65

UTICAL LEADERSHIPAND QUEENSLAND NATIONALISM

Brian Costar

'ius Murphy had a strong political and historical interest in biography the personal qualities involved in political leadership. Much ofhis best fJry was written during the 1970s-a time when Queensland was seen §any as being 'different' from the rest ofAustralia. Murphy remained \jJtical of this orthodoxy and argued in 1978 that, from an historical §pective, 'the image that a state has in the national picture is not .ething that is static. Itwill change and often be related to the calibre of state's political leaders' .1 Queensland in the 1980s seemed to prove him ~ng as Australia's first and only majority National Party gove=ent ~elected in 1983 (the year Murphy entered Parliament as the member (Stafford) and surprisingly re-elected in 1986. Premier Bjelke-Petersen r'?68-87), as the personal embodiment of all that was 'different' about t1.{eensland, reigned supreme and appeared invincible, yet he was deposed his own party in 1988 and the Labor electoral landslide which followed .1989 shattered more than a few myths about Queensland's inherent ?hservatism. Queensland's status as Australia's different state was usurped .Victoria in the 1990s, where the iconic leadership of Jeffrey Kennett dpught a revolution in the finances and governance ofthe State.'

"0 is chapter investigates the relationship between 'Queensland j'(fationalism' and politicalleadership by reviewing the role played by then 'federal Opposition leader, Gough Whitlam, inreviving the electoral stocks f Queensland Labor in the 1960s.The chapter argues that there is more l!\an one seam in the lode ofQueensland nationalism and that the political ?1.I1ture ofthe state has been influenced by styles ofpolitical leadership to ~extent not sufficiently appreciated by previous co=entators.

,:¢onventional wisdom holds that Queensland was Prime Minister (1972­ 7?) Gough Whitlam's electoral nemesis because its political culture was @1erently hostile to the progressivism inherent in his reform agenda. Memories of the Gair Affair, the very poor result at the 1974 federal ?lection, the state Labor debacle later that year when the National Party's xlectoral motif was denunciation of the 'centralist, socialist' Canberra ,¥Ove=ent, the appointment ofPat Field to the Senate in the wake ofBert 66 67 Milliner's sudden death, and regular clashes between Whitlam and Bjelke be unnecessarily provocative and antagonistic'.' Provocation was, Petersen over race relations, the environment and just about everythin, ,oyer, central to Bjelke-Petersen's 'agitator' leadership style4 and he else suggests that Queensland was the harbinger of the collapse of tl:i~ 'red Robinson as well as his Liberal Treasurer, Gordon Chalk, who federal Labor government in late 1975 which left Bill Hayden as the sole -,concerned that his aggression might impede Queensland's access to Queensland ALP member ofthe House ofRepresentatives. "alfunds for health, education and transport. The Premier's position defiant: '1 won't take [federal] money ifit's associated with Socialistic Against this tale of woe must be set Whitlarn's spectacular popularity Communistic commitments'.5 the northern state (and particularly in its north) in the 1960s where he bui: a deserved reputation as a vote magnet at federal and state elections and 'ded by his press secretary, Allan Callaghan (later jailed for at the Dawson and Capricornia by-elections - much to Arthur Calwell'~ appropriating public funds), Bjelke-Petersen's political instincts were chagrin. By boosting its electoral appeal, he won supporters within and fNbe proved sound at the 1974 Queensland election. Encouraged by beyond the local ALP organisation whose votes saved him from expulsion a'bor's poor showing in Queensland at the May 1974 federal election, from the party in 1966 and aided his actions against the Victorian executive ',ere the party's failure to win four Senate places was to contribute to in 1970. litlam's sacking on 11 November 1975, Bjelke-Petersen's campaign ,etic for the November state poll was to attack the federal government. Regrettably, Queensland Labor's electoral revival in the sixties was not eclaring that 'I'll not stop until I get rid of the wreckers in Canberra',' mirrored in its extra-parliamentary organisation which was dominated ePremier constantly reminded voters not to be 'lulled by claims that the by as an unrepresentative and electorally indifferent trade union clique ~_eensland ALP is somewhat different from the federal ALP'.7 This 'guilt as was the Victorian branch. The only thing lacking in Queensland was ,yassociation' tactic proved devastatingly successful: Labor's primary any semblance of ideological fervour - alcoholic fervour there was in ote fell 10 percentage points from 1972 and it was reduced to a mere abundance. Ironically, Whitlam's electoral achievements and leadership even seats in a parliament of82. elan temporarily concealed deep flaws within the Queensland ALP organisationwhichprovedtotally ineptWhen leftto its ownresources during is election made Bjelke- Petersen's political reputation and provided the the electorally demanding 1970s. Those failures led to the emergence ofa 'edrockfor a further fourteenyeardominance ofQueenslandpolitics; hewas Reform Group led by Denis Murphy which secured the restructuring ofthe cramed the Australian newspaper's 'Man oftheYear' for 1974 and is easily Labor Party in 1981, thereby paving the way for the Labor Premierships of the state's longest serving Premier. By his clever targeting of the federal Wayne Goss and Peter Beattie. government, the Premier proved, so it seemed to many, that Whitlam's ''political agenda was totally incompatible with Queensland's inherently Premier Bjelke-Petersen v. Prime Minister Whitlam conservative and exceptionalist political culture. He certainly convinced We local ALP organisation as was evident from remarks made by party At the end of 1972 the political stocks of Whitlam and Bjelke-Petersen ~ecretary, Bart Lourigan, to the media on the Monday after the 7 December stood poles apart: the former, his leadership ofthe ALP secure at last, had state election in which he hectored Whitlam to accept full responsibility for led Labor to its first federal election victory since 1946; whereas the latter the electoral debacle - including a familiar jibe against 'a lot ofacademics had a near-death leadership experience in 1970 and the CountrylLiberal who aren't in the ALP and know nothing ofthe grassroots ofthe party and Coalition had to rely on Democratic Labor Party (DLP) preferences to never go out in the street and talk to the common people'.8 narrowly win the April 1972 state election. Bjelke-Petersen's precarious political situation, rather than acting as a restraint, encouraged him to What a Difference a Decade Makes confrontandchallenge theWhitlam governmenton multiple fronts. As early as February 1973 Queensland Liberal Party president and federal MHR for As Bjelke-Petersen flourished and Whitlam and the ALP floundered both McPherson, Eric Robinson, publicly rebuked the Premier for his constant federally and in Queensland after 1975, the conventional wisdom of attacks on the federal government and declared that 'the Premier should Queenslandparticularismbecameamantrachantedbythemedia,politicians 68 69 of all persuasions and certain academics. While it would be abistoric "eHolt a Jolt': The Dawson By-Election to deny a certain 'difference' in the Queensland polity, its precise na 1""-" and source deserve more analysis. In the midst of the 1974 state electi _. 0,%he 1960s the federal Queensland coastal constituency of Dawson campaign the perceptive Brisbane correspondent [DJ Murphy] for the 'nded from just north of Gladstone in the south to include Ayr in the Nation Review (22 November 1974) reminded its readers that 'Whitlam ,with the provincial city of Mackay as the major population centre. had built something ofa reputation ofa legend in Queensland in the 1960s son was a 'sugar' seat and had been held continuously by the Country ... The Laborvictories in the Dawson and Capricornia by-elections set him .since its creation in 1949. It was rendered vacant by the death of as a favourite Queensland son'. In fact from the time he became Deputy ,rge Shaw who had been elected in 1963. Despite presenting no danger Leader ofthe Federal Parliamentary Labor Party (FPLP) in 1960, Whitlam .e- Coalition's 22 seat majority, the by-election took on more than usual staked a claim to Queensland as bis electoral turf. This was both politically ainence since it was the first to be held in Queensland since 1939 and courageous and calculating: courageous because the circumstances ofthe , ',first electoral test of the popularity of Harold Holt as the new Prime 1957 Split had made the splinter QueenslandlDemocratic Labor Party (Q! 'iilister. In August 1965 the ALP had chosen Dr Rex Patterson as its DLP) electorally strong; and calculating since if Whitlam could enhance iididate for the forthcoming 1966 general election. Patterson was head of Labor's appeal in such a hostile environment it would confound bis rivals inorthern division ofthe federal Department ofNational Development. and assist in realising bis ambition to replace Arthur Calwell as !1rri.e Minister Robert Menzies decided it was 'monstrous' for a public leader. ',j;i;ant to remain in a confidential post advising a government he intended ;'/bppose and had bim 'sacked downstairs' to Canberra.12 Patterson, who To that end Whitlam campaigned enthusiastically in Queensland at '1Is passionate about northern development, stirred strong emotions. He 1960s federal (1961,1963,1966 and 1969) and state elections (1960,1963, s described as 'a theorist and an intellectual'13 and Prime Minister Holt 1966 and 1969). It proved to be worth the effort, as Queensland returned a bim as 'a crusader with a fanatical gleam in bis eye'.14 So outraged bigherthan national ALPprimaryvote at all the 1960s federal elections. Of he at Patterson's alleged disloyalty that bis erstwbile employer, the these, the 1961 election stands out as a Whitlam triumph: Labor acbieved ·.ster for National Development, David Fairbairn, went out ofbis way a swing of 10% on the 1958 result and won 11 (61%) ofthe 18 House of campaign against bim. Representatives seats and helped take Calwell to witbin two seats of the Lodge. Bill Hayden, who first won Oxley in 1961, described the Whitlam 'FhC" Country Party candidate was a local cane farmer, John Fordyce, whom mystique: j'qumalist Peter Bowers described as being 'as raw as unrefined sugar'.I' ';r;p.e Liberals left the contest to their Coalition partners. The DLP, whose Whitlam dazzled the Queensland electorate. On a platform of northern development I candidate polled 6.8% ofthe vote in 1963, did not contest the by-election, he mesmerised the northerners with visions of rivers being turned inland and running out its leader, Queensland Senator Vmce Gair, attacked the government's backwards, of dams and roads littering the vast and sparsely populated top end ofthe country. Forget the economics, it is the votes that count ... Here at last was someone who record on northern development. 16 • The Country Party's George Shaw had understood the State, who was capable ofthinking the way Qneenslanders did. Thereafter ~on Dawson in 1963 with 59% (est) of the two-party preferred vote and Queensland loved Whitlam.' @arly in the three week by-election campaign few observers gave Patterson achance oftaking the seat. Nevertheless Dawson became a honey pot for Whitlam anticipated Colin Hughes' insight that 'Queensland politics are Australia's political leaders: Deputy Prime Minister Jack McEwen opened the politics ofdevelopment, concerned with things and places rather than ,Fordyce's campaign, as didALP leader Arthur Calwell Patterson's. Prime people and ideas'lo and understood that 'north Queensland electorates Minister Harold Holt drew a crowd ofover 600 to bis campaign meeting. are especially susceptible to northern development blandishments'.u As Dawson, because the electorate had no television coverage, was to be one important as general elections are, the Dawson (1966) and Capricornia . ofAustralia's last 'meet and greet' election campaigns. Inall, tenministers, (1967) by-elections well illustrate the sub-tropical appeal ofWhitlam and five ALP frontbenchers and dozens offederal MPs visited Dawson. indicate reasons why bis allure faded after 1972. .The standout campaigner was deputy Labor leader Gough Whitlam. 70 71 Unlike Calwell, who came to Dawson only once and left declaring the tumbril ready?' 'unwinnable"', Whitlam spent eleven days in the electorate including the entire final week. He and Patterson complemented each other as theyflayed e ,issue of state aid to non-gove=ent schools had been contentious the gove=ent on its alleged neglect of north Queensland. Whitlam also ,thin the federal ALP since Prime Minister Menzies decided to provide managed to energise the Queensland ALP machine and reactivated many ,rnmonwealth funding for science blocks in private schools prior to the dormant branches in Dawson. Even the Australian Workers' Union (AWU) 963 election. Within the ALP the issue was laced with the venom of which was not affiliated with the ALP and had refused to support federal ~tarianismas a consequence ofthe 1955 Split, butproduced some strange Labor candidates since the 1965 Mt Isa strike because ofthe support Jim ~gnments: Whitlam, a 'fellow traveller with Christianity', was in support; Cairns and Clyde Cameron had given to rebel union leader Pat Mackie, hereas the Catholic Calwell, a Papal Knight, was at best lukewarm. The donated $400 to Patterson's campaign. IS The Dawson campaign was "ealots, however, were to be found on the Federal Executive under the conducted in the midst ofheightened leadership tension between Calwell 'f~adership of West Australian State Secretary and Whitlam-hater, Joe and Whitlam. Whitlam's objective in Dawson was to show that he was a Chamberlain. At a meeting on 9 February 1966 the Executive instructed vote winner, but this was a risky strategy since 'Dr Patterson is very much the ALP Legal and Constitutional Committee to prepare a High Court a Whitlam protege and Mr Whitlam would shoulder much of the blame challenge to state aid and also instructed the caucus not to support further ifDr Patterson failed to gain substantial ground'.19 At the beginning of ~xtensions of co=onwealth grants to independent schools. Whitlam the last week ofthe campaign the Country Party believed it had Dawson ;4nmediately wrote a letter, which soon became public, to federal ALP 'in the bag'" and on election eve few of the well-informed journalists ,~ecretary Cyril Wyndham in which he argued that there was no possibility thought Labor could win. No opinion polls were conducted during the by­ ;9fthe High Court invalidating state aid and, more controversially, that it election. )'Vas the duty ofa 'socialist' party to promote educational equality across the entire sector?' Then ensued a public brawl in which Whitlam called the Patterson achieved the seemingly impossible by securing a 12 % swing to ',Executive 'the twelve witless men' and which saw him charged with 'gross the ALP and taking Dawson with 55 % of the vote. The Sydney Morning disloyalty'. Herald saw wider political implications in the result: The deputy leader was su=oned to appear before the Federal Executive The Dawsonby-election is a trinmph for MrEGWhitlam. Itwas underthe DepntyLeader in Canberra on 3 March 1966, a week after the Dawson triumph, where ofthe Federal Opposition's banner that the brilliant Commonwealth public servant, Dr it was expected he would be expelled from the party, hence his remark Patterso~ became the successful political candidate. l\1r Wbitlam showed again, as he to assembled journalists 'is the tumbril ready'.22 It was on this day that did ... to such devastating effect in the 1961 Federal elections, that he is the man to bring the sweet taste ofsuccess to the Labor Party (28 February 1966). Patterson arrived to be sworn in as a member ofParliament and he decided to pay a visit to the office ofAllan Fraser, the member for Eden Monaro, But not everybody in the ALP thought so. Patterson's victory is more whohadcampaignedforhiminDawson. FortnitouslyPattersonwaspresent remarkable in that it was achieved against the backdrop of a significant when Fraser received a phone call from a gleeful Calwell informing him factional battle between Whitlam and the party's Federal Executive acting that 'we've gotthe numbers to expel the big bastard'.23 Appalled, Patterson in Calwell's leadership interests. Inthe middle ofthe campaign the Federal alerted Queensland ALP State Secretary, Tom Burns, who phoned the Executive did Patterson's cause little good when it overlooked north Queensland delegates Jim Keefe and Fred Whitby and told them ifthey Queensland-based Senator Jim Keefe and appointed Victorian ALP State voted for expulsion they would be removed from the Executive. The 2 Secretary Bill Hartley to the chair of the party's National Development expulsion motion failed seven votes to five. ' Politics, as Denis Murphy Committee. Ofgreater concern was the outbreak in early February 1966 of often pointed out, involves an element of chance and Whitlam can thank a bitter dispute between Whitlam and the Executive over the volatile issue his sub-tropical guardian angel because, without the series of contingent ofgove=ent funding to private schools. events, he would have been expelled from the party. Henceforth Whitlam always referred to Burns as 'the man who saved me?' 72 73 Despite its political significance Dawson, like so many by-elections, was lpManon a mild rebuke from Prime Minister Holt and a predictably a poor guide to general voting trends. Labor suffered a heavy defeat at , her one from Deputy Prime Minister Jack McEwen who insisted that the 1966 federal elections - though Patterson increased his majority ill ":was not the Country Party's style to run down a political opponent'.33 Dawson - and Whitlam replaced Calwell as party leader in April 1967. j:rllse he was a prodigious writer ofletters to the Rockhampton Morning Whitlam's position was again to come under serious challenge in 1968 ,illelin, Everingham's political views were well known in the electorate when, as part of his strategy to reform the ALP federal organisation and ¥g before he became the Labor candidate. What was not so well known restructure its Victorian branch, he impetuously resigned the leadership >':6utsiders that he was a very well-liked general medical practitioner who, and in recontesting was almost defeated by Jim Cairns.26 In contrast to ;ihe days before Medibank, often forgot to bill his less wealthy patients. 1968, in which Whitlam's political career sailed close to 'oblivion, the first ,nile little more was seen or heard ofMcMahon during the campaign, his year of [his] leadership passed tranquilly enough'.27 By contrast 1967 was rrsonal deuigration ofEveringham had a lingering impact, with even the a 'calamitous' year for Prime Minister Holt, which ended with his death by ':hservative Courier-Mail calling Mc Mahon's remarks 'a blunder'." drowning on 17 December.2S en a newspaper reported that DrEveringham was personally disliked by ,...[A)nother outburst of Queensland nationalism' (C A Hughes): iththe bishops ofRockhampton, Anglican Dr Shearman publicly denied Capricornia 1967 ,5 He went on to describe Labor's candidate as 'a very ethical and moral on' who was 'devoted to the welfare of other human beings'." The Two by-election defeats numbered amongst the Prime Minister's 1967 o"DLP magazine Newsweekly sought to discredit Shearman as a political political woes: the first was occasioned by the retirement of Hubert elate, but this was negated by the Catholic bishop Dr Rush, whose Opperman in the Victorian seat of Corio which, after intensive, Dawson­ WYfupathies usually lay with the DLP, refusing to condemn Everingham like campaigning by Whitlam, was won by Labor with a 9.5% swing on 'forhis religious beliefs. Despite the absence of opinion poll data, the 22 July.29 The next month the politically eccentric but very popular Labor "efieral consensus was that McMahon's personal remarks (the product of member for the north Queensland seat ofCapricornia, George Gray, died, :poor advice and worse champagne' according to Graham Freudenberg; thereby providing another opportunity for 'a concentrated projection of §]:It deuied in Parliament by McMahon") harmed the Liberals rather than the Whitlam image'.30 While Capricornia shared the southern boundary ~elr intended target. Given that religious beliefand religiosity, especially of the site of Whitlam's earlier triumph in Dawson, the two by-elections when combined with ruralism, are often associated with political were conducted in quite different political circumstances. Unlike Dawson, conservatism."and that religious adherence in Queensland was then the Capricorniawas a seat held by the ALP since 1961 and, given the difficulty strongest ofall the states," the willingness ofCapricornians to behave as governments usuallyencounterinwinning Opposition seats at by-elections, ~Ibctoral secularists raises important issues dealt with later in this article. was unlikely to change hands. However, like Dawson, Capricornia was to ':1 "~" prove another example ofWhitlam's then celebrity status in Queensland. Whilejoiningthe chorus ofMcMahon's detractors, Whitlam criticised Holt for not opening the Liberal Party campaign himself, suggesting that this Local party members preselected as their candidate Rockhampton medical Was typical ofthe 'Government's indifference to Queensland's problems'.40 practitionerDr Doug Everingham, who had contested Dawson in 1963, but FOr his part, Holt was indecisive as to what to do in regard to Capricornia. who had stood aside for Rex Patterson at the 1966 by-election. Whitlam Saddled with a weak candidate, he had campaigned poorly in Corio by was not alone in expressing unease about Everingham's likely attraction to concentrating on the Vietnam war while Whitlam highlighted domestic conservative, rural Queenslandsince the candidate didnothide his religious issues. Holt's dilemma was that, despite its controversial candidate, Labor agnosticism and had been active in various controversial, local political was always the favourite in Capricornia which should have encouraged causes. The leader ofthe DLP Senator Vmce Gair was quick to denounce l1irii to stay shy of another Liberal defeat. However, the Prime Minister him as 'a Communist',31 and federal Treasurer Billy McMahon, in opening ,was under increasing pressure from within his own party 41 and finally the Liberal Party campaign, referred to Everingham as 'a left-winger with ~ntered the Capricornia contest hoping to redeem his reputation as a vote way-out social, economic and religious beliefs'." These comments'eamed Winner and to build some political momentum for the half Senate election 74 75 scheduled for November 1967. Queensland Exceptionalism: are-consideration Not only did he enter the campaign, he declared that he was in Capricornia In the decade following his Capricornia victory Whitlam had reformed the to win it, having decided that the ALP held the seat on GraY's personal federal ALP and won government in 1972 and defended it in 1974 - thereby vote.42 Initially he repeated the Corio mistake by campaigning on defence becoming the first Labor Prime Minister to win two consecutive elections. and foreign policy, highlighting Everingham's well-known opposition In 1975 he became the first (and only) Prime Minister to be dismissed by to the Vietnam war and Labor's subservience to 'faceless men'. When a Governor-General as a consequence of a Senate failure to pass supply. this failed to gain traction, the Prime Minister told a public meeting in ',Queensland now presented as Whitlam's nemesis: it returned the lowest Rockhampton a week from polling day that 'development was the basic ALP House ofRepresentatives' vote ofany state in 1975 and only one of issue' in the by-election, but offered only a general defence ofthe Coalition eighteen seats. Labor's failure to win four Queensland Senate places in government's expenditure record, which he compared unfavourably with 1974 called into question the commitment and competence ofthe 'Egerton 43 the last year (1949) ofthe Chifley Labor administration. Machine' which had effectively controlled the ALP since the 1957 Split. The chronic incompetence and authoritarianism of the ALP organisation Holt's last-minute switch in campaign focus was a serious tactical error spawned what came to be known as the 'Reform Group', led by Denis because .it belatedly recognised the legitimacy of Whitlam's consistent 'Murphy, which was to achieve sweeping party reform in 1981. Whitlam emphasis on water policy and northern development. The gaff was was its distant patron. confounded by the absence of any new government initiatives in either area. Despite his concerns about Everingham's 'radicalism', Whitlam Confronted with increasing criticism from some of its rank and file entered the by-election with gusto and was in the 'middle of everything, irlenibership, the response of the Breakfast Creek Junta was a mixture of most of the time.'44 He, Everingham and Patterson - 'the big three of "!llthoritarianism, such as suspending the presentPremierPeterBeattie from northern development'45- campaigned together throughout the electorate. 'arty membership for three months in 1979, and assertions that Queensland On 26 September Whitlam had Patterson move an urgency motion in the University of Sydney , Morrison's contention attracted qualified endorsement re-issued a series of earlier Current Affairs Bulletin articles under the 'om political scientist Margaret Cribb twenty years later. For Cribb the title Politics at State level-Australia (Rork, 1970). Each contributor had ey to unlocking the state's political psyche is 'rural fundamentalism something to say about the political character oftheir state: for New South d the values that go with it' including 'rural conservatism' and 'anti- Wales it was 'tranquillity' (Turner); Victoria 'conservatism' (Staley); ntellectualism'." Finally, in 1987 journalist and author, Peter Charlton, Queensland 'development' (Hughes); South Australia 'an assumption­ argued that 'Queensland is a state where chauvinism has been raised almost gap' based on social cleavage (Reid); WestemAustralia 'state-nationalism' 'tba religion ' ... Queensland is more than a geographic entity. It is also a (Reid); and Tasmania 'regional loyalties' and 'domesticat[ion]' (Boyce). 'state ofmind'.54 Thus each author could find something that differentiated their state from the others, though some of the differences were not particularly strong. Is there any possibility ofa rapprochement between these two, apparently Also, Queensland did not stand out as being different from some imagined irreconcilable, interpretations of Queensland's political history? The national benchmark. As Denis Murphy and Roger Joyce argued in the hint that there may be is to be found in Margaret Cribb's description of Introduction to Queensland Political Portraits 'we would concede that Premier Bjelke-Petersen as the 'personification' ofrural fundamentalism Queensland politics are different, but different only in a sense that applies :>iriJ.d conservatism. Similarly, the persona ofthe Premier holds centre stage to each ofthe other states':' 1iliroughout Peter Charlton's book State of Mind: Why Queensland is '''Different. One attempt at reconciliation was made by Roger Scott and his A view generally supported by another Queensland historian Humphrey •. colleagues in 1986 when they suggested that 'all these types ofexplanations Mcqueen who explained Queensland's difference was 'anchored in the [historical, economic, cultural] have relevance in assessing the state of primary-industry bias of [its] political economy'.50 A psychological study ,this particular, and perhaps, peculiar state'." The remainder ofthis paper of university students in the late 1960s revealed that 'Queensland was \vi!! advance a related but different argument based on an analysis ofthe stereotyped with the most uniformity' by residents ofthe other states.51 Yet ,sources of'political culture'. the adjectives most frequently applied to Queenslanders - casual, friendly, outdoor, apathetic, carefree - were noticeably apolitical; and whereas Political Culture: Theory and Practice. Victoria, South Australia and Tasmania were stereotyped as conservative, Queensland was not. Dennis Kavanagh defines political culture as 'a shorthand expression to ,denote the emotional and attitudinal environment within which the political Murphy and Joyce's depiction of the nature of 'Queenslandism' was • system operates'." Borrowed originally from anthropology, political controversial, and contested by many. In addition to popular media 'culture remains a contestable concept: it is methodologically fuzzy and can portrayals ofthe state as Australia's 'Deep North', there existed a strong be misleadingly reductionist in treating political institutions and processes scholarly tradition which stressed Queensland's exceptionalism. It began as dependent variables incapable ofexerting an independent influence on at least as early as 1960 when historian Alan Morrison laid down the a political system. Neyertheless the concept has been employed to explain gauntlet: differences in the polities ofnations and sub-national regions. In regard to the latter, Samuel C Patterson, in using it to analyse the differing politics of Anyone who enquires into the state ofpolitics in Queensland is immediately faced with the American states, concluded that despite its problems: some striking paradoxes. At the same time he will find little attempt at explanation partly because ofabeliefamong local citizens that their State is so different from the others that It is possible, nonetheless, to make the case that research in state politics ought to be such divergences are only to be expected. He will become aware ofa conscious sense of comparative, and that it can in important ways :fruitfully be guided by the organising unity, associated with the conviction that decisions affecting this State can only be taken by Queenslanders, and that anyone who has not lived in the state for some years can have notion ofpolitical culture. S7 little bope ofunderstanding it." Influenced by such research in the USA and Canada, Jean Holmes and While located at the extreme end of the endorsement of 'Queensland Campbell Sharman set out in 1977 to test 'the hypothesis of cultural homogeneity and politically insignificant state differences'." Their 78 79 interpretation of opinion poll data encouraged them to endorse Rufus state in popularimagination until the premiership ofBjelke-Petersen (1968­ Davis' earlier characterisation ofAustralian federalism as 'diversity within 88): from the mid-I920s to the mid-1950s the tag was owned by Victoria.66 unity',59 but by 1993 Sharman had reluctantly come to the conclusion Bjelke- Petersen was the classic political 'agitator': ideologically extreme, that'.,. in general terms, there are not distinct [Australian state] political authoritarian, contemptuous of opposition, aggressive and combative. cultures ofthe kind demonstrated in the Canadian literature'.6° By exploiting and exaggerating traditional Queensland separatism and hostility to Canberra, Bjelke-Petersen crafted a political culture that was Here is not the place to conduct a detailed exegesis on the political culture as inhospitable to the Whitlam style in the 1970s as the 1960s culture was literature, but some brief remarks are relevant. First, political culture is welcoming. Consider, however, the Premier's predecessor once removed; a subjective not an objective concept; to say that Queensland was/is Frank Nicklin(l957-68) was a 'conciliator' of whom Brian Stevenson characterised by population and economic decentralisation is not to say Writes: that its political culture is decentralism. Second, 'a political culture is not static but will [may?] respond to new ideas from within the political (Honest Frank] Nicklin's real significance to Queensland politics lies in the part his system or imported from outside'.61 Third, ifwe are to admit the existence personality played in making the 1960s the most tranquil decade ofthis century in state of a dominant political culture we should also concede the co-existence politics. Once he became premier, he was willing to share the power for which he had waited so long. Rarely trying to override the will afms cabinet and party, he never leaned ofsub-cultures and even insurgent cultures.'2 It is commonly accepted in on his Liberal colleagues. He presided over rather than dominated his men. Yet, though the literature that different political cultures are the product of different by political standards a gentleman, he was able to survive, and indeed thrive, without a objective characteristics ofa given society and that these include: history, single leadership challenge in over a quarter ofa century as Country Party leader. 67 ethnicity, economic development,urbanisationandso on.Also, itis generally assumed that political culture and political leadership are asymmetrical, The contrast with Bjelke-Petersen is so stark as to require no comment. that is, that different cultures produce different leadership styles and not vice versa; for example, Patricia Smith argues that 'the central values and To conclude, Denis Murphy pointed out how rapidly South Australia's aspirations nurtured in Queensland's political culture find embodiment in image - 'a stodgy conservative place' - under the Premiership of Tom the political rhetoric ofthe Premier [Bjelke-Petersen]'." Could it be though Playford changed to one of 'a liberally minded state with progressive that the two are symbiotic and that certain leaders help craft the political views' under Don Dunstan.68 culture in which they operate? This is not an isolated transformation, Henry Bolte to DickHamer and John Margaret Cribb anticipated this line of argument when she pointed out Cain to JeffKennett wrought similar changes to the image ofVictoria. The that rural fundamentalism 'did not come to Queensland in the baggage evidence suggests that ifwe are going to employ the concept of 'political train [of Bjelke-Petersen]'.64 Queensland changed after the 1920 'Loans culture' we should be prepared to concede that as well as influencing Affair' helped derail the economic reformism and social progressivism leadership styles, leaders can also influence political cultures. of Ryan and Theodore. All of Bjelke-Petersen's predecessors, save Gair, were conservative agrarians and almost all of them, including Gair, were Endnotes

'strong, powerful, authoritarian leader(s)'.65 They were unrestrained 1 1 Denis Murphy, 'Queensland Nationalism', Australian Quarterly, 1978, p. 79. by passive parliaments, weak Oppositions and, until recently, a non­ 2 Brian Costar and Nick Economou, eds, The Kennett Revolution: Victorian Politics in investigative media. Whenever dissident cultures emerged, be they in the the 1990s, Sydney, University ofNew South Wales Press, 1999. form of industrial action or public demonstrations they were ruthlessly 3 Courier-Mail, 23 Fehruary 1973. crushed. Not only did the Premiers dominate their state, they also helped 4 Harold Lasswell cited in RA Dahl, Modern Political Analysis, 4th ed. New Jersey, to create the dominant political culture which sustained them. But, while it Prentice-Hall, 1984, p. 115. 5 Courier-Mail, 19 November 1974. was dominant, it was not a static mono-culture. 6 Cowier-Mail, 21 November 1974. 7 Courier-Mail, 5 November 1974. Despite Morrison's comments, Queensland did not become the 'different' 8 Hugh Lunn, Joh: The Life and Political Adventures ofJohannes Bjelke-Petersen, St "...

80 81 Lucia, University ofQueensland Press, 1978, pp. 212-3. 43 Hughes, 'The Capricornia By-Election 1967', p. 10. 9 Bi1l Hayden, Hayden: An Autobiography, Sydney, Angus & Robertson, 1996, p. 68. 44 Ibid, 10 Colin A Hughes, 'Queensland', in J Rorke, ed., The Politics ofthe Australian States, 45 Sydney Morning Herald, 27 September 1967. University ofSydney, 1970, p. 44. 46 Courier-Mail, 2 October 1967. 11 Canberra Tunes, 23 September 1967. 47 Australian, 2 October 1967. 12 Sun Herald, 16 January 1966. 48 Gough Whitlam, Speech to the Labor-in-Politics Convention, Brisbane, 19 January 13 Canberra Times, 25 February 1966. 1977, p. 2. 14 Graham Freudenberg, A Certain Grandeur: Gough Whit/am in Politics, Melbourne, 49 DJ Mwphy and RB Joyce, eds, QueenslandPoliticalPortraits, St Lucia, University of Sun Books, 1978, p. 32. Queensland Press, 1978, p. 1. 15 Sydney Morning Herald, 25 February 1966. 50 Humphrey McQueen, 'Queensland: A State ofMind', Meanjin, vol. 1, 1979, p. 41. 16 ColinA Hughes, 'The Dawson By-Election 1966', Australian Journal ofPolitics and 51 JWBerry, 'The Stereotypes oftheAustralian States', AustralianJournal ofPsychology, History, voL 12, no. I,Apri11966, p. 13. vol. 21,1969, p. 231. 17 Laurie Oakes, Whitlam PM, Sydney, Angus & Robertson, 1973, p. 129. 52 Alan Morrison, 'The Government ofQueensland',in SR Davis, ed., The Government 18 Courier-Mail, 26 February 1966. ofthe Australian States, London, Longmans, 1961, p. 251. 19 Wallace Brown, Courier-Mail, 7 February 1966. 53 Margaret Bridson Cribb and Peter Boyce, eds, Politics in Queensland:1977 and 20 Sun Herald, 20 February 1966. beyond, St Lucia, University ofQueensland Press, 1980, pp. 50-1. 21 Gough Whitlam, The Whitlam Government 1972-1975, Melbourne, Penguin, 1985,pp. 54 Peter Charlton, State ofMind: Why QueenslandisDifferent, Sydney, Methuen, 1983 & 301-2. 1987,pp.10-11. 22 Freudenberg, A Certain Grandeur, p. 35. 55 Roger Scott et ai., 'Queensland', in Brian Galligan, ed, Australian state politics, 23 Oakes, Whitlam PM, p. 139. Melbourne, Longman Cheshire, 1986, p. 51. 24 WhitIam, The Whitlam Government, p. 303; Hayden, Hayden, p. 126f; Freudenberg, A 56 Samuel C Patterson, 'The Political Cultures oftheAtnerican States', in Marian D Irish, Certain Grandeur, p. 30f. ed., Readings on thePolitics ofAustralian Democracy, New Jersey, Prentice-Hall, 1969, p. 25 Whitlam, The Whitlam Government, p. 303. 12. 26 Paul Strangio, Keeper ofthe Faith: A Biography ofJim Cairns, Melbourne University 57 Deonis Kavanagh, Political Culture, London, Macmi1lan, 1972, p. 10. Press, 2002, p. 174f. 58 Jean Hoboes and Campbell Sharman, The Australian Federal System, Sydney, Allen & 27 Clem Lloyd, 'Edward Gough Whitlam', in Michelle Grattan, ed., Australian Prime Unwin, 1977, p. 9. Ministers, Sydney, New Holland, 2000, p. 337. 59 Davis, op. cit., p. 557f. 28 Ian Hancock, 'Harold Edward Holt', in Grattan, ed., Australian Prime Ministers, p. 60 David Denemark and Campbell Sharman, 'Political Efficacy, Trust and Alienation in 281. Australia's Federal System: The 1993 Election Survey', Australasian Political Studies 29 Paul Rodan, 'The Prime Ministership of Harold Holt', MA thesis, University of Association Conference, Monash University 29 September-1 October 1993, p. 1. Queensland, 1977, p. 125f. 61 Alan R Ball, Modern Politics and Government, 3rd ed., London, Macmi1lan, 1983, pp. 30 Wallace Brown, Courier-Mail, 2 October 1967. 55-60. 31 Sydney Morning Herald, 5 September 1967. 62 ColinAHughes, 'Political Culture', in HernyMayer and Helen Nelson, eds, Australian 32 Courier-Mail, 21 September 1967. Politics: A Third Reader, Melbourne, Cheshire, 1973, pp. 174-5. 33 Courier-Mail, 21 September 1967. 63 Patricia Smith, 'Queensland's Political Culture', in Alan Patieoce, ed., The Bjelke­ 34 Courier-Mail, 25 September 1967. Petersen Premiership: 1968-1983: Issues in PublicPolicy, Melbourne, Longman Cheshire, 35 ColinA Hughes, 'The Capricornia By-Election 1967', Australian Quarterly, vol. 39, 1985, p. 30. no.4, December 1967, p. 15. 64 Cribb,op. cit., (1980), p. 50. 36 Freudenberg, A Certain Grandeur, p. 113. 65 MNB Cribh, 'Introduction', in Denis Mwphy, Roger Joyce and Margaret Crihb, eds, 37 Paul Reynolds, Political SOCiology, Melbourne, Longman Cheshire, 1991, p. 227. The Premiers ofQueensland, Brisbane, University of Queensland Press, 1990, p. xv. 38 Jean Hoboes and Campbell Sharman, The Australian Federal System, Allen & Unwin, 66 Nick Economou, Brian Costar and Paul Strangio, 'Victoria', in Jeremy Moon and 1977, p. 50. Campbell Sharman, eds, Australian Politics and Government: The Commorrwealth, the 39 Courier-Mail, 9 September 1967. States andthe Territories, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2003, p. 162f. 40 Rodan, 'The Prime Ministership ofHarold Holt', p. 133. 67 Brian Stevenson, 'George Francis Reubeo Nicklin: "Honest Frank" The Gentleman 41 Courier-Mail, 5 September 1967; Hughes, 'The Capricornia By-Election 1967', p. 9. Premier', in Denis Mwphy et 01., eds, The Premiers ofQueensland, 2nd ed., St Lucia, 42 Courier-Mail, 22 September 1967. University ofQueensland Press, 2003, p. 303. 68 Mwphy, op. cit., (1978), p. 79.