Ejecting the Party Leader: Party Structures and Cultures: the Removal of Kevin Rudd and Non Removal of Gordon Brown
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Ejecting the Party Leader: Party Structures and Cultures: The Removal of Kevin Rudd and Non Removal of Gordon Brown Dr Mark Bennister, Canterbury Christ Church University [email protected] Dr Tim Heppell, Leeds University PSA CONFERENCE CARDIFF UNIVERSITY 25 MARCH 2013 DRAFT ONLY – CONTACT AUTHORS FOR PERMISSION TO CITE Abstract This article examines the interaction between the respective party structures of the Australian Labor Party and the British Labour Party as a means of assessing the strategic options facing aspiring challengers for the party leadership. Noting the relative neglect within the scholarly literature on examining forced exits that occur; and attempted forced exits that do not occur, this article takes as its case study the successful forced exit of Kevin Rudd, and the failure to remove Gordon Brown. In doing so the article challenges the prevailing assumption that the likely success of leadership evictions are solely determined by the leadership procedures that parties adopt. Noting the significance of circumstances and party cultures, the article advances two scenarios through which eviction attempts can be understood: first, forced exits triggered through the activation of formal procedures (Rudd); second, attempts to force an exit by informal pressures outside of the formal procedures which are overcome by the incumbent (Brown). Keywords Prime Ministers; Party Leadership; Leadership Elections; Party Organisation; Kevin Rudd; Gordon Brown 1 Introduction In an age of valance, rather than positional politics, party identification and competition is increasingly shaped through electoral judgements about the competence and charisma of party leaders (Clarke, Sanders, Stewart and Whiteley, 2004; Bean and Mughan, 1989; Clarke and Stewart, 1995; King, 2002; Aarts and Blais, 2009). Academics have become increasingly interested in assessing leadership effects, especially as parties have undergone processes of institutional change that have enhanced the dominance of the leader (Evans and Anderson, 2005; Andrews and Jackman, 2008; Heffernan and Webb, 2009, Blondel and Thiebault 2013). One of the most intriguing aspects of organisational change within political parties has been the trend towards democratisation with regard to the selection of the leader. Whilst this should enhance the accountability of the leader to the wider party it has been argued that the process of democratisation diffuses power and makes it harder to hold incumbents to account and makes them more difficult to replace (Mair, 1994; Weller, 2012). This is an argument that has been made most notably about the British Labour Party (see Quinn 2004, 2005, 2012; and Heppell 2010). The dynamics of leadership survival or eviction are considerably different within the Australian Labor Party where such processes of democratisation have not been undertaken (Cross and Blais, 2012; LeDuc 2001; Bynander and t’Hart, 2007; Weller, 2012). The differences between the two parties in terms of their organisational arrangements regarding the party leadership make for an interesting comparison. And for scholars of party organisation it provides a dilemma: how and why was Kevin Rudd removed from the leadership of the Australian Labor Party, and how and why was Gordon Brown not removed from the leadership of the British Labour Party? 2 Of the interaction between the structural apparatus of the institutional arrangements that parties use, and the strategic choices that then face aspiring leaders of the two parties, Weller draws a clear distinction. The dynamics of Australian party politics demand that aspiring leaders have to ‘fight’ – i.e. flexible procedures means that challengers can ‘seize the job by political force’ and ‘eject the incumbent in a direct confrontation’ (Weller, 2012: 154). The strategic options to aspiring Labour party leaders are considerably reduced by the constraining impact of the convoluted Electoral College system that serves to inhibit challengers and protect incumbents. Using Gordon Brown as his primary example (from the period between 1997 and 2007), Weller argues that such leadership aspirants are left to ‘fulminate’. His description of how hypothetical challengers have to wait ‘grumbling, complaining [and] agonising at the unwarranted delay’ would resonate with many New Labour parliamentarians (Weller, 2012: 154). Weller concludes that whilst Australian Prime Ministers (from both Labor and Liberal parties) are ‘dogs on a very short leash’, aspiring Labour Prime Ministers have ‘no opportunity to wield the knife’ (Weller, 2012: 154, 157). Does this claim by Weller explain the differences between Rudd and Brown? Weller, himself, does not address Brown’s survival against this distinction, preferring to focus in on the survival of Blair and the impotence of Brown in the face of the procedural hurdles. This article aims to assess whether structural factors alone explain all, or whether wider circumstances relating to the agency of incumbents, leadership aspirants, and timing in the electoral cycle and governing duration need consideration as well. By doing so, this article adds a comparative slant to the study of 3 party leadership selection from the perspective of leadership survival, which in itself is an underdeveloped aspect of the leadership succession literature. Electing and Ejecting the Party Leader As Weller notes there is ‘an extensive literature on the election of party leaders’ (Weller, 2012: 152). The focus of that literature on leadership successions is dominated by three countries with similar polities – Britain, Australia and Canada, whose ‘governing principles derived from similar constitutional assumptions’ (Weller, 2012: 152; see also Rhodes, Wanna and Weller, 2009; Bennister 2012; Weller, 2013). Most of that literature tends to have a one country focus, but exceptions include Weller, 1983; 1994; Punnett, 1992; Davis, 1998; Bynander and ‘t Hart, 2007; 2008; Kenig, 2009; and Cross and Blais, 2012). However, within the single country focus based literature considerably more has been offered on assessing leadership successions within British political parties. Perhaps stimulated by the dramatic political theatre of the removal from Downing Street of Margaret Thatcher, scholars have developed their work around the following subthemes within leadership successions. First, there is scholarly work that appraises individual contests to examine the quality of candidates and the significance of the campaigning period (Drucker, 1976, 1981, 1984; Denham and O’Hara, 2008; Heppell, 2008, 2010a; 2010b; Alderman and Carter, 1991; 1993; 1995; Alderman, 1996, 1998; Dorey and Denham, 2006; 2011 Wickham-Jones and Jobson, 2010). Second, there is work that seeks to examine the variables that may have influenced voting behaviour at the level of the parliamentary party; with much of that work being focused on the significance of ideology and factions (see Wickham-Jones 1997; Cowley and 4 Garry, 1998; Cowley and Bailey, 2000; Heppell and Hill 2008, 2009, 2010; Heppell Crines and Nicholls, 2010; Heppell and Crines, 2011). Third, there has been a focus on the significance of amending the party leadership selection rules within the respective parties, or the continuing merits or otherwise of existing procedures, with much of this work highlighting the impact of the Electoral College that the Labour Party utilise (Alderman, 1994, 1999; Stark, 1996; McSweeney, 1999; Quinn, 2004; 2005; 2012; Denham, 2010; Wickham-Jones and Jobson, 2011). Fourth, there has been work that analyses the ease, or otherwise, with which incumbents can be removed from the party leadership (Alderman and Smith, 1990; McAnulla, 2009; 2010). What the above appraisal demonstrates is the dominant focus on elections, whether for vacancies (the majority of cases) or challenges which have been successful, the most notable one being that of the removal of Thatcher (Jones 1995). The academic analysis of when party leaders survive, despite considerable questioning of their leadership, can thus be said to be the under-developed aspect of leadership selection studies. The Non Removal of Gordon Brown What made Brown vulnerable to eviction? Some of his critics, such as former minister Charles Clarke and Frank Field, would claim that Brown lacked legitimacy flowing from the way in which he had acquired the Labour Party leadership in May 2007 (Quinn, 2012: 88). Brown had been elected unopposed in what was a coronation rather than a contest, as his only possible rival for the leadership, John McDonnell failed to secure the requisite number of parliamentary backers to initiate the Electoral College. However, as Brown defeated McDonnell by 313 to 29 nominations (McDonnell needed 44 to pass the nomination threshold or 12.5 percent of the PLP), the argument that he lacked legitimacy at PLP level is erroneous (Heppell, 2010: 187). What made Brown vulnerable was necessarily the method of 5 acquisition and his legitimacy to lead the party. His legitimacy only came into question as his authority was undermined by his lamentable performance as Prime Minister (Foley, 2009; Theakston, 2011). That Brown had so ‘desperately’ wanted to be Prime Minister, and had plotted so ‘meticulously’ and ‘ruthlessly’, it was therefore a great surprise and disappointment that he once there he had ‘no vision [and] no strategy’ (Watt, 2010: 7-8). There had been an expectation that he would have a clear political programme to implement (Foley, 2009: 502). It is justifiable, however, to argue that his circumstances