Minorities Under Attack: Faith-Based Discrimination and Violence in Pakistan
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Pakistan's Nuclear Weapons
Pakistan’s Nuclear Weapons Paul K. Kerr Analyst in Nonproliferation Mary Beth Nikitin Specialist in Nonproliferation August 1, 2016 Congressional Research Service 7-5700 www.crs.gov RL34248 Pakistan’s Nuclear Weapons Summary Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal probably consists of approximately 110-130 nuclear warheads, although it could have more. Islamabad is producing fissile material, adding to related production facilities, and deploying additional nuclear weapons and new types of delivery vehicles. Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal is widely regarded as designed to dissuade India from taking military action against Pakistan, but Islamabad’s expansion of its nuclear arsenal, development of new types of nuclear weapons, and adoption of a doctrine called “full spectrum deterrence” have led some observers to express concern about an increased risk of nuclear conflict between Pakistan and India, which also continues to expand its nuclear arsenal. Pakistan has in recent years taken a number of steps to increase international confidence in the security of its nuclear arsenal. Moreover, Pakistani and U.S. officials argue that, since the 2004 revelations about a procurement network run by former Pakistani nuclear official A.Q. Khan, Islamabad has taken a number of steps to improve its nuclear security and to prevent further proliferation of nuclear-related technologies and materials. A number of important initiatives, such as strengthened export control laws, improved personnel security, and international nuclear security cooperation programs, have improved Pakistan’s nuclear security. However, instability in Pakistan has called the extent and durability of these reforms into question. Some observers fear radical takeover of the Pakistani government or diversion of material or technology by personnel within Pakistan’s nuclear complex. -
Poverty, Inequality, Political Instability and Property Crimes in Pakistan a Time Series Analysis
Poverty, Inequality, Political Instability and Property Crimes in Pakistan A Time Series Analysis Shabib Haider Syed* Eatzaz Ahmad∗ ABSTRACT In a formal econometric analysis of crime statistics in Pakistan, this paper estimates five systems of equations determining crime rates against property, conviction rates and police and justice input using time series annual data. The study finds substantial empirical support for the model of crime, punishment and deterrence based on economic theory. The main conclusion of the study is that in the fight against crime Pakistan needs to divert resources from provision of legal justice through various deterrence measures, like large police force, conviction and punishment, towards the provision of social justice in the form of fight against poverty, inequality and unemployment and maintenance of political stability, especially by controlling sect and ethnic based terrorists activities. Resources also need to be diverted from punishments to apprehension of criminals. Keywords: crime deterrence, inequality, Pakistan, political instability, poverty. JEL: K42 * Shabib Haider Syed -Associate Professor- Department of Economics, Forman Christian College (A Chartered University), Ferozepur Road Lahore-56400, Pakistan. Email: [email protected] Tel: 92- 3004215159 ∗ Eatzaz Ahmad – Professor- Department of Economics, Quaid-i-Azam University Islamabad, Pakistan. Email: [email protected] Tel: 92-51-90643044, 92-51-90643020. 1 1. INTRODUCTION Crime is a complex socio-economic phenomenon, which needs to be addressed by social scientists as well as policy makers at the regional and global levels. The extensive research on the causes of crime has resulted in rich theoretical foundations. In the first formal treatment of economics of crime, Becker (1968) emphasized that criminals act as rational maximizing agents while making choices, keeping in view the expected benefits and costs of committing crime. -
Scoping the Illegal Economy in Pakistan
DISCLAIMER The contents of this publication do not necessarily reflect the views or policies of UNODC, SDPI or contributory organizations and neither do they imply any endorsement. The designations employed and the presentation of material in this publication do not imply the expression of nay opinion whatsoever on the part of UNODC concerning the legal status of any country, territory or city or its authorities of concerning the delimitation of its frontiers or boundaries. ii iii TABLE OF CONTENTS PREFACE ............................................................................................................................................. i ACKNOWLEDMENTS ......................................................................................................................... iii EXPLANATORY NOTES ....................................................................................................................... v ACRONYMS ..................................................................................................................................... vii EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ...................................................................................................................... ix 1 INTRODUCTION .................................................................................................................... 1 1.1. Scope of the research ........................................................................................................... 2 1.2. Methodology ....................................................................................................................... -
Effects of Socio-Economic and Political Factors on the Crime Rate in Pakistan
Journal of Political Studies, Vol. 23, Issue - 1, 2016, 183:206 Effects of Socio-Economic and Political Factors on the Crime Rate in Pakistan Nabila Asghar, Shazia Qureshi and Muhammad Nadeem* Abstract The present study is an attempt to explore the impact of social, economic and political factors and the event of 9/11 on crimes in Pakistan for the period 1984-2013. Three models have been estimated for political, economic and social factors separately. The political factors like corruption, law and order, 9/11 event, have been found to increase crimes, whereas government stability reduces the crimes. The economic factors such as poverty increase crimes whereas foreign remittances and external debt reduce crimes. In social factors human rights, human capital, income inequality and population density increase crimes. In short run, error correction terms indicate that there is convergence towards the equilibrium in all the models in case of any shock. Various diagnostic tests have been applied to confirm the reliability of results which indicate that there is no problem of autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity in the models. The study suggests that in order to mitigate criminal activities policy makers should focus on political, social and economic problems faced by Pakistan. Keywords: Law and order, Human rights, Government stability, ARDL, Socio- economic and political factors JEL Classification: A13, C01, H01, J83, K00, P47 I. Introduction Any illegal act or activity that is punishable by law is crime. Crime is an act of human conduct that is harmful to others and the state is bound to prevent it. Crime renders the person liable to punishment as a result of proceeding instigated by the state organs assigned to ascertain the nature, the extent and the legal consequences of the person’s wrongness” (for detail see Auolak, 1999). -
Duties: the Incumbent Serves As a Bodyguard in the Execution of Protective Security Operations for the U.S
U.S. Mission AMERICAN EMBASSY, NEW DELHI, INDIA Announcement Number: New Delhi-2019-084 Position Title: Bodyguard Regional Security Office (RSO) Opening Period: October 30, 2019 – November 5, 2019 Series/Position/Grade: LE-0701 /DLA-562042/05 Salary: Rs. 466,405 (annual salary) *Starting salary will be determined on the basis of qualifications and experience, and/or salary history. For More Info: Human Resources Office Mailing Address: Human Resources Office (Recruitment Team) C/o U.S. Embassy, Shantipath, Chanakyapuri, New Delhi – 110021. E-mail Address: [email protected] Who may apply: All Interested Candidates/All Sources Security Clearance Required: Local Security Certification Duration Appointment: Indefinite - subject to successful completion of probationary period Marketing Statement: We encourage you to read and understand the Eight (8) Qualities of Overseas Employees before you apply. Summary: The U.S. Embassy in New Delhi is seeking an individual for the position of Bodyguard in the Regional Security Office (RSO). The work schedule for this position: Full Time; 40 hours per week Start date: Candidate must be able to begin working within a reasonable period of time of receipt of agency authorization and/or clearances/certifications or their candidacy may end. Supervisory Position: No Duties: The incumbent serves as a Bodyguard in the execution of protective security operations for the U.S. Ambassador/Chief of Mission (COM), and other designated or visiting U.S. Government officials as directed. The incumbent will be under the supervision of the Bodyguard Supervisor and will be managed by the Regional Security Officer (RSO) to U.S. Embassy New Delhi in order to protect COM from harm and embarrassment. -
The Oath a Film by Laura Poitras
The Oath A film by Laura Poitras POV www.pbs.org/pov DISCUSSION GUIDe The Oath POV Letter frOm the fiLmmakers New YorK , 2010 I was first interested in making a film about Guantanamo in 2003, when I was also beginning a film about the war in Iraq. I never imagined Guantanamo would still be open when I finished that film, but sadly it was — and still is today. originally, my idea for the Oath was to make a film about some - one released from Guantanamo and returning home. In May 2007, I traveled to Yemen looking to find that story and that’s when I met Abu Jandal, osama bin Laden’s former bodyguard, driving a taxicab in Sana’a, the capital of Yemen. I wasn’t look - ing to make a film about Al-Qaeda, but that changed when I met Abu Jandal. Themes of betrayal, guilt, loyalty, family and absence are not typically things that come to mind when we imagine a film about Al-Qaeda and Guantanamo. Despite the dangers of telling this story, it compelled me. Born in Saudi Arabia of Yemeni parents, Abu Jandal left home in 1993 to fight jihad in Bosnia. In 1996 he recruited Salim Ham - dan to join him for jihad in Tajikistan. while traveling through Laura Poitras, filmmaker of the Oath . Afghanistan, they were recruited by osama bin Laden. Abu Jan - Photo by Khalid Al Mahdi dal became bin Laden's personal bodyguard and “emir of Hos - pitality.” Salim Hamdan became bin Laden’s driver. Abu Jandal ends up driving a taxi and Hamdan ends up at Guantanamo. -
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) Case Log October 2000 - April 2002
Description of document: Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) Case Log October 2000 - April 2002 Requested date: 2002 Release date: 2003 Posted date: 08-February-2021 Source of document: Information and Privacy Coordinator Central Intelligence Agency Washington, DC 20505 Fax: 703-613-3007 Filing a FOIA Records Request Online The governmentattic.org web site (“the site”) is a First Amendment free speech web site and is noncommercial and free to the public. The site and materials made available on the site, such as this file, are for reference only. The governmentattic.org web site and its principals have made every effort to make this information as complete and as accurate as possible, however, there may be mistakes and omissions, both typographical and in content. The governmentattic.org web site and its principals shall have neither liability nor responsibility to any person or entity with respect to any loss or damage caused, or alleged to have been caused, directly or indirectly, by the information provided on the governmentattic.org web site or in this file. The public records published on the site were obtained from government agencies using proper legal channels. Each document is identified as to the source. Any concerns about the contents of the site should be directed to the agency originating the document in question. GovernmentAttic.org is not responsible for the contents of documents published on the website. 1 O ct 2000_30 April 2002 Creation Date Requester Last Name Case Subject 36802.28679 STRANEY TECHNOLOGICAL GROWTH OF INDIA; HONG KONG; CHINA AND WTO 36802.2992 CRAWFORD EIGHT DIFFERENT REQUESTS FOR REPORTS REGARDING CIA EMPLOYEES OR AGENTS 36802.43927 MONTAN EDWARD GRADY PARTIN 36802.44378 TAVAKOLI-NOURI STEPHEN FLACK GUNTHER 36810.54721 BISHOP SCIENCE OF IDENTITY FOUNDATION 36810.55028 KHEMANEY TI LEAF PRODUCTIONS, LTD. -
Death-Penalty-Pakistan
Report Mission of Investigation Slow march to the gallows Death penalty in Pakistan Executive Summary. 5 Foreword: Why mobilise against the death penalty . 8 Introduction and Background . 16 I. The legal framework . 21 II. A deeply flawed and discriminatory process, from arrest to trial to execution. 44 Conclusion and recommendations . 60 Annex: List of persons met by the delegation . 62 n° 464/2 - January 2007 Slow march to the gallows. Death penalty in Pakistan Table of contents Executive Summary. 5 Foreword: Why mobilise against the death penalty . 8 1. The absence of deterrence . 8 2. Arguments founded on human dignity and liberty. 8 3. Arguments from international human rights law . 10 Introduction and Background . 16 1. Introduction . 16 2. Overview of death penalty in Pakistan: expanding its scope, reducing the safeguards. 16 3. A widespread public support of death penalty . 19 I. The legal framework . 21 1. The international legal framework. 21 2. Crimes carrying the death penalty in Pakistan . 21 3. Facts and figures on death penalty in Pakistan. 26 3.1. Figures on executions . 26 3.2. Figures on condemned prisoners . 27 3.2.1. Punjab . 27 3.2.2. NWFP. 27 3.2.3. Balochistan . 28 3.2.4. Sindh . 29 4. The Pakistani legal system and procedure. 30 4.1. The intermingling of common law and Islamic Law . 30 4.2. A defendant's itinerary through the courts . 31 4.2.1. The trial . 31 4.2.2. Appeals . 31 4.2.3. Mercy petition . 31 4.2.4. Stays of execution . 33 4.3. The case law: gradually expanding the scope of death penalty . -
A Brief History of U.S.-Turkey Tensions (1960-2017) in Early October, the Arrest of a Turkish Employee at the U.S
THO FACTSHEET November 22, 2017 A Brief History of U.S.-Turkey Tensions (1960-2017) In early October, the arrest of a Turkish employee at the U.S. consulate in Istanbul prompted Washington to take an unprecedented, retaliatory measure. The U.S. announced it would suspend non-immigrant services in Turkey, its NATO ally of more than sixty years. Turkey responded in kind. While the crisis has recently been partially diffused, the spat has been called the lowest point in U.S.-Turkey relations.1 Yet the two governments have had their difficulties before. As a CFR task force described in a 2012 report, “a mythology surrounds U.S.-Turkey relations, suggesting that Washington 2 and Ankara have, through six decades, worked closely and with little friction.” While the overarching relationship remains strategic and important, here are some of the notably sour moments. June of 1964 Exchange of Letters Between President Late 1960’s Johnson and Prime Minister Inonu Sixth Fleet Clashes over Cyprus Turkish anti-American sentiment grew rapidly over ACTORS these years, particularly from left-wing elements U.S. President Lyndon B. Johnson, Turkey’s Prime concerned with Turkey’s perceived dependence Minister (PM) Ismet Inonu on the U.S. and NATO. Protests often focused on the presence of American servicemen in Turkey, CONTEXT the privileges they enjoyed, and a general desire Ethnic tensions and violence in Cyprus (home to a for a non-aligned Turkey (“bagimsiz Turkiye”). sizeable ethnic Turkish minority) led Turkey to Mass demonstrations and violent clashes broke consider an invasion of the island. out during several U.S. -
Applying Personality Theory to a Group of Police Bodyguards: a Physically Risky Prosocial Prototype?
Psicothema ISSN 0214 - 9915 CODEN PSOTEG 2002. Vol. 14, nº 2, pp. 387-392 Copyright © 2002 Psicothema Applying personality theory to a group of police bodyguards: a physically risky prosocial prototype? Montserrat Gomà-i-Freixanet and Andreas A. J. Wismeijer Autonomous University of Barcelona The aim of the present study is twofold. First, to present evidence in favour of the application of the dispositional model to police applicants and second to present evidence that police bodyguard mani- fest a personality profile similar to that of subjects engaged in activities that imply a high level of phy- sical risk of a prosocial kind. The sample consisted of 20 subjects, the complete Bodyguard Unit from the Autonomous Government of Catalunya. Subjects were administered the Eysenck Personality Ques- tionnaire (EPQ) and the Sensation Seeking Scale form V (SSS-V) from Zuckerman. The findings seem to favour the dispositional model and that the profile of a police bodyguard matches that of prosocials. The profile of a police bodyguard is characterized by being ambiverted, emotionally stable, with low scores on psychoticism and sensation seeking, and shows a distinctive characteristic expressed by a high sincerity and a low susceptibility to boredom. Perfil de personalidad de un grupo de policías-guardaespaldas: ¿Un prototipo de riesgo físico proso- cial? El objetivo del presente estudio es doble. Primero presentar evidencia a favor de la aplicación del modelo disposicional a los aspirantes a policía y segundo evidenciar que los policías-guardaespaldas manifiestan perfiles de personalidad similares a los de los sujetos que practican actividades que impli- can un nivel elevado de riesgo físico de tipo prosocial. -
THE MINORITY SAGA a Christian, Human Rights Perspective
THE MINORITY SAGA A Christian, Human Rights Perspective Yousuf Jalal Gill Publisher UMEED ACADEMY Umeed Partnership Pakistan (UPP) 1 Book: THE MINORITY SAGA A Christian, Human Rights Perspective Author: Yousuf Jalal Gill Publisher: UMEED ACADEMY Umeed Partnership Pakistan (UPP). House # 198/199, Block J-3, M.A. Johar Town, Lahore E-mail:[email protected], [email protected] Tel 0092 42 35957302, Cell. 0092 300 9444482 Website: uppakistan.org, umeedpartnership.org.uk Printer: Zafarsons Printers, Lahore Edition: First Year: 2016 Print 1000 Price: Rs.200 UMEED ACADEMY Umeed Academy is the publishing arm of Umeed Partnership Pakistan (UPP) that is involved in developing disadvantaged communities through education and training. Umeed Academy publishes, in particular, research works on downtrodden, women and minorities and helps disseminate people-oriented publications so as to facilitate transformation of society through sustainable social change. The publications of Umeed Academy reflect views of the researchers and writers and not necessarily that of the UPP. 2 Dedicated to: Dr. John Perkins A consistent and fervent supporter of UPP in its endeavors to serve the most disadvantaged communities in Pakistan. 3 “The harvest is past, the summer is ended, and we are not saved.” -Jeremiah 8:20 4 “The test of courage comes when we are in the minority; the test of tolerance comes when we are in the majority.” -Ralph W. Sockman (American Writer) 5 6 About the Author The formative years of Yousuf Jalal Gill (b.1957) were spent with the Oblate Missionaries whom Pope Pius XI (1857 – 1939) referred to as the “Specialists in the most difficult missions…” Moreover, his youthful days witnessed an era of political upheaval after the dismemberment of erstwhile East Pakistan in 1971. -
2011.10.00 Pakistans Law Enforcement Response Final.Pdf
1 Telephone: +92-51-2601461-2 Fax: +92-51-2601469 Email: [email protected] Website: www.unodc.org This report was produced by the United Nations Office for Drugs and Crime, Country Office, Pakistan. This is not an official document of the United Nations. The designations employed and the presentation of the material in this material in this document do not imply the expression of any opinion whatsoever on the part of the Secretariat of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime concerning the legal status of any country, territory, city or area of its authorities, or concerning the delimitations of its frontiers and boundaries. The information contained in this report has been sourced from publications, websites, as well as formal and informal consultations. The analysis is not definitive. 2 Table of Contents Table of Contents ...................................................................................................................3 Abbreviations .........................................................................................................................5 About the Authors ..................................................................................................................6 Acknowledgments ..................................................................................................................7 Executive Summary .......................................................................................................... 8 Key findings ......................................................................................................................