Annex a Pre-Trial Brief
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R132552 PUBLIC STL-ll-011PTIPTJ F0534/A01IPRV/201211191R132551-RI32604IEN/pvk BEFORE THE PRE-TRIAL JUDGE Special Tribunal for Lebanon Case No: STL-ll-OIIPTIPTJ Before: Pre-Trial Judge Registrar: Mr. Herman von Hebel Date: 15 November 2012 Filing Party: Prosecutor Original language: English Classification: Public Redacted THE PROSECUTOR v. SALlM JAMIL AYY ASH, MUST AFA AMINE BADREDDINE, HUSSEIN HASSAN ONEISSI & ASSAD HAS SAN SABRA Prosecution Pre-Trial Brief Pursuant to Rule 91 Office of the Prosecutor: Counsel for Mr. Salim Jamil Ayyash: Mr. Norman FarreIl Mr. Eugene O'Sulhvan Mr. Emile Aoun Legal Representatives of Victims: Counsel for Mr. Mustafa Amine Badreddine: Mr. Peter Haynes Mr. Antoine Korkmaz Mr. Mohammad F Mattar Mr. John Jones Ms. Nada Abdelsater-Abusamra Counsel for Mr. Hussein Hassan Oneissi: Mr. Vincent CourceIle-Labrousse Mr. Yasser Hassan Counsel for Mr. Assad Hassan Sabra: Mr. David Young Mr. Guenael Mettraux R132553 PUBLIC STL-II-0l/PT/PTJ F0534/AOIIPRVl201211191R132551-RI32604/EN/pvk I. INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................................ 1 11. THE ACCUSED .................................................................................................................. 3 A. MUSTAFA AMINE BADREDDINE ......................................................................................... 3 B. SALIM JAMIL A YY ASH ........................................................................................................ 5 C. HUSSEIN HASSAN ONEISSI .................................................................................................. 5 D. ASSAD HASSAN SABRA ...................................................................................................... 6 m. THE VICTIMS .................................................................................................................. 6 A. RAFIK HARIRI ..................................................................................................................... 6 B. OTHER VICTIMS .................................................................................................................. 6 IV. THE USE OF PHONE NETWORKS TO PREPARE AND EXECUTE THE ATTACK '............................................................................................................................ 7 A. THE RED NETWORK ........................................................................................................... 7 B. THE GREEN NETWORK ....................................................................................................... 8 C. THE BLUE NETWORK .......................................................................................................... 9 D. THE YELLOW NETWORK .................................................................................................. 10 E. THE PURPLE PHONES ........................... .' ............................................................................ 10 F. PERSONAL AND SEQUENTIAL MOBILE PHONES ................................................................. 11 V. ATTRIBUTION OF PHONES ...............................................•.•.•.....................•.......•...... 11 A. BADREDDINE's PHONES .............................................................................................. 13 B. A YYASH's PHONES ........................................................................................................ 17 C. ONEISSI's PHONES ............................................................ ~ ............................................ 19 D. SABRA's PHONES ........................................................................................................... 19 VI. THE CONSPIRACY ....................................................................................................... 19 VII. PREPARATIONS FOR THE TERRORIST A TTACK ............................................ 20 A. OBSERVATIONS IN PREPARATION FOR THE ATTACK ......................................................... 20 1. Surveillance on 11 November 2004 ............................................................................. 21 2. Observations on 21 December 2004 ............................................................................ 22 3. Observations on 30 December 2004 ............................................................................ 22 4. Purchase of the Red Network Handsets and Phones ................................................... 22 5. Observations on 14 January 2005 ................................................................................ 23 6. Planned Surveillance on 20 January 2005 ................................................................. 23 7. Observations on 28 January 2005 ................................................................................ 24 8. Surveillance and Observations on 31 January 2005 .................................................... 25 9. Topping up the credit on the Red Network phones ..................................................... 26 10. Surveillance on 3 February 2005 ............................................................................... 27 11. Surveillance on 8 February 2005 ............................................................................... 28 12. Final preparations before the Attack .......................................................................... 31 13. Conclusion as to Observations and SurveIllance ....................................................... 31 B. THE PURCHASE OF THE MITSUBISHI CANTER VAN USED AS THE VBIED TO PERPETRATE THE TERRORIST ATTACK ................................................................................................. 32 C. PREPARATIONS RELATED TO THE FALSE CLAIM OF RESPONSIBILITy ................................ 34 VIII. THE TERRORIST A TTACK ..•.....•...•..••..........•.........•......•.................•................•..... 37 IX. THE DELIVERY OF THE VIDEO AFTER THE TERRORIST ATTACK .......•.... 41 x. [REDACTED] ................................................................................................................... 46 R132554 PUBLIC STL-II-OIIPTIPTJ F0534/AOIIPRVl20121 I 191R132551-R132604/EN/pvk A. [REDACTED] ................................................................................................................. 47 B. ATTACKS IN KUWAIT ........................................................................................................ 48 C. CONCLUSION .................................................................................................................... 49 XI. CONCLUSION ................................................................................................................ 50 RI32555 PUBLIC STL-II-OIIPTIPTJ F0534/AOIIPRVl201211191R132551-RI32604lEN/pvk I. INTRODUCTION 1. On 14 February 2005, at 12:55 on Rue Minet el,Hos'n in Beirut, as former Prime Mmister Rafik Baha'eddine AL-HARIRI (HARIRI) and his security convoy were returning to his residence at Quraitem Palace from a session of Parliament, a suicide bomber detonated a large quantity of explosives concealed in a Mitsubishi Canter van parked along the side of the road. The resulting explosIOn killed HARIRI and 21 other persons and injured 226 persons. 2. Shortly after the terronst attack, AI-Jazeera news network in Beirut received a video with a letter attached on which a man named Ahmad ABU ADASS (ABU ADASS) falsely claimed to be the suicide bomber on behalf of a non-existent fundamentahst group named "Nusra and Jihad Group m Greater Syria". AI-Jazeera broadcast the video. 3. The assassination of HA RI RI was the culmination of extensive preparation by a select group of persons with either professional skills and/or experience, who acted together to commit this terrorist attack. The Accused, with others, used phones from five mobile phone groups to communicate while preparing and perpetrating this terrorist attack. On at least 50 days there was surveillance of HARIRI and observations of locations assoclated with him, beginning, at the latest on 20 October 2004 until the day of the attack, 14 February 2005. 4. BADREDDINE monitored and together with A YYASH coordinated the observatIOns of HARIRI's residences, Parhament and the eventual crime scene and surveillance of HARIRl's movements. Further, BADREDDINE monitored and together with A YY ASH coordinated the purchase of the M itsubishi Canter, which was used as a Vehicle Borne Improvised Explosive DeVIce (VBIED), carrying the equivalent of approximately 2,500 kg of TNT to perpetrate the attack. After all this preparation, A YY ASH coordinated the perpetratIon of the attack on HARIRI, which BADREDDINE monitored. ONEISSI and SABRA particlpated in identifying a suitable indIVIdual who would be used to make a video-taped false claim of responsibility for the attack, and ensure its dissemination to news agencies immediately after the attack. RI32556 PUBLIC STL-II-OIIPTIPTJ F0534/AOIIPRV120121 I I 91R1 3255 I-R I 32604lEN/pvk 5. The carrying out of these steps, either individually or cumulatively - observation, surveillance, the purchase of certain covert phones used by the Assassination Team, I the purchase of the van suitable to carry the equivalent of approximately 2,500 kg of TNT by persons using false names, the selection of someone for use in making a false claim of responsibility, the coordination or monitoring of preparations and of the attack itself and the dissemination of a false claim of responsibility to shield the