's officer corps. If they had succeeded in the 1 1942-1945. promotion of these 'developmental warfare' strategies, perhaps the FARC and ELN would have been long since defeated and Colombia now would be at peace with itself. It is of interest to note that the odd, friction-filled relationship between Lopez Michelsen and the COLAR would continue after he exited the presidency. In 1977,282 the Senate of Colombia refused to ratify Protocol II of the Geneva Accords. In 1994, the issue resurfaced, with military notables such as retired General Alvaro Valencia Tovar stating that ratification would afford legitimacy to the insurrection because Protocol II defined insurgents as belligerents, therefore making them legal combatants. Moreover, Major General Harold Bedoya Pizarro denounced Protocol II as being unworkable in Colombia's context of foreign-supported insurrectionists and narco-traffickers.283 Lopez Michelsen regretted that Colombia was one of the few nations that expressed reservations to the ratification of the Geneva Conventions' Protocol II.284 Similar to Lopez Michelsen's life after office, Valencia Tovar has been very active in the public scene after his retirement. Valencia Tovar has written many articles critical of "yellow journalism" and government policy in El Tiempo. These articles speak from a soldier's perspective, advising the This was Lopez Michelsen's presidency. 283 H. C. Samper "Protocolo II, Un Freno A La Barbarie". El Tiempo. (19 Feb. 1996). Downloaded from internet. (22 May 2009). 284 S. J. Randall Alfonso Lopez Michelsen Su vida, su epoca. Bogota: Villegas Editores S. A. (2007): 521- 525. government to fulfill the COLAR's needs, and advocating the use of Ruiz Novoa's 'developmental warfare' concepts to defeat the insurrection. A notable article by Valencia Tovar defended the United States' Army School of the Americas against the unfounded accusations of the leftist press.285 The administration of President Julio Cesar Turbay Ayala was in power from 1978 to 1982. It enacted the National Security Statute, giving the military complete control over many of the departments of Colombia. In this apparent amplification the government's fuero decrees, the COLAR could hold all persons subject to military law and courts-martial in departments deemed rebellious by local commanders.287 In effect, Turbay Ayala gave the COLAR the right to proclaim a regime of exception288 at any time and place it saw fit, thereby weakening civilian control over the military. During Turbay Ayala's administration came an influx of private military contractors from foreign nations and with them a rise in 285 A. Valencia Tovar. "La Escuela De Las Americas". El Tiempo. (31 Jul. 1998). Downloaded from internet. (18 Jun. 2009). 286 W. Aviles. "Institutions, Military Policy, and Human Rights in Colombia". Latin American Perspectives. Vol. 28. No. 1. Colombia: The Forgotten War. (Jan. 2001): 50. 287 C. A. Watson. "Political Violence in Colombia: Another Argentina". Third World Quarterly. Vol. 12. No. 3/4. (1990-1991): 27-28. 288 Ibid. the number and strength of paramilitary organizations. The amplification of the fuero decrees, the rise of the paramilitaries, and the arrival of military contractors would prove problematic for upcoming administrations. These problems arose during the 1982-1986 administration of Belisario Betancur Cuartas. His approach to the insurgency was radically different from previous administrations in that he favored conciliation, a negotiated peace, and reintegration of insurgent combatants into civil society. Betancur Cuartas issued a partial guerrilla amnesty in 1982. The conservative majority of the COLAR's officer corps still supported the state of siege290 policy of the previous administration and publicly dissented with Betancur Cuartas' position. Many senior officers asserted the amnesty was a civilian's strategic error that emasculated the COLAR's efforts to defeat the insurgents.291 The COLAR resisted any peace process that excluded the disarmament of the insurgents, and paramilitary groups 289 Ibid. 290 Article 121 of the Constitution of 1886 states: "In case of exterior war or internal commotion the President may, with the signature of all the ministers, declare the state of siege and public order... in the whole or part of the country. Through declaration, the government may have, in addition to the legal instruments, those that the Constitution authorizes in times of war or alteration of public order and those that according to the rules accepted by the 'peoples rights' [that] deal with the war among nations"... From L. A. Gomez Araujo. "Reflections about the Peace Process in Colombia — The Legal Framework and Other Considerations". Revista de Derecho. No. 018. (Sept. 2002): 138. 1 O. Behar. Guerras de la Paz. Bogota: Planeta Colombiana Editorial. (1985): 308-311. became increasingly active. 2 Betancur Cuartas' insurgent amnesty failed in 1984, mainly due to the public opposition campaign by the COLAR's conservative officers and some of the country's economic elites.29 Betancur Cuartas signed a ten-month truce with the M-19 insurgents in August 1984. Nonetheless, the M-19 stopped negotiations and in November 1984 seized the Palace of Justice building in Bogota. During the COLAR's assault on the M-19 in the Palace of Justice, over one hundred people died, among whom were eleven Supreme Court Justices.294 From the CMR perspective, this scenario is relevant because the COLAR directly assaulted the Palace of Justice on its own initiative, without any specific orders from President Betancur Cuartas or his staff.295 As previously noted in this paper, the military 'annihilation assault' against the M-19 was outside of any instructions the 292 D. Pecaut. Guerrillas and Violence, in C. Bergquist, R. R. Penaranda and G. Sanchez G. Violence in Colombia - The Contemporary Crisis in Historical Perspective. Wilmington: Scholarly Resources Inc. (1992): 219. 293 W. Aviles. "Institutions, Military Policy, and Human Rights in Colombia". Latin American Perspectives. Vol. 28. No. 1. Colombia: The Forgotten War. (Jan. 2001): 41. A. Rabasa and P. Chalk. Colombian Labyrinth: The Synergy of Drugs and Insurgency and Its Implication for Regional Stability. Santa Monica: RAND Corporation. (2001): 71. 295 M. W. Chernick. "Negotiated Settlement to Armed Conflict: Lessons from the Colombian Peace Process". Journal of International Studies and World Affairs. Vol. 30. No. 4. (Winter, 1988-1989): 75. Chernick maintains the COLAR under Colonel Plazas' command acted without any orders from the President. Please see in this paper page 13 for T. Wells' and page 14 for J. B. Treaster's comments to the contrary. 104 President gave to the COLAR. These actions point to the fact that the COLAR held the civilian government in contempt. In his first year of leadership, President Virgilio Barco Vargas negotiated a peace agreement with the M-19296 that seemed to be more durable than that of his predecessor, Betancur Cuartas. This agreement included a cease-fire, protection for the M-19's leaders, an amnesty, and a program for the reintegration of M-19 personnel into civil society. Barco Vargas, like his predecessors, used the state of siege clause in Colombia's 1886 Constitution to allow prosecution of civilians in military courts-martial. On March 1987, the Supreme Court of Colombia declared unlawful the trial of civilians in military tribunals and their imprisonment in military stockades.2 7 The COLAR's conservative senior officers vigorously disagreed with this judicial ruling in the public media, again entering into Colombia's domestic political arena. President Cesar Gaviria Trujillo attempted to cement civilian control of the armed forces by appointing a civilian to the Minister of Defense portfolio. Additionally, he 296 K. Cragin and B. Hoffman. Arms Trafficking and Colombia. Santa Monica: RAND Corporation. (2003): 67. 297 H. F. Kline. State Building and Conflict Resolution Colombia, 1986-1994. Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press. (1999): 170. appointed a civilian to head the Department of Internal Security. The COLAR did not support Gaviria Trujillo's civilian appointees to these critical posts — several officers made this position clear in Colombia's national media. In 1991, Colombia instituted a new constitution. Based on this document, the Colombian Constitutional Court299 handed down an affirmative decision that civilians were not subject to military courts martial.300 This apparent erosion of the fuero decrees caused several senior officers in the COLAR to threaten their resignations and make disparaging comments about the government to the media. In the 1998 - 2002 Andres Pastrana Arango administration, seventeen senior military officers threatened their resignation in protest of his decision to make the Zona Despeje permanent. Moreover, the officer corps feared that Pastrana would offer a second, permanent Zona Despeje as an inducement for the FARC to accept the central government's peace feelers. Rodrigo Lloreda Caicedo then resigned his portfolio as 298 W. Aviles. "Institutions, Military Policy, and Human Rights in Colombia". Latin American Perspectives. Vol. 28. No. 1. (Jan. 2001): 33-34. 299 The Constitution of 1991 instituted the Colombian Constitutional Court on 7 July 1991. This body's mandate was to decide the constitutionality of laws and government policies. For information on the mandate and legislation relating to the court, please see: Anonymous. "La Corte". Corte Constitucional de Colombia. (Undated). Downloaded from internet (29 May 2009). 300 E. M. Restrepo. Colombian Criminal Justice in Crisis: Fear and Distrust. Gordonsville: Palgrave Macmillan. (2003): 152. Minster of Defense, thus seriously weakening Pastrana's influence with the COLAR. The military again had entered the political sphere — it had disagreed publicly with the President's policies and his choice of advisors. Pastrana Arango attempted to quell the discord in the COLAR by appointing Colombia's senior military officer, General Fernando Tapias Stahelin to the Minster of Defense portfolio. Again, the top echelon of the COLAR could have been politicized by the appointment of its commanding officer to a government portfolio. Fortunately for Colombia, Tapias Stahelin was a constitutionalist and a consummate professional soldier — during that era, he was one of the few examples of a senior COLAR officer who believed in the subordination of the military to the state's lawfully elected civilian leaders. Moreover, Tapias Stahelin had the requisite interpersonal skills to bridge the gap between the hard-nosed soldiery and their civilian political leaders. Upon his appointment as Colombian Minister of Defense, Tapias Stahelin forced the institution of a program to reform the COLAR along the lines of the civilismo doctrine. The subsequent Alvaro Uribe Velez administrations fully supported the implementation and enforcement of the military reforms initiated by Generals Tapias Stahelin, Mora Rangel and Ospina Ovalle.302 Unfortunately, some officers in the C. A. Watson. "Civil-Military Relations in Colombia: A Workable Relationship or a Case for Fundamental Reform". Third World Quarterly. Vol. 21. No. 3. (Jun. 2000): 537. Jorge Enrique Mora Rangel and Carlos Alberto Ospina Ovalle. Colombian military refused to accept the doctrine of civilismo — they chose to publicly disagree with the civilian administration and denigrate its policies in various media outlets.303 On 27 April 2005, Minister of Defense Jorge Alberto Uribe Echavarria, under direction of President Uribe, terminated the commands of four of the six highest-ranking COLAR officers.304 Congress later tried to censure the Minister of Defense for his actions, and in the following months, Uribe Echavarria resigned this portfolio. These examples of military insolence are strictly prohibited in the doctrine taught to Colombian military officers in various United States' military institutions, la Escuela Militar de Cadetes General Jose Maria Cordova and la Escuela Superior de Guerra. Armed forces' doctrine and law prohibits military personnel from publicly disagreeing with their commanding officers and civilian leaders. When one views these infractions in the light of the COLAR's doctrinal suites, the question again arises as to what is paramount in 303 T. C. Bruneau. "Civil-Military Relations in Latin America: The Hedgehog and the Fox Revisited". Revista Fuerzas Armadas y Sociedad. Kho 19. No. 1. (2005): 116. 304 Ibid: 115-116. 305 Even the highly militaristic Prussian Empire prohibited this sort of public disagreement. Prussian officers used the mechanism of kritik to debate privately the merits of military tactics, strategy and policy. The differing arguments in this debate would help flesh out the best possible solution to a problem. Once the commander's decision emerged, debate ended and a unified stance emanated from the officers involved in the kritik, thus preserving unit cohesion and esprit d'corps in the lower ranks. Both the United States' Army and the COLAR support this doctrine of kritik. A fine example of kritik used by professional military officers is found in the following: C. von Clausewitz. trans. J. J. Graham On War 2nd Edition. London, N. Trubner and Co. (1873). 108 the Colombian scenario, the Huntingtonian doctrine of objective civilian control of the military, or the culture of the fuero militar and militarismo. The answer to this query will become more apparent when I examine COLAR 'rogue operations', war fighting methods, and operational failures in upcoming sections of this paper. 'Rogue Ops' Undertaken by the COLAR The COLAR has exhibited the propensity to embark upon self-initiated, rouge operations without the knowledge or approval of its civilian political masters. Of particular interest is the relationship between the COLAR and the various paramilitary organizations operating in Colombia. Although most commentators recognize the paramilitaries by way of their umbrella organization, the Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia, these groups are best understood as independent entities operating within the matrix of caudillismo and the patrias chicas. There is no set and fast typology to describe the political ideologies of these groups — they are not exclusively Communists, Falangists, pro-Bogota nationalists, or opportunistic criminals. Each group represents a unique mix of ideologies, methods, and support mechanisms. What I can say about these groups is that they are pragmatists, and in the nature of caudillos, they use personalismo, corruption, and violence to attain their Henceforth referred to as the AUC in this paper. The AUC is an umbrella organization of regional self defense groups, such as the Santander and Southern Cesar Self-Defense Block, the Casanare Self-Defense Unit, the Putumayo Southern Self-Defense Block and, the Peasant Self-Defense Block of Cordoba and Uraba. goals. The geographical area under the control of a paramilitary group is very similar and sometimes identical to apatria chica. In short, the paramilitary groups attempt and sometimes succeed to be the sole repository of legitimate coercive force in the area under their domination. The relationship between the paramilitaries and the COLAR can best be shown in the following examples — the killing of reintegrated insurgent political candidates, the Death to Kidnappers organization, los Pepes, and the COLAR's operational support to the Autodefensas. On 1 March 1990, the M-19 surrendered their arms and formed a political party.307 In the 1989-1990 general elections, the Partido Union Patriotica nominated Bernardo Jaramillo Ossa309 and the Alianza Democrdtica M-19 nominated Carlos Pizarro Leongomez ° for President. The paramilitaries promptly assassinated these candidates.31' On 24 May 1999, the Colombian Attorney General indicted the AUC's leader, Carlos 307 This body was the Alianza Democrdtica M-19 or the M-19 Democratic Alliance. 308 This body was the Patriotic Union Party. Jaramillo assumed leadership Partido Union Patriotica after the Autodefensas' assassination of the previous leader, Jaime Pardo Leal on 12 October 1987. The media reported that drug lord Jose Gonzalo Rodriguez Gacha sponsored the Autodefensas' assassination of Pardo Leal. 310 Originally, a member of the FARC, Carlos Pizarro Leongomez left that group and was a founding member of the M-19. He later became the fourth commander of the M-19. The Autodefensas assassinated him on 26 April 1990. 311 N. M. Serafino. "Colombia: Conditions and U. S. Policy Options". United States' Library of Congress - Congressional Research Service. (12 Feb. 2001): 39. 110 Castano Gil for these murders. Other Partido Union Patriotica candidates and political workers312 suffered similar fates at the hands of the paramilitaries.313 During the Betancur Cuartas administration, some of the COLAR's generals increasingly moved their COIN to unofficial channels such as membership in private military enterprises. Colombia's Attorney General had evidence in his possession that linked fifty-nine serving COLAR officers to the Death to Kidnappers314 paramilitary group.315 This group formed in the early 1980s because of the kidnapping of Marta Nieves Ochoa, the daughter of a prominent narcotraficante. This paramilitary group grew to include members from the hacendados, the gamonales, and local caudillos. It eventually expanded its targeting activities to Communists. In 1987, the Attorney General released 312 Some commentators indicate between six hundred and two thousand victims 313 T. Marks. "Colombian Army Adaptation to FARC Insurgency". United States' Army War College Strategic Studies Institute Publications. (Jan. 2002): 6. 314 MAS or Muerte a los Secuestradores. 315 M. W. Chernick. "Negotiated Settlement to Armed Conflict: Lessons from the Colombian Peace Process". Journal of International Studies and World Affairs. Vol. 30. No. 4. (Winter. 1988-1989): 58. 316. R. W. Lee. The White Labyrinth: Cocaine and Political Power. New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers. (1989): 216. Ill information that this and most other paramilitary groups operating in the nation had active duty or retired COLAR members.317 Another interesting instance of paramilitary-COLAR collusion occurred with los Pepes318. This paramilitary organization arose in response to the terror campaign waged by the Medellin drug cartel's leader, Pablo Emilio Escobar Gaviria. During the late 1980s to the early 1990s, Escobar waged a terror war against the Colombian state in order to prevent his extradition to face various criminal charges in the United States. His cartel's bombings, assassinations and kidnappings did not stop with government officials — he instructed his henchmen to deal with anyone he considered a risk to him, his family, and his drug business. No person in Colombia was safe from Escobar's reach. In the early 1990s, the United States and Colombian authorities started the Medellin Task Force. It is known in Spanish as Bloque de Busqueda — it employed telecommunications triangulation equipment supplied by the CIA and decryption equipment supplied by the NSA.320 The United States' strategy was to decrypt suspected cellular telephone transmissions from R. Cribari. Colombia Operation Extermino. Montevideo: Editorial Monte Sexto. (1988): 23-30. Los Pepes is a Spanish acronym meaning Perseguidos por Pablo Escobar or People Persecuted by Pablo Escobar. 319 The Search Block. 320 This equipment was carried in small aircraft that patrolled areas suspected of being havens for Escobar, his family and business associates. 112 Escobar, his family and business associates, thereby allowing the Bloque de Busqueda to locate and capture him.321 The campaign to find and eliminate Escobar used ties between Colombian intelligence agencies, United States' assets and Fidel Castano Gil, the leader of los Pepes. The paramilitary group, los Pepes used 'tit-for tat' terror tactics against Escobar, his cartel, friends and family.323The Colombia Documentation Project of the National Security Archive mentions a secret cablegram from U. S. intelligence sources that asserts the director of the Colombian National Police324 General Miguel Antonio Gomez Padilla, ordered a senior Colombian National Police intelligence officer to maintain contact with 321 An interesting summary of the Escobar operation appears in el Semana. It provides an interesting perspective on the details of the players, policies, and relationships behind the attempts to locate and apprehend the narcotraficante. Anonymous. "Killing Pablo". El Semana. (11 Dec. 2000). Downloaded from internet. (19 May 2009). 322 Fidel Castano Gil is the late brother of the AUC's leader Carlos Castano Gil. El Semana produced an article that features a Fidel Castano and his relationship to los Pepes and the paramilitary movement. Please see the following link: Anonymous. "^Quienes son los Pepes?". El Semana. (29 Mar. 1993), Downloaded from internet. (18 May 2009). 323 This was mentioned in a cablegram from the United States' Embassy in Bogota to the Secretary of State in Washington D.C. Please see the following link for the redacted cablegram: Anonymous. "Unraveling the Pepes Tangled Web". United States' Embassy, Bogota. (6 Aug. 1993). Downloaded from internet. (23 May 2009). 324 It is important to note that the Colombian National Police are under the control of the Department of Defense, and hence they are a military unit reporting to the commanding general of the Colombian Armed Forces. 113 Fidel Castano for the purposes of intelligence collection.325 A heavily redacted secret CIA document from the "Latin American Military Issues" series mentioned that there was no evidence President Gaviria sanctioned the Colombian National Police's support and collusion with los Pepes. It does mention that his demands for the capture of Escobar may have led his subordinates in the Colombian National Police and other intelligence gathering agencies to collude with los Pepes and use extralegal means to attain their objectives.326 Another interesting example of the COLAR's complicity with the Autodefensas occurred at el Tigre in the Department of Putumayo. This operation occurred in January 1999 -- in it, members of the AUC used trucks supplied by the COLAR's 24th Brigade327 to prosecute their operation.328 The targets of this action were civilians who supported the FARC. In this operation, the AUC operatives killed twenty-six and kidnapped sixteen of these people. An additional example of the COLAR's support of the AUC occurred in 325 M. Evans. "Colombian Paramilitaries and the United States: Unraveling the Pepes Tangled Web". George Washington University National Security Archive. (17 Feb. 2008). Downloaded from internet. (6 May 2009). 326 Anonymous. "Colombia -Extralegal Steps Against Escobar Possible - Latin American Military Issues Series, Document No. 1340585". United States' Central Intelligence Agency. (30 Apr. 1993). Downloaded from internet. (23 May 2009). 327 Anonymous. "The Butchers Strike Back" The Economist. Iss. 8102. (Saturday 16 January 1999): 58. A. Rabasa and P. Chalk. Colombian Labyrinth: The Synergy of Drugs and Insurgency and Its Implication for Regional Stability. Santa Monica: RAND Corporation. (2001): 57. 114 Uraba. Carlos Castano and his faction of the AUC had conquered Uraba and this coincided with Alvaro Uribe's election as governor of the Antioquia Department form 1995 to 1997. During this period, General Rito Alejo Del Rio Rojas329 served as commander of the COLAR's 17th Brigade in Uraba — notably this time frame was the most violent in Uraba's history. In 1994, there were almost four hundred murders in Uraba, but in 1995, the number rose to eight hundred, and in 1996 the level was twelve hundred. Moreover, the United States' Department of State alleged Pastrana administration Generals Fernando Millan Perez, Rafael Hernandez Lopez and Rito Alejo Del Rio Rojas as having direct connections to the paramilitaries. Furthermore, the State Department asserted paramilitarism to be on the rise during the Pastrana administration.330 In 1997, the United States' Defense Intelligence Agency331 cited the COLAR's 17th Brigade as having direct complicity with paramilitary actions in Carepa, which resides in the Department of Antioquia. This DIA report also stated that COLAR-paramilitary cooperation was a long-standing phenomenon 329 In a 27 December 2008 article, El Tiempo noted that "the retired general Rito Alejo Del Rio will be investigated for the murder of Marino Lopez Mena, a peasant leader from Riosucio (Choco), who was beheaded by the paramilitaries... the controversial military officer coordinated the Autodefensas' entry into the FARC's former fiefdoms in Uraba and therefore has responsibility for the crimes they committed during the bloody crackdown". Anonymous. "Del Rio, A Juicio Por Crimen De Paras". El Tiempo. (27 Dec. 2008). Downloaded from internet. (22 May 2009). 330 Anonymous. "Official - Informal for Ambassador Kamman from WHA and Director Chicola and DRL Das Gerson". United States' Department of State. (25 Jan. 1990): 1-2. Downloaded from internet. (25 Apr. 2007). 1 Henceforth referred to as DIA in this paper. 115 that accelerated under the command of General Rito Alejo Del Rio Rojas.332 In 1998, the Pastrana government removed from command General Rito Alejo Del Rio Rojas333 on charges of collaboration with the Autodefensas in Uraba." Another glaring example of senior COLAR officers' complicity with the Autodefensas appears in the case of General Jamie Humberto Uscategui. During 1997, as a commander of the COLAR'S 7th Brigade in the Meta Department, Uscategui failed to prevent the paramilitaries from torturing and massacring twenty-two non-combatants in Mapiripan. Bibiana Mercado wrote an initial report of this situation in the 31 August 1997 edition of £7 332 Anonymous. "Cashiered Colonel Talks Freely About the Army He Left Behind" United States' Defense Intelligence Agency. (24 Dec. 1997): 2-3. Downloaded from internet. (25 Apr. 2009). 333 El Tiempo reported on 3 September 2008 that "a group of attorneys petitioned the Fiscalia General to investigate retired General Rito Alejo Del Rio not only for conspiracy to commit a crime and alleged complicity with the paramilitaries, but also for the murder of tens of people in the Uraba Department. According to lawyers who will take part in the civil proceedings the Attorney General asked the Supreme Court to reopen the investigation, beginning with the murder of the soldier of Jesus Oswaldo Giraldo Yepes, a prosecution witness against the general. The soldier was killed on April 2, 2005, after leaving the prison in Santa Rosa de Osos (Antioquia). Shortly before he died, he told the office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights that he had received threats and pressure from the defense lawyers close to Rito Alejo in order to retract his statements...[Based upon] confessions from three paramilitaries today, the Procurador went before the Court to reopen the case of the paramilitaries that former Procurador Luis Camilo Osorio concluded for the general in 2004. Among other arguments, the prosecution says that by 1995 the paramilitaries, sometimes in conjunction with the Army, set up illegal roadblocks, forced farmers to abandon their lands and killed many residents of San Jose de Apartado, and Dabeiba Vigia del Fuerte"... Anonymous. "Explosivo Testimonio Contra Del Rio". El Tiempo.(3 Sep. 2008). Downloaded from internet. (4 Apr 2009). 334 Anonymous. "Colombia: Negotiating with the Paramilitaries". ICG Latin America Report. No. 5(16 Sept. 2003): 8-9. 116 Tiempo.ii:> ii0 A tribunal requested by the Procuraduria331 in the early days of February 2001 sentenced Uscategui to forty months imprisonment for complicity with the paramilitaries and dereliction of duty in the prevention of homicide and kidnapping. " In late 2007, a Colombian special court acquitted Uscategui on these charges.339 340 Roxanna Altholz of the University of California Berkeley School of Law represented the families of the victims of the Mapiripan massacre in the Inter-American Court of Human Rights. Her perspective on the Mapiripan scenario points to more than fifty victims of the Autodefensas, with Uscategui and his officers rendering to the perpetrators direct support, 335 B. Mercado. "Cordoba Y Uraba Exportan Paramilitares". El Tiempo. (31 Aug. 1997). Downloaded from internet. (15 Apr. 2009). 336 An El Tiempo article of 16 December 1998 cites "a disciplinary process against two army generals, Rito Alejo Del Rio and Fernando Tapias Stahelin [was] brought by the Procuraduria for the slaughter of Mapiripan. The process was closed as it was based on nonexistent evidence. The Procurador Jaime Bernal Cuellar found that anonymous complaints ...are very vague and imprecise and therefore do not provide elements to initiate a preliminary investigation". Anonymous. "Cierran Investigation A Rito Alejo". El Tiempo. (16 Dec. 1998). Downloaded from internet. (18 Apr. 2009). 337 The Colombian Procuraduria is equivalent to the solicitor general. The Colombian Fiscalia is equivalent to the attorney general. 338 S. Wilson. "Colombian General Convicted in Killings; Collaboration with Paramilitaries Seen". The Washington Post. (14 Feb. 2001): A19. 339 Anonymous. "Absuelto el Unico General Investigado en Colombia por Supuestos Nexos con los Paramilitares" El Espectador. (3 Dec. 2007). Downloaded from internet. (28 May 2008). 340 gi jiertlp0 producecj an article about the conditional release of General Uscategui on 18 November 1999. This article shows some of the legal details about the limits on military detention in Colombia. Anonymous. "En Libertad, El General Uscategui" El Tiempo. (18 Nov. 1999). Downloaded from internet. (28 May 2008). Orozco, one of Uscategui's subordinates, acted as a whistleblower to the crimes and the complicity of the 7l Brigade's command structure. For his part in these crimes, Orozco received a four-year sentence from a tribunal.341 Altholz sees the acquittal of Uscategui as a miscarriage of justice and a return to the COLAR's position of being 'above the law'.342 On 25 March 2007, Paul Richter and Greg Miller of the Los Angeles Times released a report that implicated the commander of the COLAR, General Mario Montoya Uribe to be complicit in the operations of the paramilitaries. He mentioned COLAR forces killed at least fourteen people during 'Operation Orion', with dozens more reportedly 'disappeared' during the sweep. Richter and Miller also said that a CIA document implicated the current Commander of the Colombian Armed Forces, General Freddy Padilla de Leon as an AUC cooperator during his Barranquilla command in same time period.343 A few days later,344 341 J. Forero. "Colombia Massacre's Strange Fallout". New York Times. (23 Feb. 2001): A6. 342 R. Altholz. "Human Rights Atrocities Still go Unpunished in Colombia". AlterNet. (28 Jan. 2008). Downloaded from internet. (2 Jul. 2009). 343 P. Richter and G. Miller. "Colombia Army Chief Linked to Outlaw Militias". Los Angeles Times. (25 Mar. 2007). Downloaded from internet. (1 May 2009). 4 April 2007. 118 Michael Evans345 released information on 'The Nation' website pertaining to the ongoing illegal financial and logistical support offered to the AUC by Chiquita Brands, International.346 In the article, Evans mentions the corrupt relationship between the American firm and the AUC — he also mentions the complicity of General Montoya with the AUC. Evans goes on to say a secret CIA document alleged Montoya planned and executed a 2002 military operation with Medellfn-based paramilitaries.347 In an el Tiempo article of 12 August 2008, that publication's editorial staff reported a story that alleges the following about General Montoya: "Luis Adrian Palacio Londono, alias 'Diomedes' of the AUC Miners' Block said that a commander of the Army afforded him a truck to be personally delivered to the late paramilitary leader 'Double Zero'. The events occurred on April 2, 2002 when General Montoya served as commander of the Fourth Brigade of the Army... 'Diomedes' said [a weapons] cache included six AK-47 rifles and an M-16. An [Army] officer would be appointed [to lead] a group of troops to escort the vehicle in which the arsenal was transported to Corregimiento Crystals in the municipality of San Roque, located 108 kilometers northeast of Medellin in Antioquia".348 345 Evans is the director of the Colombia Documentation Project at George Washington University's National Security Archive. 346 This entity was formerly known as the United Fruit Company, Inc. 347 M. Evans. "Para-politics Goes Bananas". The Nation. (4 Apr. 2007). Downloaded from internet. (1 May 2009). 348 Anonymous. "General Mario Montoya Uribe, Acusado por Desmovilizado de las AUC de Entregar Armas a Paramilitares". El Tiempo. (12 Aug. 2008). Downloaded from internet. (18 Apr. 2009). In a rebuttal on Colombia's Ministry of National Defense website, Montoya denied any allegations of his connections to the paramilitaries and their operations. He also mentioned his intent to sue the Los Angeles Times for personal damages incurred because of what he asserted to be false and baseless accusations. Additionally, on this web page, the Minister of National Defense at that time, Juan Manuel Santos said that Montoya still enjoyed the support and respect of the Colombian government.349 The documents produced by the CIA and the United States' Embassy in Bogota do not agree with Montoya's assertions of innocence and the Colombian government's support of him. The National Security Archive Colombia Documentation project has provided declassified information from the United States' Department of State - Bogota Embassy, the CIA and DIA on this situation. Evans and Mesa of the Colombia Documentation Project have provided an overall summary of the Montoya situation — they stated that under Montoya's leadership the COLAR suffered with a 'body count syndrome' and had used 'death squad tactics' in its prosecution of the COIN. Evans and Mesa went on to say a secret COLAR report mentioned an undisclosed policy that influenced military actions to include extrajudicial executions and collaboration with paramilitary drug traffickers. The secret report resulted in the dismissal of thirty COLAR officers and the resignation of ' J. M. Santos and M. Montoya. "Mindefensa Expresa Respaldo al General Montoya". Gobierno de la Republica de Colombia, Ministerio de Defensa. (27 Mar. 2007). Downloaded from internet. (29 May 2009). in cablegram from C. W Kamman of the United States' Embassy Bogota. In this document of 8 February 2000, the author alleges complicity between the COLAR's 4th Brigade and the ACCU paramilitary group351 operating in Antioquia. In an incident at Montebello municipality, the ACCU kidnapped and killed two alleged insurgents from the CRS352 group, a local teacher, and a young man. The COLAR claimed responsibility for killing two ELN operatives in this incident, who upon forensic autopsies were shown to be the demobilized CRS members.' On 29 June 1999, The United States' Embassy in Bogota sent a highly revealing electronic message to the United States' Departments of State, Defense, CIA, DIA and other United States' embassies in Latin America. This message summarized the 350M. Evans and A. Mesa. "Body Count Mentalities - Colombia's 'False Positives' Scandal Declassified". George Washington University National Security Archive - Colombia Documentation Project. (7 Jan. 2009). Downloaded from internet. (27 May 2009). ' A graphic description of the Autodefensas Campesinas de Cordoba y Urabd and its grisly tactics appears in the following document: L. Haugaard. "Longing for Home - Return of Land to Colombia's Internally Displaced Population". Latin America Working Group Education Fund. (Sep. 2006): 1-20. Downloaded from internet. (19 May 2009). 352 The Corriente de Renovacion Socialista or Socialist Renovation Current is a small revolutionary group that demobilized as part of the terms of a 1994 treaty with the Bogota government. 353 C. Kamman. "Paramilitary Ties of the Army's 4th Brigade". United States' Department of State - United States' Embassy, Bogota, Colombia. (8 Feb. 2000 ) Downloaded from internet. (23 May 2009). Ambassador Curtis W. Kamman stated that in July 1997, the AUC murdered between eleven and fourteen persons and abducted between thirty to thirty-six others.354 Kamman also stated in May 1997 that the AUC murdered approximately seventy people in seven separate incidents. The most damning section of this message mentioned the Colombian Vice President's report that COLAR soldiers donned AUC armbands and actively participated in the massacre. Kamman went on to say that Sierra de Tibu was the 'place to watch' for AUC-COLAR complicity, and he was amazed the security forces in that area could not prevent crimes such as this. He said possible reasons are the security forces' siege mentality, their incompetence, lack of firepower or complicity with the Autodefensas - but the ultimate reason remained unclear in his opinion.355 The relationship between the Autodefensas and the COLAR has an interesting origin. Concerning this scenario, Rempe cites Maullin's statement that the COLAR helped organize and arm the Autodefensas during its execution of Plan LAZO. Amnesty International provides more information on this situation: 354 This act allegedly occurred in Tibu, Department of Norte de Santander " C. Kamman. "Paramilitaries Massacre as Many as Fifty in Norte de Santander". United States' Department of State - Bogota Embassy. (7 Jun. 1999): 1-5. Downloaded from internet. (9 May 2009). The Autodefensas' units were tasked to village defense in areas pacified by the COLAR, thereby releasing soldiers from these duties and allowing them to resume aggressive interdiction operations against the insurgents." This concept is very similar to 356 D. M. Rempe. "Counterinsurgency in Colombia: A U. S. National Security Perspective". University of Miami Publications — University Microfilms Inc. (May 2002): 138. 357 Anonymous. "Colombia - The Paramilitaries in Medellfn: Demobilization or Legalization? Amnesty International. (13 Aug. 2005): 3-4. Downloaded from internet. (28 May 2009). R. L. Maullin. Soldiers, Guerrillas, and Politics in Colombia. Santa Monica: RAND. (Dec. 1971): 75. 123 the MAAG / MACSOG 'Strategic Hamlets' program in the Vietnam War — it is interesting to note that both programs were failures.359 This above situation presents an interesting perspective into the ongoing coziness between some members of the COLAR's officer corps and the Autodefensas. I assert that this relationship has existed for such a time that cooperation between the two entities has become a pillar of the intersubjective understanding suite of some members of the COLAR's officer corps. In short, COLAR complicity with the Autodefensas has become a cultural norm in the minds of many of its officers. The ramifications of the COLAR- paramilitary relationship are clear — when defense policy disputes between the civilian leadership and the officer corps fester, some of these officers revert to their cultural ties with the Autodefensas, thereby allowing them to prosecute the COIN as they see fit. These actions have often worked at cross purposes to the political goals of the civilian government, causing the breakdown of negotiations that could have ended the insurrection 359 The United States' MAAG operated with a global mandate. MAAG was operational in the Vietnam War and some of its personnel were transitioned from Vietnam to Colombia as military advisors. With this perspective in mind, it is not surprising that a variant of the armed village defense concept would appear in Colombia — this concept was the Autodefensas. 124 in an amicable and less bloody fashion than the path offered by some COLAR officers' 'force-only' solution.360 The Autodefensas are not simple brigands or petty criminals - they enjoy the sizeable monies offered by the narcotics trade. With this cash, they have access to advanced small arms such as assault rifles and RPGs,361 communications systems and claymore mines.362 Moreover, the Colombian media has reported the Autodefensas' use of helicopters in support of their operations363 against the insurgents in the south of the Bolivar Department. The governor of that department stated the AUC used two helicopters for logistical and medical evacuation purposes during combat operations against the FARC.364 360 Early in the Colombian COIN, General Ruiz-Novoa championed a 'developmental warfare' concept to defeat the insurgents. Coupled with aggressive patrolling, and joint operations, Novoa posited a Colombian 'Hearts and Minds Campaign' to help remove campesino support for the insurgents and re-invigorate state legitimacy in the countryside. The 'force only' solution refers to the perspective held by some COLAR officers who refused to accept the efficacy of military-based civil affairs programs like those espoused by Ruiz Novoa. 361 An RPG is a Russian shoulder-fired rocket propelled grenade featuring a conical charge that can penetrate the homogenous armor systems of older generation tanks and personnel carriers. This weapon is also useful against buildings and ad-hoc field fortifications. It is so simple to operate that illiterate personnel can attain a modicum of operational proficiency with 30 minutes' training. 362 A claymore mine is a U. S. manufactured, remote detonated anti-personnel mine. Its wide swath of devastation caused it to be named after the legendary Scottish broadsword - the claymore. 63 The operations were in South Arenal, Micoahumado, Morales, and the Corregimiento Pueblito Mejfa of Barranco de Loba. 364 Anonymous. "Investigan Posibles Helicopteros Paras". El Tiempo (12 Nov. 1998). Downloaded from internet. (3 May 2009). In its ongoing use of the Autodefensas as proxy operatives, the COLAR's officer corps has exhibited a rocky and friction-filled relationship with the Procuraduria. Lillian Coral et. al, in a report to the office of United States' Senator Patrick Leahy365 cited the following: "Cooperation has not been forthcoming when officers have been prosecuted for human rights abuses or dereliction of duty with respect to preventing massacres perpetrated by the Autodefensas. In some cases, the COLAR has restricted the Procuraduria's access to 'confidential' documents they considered incriminating to certain members of the officer corps. In other instances, COLAR personnel have colluded with members of the Autodefensas to avoid imminent arrest".366 This situation does not speak well to the rule of law in Colombia — it agrees with previous statements in this paper that certain members of the COLAR's officer believe they are above the law and their position of privilege permits them to flaunt their impunity in the 365 L. Coral. H. Mahgerefteh and H. Ward. "Reducing the Incidence of Massacres in Colombia". UCLA School of Public Policy and Social Research - Department of Policy Studies Publications Service. (Undated): 20-21. Downloaded from internet. (20 May 2009). 366 Anonymous. "Colombia Attacks on Justice - 2002". International Commission of Jurists. (27 Aug. 2002). face of criminal prosecutions.3 The Constitution of 1991 offers clauses pertinent to the situation of the Autodefensas: "ARTICLE 216. Security forces shall be composed exclusively of the Armed Forces and the National Police. ARTICLE 217. The nation will have for its defence a permanent military force constituted by the Army, Navy and Air Force. The armed forces shall [have as its] primary purpose the defence of sovereignty, independence, the integrity of the national territory and the constitutional order. ARTICLE 223. Only the Government can introduce and produce weapons, munitions of war and explosives. No one shall possess them or carry them without permission of the competent authority... Members of national security agencies and other armed permanent official bodies, by treaty or authorized by law, may carry arms under the control of the Government"...36 The Constitution of 1991 is quite clear -- the sole coercive agencies permitted are the COLAR and National Police while the manufacture, carrying or importation of weapons, munitions of war or explosives is prohibited except by the agencies mentioned in above 367 For those proficient Spanish readers who can tolerate turgid legal jargon, I recommend visiting the web site maintained by the Justicia Penal Militar. This site offers sections on the details of specific laws and sentences handed down by various courts martial. Please see: Anonymous. "Biblioteca Judicial". Justicia Militar Penal Republica de Colombia. (26 Jul. 2005). Downloaded from internet. (18 May 2009). 368 Anonymous. "Political Constitution of 1991 through 2005 Reforms". Republica de Colombia (Nov. 2008) Downloaded from internet. (18 May 2009). On 12 March 2007, Liliana Segura of The Nation wrote an article that revealed the following: ".. .Then, on February 15, five more senior senators were arrested for paramilitary ties, including Senator Alvaro Araujo, the brother of Uribe's Foreign Minister, Maria Consuelo, provoking her resignation February 19. A warrant for the capture of their father, Alvaro Araujo Noguera, was issued March 2; meanwhile, former security and intelligence head Jorge Noguera, a campaign chief for Uribe in 2002, was arrested for arranging the assassination of union leaders and academics by paramilitaries. The unraveling confirms what has long been an open secret: The Colombian government is rife with paramilitary influence." The Autodefensas are a significant problem in Colombia ~ they violate Colombian law, International Human Rights Law and besmirch the reputation of the COLAR and the government in general. Especially when working in concert with the COLAR, the actions of the Autodefensas weaken state legitimacy in the eyes of the people supposedly protected L. Segura. "Bush Amigo's Para Pals". The Nation. (12 Mar. 2007). Downloaded from internet. (3 May 2009). This dismal situation lends credence to the insurgents' claims of oligarchic control of the state ~ the rebels see Colombia as a land in which the campesinos, llaneros, and urban poor will never enjoy basic rights and a decent living standard until the ruling class is overthrown. The COLAR's Entrenched, Traditional War Fighting Methods and Resultant Operational Failures In this section, I shall examine how the COLAR's culture has led to operational failures in the COIN. This culture of militarismo and aristocratic entitlement will be shown in three practices — 'I obey but do not comply',370 'operation turtle', and 'the army of the poor'. Moreover, this section shall show the COLAR's adoption of these practices has broken Bruneau's CMR trinity and thus has been a negative factor in Colombia's campaign to end the insurgency. I shall provide examples from the times of the Rojas Pinilla dictatorship to the present. In April 1955, the COLAR invaded the eastern section of the Tolima Department. President Gustavo Rojas Pinilla ordered the COLAR to destroy that area's guerrilla force of about two thousand combatants, and capture their leader, Juan de la Cruz Varela. After two C. I. Archer. Department of History, University of Calgary, Calgary, Alberta, Canada, personal communication. (Apr. 2008). months of intense combat using traditional fighting methods, the campaign failed. Neither did the COLAR destroy the guerrilla force nor did they capture its leader. Instead of orchestrating an orderly return to their presidios, the COLAR's officers took vengeance on the local population by allowing their troops to pillage and destroy the property of the campesinos?11 These actions explicitly violated Robert Thompson's COIN doctrine372 and delegitimized the Bogota government in minds of the Tolima residents. This sort of disregard for the well-being of the campesinos was and still is a hallmark of the COLAR's traditional war fighting methods and militarist Weltanschauung. As with previous administrations, President Lleras Camargo used the COLAR to quell violence in the countryside. In 1962, a United States' special warfare team produced a report on the efficacy of these operations. Rempe cites373 Brigadier General W. P. Yarborough's374 statements that the COLAR's eight combat brigades had very serious defects in its officer corps, such as non-existent central planning, coordination, 371 J. M. Daniel. Rural Violence in Colombia since 1946. Washington: Special Operations Research Office. (1965): 93-94. 372 Please see the upcoming section on Malaya, Vietnam and Colombia for information on Sir Robert Thompson's COIN doctrine. 373 D. M. Rempe. "Counterinsurgency in Colombia: A U. S. National Security Perspective". University of Miami Publications — University Microfilms Inc. (May 2002): 132-133. 7 After other assignments, W. P. Yarborough went on to be commander of the United States' Army Special Forces. 130 communication, and intelligence. The officer corps had a blockhouse mentality that insisted they statically position their combat resources in presidios — in this practice, they neglected the most basic of COIN techniques such as aggressive patrolling, intelligence gathering and offensive interdiction operations. This static defense strategy allowed the insurgents to gain and retain the combat initiative, thus putting the COLAR at a significant disadvantage. The FARC and ELN stepped up their actions against the Bogota government after the M-19 surrendered and became Alianza Democratica M-19.375 The COLAR was notably ineffective in its mandate to suppress and ultimately defeat the FARC and the ELN, and for the most part followed a traditional mindset that focused on urban security. The deployment of the COLAR outside of the cities closely resembled that of the United States' Army during the Indian Wars of the nineteenth century. Both armies used presidio based defensive tactics, with no major focus on offensive patrolling. These tactics failed to 'bring the war to the enemy' — most battles occurred at places and times of the enemy's choosing and under conditions favorable to him. In short, this mindset and the tactics generated by it effectively surrendered the rural areas to enemy domination. • J. G. Cristy. "Colombia: A Risk-Prone Democracy". United States' Navy Postgraduate School Publications. (Dec. 1998): 69. 376 F. La Rotta and A. Chavez. "Colombian Armed Forces Restructuring Process". United States' Department of Defense Command and Control Research Program - Strata Publications. (Jun. 2005): 4. Downloaded from internet. (20 Mar. 2008). The COLAR suffered humiliating defeats377 at the hands of the FARC during the 1990s.378 The FARC attacked Puerres in the Narino Department on April 16, 1996. In this engagement, the COLAR suffered thirty-one soldiers killed and fifteen wounded.379 On 30 August 1996, the FARC attacked the Las Delicias presidio in the Department of Putumayo. In this encounter, the COLAR suffered twenty-eight members killed and sixty kidnapped. On 7 September 1996, the FARC attacked the COLAR's La Carpa presidio in the Guaviare Department, with the COLAR suffering thirty soldiers killed in action.380 On 20 December 1997, the FARC's 42nd and 48th fronts381 surrounded the Patascoy presidio, in the Narino Department. This installation was a fortified communications base atop a hill, about forty- one hundred meters above sea level. On 21 December, the guerrillas managed to climb the hill without detection by the defenders, who were thirty-four soldiers of the Boyaca Battalion's Dart Company. Using automatic weapons and mortars, the guerillas managed to overrun the COLAR soldiers' prepared defenses. Irrespective of the advantages offered by the hilltop installation, its fortifications, or its communications capabilities, the FARC K. Cragin and B. Hoffman. Arms Trafficking and Colombia. Santa Monica: RAND Corporation. (2003): 5-6. 378 N. F. Padilla. "Cabanuelas de Paz". Cambio. (21 Dec. 1998): 24-25. 379 G. G. Restrepo. "Transforming the Colombian Army During the War on Terrorism". United States' Army War College Publications. (15 Mar. 2006): 3. 380 C. Echandia. "El Conflicto Armado Colombiano en los Arios Noventa: Cambios en las Estrategias y Efectos Economicos" Vol. 49-50. Colombia Internacional. (2006): 120. 381 The combined strength consisted of approximately one hundred-fifty guerrillas. guerrillas managed to destroy the facility using satchel charges. The FARC killed eleven and captured eighteen COLAR soldiers in this engagement.383 On 26 February 1998, the FARC lured a COLAR brigade into a trap at el Billar Creek near the Caguan River. Before the combat engagement, the COLAR's 52nd Counter "1QA Guerrilla Battalion was encamped in the town of Pena Colorada for six weeks. This unit received orders to conduct a campaign against the FARC in the lower Caguan River basin. Villagers and campesinos advised the local FARC block of the COLAR battalion's presence in the area. The FARC's counterintelligence campaign caught the COLAR battalion off-guard — it was ill prepared for a set-piece battle with a large enemy force. The COLAR's battalion commanders, still adhering to traditional war fighting concepts, neglected the use of aggressive patrolling and intelligence gathering — hence, they were ignorant of the FARC forces massing in the area. A FARC front of approximately eight hundred combatants encircled the COLAR battalion, thus closing land-based escape and reinforcement routes. To make matters worse, bad weather conditions hampered the Colombian Air Force's attempts to support the battalion. The COLAR then attempted a 382 A satchel charge is a man-portable explosive charge carried in a disposable container such as a satchel. 383 D. Spencer. "Focus - Latin America - Bogota Continues to Bleed as FARC Finds Their Military Feet". Jane's Intelligence Review. Vol. 010. Iss. Oil. (10 Nov. 1998): 35-36. 384 This battalion was from the 3rd Mobile Brigade. 133 paratroop assault without the benefit of intelligence about the FARC front's operational disposition. This intelligence failure proved disastrous to the COLAR relief operation -- the FARC quickly, yet effectively prepared the para-drop area into a kill zone. As a result of this preparation, the assault failed with the COLAR's paratroopers suffering significant casualties. On 4 March, the COLAR finally relieved the battalion by way of an armor and infantry incursion. By that time, the FARC front had decisively defeated the COLAR battalion, killing one hundred seven of its one hundred fifty-four soldiers,385 with forty- three captured and the rest escaping into the rain forest.386 The COLAR's fortunes did not improve during the latter half of 1998. In August of that year, the FARC and ELN attacked forty two times in fourteen geographical areas. In these attacks, the insurgents killed one hundred four members of the security forces while capturing one hundred fifty eight. The insurgents suffered two hundred forty-three killed in action. The ELN sabotaged Colombia's main oil pipeline on 18 October 1998, killing seventy-five people in the resulting fire.387 On 3 August 1998, the FARC attacked the 385 A. Rabasa and P. Chalk. Colombian Labyrinth: The Synergy of Drugs and Insurgency and Its Implication for Regional Stability. Santa Monica: RAND Corporation. (2001): 42-43. 386 D. Spencer. "Focus - Latin America - Bogota Continues to Bleed as FARC Finds Their Military Feet" Jane's Intelligence Review. Vol. 010. Iss. Oil. (10 Nov. 1998): 35. 387 P. A. Acosta. "Colombia's Economic Recession: The Impact of Guerrilla Violence, Illicit Drug Trafficking and the 1991 Constitution". United States' Naval Post-Graduate School Publications. (Dec. 2001): 16-17. 134 Miraflores base in Guaviare, the Uribe presidio in Meta, and the Pavarando installation in Uraba. These engagements cost the COLAR and National Police one hundred dead and one hundred thirty-three kidnapped. In early November 1998, just before the creation of the Zona Despeje, the FARC assaulted Mini, capital of the Vaupes Department. In this battle, the FARC killed eighty security personnel and captured forty.388 Even in the twenty-first century, the FARC has inflicted noteworthy defeats on the COLAR. On 25 February 2005, the FARC attacked the Iscuande marine base in the southwestern sector of Colombia. On April of that year, the insurgents attacked Toribio in the Cauca Department and Puerto Asis in the Putumayo Department. Another example of the COLAR's failure occurred on 27 December 2005. In this engagement, the FARC killed twenty-five soldiers and three non-commissioned officers of the 12th Mobile Brigade in the village of Playa Rica, which is part of the rural district of Vista Hermosa. This area is in the Meta Department, about two hundred eighty kilometers southeast of Bogota. A company- strength sub-unit of this brigade deployed as a perimeter security force to protect a campesino group that was burning a cocaine plantation. In the early morning, the 27th Front of the FARC's Eastern Block attacked the campesinos and the COLAR detachment. Luis C. Echandia. "El Conflicto Armado Colombiano en los Afios Noventa: Cambios en las Estrategias y Efectos Economicos" Vol. 49-50. Colombia International. (2006): 120. 135 Eduardo Lopez Mendes389 led three hundred FARC combatants to victory in this engagement with the COLAR.390 The FARC combatants had advance intelligence about the eradication operation and the COLAR's presence in the area -- consequently, they prepared the area into a kill zone and encircled it with booby-traps and anti-personnel mines. The situation was so grave that the COLAR unit had extreme difficulty with egress, reinforcement, casualty evacuations, and removal of the dead. These defeats cause concern for any party supporting the COLAR's victory in the insurrection. They point to the COLAR's flawed strategic vision with respect to COIN. Colonel German Giraldo Restrepo of the COLAR stated the following about that defective strategic vision: "The situation in Colombia in 1998 was critical... [T]he Armed Forces reached the lowest levels of credibility and legitimacy... At the same time, the Army had a bad strategic vision about how to combat terrorism...General Alvaro Valencia Tovar in the preface of the book, [by General J. E. Mora Rangel] 'The History of the Army's Restructuring', argued that the Army should reconsider two assumptions to strengthen its position. First, that the Colombian Army is the best in the world to combat terrorism, because of its extensive experience. Second, the responsibility for the war rests solely with the Army.391 These inaccurate 389 His nom de guerre was Efren. 390 A. de Souza-Pinheiro. "Narco Terrorism in Latin America - A Brazilian Perspective". United States' Department of Defense Joint Special Operations University Publications. (Apr. 2006): 28-29. 391 G. G. Restrepo cites Valencia Tovar's comments in J. E. Mora-Rangel. Historia de la Reestructuracion del Ejercito. Bogota: (Jan. 2004): 2. assumptions led the Army down a road of uncertainty, lost experience, and initiative, and badly conducted operations at all levels, thereby leaving the initiative to [the] terrorists. Under such circumstances, the Army began to understand the necessity for change. Military leaders made a decision to restructure it." 392 Colonel Restrepo and General Valencia Tovar's comments are quite profound — both individuals are senior COLAR officers with significant in-field command experience. This situation points to the fact that pragmatic, professional officers in the COLAR are willing to adopt COIN methods proven in foreign contexts. Moreover, the reformist position started by General Ruiz Novoa and amplified by General Valencia Tovar is regaining traction in the COLAR. These defeats are especially telling in that they show serious flaws in the professional and political culture of the COLAR's officer corps. The flaws revolved around the COLAR's adamantine insistence on traditional tactics, the presidio mentality, and defense-oriented postures.393 Why did many officers in the COLAR's senior command structure remain adamantly attached to traditional war fighting methods even when confronted with an enemy ready, willing and able to use the devious and pragmatic 392 G. G. Restrepo. "Transforming the Colombian Army During the War on Terrorism". United States' Army War College Publications. (15 Mar. 2006): 3. 393 F. La Rotta and A. Chavez. "Colombian Armed Forces Restructuring Process". United States' Department of Defense Command and Control Research Program - Strata Publications. (Jun. 2005): 5. Downloaded from internet. (20 Mar. 2008). The old 'I obey but do not comply' maxim that originated in the colony of New Spain buttressed the COLAR's traditional mindset and defense-oriented tactics. In the colonial environment, local leaders, both civilian and military, would apply a tactic of iip-service obedience' with royal edicts while in practice, refusing to execute these orders. This paradoxical tactic hamstrung the operation of various colonial institutions and destabilized the legitimacy of Spanish regal governments in the Americas.394 Certain COLAR officers still use this tactic in response to certain orders they deem distasteful. When ordered by their civilian leaders to use the COIN precepts learned at the United States' Army School of the Americas and the Escuela de Lanceros, certain COLAR officers offered 'lip service obedience' but still insisted on traditional war fighting tactics. Porch reports that a refinement of this tactic is so well known in the COLAR that the officer corps has named it 'operation turtle'.395 This soldier's colloquialism refers to a mode of operation in which the COLAR obeys civilian edicts so slowly, that in practice the orders are not executed.396 The C. I. Archer. Department of History, University of Calgary, Calgary, Alberta, Canada. Personal communication. (Apr. 2008). 395 D. Porch. "Uribe's Second Mandate, the War, and the Implications for Civil-Military Relations in Colombia". Strategic Insights. Vol. V. Iss. 2. (Feb. 2006): 8. 396 Douglas Porch first reported 'operation turtle' to academia in his article "Uribe's Second Mandate, the War, and the Implications for Civil-Military Relations in Colombia". result of this tactic is a poorly motivated COLAR -1 assert this lack of motivation generates a foot-dragging military that results in poor battlefield performance and a needless lengthening of the insurgency. Another source of military de-motivation exists - this is the ley bachilleres. Under this law, regular soldiers397 with a high school diploma398 are exempt from combat duties.399 This law ensures that poor urban and rural conscripts do the fighting and dying for the state — they are an 'army of the poor'. This situation does not support the notion of civic republicanism with its construct of virtuous service in defense of the polis. Porch provides some insights into this situation: "Nowhere is the social inequality of Colombia more apparent than in the military's conscription policies. While the military has taken steps to professionalize its ranks, attempts to institute a more equitable method of conscription that would share the burden across social classes has failed to gain 397 Regular soldiers are conscripts in the Colombian lexicon. Law 48 of 1993 states all males who reach the age of majority must register at a government office for conscription. This regulation is described at the following Colombian government website: Anonymous. "Definition de la situation militar". Ejercito Nacional, Republica de Colombia, Ministerio de Defensa. (2009) Downloaded from internet. (28 May 2009). 398 Colombian law states military service is mandatory for males, eighteen years or older. A summary of this situation, along with the exemption status for high school graduates is found on the following Colombian government web site: Anonymous. "Servicio Militar Obligatorio". Ejercito Nacional, Republica de Colombia, Ministerio de Defensa (13 Apr. 2009). Downloaded from internet. (24 May 2009). C. A. Watson. "Civil-Military Relations in Colombia: A Workable Relationship or a Case for Fundamental Reform". Third World Quarterly. Vol. 21. No. 3. (Jun. 2000): 545-546. traction. The burden of fighting the conflicto" falls heavily on the peasantry... Colombians might admire the military from a distance, but that does not translate into a desire to enlist their children. Attempts by the [Minister of Defense] to introduce a lottery system in 2004 failed to get a final reading in Congress... This is reflected in conscription".400 This situation spawns the following question: how have these de-motivating practices caused the COLAR's historical lack of success in the counter-insurgency? To answer this query, this paper must first discuss some general concepts of irregular war fighting. I shall do so by examining some common principles extant in the Malayan, Vietnamese and Colombian conflicts. Malaya, Vietnam and Colombia -- Different Wars, Similar Concepts The concepts of COIN solidified into a consolidated suite of strategy and practices during the Malayan Emergency of 1947 to 1960. In this British colony, the insurgents used the techniques of a 'poor man's war' in the hope of counterbalancing the overwhelming preponderance of conventional war fighting capabilities enjoyed by the British military. Reading from the playbook of Mao Ze Dong,401 the insurgents attempted to co-opt and in 400 D. Porch. "Uribe's Second Mandate, the War, and the Implications for Civil-Military Relations in Colombia". Strategic Insights. Vol. V. Iss. 2. (Feb. 2006): 7. R. W. Komer. The Malayan Emergency in Retrospect: Organization of a Successful Counterinsurgency Effort. RAND: Santa Monica. (Feb. 1972): 7. some cases, force the rural population into a mass-line uprising against their colonial masters. In this uprising, the insurgents employed 'hit, run, and vanish' tactics designed to foil the overwhelming conventional war fighting capabilities of the British military. Surprisingly, the insurgents did not realize the British had employed small unit, unconventional combat techniques since the start of World War II.402 In a COIN, the key to success is not the overarching ability to 'kill one's way out' of the conflict. This 'overkill' notion is a foundation of traditional war fighting, but it is completely antithetical to the practice of unconventional warfare. Eschewing traditional war fighting, the British employed military restraint in the Briggs Plan.403 This strategy document set out two key goals for victory in the Malayan COIN — protect the population and isolate them from the guerrillas.404 To attain these goals, the British relied on small units of highly motivated, professional military specialists to fight the insurgents in short duration, high intensity battles using small arms, grenades, mortars and the like. The British command structure rejected the indiscriminate use of air bombardment, large-scale artillery barrages, massed 402 These techniques originated from the British involvement in the South African Boer War. The Boers used highly mobile raider groups called kommandos to harass and interdict British military operations. Learning from this experience, Winston Churchill, who served in the Boer War, instituted British commando operations in World War II. In that conflict, Prime Minster Churchill mandated the use of irregular war fighting by the Special Air Service and the Royal Marine Commandos. The British utilized these units in the Malayan Emergency. 403 R. W. Komer. The Malayan Emergency in Retrospect: Organization of a Successful Counterinsurgency Effort. RAND: Santa Monica. (Feb. 1972): 18-19. 404 J. E. Hamby. "Civil-Military Operations - Joint Doctrine and the Malayan Emergency". Joint Forces Quarterly. (Autumn 2002): 55. 141 armor incursions, and other tools of traditional war fighting. The reason for this position is not surprising when one realizes the British strategists did the same thing as the Communist insurgents — they understood the strategy of Mao Ze Dong and came to the same, simple conclusion. This deduction stated the key to victory in asymmetric warfare was not overwhelming military capabilities — it was in fact, obtaining and maintaining the support of the local population upon whose territory the conflict occurred. To gain victory, the counterinsurgent troops would live amongst the local population, offering them training, equipment, support, and protection against the enemy. The locals would abet the counterinsurgents by allowing the British to use their villages as bases and, more importantly, the peasants themselves would act as real-time sources of intelligence about guerrilla operations and their whereabouts. The use of wide brush-stroke military tactics capabilities by the British forces would have caused serious damage to the lives, well-being, and property of the people the COIN was attempting to protect ~ the Malayan villagers. If this damage had occurred, the villagers would have cemented their support behind the Communist insurgents and the British would have lost the conflict. Going back to Mao's strategy, the British chose to focus on the base of the asymmetric war pyramid — the local population. These tactics protected the local people via the dictum of operational flexibility buttressed by limiting military force to the minimum level necessary for mission success.4 The tide of victory slowly and inexorably moved away from the Communist guerrillas when the peasantry felt safe enough to support the COIN. After their success in Malaya, the British Permanent Secretary for Malayan Defense, Robert Thompson406 codified these concepts into a publication407 that the United Kingdom still employs in its COIN doctrine. The concepts in this publication migrated to the United States' Army — its Special Forces merged these methods into the American irregular war fighting doctrine408 taught at the John F. Kennedy Special Forces School at Fort Bragg, North Carolina and the United States' Army School of the Americas at Fort Benning, Georgia. 405 J. A. Nagl. Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam: Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife. Westport: Praeger Publications. (2002): 51, 192, 204-5. 406 Thompson, although a commissioned officer in the Royal Air Force, served in British Army General O. C. Wingate's 'Chindits' during the Burma campaign of World War II. During this service, Thompson learned the techniques of jungle and guerrilla warfare. The 'Chindits' were officially in 1943, the 77 th Indian Infantry Brigade and in 1944, the 3rd Indian Infantry Division. These units specialized in long-range commando operations deeply inserted behind Japanese lines. 407 R. G. Thompson. Defeating Communist Insurgency: The Lessons of Malaya and Vietnam. New York: Praeger (1966). 408 American irregular war doctrine is contained in a stream of continuously updated publications, the most current of which are the following two works: J. M. Shalikashvili. Joint Doctrine for Military Operations other than War - Joint Publication 3-07. Washington: United States' Department of Defense Publications. (16 Jun. 1995). D. H. Petraeus and J. F. Amos. Counterinsurgency FM 3-24. Washington: Department of the Army. (Dec. 2006). Units of the United States' Military Assistance Command Studies and Observation Group409 and the earlier Military Assistance Advisory Group410 used Robert Thompson's techniques during the early and middle stages of Vietnam War. These techniques were part of the 'Hearts and Minds Campaign' that focused on defending and protecting South Vietnamese villages. These units instituted the 'Strategic Hamlets Program'411 — in it, they supported the 'Ruff-Puffs'412 to protect the rural population against the unconventional warfare tactics of the Viet Cong. Due to U.S.-RVN friction, and Generals Maxwell Taylor and William Westmoreland's traditional war fighting mindsets, the 'Strategic Hamlets Program' was not a success. However, another program in the 'Hearts and Minds Campaign' netted valuable tactical intelligence about Viet Cong and NVA operations. This was the 'Chieu H6iAn program — in it, selected Viet Cong, NVA and civilian personnel were allowed to surrender peaceably and become 'ralliers'414 to RVN415 loyalty. Some of 409 MACSOG. 4I0MAAG. 411 Strategic Hamlets were South Vietnamese villages equipped and armed by United States' special operations forces for the purpose of defending the residents against the actions of the Vi$t Cong. 412 Ruff-Puff is a Special Forces nickname for Regional Forces-Popular Forces. These forces consisted of South Vietnamese villagers who expressed loyalty to the Saigon regime. The U. S. Special Forces trained and equipped these units so they could defend their strategic hamlets against the terror raids of the Viet Cong. In many engagements, the Special Forces fought alongside their Ruff-Puff counterparts. 413 This Vietnamese phrase roughly translates to 'open arms'. 1 'Ralliers' are those insurgent personnel whose chose to reinstate their loyalty to the Saigon government. The Vietnamese term for 'rallier' is Hoi Chanh. Among the Hoi Chanh were those who served alongside United States Military units as 'Kit Carson Scouts'. 144 these individuals worked alongside United States' combatants, often saving the lives of many friendly personnel by the provision of tactical intelligence about their former comrades. In a recently declassified416 report by the RAND Corporation for the United States' Department of Defense, the author cites a total of over 194,000 Vietnamese 'ralliers' to RVN loyalty. The author, J. A. Koch stated: "[I] was personally involved in the development of the program in the field and thus [am] intimately aware of how relatively little of the results and experiences gathered there have been assembled and made known".417 The 'Chieu Hoi' program started in 1963, and the Viet Cong reacted strongly to it — becoming a 'rallier' was a crime punishable by death. J. A. Koch states this reaction attested to the 'Chieu Hoi' program's significant and negative impact on the Communist insurgents. This program originated in two advisory programs ~ the American effort418 415 Republic of Vietnam, sometimes called South Vietnam. 4161 ThiThiss reporreport t wawass writtewrittenn inin Januar Januaryy 19719733 — — iti t waw s declassified by the United States' Department of Defense for public perusal on 8 November 2005. 417 J. A. Koch. R-1172-ARPA. The ChieuC H6i Program in South Vietnam, 1963-1971. Santa Monica: RAND Corporation (Jan. 1973): iii. 418 Both Phillips and BohannoBohannon drew on their experience in the Philippine amnesty and resettlement program to the Hukbalahaps. 145 with Rufus Phillips and C. T. R. Bohannan,419 and the British Advisory Mission's Sir Robert Thompson, who successfully lobbied for a Vietnamese defector program at the highest levels of the RVN government.420 During the Ngo Dinh Diem regime, the program was very successful, netting 5,000 enemy 'ralliers'. In 1964, when Diem and his younger brother Ngo Dinh Nhu were assassinated, almost 10,000 enemy personnel had rallied to the Saigon government. Even after thirty months of successful operation, "Chieu Hoi' was an underfunded program — it was understaffed and plagued by internal political strife.421 The program's primary objective of reducing the level of Communist insurgents in the RVN produced a significant side benefit ~ some of the 'Hoi Chanh' chose to joint the 'Kit Carson Scouts'422 and the 'Ruff Puffs'. Others chose to join covert operations423 such as the 'Chien dich Phuong Hoang'.42 These groups provided valuable tactical intelligence to the ARVN and the United States' forces. For the most part, all of these groups remained loyal 419 Bohannan played a prominent role in a CIA-sponsored analysis team dispatched to Colombia during the 1950s. 420 Ibid: v-vi. 421 Ibid: vi. 422 Former Viet Cong and NVA members made up the 'Kit Carson Scouts'. The program was started by a U. S. Marine and later expanded to the Army. The scouts served with U.S. military units — these military 'ralliers' saved many U.S. lives on the battlefield. 423 'Chien dich Phuong Hoang' was a program designed to eliminate via infiltration, capture, terror and assassination, persons supporting the Viet Cong. Designed by the U. S. Central Intelligence Agency, 'Chiin dich Phuong Hoang' used American and South Vietnamese special operations assets. It is otherwise known as the Phoenix Program. 424 Ibid: ix. to the RVN Government. Unfortunately, the 'Hearts and Minds Campaign' was unsuccessful — traditional war fighting techniques eventually came to prominence due to the policies of General William Westmoreland and those in his top-level command structure. Westmoreland's strategy was that of traditional mobile warfare — it used broad brush-stroke techniques such as large-scale air support, artillery barrages, and massed armor incursions. These techniques killed, injured, and damaged the property of the people the Americans supposedly protected - the South Vietnamese villagers. Why did Westmoreland revert to traditional warfare methods in Vietnam? Any form of praetorianism is not foundational to this problem because the United States' military establishment is professional, de-politicized and institutionally subservient to its civilian leadership. As in the COLAR's officer corps, the answer lies in the inherent conservatism of the conventional combat arms stream in the United States' Army. These officers426 find COIN operations very difficult to accept — unconventional warfare flies in the face of centuries of military tradition and 'lessons learned' documents gleaned from multiple conflicts. This gulf is so deep and wide that officers in the conventional combat arms stream tend to treat special operations personnel as 'black sheep' who go against the military grain and are subsequently, not 'real soldiers'. Westmoreland and his command Ibid: vii. Infantry, armor, and artillery. structure refused to recognize the type of war waged in pre-1968 Vietnam — an insurgency that required for victory the widespread use of unconventional war fighting techniques. This strategic myopia undermined any chance of the United States' forces gaining a significant level of local support in their efforts to destabilize the Communist insurgency. These types of officers, in both the United States' Army and the COLAR have caused their establishments to sacrifice strategic and battlefield realities on the altar of traditional military methods — the results in these two wars speak for themselves with the insurgents causing defeat and ongoing problems for their respective opponents. The parallels between the United States' situation in Vietnam and the COLAR's predicament are strikingly similar — they will appear in upcoming sections of this paper. Even after America's Vietnam debacle, Robert Thompson's COIN methods remained intact at the John F. Kennedy Special Forces School and the United States' Army School of the Americas. From the early 1960s onward, the United States' Army included these operational precepts in the doctrinal syllabus taught to selected Latin American military officers under the MATP.427 This syllabus also migrated to the COLAR's Escuela de Lanceros.42* A Among these officers were those from the COLAR. 428 It is important to remember that an earlier version of U. S. COIN doctrine migrated to la Escuela de Lanceros before the institution of the John F. Kennedy Special Warfare School. The earlier doctrine was focused on small-unit, unconventional warfare tactics and did not have the significant political and civil affairs aspects of its later counterpart. 148 keystone of this situation is that courtesy of the MATP, many COLAR officers had the skillsets necessary for the successful prosecution of their own COIN campaign. So why has the COLAR failed to succeed in its mandate to defeat the FARC and the ELN? The answer comes from the concepts previously discussed — a conservative military culture focused on traditional war fighting operations, buttressed by 'I obey but do not comply', 'operation turtle', and the 'army of the poor'. When one examines the COLAR's defeats at Mitu, Puerres, las Delicias, Miraflores, and el Billar, a few striking deficiencies in tactics become apparent. In all of these engagements, the COLAR units had a history of using traditional war fighting techniques in the areas surrounding the battle zones. As mentioned before, these techniques caused damage to the local residents and their property. Consequently, these operations generated significant local animosity towards to Bogota government. By ignoring the COIN training at the United States' Army School of the Americas, the John F. Kennedy Special Warfare School, and la Escuela de Lanceros, the traditionalist members of the COLAR's officer corps transformed the countryside into a hostile territory in which the local residents offered support, and in some cases fought alongside the insurgents. As a result, the COLAR enjoyed very little tactical intelligence about the enemy's areas of operation. Instead of recognizing this situation, these COLAR officers acted like haughty hidalgos-caballeros 149 riding into battle to suppress a group of upstart campesinos.429 The COLAR's traditional warfare methods were grossly ineffective — they undermined local support and changed the confrontations into situations in which the COLAR found itself overwhelmed by a tidal wave of hostile guerrilla combatants, and at best, indifferent local personnel. Certain senior COLAR officers ignored the techniques of aggressive patrolling and local intelligence gathering that are keystones of Thompson's COUNT method. Moreover, they failed to cultivate a local support base by not ensuring the protection and good will of the campesinos.430 This failure caused a loss of government legitimacy in the minds of the campesinos and amplified local support for the insurgents. Although trained in COIN doctrine and ordered to use it by Colombia's civilian leaders, the conservative faction of the COLAR's officer corps followed the 'I obey but do not comply' maxim and used traditional war fighting tactics.431 Simply put, the COLAR's traditional military culture was out of touch with the reality of fighting a successful COIN. Whether mounting an operation to rescue an embattled presidio or prosecuting one of their infrequent offensive incursions, traditional military culture has put the COLAR at a severe disadvantage with respect to the 429 The FARC is primarily a campesino force. 430 This concept is a keystone in the United States' Doctrine of MOOTW. Please see the following: J. M. Shalikashvili. Joint Doctrine for Military Operations other than War - Joint Publication 3-07. Washington: United States' Department of Defense Publications. (16 Jun. 1995): II-4 - II-5. Most senior COLAR officers were traditional combat arms specialists. They viewed special operations and counterinsurgencies as military methods beneath their professional station. 150 insurgents. Without the reliable tactical intelligence offered by a Thompson-like COIN, the COLAR was unable to muster their forces at the right time and in the right place to attain victory. Just like Westmoreland's traditionalism in the Vietnam War, the Colombian officer corps' conservative military culture led to a combined tactical and strategic myopia that resulted in a string of battlefield defeats. To the distress of the COLAR, the old Iberian culture of the hacendado-caballero had trumped Thompson's proven methods of irregular war fighting. As a result of these mindsets and the resultant faulty tactics, the COLAR still controls only the cities, major townships, and proximal metropolitan areas, while the FARC and ELN enjoy a significant dominance of the countryside. CHAPTER 3 - COMPARISONS AND ANALYSES The Political Perspective Viewed from the political perspective, the ruling parties in Bogota have used the COLAR to maintain internal stability by defending against insurrectionist movements, criminal organizations, and political opponents. Prussian-style militarism moved to Colombia in the early twentieth century with a military mission from Chile. Coupled with the fuero decrees, Prussian military attitudes caused the COLAR to become an elitist sub culture of armed and politically active power brokers. When they aligned with the gamonales, caciques, and the local caudillos, elements of the COLAR helped build and maintain some of the patrias chicas.432 These little fatherlands vectored loyalty from the nation-state and reinforced a Weltanschauung of class superiority in the COLAR's officer corps. These professional militarists expected and more often than not, received preferential treatment from the government they nominally served. In some cases, serving or retired military officers formed or supported paramilitary groups, thereby causing a further dilution of loyalty to the state. This military culture came Leftists maintained other patrias chicas, such as the independent peasant republic of Marquetalia in Tolima. This area was under the control of the FARC leader Manual Marulanda. Further examples of patrias chicas are the domains of the narcotraficantes, and certain large-scale latifundia — the huge plantations. 152 to the political forefront during the rise of General Gustavo Rojas Pinilla. During his military dictatorship, Rojas Pinilla fully politicized the COLAR by way of patron-client relationships. In this scheme, Rojas Pinilla gained the support of his brother officers by way of increased military appropriations, pay raises and a reaffirmation of fuero decrees. Nonetheless, in conjunction with a group of civilian elites, an interim military junta eventually deposed Rojas Pinilla. The interim junto offered no resistance to the creation and maintenance of a closed political hegemony called the Frente Nacional. The Frente Nacional tried to guarantee its continuance by granting the COLAR powers to govern by martial edict433 any of Colombia's departments it deemed to be insurgent strongholds. Irrespective of these incentives, some senior military officers chose to criticize the government and its chief executive in Colombia's media. Several times in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries, the President of Colombia had to resort to coercive actions when dealing with insolent military officers. From the late 1940s onward, the COLAR sent some of the best of its junior and mid-grade officers to train in the United States. Some officers trained at the United States' Army School of the Americas, while others received training at the United States' Army War College in Carlisle, Pennsylvania and National Defense University in Washington, D. C. The doctrines taught in these ' These areas would be under a regime of exception, sometimes called a state of siege. Under this situation, residents in these areas would not enjoy the protections and civil rights afforded by the Colombian Constitution. institutions downplayed militarismo and strenuously emphasized the concepts of civilian governmental supremacy over the military.434 The United States' Army trained these individuals in the precepts of civilian government paramountcy as described in the publication "FM 22-100, Army Leadership". The COLAR has produced its own junior officers' manual that contains many of the same concepts as "FM 22-100, Army Leadership". This manual entitled "Manual Basico de Liderzago -EJC 3-1" is available on the Ejercito Nacional web site, in redacted form.435 This manual deals with the facets of professional military leadership, such as values, ethics and commander-subordinate relations. For those who read Spanish, it provides a very good insight into the striking parallelisms between the doctrine of professional officership in the COLAR and the United States' Army. In addition, the COLAR has offered for perusal a manual entitled "Manual de Etica y Honor para las Fuerzas Militares, Primera Edicion - FF - MM 3.22",436 that also deals with honor, duty and the subordination of the military to Colombia's civilian leaders. Although the publicly available edition is in redacted form, it does provide the Spanish 434 Please see this paper's section concerning Samuel P. Huntington. "" Anonymous. Manual Basico de Liderzago - EJC 3-1. Bogota: Fuerzas Militares de Colombia - Ejercito Nacional. (Undated). Downloaded from internet. (5 Jun. 2009). 6 C. A. Ospina Ovalle and R. R. Rubianogroot. Manual de Etica y Honor para las Fuerzas Militares, Primera Edicion - FF - MM 3.22. Bogota: Republica de Colombia, Comando General de las Fuerzas Militares. (14 Oct. 2005). Downloaded from internet. (8 May 2009). CMR. Flag rank officers such as Generals Tapias Stahelin, Mora Rangel, and Ospina Ovalle vigorously supported civilismo and indoctrinated subordinate officers in this philosophy. In the course of operational modernization and audits of officer and unit performance, these generals forcibly removed many underperforming and non-compliant officers. Regrettably, this process is far from complete, with the current Colombian President Alvaro Uribe removing from command several senior military officers. Although the 1991 Constitution forbade the use of military courts to try civilian criminal defendants, the martial culture revolving around the fuero decrees is still a pervasive and powerful force in Colombia. Fernando La Rotta, a noted consultant to the COLAR, commented on the status of the fuero militar. "The fuero militar concept437 has never been removed from the Colombian legislation. It is the key element in our Military Criminal Law (Justicia Penal Militar) that grants members of the military and police forces a special treatment for the judgment of activities related to [their] service. The fuero militar [concept] was applied with practically no limitations until 1991 when Colombia issued a new [and] modern Constitution replacing the long-standing 1886 Constitution. In it, the fuero militar was subject to a new regulation based on civil rights considerations that eliminated the judgment of common citizens by the Justicia Penal Militar",438 437 The emphasis is supplied by the author of this paper. 438 F. La Rotta. Personal communication via e-mail. (9 Feb. 2009). The Mitigation of the Traditional Fuero Mihtar In Article 221 of Colombia's 1991 Constitution,439 the only privilege granted to uniformed members of the COLAR and National Police is a trial before their peers for crimes directly related to their active service.440 Moreover, Article 250 states that the Fiscalia General is responsible for the investigation and prosecution of all crimes except those related to the active-duty service of the security services.441 These crimes are subject to the terms of Justicia Penal Militar. Civilians are not subject to prosecution under the terms of the Justicia Penal Militar. This legal position gives a clear demarcation line between crimes committed by members of the state's uniformed security forces and ordinary crimes committed by civilians. In the strict doctrinal sense, the pervasive privileges afforded by the traditional fuero militar are gone. The Justicia Penal Militar website provides some insights into Colombia military privilege and the doctrinal roots of Colombian military law. A condensed paraphrase of these concepts follows: 439 Anonymous. "Political Constitution of 1991 through 2005 Reforms". Republica de Colombia (Nov. 2008) Articulo 221. Downloaded from internet. (18 May 2009). If the Procurador charges members of the security forces with human rights violations, the Justicia Penal Militar revokes a military suspect's privilege of a trial before their military peers. 156 "This set of codes is derived from ancient Spanish roots, originating in the Legions of Rome. King Carlos III, in a royal decree issued on 9 February 1793, established in the domestic and overseas armies of Spain, military courts for the prosecution of crimes by military personnel. Later, the Military Penal Code was enacted in 1813 and set penalties for the military crime of desertion. In 1842, Act Number 2 was promulgated — it restricted the makeup of war councils and [set the] jurisdiction for agencies responsible for military criminal prosecutions. Following this, the second head of the Supreme Court of Bogota, Cauca, and Magdalena created the Military Penal Code of the United States of Colombia, which was composed of the laws of the Republic of New Granada in 1859, and of Act Number 35 of 1881, covering the security forces and military courts... Our Constitution of 1886 enshrined the military in Article 17, [it included] the army, navy and air, (excluding police personnel), could take advocate shelter in this law, and be treated under its discipline when acting as a uniformed force during disruptions of public order, and [undertaking] the restoration of peace and quiet in regions affected by violence. In 1954, Decree 1426 afforded the police more special privileges stating the military criminal justice system will apply to crimes committed by members of the police forces on active duty. The Military Penal Code of 1905 merged the term 'military' with 'police', and the police were granted Fuero Decrees 1667 of 1966, 2247 of 1971, Law 2 of 1977 and Decree Law 2137of 1983. The Constitution of 1991442 prohibited the investigation and trial of civilians by military justice, in the state of internal unrest, in peacetime or war, whether declared or not".443 441 Anonymous. "Political Constitution of 1991 through 2005 Reforms". Republica de Colombia (Nov. 2008) Articulo 250. Downloaded from internet. (18 May 2009). 442 This is stated in Article 213 of the 1991 Constitution. Anonymous. "Political Constitution of 1991 through 2005 Reforms". Republica de Colombia. (Nov. 2008). Articulo 213. Downloaded from internet. (18 May 2009). Downloaded from internet. (27 Apr 2009). 443 Anonymous. "Resefia Historica". Justicia Militar Penal Republica de Colombia. (26 Jul. 2005). Downloaded from internet. (18 May 2009). This web page does show reference to specific fueros granted via executive decree to the COLAR and National Police. These privileges apply to uniformed service members who commit crimes in the pursuit of their normal service duties444 - they do not afford the pervasive immunities provided by the original Spanish/kero de guerra militar. Nonetheless, the fuero decrees mentioned above do reinforce the cultural construct of impunity inherited from the days of la Conquista. Although significant progress has occurred in the indoctrination of the Huntingtonian concept of objective civilian control into Colombia's officer corps, certain members still adhere to the cultural notions of the traditional Iberian fuero de guerra militar, militar ismo, and the 'politics of anti-polities'. I 444 The current Justicia Penal Militar Act 522 of 1999 states: "members of the Fuerzas Armadas when on active duty, or [when in the course of] other service-related [tasks]... when they commit crimes referred to in this Code, may be tried by judges and courts established by this Code and institutions prior to the commission of the offense. Therefore, members of the military must be judged by their peers... The Justicia Penal Militar applies only to offenses that are related with the [military] service acts themselves... otherwise the [ordinary] courts will be competent". The Act specifically "exempts from as service-related the crimes of torture, genocide and enforced disappearance, as understood in the terms defined in conventions and international treaties ratified by Colombia". (Judgment 878-00). El Congreso de Colombia. "Ley 522 de 1999". Gobierno de la Republica de Colombia. (1999) Downloaded from internet. (3 May 2009). 445 The Spanish fuero de guerra militar ensured military officers (and to a lesser extent the enlisted men) freedom from paying certain taxes and immunity from prosecution in either the ecclesiastical or civilian courts. All legal actions involving a member of the Spanish military were held in military courts, with military judges, lawyers and jury members. Even mundane issues such as debt payment were moved to these venues, where military members could expect much more favorable outcomes than those normally associated with other court systems. This is one of the keystone features of a society in which the privileged estates are 'above the law' that deals with ordinary citizens. 158 assert this situation is at the nexus of Colombian military politicization and is one of the contributing factors in the COLAR's failure to end the insurgency. Answers to Research Questions and Conclusions This paper has shown that the COLAR's officer corps has maintained a highly conservative stance on war fighting tactics and strategy. In this stance, certain senior officers have steadfastly refused to employ Sir Robert Thompson's COIN methods, even though they have received instruction on these precepts at the United States' Army School of the Americas, other American military institutions and the COLAR's Escuela de Lanceros. Moreover, they have refused to use these principles even when ordered to do so by their civilian leaders. By ignoring Thompson's COIN precepts, these officers have effectively turned the rural areas of Colombia into hostile territory — this situation has resulted in a dearth of reliable intelligence on the insurgents' operational details and their whereabouts. With this intelligence shortfall, the COLAR was ill prepared to counteract the FARC's change of strategy from a pure Viet Cong-like insurgency to that of hybrid mobile warfare in the latter 1990s. Some of the COLAR's senior officers maintained and to some extent, still maintain a fixation on traditional warfare precepts. This fixation resides within the cultural nexus of the Ibero-American hidalgo-caballero. Traditional warfare died out in Latin America's independence struggles — it has no place in the fight against a modern, pragmatic insurgency. Senior COLAR officers must discard old and embrace new war fighting concepts on a continuing basis — if they intend to succeed, their prosecution of the COIN must be as flexible and adaptable as the tactics of their enemies. Throughout the twentieth and twenty-first centuries, the COLAR has acted in a direct, political fashion to support the party in power or sometimes in an insolent fashion with respect to civilian government oversight of the military. The rise to power of General Gustavo Rojas Pinilla was Colombia's textbook example of praetorianism in which the military usurped control of civilian governance.446 Examples such as Generals Alberto Ruiz Novoa and Guillermo Pinzon Caicedo demonstrated friction between Colombian flag rank officers and their civilian leaders. These generals and their supporters openly entered the political sphere, criticized the President and his administration in the media, and in some cases, refused to comply with civilian government directives. A more ominous set of military politicizations occurred in Colombia's history. Significant examples were that of Colonel Diogenes Gil's golpe attempt during the Lopez Pumarejo administration and a Policia Militar plot to assassinate President Lleras Camargo. Another example was that of ANAPO and its insurgent spinoff group, the M-19. Although it enjoyed popular support, a faction of COLAR personnel underpinned ANAPO. Some of these officers, along with dissident members of the FARC and the Colombian Communist Party, left ANAPO after its 1970 election defeat to organize the M-19. Another example of Colombian military problems cited in this paper was that of active duty or The case of Rojas Pinilla is the most widely recognized example of this scenario. Oddly, many commentators seem to ignore the rise and fall of President-General Rafael Reyes Prieto in the early 1900s. 160 retired military members cooperating with or being members of paramilitary groups. These private armies allied themselves with local caudillos, gamonales, hacendados, and in some cases narcotraficantes to form various flavors of patrias chicas. All of these small fatherlands drew loyalty and legitimacy away from the state and were political entities that attempted to be the exclusive agent of coercive force within their claimed boundaries. In some instances, the military underpinnings of the patrias chicas cooperated with the Bogota government and in other cases, they engaged in combat against the state. Moreover, when the Colombian civilian leadership attempted a rapprochement with the insurrectionists, the COLAR simply responded with paramilitary rogue operations against the insurgents and their former comrades who attempted to reintegrate into civil society. Before the reforms of Generals Tapias Stahelin, Mora Rangel, and Ospina Ovalle, the COLAR was highly active in the political sphere; it generally offered support to the civilian government only when its corporate demands were met. This soft form of praetorianism is in alignment Brian Loveman's concept of the 'politics of anti-polities'. During the golpe of General Gustavo Rojas Pinilla, the COLAR coalesced into hard praetorianism - it usurped the power of governance from the civilian sector and instituted a military dictatorship. In short, the Colombian military seldom offered unconditional support to the government of the day ~ this support was leased to the political entity offering the highest bid. Arguably, the COLAR's relationship to the civilian government has been at best, a quid pro quo, and at worst an outright struggle to usurp power. 161 The civilismo doctrine of Generals Tapias Stahelin, Mora Rangel, and Ospina Ovalle significantly coalesced during the Pastrana Arango and Uribe Velez presidential terms. During these administrations, Colombia's civilian leadership was intolerant of military commanders' insolence — it removed many offending officers from office and forcibly retired them from service. Under Tapias Stahelin's direction, the COLAR adopted the United States' Army publication "FM 22-100, Army Leadership" during the Pastrana Arango administration. The COLAR now employs the concepts in "FM 22-100" as one of the keystones in its doctrine of professional officership. "FM 22-100" set out the relationship between the civilian government and the military chain of command: "Especially important for the army are those provisions in the Constitution that place fundamental military authority in Congress and the President. As part of that authority, Congress has the power to 'provide for the common defense', which includes the power to 'raise and support armies', and the President is the commander in chief of the armed forces. So the Constitution establishes the critical principle that.. .military leaders are subordinate to the nation's civilian authorities".447 This set of precepts was core to General Tapias Stahelin's doctrine of civilismo — his goal was the transformation of an establishment that focused on Prussian-style E. K. Shinseki. Army Leadership - Field Manual 22-100. Washington: United States' Army Publications. (1999): Appendix F-l. militarism to that of a national institution dedicated to military professionalism. Tapias Stahelin's move from the tradition of militarismo was a significant change in Colombian civil military relations. By early 1999, General Tapias Stahelin and Major General Mora Rangel's changes were so widespread that many non-compliant officers were relieved of command449 ~ this situation marked the beginning of a new COLAR based on professionalism and civilismo. When the civilismo doctrine of General Tapias became the hub of the COLAR's doctrine, its CMR began a gradual move towards the Huntingtonian objective control dictum espoused by the United States. The close relationship between President Uribe Velez and his reformist generals has set the foundation for the paramountcy of the civilian government over the COLAR. Although this change is fundamentally incomplete, the situation bodes well for Colombia ~ its citizenry now sees the COLAR as their servants and protectors. Prior to the Uribe Velez administration, a significant number of Colombians saw the COLAR in a negative light. This perspective appeared in an El Tiempo poll of 31 August 1997.450 An example of the increased legitimacy of the COLAR appeared in an El B. Loveman and T. M. Davies eds. The Politics of Anti-Politics - The Military in Latin America. Wilmington: Scholarly Resources. (1997): 32. 449 T. Marks. "Colombian Army Adaptation to FARC Insurgency". United States' Army War College Strategic Studies Institute Publications. (Jan. 2002): 12-13. J. G. Cristy. "Colombia: A Risk-Prone Democracy". United States' Navy Postgraduate School Publications. (Dec. 1998): 47. 163 Tiempo poll of 17 January 2004. In this poll, the COLAR scored an eighty percent favorability ranking from the Colombian public, which was slightly ahead of the Roman Catholic Church's seventy-five percent ranking.451 The COLAR was the most favorably ranked Colombian institution in this poll. Before 1999, the COLAR's operations were primarily defensive and reactive in nature, forcing the troops into combat at places and times chosen by their opponents. This posture reduced overall combat effectiveness because of the COLAR's inability to muster combat reserves and other support mechanisms in a timely fashion. In short, the COLAR waged war on the terms of the insurrectionists. In 1999, the fortunes of the COLAR markedly improved due to a change in leadership, tactics, and strategy. This change moved toward aggressive military patrolling tasked to a five thousand-man rapid deployment force. In the first six months of 2000, this change bore fruit — the rapid deployment force undertook eighteen hundred-eight counter-insurgency raids, killing five hundred-four insurgents. Moreover, in September 2000, the Colombian 13th Brigade launched 'Operation Annihilator II' in which it cleared the FARC from the Sumapaz area. This overall scenario 451 W. F. Perez. "An Effective Strategy for Colombia: A Potential end to the Current Crisis". United States' Army War College Publications. (3 May 2004): 18. 164 compares favorably to the eight hundred fifty-five combat actions with three hundred sixty- four insurgents killed in action during 1999.452 The COLAR Re-Aligns for Success After the battlefield defeats of the 1990s, Generals Tapias Stahelin, Mora Rangel and Ospina Ovalle undertook a revolution in Colombian military affairs. General Tapias Stahelin's changes focused on mobility, rapid reaction, improved use of air power, intelligence, cooperation with and protection of the civilian populace in the support of the government's political goals.453 The. presidio mindset and orders of battle supported by the traditionally grounded members of the COLAR's officer corps were scrapped in favor of a COIN strategy based upon Sir Robert Thompson's techniques. As mentioned previously in this paper, senior officers were ordered to commit their units to battle ready status — those who failed in this commitment were sacked. Coupled with the methods found in the United States' Joint Doctrine for Military Operations other than War - Joint Publication 3-07, A. Rabasa and P. Chalk. Colombian Labyrinth: The Synergy of Drugs and Insurgency and Its Implication for Regional Stability. Santa Monica: RAND Corporation. (2001): 43-44. Ibid: 101-102. and the methods in the taught in the Escuela de Lanceros, 4 the COLAR has re-aligned its force deployment, strategy and doctrine into a matrix that is ready, and more importantly, willing to engage and defeat the insurgents. The nexus of this revolution in military affairs revolves around the concept of 'jointness'.4 In all joint operations, the regional commander has at his disposal the assets of all Colombia's Fuerzas Armadas.456 Any asset can be brought to bear in a combat situation requiring support. In this doctrine of command, the needs of the combatant personnel completely out weigh the operational differences of the branches of the Fuerzas Armadas. In addition to this doctrinal change, the COLAR has expanded its ranks, and has realigned it strategy and tactics into a matrix that emphasizes operational flexibility, enhanced command, control and communications capabilities, and most importantly, a 454 For a summary view of the COLAR' counterinsurgency doctrine, please see the following link (redacted): Anonymous. Subversion y Contrasubversion. Bogota: Ejercito Nacional, Republica de Colombia, Ministerio de Defensa. (Undated). Downloaded from internet. (IMay 2009). 455 'Jointness' is a word coined by the United States' Department of Defense. Although not in the accepted lexicon of English usage, this word denotes the unity of command of all service branches in a particular operational area. In the Unites States' war in Afghanistan, all of its armed services are under the command of a single field grade officer. This arrangement mitigates the chances of inter-service command miscommunication -- it makes top-level decision making more streamlined and responsive to the exigencies of the battlefield. Armed Forces. 166 focus on the rational decision-making capabilities of highly trained and professional officers. In short, the demands of the 'combatant boots on the ground' have attained primacy in the COLAR's doctrine of war fighting. Force Reallocation Colonel G. G. Restrepo recognized the faulty force allocations of the COLAR's traditionalist command structure. As career officer in the COLAR, Restrepo noted that the old methods of presidio oriented, defensive tactics caused his organization's humiliating defeats in the latter half of the 1990s. These tactics hamstrung the COLAR's ability to deploy its forces in a timely fashion to counteract the FARC's strategy of 'hybrid warfare'. Led by Major General J. E. Mora Rangel, the COLAR's high command based their analyses upon the Prussian method of 'Kritik'451 — in this method, internal debate proved faulty the strategy and tactics of the traditionalists in the officer corps. On 22 December 1999, via Disposition Number 000011, Mora Rangel issued orders for the restructuring and 457 Restrepo calls 'Kritik' a process of self-criticism and mission analysis. This method is the foundation of the United States' Army 'Center for Army Lessons learned'. For Restrepo's comments on this issue, please see: G. G. Restrepo. "Transforming the Colombian Army During the War on Terrorism". United States' Army War College Publications. (15 Mar. 2006): 4. For details on the United States' Army 'Center for Army Lessons Learned' please see: Anonymous. "Center for Army Lessons Learned". United States' Army Combined Arms Center. (Undated). Accessed via internet. (18 Apr. 2009). Conversion of Regular Soldiers to Professional Soldiers In the COLAR, regular soldiers are conscripted for a maximum of one and one-half years. Soldados bachilleres460 are required to provide only one year of active duty service, while being legally guaranteed freedom from combat duty. As the reader will see later in this paper,461 most of Colombia's non-graduate, regular soldiers are barely literate — this situation prevents them from absorbing and understanding the complex notions inherent in the modern profession of arms. The one and one-half year term of service is of insufficient length to teach these persons the skills of literacy and the techniques necessary for them to be effective soldiers serving in Colombia's COIN. It must be re-emphasized that COIN is very different from the prosecution of traditional maneuver warfare — counterinsurgencies " Anonymous. "Resena Historica". Escuela de Formation Soldados Profesionales Ejercito National, Republica de Colombia, Ministerio de Defensa. (Undated). Downloaded from internet. (23 May 2009). 459 Restrepo provides a succinct description of Mora Rangel's modifications to the COLAR. Please see: G. G. Restrepo. "Transforming the Colombian Army During the War on Terrorism". United States' Army War College Publications. (15 Mar. 2006). 460 Soldados bachilleres are high school graduate soldiers. 461 Please see this paper's upcoming section entitled Commentator's Approaches Revisited for a possible failure scenario associated with these soldiers. 168 require their combatants to be more than mobile, animated weapons platforms. COIN is a thinking person's war, and this situation requires extensive training. In order to fill its combat manpower requirements, along with supplying the proper quality of soldiers, the COLAR embarked on a process to convert regular soldiers into professional soldiers. In this program, the COLAR offered inducements to regular soldiers to entice them into the ranks of professional soldiers.462 Among these inducements were pay increases, career development plans that included training programs guaranteeing promotion upon successful completion, enhanced medical care, and increased annual leave.463 J. E. Mora Rangel's Disposition Number 000011 mandated the creation of la Escuela de Formation Soldados Profesionales 4 and the conversion of regular soldiers into professional soldiers. On 1 February 2000, this institution became active and shortly thereafter started its first class of candidates.465 When a regular soldier accepts466 the 462 This included the soldados bachilleres. 463 For details on these inducements and the soldier conversion program, please see: G. G. Restrepo. "Transforming the Colombian Army During the War on Terrorism". United States' Army War College Publications. (15 Mar. 2006): 5-7. 464 The Training School for Professional Soldiers. 465 Anonymous. "Resefia Historica". Escuela de Formacion Soldados Profesionales Ejercito Nacional, Republica de Colombia, Ministerio de Defensa. (Undated). Downloaded from internet. (23 May 2009). Profesionales and then embarks on a regimen of basic training. Upon graduation, the candidate progresses to various military operational specialty schools.4 7 Upon graduation from these schools, the 'newly minted' professional soldier then joins an active duty unit that may see combat duties. The Autodefensas Re-Engineered- The 'Town Soldiers' As mentioned previously in this paper, the COLAR created, armed, and supplied the Autodefensas in order to consolidate and secure areas wrested from the control of the insurgents. The major problem with this program was that the Autodefensas were not explicitly under the command and control of the COLAR's officer corps. In, effect, the COLAR left the Autodefensas to operate in their domains with a free rein — they were only subject to the civilian code of justice. Therein lies the problem ~ the military justice code mandates mission success, soldierly behavior, and obedience to superior orders, while such The regular soldier must meet the entry requirements for la Escuela de Formation Soldados Profesionales, but the entry adjudicators afford special dispensation on the educational and literacy requirements normally levied on civilian candidates. Those regular soldier candidates found deficient in these areas are offered intensive, remedial training in basic literacy and other educational skills. To view the direct-entry requirements for la Escuela de Formation Soldados Profesionales, please see the following link: Anonymous. "Requisites". Escuela de Formation Soldados Profesionales Ejercito National, Republica de Colombia, Ministerio de Defensa. (Undated). Downloaded from internet. (23 May 2009). Over time, the narcotraficantes corrupted the Autodefensas, and these organizations began to work at cross-purposes to the goals of the civilian government. The Autodefensas became the coercive organs of the patrias chicas and their caudillos — they committed heinous crimes in the name of national security while, in reality working in the furtherance of their own criminal agendas. The corruption of the Autodefensas also touched the COLAR, as shown in other sections of this paper. Responding to this situation, the Bogota government and certain senior members of the COLAR's officer corps generated a new concept for the consolidation of rural areas — the 'Town Soldier468 Program'. Started in January 2003, under the auspices of 'Plan Colombia', this program has grown to protect a large portion of the Colombian countryside.469 Colonel William Perez of the COLAR stated that by 2004, the 'Town Soldiers Program' had penetrated forty-two percent of rural 467 These military operational specialties are infantry, armor, artillery, logistics, and intelligence, to name a few. Links to these schools can be found at the following website: Anonymous. "Centro de Educacion Militar - Jetafura de Educacion y Doctrina". Ejercito Nacional, Republica de Colombia, Ministerio de Defensa. (Undated). Downloaded from internet. (23 May 2009). 468 Soldado de mi pueblo. E. Fichtl. "Araucan Nightmare: Life and Death in Tame." Colombia Journal. (1 Aug. 2003). Downloaded from internet. (27 May 2009). The 'town soldier' program employs regular soldiers471 whose mandate is to supply armed security services to their hometowns and surrounding areas during their terms of conscription. The town soldiers deploy in a standard hierarchy with respect to the COLAR's normal order of battle. They form in squads, platoons, companies, regiments and so on. Officers from the professional ranks command all units, and all non-commissioned officers are also professional soldiers. The beauty of the town soldier program is that it employs previously de-motivated draftees in the defense of their hometowns — this situation gives them an incentive in having a motivated and pugnacious attitude towards • • • >• • 472 47"? their military service. 470 W. F. Perez. "An Effective Strategy for Colombia: A Potential End to the Current Crisis". United States' Army War College Publications. (3 May 2004): 6. 471 Regular soldiers in the Colombian lexicon are draftees, while professional soldiers are volunteers. 472 S. N. Kalyvas. The Logic of Violence in Civil War. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (2006): 215. 473 A. Uribe Velez. "Palabras del Presidente Uribe en Foro de la Revista Poder". Casa de Narino, Presidencia de la Republica de Colombia. (2 Aug. 2006): Downloaded from internet. (27 May 2009). The town soldier program presents some very important advantages when compared to the earlier Autodefensas program. The first advantage is that of compliance to the law. As all town soldiers are members of the COLAR, they are subject to the Justicia Penal Militar, the investigations of the Office of the Inspector General, and the punishments meted out by military courts martial. The second advantage is that of command, control and communication capabilities. As members of the COLAR, they are under the direct command of professional soldiers — the non-commissioned and commissioned officers. Orders from the high command of the COLAR can be transmitted rapidly to the town soldier garrisons, and more importantly can be verified as received and understood. The third advantage is supply and training. All town soldiers receive training that is of longer duration and higher intensity than that of ordinary draftees, making them more proficient at the military craft than their counterparts. The fourth advantage is that of local knowledge — town soldiers are familiar with the local terrain, population, and potential sources of criminal and insurgent activity. These soldiers have the ability to supply valuable HUMINT474 to the COLAR's command structure, with the potential to mitigate and sometimes nullify insurgent operations. The fifth advantage is that of legitimacy — town soldiers show the campesinos, llaneros and other rural residents that governmental Human intelligence. protection is present in the countryside, and that the uniformed soldier represents an enhancement to personal security.475 Tapias Stahelin's and Mora Rangel's military reforms have netted some hallmark successes — such as the rescue of Ingrid Betancourt, a group of captured Colombian security personnel, and three kidnapped American military contractors.476 477 This highly successful operation, codenamed 'Jaque' demonstrated the maturation of the COLAR's joint operations doctrine. In this bold rescue, the COLAR used information from 475 Portions of the Colombian media are hailing the soldados de mi pueblo as unsung heroes in the fight against the insurgents. This is one such article: H. Ardila Duran. "Heroes de guerra". Poder 360". (11 Aug. 2007). Downloaded from internet. (14 Jun. 2009). 476 Those freed in Operation Checkmate are Ingrid Betancourt, Keith Stansell, Thomas Howen, Mark Gonsalves, Lieutenant Juan Carlos Bermeo (ARMY), Sub-Lieutenant Raimundo Malagon (ARMY), Second Sergeant Jose Ricardo Marulanda (ARMY), First Corporal William Perez (ARMY), Second Sergeant Erasmo Romero (ARMY), First Corporal Jose Miguel Arteaga (ARMY), First Corporal Armando Florez (ARMY), First Corporal Julio Buitrago (POLICE), Sub-Lieutenant Armando Castellanos (POLICE), Lieutenant Vianey Rodriguez (POLICE), and First Corporal John Jairo Duran (POLICE). Please see the following website for a press release concerning this operation (in Spanish): Anonymous. "Operation Jaque". Ejercito Nacional, Republica de Colombia, Ministerio de Defensa. Downloaded from internet. (2 Jul. 2008). Downloaded from internet. (6 Apr. 2009). 477 A. de Souza-Pinheiro. "Narco Terrorism in Latin America - A Brazilian Perspective". United States' Department of Defense Joint Special Operations University Publications. (Apr. 2006): 28. The FARC captured Betancourt in 2002. The FARC captured American contractors, Tom Howes, Marc Gonsalves, and Keith Stansell in 2003. Checkmate. SIGINT479 sources to find the location of the FARC hostages. With further use of SIGINT and HUMINT information, the COLAR fooled the kidnappers into thinking that the government operatives talking to them on the radio were FARC members. Repainting a COLAR MI-8 helicopter480 into civilian medical markings, government operatives arranged an evacuation mission to a location arranged with the kidnappers. The meeting succeeded, with the captives and a few FARC guards boarding the helicopter. The medical personnel on the helicopter were in reality police officers and COLAR soldiers from the Rapid Deployment Force. At an opportune moment, the officers and soldiers overpowered the FARC personnel, allowing the captives' return to safety. This operation demonstrated the COLAR's re-invigorated use of military intelligence, special operations personnel, joint operations techniques, and the art of battlefield deception.481 This type of flexible and pragmatic operational approach bodes well for the COLAR in its ongoing fight against the insurgents. 479 SIGINT is an acronym for signals intelligence. Military intelligence is comprised of SIGINT, HUMINT — human intelligence and IMGINT — image intelligence. 480 Among other types in its fleet, the COLAR uses Russian-built MI-8 helicopters for troop carriage and general cargo lift operations. 481 Anonymous. "Operacion Jaque". Ejercito National, Republica de Colombia, Ministerio de Defensa. Downloaded from internet. (2 Jul. 2008). Downloaded from internet. (6 Apr. 2009). operations. The United States' Army invented 'vertical encirclement' during the Vietnam War. The 11th Air Assault Division's mandate was the use helicopters for troop and arms transport to distant and poorly accessible battlefields. This tactic was designed to gain the combat advantage over enemy forces via deception and surprise. When the 11th Air Assault Division took the colors of the 1st Cavalry Division, the 'vertical encirclement' doctrine483 first showed its value in the 1st Battalion, 7th U. S. Cavalry Regiment's landmark battle against an NVA regiment at LZ484 X-Ray and LZ Albany in the la Drang Valley.485 Reading from this playbook, in 2008 the COLAR executed a joint fixed-wing, helicopter and land assault on a FARC encampment that resided across the Putumayo River, one mile inside Ecuador. The assault was a success and COLAR killed sixteen FARC combatants, one of whom was Raul Reyes — the FARC's second in command. In addition, the 482 Vertical encirclement is a phrase coined by the United States' Army Combat Developments Group in the early 1960s. It denotes the use of helicopter-borne infantry and helicopter gunships to encircle the enemy before these assets actually touch the ground. This tactic became standard operating procedure with the 1st Cavalry and 101st Airborne Divisions in the Vietnam War. 483 The use of helicopters in United States' Army combat operations was a product of the Howze Board. General H. H. Howze was a noted proponent of the U. S. Army's use of armed helicopters in battlefield operations. For more details on the Howze Board of 1962, please see the following publication: J. A. Stockfisch. The 1962 Howze Board and Army Combat Developments. RAND: Santa Monica (1994). 484 LZ is a U. S. Army acronym for landing zone. 485 These battles occurred in the Vietnam War. The LZ X-Ray encounter started on 14 November 1965, and the LZ Albany fight started on 17 November 1965. For participants' accounts and official after-action reports of these battles, please see the following link: H. G. Moore and J. Galloway. "LZ X-Ray". (Undated). Downloaded from internet. (22 Apr. 2009). Ecuadorian and Venezuelan governments. The files uncovered these facts: "Files alleged to have been stored in the computers were released... Monday. The files include information on a $300-million payment [Hugo] Chavez allegedly made to the FARC and a promise from FARC leader Manuel Marulanda to help defend Venezuela in the event of American aggression, police commander Gen. Oscar Naranjo said at a news conference. On Sunday, Colombia said Reyes' computer files indicated that Ecuador accommodates the presence of the rebels by stationing 'non-hostile' police and army units in the zone where they camp. Files also documented meetings between Ecuadorean Interior Minister Gustavo Larrea and Reyes, the Colombians charged."487 In recent months, the insurrectionists' organizations have weakened, and the FARC has suffered internecine power struggles and assassinations since the death of its long-time leader, Manuel Marulanda Velez. 89 Irrespective of the good news emanating from the Uribe administration, the FARC and ELN are still operational in the countryside and are far 486 C. Kraul. "Border Incursion was a Colombian Gamble". Los Angeles Times (4 Mar. 2008). Downloaded from internet. (28 Apr. 2009). 487 Ibid. 488 D. Porch. "Uribe's Second Mandate, the War, and the Implications for Civil-Military Relations in Colombia". Strategic Insights. Vol. V. Iss. 2. (Feb. 2006): 4. Manuel Marulanda Velez was the nom de guerre of Pedro Antonio Marin Marin. He died of a heart attack on 26 March 2008. 177 from final defeat by the COLAR. In an interview with the Miami Herald, General F. Padilla, commander of the COLAR noted that the FARC is reorganizing its command structure and reinvigorating its combat capabilities. Learning from the United States' problems in Afghanistan and Iraq, the FARC, in 'Plan Rebirth' is concentrating on troop retention and re-vectoring its efforts from head-to-head combat to long-range sniping, mines, and improvised explosive devices. Alfonso Cano,490 the new leader of the FARC is the driving force behind 'Plan Rebirth' and that organization's new suite of combat tactics.491 Any expectations of an easy victory over the FARC are not in alignment with the realties of that organization's irregular war fighting expertise and the continued financial support offered by its criminal enterprises, such as the illegal narcotics and weapons trades. As previously shown, in the twentieth century the FARC inflicted hallmark defeats on the COLAR. Moreover, the presidio mentality, and the 'I obey but do not comply' and 'operation turtle' tactics are still practiced by certain members of the COLAR's officer corps. Many of the older, senior COLAR officers still follow the culture of militarismo and grudgingly refuse to follow Robert Thompson's COIN doctrines as taught by the United States' Army School of the Americas, the John F. Kennedy Special Warfare School, and Alfonso Cano is the nom de guerre of Guillermo Leon Saenz. 491 S. Brodzinsky. "Colombia's FARC Rebels Work on Rebirth Plan". Miami Herald. (27 May 2009): 1. Downloaded from internet. (27 May 2009). Traditional Ibero-American military culture is still a significant factor in the COLAR — the doctrines of civilismo and COIN492 are still are not paramount in the operational mindset of several members of the COLAR's officer corps. This situation is a significant contributory factor in the COLAR's failure to quell the insurrection. Commentators' Approaches Revisited In retrospect, the learned commentators' approaches presented earlier in this paper retain their validity when one analyzes the causes of the long-term survival of the Colombian insurrection. The tentacles of the narcotraficantes have reached into all This refers to the COIN doctrine as taught by the United States' Army, la Escuela de Lanceros, la Escuela Militar de Cadetes General Jose Maria Cordova and la Escuela Superior de Guerra. 179 segments of Colombian society. This paper cannot ignore the corrupting influences of the illegal drug trade — they have caused the government as a whole and more specifically the COLAR to fail in their objective of protecting Colombia's citizens. The attraction of 'narco-cash' has caused the compromise and failure of many COLAR operations. Lack of military materiel and resources were important factors before the aid programs of U. S. President G. W. Bush. During his administration, Colombia enjoyed and now continues to enjoy massive amounts of U. S. aid in the areas of military materiel and training. This paper asserts the COLAR no longer suffers shortages of military resources and hence, these issues are no longer factors in its failure to defeat the guerrillas. Lack of competent combat manpower in the COLAR is a different story — this is truly an internal Colombian issue that I attribute to the ley bachilleres. This law, as previously mentioned, guarantees Colombian conscripts with high school diplomas immunity from serving in combat operations. Not only does the ley bachilleres reduce the quantity of troops available for combat duties, but also negatively affects the quality of these troops. Counterinsurgency operations are skill-intensive — they require highly trained, motivated, and literate operational staff. Simply navigating one's way in and out of the remote areas of Colombia's countryside requires acumen, advanced map reading and orienteering skills. These skills are not easy to learn — they require intensive training well beyond that offered to the average Colombian conscript. Most Colombian conscripts without a high school diploma are barely literate — they exhibit severe difficulties in reading and comprehending even the simplest of military field manuals. The chances are quite slim for these personnel to understand the advanced concepts of COIN, such as politico-military doctrine, CMR, and technical skills such as satellite communications, global positioning systems, radio triangulation, and orienteering. Officers and non-commissioned officers are proficient in these techniques, but during the exigencies of combat may not be available to provide support in these critical areas. A good example of this situation would be a battle in which COLAR troops are helicopter-lifted into action against a FARC front. During the course of battle, the officers and non-commissioned officers could be killed or incapacitated. In this scenario, the conscripts must fend for themselves by requesting emergency helicopter support for cover fire, resupply, reinforcement, and casualty evacuation. The critical problem in this scenario revolves around the fact the conscripts are unable to locate themselves on a topographical map using the military grid reference system. Without this reference point, and even if they could use their radio sets to call for help, the conscripts would be unable to geo-locate the terminus of the helicopter support sorties. Without this urgently needed support, the COLAR unit would suffer a major defeat. This is but one scenario I can generate to show how poorly trained and barely literate conscripts could fail in COIN operations. In short, Colombia's combatant conscripts do not have the skills required to fight a successful COIN. The conscripts are of the same quality as the rank and file soldiers used in traditional warfare — they are simply cannon fodder. In a manner similar to the situation of the serf-soldiers in Imperial Spain, the ley bachilleres reinforces the message that the bottom stratum of Colombian society is cannon fodder — its members are the only personnel legally forced into combat duties during their terms of conscription. This situation provides a foundation for a de-motivated COLAR and reinforces 'operation turtle' 181 from the bottom up. A precipitous drop in combat efficacy results when the conscripts' version of 'operation turtle' meets the officer corps' variant of this tactic. Lack of esprit de corps and operational proficiency in the ranks has often converged with a de-motivated officer corps to generate disastrous battlefield defeats. The ley bachilleres is a good example of subjective civilian control of the military. In its refusal to repeal this law, the Colombian Congress has politicized the COLAR, weakened its operational strength, and hence, prolonged the insurrection. Bruneau and Pion-Berlin's positions on Ministries of Defense ring true in the Colombian scenario. After the inception of the Frente Nacional, the civilian leadership of the Colombian state abrogated its duty to pursue democratic, objective control of the COLAR. By giving the COLAR a laissez-faire mandate in the military sphere, the leaders of the Frente Nacional set the foundation for continued military impudence and insubordination of civilian directives. Only by appointing a senior military officer as Minster of Defense could the civilian leadership maintain a facade of military subordination to the government. The lack of military expertise in the government and more specifically, the Ministry of Defense has reinforced the COLAR's historical lack of respect for its civilian masters. This situation still exists in present-day Colombia, with President Uribe having to terminate the careers of several senior officers who publicly disagreed with his policies and the manner in which his Ministry of Defense implements them. I agree with Bruneau and Pion-Berlin ~ civilian expertise in military matters is a prerequisite to democratic, objective control of a military establishment. 182 Another general approach worthy of discussion is the combat proficiency of the FARC. This insurgent group recognized its own paucity of traditional combat resources and responded accordingly to this situation. Well aware that their combat units would not succeed in battle scenarios that depended upon large engagements and traditional tactics, the insurgents chose to fight a 'poor man's war', using the techniques pioneered by the Viet Cong, Sandinistas and FMLN in the Vietnamese, Nicaraguan and Salvadoran wars respectively. The keys to success in these conflicts resided in the guerrilla combatant commanders' ability to observe, analyze, and overcome their enemies' overwhelming preponderance of conventional war fighting capabilities. In these conflicts, the guerrillas used a facet of Mao Ze Dong's mass line warfare dogma and modified it to small unit engagements. In this doctrine, the rural populace was the base of support and strength in the irregular war-fighting pyramid. Without the support of the rural population, the guerrilla combatants would eventually fall victim to their opponents' traditional combat strengths. Using this perspective, the insurgents in Viet Nam, Nicaragua and El Salvador focused the bulk of their political and military efforts to the task of rural pacification and conquest. The FARC used this concept throughout its war with the Colombian state, and by force, cooptation, or enticement, effectively made the countryside and its population into a safe haven and source of support. Nevertheless, the FARC did not stay in guerrilla-mode operations — local raiding of weakly defended government outposts did not remain as its primary modus operandi. A revolution in the FARC's military affairs occurred when Jorge Briceno Suarez, the FARC's military commander, received training in Daniel Ortega's Communist Nicaragua. In the late 1970s and early 1980s, the FARC learned the concepts of hybrid warfare, which encompassed maneuver warfare enhanced by guerrilla operations. 183 When in the 1990s, the insurgency gained enough soldiers, materiel, and finances to expand its operations, Jorge Briceno Suarez changed the FARC's combat strategy to hybrid warfare and won the victories mentioned previously in this paper. In short, the insurgents' combatant commanders exhibited flexibility and a pragmatic genius when dealing with an opponent that was in the comparative sense, lavishly endowed with conventional war fighting capabilities. The COLAR's conservative-minded commanders, for the most part, remained mired in the aristocratic notions of traditional war fighting — they exhibited very little operational flexibility and no such adaptive genius. Conclusions I assert that the final victory against the insurrection shall occur on the political front, much like that of the reintegration of the M-19 into Colombian civil society. The reintegration of this group was hampered by the intransigence of the COLAR's officer corps — a group of individuals I have shown to be politicized and sometimes meddlesome in civilian governmental affairs. Even though the M-19 successfully merged into Colombian civil society, the insubordinate and illegal actions of the COLAR's personnel and their paramilitary associates set a precedent of duplicity that the FARC and the ELN had noted well. When the COLAR's paramilitary proxies assassinated various Partido Union Patriotica and Alianza Democrdtica M-19 candidates, the possibility of a negotiated 184 settlement with the FARC and ELN promptly evaporated.493 Simply put, the COLAR's practice of 'anti-politics' short-circuited the politicians' attempts at a negotiated settlement to the insurrection and solidified the guerrillas' distrust of any peace overture emanating from the Bogota administration. Irrespective of the gloomy situation, a slow change to Huntington's objective control of the military began when President Samper appointed a civilian Minister of Defense.494 Nazih Richani commented on the Colombian Ministry of Defense situation thusly: "From 1958 through 1990, the appointment of the Ministry of Defense was the prerogative of the military. Normally an active duty military [officer] was appointed to the position of Minister of Defense. This practice only stopped in 1991 and was reinforced by constitutional reform of the same year when a civilian was appointed to this position following consultations with the military. Before 1991, the military commanders articulated the institutional interests of the military and the Defense Minister carried out these goals with no oversight from the other branches r ,,495 of government. 493 C. A. Watson. "Civil-Military Relations in Colombia: Solving or Delaying Problems." Journal of Political and Military Sociology. Vol. 33. No. 1. (Summer. 2005): 100. 494 N. Richani. "The Political Economy of Violence: The War-System in Colombia". Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs. Vol. 39. No. 2. (Summer 1997): 51-52. Ibid: 41-42. 185 The appointment of civilian politician as the Minister of Defense is essential to the de- politicization of the Colombian military496 ~ this practice forces the active duty military away from the pinnacle of executive decision-making. Inside the Ministry of Defense, civilian experts could assist the minister in the making of informed and timely decisions concerning the state's coercive forces. By this method, the Colombian President and the Cabinet could make the best possible policy decisions concerning the state's grand strategy and its use of military force. Even if these decisions are incorrect, one must realize that in a democratically elected polity, the civilian leaders should have the right to make mistakes without the fear of military intervention in the state's political environment. Any such intervention would turn the state into a de facto military dictatorship. Another issue of military politicization is the ley bachilleres. In fact, this law points to a situation that aligns with Huntington's notion of subjective control of the military — this means a military machine politicized by its civilian masters in the furtherance of their internal agenda. This politicization reflects an elite choice in which the financially and educationally advantaged Colombian citizens have skewed the political arena to such an extent that their sons and daughters will never bear the burdens or suffer the injuries associated with combat. The choices of the Colombian elites have made the COIN into a T. C. Bruneau. "Ministries of Defense and Democratic Civil-Military Relations". PDGS Seminar "Governance, Security, and Military Institutions in Democracies". (Aug. 2001): 1. Downloaded from internet. (26 Dec. 2008). The ethics of Aristotle, Cincinnatus, and George Washington are conspicuously absent in the government's system of manpower acquisition for the COLAR. This situation reinforces 'operation turtle', which results in a foot dragging, poorly motivated, and unresponsive military establishment. The removal of 'operation turtle' as a tool of quid pro quo bargaining with the Colombian civil government could help lead to a depoliticized, motivated, and institutionally subservient COLAR. This is one of the keys to the final defeat of the insurrection, and as long as 'operation turtle' exists, so will the insurrection. The COLAR is slowly marching on the road to professionalization even though certain command echelons in that institution are still inculcated with the hidalgo-caballero culture 497 N. Richani. "The Political Economy of Violence: The War-System in Colombia". Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs. Vol. 39. No. 2. (Summer 1997): 48-51. Who benefits? of traditional war fighting, the fuero militar mindset, the 'politics of anti-politics' and militarismo. This situation speaks to the COLAR's deeply seated resistance to change. When one views the COLAR's collusion with the Autodefensas via the prism of the Yamashita Principle, the overall culpability for that practice must reside with the commanders who ordered the cooperation or did nothing to prevent it. Before 1989, there was no legal prohibition from membership in the Autodefensas or cooperation with them. In 1989, President Barco rescinded Decree 3398499 — he made illegal the use of armed civilians in COLAR operations. Moreover, Barco put forward Decree 1194 that made membership in, and the promotion and financing of the Autodefensas illegal. Human Rights Watch revealed explicit orders that mandated the COLAR's continued complicity with and support of armed civilian groups. This document, Reglamento 200-5/91, issued in May 1991 was in clear violation of Decree 1194.500 After the advent of the 1991 Constitution, this prohibition rose from the statutory level to that of constitutionally mandated prohibitions. 499 "Decree 3398 on 1965 defined national defense as the organization and taking of all residents of the country and national resources to guarantee national independence and institutional stability - it legalized the arming of civilians"... Please see F. Leal Buitrago. El Oficio de la Guerra. Santafe de Bogota: Tercer Mundo - Instituto de Estudios Politicos y Relaciones Internacionales. (1994): 86-87. 500 Anonymous. Colombia's Killer Networks, The Military-Paramilitary Partnership and the United States. New York: Human Rights Watch / Americas - Human Rights Watch Arms Project. (1996): 28-30, 120- 135. The Reglamento appears on page 120-135, signed by the Commander of the Fuerzas Armadas, General Luis Eduardo Roca Maichel. 188 Given the fact that the COLAR helped create the Autodefensas during Plan LAZO to help secure rural areas wrested from the insurgents,501 it becomes evident that the relationship with the paramilitaries is a long-term cultural construct in the minds of some members of the officer corps. The Procuraduria has diligently worked to eliminate the COLAR's illegal relationship with armed civilians, but these crimes have not ended as evidenced by the following case released on 18 August 2009: "For violating international humanitarian law, the court sentenced both Captain Carlos Francisco Arteaga Polanfa and Lieutenant Jose Rodrigo Sanchez Florez on 24 August 2007 to a dishonorable discharge from the COLAR and a prohibition from occupying public office for ten years. This crime occurred in September 2002 near the municipality of Cantagallo, South of the Bolivar jurisdiction. In the process of these events, Arteaga Polanfa and Rodrigo Sanchez Florez supplied Galil 5.56 mm assault rifles502 and classified COLAR materials to unauthorized civilian personnel serving as informants and guides in a military operation. These officers violated the laws of armed force prohibiting the use armed civilian guides. Moreover, Yanacue District residents accused members of the military unit commanded by Captain Arteaga Polanfa and Lieutenant Sanchez Florez for the death of a nine-year-old child and his father after that unit violently entered the house of the sleeping victims. Both officers ignored the principle of proportionality 501 R. L. Maullin. Soldiers, Guerrillas, and Politics in Colombia. Santa Monica: RAND. (Dec. 1971): 75. 502 The Galil 5.56mm caliber assault rifle is a product of Israel Weapon Industries, based in Ramat Hasharon, Israel. Due to its robust construction, reliability, and immunity to dirt and moisture, the COLAR makes extensive use of this weapon in its operations. For technical details on the Galil family of assault weapons, please see the following link: Anonymous. "Galil Assault Rifles 5.56mm". Israel Weapon Industries, Ltd. (Undated). Downloaded from internet. (11 May 2009). Although not in the same scale as general officers' complicity with the Autodefensas, the case of Captain Arteaga Polania and Lieutenant Sanchez Florez demonstrates the same culture of impunity as that of their senior comrades-in-arms. The problem of officers' complicity with armed civilians is pervasive and deep — it reaches downward from the most senior commissioned officers to their junior subordinates. With all of these officers mentioned in this paper, the 'I obey but do not comply' concept applies to their relations with the Autodefensas and other armed civilians — these soldiers view the cultural construct of collusion with the Autodefensas as paramount to the doctrine and law that prohibits it. One may call this collusion simple corruption, and in some cases that may be the case. As mentioned before, the attraction of 'narco-cash' is a powerful factor in Colombia. When one adds the 'politics of anti-politics' to the COLAR-Autodefensas collusion equation, a simpler and perhaps more logical conclusion becomes apparent. This answer resides in the fact that from the cultural perspective, certain COLAR officers believe the current legal framework504 of Colombia's civilian government hamstrings their efforts to defeat the Anonymous. "Por muerte de civiles en operation militar destituyen a dos oficiales del Ejercito". Procuraduria General de la Nacion, Republica de Colombia. (18 Aug 2009). Downloaded from internet. (19 Aug. 2009). Based on human rights and non-collusion with the Autodefensas. 190 insurrectionist movements. In short, these officers believe the only way to defeat an opponent that uses the reprehensible tactics of a 'dirty war'505 is to use reciprocally those tactics on that opponent. Certain COLAR officers, although constrained in their actions by the Justicia Penal Militar, revert to their cultural connections with the Autodefensas and use these groups as proxies to wage an internecine struggle that 'gives no quarter'506 and asks none. Although based upon the notion that 'the military knows better' this myopic approach neglects the issue of state legitimacy. Social contract theory posits that citizens of a polity accept governance and a degree of curtailment in their absolute freedoms because the sovereign state protects them from hazards they are unable to combat by themselves. If the state cannot protect its own citizenry, then the social contract will be broken and the COIN may fail. I assert this is the primary reason that a state-run COIN based on 'dirty war' tactics shall at best, yield only short-term successes, but will not ultimately defeat a well-run insurgent movement. 505 For purposes of clarity, I shall define a 'dirty war' as any conflict in which the fighters, as a matter of routine operations, purposefully target unarmed, innocent non-combatants. 5 Giving no quarter (showing no mercy) to one's opponent in war is a violation of the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Hague Convention II, 29 July 1899, SECTION II. - ON HOSTILITIES, CHAPTER I. - On Means of Injuring the Enemy, Sieges, and Bombardments, Article 23. Please see the following link: Anonymous. "The Avalon Project, Documents in Law History and Diplomacy, The Laws of War". Lillian Goldman Law Library, Yale Law School. (Undated). Downloaded from internet. (14 May 2009). This paper has shown that the Colombian hidalgo-caballero culture of traditional war fighting, 'anti-polities', militarismo, thefuero militar mindset, and the ley bachilleres are still paramount to the doctrine of objective civilian control of the COLAR and modern, professional officership. In conclusion, I have shown that the traditional Ibero-American Weltanschauung and military culture of the COLAR has resulted in an officer corps with certain members who were and still are: (1) politicized, publicly insolent and sometimes insubordinate of their civilian leaders; (2) focused on corporate interests instead of the public good; (3) mired in the traditional war fighting techniques of years past; (4) inflexible in the practice of their profession, exhibiting an adamantine refusal to employ the time- proven strategies, tactics and doctrines of COIN, and; (5) behaving like aristocratic knights from the days of la Reconquista and la Conquista. These facets of the COLAR's military culture have impeded its battlefield efficacy, hampered the government's efforts to negotiate a settlement, and thus have extended the life of the insurgency. As a result of this situation, the Colombian instance of Bruneau's CMR trinity has two of its three legs broken - democratic civilian control of the military and its effectiveness as a combat force. Although not the exclusive reason for the lack of success in the COIN, I have shown this military culture to be a major, yet previously unrecognized factor in the COLAR's failure to defeat the insurgency. In closing, one must realize that military officers are appointed, not elected. If these individuals remain active in the political sphere, then the democratic state may slide down the slippery slope to military rule. 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