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BEFORE THE PRE-TRIAL JUDGE Special Tribunal for Lebanon
Case No: STL-ll-OIIPTIPTJ
Before: Pre-Trial Judge
Registrar: Mr. Herman von Hebel Date: 15 November 2012 Filing Party: Prosecutor
Original language: English
Classification: Public Redacted
THE PROSECUTOR v. SALlM JAMIL AYY ASH, MUST AFA AMINE BADREDDINE, HUSSEIN HASSAN ONEISSI & ASSAD HAS SAN SABRA
Prosecution Pre-Trial Brief Pursuant to Rule 91
Office of the Prosecutor: Counsel for Mr. Salim Jamil Ayyash: Mr. Norman FarreIl Mr. Eugene O'Sulhvan Mr. Emile Aoun
Legal Representatives of Victims: Counsel for Mr. Mustafa Amine Badreddine: Mr. Peter Haynes Mr. Antoine Korkmaz Mr. Mohammad F Mattar Mr. John Jones Ms. Nada Abdelsater-Abusamra Counsel for Mr. Hussein Hassan Oneissi: Mr. Vincent CourceIle-Labrousse Mr. Yasser Hassan
Counsel for Mr. Assad Hassan Sabra: Mr. David Young Mr. Guenael Mettraux R132553 PUBLIC STL-II-0l/PT/PTJ F0534/AOIIPRVl201211191R132551-RI32604/EN/pvk
I. INTRODUCTION ...... 1 11. THE ACCUSED ...... 3 A. MUSTAFA AMINE BADREDDINE ...... 3 B. SALIM JAMIL A YY ASH ...... 5 C. HUSSEIN HASSAN ONEISSI ...... 5 D. ASSAD HASSAN SABRA ...... 6 m. THE VICTIMS ...... 6 A. RAFIK HARIRI ...... 6 B. OTHER VICTIMS ...... 6 IV. THE USE OF PHONE NETWORKS TO PREPARE AND EXECUTE THE ATTACK '...... 7 A. THE RED NETWORK ...... 7 B. THE GREEN NETWORK ...... 8 C. THE BLUE NETWORK ...... 9 D. THE YELLOW NETWORK ...... 10 E. THE PURPLE PHONES ...... ' ...... 10 F. PERSONAL AND SEQUENTIAL MOBILE PHONES ...... 11 V. ATTRIBUTION OF PHONES ...... •.•.•...... •...... •...... 11 A. BADREDDINE's PHONES ...... 13 B. A YYASH's PHONES ...... 17 C. ONEISSI's PHONES ...... ~ ...... 19 D. SABRA's PHONES ...... 19 VI. THE CONSPIRACY ...... 19 VII. PREPARATIONS FOR THE TERRORIST A TTACK ...... 20 A. OBSERVATIONS IN PREPARATION FOR THE ATTACK ...... 20 1. Surveillance on 11 November 2004 ...... 21 2. Observations on 21 December 2004 ...... 22 3. Observations on 30 December 2004 ...... 22 4. Purchase of the Red Network Handsets and Phones ...... 22 5. Observations on 14 January 2005 ...... 23 6. Planned Surveillance on 20 January 2005 ...... 23 7. Observations on 28 January 2005 ...... 24 8. Surveillance and Observations on 31 January 2005 ...... 25 9. Topping up the credit on the Red Network phones ...... 26 10. Surveillance on 3 February 2005 ...... 27 11. Surveillance on 8 February 2005 ...... 28 12. Final preparations before the Attack ...... 31 13. Conclusion as to Observations and SurveIllance ...... 31 B. THE PURCHASE OF THE MITSUBISHI CANTER VAN USED AS THE VBIED TO PERPETRATE THE TERRORIST ATTACK ...... 32 C. PREPARATIONS RELATED TO THE FALSE CLAIM OF RESPONSIBILITy ...... 34 VIII. THE TERRORIST A TTACK ..•.....•...•..••...... •...... •...... •...... •...... •..... 37 IX. THE DELIVERY OF THE VIDEO AFTER THE TERRORIST ATTACK ...... •.... 41 x. [REDACTED] ...... 46 R132554 PUBLIC STL-II-OIIPTIPTJ F0534/AOIIPRVl20121 I 191R132551-R132604/EN/pvk
A. [REDACTED] ...... 47 B. ATTACKS IN KUWAIT ...... 48 C. CONCLUSION ...... 49 XI. CONCLUSION ...... 50 RI32555 PUBLIC STL-II-OIIPTIPTJ F0534/AOIIPRVl201211191R132551-RI32604lEN/pvk
I. INTRODUCTION
1. On 14 February 2005, at 12:55 on Rue Minet el,Hos'n in Beirut, as former Prime Mmister Rafik Baha'eddine AL-HARIRI (HARIRI) and his security convoy were returning to his residence at Quraitem Palace from a session of Parliament, a suicide bomber detonated a large quantity of explosives concealed in a Mitsubishi Canter van parked along the side of the road. The resulting explosIOn killed HARIRI and 21 other persons and injured 226 persons.
2. Shortly after the terronst attack, AI-Jazeera news network in Beirut received a video with a letter attached on which a man named Ahmad ABU ADASS (ABU ADASS) falsely claimed to be the suicide bomber on behalf of a non-existent fundamentahst group named "Nusra and Jihad Group m Greater Syria". AI-Jazeera broadcast the video.
3. The assassination of HA RI RI was the culmination of extensive preparation by a select group of persons with either professional skills and/or experience, who acted together to commit this terrorist attack. The Accused, with others, used phones from five mobile phone groups to communicate while preparing and perpetrating this terrorist attack. On at least 50 days there was surveillance of HARIRI and observations of locations assoclated with him, beginning, at the latest on 20 October 2004 until the day of the attack, 14 February 2005.
4. BADREDDINE monitored and together with A YYASH coordinated the observatIOns of HARIRI's residences, Parhament and the eventual crime scene and surveillance of HARIRl's movements. Further, BADREDDINE monitored and together with A YY ASH coordinated the purchase of the M itsubishi Canter, which was used as a Vehicle Borne Improvised Explosive DeVIce (VBIED), carrying the equivalent of approximately 2,500 kg of TNT to perpetrate the attack. After all this preparation, A YY ASH coordinated the perpetratIon of the attack on HARIRI, which BADREDDINE monitored. ONEISSI and SABRA particlpated in identifying a suitable indIVIdual who would be used to make a video-taped false claim of responsibility for the attack, and ensure its dissemination to news agencies immediately after the attack. RI32556 PUBLIC STL-II-OIIPTIPTJ F0534/AOIIPRV120121 I I 91R1 3255 I-R I 32604lEN/pvk
5. The carrying out of these steps, either individually or cumulatively - observation,
surveillance, the purchase of certain covert phones used by the Assassination Team, I the purchase of the van suitable to carry the equivalent of approximately 2,500 kg of TNT by persons using false names, the selection of someone for use in making a false claim of responsibility, the coordination or monitoring of preparations and of the attack itself and the dissemination of a false claim of responsibility to shield the perpetrators from justice - shows the degree of participation by various members of the conspiracy, the level of coordinated action and the shared intent of the Accused.
6. The four Accused, Mustafa Amine BADREDDINE (BAD REDDINE), Salim Jamil AVYASH (AVYASH), Hussein Hassan ONEISSI (ONEISSI), and Assad Hassan SABRA (SABRA) (collectively, the Accused), and others, conspired to commit this terrorist attack to assassinate HARIRI. BADREDDINE, AVYASH, and others also co-perpetrated the substantive offences of commlttmg a terrorist act, intentional homicide of HARIRI and 21 others, and attempted intentional homiCide of 226 others. ONEISSI, and SA BRA are accomplices to these offences.
7. "Subjects"/ including the Accused, used phones from five interconnected mobile phone groups to coordinate and monitor the preparations for and perpetration of the terrorist attack. Four of these five phone groups operated as "Networks". A Network is a group of phones with a high frequency of contact amongst the phones within that group.
8. The phone groups, which are colour-coded for ease of reference, are: (i) the Red Network, which was used by, among others, AVYASH, S5, S6, S7, S8, and S9 (collectively, the Assassination Team) for preparing and carrying out the attack; (ii) the Green Network, a group of three phones, two of which were used by BADREDDINE and AVY ASH to monitor and coordinate the preparation and perpetration ofthe attack; (ili) the Blue Network, a group of 18 phones, 15 of which were used in preparations for the attack and six of which were also used by the Assassination Team; (iv) the Yellow Network, a group of 18 phones, four of which
I See paragraph 8, below. 2 A Subject IS a person who used one or more relevant phones from these phone groups. In thIS filing, Subjects other than the Accused are Identified by the letter "s" and numbers assIgned to them by the Prosecution, for example, Subject 15 IS Identified as S 15
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were used by A YYASH and three other members of the Assassination Team while preparing for the attack; and (v) the Purple phones, a group of three phones used by ONEISSI, SABRA and S 15 in preparing and putting into effect a false claim of responsibility for the attack. As described in detail below, these phones have been attributed to the Accused based on a variety of established techniques.
9. As for the specific roles of the Accused in the preparation and perpetration of the terrorist attack, BADREDDINE monitored, and together with A YYASH, coordinated preparations for the terrorist attack, mcludmg observations3 of HA RIRI's residences, Parliament, and the crime scene, amongst other locations, surveillance4 of HA RI RI's movements, and the purchase of the Mitsubishi Canter van used as a vehicle-borne Improvised explosive device (VBIED) to perpetrate the attack. BADREDDINE also monitored the perpetration of the terrorist attack by the Assassmation Team. In addition to coordinating preparations for the terrorist attack With BADREDDINE, A YYASH coordinated the perpetration of the attack.
10. ONEISSI and SABRA participated in identifying ABU ADASS as a suitable individual to be used in making a false claim of responsibility for the attack. ONEISSI also participated in ABU ADASS's disappearance. Following the attack, ONEISSI and SABRA participated in disseminating statements falsely attnbuting responsibility for the attack, ensunng that the video and letter containing the false claim of responsibility were delivered to Al-Jazeera, and that AI-Jazeera broadcast the video.
II. THE ACCUSED
A. Musta/a Amine Badreddine
11. BADREDDINE was born on 6 April 1961 in AI-Ghobeiry, Beirut, Lebanon. He is the son of Amine Badreddme (father) and Fatima Jezeini (mother). He is a citizen of
l For the purposes of thIS fihng, the Prosecutton uses the term "observatIOn" In sltuattons where a specIfic location IS being observed. 4 For the purposes of thIS fihng, the ProsecutIOn uses the term "surveIllance" where HARIRI or hIS movements are being observed.
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Lebanon with civil registration number 341/AI-Ghobeiry.5 He is a Shiite Muslim and a supporter of Hezbollah,6 which is a politIcal and military organization in Lebanon.7
12. BADREDDINE operates under various aliases, including: "Sami (or Sam) IS SA", "Elias Fouad SAAB", and "Safi BADR".8 Two aliases, "Sami ISSA" and "Elias Fouad SAAB", are of particular relevance to this case.
13. A number of characteristics ascribed to 'Sami ISSA' are consistent with his being BADREDDINE. They share similar physIcal characteristics, such as having problems with their leg, both having burnt a leg on a heater as a result of lack of feeling, wearing special shoes, and having poor eyesight. They also share a birthday on 6 April, are Shiite Muslim, and are supporters of Hezbollah.9 BADREDDINE was registered at the Lebanese American University (LAU) where he studied political sCIences from 2002-2004, although those who knew him did not know him under his real name, but rather as 'Sami ISSA' or 'Safi BADR'. 'Sami ISSA' asked an LAU classmate to pick up the degree certificate of a friend named "Mustafa BADDREDINE", who was abroad and could not collect his degree certificate in person. Although the classmate had not known a "Mustafa BADDREDINE" at LAU, he collected the degree and handed it to Sami ISSA. 10
14. In addition, various telephones attributed to BADREDDINE and Sami IS SA provide further compelling evidence that the two are one and the same.
5 R91-801010, R91-801008 P 60230562 6 R91-801008 p 60230562; R91-801009 pp 60236242,60236244; R91-801010, R91-300200 pp 60236185, 60236186. 7 R91-1 00040 paras. 36-82 8 R91-801025 p. 60222602-60222605; R91-300094 pp 60228566-60228573; R91-801027 pp 60229603- 60229609; R91-300195 paras. 5-12, R91-801023 transcTlpt pp. 1-35; R91-801024 transcript pp. 4ff; R91- 300193 transcTlpt pp. 4ff, R91-801026 transcTlpt pp Ilff; R91-801028 p. 60222486 para 20, R91-300260 p. 60269764 para 8; R91-300232 pp. 60254598-60254607 9 R91-801010; R91-801008 p. 60230562; R91-801009 pp. 60236242, 60236244, transcTlpt pp.28-30, R91- 300193 pp 60223304-60223306; R91-300232 p. 60254602, R91-300200; R91-80 1028 pp 60222483- 60222492, R91-801027 pp. 60229603-60229609. 10 R91-801025 pp. 60222600-60222605; R91-300094 pp 60228566-60228573; R91-801027 pp 60229603- 60229609; R91-300 195 paras. 5-66; R 91-801023 transcTlpt pp 1-35; R91-80 1024 transcTlpt p. 8, R91-300260 pp 60296763-60296766; R91-300193 pp 60223303-60223307, R91-801 026 pp. 60228615-60228619; R91- 801027 pp 60229603-60229609, R91-80 I 028 pp 60222483-60222492, R91-300257 pp 60267198-60267202
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15. As "Sami IS SA", BADREDDINE owned a jewellery store called "Samino", a boat of the same name, and an apartment in Sahel Alma, an area in Jounieh, where he
entertained friends. All these assets were regIstered in other people's names. I I
16. On 27 March 1984, BADREDDINE, was convicted in Kuwait as "Elias Fouad SAAB" for a series of terrorist attacks along with other individuals. 12 Just as BADDREDINE coordinated the preparation of the HARIRI attack, 'SAAB' coordmated the preparations for the series of attacks in Kuwait, including an attack in which a suicide bomber drove a truck loaded with explosives into an embassy.13 He was sentenced to death, but he escaped from prison when Iraq invaded Kuwait in 1990. One ofthe co-accused also convicted with 'SAAB' was Hussein EI-Moussawi, another Lebanese national. BADREDDINE and "SAAB" share similar physical characteristics, mcluding a leg problem and poor eyesight. 14
B. Salim Jamil Ayyash
17. AYYASH was born on 10 November 1963 in Harouf, Lebanon. He is the son of Jamil Dakhil Ayyash (father) and Mahasen Issa Salameh (mother). He is a Lebanese citizen with civil registration number I 97lHarouf. His Hajj passport number is 059386, and his social security number is 63/690790. 15 He is a Shiite Muslim and a
supporter of Hezbollah. 16
C. Hussein Hassan Oneissi
18. ONEISSI, a Shiite Muslim, was born HUSSEIN HASSAN IS SA on II February 1974 in Beirut, Lebanon, and he is also known by that name. He is the son of Hassan
Oneissi (also known as 'Hassan Issa') (father) and Fatima Darwich (mo~her). He is a Lebanese citizen with cIvil registration number 7/Shhour. On 2 January 2004 HUSSEIN HAS SAN ISSA filed with the Civil Court of Jouaiya to change his
11 R91-300 179; R91-80 1027, pp. 60229603-60229609; R91-300093, pp. 60220462-60220475 12 R91-300064 13 R91-300282 14 R91-300282 pp. 60274631, 60274775-60274776, R91-80 1009, pp. 60236244-60236245. IS R91-801051. 16R91_100318; R91-I00319; R91-801070para. 39, R91-801112 p. 60147257; R91-100391; R91-801143, R91- 801766 pp 60217343-60217344.
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17 surname to ONEISSI. That application was granted on 12 January 2004. He is a 18 supporter of Hezbollah.
D. Assad Hassan Sabra
19. SABRA, a Lebanese citizen, was born on 15 October 1976 in Beirut, Lebanon. He is a Shiite Muslim born to Hassan Taan Sabra (father) and Lella Saleh (mother). His Lebanese civil registratIOn IS 1339/Zqaq AI-Blat. 19 He is a supporter of Hezbollah.2o
Ill. THE VICTIMS
A. Rajik Hariri
20. Rafik Baha'eddine AL-HARIRI (HARIRI) was born on I November 1944 in the city of Sidon, Lebanon. He was a Sunni Muslim.21 HARIRI served as Prime Minister of Lebanon in five governments from 31 October 1992 to 24 December 1998, and from 22 26 October 2000 until his resIgnation on 26 October 2004. After his resignation, HARIRI started preparing for parliamentary elections which were due to start in late 24 May 2005.23 HARIRI resided at Quraitem Palace in Beirut. He also spent time at a family home at Faqra, 25 in Faraya, an area northeast of Beirut.
B. Other Victims
21. Twenty one people were killed in addition to HARIRe6 inc\udmg seven members of 8 HARIRI's convoy/7 Bassel Fuleihan, who was travelling in HARIRI's car/ and 29 thirteen bystanders. As a result of the attack, 226 people were injured.
17 R91-300022 18 R91-300056 P 60223025. 19 R9J-300033. 20 R91-800969, R91-800972 p. 60185490; R91-800966. 21 R91-602957. 22 R91-400002 23 R91-200081, R91-200098, R91-400003 24 R91-200088 25 R91-200129, para 36. 26 R91-602957, R91-100278, R91-400175, R91-600023, R91-100314 27 R91-100222 para. 9. 28 R91-100222 para 9 29 R91-400005, R91-40001 0-R91-400157, R91-400167-R91-400169, R91-400171-R91-400172
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IV. THE USE OF PHONE NETWORKS TO PREPARE AND EXECUTE THE ATTACK
22. The Accused and other Subjects used phones from five mobile phone groups to communicate while preparing and perpetrating the terrorist attack against HARTRI.3o Four of these five phone groups operated as Networks.31 The Network phones were not used in the same way as personal mobile phones (PMPs). They are used for specific activities. As a result, the vast majority of calls from Network phones are made to other phones within the same Network in relation that activity.
23. Each phone group has been colour-coded for ease of reference. Where the term 'phone' is used below It indicates the relevant Subscnber Identification Module (SIM) which determines what is commonly referred to as the phone number.32 Where the International Moble EqUipment Identities (IMEIs), or handsets, are discussed, this is done specifically.
A. The Red Network
24. The Red Network consisted of eight phones which were activated on 4 January 2005 and operated from 14 January 2005, until they ceased all activity two minutes before the attack on 14 February 2005.33 Red Network phone users communicated almost exclusively with each other and did not use Short Message Service (SMS).34 Subjects used Red Network phones to communicate while observing HARIRI, including his residences and movements, Parliament, the crime scene, and other locations between 14 January 2005 and 12 February 2005. In particular, AYYASH and the other members of the Assassination Team used six of the Red Network phones to communicate whIle preparing and carrying out the assassination ofHARIRI.35 The Red Network phones are identified with their short-names in the table below:
Red Network Number
30 R91-200273 and R91-200334 31 R91-200273 32 R91-8000173, p 26. 33 R91-200273 p39, para 151; R91-200334 p 156, para 464. 14 R91-200273 p41, para 158(excludmg servIce numbers, 99.41 % of all Red Network communications were wIth each other) 35 R91-200334.
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Short-name
25. The Red Network phones were obtained through applications supported by fraudulently-used identification documents. 36 They were activated on 4 January 2005 within 30 minutes of each other in the Tripoli area and each phone contacted a service number associated wIth handling phone credit.37 They were provided with additional 38 credit within a 45 minute period in the Tripoli area on 2 February 2005. There was also handset (IMEI) swapping amongst the eight Red Network phones, which further 39 demonstrates a relationshIp between the users of the Red Network phones.
B. The Green Network
26. The Green Network consisted of three phones which were used from at least 30 September 2004 to 14 February 2005.40 From 13 October 2004 until they ceased all activity on 14 February 2005, about one hour before the attack, the users of the Green Network phones communicated exclusively with each other41 and did not use SMS.42 BADREDDINE, who monitored and coordmated the preparations and who monitored the attack, and A YYASH, who. coordinated the preparations. and the attack, commuDlcated with each other using their Green Network phones.43 The three Green Network phones are identified with their short-names in the table below:
Green Network 3140023 3150071 3159300 Number Short-name Green 023 Green 071 Green 300
27. The Green Network phones were part ofa larger group of 18 Green Phones which
were linked, through subscribers, activation dates and In some cases sequential order 44 of phone numbers. False documents, belonging to nine individuals, were used to
36 R91-801461 p3 para. 10 37 R91-200273p39 para. 152. 38 R91-200273p39 para. 153. 39 R91-200273p 46 paras. 176, 180. 40 R91-200273p73 para. 34; p 73 para 345. 41 ThIS statement does not mclude communication wIth servIce numbers. 42 R91-200273p73 para 340; p 76 para 361; p78 para. 377, p80 para. 394. 43 R91-200334. 44 R91-200273, p 72, para 337
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obtain the Green Phones.4s All 18 Green Phones were deactivated by Alfa, a Lebanese telecommunications provider, in August 2005.46
c. The Blue Network
28. The Blue Network consisted of 18 phones which operated as a Network between 18 October 2004 and 1 October 2005.47 FIfteen of these phones were used for preparations for the attack and for surveillance of HARIRI between 18 October 2004 and 14 February 2005.48 These 15 phones communicated almost exclusively with each other49 and had almost no SMS use. AYYASH and the other members of the
Assassination Team used six of these 15 phones. so The 15 B lue Network phones used in relation to the attack are identified with their short-names in the table below:
Blue Network 3071233 3043585 3197610 3067324 3197817 3198864 3071235 3079501 Number Short-name Blue 233 Blue 585 Blue 610 Blue 324 Blue 817 Blue 864 Blue 235 Blue 501
Blue Network 3067322 3193428 3196742 3020967 3198940 3846965 3196813 Number Short-name Blue 322 Blue 428 Blue 742 Blue 967 Blue 940 Blue 965 Blue 813
29. Blue Network phone users swapped handsets (IMEls) with each other and with the users of certain Yellow Network phones, which further demonstrates the mter relationship of these users and a connection between the Networks.s1 No legitimate
subscriber of any of the Blue Network Phones has been traced. 52
45 R91-801461, pp 3-10, paras 10-33 46 R91-200273, P 73, para. 343 47 R91-200273, P 83, paras. 407-411 48 R91-200334. 49 From a high of 100% In October to a low of 97.11 % In December. See R91-200273, p. 84, para 431. 50 R91-200273 p82-139 51 R91-200273, p. 85, para 420-421 52 R91-80 1461, pp. I 0-25, paras. 34-88
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D. The Yellow Network
30. The Yellow Network consisted of 18 phones activated between 1999 and 2003 and operational until approximately 7 January 2005. Of these 18 phones, 13 were used between 1 September 2004 and 7 January 2005. 53 A YY ASH and three other members of the Assassination Team used four of the Yellow Network phones in preparation of the attack.54 The call activity of these four phones involved contact with other Yellow Network phones· almost exclusively. 55 The four Yellow Network phones used in relation to the attack are listed below with their short-names:
Yellow Network 3205294 3345457 3971933 3712024 Number Short-name Yellow 294 YeUow4S7 YeUow933 Yellow 024
31. The users of certain Yellow Network Phones used the same handsets .(IMEIs) as certain Blue Network phones and two of AYYASH's PMPs (PMP 165 and 170), demonstrating a relationship amongst the users. 56 One of the Yellow Network phones subsequently became an A YYASH PMP (Yellow 170).57 No legitimate subscriber of any of the Yellow Network phones has been traced. 58
E. The Purple Phones
32. The Purple phones were a group of three phones, whIch were used tt;om January 2003 until 16 February 2005.59 Purple phones were used to communicate amongst each other and to communicate with others outside the group.60 ONEISSI , SABRA, and S15, who were involved in the false claim of responsibility, used Purple phones to communicate with each other. 61 The Purple phones are listed below with their short- names:
53 R91-200273, pp. 144-150, paras 722-749. 54 R91-200334 55 R91-200273, pp. 144-150, paras 722-749 56 R91-200273, p 149 57 R91-80 1194, p. 76, para. 182. 58 R91-801461 pp. 36-46. 59R91-200334 pp. 59367, R91-801 568, p.3, para. 1; R91-801738, P 3 para 1. 60 R91-800077, R91-800075; R91-800076; R91-801 568, p. 12-14, para. 34; R91-801738, p. 13-14 para. 27 6IR91-200334, pp 59-367
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Purple Pbones 3598095 3419018 3575231 Number Short-name Purple 095 Purple 018 Purple 231
33. The named subscriber for Purple 095 and Purple 231 did not purchase either phone.62
F. Personal and Sequential Mobile Phones
34. In addition to their network phones, both A YYASH and BADREDDINE used PMPs, which were used for contact1Og friends and family and for worklbusiness purposes. In addition, BADREDDINE used nine 'sequential mobile phones' (SMPs) between January 2003 and August 2006.63 SMPs were used 10 sequential order, meaning that each phone was used for a period of weeks or months and then replaced by another. The number ofSMP phone contacts was limited and SMS use was minimal.64
v. ATTRIBUTION OF PHONES
35. The attribution of the phones to each subject relies on a variety of recognised attribution techniques including; witness eVIdence, documentary evidence, analysis of. frequently called numbers and the lmks between the persons associated with those numbers and the user of the main phone, analysis ofSMS content, IMEI swapping (ie analysing the use of different SIM cards, in the same handset) co-location, cell utilisatIOn analysis and other additional attribution points that lInk an indIvidual to one or more phones.65
36. Co-location IS a term used to describe two or more mobile phones utilising cell sites or cell towers (cells) in the same area as one another or travelling over the same route over the same time period such that the users of the mobile phones could be together. In other words the cell usage of the two phones is analysed and if they are us10g the
62 R91-801461, p. 46, para. 168. 61 R91-801452 p22-24, para. 64(b); p 12 paras. 22-23 64 R91-801452, pp. 86-222 6S R-800173, pp. 133-156
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same or closely located cells close in time or the cell usage analysis shows they travel
together, they can be said to be co-located. 66
37. Cell utilisation analysis involves comparing the most common cells used by a phone/the pattern of cells used by a phone against the known geographical movements of a person or the cell utilisation by another phone. For example one might expect a person's mobile phone to use cells close to their work during the day tIme and close to their home at night (depending on their lifestyle and the user of the
main phone). 67
38. AYVASH and BADDREDINE along with certain other Subjects carried and used multiple phones from different networks.68 In addition, A YY ASH also carried and used PMPs and BADDREDINE also carried and used PM Ps and SMPs.
39. The table below sets out a list of all p.hones used by each of the Accused during the relevant period as well as relevant Yellow Network, Blue Network, Green Network, and Red Network phones, and Purple Phones used by Subjects. In cases where one individual used multiple phones, all phones attributed to that individual have been listed. 69
Red Green Blue Yellow Purple PMPs/SMPs Network Network Network Phones Phones BADREDDINE 3140023 3966663 (PMP 663 Green 023 3833354 (PMP 354) 3476683 (SMP 683) 3293944 (SMP 944) 3103195 (SMP 195) 3121486 (SMP 486) 3442593 (SMP 593) AVYASH 3123741 3159300 3071233 3205294 3767165 (PMP 165) Red 741 Green 300 Blue 233 Yellow 294 3523935 (PMP 935) 3831170 (PMP 170) 3020091 (PMP 091) ONEISSI 3598095 Purple 095 SABRA 3419018 Purple 018 S3 3150071 Green 071
66 R91-800173, P 143 67 R91-800 173, p. 150. 68 R91-200273, p. 5, para 9. 69 The table relies on R91-200273, R-91-801194, R-91-801452, R91-801568, and R91-801738.
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S5 3125636 3043585 Red 636 Blue 585 S6 3129678 3197610 3345457 Red 678 Blue 610 Yellow 457 S7 3127946 3067324 Red 946 Blue 324 S8 3129893 3197817 3971933 Red 893 Blue 817 Yellow 933 S9 3129652 3198864 Red 652 Blue 864 S10 3478662 Red 662 Sl1 3292572 Red 572 S12 3071235 Blue 235 S13 3079501· Blue 501 S14 3067322 Blue 322 S15 3575231 Purple 231 S18 3193428 Blue 428 S19 3196742 Blue 742 S23 3020967 Blue 967 nJa 3198940 Blue 940 nla 3846965 Blue 965 nla 3196813 Blue 813
A. BADREDDINE's Phones
40. BADREDDINE has two PMPs, nine SMPs and one Green Phone attributed directly to him, or via his alias 'Sami ISSA,.7o
41. PMP 663 is attributed through witness statements, SMS content, cell utilisation analysis, contacts profile, and other additIonal attnbutIon pomts. Witnesses attribute this telephone to 'Sami ISSA' or 'Safi BADR,.71 The user ofPMP 663 identified
70 R91-801452, R91-802650. 71 R91-801452, p 15, para 39.
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himselfas 'Saml ISSA', Sami Samino or Samino in SMS messages.72 The user of PMP 663 received a total of seven text messages containing birthday greetIngs on 6 April 2004 and 2005, BADREDDINE's blrthday.73 The user of PMP 663 attended university at the same time BADREDDINE attended the LA U. PMP 663 contacts include known 'Sami ISSA' girlfriends, 'Sami ISSA' university friends, 'Sami ISSA' bodyguards and personal and business associates of 'Sami ISSA' as well as Badreddine family members and Hezbollah members.74
42. PMP 354 is attributed to both 'Sami ISSA' and BADREDDINE. Witness evidence attributes PMP 354 to 'Sami ISSA' and 'Safi BADR'. Documentary evidence attributes PMP 354 to both 'Sami ISSA' and Mustafa BADREDDINE.75 The user of PMP 354 identified himself as either 'Sam' or 'Sami' with the exception ofa short period of time when there was a clear change of usage profile where the user identified herself as Z or Zaza. This and other evidence demonstrate that the phone 76 was used by Zahraa, BADREDDINE's daughter, during this period. The contacts profile for PMP 354 includes friends and associates of Sami ISSA as·well as ten telephone numbers of known Badreddine family members, as well as the phone number of one Samar Badreddine, who worked at the Great Prophet Hospital. PMP 354 co-locates with PMP 663 and has a similar cell utilisation pattern as PMP 663, the two telephones also share a similar contacts profile. There are also several additional attribution points for PMP 354 linking it to BADREDDINE and the other phones attributed to him.77
43. There are nine SMPs attributed to BADREDDINE.78 The first is SMP 128 which is attributed from 17 January 2003 to 4 March 2004.79 This telephone co-locates with
PMP 663 and PMP 354 80 To gIve an example of what IS meant by co-location, SMP 128 shares 406 days of common use with PMP 663 and 313 days of common use with
72 R91-801452, p. 15, para. 40(a), R91-801016, p. 6, paras 14-22 73 R91-801016, p 5, paras. 24-25 74 R91-801452, pp. 56-84, paras. 129-203 75 R91-80 1452, pp. 56-84, paras 129-203 76R91-801452,p 250, paras. 711-712. 77 R91-80 1452, p56-84, para 129-203, R91-802650. 78 R91-801452 pl2 para. 22 79 R91-801452 p86 para. 205. 80 R91-801452 p86 para. 205
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PMP 354.81 On the days of collective common use, SMP 128 was used within 10 minutes of PMP 663 or PMP 354 a total of 3,869 times.82 In half of these instances, SMP 128 activated the exact same cell as the PMPs, and overall the distance between
the cells activated was less than 1000 metres for 80 percent of calls. 83 SMP 128 was in contact with Samino Jewellery associated numbers, Hezbollah members and Badreddine family members. This SMP was also in contact with Salim AYYASH's PMP 165 and never contacted the two BADREDDlNE PMPS. 84
44. The second SMP IS SMP 944 and was used from I September 2004 to 9 March 2005, throughout the period relevant to the Indictment. This SMP has a sImilar contacts profile to SMP 128 and utilised similar cells to SMP 128 (although not the same cells as the two telephones were on different networks) and co-located with PMP 663 and 85 86 PMP 354. SMP944 was never ID contact with PMP 663 or PMP 354.
45. Through co-location With the PMPs and the Similarity of contacts and cell utilisation with the other SMPs, the subsequent seven SMPs are also attributed to
BADREDDINE. 87
46. Green 023 IS attributed from 6 September 2004 to 14 February 2005 to the user of PMP 663, PMP 354 and SMP 944 through co-location, supported by cell utilisation analysis.88 Green 023 's last call was at 11:58 on 14 February 2005; after this it was never used again. It was deactivated in August 2005.89'Green 023 was used on 57 days. It shared all 57 days of use with PMP 663 and SMP 944 and 37 days with PMP 354.90 Green 023 was never in contact with the PMPs or SMPS. 91 It co-located with the PMPs and SMP on all common usage days with no anomalies.92
81 R91-801452 plOO para. 250 82 R91-801452 p98 para 239 83 R91-801452 p98 para 239 84 R91-801452 p92 para 230 85 R91-801452 plOI para. 255. 86 R91-801452 plOI para. 257. 87 R91-801452 pI23-250. 88 R91-801452 p264 para. 758-759. 89 R91-801452 p264 para. 762. 90 R91-801452 p271 para. 783. 91 R91-801452 p271 para. 784. 92 R91-801452 p271-275.
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47. The following telephone attribution evidence supports that 'Sami ISSA' and BADREDDINE are one and the same person:
(I) The two telephones attrIbutable to the "Sami ISSA" alias, namely PMP663 and PMP354 are in contact throughout their attribution period with Badreddine family members' telephones;93
(ii) the user ofPMP663 (Sami IS SA) received birthday greetings on 6 Apnl which IS the birthday of BADREDDINE;
(iii) the user of PMP663 was at university at the same time BADREDDINE was studying at the LAU;
(iv) a Saudi number is in contact with the user of PMP663 on the dates BADREDDINE's wife Fatima HARB and her son were in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia;94
(v) a top contact of the telephones that co-locate with PMP663 (and are therefore attributed to the same user) namely the SMPs, was at the BeIrut International Airport on the days that Fatima HARB and her son departed for and returned from the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia;9s
(vi) 'Sami ISSA' sent SMS messages mentioning the death of a family member at a time which coincided with the death of a BADREDDINE family member;96
(vii) analYSIS of CDRs and SMS content show that there was a second user of PMP354 during the period 29 June 2007 to 9 January 2008, who refers to herself in SMS as Z and Zaza; BADREDDINE's daughter is called Zahraa, SMS content shows this second user of P¥P 354 referring to her Dad, and these references correspond to the movements of the user ofPMP 663;97
(VIii) the user ofPMP 354 called a Saada Badreddine on landline number 1833354 a total of2,056 times and used call forwarding from PMP354 to her landline on 27
93 R91-80 1452 p33 para 70; p 69-70 para. 168 94 R91-801452 plO para. 17(c). 9S R91-801452 p53 para. 116 96R91-801452,p 53, para. 118 97 R91-801452, pp 250-262, paras 711-757
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occasions, at a time when Sami IS SA said he was living with his sister;98 the last six digits of this landline match those ofPMP 354; BADREDDINE has a sister called Saada Badreddine;99
(ix) PMP 354, which is clearly attributed to "Sami ISSA" IS also directly attributed to BADREDDINEIOO and a Safi BADR;IOI
(x) the telephone number PMP 354 and co-locating SMPs regularly called Hezbollah related numbers which would be consistent with the profile of BADREDDINE; 102 and
(xi) these telephones also contacted the 'Sami IS SA ' associated numbers such as Sammo Jewellery. 103
48. The following telephone attribution supports the evidence that BADREDDINE and 'SAAB' are one and the same: PMP 354 is attributed to BADREDDINE. 'SAAB' was convicted with Hussein EL-Moussawi in Kuwait. Hussein Al Sayed AL MUSA WI is named on the Interpol Terrorism Notices Diffusion List and is currently 'Wanted' for crimes committed in Kuwait. 104 Hussein Al Sayed Youssef AL MU SA WI was the recorded subscriber of 3668280 which was in contact with PMP
354 on 9 occasions. 105 Hussein EI-Sayyed Youssef EI-Kontar EI-Hussein EL MOUSSA WI, born in 1955, used the number 3668280 to submit a renewal for a 106 passport in 2001. Fingerprint comparison from the passport application with the recorded fingerprints on Interpol confirmed the two to be one and the same person. 107
B. AYYASH'sPhones
49. There are four PMPs and four network phones attributed to A YYASH. 108
I' 98 R91-S01452 ,p 69, para. 16S(a) 99 R91-S01452 p 69, para 16S(a) 100 R91S0100S document, p.2. 101 R91-S01452 p. 56 102 R91-S01452. 103 R91-S01452 p66 para. 166 104 R91-300052, pI. 105 R91-S01S06. 106 R91-S01S06. 107 R91-300091. 108 R91-S01194, R91-S02651.
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50. PMP 165 stopped being used on 18 April 2004. 109 This telephone is attnbuted to A yyASH through witness evidence, documentary evidence, contacts profile (family members and known associates), cell utilisation analysis, and additional attribution points. llo In addition PMP 165 was used in the handset of a car purchased by A YYASH and used in two handsets that were also used by a total of six Yellow
Network phones. I 11
51. PMP 935 is attributed to AYYASH between 1 September 2004 and 13 January 2005. 112 Documentary evidence, the contacts profile, co-location, cell utilisation analysis, and additional attribution points such as a car accident AYY ASH had on 20 November 2004 and shared handset use demonstrate that this was A YYASH's
phone. 113 PMP 935 used the same handset subsequently used by PMP 091 and also
used a handset installed in a vehicle that was purchased by A YY ASH. I 14
52. PMP 091 is attributed to AYYASH between 13 January 2005 and 6 March 2005. 115 It is attributed through documentary evidence, contacts profile, co-location, cell utilisation analysis and additional attribution points including shared handset use with PMP 935 and its contact with a medical clinic on a day that A YYASH's wife had an appomtment. th ere. 116
53. PMP 170 is attributed to A YY ASH from 7 January 2005 to 26 November 2005, through documentary evidence, contacts profile, co-location, cell utilisation analysis and additional attribution points such as a series of calls made around 25 May 2005 when A YYASH is known to have been involved in a car accident, resulting in the need for his car to be repaired (and for A YY ASH to make telephone calls to facilitate
this). 117
109 R91-80 1194 p34 para. 66. 110 R91-80 1194 p50 para. 103 III R91-801194 p35 para 69 112 R91-80 1194 pSO para. 102 113 R91-801194 pSO para 103 114 R91-801194 pSI para. 107; pS3 para. 120. 115 R91-801194 p31 para. S9(c) 116 R91-801194, p. 64, para. 142; p73 para 170. 117 R91-80 I 194, p. 76, paras 182, 206
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54. Yellow 294, Blue 233, Green 300 and Red 741 are attributed through cell utilisation ana IYSls· an d co- I ocatlOn. . lIB
c. ONE/SS/'s Phones
55. ONEISSI is the user of Purple 095. This phone is attributed to him through witness evidence, documentary evidence, contact profile (multiple famIly members and known associates as well as the two other Purple phone users) and cell utilisation analysis (comparing the most frequently used cells with his home address)} 19
D. SA BRA 's Phones
56. SABRA is the user of Purple 018. This is attributed to SABRA through SMS content, the contacts profile (multiple family members as well as the two other purple phone users) and cell utilisation analysis (compared with his home address). 120 In addition, the contacts and cell utilisation profile of two subsequent phones, both of which are
directly att~ibuted to SABRA or his family, were compared with the profile of Purple
018 and provide support for the attribution of this telephone to SABRA. 12l
VI. THE CONSPIRACY
57. As demonstrated by their actions, which are described in detail below, the Accused agreed amongst themselves and with unidentified others, including the Assassination Team and S 15, to commit a terrorist act by means of an explosive device in order to assassinate HARIRI.122 The exact dates on which the Accused agreed to or joined the conspiracy are not certain. The Prosecution submits that their actions, described below, demonstrate that BADREDDINE, A YYASH and the members of the assassination team were early members of the conspiracy, and that ONEISSI,
118 R91-801194, p. 93 para 234; p.107, para. 285; p. 119, para 324 119 R91-801738, pp 13-14 120 R91-801568, pp. 12-14. 121 R91-801568,pp. 17-38 122 All four Accused are charged wIth ConspIracy aimed at committmg a Terronst Act. See Amended IndIctment of 30 October 2012, Count I, paras. 47-48; see also Articles 2 & 3( I )(a) of the Statute of the SpecIal Tnbunal for Lebanon; ArtIcles 188, 212, 213, 270, and 314 oflhe Lebanese Cnmmal Code (LCC); ArtIcles 6 & 7 of the Lebanese Law of 11 January 1958. The Appeals Chamber has Identified the elements of conspIracy under Lebanese law. See STL, Prosecutor v Ayyash et al , Case No. STL-II-OIII, Interlocutory DecIsIon on the Apphcable Law: Terronsm, ConspIracy, HomIcIde, Perpetration, Cumulative Charging, 16 February 2011 (Apphcable Law DeCISIon), para. 202
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SABRA and S 15 subsequently Joined the conspiracy. The eVidence demonstrates that the Accused had all agreed to commit the terrorist act by 16 January 2005 at the latest.
VII. PREPARATIONS FOR THE TERRORIST ATTACK
ss. The Accused were involved in acts taken in preparation for the terrorist attack. Specifically, BADREDDINE monitored and, together with AYYASH, coordinated observations of HARIRI's residences, Parliament, the eventual crime scene, surveillance of HARIRI's movements, and the purchase of the Mitsubishi Canter van used as a VB lED to perpetrate the terrorist attack. ONEISSI and SABRA participated in identifying a suitable individual, namely Ahmed ABU ADASS (ABU ADASS), who would be used to make a video-taped false claim of responsibility for the attack. In addition, ONEISSI was involved in the disappearance of ABU ADASS. There were at least 65 days of relevant phone activity in relation to the attack on HARIRI.123
A. Observations in Preparation/or the Attack
59. Between 20 October 2004 and 14 February 2005, A YYASH, SS, S6, S7, SS, S9, SI 0, Sll, S12, S14 and S23, communicating on their Blue Network phones, Yellow Network phones and, as of 14 January 2005, Red Network phones, conducted extensive observations and surveillance in preparation for the terrorist attack, including observations of key locatIOns such as HARIRI's residences, Parliament, and the eventual crime scene, and surveillance of HA RI RI's movements. Beginning at the latest on 20 October 2004, the day of HARIRI's resignation as Prime Minister, and continuing until the day of the attack, there were at least 50 days involving observations and surveillance. 124 By observing relevant locations, as well as HARIRI's movements and those of his security team, BADREDDINE, AYY ASH and the Assassination Team determined the most suitable location and method for the attack, which they then executed on 14 February 2005.
123 R91-200334. 124 R91-200334. The other Identified observatIOn and surveillance days are 20, 21, and 22 October, I, 2, 3, 4, 8, 9, 10, 11, 23, 24, 25, and 26, November 2004, 17, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, and 31 December 2004, I, 7, 8, 12, 14, 22, 27, 28, 29, 30 and 31 January 2005, and I, 2, 3,4, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12 and 13 February 2005. See R91-200334
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60. HARIRI's security detail included a civilian close protection team and a close protection team from the Lebanese Internal Security Forces (ISF), each operating under separate team leader~.125 Followmg his resignatIOn as Prime Minister m October 2004, HARIRI's ISF security team was reduced from forty to eight men. 126 HARIRI's convoy was usually made up of six or eight cars. 127 Generally, the ISF car was in the lead, followed by a Mercedes which was followed by HARIRI's armoured Mercedes. One Mercedes remained on either side of HA RI RI's car. The ambulance
was at the rear of the convoy. 128 The overall Chief of Security decided on the route to
be taken and communicated it to [REDACTED). 129 The three Mercedes were equipped with jamming devlces. 130 The purpose of the jamming devices was to prevent any connection between the transmitter and receiver of wireless devices. l3l
6 I. A VYASH was in frequent contact wIth BADREDDINE throughout the observation period. Between 1 January 2005 and 14 February 2005, often during observation activity by the Assassination Team and other Subjects, BADREDDINE on Green 023 was in contact 59 times with A VYASH on Green 300.132 Prior to significant events related to the assassinatIOn of HARIRI, the volume of calls between A YYASH and
BADREDDINE increases. 133
1. Surveillance on 11 November 2004
62. On 10 November 2004, BADREDDINE and AVYASH were in contact twice on theIr Green Network Phones. 134 Following this contact, on 11 November 2004, surveillance of HARI RI's movements began. On this day, SS and S7 used their Blue Network phones near Quraitem Palace in the morning until 12:02, and were at or near the airport by 12: 19. 135 HARIRI left Quraitem Palace after 11 :57 and arrived at Beirut
125 R91-200282, para. 12. 126 R91-200282, para 12. 127 R91-200282, para. 12 R91-600053, para 8. 128 R91-200282, para 12 129 [REDACTED] 130 R91-400176 para.66. 131 R91-602917 para.21. 132 R91-200334 pI 13-346. 133 R91-800098, R 91-800099 134 R91-200334 p42-43, para. 77-86. 135 R91-200334 p44-48 para 87-98.
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Airport by 12:20. This demonstrates that SS and S7 observed HARIRI, including his security arrangements, as he travelled from Quraitem Palace to Beirut Airport.
2. Observations on 21 December 2004
63. On 21 December S6, S8, S9 and the users of Yellow 120 and Yellow 170 conducted observation at Quraitem Palace. 136 HARIRI had appointments at Quraitem throughout the day.137 Dunng the evening, whilst observations continued, A VY ASH, who was in South Beirut, called S6 at 19:38 on their Yellow Network phones. BADREDDINE called AVYASH on theIr Green Network phones twice around 19:4S, with the first call lasting five seconds and the second a little over four minutes. 138
3. Observations on 30 December 2004
64. On 30 December 2004, individuals using Blue Network phones observed HARIRI's Faqra residence and Quraitem Palace. HARIRI travelled from Faqra to Quraitem Palace that day.139
4. Purchase of the Red Network Handsets and Phones
6S. The phones were purchased separately from a shop in Tnpoh on a day between 24 December 2004 and 4 January 200S:40 On 30 December 2004, there was Yellow Network activity in Tripoli near the phone shop where on that same day five of the Red Network handsets were purchased. 141 On 4 January 200S, S6 and S9, while together, activated the eight Red Network phones in the Tripoli area over a period of approximately 30 mmutes. 142 Tripoli was chosen as the purchase location in order to dIvert attention away from the perpetrators, including the Accused, who were not from that area.
136 R91-200334 p59-66 para. 128-158. 137 R91-200284, p. 183-184, R91-200283, p. 64 138 R91-200334 p59-66 para 128-158 139 R91-200334 P 98-104 para. 260-280; PRH 407; R91-200129, p.8 para.42; R91-200284, p 199 140 R91-200334 p124-130 para. 351-375. 141 R91-200259 p5 para 16 142 R91-200334 p124-130 para. 351-375
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5. Observations on 14 Januarv 2005
66. On 14 January 2005, Subjects began using Red Network phones while conducting observations. On this day, while HARIRI had appointments at Quraitem Palace,143 users of Red Network phones were in contact with each other on at least 32 occasions around Quraitem Palace, Parliament and Faqra. BADREDDINE and A YY ASH were in contact after the end of the Red Network activity on their Green Network phones, demonstrating BADREDDINE's role in monitoring and their mutual coordinatIOn of the observations. S6 and S8 also used their Blue Network phones on this day.l44
6. Planned Surveillance on 20 Januarv 2005
67. Planning for surveillance ofHARIRI on 20 January 2005 began in the preceding days. On 18 January 2005, there was SIgnificant Green Network activity, including a time when both A YY ASH and BADREDDINE activated the same cell near the Grand Mosque (HARIRI's planned destination for Eid prayers on 20 January).145 On 19 January, AYYASH and BADREDDINE were in contact on their Green Network phones on five occasIOns. A YYASH, using Blue 233, was also in contact with multIple Blue Network phone users. 146
68. On 20 January 2005, HARIRI was scheduled to attend the Grand Mosque of Beirut in the morning. He attended the Imam Ali Mosque for Eid prayers. 147 A YYASH, on Red 741, and SS, S6, S7, S8, S9 and S10, using their Red Network phones, were in contact for less than one hour in the vicinity of Quraitem Pala.ce and the Grand Mosque. Prior to these observations, A YYASH and BADREDDINE were in contact on their Green Network Phones. About an hour and a half after the cessation of Red Network activity 148 A YY ASH called BADREDDINE on their Green Network Phones. This is demonstrative of AYY ASH and BADREDDINE coordinating and monitoring the surveillance which they had planned for that day.
143 PRH0066, R91-200123, para 26. R91-200284, p. 223-225. 144 R91-200334 p156-160 para. 263-475. 14S R91-200334 p169-171 para 524-536. 146 R91-200334 P 172-173 para. 537-545 147 R91-200235, PRH0066; R91-200123, para 32; PRHOI7; R91-200108, para.37. 148 R91-200334 pI74-177 para. 546-555
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7. Observations on 28 January 2005
69. On 28 January 2005, the Assassination Team observed HARIRI's residences. On that day, HARIRI had appointments in Beirut, including at Quraitem Palace. 149 The Assassination Team, using their Red Network phones, including A VY ASH on Red 741, operated for more than six hours around Quraitem Palace, HARIRI's residence
in Faqra, and the route between these two locations. 150
70. Specifical\y, between 11 :36 and 16:57, S6 and S8 were in the vicinity of Quraitem 5 Palace and Parhament.' I Between 13:30 and 17:54, AVYASH, SS, S7 and S9 were in the Zouk Mosbeh area northeast of Beirut and along the route to Faqra. At 14:14, A VYASH contacted BADREDDINE on their Green Network phones. BADREDDINE was travelling north to the Zouk Mosbeh area. At 14: 17, A VY ASH, who was in the Zouk Mosbeh area, caned S9, who was near the route to Faqra. Ten minutes later, BADREDDINE, now located in the Zouk Mosbeh area, contacted A VY ASH. The next call between the two was at 16:25. At the time of that call, AVY ASH was still in the vicinity of Zouk Mosbeh, while BADREDDINE had travelled north. Following this call, AVY ASH was involved in five Red Network 152 CanS.
71. At 16:46, A VY ASH then caned S6, who was in the vicinity of Quraitem palace. Within two minutes, AVYASH called BADREDDINE who was located in the Jounieh area, north of Beirut. This was the last Green Network call of the day.153
72. Approximately one hour later, shortly before the end of Red Network activity, S9 called AVYASH via their Blue Network phones. AYYASH had returned to South Beirut. After Red Network activity ceased, A VY ASH was in further contact with S6 on their Blue Network phones. At the time, they were both in South Beirut. 154
73. In summary, throughout that day, A YY ASH was in frequent contact with Subjects active at both HARIRI residences and along the route between the two. This is
149 PRH0066; R91-200123, para. 40 ; R91-200284, p 261-265. ISO R91-200334 pI89-193, para. 595-606 151 R91-200334 p189 para 601. 152 R91-200334 p191 para. 602-606. 153 R91-200334 pI91-192, para. 602-606. 154 R91-200334 pI91-192, para. 602-606.
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consistent with A YYASH coordmating the observations. Moreover, his contact with users of the Red and Blue Network and BADREDDINE indicates that A YYASH was an intermediary between them, and demonstrates that BADREDDINE monitored the observations.
8. Surveillance and Observations on 31 January 2005
74. On 31 January 2005, HARIRI was at Quraitem Palace before gomg to the Higher Shiite Council. l5S BADREDDINE, AYVASH, SS, S6, S7, S8, and S9 were active in the vicinity of the Quraitem Palace, the Higher Shlite Council, the Parliament area, and along routes between these venues for the period before, during and after HARIRl's movements, operating from at latest 09:35 to at least 12:42. They were located around Quraitem Palace and the Higher Shiite Council when HARIRI was present. AYYASH operated in both areas, makmg calls on Red 741, Blue 233 and Green 300. There were II Green Network calls between AYYASH and BADREDDINE, indicatIve of their monitoring and coordination of the surveillance. IS6
75. At 09:54, whIle HARIRI was still at the Quraitem Palace, S6 contacted S8, using their Red Network phones. Both were in the vicinity of the Quraitem Palace. Two minutes later, AYYASH received a call from S8 on his Blue Network phone. AYYASH was located in South Beirut. At 09:58, S7 called S9 on their Red Network phones. They were in the vicinity of Parliament and the Beirut Port. IS7
76. HARIRI left Quraitem Palace after 10:09. He was in the VIcinity of the Higher Shiite Council by 10:55 and stayed there untIl approximately 11 :44, when he departed to return to the palace. At 1I :44, BADREDDlNE called A YY ASH. At 11 :47, S8 contacted A YV ASH on their Red Network phones; both were close to the Higher Shiite Council. At 11 :48, A YVASH, moving north in the direction of Quraitem Palace, consistent WIth HARIRl's movements, called BADREDDINE, who immediately returned his call. Over the next twenty minutes, A YYASH was in frequent contact with BADREDDINE as well as Subjects near Parliament, travelling
155 PRH0066; R91-200123, para. 43 and 81; R91-200189 156 R91-200334 p203-213, para. 633-663. 157 R91-200334 p203 para 638-640
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along the route to Quraitem Palace, and at Quraitem Palace. At 12:07, BADREDDINE called A VY ASH, who, along with S6, was in the area of Quraitem
Palace. By 12:08, HARIRI had returned to Quraitem Palace. 158
77. By 12:23, A VY ASH had switched to using his Blue Network phone and had returned to South Beirut, from where he contacted S6, who was near the coastal road to the southwest of Quraitem Palace. The Red Network activity concluded at 12:42.159
78. By 15:28, Blue Network phone use resumed in South Beirut. Later that day, SS, S6, S7, and S8, in contact on their Blue Network phones, conducted observations in the vicinity of Quraitem Palace between 17:51 and 23:25. 160
79. The activity of the Red, Green and Blue Network phone users on this day demonstrates surveillance of HARIRI's movements. A VY ASH figured prominently in the surveillance operation, making frequent calls to all the other users, and being present at all the key locations that day. This demonstrates that he coordinated the surveillance. BADREDDINE was frequently updated by AVYASH while HARIRI travelled to and from the meeting. He spoke exclusively to A VY ASH, doing so II times. This demonstrates BADREDDINE's role in monitoring and, together with A VY ASH, coordinating the surveillance.
9. Topping up the credit on the Red Network phones
80. On 2 February 2005, S8 travelled to the greater Tnpoli area and topped up the credit of the eight Red Network phones in the greater Tnpolt area over a 45 minute period. In the same area, within 10 minutes of the top-up, S8 on Blue 817, called S6 on Blue 610. Later, while travelling back to Beirut, S8, on Blue 817, was in communication 3 times with A VYASH, who was in Beirut, on Blue 233. 161 As With the purchase of the Red Network phones in Tripoli, this was again intended to divert attention away from the perpetrators, including the AssassinatIOn Team.
158 R91-200334 p205-209 para. 645-660. 159 R91-200334 p208-210 para. 654-662 160 R91-200334 p209-212 para 662-663. 161R91_200334 p217-221 para 679-690.
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10. Surveillance on 3 February 2005
81. On 3 February 2005, HARIRI had appointments in Beirut including at Quraitem Palace before going to the St. Georges Yacht Club for lunch and later returning to
Quraitem Palace. 162 Prior to his lunch, which was scheduled for 14:00, HARIRI was at the residence of [REDACTED]. He departed [REDACTED] at approximately 13:51. 163
82. AVYASH, S7, S8, and S10 were active in the vicinity of the St. Georges Marina before and dunng HARIRl's lunch. Around the same time period, S5, S6, and S9 were in the vicinity of Quraitem Palace. Red Network activity began in the vlcinity of the St. Georges Marina at 12:58, approximately one hour prior to HARIRI's scheduled arrival. At 13:33, A VYASH, who was travelling towards the Marina, was in contact with S8, who was at the Marina. At 13:56, close to the time that HARIRI was scheduled to arrive for his lunch, BADREDDINE, who was in South Beirut, called A VYASH, who was now in the vIcinity of the St. Georges Marina. At 14:05, S8 called A VYASH. Both were near St. Georges Marina. l64
83. By 14: 17, HARIRI had arrived at the St. Georges Marina. 165 Between 14: 13 and
14:36, th~re were 10 Red Network calls among the Subjects, three involving AVYASH. At 14:42, BADREDDINE called AVYASH from South Beirut. Then, between 14:50 and 14:55, A VYASH made five Red Network calls: three to S8, east of the St. Georges Marina, one to S5, near Quraitem Palace, and one to S7. At 15:25, S1O, in the same area of the Marina as AVYASH, called S5, who was west of Quraitem Palace. At 15 :27, BADREDDINE, now also in the area of St. Georges M arina, called A VYASH. 166
84. HARIRI left St. Georges Marina after 15:30. Between 15:36 and 15:43, there were eight Red Network calls, four of which involved AVYASH. At 15:44, AVYASH called BADREDDINE while they were both in the vicinity of St. Georges Marina and activating the same cell. This final call indicates that they were close enough to
162 PRH0066; R91-200123, para. 46, R91-200284, p 279-280. 163 [RED ACTED] 164 R91-200334 pp. 222-225 para. 692-702. 165 R91-200334 p. 224, para. 701. 166 R91-200334 p225-226 para. 703-706.
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meet In person. Between 15:44 and 15:58, there were eight Red Network calls, the last being a call between S6 and S9 while both were south of Quraitem Palace. 167 HARIRI had arrived at Quraitem Palace by 16: 18. 168
85. In summary, AVYASH and BADREDDINE played significant roles in the surveillance. AYYASH was active in the area of the St. Georges Marina from 13:56 until 15:51, making 19 calls with other Red Network phone users and BADREDDINE. This is consistent with him coordinating the surveillance on HARIRI. BADREDDINE and A YY ASH were in contact around the time that HARIRI was scheduled to arrive at St. Georges Marina, during the surveillance period, around the time HARIRI departed, and after HARIRI's departure. This demonstrates that BADREDDINE monitored and, together with A YYASH, coordinated the surveillance.
11. Surveillance on 8 February 2005
86. On 8 February 2005, HARIRI's movements and those of the Assassination Team are similar to their respective movements on 14 February 2005. HARIRI was at Quraitem Palace in the moming. 169 He left to attend Parliament sometIme after 11 :44, arrived at the Parliament by 12:06, left this area after 13: \0, and was back at Quraitem Palace by 13:45. 170 AYYASH and the other members of the Assassination Team were active on their Red Network or Blue Network phones around Quraitem Palace, Parliament,
and routes between both locations. 171
87. On that day, AYYASH and S5, S6, S7, S8 and S9, using their Blue Network phones, were in key locations from 09:25 onwards. At 09:25, S9, near Quraitem Palace, called
S6. Forty minutes later, S8 had arrived In the Quraitem Palace area, and received two calls from A YY ASH. The Blue Network activity continued in these areas between
10:00 and midday. 172
167 R91-200334 p225-228 para 702-714. 168 R91-200334 p227-228 para 708. 169 PRH0066; R91-200123, para. 51; R91-200284, p 285 170 R91-200334 p251-266 para 772-808. 171 R91-200334 p251-266 para. 772-808 172 R91-200334 p251-252 para. 776-782
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88. HARIRI left Quraitem palace after 11 :44. At II :58, A YYASH, who was now in the vicinity of Parliament, received a call from S8 who was near Quraitem Palace, and
then from S9, who was III the same area as S8. At 12:04, AYYASH telephoned S7, who was in South Beirut. At 12:05, S8, now in the Parliament area, telephoned AVYASH. 173
89. By 12:06, HARIRI had arrived at Parliament. At that time, SS, who was in the Parliament area, received a call from S8, who was in the vicinity of the eventual crime scene, using their Blue Network phones. At 12:07, AYYASH called S9, and two minutes later he received a call from S6, who was in South Beirut. There were then a series of Blue and Red Network calls prior to HARIRI's departure from Parliament. At 12:24, SS called A YYASH, both of them using their Red Network phones and activating the same cell. A VYASH then used his Blue Network phone to call S8 and S9. 174
90. A VYASH then switched to his Red Network phone to call S9 and then SS. Both A YYASH and SS were in the vicinity of Parliament. SS then called A VYASH. S9 then called S7 and then A VYASH. At this point, SS called A VYASH again and, one minute later, S6 called S8 from the Parliament area. By the time of HARIRI's departure from the Parliament area, at approximately 13:10, all six Red Network phones in use on that day were in the vicinity of Parliament. A YYASH was also in contact with S8 and S9 using their Blue Network Phones dunng thIS period. 175
91. Followmg HARIRI's departure from Parliament, he returned to Quraitem Palace. AYYASH and S9 also travelled from the Parliament area to the vicinity of Quraitem Palace. By 13:36, AYYASH was in the vicinity of Quraitiem Palace calling S8. 176
92. A VYASH then called BADREDDINE at 13:40. Over the following 12 minutes there were nine Red Network calls, four involving A YYASH. During this period, HARTRI
J73 R91-200334 p253-254 para. 783-787. 174 R91-200334 p254-256 para. 786-789 17S R91-200334 pp 253-258, paras. 788-791. 176 R91-200334 p259 para 792-793.
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arrived at Quraitem Palace. In the next hour there were a further nine Red Network
calls. 177
93. At 15 :05, BADREDDINE contacted A YY ASH. Both were located in South Beirut. For over three hours, S5, S6, S8 and S9 on their Red and Blue Network phones remained in the vicinity of Quraitem Palace. After 18:36 there were no further Red Network calls. There was also a temporary cessation in the use of the Blue Network phones. Then, between 20:54 and 23:05, S5, S6, S7 and S8 used their Blue Network phones around Quraitem Palace. SS and S6 were in contact with A YYASH, who was
in South Beirut during this period. 178
94. Later, S5 and S6 were active on their Blue Network phones on the coastal road around the crime scene. This included one call from S6 to A YY ASH and two calls from AYYASH to S6. AYYASH remained in South Beirut, around his Hadath residence. The last Blue Network call of the day was between AYYASH and S6 at 23:32. Both were in South Beirut. 179
95. In summary, throughout the day, members of the Assassination Team operated around the Quraitem Palace and Parliament areas. Their movements were consistent WIth the movements of HA RI RI and his security team. AYYASH was a significant figure in the operation. He was in frequent contact with the other members of the Assassination Team during this period, demonstrating his role in coordinating the surveillance. While near the eventual crime scene and later in south Beirut, A YYASH was in contact with BADREDDINE. The first call with BADREDDINE was at a SIgnificant time, as shortly after the 13:40 call with A YY ASH, other members of the Assassination Team involved in the surveillance moved from the Parliament area to the vicinity of Quraitem Palace. The subsequent call at 15 :05 is consistent with AYYASH updatmg BADREDDlNE on the surveillance. Taken together, these calls demonstrate BADREDDINE's role in mODltoring and coordinating the surveillance.
177 R91-200334 p259-260 para 794. 178 R91-200334 p260-266 para. 759-800. 179 R91-200334 p264-266 para 801-808.
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12. Final preparations before the Attack
96. On 13 February there was activity on Blue Network Phones and BADREDDINE and AYVASH's Green Network phones, which continued into the early hours of 14 February 2005. In addition, AYVASHused PMPI70 from the vicinity of the crime scene to call S4. AYVASH again contacted S4 at 20:33, by which time AYVASH was in the vicinity of Parliament. By the time of his next contact with S4, A YYASH
was back in South Beirut. 180
97. At 23:07, BADREDDINE called AYVASH using the Green Network phones. There was then Blue Network activity, including S6 using his Blue Network phone in the same area of South Beirut that AYY ASH was in. The Blue Network activity continued to 01 :05 on 14 February 2005. At 02:31, BADREDDINE sent an SMS message on his PMP 663 to a female associate. The message read "If you knew where I have been you would be very upset.',181
13. Conclusion as to Observations and Surveillance
98. AYVASH's and BADREDDINE's extensive involvement in the surveillance of HARIRI's movements and observatIons of his residences, Parliament and the crime scene, among other locations, demonstrates that they had the mtent to kill HARIRI. Their actions also show premeditation. 182 Moreover, their choice of HARIRI as a target demonstrates their knowledge and intent to kill HARIRI. 183
180 R91-200334 p297-300 para. 809-829. 181 R91-200334 p297-300 para 809-829, R91-801535 pI!. 182 AWASH and BADREDDINE are charged with intentional homicide with premeditation pursuant to Count Three of the Amended Indictment of 30 October 2012, paras. 51-52 Pursuant to Article 549 of the Lebanese Cnmlnal Code (LCq, premedltatton is an aggravating factor for the cnme of Intenttonal Homicide The Appeals Chamber outhned the elements of premeditatIOn as "(I) a calm and clear mind while planntng and executing the crime, so that the perpetrator is shown to be emotIOnally detached, not acting upon rage or anger; and IS therefore considered to be a dangerous criminal Justifying the aggravating circumstance; (1\) the lapse of a pen od of time before the commiSSion of the Crime, which should allow the perpetrator to think, and plan, and regain calmness." STL, Prosecutor v Ayyash et ai, Case No. STL-II-Oln, Interlocutory DeCISion on the Apphcable Law: Terronsm, Conspiracy, Homicide, PerpetratIOn, Cumulative Charging, 16 February 2012 (Apphcable Law DeCISion), para. 132. 183 Knowledge and Intent are elements of the cnme of Intenttonal homicide under Article 547 of the Lebanese Cnmlnal Code, with the requIsite knowledge being the knowledge that their act IS aimed at a hVlng person and that the tool he IS uSing may cause the death of the person. See Applicable Law DeCISion, para 162. The Accused must intend the death of the vlcttm as well See Apphcable Law DecisIOn, para. 163
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B. The Purchase ofthe Mitsubishi Canter van used as the VB/ED to perpetrate the terrorist attack
99. By 11 January 2005, BADREDDINE and AVYASH were coordinating an extensive observation and surveillance operatIOn, which included at least 30 days of observations and surveillance. The Red Network phones, which would be used to execute the attack on 14 February 2005, had been purchased and activated. Moreover, as will be demonstrated below, ONEISSI and SABRA had taken significant steps to identIfy a suitable individual to make the false claim of responsibility. During this period, BADREDDINE and AYY ASH were also taking steps to identify and purchase a vehicle suitable for use as a VBIED to carry out the attack.
100. On 11 January 2005, A YV ASH visited the area of AI-Beddaoui in Tripoli where vehicle showrooms are located, including the showroom where the Mitsublshi Canter van used as the VBIED was subsequently purchased. 184 From there, AVYASH, contacted BADREDDINE twIce at 14:30 and 14:55, both using their Green phones. 185
101. On 15 January 2012, S8 travelled to Tripoli and was in the vicinity of the showroom. 186 From there he called S6 on their Blue Network Phones. S6 was in contact with A YY ASH, who was then in contact WIth BADREDDINE. The relevant calls were: (i) at 17:20 S8 called S6 (Blue Network Phones); (ii) at 18:51 S3 called BADREDDINE (Green Network Phones); (iii) at 20:03 AYVASH called S6 (Blue Network Phones); (iv) at 20:22 AVYASH called BADREDDINE (Green Network Phones); (v) at 21 :32, S8, who was in Tripoli, called S6 in South Beirut (Blue Network Phones); (vi) at 21 :34, S6 called AVYASH (Blue Network Phones); (vii) from 22: 13 to 22:53, S8 and S6 were involved in a series of calls (Blue Network Phones); and (viii) the last call of the day was from S3 to BADREDDINE at 23:40
(Green Network Phones). 187
184 R91-200002, p. 12 . 185 R91-200334, pp. 150-151 paras. 442-45\. 186 R91-200002 p12 187 R91-200334, pp 161-164, paras 481-506.
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188 102. On 25 January 2005, the Mitsubishi Canter van was purchased in Tripoli. Between 14:41 and 14:59, A VY ASH, who was in Beirut was in contact three times with S6, who was in the Tripoli area. 189 At 15:10, AVYASH called BADREDDINE.~9o Between 15 :30 and 16:00, S6 on Blue 610, with another unidentified person, both giving false names, purchased for $11,250 USO in cash a Mitsubishi Canter van with engine block number 4033-JO 1926 from a vehicle showroom in the AI-Beddaoui area ofTripoli. 191 At 15:37, during the negotiation of the purchase of the eventual VBIEO, S6 called AVY ASH, acttvating the cell which covers the showroom. 192 Fragments of the Mitsubishi Canter van, Including a fragment of the engine block beanng the number 4033-JOI926, were later recovered at the HARIRI crime scene. 193
103. By 25 January 2005, observations and surveillance had been ongoing for over three months. From 14 January 2005, the users of the Red Network phones, the Assassination Team, had been assigned and the Red Network began operating. From this point, the level, complexity, and intensity of observations and surveillance increased significantly. With the purchase of the van, the final stages of preparation were being completed, including the Identification of a suitable individual to make the false claim of responsibility.
104. AVYASH's and BADREDDINE's involvement in the purchase of the Mitsubishi Canter van, together with their other actions described throughout this brief, IS demonstrative of their status as conspirators pursuant to Count 1 of the Indictment and their criminal intent in relations to Counts 2 through 5 of the Indictment.
105. Specifically, the decision to use a van of this size in the attack demonstrates the intention to use a significant amount of explosives, and is evidence of AVY ASH and BADREDDINE's agreement to commit a terrorist act in order to kill HARIRI,194 and
188 R91-200001, p. 12 189 R91-200334 p. 183, para. 577-584 190 R91-200334 p. 183, para. 580. 191 R91-20001 192 R91-200334, p.183, para. 581. 193 R91-200452; R91-602861; R91-602920, III.B; R91-606444, R91-606735 194 AYY ASH and BADREDDINE are charged with Conspiracy aimed at committing a Terronst Act. See Amended Indictment of30 October 2012, Count I, paras. 47-48, see also Articles 2 & 3(1)(a) of the Statute of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon; Articles 188, 212, 213, 270 and 314 of the LCC; Articles 6 and 7 of the Lebanese Law of 11 January 1958. The Appeals Chamber has identified the elements of conspiracy under Lebanese law See Applicable Law DeCISion, para 202 These elements are: (I) two or more indiViduals who (11)
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demonstrates their intent to do so by means liable to create a public danger and their intent to cause a state of terror. 195 Their choice of means to commit the attack further demonstrates their mtent to kill other individuals in HARIRI's convoy and in the vicinity of the crime scene, or at least that they foresaw that such deaths would occur and accepted this risk.196 Tn addition, their involvement in the purchase of the Mitsubishi Canter van demonstrates premeditation. 197
C. Preparations related to the False Claim of Responsibility
106. While BADREDDINE and A YYASH were coordinating and monitoring the observation and surveillance operation and taking steps to purchase the vehicle to be used in the attack, ONEISSI and SABRA were taking steps to identify a suitable stranger to be used to make a false claim of responsibility for the attack.
107. As part of the preparations for the attack, between 22 December 2004 and 17 January 2005, ONEISSI and SABRA agreed to locate a suitable stranger who would be used to make a false claim of responsibility, on a video, for the attack agalOst HARIRI. They chose ABU ADASS. ONEISSI also participated in ABU ADASS's disappearance. In addition, S 15 was involved in the preparatIOn of the false claim of
conclude or Jom an agreement; (11\) aImed at commlttmg a cnme agamst State secunty, WhICh, before the Tnbunal, must be a terrorist act, (IV) havmg agreed on the use of means liable to cause a public danger; and (v) the eXIstence of a cnmmal mtent. 195 AYV ASH and BADREDDINE are charged wIth the commIssIon ofa terronst act pursuant to Count 2 of the Amended IndIctment of 30 October 2012 The volitional commIssIon of an act by means liable to cause a public danger with the mtent to cause a state of terror are the elements of the crime of commlttmg a terronst act by means liable to cause a public danger pursuant to Arttcle 314 of the Lebanese Cnmmal Code Sce Applicable Law DecisIOn, para. 147. The Appeals Chamber has also recogmzed that the element of means liable to cause a public danger may result from an attack on a prominent pollhcalleader, like HARIRI, and that the means are closely mterllnked wIth the mtent to cause a state of terror. See Applicable Law DecisIOn, paras 127-128 196 A YV ASH and BADREDDINE are charged wIth the mtentlonal homICIde of 21 others kIlled m the terrorist attack, see Count 4 of the Amended IndIctment of 30 October 2012, paras 53-54, as well as the Attempted Intentional HomICIde of the 226 persons mJured as a result of the terrorist attack, see Count 5 of the Amended IndIctment of 30 October 2012, paras. 55-56. Intentional homICIde IS a crime under ArtIcle 547 of the LCC, and the Appeals Chamber has recogmzed knowledge and mtent as elements. See Applicable Law DeCISIon, paras. 162-163. ArtIcles 200 and 201 of the LCC crlmmallze attempt WIth respect to felomes, mcludmg mtentlonal homICIde The Appeals Chamber has dIscussed the elements of attempt under the LCe. Applicable Law DeCISIon, paras. 176, 180 and 182. Fmally, ArtIcle 189 of the LCC recognizes dolus eventualls, whIch the Appeals Chamber also dIscussed. See Applicable Law DeCISIon, para 165 197 See Amended IndIctment of 30 October 2012, Counts 3-5, ArtIcle 549( 1) of LCC; Applicable Law DeCISIon, para. 168.
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responsibility and acted as the liaison between A YYASH and ONEISSI and SABRA.198
108. ONEISSI and SABRA have a history of contact with each other and with S 15, who used Purple 231. In particular, ONEISSI and SABRA were in contact with each other on their Purple phones 84 times between 12 January 2003 and 16 February 2005. 199 SABRA has been in contact 212 times with S 15 on Purple 231 between 7 January 2003 and 14 February 2005/00 and ONEISSI 195 times with SI5 on Purple 231 between 25 June 2003 and 26 January 2005.201 Between 4 December 2003 and 6 February 2005, S15 on Purple 231 was in contact 29 times with AYYASH on PMP 165, PMP 935, and PMP 091, and in particular seven times on PMP 091 between 23 January 2005 and 6 February 2005.202
109. ABU ADASS IS a [REDACTED].203
110. ABU ADASS often attended the Arab University Mosque of Beirut, also known as "the AI-Houry Mosque" (the "Arab University Mosque"), [REDACTED], and where he would sometimes lead prayers.204 [REDACTED].20S
111. On 22, 29, 30, and 31 December 2004 and 3 and 7 January 2005, ONEISSI was in the vicinity of the Arab UniversIty Mosque.206 On four of those days, ONEISSI, on Purple 095 was also in contact with SABRA on Purple 018 and S 15 on Purple 231.207 On 30 and 31 December 2004 and I, 3, 4, 5, 6, and 7 January 2005, SABRA was in the vicinity of the Arab University Mosque. On each of those days, SA BRA on Purple 018, was also in contact with ONEISSI, on Purple 095, or S15, on Purple 231, or both.208
198 R91-200334, p. 59-167 199 R91-800077. 200 R91-800075. 201 R91-800077 202 R91-800099 20J [REDACTED] 204R91-100274paras. 74-76. R91-100284 para. 60 205 [REDACTED] 206 R91-200334 p59-167 207 R91-200334 p59-167 208 R91-200334 p59-167
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112. At the beginning of January 2005, [REDACTED].209
113. Around the same time period, ONEISSI, acting as Mohammed, met another individual under strikingly similar circumstances. ONEISSI also asked thIS individual If he could teach him how to pray. The individual did not have time to teach ONEISSI, but he identified ABU ADASS as someone who could do so and offered to introduce ONEISSI to him. ONEISSI declined the offer of an introduction, and made arrangements to meet the individual on another day when he had time to teach ONEISSI how to pray. The individual was late for this appolDtment, and he never saw ONEISSI after his first meeting with him.2IO
114. [REDACTED].2I1 [REDACTED].212
115. On the same day, S3 and BADREDDINE were ID contact on five occasions between 06:19 and 09:00.213 Aside from one call by SABRA at 00:03 none of the three Purple phones were used on 16 January 2005. Save for SABRA's call at 00:03, this was the only day since 9 January 2003 when 'all three phones were inactive at the same time. They neither called each other nor other people. This is a significant anomaly in their phone usage, especially considering that It happened on the day ABU ADASS dIsappeare· d .214
116. [REDACTED],215 [REDACTED].216 [REDACTED].217
117. [REDACTED].218
118. On 17 January 2005, ONEISSI was in the vicinity of the Arab University Mosque,
[REDACTED], between 20:55 and 21 :03, [RED ACTED]. ONEISSI was ID contact
209 [REDACTED] 210 R91-100284. para. 76. R91-100329 211 [RED ACTED] 212 [REDACTED] 213 R91-200334, para 512,514 and 515. 214 R91-800075; R91-800076; R91-800077 215 [REDACTED] 216 [REDACTED] 217 [REDACTED] 218 [REDACTED]
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with SI 5 at 21 :03. This IS the last time any of the Purple phones activated cells in the vicinity of the Arab University Mosque. 219
119. [REDACTED].22o
120. ONEISSl's and SABRA's involvement in selecting ABU ADASS, and ONEISSl's involvement in his disappearance, demonstrate their volitional involvement in preparing the false claim of responsibility in order to shield the perpetrators from justice. It further demonstrates their knowledge of the criminal intentions of the perpetrators and their intent to assist the perpetrators in the commission of the crimes.221
VIII. THE TERRORIST ATTACK
121. On 14 February 2005, AYYASH and the other members of the Assassination Team positioned themselves in locatIOns where they were able to track and observe HARIRI's convoy at Quraitem Palace, Parliament, and his return as far as the area of the St. Georges Hotel, enabling them to execute the attack. That morning, beginning at 04:55, the Assassmation Team operated using thelT Blue Network Phones m South Beirut and then moved to the vicmity of Parliament and the crime scene.222
122. On 14 February 2005, HARIRI was at Quraitem Palace and had various meetings until he left for Parliament sometime after 10:30. 223 He was due to return to the palace for a weekly scheduled lunch at around 13 :00. 224
123. HARIRI drove to Parliament in his armoured Mercedes as part of a six vehicle convoy. The first vehicle in the convoy was a Land Cruiser with four ISF close protection team members. The second vehicle was a Mercedes equipped with jammmg devices and dnven by and transporting civilian bodyguards. The third
219 R91-800075; R91-800076; R91-800077, R91-200334, p. 167-168, paras. 516-523 220 [REDACTED] 221 ONEISSI and SABRA are charged with being accomphces to the felomes to commit a terrorist act by means of an explosive deVIce and of intentIOnal homIcides wIth premeditatIOn. See Amended IndIctment of 30 October 2012, Counts 6-9, paras. 57-64; see also ArtIcles 188, 189,200,201,219(4) and (5), 314, 547, 549 of the Lebanese Criminal Code, and ArtIcle 6 of the Lebanese Law of 11 January 1958. The Appeals Chamber has identified the elements of comphclty under Lebanese Law See Apphcable Law DecJSJon, paras. 219 and 220. 222 R91-200334 p303-313 para. 929-951. 223 R91-200088, para. 48. 224 R91-200088, para 62
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vehicle was HARIRI's annoured Mercedes. This was followed by two black Mercedes equipped with jamming devices and driven by and transporting civilian bodyguards. The final car in the convoy was an ambulance. 22S The jamming devices were working on the day of the attack and turned on.226 [REDACTED].227
124. HARIRI had arrived at Parliament at 10:54.228
125. Red Network activIty began at 11 :00, when S8, who was on the coastal road to the east of Quraitem Palace, called S6, who was in the vicinity, of Quraitem Palace. S8 then called S9, who was also on the coastal road. There were 33 calls within the Red Network between 11 :00 and 12:53, mostly in the vicinity of Parliament and the St. Georges Hotel. 229 DUring this time frame there were also Blue Network calls as the Assassination Team continued to move from South Beirut to their positions. By 11 :48, all subjects had switched from their Blue Network Phones to Red Network phones and were in the vicinities of Parliament, the crime scene or the route in between. The Blue Network Phones were not used again that day until after the attack. 230
126. At around 11 :54, HARIRI left Parliament,23I and went to the Cafe Place de I'Etoile.232 As HARIRI walked to the cafe, S6, S8 and S9 exchanged calls on their Red Network phones. S8 and S9 were in the vicinity ofParhament. This demonstrates Red Network users informing each other of HA RI RI's movements. At around 11 :56, a Mltsubishi Canter van is seen on CCTV cameras travelling through the President Solaiman Franjiye Tunnel, which is close to the crime scene. The Mitsubishi Canter van appears to pull off the main road on exiting the Tunnel. 233 At 11 :57 AYYASH received a call from s5, both were in the area of the crime scene?34
22S R91-200069, para 12 and 29, R91-200059, p. 9 226 R91-200069, para. 67 R91-600053, para. 28. 227 [REDACTED] 228 R91-200334, para. 942.; R91-200126, R91-200132, P 27. R91-200054 229 R91-200334 p307-339 para 945-975. 230 R91-200334 p307-346 para. 945-993. 231 R91-200126, R91-200132, P 160. R91-200054 232 R91-200087,para. 21. 233 R91-1 00050 para.163-165 234 R91-20334, p 320, para. 959
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127. At 11:58, AYYASH, on Green 300, while positioned close to the area of the St. Georges Hotel, contacted BADREDDINE on Green 023 for 14 seconds.m The Green Network phones were never used again. 236 BADREDDINE's phones all had been inactive for the three hours preceding this call. This inactivity is highly unusual for BADREDDINE. Between 11 :59 and 12:02, BADREDDINE made calls to unidentified phones using SMP 944. For the next two and a half hours BADREDDINE neither made nor received any calls and only received text messages. Again this was highly unusual for BADREDDINE. 237
128. Between 12:00 and 12:16, there were 11 Red Network calls.23~ During this time period, S5 moved from the VIcinity of the crime scene to an area west of Parliament. AYYASH and S7 were in areas between the crime scene and Parliament. S8 was in the vicmity of Parliament, S6 was southwest of Parliament, and S9 moved from the vicinity ofParhament to an area southwest ofParliament.239
129. At approximately 12:25, HARIRI eXIted the cafe [REDACTED] before re-entering the cafe.24o At 12:26, there was one Red Network call between S9 and S6. At 12:43, A YY ASH called S8. 241
130. At approximately 12:49, HARIRI left the cafe and returned to his armoured car.242 [REDACTED].243 HARIRI's car followed the lead vehicle.244 The jamming deVIces were working as the convoy left Parliament.245 The convoy formation was as described above. 246
131. Immediately, the Red Network activity recommenced. At 12:49, S9 called S8. At 12:50:34, S8, located near Parliament, made a five second call to S7, located in the vicinity of the St. Georges Hotel. Immediately after, at 12:50:55, S8 made a 10 second
235 R91-200334, p 325, para. 962 236 R91-200334, p. 325, para. 962. 237 R91-800098. 238 R91-200334, p. 326, para. 964. 239 R91-200334 p 326, para. 964. 240 [REDACTED] 241 R91-200334 pp. 332-333, para. 967-969. 242 R91-600059, p. 10. R91-200126, R91-200132, P 184 and 192, R91-200054 243 [REDACTED] 244 R91-200059, p. 11. 24S R91 -400177pg 4 246 R91-1 00223para. 6 and 19
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call to A YY ASH, who was still located between Parliament and the St. Georges Hotel. At 12:51 :32, S8 called S9 for seven seconds. At 12:52:02, S9 called S5 for 20 seconds. At 12:52:09, S8 called S6 for 13 seconds.247 All members of the Assassination Team had been informed that HARIRI was on the move.
248 132. The Mitsubishi Canter van began moving towards the St. Georges Hote1. At 12:53, S9, in the vicinity of Parliament, made the final Red Network call to S6, nearby.249 The Red Network phones were never used again. 25o
133. At 12:55/51 an unidentified male suicide bomber detonated the improvised explosive device contained in the Mltsublshi Canter van with engine block number 4D33- J01926 as HARIRI's convoy drove past.252
134. Based on the crater Size, the phYSical. damage to the surrounding environment, including buildings and cars, specifically designed computational models, and explosion experiments/53 the quantity of explosives was equivalent to approximately 2,500kg to 3,000kg of TNT. 254 The chemical composition of the explosives used was cyclotrimethylene tnnitramine (RDX): pentaerythritol tetranitrate (PETN):
trinitrotoluene (TNT), in the ratio of 10: 1: 1. 255
135. Twenty one people were killed in addition to HARlRI256 including seven members of HARIRI's convoy257, Bassel Fuleihan, who was travelling in HARIRI's car,258 and thirteen bystanders. As a result of the attack, 226 people were injured. 259 Biological materials were collected from the crime scene. None of these materials came from ABU ADASS.26o
247 R91-200334, pp 336-337, paras. 972-975. 248 R91-1 00050 para. 166-168 249 R91-200334 p 338, para 978 250 R91-200334 p 338, para 978 251 R91-602920, 1I A 252 R91-200452; R91-602861; R91-602920, III.B; R91-606444; R91-606735 253 R91-600001 254 R91-602920, III.C.2; R91-606444 2SS R91-602920, III.C.I 256 R91-602957, R91-100278R91-400175R91-600023, R91-100314 257 R91-100222 para. 9. 258 R91-1 00222 para. 9 259 R91-400005; R91-400010-R91-4001 57; R91-400167-R91-400169, R91-400171-R91-400172 260 R91-602920, 1I.C 5
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136. The perpetrators carefully chose the method of detonating the Improvised ExplOSive Device (lED) - the use of a suicide bomber - as it was the option most likely to succeed in the circumstances. The circumstances, IOcluding the speed of the convoy, the specific environment, and the complexity of the attack itself, did not allow for a margin of error despite the massive quantity of military explosives used. The perpetrators carefully prepared the attack IOcluding choosing the location - in the corridor between two tall buildin'gs where the convoy had to slow down - and the specific setup of the lED concealed inside the loading platform of the Mitsubishi Canter. They also relied upon specific logistical support including the surveillance of HARIRI's convoy to report on both its timing and the position of the target vehicle within the convoy?61
137. A YY ASH's actions on 14 February 2005 demonstrate that he coordinated the terronst attack of 14 February 2005. BADREDDINE's actions demonstrate that he monitored the attack through contact with A YYASH. It follows from these acts and the well planned nature of the attack that they had agreed with others, including the members ofthe Assassination Team, to commit a terrorist act in order to kill HARIRI. Their actions also demonstrate their intent to commit the terrorist attack agalOst HARIRI by means liable to create a public danger. Their choice of means to commit the attack further demonstrates their intent to kill other individuals in HARIRI's convoy and in the vicinity of the crime scene, or that they foresaw that such deaths would occur and accepted this risk. Furthermore, their choice of means and target demonstrate their intent to cause a state of terror.262
IX. THE DELIVERY OF THE VIDEO AFTER THE TERRORIST ATTACK
138. By 10 February 2005, the main preparations for the attack had been completed. Extensive observations of locations and surveillance of HARIRI's movements had been conducted over at least 46 days in order to decide on the best location and timing for the attack. Of particular note, on 8 February 2005, A YY ASH and the Assassination Team had conducted surveillance of HA RI RI while he traveled along
261 R91-606735 262 See, supra, footnotes 181, 182, 193, 194, and 220.
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the same route as on the day of the attack. The perpetrators had identified and chosen ABU ADASS, he had disappeare.d, and, presumably, the false claim of responsibility had been made. The Mitsubishi Canter van that was used in the attack had been purchased. The Parliamentary sessIOn of 14 February 2005 had been well publicized263 and ifHARIRI were to attend the parliamentary session, his movements were likely to be the same as his movements on 8 February 2005. Phone card number 6162569 was purchased on or around 10 February 2005 at the Al Nahr Ministry of
Telecommunications branch in BeIrut, 264 completing the final step necessary for the false claim ofresponsibihty, and thus, for the attack.
139. After a decrease in communicatIOns among the Purple phones between 18 January and 13 February 2005, communications resumed on 14 February 2005. 265 On 14
February 2005, ONEISSI and SABRA were in contact five times, 266 whilst SABRA and S 15 were in contact 7 times. 267
140. Following the attack on 14 February 2005, four telephone calls to news agencies were made in connection with the false claim of responsibility. One call was made to
Reuters News Agency and three calls were made to AI-Jazeera. 268
141. The call to Reuters and the three calls to AI-Jazeera were made using the same phone card, serial number 6162569 from four different public payphones in Beirut. 269
142. After the attack, SABRA was in South Beirut until at least 13.33 and ONEISSI until at least 13.46.270 They both then travelled in the direction of the payphone (First Payphone) from which the first call to Reuters was made. 27I At 13:59, ONEISSI actIvated a cell south of the First Payphone and west of his location at 13 :46. At 14:01, SABRA activated a cell adjacent to the one activated by ONEISSI at 13:59. At 14:03, S 15 called SABRA who activated a cell approximately 1-2 km south of the
263 R91-200093para, 25, R91-200211. R91-200211 264 R91-I00237, p. 2; R91-I00298, paras. 24, 28 and 52. 265 R91-800075; R91-800076; R91-800077 266 R91-S00075; R91-S00076; R91-S00077 267 R91-S00075; R91-S00076; R91-S00077 268 R91-200334, para. 1004. 269 R91-200334, para. 1004-1005 270 R91-200334, para 1006 and 1007 271 R91-200334, para lOOS.
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First Payphone.272 SABRA and ONEISSl's phone activity between 13:33 and 14:03 shows that both travelled from South Beirut towards the First Payphone. Their location around 14:00 indicates that either of them could have travelled to the First Payphone by 14:11 to make the first call to Reuters. During the 14:11 call, ONEISSI or SABRA claimed responsibility for the attack on behalf of "Nusra and Jihad Group in Greater Syria". 213
143. At 14:19, ONEISSI or SABRA made a phone caU to AI-Jazeera from another payphone (Second Payphone), about 330 metres from the First Payphone.274 ONEISSI or SABRA claimed responsibility for the attack on behalf of "Nusra and Jihad Group in Greater Syria", reading a statement over the phone that was similar in content to what was on the videotape. 275 SABRA and ONEISSl's locations before the calls made from the First and Second Payphones, the distance betWeen the two payphones and the time between the two calls indicate that either SABRA or ONEISSI made the 14: 19 call. Further, some twenty m inutes after the 14: 19 call, SABRA and ONEISSI both activated the cell approximately 1-2 km south of the First and Second Payphones.276
144. After the 14: 19 call to AI-Jazeera, [REDACTED] read the statement made over the 277 phone on-air. Following on from this, a second phone call to AI-Jazeera was made from a different payphone (Thud Payphone) at 15:27.278 The caller, SABRA, advised of the location of a videotape in a tree in the ESCW A Square, also known as the Riad al Solh Square. SABRA stated that should the vldeotape not be picked up within 15 minutes, it would disappear.279 Shortly thereafter, at 15:54, ONEISSI and. SABRA activated the cells in the vicinity of the tree and the Third Payphone respectively.28o
This fact, In conjunction with the time constraints placed on the retrieval of the videotape by SABRA, indicates that whilst SABRA made the 15:27 phone call, ONEISSI watched the tree. The distance between the Third Payphone and the tree is
m R91-200334, para. 1008-1009,1018. 273 R91-200262, para 38 274 R91-200334, para. lOll, 1018. 27S R91-200263, para 42. 276 R91-200334, para. 1015, 1018. 277 [REDACTED] 278 R91-200334 para. 1004 and 1020 279 R91-200263, para. 58. 280 R91-200334, para 1026
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over one kilometer.281 In order to ensure that ONEISSI or SABRA could observe the pick ,up of the video and subsequently report on it, it was necessary for one to make the call, whilst the other watched over the tree.
145. [REDACTED] retrieved the videotape. At 15:50, he sent a text to a colleague, telling her that he had the vldeotape.282 The video tape was accompanied by a letter.283
146. At 15:53, S15 called SABRA, who was in the vicimty of the Third Payphone.284 Immediately after, at 15:54, SABRA called ONEISSI, who was in the vicinity of the tree in which the videotape had been placed.285 At 15:55, SABRA called S15.286 ONEISSI had been watching the tree and confirmed to SABRA that the videotape had been picked up. SA BRA reported to S 15.
147. S 15 called SABRA at 16:00, as he was travelling towards Riad al Solh Square. 287 At 16:01 and 16:02, ONEISSI called SABRA, with both phones activating the same 288 cell, near the tree. ONEISSI and SABRA then returned to South Beirut. 289
148. At 16:53, ONEISSI was active in South Beirut.29o At 16:55, SABRA was in Southwest Beirut, North of the airport. 291 At 17 :04, ONEISSI or SABRA made the
fourth phone call t9 AI-Jazeera from a payphone (Fourth Payphone), 292 situated Northwest of SABRA's location at 16:55.293 Either ONEISSI or SABRA made the call, as either could have travelled from their previous locations. [REDACTED] should broadcast the video or he would regret it. 294
281 R91-200334, para. 1032 282 R91-200267, para 60 283 R91-200263, para 66 284 R91-200334, para 1025. 285 R91-200334, para. 1026. 286 R91-200334, para 1027. 287 R91-200334, para 1030 and 1031 288 R91-200334, para 1032. 289 R91-200334, para 1033-1035. 290 R91-200334, para 1034 291 R91-200334, para 1035. 292 R91-200334, para. 1036 and 1004. 293 R91-200334" para. 1039. 294 [REDACTED]
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149. The video was broadcast on television by AI-Jazeera shortly after the 17:04 call. 295 When played, the vIdeo tape showed ABU ADASS dressed in black with a white turban and a long beard, claiming responslbihty for the attack against HARIRI.296
150. On the video, ABU ADASS stated:
"In the name of Allah, Lord of the Worlds, Blessmgs and Peace be upon his Beloved Prophet and his family and all his compamons In support of our brothers, the MUJahedeen in the Land of the Two Holy Mosques, and to avenge their mnocent martyrs, who were killed by the security forces of the infidel Saudi regime in the Land of the Two Holy Mosques, we have resolved, having placed our trust in God Almighty, to inflict just punishment upon the agent of that regime and its cheap tool in Greater Syria, the sIDner and holder of ill-gotten gains Rafiq Harlri, through the execution of a surrounding martyrdom operation; such as to confirm our promise of 'Nusra' and 'jihad' and to herald numerous martyrdom operations agamst the mfideis, apostates and tyrants ID the Greater SYria. Praise to be AlIah, Lord of the Worlds.,,297
151. The letter accompanying the video claimed responsibility for the attack, which it described as a martyrdom operation, on behalf of the group "Nusra and Jihad Group in Greater Syria" and named ABU ADASS as the suicide bomber.298
152. At 17:15, SABRA called S15, at which time SABRA was in the area of the Fourth Payphone.299 At 17:24, S15 called SABRA, who was back in South Beirut.30o This was the last phone contact between the three Purple phones.30l
153. The attack on HARIRI occurred at approximately 12:55. Starting at 13 :08 until 20:34, the complete Assassination Team except SS was located in the same area of South Beirut.302 In particular, A YYASH was in this area in the early evening after the attack. BADREDDINE was also in this same area and had been there all day, until at least 22:16. AYVASH and BADREDDINE activated the same cell tower within thirty minutes of each other, between 19:55 and 20:24. BADREDDINE was still at
this location at least until 21: 19 when he actIvated the same cell tower again. 303
295 R91-200263, para. 82. 296 R91-S00001. 297 R91-S00002. 298 R91-S00002. 299 R91-200334, para 1037 and 1039 300 R91-200334, para 1038. 301 R91-200334, para. 1038. 302 R91-8000SI, R91-800042, R91-8000S0, R91-8000S4, R91-8000SS, R91-8000S7 and R91-800098 303 R91-8000S7 and R91-800098
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154. S15 was also in the same area as the Assassination Team and BADREDDINE, and had been throughout the day. At 16:53 on the afternoon of the attack, ONEISSI was in South Beirut, activating a cell tower in the same area as the Assassmation Team. By 21 :01, SABRA was ·also in this area. 304
305 155. The day after the attack, on 15 February 2005, S15's Purple 231 ceased being used. On 16 February 2005, ONEISSl's Purple 095 and SABRA's Purple 018 ceased being used.306
156. ONEISSl's and SABRA's actions demonstrate that they hadjomed the conspiracy to commit a terrorist act by assassmating HARIRI with the agreed role of participating in the preparation and dissemination of a false claim of responsibility in order to shield the perpetrators from justice.307 The statements made in the phone calls to AI Jazeera and the contents of the video-tape demonstrate their knowledge of the crimes committed, including that HARIRI was the target and had been killed, the means used, and the intentions of the perpetrators.308
x. [REDACTED]
157. [REDACTED].309 [REDACTED]310 [REDACTED].3\1
158. [REDACTED]312 [REDACTED],313 [REDACTED].314
159. [REDACTED]315
304 R91-800075; R91-800076, R91-800077 305 R91-200334, para 1044. 306 R91-200334, para 1047 and 1049 307 See Amended Indictment of30 October 2012, Count I, paras 47-48; see also Articles 2 & 3(1)(a) of the Statute of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon; Articles 188, 212, 213, 270, and 314 of the Lebanese Criminal Code; Articles 6 & 7 of the Lebanese Law of 11 January 1958, and Apphcable Law DeCISion, para 202 308 See Amended Indictment ofJO October 2012, Counts 6-9, paras. 57-64; see also Articles 2 & 3(\)(a) of the Statute of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon; Articles 188, 189,200,201,219(4) and (5), 314, 547, 549 of the Lebanese Crlmmal Code, and Article 6 of the Lebanese Law of 11 January 1958. See Applicable Law DeCision, paras. 219 and 220. 309 [REDACTED] 310 [REDACTED] 311 [REDACTED] 312 [REDACTED] 313 [REDACTED] 314 [REDACTED] 315 [RED ACTED]
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A. {REDACTED}
}'60. [REDACTED]316 [REDACTED]317 [REDACTED]318
161. [REDACTED]319
162. [REDACTED]32o [REDACTED.321
163. [REDACTED]322 [REDACTED]323
164. [REDACTED]324 [REDACTED]325
165. [REDACTED]326
166. [REDACTED]327 [REDACTED]328 [REDACTEDf29 [REDACTED]33O [REDACTED]331 [REDACTED]332
167. [REDACTED]333 [REDACTED]334 [REDACTED]335 [REDACTED]336 [REDACTED]337 [REDACTED]338 [REDACTED]339 [REDACTED]34o [REDACTED]34I
316 [RED ACTED] 317 [REDACTED] 318 [REDACTED] 319 [REDACTED] 320 [REDACTED] 321 [REDACTED] 322 [REDACTED] 323 [REDACTED] 324 [REDACTED] 325 [REDACTED. 326 [REDACTED] 327 [REDACTED] 328 [REDACTED] 329 [REDACTED] 330 [REDACTED 331 [REDACTED] m [REDACTED] 333 [RED ACTED] 334 [REDACTED] 33S [REDACTED] 336 [REDACTED] 3J7 [REDACTED] 338 [REDACTED] 339 [REDACTED] 340 [REDACTED] 341 [REDACTED]
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168. [REDACTED]342 [REDACTED]343 [REDACTED]344 [REDACTED]345 [REDACTED]346
B. Attacks in K uwail
169. On 27 March 1984, the State Security Court of Kuwait (Court of Kuwait) convicted the 23 years old "Elias Fouad SAAB" an alias of BADREDDINE, along with 16 other individuals for a senes of terrorist attacks carried out in Kuwait on 12 December 1983.347 The preparation of and their commission on one day required a team of operators 16 of whom were convicted along with SA AB. The State Security Court of Kuwait established that SAAB and another accused developed and Implemented the 349 plan for execution348 and that roles were distributed among the other accused. To commit each attack, vehicles prepared with explosives were used. One attack consisted of a suicide bomber driving a truck loaded with explosives into the American embassy.350 The Court of Kuwait held that SAAB selected the cars351 and prepared the explosive devices352 which required "a broad technical experien.ce in the make and use ofexplosives".353 The Court of Kuwait held that the night and early morning prior to the attacks, SAAB toured what would later become the crime scenes, set the timers, supervised and instructed the operatives. 354
170. In its judgement, the Court of Kuwait found that 'SAAB' was an explosive expert, a trade he learned in,his country Lebanon. The Court of Kuwait also found that 'SAAB' coordinated the purchase of vehicles and explosives, as well the perpetration of the attacks.355
342 [REDACTED] 343 [REDACTED] 344 [REDACTED] 345 [REDACTED] 346 [REDACTED] 347 [REDACTED] 348 [REDACTED] 349 [REDACTED] 350 [REDACTED] 351 [REDACTED] 352 [REDACTED] 353 [REDACTED] 354 [REDACTED] 3SS [RED ACTED]
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171. BADREDDINE as "SAAB" instructed that every car bomb driven to a site be followed by another car driven by a partner who should pick up the driver of the car bomb away from the explosion scene.356
C. Conclusion
172. [REDACTED]357 [REDACTED]358
173. [REDACTED]
174. [REDACTED]
175. The series of terrorist attacks carried out in Kuwait on 12 December 1983 present
simila~ or analogous features with the attack against HARIRI wIth regards to the participation of BADREDDINE, who coordinated and monitored the preparation and perpetration of all these attacks just as he later did in relation to the HARIRI attack. Just as in the HARIRI attack, BADREDDINE, as 'SAAB' was involved in the observations of the crime scenes before the attacks and the selection of the vehicles that were used during the attacks. All these attacks were committed through the detonation of explosives stored in or under motorized vehicles in public streets, in broad day light. The evidence further demonstrates a consistent pattern of conduct probative to the charges against BADREDDINE in the Indictment.
356 R91-300282, ERN 60274835-60274839. 357 [REDACTED] 358 [REDACTED]
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XI. CONCLUSION
176. The Prosecution submits this pre-trial brief pursuant to Rule 91(G). Based on the evidence summarized above, the Prosecution submits that the Accused arc responsible for the crimes for which they are charged in the Indictment.
Dated this 15th day of November 2012 Leidschendarn, The Netherlands
19162 Word count
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