Durand Line South Asia's New Trouble Spot

Total Page:16

File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb

Durand Line South Asia's New Trouble Spot View metadata, citation and similar papers at core.ac.uk brought to you by CORE provided by Calhoun, Institutional Archive of the Naval Postgraduate School Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive Theses and Dissertations Thesis Collection 2005-06 The Durand Line South Asia's new trouble spot Mahmood, Tariq Monterey, California. Naval Postgraduate School http://hdl.handle.net/10945/1923 NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL MONTEREY, CALIFORNIA THESIS THE DURAND LINE: SOUTH ASIA’S NEXT TROUBLE SPOT by Tariq Mahmood June 2005 Thesis Advisor: Peter R. Lavoy Co Adviser: Feroz Hassan Khan Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188 Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instruction, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington headquarters Services, Di-rectorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project (0704-0188) Washington DC 20503. 1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank) 2. REPORT DATE 3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED June 2005 Master’s Thesis 4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE: The Durand Line: South Asia’s New Trouble Spot 5. FUNDING NUMBERS 6. AUTHOR(S) Tariq Mahmood 7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 8. PERFORMING Naval Postgraduate School ORGANIZATION REPORT Monterey, CA 93943-5000 NUMBER 9. SPONSORING /MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 10. SPONSORING/MONITORING N/A AGENCY REPORT NUMBER 11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES: The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of Defense, the U.S. Government, the Pakistan Army or the Government of Pakistan. 12a. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT 12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited A 13. ABSTRACT The Durand Line, the western border between Pakistan and Afghanistan, was delineated in 1893 as the boundary between then British India and Afghanistan. The international community recognizes the Durand line as the Pak-Afghan border since the creation of Pakistan in 1947, but successive Afghan rulers have repudiated its legitimacy. This dispute has caused turbulence in relations between these countries and instigates greater problems with regard to the Pashtun nationalism. The Durand Line has remained porous due to the nature of tribal cultures and the socio-economic compulsions of the people living along the Durand line. The Durand Line was exploited to launch the Afghan Jihad against the Soviets in the 1980s. The GWOT in Afghanistan has once again brought misperceptions regarding alignment, and the porous nature of the Durand Line to the lime light. This thesis demonstrates that existing combat operations against Al-Qaeda and the Taliban and the exploitation of the Durand Line by the U.S.-led coalition forces, had a destabilizing effect on Pakistan, due to the autonomous nature of tribal areas and Pakistan’s necessity to extend its authority in tribal areas while supporting the GWOT. This thesis recommends that a clear understanding of the Durand Line as an international border by all concerned states will enhance the coordination of operations at all tiers, and thereby prevent this border from becoming South Asia’s next trouble spot. 14. SUBJECT TERMS: Pakistan, Afghanistan, The Durand Line, Pashtunistan, Pak-Afghan 15. NUMBER OF Relations, Role of International and Regional players in South Asia, FATA, NWFP and Operations PAGES against Al-Qaeda and Taliban in Afghanistan and Pakistan, GWOT, India and Afghanistan. 119 16. PRICE CODE 17. SECURITY 18. SECURITY 19. SECURITY 20. LIMITATION CLASSIFICATION OF CLASSIFICATION OF THIS CLASSIFICATION OF OF ABSTRACT REPORT PAGE ABSTRACT Unclassified Unclassified Unclassified UL NSN 7540-01-280-5500 Standard Form 298 (Rev. 2-89) Prescribed by ANSI Std. 239-18 i THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK ii Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited THE DURAND LINE: SOUTH ASIA’S NEW TROUBLE SPOT Tariq Mahmood Lieutenant Colonel, Pakistan Army BSc (Honors) War Studies, Balochistan University, 1996 Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of MASTER OF ARTS IN NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS from the NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL June 2005 Author: Lieutenant Colonel Tariq Mahmood Approved by: Peter R. Lavoy Thesis Advisor Feroz Hassan Khan Thesis Co Advisor R. Douglas Porch Chairman, Department of National Security Affairs iii THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK iv ABSTRACT The Durand Line, the western border between Pakistan and Afghanistan, was delineated in 1893 as the boundary between then British India and Afghanistan. The international community recognizes the Durand line as the Pak-Afghan border since the creation of Pakistan in 1947, but successive Afghan rulers have repudiated its legitimacy. This dispute has caused turbulence in relations between these countries and instigates greater problems with regard to the Pashtun nationalism. The Durand Line has remained porous due to the nature of tribal cultures and the socio-economic compulsions of the people living along the Durand line. The Durand Line was exploited to launch the Afghan Jihad against the Soviets in the 1980s. The GWOT in Afghanistan has once again brought misperceptions regarding alignment, and the porous nature of the Durand Line to the lime light. This thesis demonstrates that existing combat operations against Al-Qaeda and the Taliban and the exploitation of the Durand Line by the U.S.-led coalition forces, had a destabilizing effect on Pakistan, due to the autonomous nature of tribal areas and Pakistan’s necessity to extend its authority in tribal areas while supporting the GWOT. This thesis recommends that a clear understanding of the Durand Line as an international border by all concerned states will enhance the coordination of operations at all tiers, and thereby prevent this border from becoming South Asia’s next trouble spot. v THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK vi TABLE OF CONTENTS I. INTRODUCTION........................................................................................................1 A. PURPOSE.........................................................................................................2 B. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK.................................................................6 C. ORGANIZATION .........................................................................................10 II. THE GENESIS OF THE DURAND LINE..............................................................13 A. INTRODUCTION..........................................................................................13 B. BEGINNING OF THE INTERNATIONAL PROBLEM..........................14 1. The Legitimacy of Afghanistan as a Nation State...........................14 2. The “Great Game” and Carving of Northern Frontiers of Afghanistan.........................................................................................16 3. Necessity to Draw Southern Border of Afghanistan.......................17 C. THE DURAND LINE AGREEMENT.........................................................18 D. INADEQUACIES OF DELINEATION ......................................................20 1. The Untimely Transfer of Sir Mortimer Durand ...........................21 2. The Effects of Having No Survey and the Unavailability of Exact Maps .........................................................................................21 3. Tribal Resentment .............................................................................21 4. Political Expediency and Tribe Divide.............................................22 E. REAFFIRMATION OF THE AGREEMENT............................................22 F. THE VALIDITY OF THE DURAND LINE AGREEMENT....................23 1. International Rules ............................................................................23 2. Commonwealth Assertion .................................................................24 3. SEATO Communiqué Confirmation ...............................................24 4. Confirmation by the United States...................................................25 G. AFGHANISTAN’S CLAIMS .......................................................................25 1. Denouncing the Treaty ......................................................................25 2. Greater Pashtunistan.........................................................................26 3. Unilateral Cancellation of the Agreement .......................................27 4. Expiration of Agreement after Lapse of Hundred Years...............27 5. Free Movement across the Durand Line .........................................28 H. MISPERCEPTIONS OF INTERNATIONAL PUBLICATIONS ............28 I. PAKISTAN’S STANCE ................................................................................29 J. CONCLUSION ..............................................................................................30 III. PASHTUNISTAN AND PAK-AFGHAN RELATIONS........................................33 A. INTRODUCTION..........................................................................................33
Recommended publications
  • Pashtunistan: Pakistan's Shifting Strategy
    AFGHANISTAN PAKISTAN PASHTUN ETHNIC GROUP PASHTUNISTAN: P AKISTAN ’ S S HIFTING S TRATEGY ? Knowledge Through Understanding Cultures TRIBAL ANALYSIS CENTER May 2012 Pashtunistan: Pakistan’s Shifting Strategy? P ASHTUNISTAN : P AKISTAN ’ S S HIFTING S TRATEGY ? Knowledge Through Understanding Cultures TRIBAL ANALYSIS CENTER About Tribal Analysis Center Tribal Analysis Center, 6610-M Mooretown Road, Box 159. Williamsburg, VA, 23188 Pashtunistan: Pakistan’s Shifting Strategy? Pashtunistan: Pakistan’s Shifting Strategy? The Pashtun tribes have yearned for a “tribal homeland” in a manner much like the Kurds in Iraq, Turkey, and Iran. And as in those coun- tries, the creation of a new national entity would have a destabilizing impact on the countries from which territory would be drawn. In the case of Pashtunistan, the previous Afghan governments have used this desire for a national homeland as a political instrument against Pakistan. Here again, a border drawn by colonial authorities – the Durand Line – divided the world’s largest tribe, the Pashtuns, into two the complexity of separate nation-states, Afghanistan and Pakistan, where they compete with other ethnic groups for primacy. Afghanistan’s governments have not recog- nized the incorporation of many Pashtun areas into Pakistan, particularly Waziristan, and only Pakistan originally stood to lose territory through the creation of the new entity, Pashtunistan. This is the foundation of Pakistan’s policies toward Afghanistan and the reason Pakistan’s politicians and PASHTUNISTAN military developed a strategy intended to split the Pashtuns into opposing groups and have maintained this approach to the Pashtunistan problem for decades. Pakistan’s Pashtuns may be attempting to maneuver the whole country in an entirely new direction and in the process gain primacy within the country’s most powerful constituency, the military.
    [Show full text]
  • Resettlement Policy Framework
    Khyber Pass Economic Corridor (KPEC) Project (Component II- Economic Corridor Development) Public Disclosure Authorized Public Disclosure Authorized Resettlement Policy Framework Public Disclosure Authorized Peshawar Public Disclosure Authorized March 2020 RPF for Khyber Pass Economic Corridor Project (Component II) List of Acronyms ADB Asian Development Bank AH Affected household AI Access to Information APA Assistant Political Agent ARAP Abbreviated Resettlement Action Plan BHU Basic Health Unit BIZ Bara Industrial Zone C&W Communication and Works (Department) CAREC Central Asian Regional Economic Cooperation CAS Compulsory acquisition surcharge CBN Cost of Basic Needs CBO Community based organization CETP Combined Effluent Treatment Plant CoI Corridor of Influence CPEC China Pakistan Economic Corridor CR Complaint register DPD Deputy Project Director EMP Environmental Management Plan EPA Environmental Protection Agency ERRP Emergency Road Recovery Project ERRRP Emergency Rural Road Recovery Project ESMP Environmental and Social Management Plan FATA Federally Administered Tribal Areas FBR Federal Bureau of Revenue FCR Frontier Crimes Regulations FDA FATA Development Authority FIDIC International Federation of Consulting Engineers FUCP FATA Urban Centers Project FR Frontier Region GeoLoMaP Geo-Referenced Local Master Plan GoKP Government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa GM General Manager GoP Government of Pakistan GRC Grievances Redressal Committee GRM Grievances Redressal Mechanism IDP Internally displaced people IMA Independent Monitoring Agency
    [Show full text]
  • People's Perceptıon Regardıng Jırga in Pakhtun Socıety
    J. Appl. Environ. Biol. Sci. , 8(1)180-183, 2018 ISSN: 2090-4274 Journal of Applied Environmental © 2018, TextRoad Publication and Biological Sciences www.textroad.com People’s Perceptıon Regardıng Jırga ın Pakhtun Socıety Muhammad Nisar* 1, Anas Baryal 1, Dilkash Sapna 1, Zia Ur Rahman 2 Department of Sociology and Gender Studies, Bacha Khan University, Charsadda, KP, Pakistan 1 Department of Computer Science, Bacha Khan University, Charsadda, KP, Pakistan 2 Received: September 21, 2017 Accepted: December 11, 2017 ABSTRACT “This paper examines the institution of Jirga, and to assess the perceptions of the people regarding Jirga in District Malakand Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. A sample of 12 respondents was taken through convenience sampling method. In-depth interview was used as a tool for the collection of data from the respondents. The results show that Jirga is deep rooted in Pashtun society. People cannot go to courts for the solution of every problem and put their issues before Jirga. Jirga in these days is not a free institution and cannot enjoy its power as it used to be in the past. The majorities of Jirgaees (Jirga members) are illiterate, cannot probe the cases well, cannot enjoy their free status as well as take bribes and give their decisions in favour of wealthy or influential party. The decisions of Jirgas are not fully based on justice, as in many cases it violates the human rights. Most disadvantageous people like women and minorities are not given representation in Jirga. The modern days legal justice system or courts are exerting pressure on Jirga and declare it as illegal.
    [Show full text]
  • Title Changing Gender Relations on Return from Displacement to The
    HPG Report/WorkingHPG Working Paper Changing gender relations on return from displacementTitle to the Subtitlenewly merged districts Authorsof Pakistan Simon Levine Date October 2020 About the author Simon Levine is a Senior Research Fellow at the Humanitarian Policy Group (HPG) at ODI. Acknowledgements This work would not have been possible without a dedicated team of researchers who did not simply conduct the interviews: they managed the whole process of fieldwork and shaped the analysis in this paper by combining their deep familiarity with the area with a very sharp analysis of the changes they saw happening. They know who they are, and they know how great is my debt to them. Thanks, too, to Megan Daigle, Kerrie Holloway and Sorcha O’Callaghan for comments on earlier drafts; and to the (anonymous) peer reviewers who generously gave up their time to give an incisive critique that helped this to become a better paper. Katie Forsythe worked her editing magic, as always; and Hannah Bass ensured that the report made it swiftly through production, looking perfect. Thanks also to Catherine Langdon, Sarah Cahoon and Isadora Brizolara for facilitating the project. The core of HPG’s work is its Integrated Programme (IP), a two-year body of research spanning a range of issues, countries and emergencies, allowing it to examine critical issues facing humanitarian policy and practice and influence key debates in the sector. This paper is part of HPG’s 2019–2021 IP, ‘Inclusivity and invisibility in humanitarian action’. The author would like to thank HPG’s IP donors, whose funding enables this research agenda.
    [Show full text]
  • Peshawar Torkham Economic Corridor Project
    Peshawar Torkham Economic Corridor Project Public Disclosure Authorized Safeguard Instruments Component I – ESIA and RAP Component II – EMF, RPF and SMF EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Public Disclosure Authorized Public Disclosure Authorized Public Disclosure Authorized January 2018 Safeguard Instumengts of the Peshawar-Torkham Economic Corridor Project Table of Contents 1 Introduction ............................................................................................................ 4 1.1 Background of the Peshawar – Torkham Economic Corridor ........................................ 4 1.2 Components of the Proposed Project ........................................................................... 5 2 Legal and Regulatory Requirements ......................................................................... 6 2.1 Applicable National Regulatory Requirements .............................................................. 6 2.2 The World Bank .............................................................................................................. 8 2.2.1 Category and Triggered Policies .................................................................................... 8 3 Description of the Project ........................................................................................ 9 3.1 Project Area ................................................................................................................... 9 3.2 Component I Peshawar – Torkham Expressway Project Description ............................ 9 3.2.1 Project Design
    [Show full text]
  • Afghan Internationalism and the Question of Afghanistan's Political Legitimacy
    This is a repository copy of Afghan internationalism and the question of Afghanistan's political legitimacy. White Rose Research Online URL for this paper: http://eprints.whiterose.ac.uk/126847/ Version: Accepted Version Article: Leake, E orcid.org/0000-0003-1277-580X (2018) Afghan internationalism and the question of Afghanistan's political legitimacy. Afghanistan, 1 (1). pp. 68-94. ISSN 2399-357X https://doi.org/10.3366/afg.2018.0006 This article is protected by copyright. This is an Accepted Manuscript of an article published by Edinburgh University Press on behalf of the American Institute of Afghanistan Studies in "Afghanistan". Uploaded in accordance with the publisher's self-archiving policy. Reuse Items deposited in White Rose Research Online are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved unless indicated otherwise. They may be downloaded and/or printed for private study, or other acts as permitted by national copyright laws. The publisher or other rights holders may allow further reproduction and re-use of the full text version. This is indicated by the licence information on the White Rose Research Online record for the item. Takedown If you consider content in White Rose Research Online to be in breach of UK law, please notify us by emailing [email protected] including the URL of the record and the reason for the withdrawal request. [email protected] https://eprints.whiterose.ac.uk/ Afghan internationalism and the question of Afghanistan’s political legitimacy1 Abstract This article uses Afghan engagement with twentieth-century international politics to reflect on the fluctuating nature of Afghan statehood and citizenship, with a particular focus on Afghanistan’s political ‘revolutions’ in 1973 and 1978.
    [Show full text]
  • The Kingdom of Afghanistan: a Historical Sketch George Passman Tate
    University of Nebraska Omaha DigitalCommons@UNO Books in English Digitized Books 1-1-1911 The kingdom of Afghanistan: a historical sketch George Passman Tate Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.unomaha.edu/afghanuno Part of the History Commons, and the International and Area Studies Commons Recommended Citation Tate, George Passman The kingdom of Afghanistan: a historical sketch, with an introductory note by Sir Henry Mortimer Durand. Bombay: "Times of India" Offices, 1911. 224 p., maps This Monograph is brought to you for free and open access by the Digitized Books at DigitalCommons@UNO. It has been accepted for inclusion in Books in English by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@UNO. For more information, please contact [email protected]. Tate, G,P. The kfn&ean sf Af&mistan, DATE DUE I Mil 7 (7'8 DEDICATED, BY PERMISSION, HIS EXCELLENCY BARON HARDINGE OF PENSHURST. VICEROY AND GOVERNOR-GENERAL OF INDIA, .a- . (/. BY m HIS OBEDIENT, SERVANT THE AUTHOR. il.IEmtev 01 the Asiniic Society, Be?zg-nl, S?~rueyof I~din. dafhor of 'I Seisinqz : A Menzoir on the FJisio~y,Topo~rcrphj~, A7zliquiiies, (112d Peo$Ie of the Cozi?zt~y''; The F/.o?zlic7,.~ of Baluchisia'nn : Travels on ihe Border.? of Pe~szk n?zd Akhnnistnn " ; " ICalnf : A lMe??zoir on t7ze Cozl7~try and Fnrrzily of the Ahntadsai Khn7zs of Iinlnt" ; 4 ec. \ViTkI AN INrPR<dl>kJCTOl2Y NO'FE PRINTED BY BENNETT COLEMAN & Co., Xc. PUBLISHED AT THE " TIMES OF INDIA" OFFTCES, BOMBAY & C.1LCUTT-4, LONDON AGENCY : gg, SI-IOE LANE, E.C.
    [Show full text]
  • Pakistan: Operations in North Waziristan Agency, By
    scholar warrior Pakistan: Operations in North Waziristan Agency ALOK BANSAL Pakistan has been going through tumult and despite Nawaz Sharif winning a resounding victory in 2013, the prospects of his government lasting five years have started looking bleak. The withdrawal of International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) from Afghanistan by end 2014 is likely to create huge turbulence in the territories along the Durand Line. Civil-military relations are looking quite tenuous, the media is being muzzled, the chimera of talks with the militants is finally over and operations in North Waziristan have eventually started. The elections of 2013, which were held under the shadow of Taliban guns, had indicated support for right wing political parties and, consequently, the Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N) came to power in Islamabad, while the Pakistan Tehrik-e-Insaaf (PTI) of Imran Khan formed a government in Peshawar. Both political parties believed that the Taliban could be talked into shunning violence. Accordingly, the government went out of its way to talk to the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), despite the TTP challenging the writ of the government in different parts of the country and targeting security installations and personnel. As a result, the killing of Hakeemullah Mehsud, the dreaded TTP leader in a drone attack by the US was protested by the government and viewed as a deliberate attempt by the US to derail the talks with the TTP. The death of Hakeemullah was a major blow to the TTP, but in his successor Fazlullah, they have found an experienced and even more shrewd and radical leader.
    [Show full text]
  • Khushal Khan Khattak's Educational Philosophy
    Khushal Khan Khattak’s Educational Philosophy Presented to: Department of Social Sciences Qurtuba University, Peshawar Campus Hayatabad, Peshawar In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirement for the Degree Of Doctor of Philosophy in Education By Niaz Muhammad PhD Education, Research Scholar 2009 Qurtuba University of Science and Information Technology NWFP (Peshawar, Pakistan) In the name of Allah, the Beneficent, the Merciful. ii Copyrights Niaz Muhammad, 2009 No Part of this Document may be reprinted or re-produced in any means, with out prior permission in writing from the author of this document. iii CERTIFICATE OF APPROVAL DOCTORAL DISSERTATION This is to certify that the Doctoral Dissertation of Mr.Niaz Muhammad Entitled: Khushal Khan Khattak’s Educational Philosophy has been examined and approved for the requirement of Doctor of Philosophy degree in Education (Supervisor & Dean of the Social Science) Signature…………………………………. Qurtuba University, Peshawar Prof. Dr.Muhammad Saleem (Co-Supervisor) Signature…………………………………. Center of Pashto Language & Literature, Prof. Dr. Parvaiz Mahjur University of Peshawar. Examiners: 1. Prof. Dr. Saeed Anwar Signature…………………………………. Chairman Department of Education Hazara University, External examiner, (Pakistan based) 2. Name. …………………………… Signature…………………………………. External examiner, (Foreign based) 3. Name. ………………………………… Signature…………………………………. External examiner, (Foreign based) iv ABSTRACT Khushal Khan Khattak passed away about three hundred and fifty years ago (1613–1688). He was a genius, a linguist, a man of foresight, a man of faith in Al- Mighty God, a man of peace and unity, a man of justice and equality, a man of love and humanity, and a man of wisdom and knowledge. He was a multidimensional person known to the world as moralist, a wise chieftain, a great religious scholar, a thinker and an ideal leader of the Pushtoons.
    [Show full text]
  • Afghanistan: Political Exiles in Search of a State
    Journal of Political Science Volume 18 Number 1 Article 11 November 1990 Afghanistan: Political Exiles In Search Of A State Barnett R. Rubin Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.coastal.edu/jops Part of the Political Science Commons Recommended Citation Rubin, Barnett R. (1990) "Afghanistan: Political Exiles In Search Of A State," Journal of Political Science: Vol. 18 : No. 1 , Article 11. Available at: https://digitalcommons.coastal.edu/jops/vol18/iss1/11 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Politics at CCU Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Journal of Political Science by an authorized editor of CCU Digital Commons. For more information, please contact [email protected]. ,t\fghanistan: Political Exiles in Search of a State Barnett R. Ru bin United States Institute of Peace When Afghan exiles in Pakistan convened a shura (coun­ cil) in Islamabad to choose an interim government on February 10. 1989. they were only the most recent of exiles who have aspired and often managed to Mrule" Afghanistan. The seven parties of the Islamic Union ofM ujahidin of Afghanistan who had convened the shura claimed that. because of their links to the mujahidin fighting inside Afghanistan. the cabinet they named was an Minterim government" rather than a Mgovernment-in ­ exile. ~ but they soon confronted the typical problems of the latter: how to obtain foreign recognition, how to depose the sitting government they did not recognize, and how to replace the existing opposition mechanisms inside and outside the country. Exiles in Afghan History The importance of exiles in the history of Afghanistan derives largely from the difficulty of state formation in its sparsely settled and largely barren territory.
    [Show full text]
  • UNHCR Pakistan
    PAKISTAN Overview of Afghan Refugee Population (as of 28 February 2021 AGE AND GENDER COMPOSITION REGISTERED REFUGEES BY LOCATION (%) Elderly Men Elderly Women Khyber Pakhtunkhwa 58.1% MILLION 3% 2% Balochistan 22.8% 1.44 Punjab T O T A L REGISTERED 11.7% AFGHAN REFUGEES Sindh 4.6% Adult Adult Federal Capital Territory 2.4% men women Other locations 0.4% 444,439 28% 23% REGISTERED REFUGEES BY LOCATION (Urban/ RVs) REGISTERED IN REFUGEE VILLAGES Khyber Pakhtunkhwa 54% 46% Boys Girls Balochistan 85% 15% 22% 21% Punjab 90% 10% 990,947 Sindh 100% REGISTERED OUTSIDE REFUGEE VILLAGES Federal Capital Territory 100% Male Female Other locations 100% 54% 46% (69%) Outside refugee villages (31%) Refugee villages The map shows registered Afghan refugees Swat Bajaur Lower Dir living in 54 Refugee Villages(RVs) Mohmand Tajikistan Malakand PA Torkham Peshawar Khyber Rawalpindi Kohat Kurram Islamabad Afghanistan North Waziristan Attock Karak Chakwal China FR Bannu Pakistan-Administered Bannu Lakki Marwat Khyber Pak Kashmiristan Administered FR Tank Mianwali Kashmir Tank Pakhtunkhwa Dera Ismail South Waziristan Khan Kabul JammuJamm andu and Sargodha KashmirKashmir Û Û Û Û Û Û Û Û Û Û Û Û Torkham Û Khushab Chiniot D Zhob Bhakkar " ¹ Û Û Û Û Û Û Û Û Û Û Û Û Û Chaman Sheerani Û Islamabad Indian-AdministeredIndian Administered Pishin Musakhel " Kashmir Layyah Jhang Kashmir Killa Saifullah Muzaffargarh Killa Abdullah Ziarat Loralai Barkhan Khanewal Dera Ghazi Quetta Harnai Khan Punjab Afghanistan Chaman Û Û Û Û Û Û Û Û Û Û Û Û Û Û Û Û " Û Pakistan Balochistan
    [Show full text]
  • 'Pashtunistan': the Challenge to Pakistan and Afghanistan
    Area: Security & Defence - ARI 37/2008 Date: 2/4/2008 ‘Pashtunistan’: The Challenge to Pakistan and Afghanistan Selig S. Harrison * Theme: The increasing co-operation between Pashtun nationalist and Islamist forces against Punjabi domination could lead to the break-up of Pakistan and Afghanistan and the emergence of a new national entity: an ‘Islamic Pashtunistan’. Summary: The alarming growth of al-Qaeda and the Taliban in the Pashtun tribal region of north-western Pakistan and southern Afghanistan is usually attributed to the popularity of their messianic brand of Islam and to covert help from Pakistani intelligence agencies. But another, more ominous, reason also explains their success: their symbiotic relationship with a simmering Pashtun separatist movement that could lead to the unification of the estimated 41 million Pashtuns on both sides of the border, the break-up of Pakistan and Afghanistan, and the emergence of a new national entity, an ‘Islamic Pashtunistan’. This ARI examines the Pashtun claim for an independent territory, the historical and political roots of the Pashtun identity, the implications for the NATO- or Pakistani-led military operations in the area, the increasing co-operation between Pashtun nationalist and Islamist forces against Punjabi domination and the reasons why the Pashtunistan movement, long dormant, is slowly coming to life. Analysis: The alarming growth of al-Qaeda and the Taliban in the Pashtun tribal region of north-western Pakistan and southern Afghanistan is usually attributed to the popularity of their messianic brand of Islam and to covert help from Pakistani intelligence agencies. But another, more ominous reason also explains their success: their symbiotic relationship with a simmering Pashtun separatist movement that could lead to the unification of the estimated 41 million Pashtuns on both sides of the border, the break-up of Pakistan and Afghanistan, and the emergence of a new national entity, ‘Pashtunistan,’ under radical Islamist leadership.
    [Show full text]