The United Nations and the Palestinian refugees: an analysis of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East, 1 May 1950--30 June 1971
Item Type text; Dissertation-Reproduction (electronic)
Authors Gama, Abid Husni, 1943-
Publisher The University of Arizona.
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Link to Item http://hdl.handle.net/10150/565262 THE UNITED NATIONS AND THE PALESTINIAN REFUGEES:
AN ANALYSIS OF THE UNITED NATIONS RELIEF AND WORKS AGENCY FOR PALESTINE REFUGEES IN THE
NEAR EAST, 1 MAY 1950-30 JUNE 1971
by Abid Husni Gama
A Dissertation Submitted to the Faculty of the
DEPARTMENT OF HISTORY In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements For the Degree of
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY In the Graduate College
THE UNIVERSITY OF ARIZONA . THE UNIVERSITY OF ARIZONA
GRADUATE COLLEGE
I hereby recommend that this dissertation prepared under my
direction by Abid Huani Gama______
entitledThe United Nations and the Palestinian Refugees* An Analysis of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East. 1 May 19^0-10 June 1971
be accepted as fulfilling the dissertation requirement of the
degree of ______Doctor of Philosophy______
(o Dissertation/Director Date
After inspection of the final copy of the dissertation, the
following members of the Final Examination Committee concur in
its approval and recommend its acceptance:*
f c u T k) .
This approval and acceptance is contingent on the candidate's adequate performance and defense of this dissertation at the final oral examination. The inclusion of this sheet bound into the library copy of the dissertation is evidence of satisfactory performance at the final examination. STATEMENT BY AUTHOR
This dissertation has been submitted in partial ful fillment of requirements for an advanced degree at The University of Arizona and is deposited in the University Library to be made available to borrowers under rules of the Library.
Brief quotations from this dissertation are allow able without special permission, provided that accurate acknowledgment of source is made. Requests for permission for extended quotation from or reproduction of this manu script in whole or in part may be granted by the head of the major department or the Dean of the Graduate College when in his judgment the proposed use of the material is in the interests of scholarship. In all other instances, however, permission must be obtained from the author.
SIGNED: ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
The author wishes to express his appreciation to the
faculty of the Department of History for their guidance and
■aide He especially wishes to extend his deep gratitude and
appreciation to Dr. William J. Wilson, the major professor and the dissertation director.
The author wishes also to express his appreciation
for the encouragement and invaluable recommendations given
to him by Dr, Richard R, Cosgrove and Dr, Ludwig -W, Adamec
of the guidance committee in the preparation of this dis sertation.
The author wishes also to express his deep gratitude to his family for their financial provision which made it possible for the author to attend The University of Arizona,
Finally, the author would like to express his sincere gratitude to Inaam, Mona and Khalid for their love, patience and understanding, without which this dissertation, might not have been finished.
iii TABLE OP CONTENTS
Page
LIST OF TABLES o o o o o o -o o o o o o o o o o o o oviii
ABSTBACT OOOOO OOO-OOO OOOOOOOOOO O lx 1o INTRODUCTION oooooooooooooooooooo 1 2o THE PALESTINE PROBLEM; AN ANALYSIS OF THE EVENTS AND PROCESSES THAT LED TO THE CREATION OF THE PALESTINE REFUGEE PROBLEM 0 o > .. 5
Palestine Throughout the Ages 00o0ooooo Persecution of the Jews . 0. *'000000.0000 The Jews in the West „ » * « = = 00 o 0 o o The Jews in the East 0 , » * ^ * *. * » * * *
The Search for a Solution 0 * * * * = <> o * - vo-^^vn <0 Zionisxn 00 000 0 000000000 00000 12 Palestine; Meaning and Significance 000000 14 Pledges and Counter Pledges; The Struggle for Palestine, 1912-1920 00000000000 18 Zionism and Britain , 000000.0000000 21 The Balfour Declaration , , , * * * * , * , 26 Meaning and Significance 00,0000000 26 Pledges to the Arabs , o , , = * , * 0 0 o' * o 29 Sir Henry McMahon , * ■» '« , « » 000 o * . o 31 Commander David George Hogarth , * * , 00 o 33 Lto Colo Jo Ro Bassett , , , o , o * , o o © 34 Declaration to the Seven , , © , © © © © o © 35 Anglo-French Declaration © „ , = © © © © © © 36 Palestine at the Paris Peace Conference © © © © 37 -Arab Deiiiand s o o © © © © ©o © © © 0. 0 © © © 37 Zioni st PIans © © © © © o © © © © © © © © © Z|.0 Woodrow Wilson; Between Arab and Zionist © 41 Palestine Under the Mandate, 1920-1947 © © © © © 49 Provisions of the Mandate © © © © © © © © © 49 Zionxst Aims. ©©©©©©©©©©©©ooo ^2 Jewish Immigration into Palestine © © © © © © © 53 Consequences © © © © © © © © © o © o © © © o 55 British Reaction:to Jewish Immigration © © © © © 56 Churchill White Paper © © © ©© © © © © © © 56 The White Paper of 17 May 1939 © © © © © © © 57 Zionist Reaction to Britain © © © © © © © © 59 Churchill and Zionism © © © © © © © © © © © © © 60 Roosevelt,s Reaction ©©©©©©©©©©©©o o o 61
i v TABLE OF CONTENTS— Continued'
Page
Truman and Zionism oooooocooooooo Position on Palestine 000oo000oo Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry ! | Truman-Bevin Dispute o o o o o o o o o o o , 66 Zionist Terrorism in Palestine: Its Meaning and Consequence s. o * @ o ■ » o o o ooo o o o » 67 Palestine at the United Nations O 40 O 0. 0 o o , 68 Partition of Palestine, 1947-1949 o o o o o o , 69 United Nations Special Committee on Palestine > 69 Partition with Economic Union oooooooo > 70 The Jewish State oooooooo <><,000 , 71 T^ie Arah State o o o 0 0 o o o o © o -o o.o 4 72 Jerusalem o o o o oooooooo ooo o . 72 Partition and Pressure Politics 0000000 . 73 Consequences of Partition 00000 «. o 0 0 = , 77 Arah .Response o o o © © © © © © © © o © o Zion3.st Response o © © © © © © ©. © © © o © i 78 Early United States-Israel Relations © © © » 79 The Arab-Israeli War of 1948 ° © © © © © © © © , 82 The Arabs in the Jewish State o 0 0 0 0 o , 82 The Position of the Arab States , 89 The Official # r © © © © © © © © © © © © © , 91 The Role of the United Nations © © © © © © , 93 The 1949 Arab-Israeli Armistice Agreements © © » 96 Definition of a Palestinian Refugee © © © © © , 98 Introduction © © © © © © © © © © © o © © © 3 98 The United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine Definition © © © © © © © © The International Refugee Organization Definition © © © © © © © © © © © © © © © © 102 The UNRWAPRNE Definition © © © © © © © © © © 104 An Israeli View © © © © © © © © © © © © © © 105
The Need for a New Definition 000000 © 108 . Who is a Palestinian? 0000000 o o o © 109 PRELUDE TO UNRWAPRNE » © © © © © © © © © © © © © © © 113 Introduction © © © © © © © © © © © © © © © © © © 113 Early United Nations Involvement © © © © © © © © 11$ United Nations Relief for Palestine Refugees (UNRPR) © © © © © © © © © « © © © © © 118 United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine (UN OCR} © © © © ©. © © ©.© © © © © © 121 TABLE OP CONTENTS— Continued
Page
The UNCOP Between Israeli Rigidity and Arab. Flexibility . = « » « = » = o « 123 The United Nations Economic Survey 1^2. S S i o n (UNjiSM) ooo oooooooo o o o- 130 AN ANALYSIS OF THE UNRWA?RNE, 1 MAY 1950- 30 JUNE 1971 o o oooo o o o oo o o o oooo
The Establishment of the UNRWAPRNE = 137 The Task of the UNRWAPRNE ooo oooooo 139 The Size of the Task , ooooooooooo llj.0 The Administration and Organization of ■ the UNRWAPRNE o o o o o o o o o o o o o o 1l|1 Introduction o o o o o o o o o o o o o o 141 The Organization of the UNRWAPRNE 142 The .Chief Executive Officer „ <, = „ .» » 144 The Employees and Staff of the UNRWAPRNE 146 Cooperation and Coordination of Relief and Works Effort @ © © © © © © © © © © © © © © 147 Introduction © © © © ©o©©©©©©©© 147 The UNRWAPRNE and Other United Nations Organizations © © © © © © © © © © © © 149 The UNRWAPRNE and Other International Voluntary Organizations „ © © © © © © 151 The UNRWAPRNE and the Host Governments © 152 The Operations of the UNRWAPRNEs 1 May 1950- 30 June 1971 © © = © © © 0 00 - 0 0 153 Introduction © © © © © 0 0- 0 0 00 153 Relief Services © © © ooooo 0 154 Special Hardship Cases 00 0 0 00 167 Health Services © © © ooooo 0 167 Curative and preventive . Services 168 Education and Training Services 0 178 Self-Support Activities 0 0 0 0 00 189 Emergency Operations © ooooo 0 196 Financial Operations ,© o p b 0 06 •207 Consultation with the UNO CP © © ©' © © © © © Status of the Palestinian Refugees in the Host Countries ©. © © © © ■ © © © © © © © © © 217 Lebanon. . © © © © © © © © © © © © © © © © 218 Syria ©■ © © © © © © © © © © © © © © © © 219 Jordan ©o©©©©©©©©©©©©©©© 220 Gaza © © © © © © © © ,© © © © © © © © © © 220 Israel and the Occupied Territories © © 221 vii
TABLE OP CONTENTS— -Continued
Page
Legal Aspects of the Work of the UNRWAPRNE „ 0 222 Legal Matters « o o o o o o o o o © © © © 224 Claims Against Governments © © © © © © © © 225
5© CONCLUSION o 229 The Intended Role of the UNRWAPRNE © © © 229 The Present Role of the UNRWAPRNE © © © 231 The Future Role of the UNRWAPRNE © © © © 233 The Future of the Palestinian Refugees , 239 APPENDIX As PALESTINE'S POPULATION 1922-19^7 « » 248 APPENDIX B: TEXT OF RESOLUTION 212 (III) ASSISTANCE TO PALESTINE REFUGEES ADOPTED BY" THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE UNITED NATIONS ON 19 NOVEMBER 194# » © © o 0 o o o © © «~ 249 APPENDIX Cs TEXT OF RESOLUTION 194 (HI) PALESTINE--PROGRESS REPORT OF THE UN MEDIATOR ADOPTED BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE UNITED NATIONS ON ' 11 DECEMBER 1948 « © © « » © © © © © 254 APPENDIX Ds TEXT OF RESOLUTION 302 (IV) ASSISTANCE TO.THE PALESTINE REFUGEES ADOPTED BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE UNITED NATIONS ON 8 DECEMBER 1949 © .© © © © © © © © © 261
LIST OF REFERENCES © © © O 270 LIST OP TABLES
Table Page
1 o TJNRWAPRNE Manning Table Posts, 30 June 1951 30 June 1971 oo oooo o. ooooooooo 148 2 0 Total Registered Population According to Category of Registration, 30 June 1950- 30 June 1971 000000000000 0000 155 3= Recapitulation of Changes in Composition of Tot.al Registered Population, 1 July 1950- 30 June 1971 o 00 o © © 0 © © © © © © © © © 158 4= Population of Established Camps, 30 June 1950= 30 June 1971 0000000000000000 163 5© Population of Emergency Camps, 30 June 1968- 30 June 1971 © © © 00 © © © © 6© o © © © © 164
60 In-Patient Medical Care as at 30 June 1971 169 7© Out-Patient Medical and Dental Care 1 July 1970-30 June 1971 © © © © © © . © © © 172 8© Infectious Diseases Reported Among Palestine Refugee Population, 1 July 1970-30 June 1971 173 9© Maternal and Child Health, 1 July 1970- 30 June 1971 © © © © © © © © © © © © 175
10© UNRWAPRNE-UNESCO Schools: Number of Elementary and Preparatory Pupils, 30: June 1951- 30 June 1971 © © © © © 181 11© Distribution of Refugee Pupils Receiving Education, as of 31 May 1971 = © © © © © © © 183 12© UNRWAPRNE-UNESCO Vocational and Technical Education Programme, 1970-1971 School Year © 184 13° Summary Statement of Income, Expenditure and Working Capital, 1 May 1950-31 December 1971 .209 14© Detailed Statement of Income to the UNRWAPRNE, 1 May 1950-31 December 1971 © © - « © © © © 213
viii ABSTRACT
The United Nations Relief and Works Agency for
Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWAPRNE) Mas estab lished by the United Nations General Assembly on 8 December
1 upon the recommendation of the United Nations Economic Survey Mission (UNESM), to implement an economic solution to the Palestine refugee problem as directed by the UNESM in its final report to the General Assembly,
Unlike the United Nations Relief for Palestine Refu gees (UNRPR)9 which provided and coordinated relief services, and the United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine
(UNCCP)j> which failed to solve the political aspects of the Palestine refugee problem due to Israel’s intransigent posi tion on the subject of repatriation and/or compensation* the
UNRWAPRNE was entrusted with the temporary task of providing relief services (food* shelter* health* education and train ing services) on a diminishing scale* and the continuing long-term task of assisting the Palestinian refugees to become self-supporting through large-scale development of the areas in which the Palestinian refugees reside.
The UNRWAPRNE has succeeded in carrying out the temporary task assigned to it* despite the limitations imposed by the lack of sufficient funds* short-term mandates and the political consequences of the unresolved Arab-Israeli X conflicto However* as far as the long-term task is con cerned* the GNRWAPRNE has failed due to the inseparability of the political and economic aspects of the Palestine refu gee problem,, Given the limits imposed by the availability of funds and the political acceptability of the projects* the UNRWAPR2TE continued to carry out its long-term task but on a smaller scale than had originally intended,, Thus* if large-scale self-support activities cannot be achieved rapidly* then' small-scale self-support activities over a longer period of time could prove to be of equal importance,,
The UNRWAPRNE* in caring for the basic needs of the Palestinian refugees* has proved itself to be an indis pensable agency in times of peace* and especially* at times of war„ The UNRWAPRNE has also become a factor of stability in the area* and its disappearance would cause unacceptable hardship to the Palestinian refugees*
If the UNRWAPRNE is expected to carry out its exist ing programme effectively* as it must* then it should be provided with secure and adequate sources of funds; a five year mandate* rather than the traditional one to two years and a re-appraisal of the future task of the UNRWAPRNE in lieu of the unimplemented* yet annually reaffirmed* rights accorded to the Palestinian refugees since 11 December 19^8 by the United Nations General Assembly* xi
No settlement of the Palestine refugee problem can be just and complete if recognition is not accorded to the right of the Palestinian refugees to repatriation and/or
eompensation0 So long as the future of those innocent
victims of the conflict remains unresolved, the UNRWAPRNE
should be allowed to continue its humane task of caring for the basic needs of the Palestinian refugees under more favorable conditions. CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
The United Nations Relief and Works Agency for
Palestine Refugees in the Near East (hereafter referred to
as the UNRWAPRNE) was established by the United Nations General Assembly, upon the recommendation of the United
Nations Economic Survey Mission, to carry out the temporary
task of providing relief services (mainly food, shelter,
health, education and training services) on a diminishing
scales and the continuing long-term task of assisting the
Palestinian refugees to become self-supporting.^
The UNRWAPRNE has succeeded in carrying out the temporary task assigned to it, despite the limitations
imposed by the lack of sufficient funds, short-term mandates
and the political consequences of the unresolved Arab-
Israeli conflict. However, as far as the long-term task is
1o "Assistance to Palestine Refugees: Interim . Report of the Director of the United Nations Relief and Works.Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East," United Nations General Assembly Official Records, Fifth Session, Supplement No! T9~Ta7 i4-51/Rev. 1), p « 2j : "Annual * Report of the Director of the United Nations Relief and Works. Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East, 1 July 1958-30 June 1959," United Nations General Assembly Official Records. Fourteenth Session. Supplement No. ilf1"(A/ljiZil)» ™ P» 1o * .
1 2 2 concerned, the UHRWAPENE has failed due to economic and political circumstances that were beyond its ability to cope with0^ The TBRWAPRNE, in caring for needs of the Palestin ian refugees, has proved itself to be an indispensable agency in times of peace and especially at. time's of war*
The UHRWAPRNE has also become a factor of stability in the area, and at times, has helped contribute towards the crea tion of a more favorable climate for a just solution of the
Palestine refugee problem within the context of the Arab-
Xsraeli conflict,^
An analysis of the contents of the aforementioned hypothesis, will begin first by examining the background of the Palestine problem in order to analyze and understand the events and processes that led to the creation of the Pales tine refugee problem. An attempt will be made in this
2. "Annual Report of the Director of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East covering the period 1 July 1953 to 30 June 1954»” United Nations General Assembly Official Records, Ninth Session^ Supplement No. Vf (A/2717)7 P° 3. ’ ~ 3. ' "Annual Report of the Director of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East covering the period 1 July 1954 to 30 June 1955s " United Nations General Assembly'Official Records., Tenth s’esTIorT/'"Supplement™HbT' 15 (%7Z97^ )s P < 5= .
4. "Report of the Commissioner-General of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refu gees in the Near East, 1 July 1970-30 June 1971," United Nations General Assembly Official Records, Twenty-Sixth' Session, Supplement No. 13 (A/8I|13), p» 13« 3 background chapter to define and ascertain the character istics of a Palestinian refugee* Some of the questions that will be raised concern themselves with the difference between a Palestinian refugee and a Palestinian who is not a refugee, and the respective rights of each group«,
Following the.Arab-Israeli war of 1% 8 , the United
Nations assumed the responsibility of caring for the imme diate needs of the Palestinian refugees who were rendered homeless as a result of the hazards of the War of 19l|S
From May 19l}-8-May 1950 several agencies were established by the United Nations General Assembly to help solve the Pales tine refugee problem,, An examination of these agencies could be of significant value in understanding the UNRWAPRNEo
Although such agencies were a prelude to the UNRWAPRNE, yet by examining their respective purpose, structure, function, limitation, success and failure, one can have a better understanding of the conditions under which the UNRWAPRNE came to be, especially as the UNRWAPRNE was expected to overcome most of the shortcomings of all the agencies that 6 preceded itc
5o "Assistance to: Palestine Refugees: Interim Report of the Director of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East," QPo cite, ppo vii, 1-5; United Nations Documents, A/bl+Q, 17 September 1948-
6 0 United Nations Documents, A/1106, Fourth Ses sion, Ad Hoo”Polideal Committee, Annex, Vol„ I, 1949, 4 The UNRWAPRNE commenced its operations on 1 May 1950 and this study will examine its record up to the year ending
30 June 1971o The study will focus on several aspects of the
UNRWAPRNE, e0 g0, its purpose, structure and function,, The
study will also deal with other aspects of the UNRWAPRNE, eogo, the legal aspects of the UNRWAPRNE; financing the
UNRWAPRNE; the relationship of the UNRWAPRNE with other United Nations, international and local agencies; the rela tionship of the UNRWAPRNE with the host governments and the status of the Palestinian refugees in the host countries and the occupied areas. The study will also assess the prob lems, success and failures of the UNRWAPRNE based on a' sta tistical analysis of its operations.
Finally, the study will conclude by examining the past, present and future role of the UNRWAPRNE. The study will also assess the prospects of a just solution to the
Palestine refugee problem with emphasis on the obstacles to such a solution. The study will also deal with the possible impact on the Palestinian refugees should the UNRWAPRNE be dissolved, the alternatives to the UNRWAPRNE and the future prospects of the UNRWAPRNE and the Palestinian refugees. CHAPTER 2
THE PALESTINE PROBLEM: AN ANALYSIS OP THE EVENTS AND PROCESSES THAT LED TO THE CREATION OP THE PALESTINE REFUGEE PROBLEM1
Palestine Throughout the Ages
Palestine has been a battleground for the great powers throughout history0 From man’s earliest history to our m o d e m era, Palestine has often been conquered and reconquered in a series of experiences0
There is some doubt as to who were the original people of Palestine, which is true of many countries0 But there is little doubt as to who were the first rulers known to have ruled that area, and those who have succeeded them0
1o The Egyptian Pharoahs were known to have ruled
Palestine before the Hebrews came in 1100 BcC0
20 During the 8th century Bo Co the Assyrians took over.
3° From the 7th to the 6th century BoCo Babylonians ruled it„
4= In 539 Bo Co Cyrus of Persia conquered Babylon*
1o This study is based largely on the author's unpublished MoA» thesis: "Survey of Some Major Developments in the Palestine Problem and the Arab-Israeli Conflict to 1967: Some Aspects of United States Involvement" (unpub lished Mo Ac thesis. University of Arizona, 1969), pp« 1«=98 =
5 In the li-th century B.O. Alexander took over.
60 In 63 BeOe the Romany Pompey^ occupied Jerusalem0 7= In 636 A»D. the Arabs under the reign of W a r Ibn Al-Khattab-conquered Palestine*
8* From, the 7th century A,D* to 1918, Palestine remained under Muslim jurisdiction, except for a
brief period during the Crusades* 9e From 1918 to the creation of the State of Israel in
19i|.8, Great Britain ruled Palestine* 10* Today, Israel is the present ruler of that area
knox-m. as Palestine* With the advent of each power, significant changes occurred in Palestine6s population* But for our purposes, perhaps the most significant changes were those which came under Judaism, Christianity, and Islam* A Jewish majority was dispersed by pagans, but a minority remained to witness the rise of a new .Christian majority* Islam was the last major religion that came to Palestine* It was brought by the Arab conquerors in the middle of the seventh century, and ever since then,, it has become the dominant religion in
Palestine under an Arab majority* Although the Arabs were conquered by Turks, yet the Turks were Muslims, and that left Palestine6s religious composition basically unchanged for thirteen centuries. Throughout these centuries, Pales tine’s population xfas predominantly Arab, and Palestine was 7 a part of the Arab world0 The Christians in Palestine were ethnically Arabs and constituted a part of that majority*
But the Jews, who remained in Palestine* and like their
counterparts elsewhere* were a relatively small minority* Not an oppressed and persecuted minority* but a minority
that lived in peace with the Arab majority* The Arabs in
Palestine* by nature of their religion* included both Christians and Muslims*
Persecution of the Jews
The majority of the Jews who fled from Palestine,
escaping persecution under Nebuchadnezzar, sought refuge in
1 Europe centuries before the Arabs conquered Spain* The
majority of them settled in Eastern Europe and Russia, and
the rest resided in Western Europe* It is difficult to Y determine when and where such extreme forms of persecution began* but it can be ascertained that the Jews were perse
cuted by Christians, and the situation later became more
tragic in Eastern Europe than in Western Europe*
The Jews in the West
The Jews in the West were often rejected by society
and were forced to.become secluded groups that were alien to
the countries in which they resided* In Western European
countries* commonly they had only restricted rights, far
from the rights of Christians. In some countries, notably 8 the Iberian Peninsula, they were forced to change their religion or suffer extreme forms of physical torture*
: With the advent of the Muslim Empire in the Iberian Peninsula, the Jews were spared persecution for many cen turies* Many Jews fled to Arab Spain, but by when the
Muslim Arabs retreated to North Africa, a large number of Jews left with them, to live as normal human beings and equals* Those who remained behind witnessed the Spanish Inquisition*
Gradual emancipation of the Jews took place in Napoleon's revolutionary Prance* The Edict of Fraternity became the motto for all men in France, then for Western
Europe* Clermont-Torrere, delegate to the French National
Assembly, said: "To the Jews as a nation we grant nothing! to the Jews as men we grant all*"^
In 1807, Napoleon convened a Sanhedrin of Jews in his Empire* The Jews declared to Napoleon that France was their country, and that Frenchmen were their brothers*
Under Napoleon, the Jews were admitted to full rights of citizenship as men, as Frenchmen who had a religion, but not as Jews per se* Since then there has never been 'Jewish
2* Alfred M* Lilienthal, The Other.Side of the Coin (New York: Devin Adair, 19657, p. 2k3; Arnold Toynbee, ITinSudy of History, Vol* VIII (London: Oxford University Press, f95k), pp. 272-312*
3= Alfred M. Lilienthal, What price Israel (Chicago: Henry Regnery, 1953)9 pp* 11-12* 9 Nationalism1 in France, the attitude of the French Jews paved the way for the rest of Western Europe to liberate its
Jewish subjects* By 1874, most of the Western European countries had granted full rights to its Jewish subjects* The Jews in the West were assimilated by society, and had their place under the sun as free, equal citizens*^
The Jews in the East
The most distressing situation in the East was in
Russia* Russia had the largest number of Jews, and it was there, most of all, that despair and misery prevailed* For them emancipation was out of the question, and they hardly expected any change in their situation. For them the solu tion was one of life or death* They hardly thought about emancipation or equality* They turned to 1 Jewish National ism1 as an answer*
The Search for a Solution
1 Jewish Nationalism* meant to the' Russian Jews a
1 Jewish National Home, 1 at first* The concept of 1 Jewish
Nationalism1 meant a home where the oppressed Jews could salvage themselves* The concept denied and rejected assimi lation* It condemned the very country they lived in. They said, in one way or another, ”1 was never anything but
Jewish, I could not conceive that a Jew could be anything
4* Ibid 10 else” (this quotation is from Chaim Weizman* a Russian Jew, who became the first President of Israel)
Leo Pinsker, a communal worker from Odessa, was the first Russian Jew known to have advocated a 'Jewish National
Home' for the oppressed Jews, Like most Jews, he realized that there was a strong spiritual attachment between Judaism and Jerusalem* It seems only natural that he should have selected Palestine, but that was not the case* About Pales tine, he said, "We must not attach ourselves to the place . £> where our political life was once violently interrupted*"
Rejecting Palestine as a 1 Jewish National Home' he was will ing to accept any place that would pose as an immediate solution to a tragic human problem*
Pinsker counted on the support of Western Jews, but he met with failure* Out of despair he joined a local
Russian organization that was bent on the very thing he warned against; Palestine*
The Jewish organization which Pinsker joined was named 'Choveve Zion' (Lovers of Zion)* Choveve Zion had as its goal, the colonization of Palestine by oppressed Russian Jews* Its goals were similar to those prescribed by Moses
5>* Chaim Weizmann, Trial and Error, Illustrated Edition (London: Harper & Brothers, 19^-9), p * 555»
6 , Fannie F* Andrews, The Holy Land Under Mandate, Yolo I (Cambridge: Riverside Press, 1 vTlTs~P<> 309% 11 7 Hess in his book * Rome and Jerusalem,, 1 Hess, another Rus
sian Jew, wanted to strengthen the ties between Jerusalem and Judaism, He realized the spiritual connection, but he wanted a physical connection with Palestine, He wanted the
Jews to buy "many towns, fields, and vineyards in the Holy O Land," as necessary to establish Jewish colonies for the oppressed Jews, Unlike Pinsker, the idea of Hess had better
success among rich Jews, The most notable contributor was
Baron Edmond de Rothschild of France, who spent over 20 million dollars,^ The colonization process was slow, but it did have as its object the Holy Land, Its financers were
Western Jews, but its colonies were made up of Eastern Jews,
The Jews of the East chose to migrate, rather than wait for emancipation. Some of them went to Palestine, and others to Western Europe, The majority of the Jewish migrants headed for the United States as early as 1892,^
Pinsker and Hess and Choveve Zion preceded Herzl and
Zionism, Although Herzl never made any reference to them, a nascent Zionist movement was already in existence, awaiting a leader,
7= Moses Hess, Rome and Jerusalem (Hew Yorks Bluch, 1945)«
8 , Andrews, op, cit,, p , 289*
. 9o Ibid,, p, 305. 10, Ibid,, p, 298, 12 Zionism
In 1896, a young Budapest B o m Austrian Jewish pub licist, by the name of Theodor Herzl, was covering the
"Dreyfus Affair* for a French newspaper0 The Dreyfus Affair left a deep impression on him; in fact, it must have con vinced him that Jewish assimilation was not possible* Herzl knew about the persecution of Jews in Eastern Europe and Russia* But that did not move him to write anything* It only moved men like Pinsker"^ and Hess,, The * Dreyfus
Affair* moved Herzl to write Judenstaat in 1896, ^
Judenstaat was unique in that it was the first piece of literature written by an 'emancipated* Western Jew rejecting assimilation and calling for a Jewish state* Haturally, it caught the attention of Eastern Jews and this literary contact led to the formation of the 'World Zionist Organization' under the leadership of Theodor Herzl*
Herzl*s Zionism, according to Weizmann, was a
"philanthropy."13 It was based on the suffering of Jews, and had as its object the procurement of money from rich
Jews to buy land for poor distressed Jews* There is no.
11* Leo Pinsker, Auto-Emancipation (New Yorks Maccabean Publishing Co*, "
12* Theodor Herzl, Judenstaat (Jerusalems Jewish Publishing House, 19^6)« 13* Weizmann, op* cit*, pp* 62-63* 13 doubt that Zionism was caused by the suffering of Jews, Otherwise, why would the Jews leave their countries and go elsewhere? Why was it that a national home or state was called for only when Jews were persecuted and rejected? Why did it appear in the 1890's and not before? Why was it that only a handful of Jews thought otherwise? How does it explain the case of Western Jewry before and after Dreyfus? Herzl's Zionism was the one that developed then and out of these conditions, Judenstaat* Auto-Emancipation, and Rome and Jerusalem, support the view that the cause was Jewish sufferings. The Zionism that Weizmann referred to was the one that developed out of Herzl's Zionism, It was Russian Zionism, it was Weizmann's Zionism:
The sufferings of Russian Jewry never were the cause of Zionism, The fundamental cause of Zion ism was, and is, the ineradicable national striv ing of Jewry to have a home of its own— a.national centre- a national home with a national Jewish life,”4
Weizmann fails to say what caused Zionism, but he succeeds in trying to explain some of its objectives at the time. Whatever was the cause of Zionism, it cannot be said that it was an accident that Herzl and Zionism came at a time when anti-Judaism was high in France,
14° Ibid,, p, 253» 14 Palestine; Meaning and Significance Russia's Zionist Jewry were the most uncompromising Jews at the World Zionists' Organization's First Congress, in Basle, Switzerland, 1897° Their pronounced stubbornness as to the cause of Zionism never failed to appear when a
solution was sought for the distressed Jews of Russia and
Eastern Europe0
The Jews of the East and West sent their delegates to this Congress, with the hope of solving the problems of distressed Jews in accordance with Herzl's Judenstaat0 ,
Herzl, like Pinsker, called for a Jewish state in any country but Palestine. He said; "Let the sovereignty be granted us over a portion of the globe large enough to satisfy the reasonable requirements of a nation and the rest we can manage for ourselves.To the hard line Zionists like Weizmann, he said; "If anyone thinks that the Jews can steal into the land of their fathers, he is deceiving either 16 himself or others." To the Russian Jews who were bent on colonizing Palestine, he said; "An infiltration is bound to end in disaster . . . it continues till the inevitable moment when the native population feels itself threatened
1f?o Andrews, op. cit., p. 310.
16. Ibid., p. 314« 15 and forces the government to stop the further influx of
Jews =,^7
The majority of the Jews recognized that Palestine, which was under Ottoman rule, already had a well-established Arab population for the last thirteen centuries.
The hard-line Zionists, however, adopted an entirely different approach. They said that God had promised the
children of Abraham.Palestine, and that the Jews in the
Diaspora, according to the Old Testament, spoke of a return from the exile to rebuild their home in Palestine.1®
Regarding the concept of Jewish return to Palestine, Alfred ! Guillame, professor of Old Testament at the University of
London said; Such views are a distortion of the Old Testament Prophecies which predicted a return from Babylon and from all the land whither the Jews had been exiled. And these prophecies were fulfilled. The Jews did return to Judea, they did rebuild the Temple; and after fluctuating they did rescue a brief period of political independence and expan- ' sion under the Maccabbees, Thus the prophecies of the return have been fulfilled, and they cannot be fulfilled again. Within the; Canonical Literature of the Old Testament there is no prophecy of a second return after the return from the Babylonian exile.
1? 0 • Ibid., p» 310, 18. I. H. Rabinoviteh, "The Jewish Problem," Papers on Palestine, vole II (May, I#.?)., "49-62.; Henry Morgen than, ‘ 'Zionism and Pa3.estine, " Papers on Palestine, vol„ II (May, 1947), 32-4 6 . ' , _
19. Quoted in "Tension and. Peace in the Middle East," Palestine Arab Refugee Office (Hew York, 1965), 16 The real reasons behind the insistence on Palestine as the only solution to the Jewish problem are alleged to be more blunt and naked than it seems„ For Weizmann said? Nothing but a deep religious conviction expressed in modern political terms could keep the movement alive, and that this conviction had to be based on Palestine and Palestine alone. Any deflection from Palestine was--well,, a form of idolatory . . c the Jewish people would never produce either the money or the energy required in order to build up a wasteland and make it habitable, unless that land was Palestine.20 ,:
The Zionist Organization's First Congress in 1897 was controlled by Russia's Jews, and they insisted on Pales tine as a home because that was the only way to get money from the Western Jews. The means by which Palestine was to become a home had to be colonization, a process which Rus sian Jews began long before 1897. Subsequently, the Congress bowed to Russia's majority votes and agreed on the following declarations "The aim of Zionism is to create for the
Jewish people a legally assumed home in Palestine.
The Zionist Organization, under Herzl, began to negotiate with the Ottoman Empire for the fulfillment of the
Zionist aim. Herzl asked Western governments to mediate on his behalf, and offered to pay generously for land in pp. ip-5; also see "Is the Modern State, Israel, a Fulfill ment of Zionist Prophecy?," Link, Vol. Ill (November- December, 1970), 3-12.
20. Weizmann, op. cit., p. 1^3.
21. Andrews, op. cit., p. 313, 17 Palestine, but the Ottoman Turks refused--not only Sultan
Abdul Hamid, but the young Turks too, refused to sell Pales tine land. The land that was purchased previously, was bought by Western Jews through their governments, never by the World Zionist Organization, At the turn of the century the situation was hope less for the Zionists and the distressed Jews in Eastern
Europe, It was about this time that Britain came in and offered Uganda to the Zionists through English Jewry, Other offers included El-Arish, Sinai, Argentina, Dutch West
Indies, French Guiana and Australia, The most significant offer was that of Uganda, The Seventh Congress of the Zion ists voted: 295> yes, 175 no, and 100 abstained on Uganda,^2
Although the majority voted yes, those 295 votes failed to reach the two-thirds votes required to pass the Uganda
Resolution, The moderate Zionists said yes, and amongst those 295 were Weizmann*s father and brother. Some Zion ists, like Max Nordau, were willing to accept Uganda as a mid-station to Palestine,por Weizmann and other hard line Zionists, it was Palestine or nothing, an attitude that culminated in the tragic loss of millions of Jews, who might have been spared persecution,^
22, Weizmann, op, cit,, pp, 113-115, 23, Ibid,, p, 111*.,
21*, Lilienthal, What Price Israel, pp, 32-33? Ben Hecht, Perfidy (New York: Julian Messner, 1961), 16 Pledges and Counter Pledges; The ~ Struggle for Palestine, ~ 1912-1926
Palestine, at the outbreak of World War Is had a
population of 700,000* There were 6414-$000 Arabs and 56,000 Jewso^ Like most of the Arab world, Palestine was a part of the Ottoman Empire*
When the Ottoman Empire joined Germany against the
Triple Entente in World War I, the security of the Suez
Canal was considered at stake* Palestine, according to the
. . British, was important strategically for the defense of the
Suez Canal* It was thought of as an eastern shield for the
canal, and due to its location, Palestine became the "Suez Canal of the air*The West could not afford to see stra
tegic Palestine fall into enemy hands, or run by a govern
ment that was hostile to the West* Too much was at stake *
Palestine witnessed a fourfold struggle in which success depended upon winning the participation of the Arab
inhabitants* The Western Allies and Axis Powers had stra
tegic motives* The Zionists had a colonial motive* The Arabs, who were the majority of Palestine's inhabitants, had
patriotic motives*
The Ottoman Empire appealed to the Arabs as fellow
f Muslims to join in a Holy War (Jihad) against the Western
25o See Appendix A on Palestine's Population*
26* Andrews, op* cit*, pp* .334-335® 19 Allies, but the Arabs, who had long suffered under Ottoman rule, were reluctant to rest their future with the Ottoman
Bnpire0 The Western Allies sensed Arab reservations regard ing the Ottomans, and likewise, appealed to the Arabs to revolt against Ottoman rule by joining the war on their side. The Arabs again had their own reservations about the
West, but they seemed to be more inclined at the time towards
London than Istanbul, The Arabs were willing to revolt, but only for a price. The price was independence, which became a subject of major controversy between the Arabs and
Britain,
The Zionist Jews were the only major involved ele ment who had a stated objective that was less demanding than the Arabs, They wanted a 1 Jewish Home1 in Palestine, and were willing to sell their services to the side that would agree to their terms. The Ottoman Turks rejected the Zion ists' appeal prior to the war, but the Zionists of World War
I were far stronger and richer than the pre-war Zionists,
The Ottoman Empire and its associated allies must have been tempted by the Zionists' appeal, for it was said that they were willing to agree to the Zionist goals of 1897, but the terms which were demanded from the Zionists were far beyond their reach and, consequently, the negotiations collapsed,
27, Ibid,, pp, 335-337, 20 The British and French were aware of the negotia tions between the Ottoman Turks and the Zionists. They were also aware that Palestine was part of the Ottoman, not
British, Empire. , Their only hope was with the Arabs, not the Zionists. But Zionism was an important movement, and some Zionists, like Weizmann, played an important part in the war effort. If Britain could not concede Palestine to the Arabs or to the Zionists, then 'it might compromise Arab and Zionist demands, for both groups were important to the
Allied cause and the future of Palestine. On 16 May 1916 "The Anglo-Franco-Russian Agreement" was concluded in London. This 11 secret agreement, 1 generally known as the "Sykes-Picot Agreement," concerned itself with the Arab portion of the Ottoman Empire, namely "Greater
Syria" and Iraq. The area in question was divided between
Britain and France, with the exception of Palestine. Pales tine, however, was to become an international area (except for the ports of Haifa and Acre, which were accorded to Britain) whose future was to be decided after the war.^
The future of Arab Palestine was left undecided to maintain the much needed support of both the Arabs and the Zionists.
Britain was not in a position to commit itself too far at this stage of the game.
28. George Antonious, The Arab Awakening (Beirut; Khayat * s, 1955b pp. l}.28-430. ~ — 21 Zionism and Britain
British involvement with Zionism dates back to 1905 when Britain offered Uganda as a possible location for the
Jewish National Borneo The Zionists regarded the Uganda, offer as a gesture of friendship, and hoped that Britain would extend its good offices in the future to the cause of
Zionismo The Zionists did not waste time in planting them selves in England to mold public opinion in their favor0
Through men like Herbert Sidebotham, of the Manchester pq Guardian, 7 they helped establish local Zionist organiza tions, like the British Palestine Committee, (a process which developed in many countries later) in all parts of
Britain to mold public opinion in their favore Through the years, the Zionists managed to establish strong contacts and win friends such as Sir Mark Sykes (who became Chief Secre tary of the War Cabinet under Lloyd George), Lord Robert
Cecil, Sir Ronald Graham, Sir Alfred Mund, Lord Cramer,
Leopold Amery, and Herbert Samuel (a Jew who became the first British High Commissioner for Palestine),^ Weizmann himself testifies to the fact that had it not been for those men mentioned, among others, "We, with our inexperience in delicate diplomatic negotiations, would undoubtedly have
29® Weizmann, op, cit,, p, 233®
30® Ibid®, pp, 2 3 0 -2 3 2 ® 22 committed many dangerous blunders*British gentiles and British pro-Zionist Jewry were important factors that led to the many successes of the Zionist movemente They not only arranged meetings between British (and non-British) states men and Zionists* but they also kept the Zionists informed about major secret negotiations that were detrimental to the Zionist cause* Weizmann* in 1916* informed a surprised Lord Balfour that the secret treaty (Sykes-Picot Agreement) "was unjust to England* fatal to us* and not helpful to the
Arabs In 1905s Chaim Weizmann* through influential local
British Zionists* met Lord Balfour to inform him about the
Zionist rejection of the Uganda offer* This first meeting was quite significant to Weizmann for he later remarked that Balfour expressed a deep interest and admiration for the
Zionist movement* On 18 July 1917 Chaim Weizmann went to see Lord Balfour with Sir Ronald Graham and Lord James
Rothchild* who arranged for this meeting*The Zionist diplomat wanted to obtain a definite statement from Lord
Balfour regarding Britain’s position in relation to Zionist aims in Palestine* The British were aware that the Zionists were conducting similar negotiations with the Axis powers,
31. Ibid** p* 230, 32* Ibid,, p * 241 *
33® Ibid** pp* 255-256 23 whose demands were unsatisfactory to the Zionists0 Never theless, the Central Allies were believed to have been will ing to issue a statement in favor of Zionist goals0^ The British who were unwilling to concede anything, until then, had to make some sort of a statement. But then again, they did not want to make a unilateral statement. Lord Balfour asked Weizmann to give him a declaration that was acceptable to the Zionists, so that he (Lord Balfour) could bring it before the British War Cabinet, Lord Rothchild handed the
'Zionist formula' to Lord Balfour on 18 July 1917 which read as follows;
HoM* Government, after considering the aims of the Zionist Organization, accepts the principle of recognizing Palestine as the National Home of the Jewish people and the right of the Jewish people to build up its National life in Palestine under a protection to be established at the conclusion of Peace, following upon the successful issue of the war.
HoMo Government regards as essential for the realization of this principle the grant of internal autonomy to the Jewish nationality in Palestine, freedom of immigration for Jews, and the establishment of a Jewish National Colonising Corporation for the re-settlement and economic development of the country.
The conditions and forms of the internal autonomy and a charter for the Jewish National Colonising Corporation should, in the view of H,M,_ Government, be elaborated in detail and determined with the representative of the Zionist Organiza tion, 35
3ij.0 Andrews, op. cit,, pp, 335-337o 35o Weizmann, op. cit., pp, 235-236, - 2k The Zionists had an important task before them, but it was a task for which they were ready» Britain was not the only country in which the Zionists chose to build up some influence0 The same objective was pursued throughout Europe, and most of all, the United States,
In the United States, the Zionists had men like Louis Brandeis, Felix Frankfurter, Stephen Wise and many others who carried on the work for Zionist goals and aspira tions, Perhaps the most influential Zionist in America was Louis D, Brandeis, friend and advisor to President Wilson.
Brandeis also was the Chairman of the Provisional Executive
Committee for General Zionist Affairs, an organization which was created by him in New York in it was through the pressure exerted by Brandeis that President Wilson agreed to use his influence, on behalf of a Jewish Pales- tine,Weizmann appealed to Brandeis to obtain President
Wilson's support,38 an(j on 16 October 1917 Colonel E, M,
House, acting for President 'Wilson, cabled the British Gov ernment Washington's support of the Zionist declaration,39
Britain did not have to make a unilateral declaration, the
360 Andrews, op. cit,, p. 3 3 4 ,
37« Julius Haber, The Odyssey of an American Zion ist (New York: Twayne Publi shers, 1 , pp, iTaO'-iSS, / "
3 8 o Weizmann, op, cit., p . 2$8,
39, Ibid., p, 262. American support was followed by French, Italian and Japa nese support,^ Despite the support that came from the United V States, France and Italy, the members in the British War
Cabinet were not entirely for the Zionist formula. Cabinet members like Sir Edwen Montagu (a British Jew) were opposed to the formula as it contemplated a Jewish State in Pales
tine,^ To recognize Palestine as the ’National Home’ of the Jewish people, would not prevent them from turning Palestine into a Jewish state. The present formula, as it stood, spelled nothing short of a Jewish State in Palestine,
although such terms as 'National Home1 were used. The
opposition, therefore, concerned itself mainly with the ultimate objective of Zionism in Palestine (which was a
Jewish State), and if a declaration were to be made, then
the objective had to be changed, A compromise was reached, although not all of the Ministers agreed, and Lord Balfour
sent a letter on 2 November 191? to Lord Rothchild, That letter became known as the ’Balfour Declaration,1
It-Oo Andrews, op, cit,, pp, 331-331).,
41o Weizmann, op, cit,, p, 2£7o 26 The Balfour Declaration
November 2, 1917 Dear Lord Rothchilds I have much pleasure in conveying to you, on behalf of his Majesty's Government, the following declaration of sympathy with Jewish Zionist aspira tions which has been submitted to and approved by the Cabinet: —
His Majesty's Government views with favour the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people, and will use their best endeav ours to facilitate the achievement of this object, it being 'clearly understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jew!sh communities in Pales tine, or the rights and political status enjoyed by Jews in any other country«, I should be grateful if you would bring this declaration to the knowledge of the Zionist Federa tion.^
Meaning and Significance
The Balfour Declaration differs considerably from the original Zionist formula. Firsts the Declaration did not specify nor accept Palestine ad the National Home for the Jews, though it viewed with favour the establishment in Palestine of a National Home for the Jews. Seconds the
Declaration said a National Home, not a state or Jewish
Nation. Thirds the Declaration seemed to limit the scope of Jewish immigration to colonize Palestine by stressing that "it being clearly understood that nothing shall be done
ij.2» Quoted in Leonard Stein, The Balfour Declara tion (London: Vailentine, Mitchell and Go., LtcU, 1961). 27 which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of exist
ing non-Jewish Communities in Palestine”? the Zionist for mula had made no reference to the ”non-Jewish community" in
Palestine, Fourths the Declaration did not proclaim any right of the Jews to resettle or rebuild a Home in Pales tine, It clearly stated that nothing shall be done which may prejudice 'the rights and political status enjoyed by
Jews in any other country,1 Britain issued the Balfour Declaration because it needed the help of the Zionist movement to win the war,
Since Zionism had an aim to colonize Palestine and eventually
turn it into a Jewish State, Britain obviously wanted a
friendly government east of Suez, if a government should be
allowed to set itself up in the first place. Although the
Balfour Declaration did not realize Zionist aims in full, it was considered satisfactory to the Zionists as they did not object to it. The only adjustment needed was to reconcile
the term 'national Home' with Jewish state. The Zionists did use both terms to mean the same thing,^ Nahum Sokolow, the President of the World Zionist Organization, said that
See "Secret Foreign and Political Department of the Government of Great Britain,» India Office Archives Extension B, August, 1920, Number 552, pp, 1-8 (obtained totoewa® S! ! £ l t " 3'pp.A335-337.b7 Profeas°1' W. Adame,); ij.lj.fl Sir John Hope Simpson, "The Palestine Mandate,” The Fortnightly, CLXII (December, 1944b 341-349, 28 Zionism did not contemplate a Jewish state; Weizmann said
that either Zionism was misunderstood or the Arabs were
deliberately lying. They all denied that Zionism contem plated political domination in Palestine. The British too, did their share of double talk.^
It became commonly known, according to Winston Churchill, that the Balfour Declaration did not prohibit the establish ment of a Jewish State in Palestine.^? Churchill went further than Balfour, not only in asserting the Zionist
goal, but in rationalizing Britain's decisions If, as may well happen, there should be created in our own life time by the banks of the Jordan a Jewish State under the protection of the British Crown which might comprise three or four millions of Jews, an event will have occurred in the his tory of the world which would from every point of view be beneficial, and would be especially in harmony, with the truest interests of the British Empire Ac
45o Nahum Sokolow, History of Zionism, Vol. I (Londons Longmans, Green and Co7,1919), pp. xxiv-xxv. 46= On the.establishment of a Jewish State in Pal estine, Lord Balfour said: "Personally this is what I . should like to see"; quoted by Carrol Quigley, "Lord Bal four's Personal Position on the Balfour Declaration," The Middle East Journal, XXII (Summer, 1968), 341"3495 also see Lord Balfour4 s memo" to Lord Curzon in September 1919, "Secret Foreign and Political Department of the Government of Great Britain,11 op. cit., pp. 1-8.
47= Ibid. 48= "United Nations Special Committee on Palestine: Report to the.General Assembly,” United Nations General Assembly Official Records, Second Session, Supplement No. 11, Vol. Ill, p. TT; oh the importance of the Suez Canal to British strategy see Ronald Robinson, John Gallagher and 29 The United States welcomed the Balfour Declaration and President Wilson expressed his approval in a letter to Stephen Wise* then President of the Zionist Federation in
America,^ (hi 21 September 1922 a joint resolution, adopted by the 6?th Congress of the I&iited States, was signed by the
President* The resolution reads
Resolved by the Senate and the House of Representa tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, that the United States of America favors the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people, it being clearly understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of Christians and all other non-Jewish communities in Palestine; and that the Holy places and religious buildings and.sites in Palestine shall be adequately protected*
Pledges to the Arabs
At the outbreak of World War I, as mentioned earlier, most of the Arab world was still ruled by the
Ottoman Empire* The Ottomans asked the Arabs to join them in a Holy War against the British-French Allies, and the
British asked the Arabs to revolt against the Ottomans* To some, it may have seemed that the Arabs were in a dilemma, but the choice was a simple one* The Arabs wanted inde pendence, and if they joined Istanbul and its allies, and
Alice Denny, Africa and the Victorians; The Official Mind of Imperialism"^London: Macmillan^ „
49* Andrews, op. cit., p* 3^1* 50. The United States Department of State, Mandate for Palestine (Washington, P* C*s Government Printing Office, 1927), p. 8. 30 had the Ottoman's won the war against the British-French and
Russian Allies, independence would have been denied to the
Arabs, since they were a part of the Ottoman Bapire„ If
they joined the British and French Allies, then it would have been for a price, and that price was independence«> It is doubtful whether the Arabs would have revolted against
the Ottomans and agreed to fight on the side of the British
and French Allies, had not independence been promised to
them. It would have been a waste of Arab blood and effort.It must also be recalled that Britain wanted the
Arabs to revolt to protect Palestine, lest it may fall into hands hostile to the British, thus endangering the Suez
Canal. The British knew that they had to agree to pay the price for the Arab revolt, and that promise came in the form of pledges to the Arabs by Britain, British statesmen, and
Allied declarations. The Arabs relied upon the pledges, and
they did revolt against the Ottomans. But much to their
surprise, Britain did not honor all of its pledges t In
fact, Britain had no intention of honoring any of its pledges to the Arabs.
51. E. W. Bethmann, Decisive Years in Palestine (Hew York: American Friends of the Middle iSast, Inc., 1957), p. 20| in 1922 the Arabs were 661,000 as opposed to 8^,000 Jews. 31 Sir Henry McMahon^
The first of these pledges came through letters exchanged between Sharif Husain of Mecca and Sir Henry McMahon# the first British High Commissioner for Egypt, The four letters written by each statesman respectively# became known as the Husain-Me Mahon correspondence. Our main con cern here is with Sharif Husain's first note to McMahon# dated 14. July 1915 and McMahon's second note of reply# dated
24 October 1915® Sharif Husain's letter of 14.July 1915 clearly stated the demands of the Arabs in return for aiding the
British and French Allies against the Ottoman Enpire, He wanted Britain to recognize the independence of the Arab countries which he specified in his letter. The countries were: Greater Syria (which included at that time Syria proper# Lebanon# Palestine and the boundaries of present day
Jordan); Iraq; and all of the Arabian Peninsula,
Sir Henry McMahon replied to Sharif Husain on 30 August 1915 and clearly stated that it was premature to accept the boundaries which Sharif Husain outlined, Sharif
Husain replied to McMahon on 9 September 1915 insisting that Britain should officially accept his proposed bound aries, It is McMahon's reply of 24 October 1915 with which we are concerned as the basis of the pledge made by Britain,
52, For the full texts of the Husain-McMahon Corre spondence see Antonious# op, cit,, pp, 413-427.
1 32 Sir Henry McMahon informed Sharif Husain in his letter of 2l\. October 1915 that Britain agreed to the bound aries proposed by Sharif Husain with a few exceptions,. Those exceptions were Western Syria, (which included Lebanon and Coastal Syria proper) and Iraq (which was to be under British rule)* McMahon said those portions of Syria lying to the West of Damascus* Homs* Hama and Aleppo; it is clear that Palestine was not excluded* and that the British agreed to Palestine "as part of the boundary proposed by Sharif
Husain* Regarding Palestine* McMahon said that Britain would guarantee the * Holy places against all external aggres sion and will recognize the obligation of preserving them from aggression!
Britain did not keep its promise regarding Pales tine* for in 1916* according to the Sykes-Picot Agreement*
Palestine was to remain under international control till the war was over* In 1917$ according to the Balfour Declara tion* Palestine was to allow the Jews to establish a "Home" in Palestine* At the peace conference* independence was denied to Palestine* and Britain ruled through a League of
Nations Mandate until Palestine became a Jewish State in
1948* There was nothing to indicate from McMahon’s exclu sions, that Palestine was not a part of Husain’s scheme of proposed boundaries* and yet* Palestine never became inde pendent* even though its population was overwhelmingly Arab* Commander David George Hogarth When Britain issued the Balfour Declaration in 1917P two years after the Husain-McHahon Correspondences and eighteen months after the Arab Revolt* Sharif Husain was greatly disappointed and asked for a definition of the mean ing and scope of the Balfour Declaration.
On Ip January 1918 Commander David George Hogarth* one of the heads of the Arab Bureau in Cairo* was instructed by the British Foreign Office to deliver an oral message to
Sharif Husain. Hogarth informed Sharif Husain that Jewish settlement in Palestine would only be allowed insofar as it
"would be consistent with the political and economic freedom
Of the Arab population.The Balfour Declaration said
"civil and religious rights," but Hogarth, as a British official, said "political and economic freedom.” The Bal four statement could not have protected or safeguarded Arab
Palestine, but the Hogarth statement was more hopeful to the
Arabs in Palestine. With this new assurance, Sharif Husain informed Hogarth that the Arabs would welcome persecuted
Jewish refugees in Palestine, provided it was clear that complete Arab sovereignty should prevail in Palestine, where
92 percent of the population was then Arab. Hogarth's mes sage was an example of false British reassurance designed to maintain Arab support against the Ottoman Empire. The Arabs
53« Ibid., p. 268 34 were deceived once more by Britain* Palestine became a Jewish state in 1943$ largely through unlimited Jewish immi gration*
Lt, Col, Jo Ro Bassett
The secret "Sykes-Picot Agreement" became known to the Arabs* thanks to Russia* through the Ottoman government.
The Ottomans* who wanted the Arabs to join them in a Holy
War against the Entente Allies* informed the Arabs that the
Allies were deceiving them* and that this secret treaty really aimed at dividing the Arab world between Britain and
France, thus denying the Arabs independence, Istanbul, once more* called upon the Arabs to join her in the war against the Entente Allies,
The British, obviously embarrassed* needed to relieve the Arabs of their suspicions and doubts. The act ing British Agent in Jedda, Lt, Coli J, R, Bassett* was instructed by Britain to reassure Husain of Britain’s honest intentions* and to deny the designs ascribed in the Sykes-
Picot Agreement, On 8 February 1918 Bassett sent a letter to Sharif Husain stating that Istanbul wanted to sow sus picion and doubt between the Arabs and the Allies* and that
Britain reaffirmed its pledges to the Arabs, insofar as their liberation was concerned,^
54<> Ibid. * pp. 431-432 = 35 The British deceived the Arabs for the third time, through Bassett, in denying that Britain and Prance had any designs on the Arab countries, even though the Bolsheviks made public in 191? the Czar6s secret treaties, of which the Sykes-Picot was one of them.
Declaration to the Seven
Seven Arab leaders, domiciled in Cairo, sent a memorial to the British Foreign Office through the Arab
Bureau in Cairo® The British government, through the Arab
Bureau, delivered its Declaration to the seven Arabs on 16 June 1913 ®55 The seven Arabs were R&fiq al-Azm; Shaikh
Kamel al~Qassab£ Mukhtar al-Sulh; Abdul Rahman Shahbandarj
Khaled al-Hakim; Pauzi al-Bakri; Hasan Himadeh®
The Declaration to the Seven, was a British promise to recognize Arab independence in the territories that were free and independent before the War, and to those territor ies that were liberated from Turkey by the Arabs themselves during the War® Regarding the territories that were liberated from the Ottomans by the Allies, and those terri tories that were still under Ottoman rule, Britain promised independence and a local government that was based on the consent of the governed* Palestine was liberated by the Allies, but it never received independence® The consent of the governed, in this case, the Arabs, who were 92 percent
55® Ibid,, pp. 433-434. 36 of the population, was never sought or obtained0 The future government of Palestine was British, not Arab, The Declara tion to the Seven was one of those, deceptive Declarations made, but never effectuated,
Anglo-French Declaration
On 7 November 1918 a year after the Balfour Declara tion, Britain and France issued a declaration in Palestine,
Syria and Iraq in the form of an official communique from
General Headquarters, Egyptian Expeditionary Force The Anglo-French Declaration stated that the goal of the Allies was to liberate the peoples who have for so long suffered under Ottoman rule, and to establish national gov ernments who derive their authority from the people*
Neither Britain nor France said that communique would impose any system in any liberated area. Instead, they would offer their services to set up popularly elected governments in such areas. Palestine was covered by the Declaration, but it never received independence, and the government estab lished was not based on the consent of the governed. Pales tine, like the rest of the "liberated" countries in Arabia, was colonized by Britain and France. Such an outcpme, hardly confirms the noble goals expressed by Britain and
France.
56. Ibid., pp. l4.35-t1.3 6 .
!' 37 Palestine at the Paris Peace Conference According to the Sykes-Picot Agreement, Palestine was to remain under international administration until its future was decided upon at the peace conference0 According
to the previous pledges made by Britain, and France, as dis
cussed earlier, Palestine was to become independent through
Allied aid, once it had been liberated by the Allies,,
Palestine was liberated by the British and was garrisoned by the British pending further instructions from the peace con ference =
Arab Demands
Insofar as Palestine was concerned, the Arabs reit erated their demand for independence, in accord with the pledges made to them by the Allies promising them independ ence 0 The Arabs were informed by Britain and France that independence could not be granted to all of the Arab coun tries* There were some Arab countries that were not ready for independence, and the Allies thought it best that they help such countries attain independence under their guidance and control„ It was suggested that France rule Syria and
Lebanon through a League of Nations Mandate, and that
Britain should do the same with Palestine, Transjordan and
Iraq* The Arabian Peninsula was to be independent at once, since it was liberated by the Arabs* 38 The Arabs* however* objected* The first objection came from Prince Faisal* Sharif Husain8s son* who informed . the Paris Peace Council on 1 January 1919 that independence must be granted to all of the Arab countries* However, due to the Anglo-French desires in Arabia, Prince Faisal sug gested that a great power could commend itself to help those
Arab countries gain independence, provided a representative local government is erected in each country upon the consent of the governed*^? "
The Arab people, however, were totally disappointed with the prospects for their future in Paris* Their objec tions were made clear when on 2 July 1919 a General Syrian
Congress assembled in Damascus, with representatives from all of Greater Syria (Syria proper, Lebanon, and Palestine)*
Their objections and demands became known as the "Resolu tions of the General Syrian Congress*" Only full review of those resolutions can adequately reveal their scope and significance* But they declared for
1 * Full and absolute independence for all of Syria
(including Palestine, as it was part of Syria)*
57® ' J• C. Hurewitz, Diplomacy in the Hear and Middle East, Vol* II" (New York: 'D, Van Nostrand Co*, 1956), pp . 58* See Antonious, op* cite, pp* l|j^0-l^!2 for the complete Resolutions of the General Syrian Congress. 39
2c. The establishment of a constitutional monarchy under Amir Faisal as King. 3® The rejection of Article XXII of the proposed League Covenant which considered Syria as insufficiently
developed. The Congress said, "We are not less
fitted or gifted than the Bulgarians, Serbs, Greeks
and Rumanians."
4.0 If a mandate is required for Syria, then the Arabs want the United States as the mandatory power, since
it had no colonial designs on Syria. The duration
of that mandate should not exceed twenty years. j?. If the United States is unable to accept the man date, then we prefer Britain reluctantly.
6. Under no condition do we accept France as a manda
tory power.
7. We oppose the claims and aims of Zionism in Pales
tine (referred to as "that part of southern Syria").
We also oppose Jewish immigration as it menaces "our
national, political and economic life."
8. The integrity and inseparability of all of Syria.
9. Independence for Iraq.
10® Reaffirmation of President Wilson* s condemnation of
secret treaties, and the nullification of the agree
ments reached between Britain,_France, and the
Zionists 11o The Congress looked to President Wilson for support in determining their own future, 12, The Congress demanded that the peace conference maintain Arab freedom, security and independence.
What in essence the Arabs wanted was national self- determination and that meant independence for all of the
Arab countries. They wanted to be free and independent to live in their own countries amongst their own people. They objected to foreign domination and intervention in all of its forms and aspects. The Arabs demanded what was promised to them by the Allies, The Arabs demanded their rights as equal human beings, who, like others, want to determine and shape their own future and destiny in their own country,
Zionist Plans The Zionist organization presented a memorandum to the Paris Peace Council, outlining Zionist aims and goals in
Palestine, The Zionist memo of 3 February 1919 noted the following as its objectives and demands
1, The right of the Jewish people to reconstitute a National Home in Palestine, The territorial bound
aries of that National Home should include parts of
Lebanon, Transjordan, Hijaz, Syria and all of
Palestine,
59, See Hurewitz, op, cit,, pp, for the com plete text of the Zionist memorandum. 2e The Zionists wanted a League of Nations Mandate tor
Palestine, with Britain as the mandatory power® The
purpose of the mandate would be to facilitate the establishment of the Jewish National Home in the
areas prescribed.
3. The Zionists reiterated the Balfour Declaration, and hoped that Britain would work with them in making
Palestine truly and wholly Jewish.
The Zionists were bent on colonizing Palestine through a mandate by the League. Britain was to facilitate Palestine*s
becoming Jewish, rather than to prepare the existing Pales
tine for independence. The Zionists' proposal was submitted
at a time when the Jews were a mere eight percent of the
total population. Again, Zionism referred to the Arab majority as non-Jewish, apparently, in fact, as non
existing, even though the Arabs constituted 92 percent of
the population in Palestine.
Woodrow Wilson: Between Arab and Zionist
President Wilson, prior to the Paris Peace Confer
ence, did not hesitate to acknowledge United States support
for Zionist goals in Palestine. President Wilson supported
the Zionist formula, and later welcomed the Balfour Declara
tion. It was through men like Brandeis, Frankfurter, and
Wise that the United States became openly pro-Zionist. It may be questioned whether’President Wilson was aware of the ultimate goals of Zionism in Palestine. But certainly the Zionist memo at the Paris Peace Council should have convinced/ or informed. President Wilson and others, of
the true goals and aims of Zionism in Palestine. The Zion ist memo was no secret, at least not to President Wilson.
The Arab demands and aspirations became known to
President Wilson at the Peace Conference too. There was
Prince Faisal’s memo, and the resolutions of the General Syrian Congress. The Arabs let it be known that they wanted to be free; free to rule and live in their own countries.
Most of all, free from being controlled or occupied by any power. The Arabs made no secret of their demands.
President Wilson must have been aware of the dilemma. The Zionist goals ran against the Arabs’ demands.
Palestine was awaiting a solution, and something had to be done.
The ideals which President Wilson expressed in his fourteen points, could have guided him in making up his mind about Palestine. President Wilson asked for reports on
Palestine by Americans in order to make up his mind. The reports, he said, should coincide with the aspirations and wishes of the people in that area. The people must decide, and President Wilson wanted to know the decision of the people of Palestine. 43 American Delegation's Recommendations* On 21 Janu ary 1919 the Intelligence Section of the American Delegation
to the Peace Conference submitted tentative recommendations
to President Wilson regarding the Hear and Middle East6x Regarding Palestine, the Report recommended:^
1.o The establishment of an independent state in Pales
tine, with Britain as the mandatory power,
2, Palestine, the report said, is important to the Jews
and Christians, The relations of the Muslims with
Palestine was not so intimate,
3® The report said that Palestine was the ancestral home of the Jews, and it is right that Palestine
should become a Jewish State, "even though the Jews
form barely a sixth of the total population of
700,000 in Palestine," (An incorrect figure, as the Jews formed eight percent,)
This is, perhaps, one of the most shocking reports about Palestine, It is poor, inaccurate and biased. The
Muslims lived in Palestine for thirteen centuries, yet the report said Palestine is not so "intimate" to the Muslims, Any student of Muslim history could very well verify that
Palestine was not only "intimate" to Muslims, but is as sacred as Mecca itself to all of Islam, And then to recom mend that a Jewish State be established in Palestine against
60, Ibid,, pp, 40"44, 44 the wishes of 92 percent of the population hardly conforms with the principle of elemental justicec But justice for the inhabitants hardly affected American, French or British interests in Palestine, In fact, regarding Palestine, Lord
Balfour wrote to Lord Curzon in September 1919 sayings For in Palestine we do not propose even to go .through the form of consulting the wishes of the present inhabitants of the country, though the American Commission has been going through the form of asking what they are. The four Great Powers are committed to Zionism, And Zionism, be it right or wrong, good or bad, is rooted in agelong traditions, in past needs, in future hopes, of far profounder importance than the drives and prejudices of the 700,000 Arabs who now inhabit that ancient land. In my opinion that is right. What I have never been able to understand is how it is harmonized with the declaration of the Covenant or the instructions to the Commission of Enquiry , , ,
' «, , , so far as Palestine is concerned, the ^ Powers have made no statement of fact which is not admittedly wrong, and no declaration of policy which, at least in the letter, they have not always intended to violate,
King-Crane Commission, President Wilson at the
Paris Peace Council in 1918, suggested that the ’Big Three’ send .two delegates each as part of a unified commission to determine the wishes of the people in Syria and Iraq,
France refused I Later, Britain refused and President Wilson alone held his ground. The majority of the American Dele gation in Paris objected to such an inquiry, They thought
61, See "Secret Foreign and Political Department of the Government of Great Britain," op, dit,, pp, 1-8, that their re commendations were adequate0 However, Presi dent Wilson sent Dr. Henry 0. King and Mr0 Charles R» Crane to investigate for him0^
The King-Crane Commission arrived in Jaffa on 10 June 1919 and spent six weeks visiting Palestine and Syria proper» The Commission visited forty towns, received 1,800 petitions, and interviewed a large number of delegations*
On 28 August 1919 the Commission submitted its report, known as the King-Crane Report, to President Wilson* The Report covered Syria, Palestine and Iraq* On Palestine, the Report recommended the follow- , 63 ings 1* The report reaffirmed the Arab position stated in
the General Syrian Congress, that Palestine be included in a united Syrian State with Faisal as its
head* The report also recommended that the United
States accept the Mandate for Syria, as it coincides
with the wishes of the people* If the United States
chooses not to accept, then Britain is the Arab's
second choice, and under no circumstances do the
Arabs want France, as France harbors colonial aims,
not independence, for Palestine*
62* Ibid* 5 also see Antonious, op. cit., pp„ 2 9 I4.- 298* -~"~
6 3 . For the full text of the King-Crane Commission see Antonious, op. cit*, pp* 294-298* 46 2e Regarding Zionism, the Report said, "the commis sioners began their study of Zionism with minds pre
disposed in its favor," but after investigating the facts, they recommended the following serious modi
fications to the Zionist programme: a, Palestine is Holy to Muslims, Christians and
Jews* The places which are sacred to Muslims and Christians are not only not sacred to Jews,
but are abhorrent, to them. The Jews cannot be
entrusted to safeguard the sanctity of the Holy
Places, but the Muslims can, as they respect all religions,
b. The Zionist claim that the Jews have a "right"
to Palestine "can hardly be seriously consid
ered, " Ninety percent of the Arabs in Palestine
are opposed to the Zionist programme in Pales
tine, which aims to establish a Jewish state.
The Zionists did acknowledge that they aimed at
dispossessing the non-Jewish community in Pales
tine by various forms of land purchase. To this
effect, the report said, a Jewish state cannot
be established except by force, and by damaging
the civil and religious rights of non-Jews. The report said that Jewish immigration should be k7 limited, and Palestine should remain Arab, and a part of a united Syrian Statee ct The report also mentioned that the government of
the United States might be embarrassed in become
ing objective, regarding Palestine, due to "her
large influential Jewish population*" But the report recommended "the settlement of every
question, whether of territory, of sovereignty,
of economic arrangement, or of political rela
tionship upon the basis of the free acceptance
of that settlement by the people immediately
concerned, and not upon the basis of the mate
rial interest or advantage of any other nation
or people which may desire a different settle
ment for the sake of its own exterior influence
or mastery," This principle had been stated by
President Wilson on I4. July 1918 as one of four
great ends for which "the. associated people of
the world were fighting," The report said that
"if that principle is to rule, and so the wishes
of Palestine’s population are to be decisive as
to what is to be done with Palestine, then it is
to be remembered that the non-Jewish population
of Palestine is emphatically against the entire
Zionist programme," ■ 48 President Wilson was aware thats
1o The British and the French promised independence to the Arabs in Palestine, and the Arabs made it known that independence was theirs by right„
20 If independence was not possible, and if a mandate
by the League for Palestine was inevitable, then the Arabs let it be known that they preferred, in order,
the United States, Britain, France, as the mandatory power*, and then for a limited period only.
3. The Zionists were promised by Britain (later sup
ported by France and the United States) a National
Home in Palestine, and the Zionists made it known
that they wanted to establish a Jewish State in Palestine, with Britain as the mandatory power,
through large scale Jewish immigration.
President Wilson, however, was advised by men like Mr. Brandeis, a Zionist, who advised him to support the
Zionist programme. In fact. President Wilson supported the Balfour Declaration, and as his term in office came to an end with the defeat of the League of Nations Covenant, there was little that he could have done. What mattered, though, was that despite the King-Crane Report, President Wilson did not support the Arab cause. Palestine Under the 'Mandate, 1920-1914-7 On 25 April 1920 the Supreme Council, which was sitting at San Remo, assigned the Mandate for Palestine and
Transjordan to Britain, in accordance with Article XXII of
the Covenant of the League of Nations, Although the United
States had not joined the League of Nations, President
Wilson supported the British Mandate for Palestine at the Peace Conference, and on 3 December 192^ the "American-
British Palestine Mandate Convention,” was concluded between those governments, in London,^
The League of Nations’ Supreme Council’s decision was a fulfillment of British and Zionist aims in Palestine.
The British made it clear at the start of the war that they wanted to see a friendly government east of Suez, Now the
League assigned Britain as the mandatory power for Pales
tine, The Zionists, whose object was to establish a Jewish
state in Palestine through large scale immigration, wanted
Britain as the mandatory power. It was Britain that issued
the Balfour Declaration, and in accord with this Declaration,
the Zionists hoped to fulfill their aim in Palestine.
Provisions of the Mandate
The purpose of the League of Nations' Mandate Sys tem, according to Article XXII of the Covenant, was to
61}.. The United States Department of State, op. cita, p. 107o 5o •f further the development and well-being of the "peoples not yet able to stand by themselves," This serious responsibil ity in each case was entrusted to a mandatory power and it was expected that the provisions of the Mandate would, in essence, reaffirm the noble goals and methods by which the
Mandatory power was to prepare the people for self- government.
The provisions of the Mandate for Palestine were geared more towards the fulfillment of Zionist aims through
British Administration than toward preparing Arab Palestine for self-government. The preamble to the Mandate held
Britain "responsible for putting into effect the declaration originally made on 2 November 1917 by the Government of His Brittanic Majesty," Unlike the Balfour Declaration, but similar to the Zionist formula of 18 July 1917 the preamble recognized "the historical connection of the. Jewish people with Palestine," and considered that connection as the necessary grounds for Zionism to "reconstitute" the Jewish
National Home in Palestine, The preamble referred to the
Arab majority as the "existing-non-Jewish Communities," whose civil and religious rights were to be protected while the Mandatory, power facilitates the reconstruction of the
Jewish National Home in Palestine,
Out of the 27 Articles of the Mandate assignment, six dealt with Zionist goals, 21 with the goals and methods 51 of administration,, and none mentioned the word Arab ov
Palestinian by name«, They were referred to as the "existing non-Jewish Coramuni ties» The six Articles that dealt with Zionism, reaffirming and stating Zionist goals, were 2,
6 , 7, 11 and 22o Article 2 held Britain responsible for the
establishment of the Jewish national home; Article I4. recog nized the Zionist organization as the appropriate Jewish
Agency to advise and cooperate with Britain in establishing
the Jewish na'tional home; Article 6 facilitated Jewish immi
gration and settlement in Palestine; Article 7 facilitated the acquisition of Palestinian citizenship by immigrant Jews
taking up their permanent residence in Palestine, a privi
lege denied to everyone else save Jews; Article 11 enabled
the Jewish Agency to perform the tasks of a state in the
Jewish areas; Article 22 established Hebrew as one of the
three, official languages in Palestine, (The other two were
Arabic and English,)
The Mandate assigned to Zionism a most favorable position. In fact, the Mandate became a charter for Zionism
to colonize Palestine through immigration with Britain as
the helping hand. The provisions of the Mandate defeated the very goals expressed in Article XXII of the Covenant, 52 which, in essence, created the Mandate system. The Mandate
was written to serve an end other than the end desired by
the majority inhabitants. The means prescribed could only serve one end, and that end was very much similar to the Zionist goal.
Zionist Aims
The Zionist aim in Palestine was to establish a Jew ish state, although such terms as ’Home1 were used. The
Zionist formula, the King-Crane Report, and other similar
statements verified the Zionist goal. Secretary of State
Lansing asked Weizmann to define the term 'Jewish National Home’ for him, and Weizmann replied: "I define the Jewish
National Home to mean the creation of an administration which would arise out of the natural conditions of the
country--always safeguarding the interests of non-Jews— with
the hope that, by Jewish immigration, Palestine would ulti mately become as Jewish as England is English.This is, perhaps, the key word that can explain forthcoming events
and interpret past activities. The goal was to make Pales
tine "as Jewish as England is English."
The Zionists never contemplated amalgamation of the Jews with the Arabs, rather, they feared that unless the two
were kept apart, Jewish standards would inevitably be
65. Weizmann, op. cit,, p. 305. 53 lowered and the Zionist raison d'etre would be destroyed,,^
The Zionists had no place for the Arabs in their scheme’, even though they were the majority of the population,. When . Mro Einstein asked Weizmann about the status of the Arabs if Palestine became Jewish, Weizmann replied: "What Arabs, they are hardly of any consequence,
Jewish Immigration into Palestine
Jewish immigration to Palestine was permissible insofar as it would not "prejudice the civil and religious rights of the existing non-Jewish communities," said the
Balfour Declaration* The Mandate, however, allowed greater " ? ■ ' latitude* Jewish immigration was limited to the economic capacity of Palestine* In both cases, however, the Manda tory power, Britain, was authorized to determine how many Jews could come in and when.
The ratio of Jewish immigration was not uniform throughout the years. Much of it depended upon the ability of the Zionists to pressure Britain into opening the gates of Palestine, When Zionism was sufficiently persuasive immigration.figures reached 73,000 in one year (193^-1935);
6 6 , Quincy Wright, "The Palestine Problem," Politj- cal Science Quarterly, XLI (September, 1926), ij.02, •
6?, Liliertthal, What Price Israel, pp. 172-17 3 , 5h when Zionism was less persuasive, the number of Jews in
Palestine remained essentially the same (1926-192?)»
Jewish immigration can be divided into three stages:
1922-1930J 1931-194-0j 1914-1-194?o Prom 1922-1930, the number of Jews rose from 84,000 to 165,000, an increase of about
96 percent* The Arabs rose from 661,000 to 8 18 ,000, by natural birth, an increase of about 23 percent6 The peak years for Jewish immigration were 1924-1926, when 55,000
Jews came in, accounting for more than 32 percent of the , increase in population during this eight year period*
From 1931-1940, the Jews increased from 175$ 000 to 464,000, an increase slightly less than 165 percent* The
Arabs rose from 848,000 to 1,069,000, an increase of about 20 percent* The peak years for Jewish immigration were
1932-36, 1938-39, where 226,000 Jews came in, accounting, for more than 22 percent of the increase in population during this nine year period*
From 1941-1947, the number of Jews rose from 474,000 to 508,000, an increase of 34$000, about 7 percent* The Arabs rose from 1,069,000 to 1,222,000 by natural birth*
The reason for the low figure of 34,000 is largely due to the restrictions placed by' the Mandatory power, which wanted to limit Jewish immigration.
Through legal and illegal immigration (a process used whenever Britain closed the gates of Palestine to the 55 further influx of unauthorized Jews), the Jews of 191? rose from a mere 8 percent to become, in 1947, 30 percent of the population in Palestine,, From the time of the Balfour
Declaration to the Partition of Palestine, the Jews increased by a ratio of more than 80? percent and during the same 30 years, the Arabs natural increase by birth was less than 89 percento
Consequences
In 1897, the founder of the World Zionist Organiza tion, Theodor Herzl, cautioned the Zionists against unlimited Jewish immigration into Palestine* Herzl said "an infiltration is bound to end in disaster „ * * It continues till the inevitable moment when the native population feels itself threatened and forces the government to stop the further influx of Jews 0
Herzl*s prophecy did materialize. The native Arab population in Palestine did feel itself threatened, and asked the British government to put an end to Jewish immi gration. The Arab protest came as early as 1929, and at first it was directed against Britain. The protest was developed and then exploded into unrest and open violence.
The protest reached its height in 1933 and extended from
1938-1939e The Arab rebellion was directed at first against
68. Andrews, op. cit., p. 310 56 Britain, then it moved to Jewish settlements in Palestine, If the Arabs could not pressure Britain into curtailing
Jewish immigration, then they might at least make Palestine unsafe for further Jewish immigration,^
British Reaction to Jewish Immigration
British reaction, to the acute tensions in Pales tine, came in the form of major policy statements and efforts to effectuate solutions that followed every major crisis in Palestine,
Churchill White Paper^
The Churchill White Paper of 1 July 1922 came as an answer to the charges that Britain and Zionism intended to create a wholly Jewish state in Palestine, Winston Churchill, who was Colonial Secretary then, denied that it was the intention of Britain to make Pales tine a Jewish National Home, Mr, Churchill said that the
Balfour Declaration contemplated a 'home' in Palestine, and that 'home' was already in existence after admitting 2 5 ,0 0 0
Jews, Mr, Churchill went on to say that unauthorized state ments have been made to the effect that "Palestine is to become as Jewish as England is English" (referring to Mr,
69, Bethmann, op, cit,, pp„ 20-22=
70, For the full text of the Churchill White Paper see Hurewitz, op, cit,, pp, 103-106= 57 Weizmann)c Churchill denied such airass and said that the
Jewish national home meant developing the existing Jewish community in Palestine, not "the imposition of a Jewish nationality upon the inhabitants of Palestine as a whole."
The Jewish national home, according to the White
Paper, was already in existence by 1922= Jewish immigration should have ceased after 1922, in order to further the development of the existing Jewish community0 But that was not the case, immigration declined for two years, only to rise again in 1925s when 27,000 Jews went to Palestine,
The White Paper of 17 May 1939^
The White Paper of 17 May 1939, was the first offi cial British public statement which purported to restrict drastically Jewish immigration, in order to resolve the rising tensions in Palestine, It was based upon the recom mendations and findings of previous investigations conducted by Britain over a period of nine years. Here are some of its stipulations:
1o Like the Churchill White Paper of 1922, the 1939
White Paper stated that a Jewish National Home does
exist, not a state. It was the intention of Britain
to create such a home in Palestine and that has been established,
. 71» For the full text of the White Paper see Ibid,, pp, 218-226. 58 20 Similar to the Simpson Report of 1930$ which con cluded that Jewish colonization had caused the dis
placement of many Arabs, the 1939 Paper prohibited the transfer and sale of land by Arab to Jew, and
limited Jewish immigration to 75*000, over a period
of five years* The Paper also warned the Zionists that it would deduct the number of illegal Jews
smuggled into Palestine from the 75*000 quota* The
Paper also stated that any further Jewish immigra tion, after the 75*000 quota, would be subject to Arab consent*
3= The Royal npeel"Commission of 1937* following the
riots in Palestine, recommended the partitioning of
Palestine into an Arab and Jewish state as the only solution* The Arabs protested, the Zionists
accepted, but the Partition ‘Woodhead1 Commission of
1938 rejected partition of Palestine as the Jewish
state would be lj.9 percent Arab* The 1939 Paper
reaffirmed this principle, and rejected the parti
tion of Palestine as a solution* The Paper chose to
deal with the cause of the problem, which was Jewish
immigration and major land purchase by Zionists.
Ij.* In accordance with the aims of the Mandate, the 1939
Paper said that Palestine would be independent by '
1949* The country was to remain one and Indivisible. 59 Zionist Reaction to Britain
Prior to 1939$ there were slight restrictions on Jewish immigration and no restrictions at all on Jews pur
chasing land in Palestine, The British Zionist honeymoon
ended with the White Paper in'1939« Previous reports had verified the causes of Arab unrest and rebellion, and the
1939 paper purported to come to grips with them. It was the
intention of Zionism to create a Jewish state in Palestine,
through unlimited immigration and land purchase. The Arabs
feared it, the British knew of it, but did nothing to stop
it prior to 1939. After many casualties in a period of
virtual civil war, the Arab Rebellion in Palestine subsided,
only to give way to a Jewish Zionist rebellion against Britain,
The official Zionist reaction came in 1942$ but existed prior to that. In May 1942 the Zionists met in New York and issued their famous "Biltmore Program,"72 The
Biltmore Program was an attack on the 1939 Paper and the
Mandate itself. The provisions of the program declared the
1939 Paper illegal, and sought to establish "Palestine as a
Jewish Commonwealth" by large scale Jewish immigration
through the Jewish Agency, The Mandate no longer served
Zionist aims to create a Jewish state. The war between
72, For the full text of the Biltmore Programme see Ibid,* pp, 234-235. 60 Zionism and the Mandate began with the Biltmore Program in 1942c
Churchill and Zionism
Winston Churchill was a Zionist sympathizer,, His sympathy dates back to 1920, when he declared himself to be in favor of a "Jewish State" west of the Jordan* In the early 1940*8 Weizmann called on Churchill and informed him that Zionism, after the war, would want to "build" a Jewish state in Palestine, with three or four million Jews.
Churchill replied, "Yes, indeed* I quite agree with that*"^ Later, Weizmann called again on Churchill and dis cussed with him partitioning Palestine and the formation of Jewish units in the British army* On partition, Churchill expressed his approval, and supported the granting of the southern part of Palestine, the Negev Desert, to the Jewish state*74 on the subject of a Jewish army, Churchill approved, and on 20 September 1944 the.Zionist demand met with approval when the British War Office agreed to the formation of a Jewish Brigade with its own flag, the flag of Israel today*75 ^he Jewish Brigade was realized in 1944$
73® Weizmann, op* cit*, p e 514® 74® Ibid., p. 536. 75® Alan Taylor, Prelude to Israel (New York: Philosophical Library, 195977""1?P ®^7ti-T2® 61 but there remained the Jewish state, Churchill did not hesitate to lend his efforts towards realizing this objec tive, Zionist spokesmen reported to Churchill that Presi dent Roosevelt had called upon Weizmann to assist the Ameri can government in some sort of synthetic rubber research,
Churchill was reported to have told Weizmann about a plan he had. The Churchill Plan was to make Ibn Sauds King of Saudi
Arabia, "Lord of the Middle East," and as a price for that title, Ibn Saud was to bargain with Weizmann toward a Jew ish Palestine.7^ Churchill said to Weizmann, "Of course we shall help you. Keep this confidential, but you might talk it over with Roosevelt when you get to America, There's nothing he and I cannot do if we set our minds on it,"7?
Roosevelt's Reaction President Roosevelt is reported to have carried on negotiations with Ibn Saud on behalf of a Jewish Palestine, but only to meet with failure,7® Ibn Saud reaffirmed his position on Palestine, which was the position of many Arabs, and expressed his resentment and. re jection of Zionist aims in Palestine, Furthermore, Ibn Saud requested from
76. Weizmann, op, cit., pp, 525-526,
77. Ibid,
78. Fred Khouri, The Arab-Israeli Dilemma (New York: Syracuse University Press7~™7^817^p7~3T=5t, 62 President Roosevelt an assurance that the United States would be fair and impartial0 Such an assurance came, when on 5 April 19i|-5 President Roosevelt wrote to Ibn Baud say ings "I assured you that I would take no action, in my capacity as Chief of the Executive Branch of this Govern ment, which might prove hostile to the Arab people*The creation of a Jewish state, in all or part of Palestine, was considered to be hostile by the Arabs, and President Roose velt assured ibn Saud that he would not take such action*
Even though President Roosevelt was considerate of
Arab aspirations in Palestine, he was also aware of the. necessity for a solution to the Jewish problem* President
Roosevelt suggested to a friend, Mr* Ernst Morris, that he would accept 150,000 immigrant Jews in America, to be matched in England, and by 200,000 or 300,000 to be settled in other areas in the Western Hemisphere* A solution for half a million Jews was a good start, but according to
President Roosevelt, the problem lay with the Zionists, who said that Zionism would not accept any place other than
Palestine* Zionism again rejected alternatives to Pales tine, and insisted on Palestine as the only solution to the
Jewish National Home aspiration*®®
79* The Department of State Bulletin, 21 October 1945, p. 623*— - — — — — 80. Lilienthal, What Price Israel, pp* 32-33. 63 Truman and Zionism
Position on Palestine
President Truman came in at a time when Britain had refused to partition Palestine and had placed severe
restrictions on Jewish immigration into Palestine* The
Zionists, as far back as 1914-2, had made it clear that they
regarded the restrictions on immigration as illegal, and had
stated that they wanted to have their own state in Pales
tine* The Zionists approached President Truman as early as
1914.5# after President Roosevelt's death, and in President
Truman's words, "top Jewish leaders in the United States were putting all sorts of pressure on me to commit American power and forces on behalf of Jewish aspirations in Pales- A 4 tine*" President Truman did not commit American forces, but he did commit American power on behalf of Zionism*
On 31 August 1945$ President Truman wrote to Prime
Minister Atlee on the subject of Jewish immigration: "As I
said to you in Potsdam, the American people, as a whole,
firmly believe that immigration into Palestine should not be
closed and that a reasonable number of Europe's persecuted
Jews should, in accordance with their wishes, be permitted
81* Harry S* Truman, Memoirs, Vol. II (Hew York: Doubleday, 1956), p* 153. — — . ' 64 Op to resettle theree" The reasonable number which President Truman asked for was 100,000 Jews. On 4 October 194&, the Zionists contacted President Truman and suggested to him the partitioning of Palestine and the immediate entry of 100,000 Jewish immigrantse Mr. Truman’s reaction, in his own words, was? Vlt is my belief that a solution along these lines would command the support of public opinion in the United States . „ . To such a solu tion our government could give its support."^3
On 2 December 1946 President Truman once more com mitted American support on behalf of Zionism. On that date the President wrote a letter to Mr. Bevin informing him of the United States’ support for partitioning Palestine, in accordance with Zionist beliefs, and that Zionism would like to have Britain’s support.®^" Mr. Bevin made no commitments. In some recognizable contract, however. Secretary of State Byrnes offered assurance in October 1945 that "no decision shall be made without reference to Arab and Jewish representatives" insofar as Palestine was concerned.The
82. The Department of State Bulletin, 18 November 1945, p. 791. 8 3 . The Department of State Bulletin, 13 October 1946, pp. 669-6707“^““ ' "”=~ ™
84. The Department of State Bulletin, 13 October 19469 pp. 669-670 and”T5~Decembe^T^k^T^PP^T105=1106. 85. The Department of State Bulletin, 21 October 1945, p. 623. ' 65 Arab and Zionist positions on Palestine were clear, and
President Truman1s position on Palestine was openly pro- Zionist*
Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry
president Truman’s insistence upon the entry of
100,000 Jews and the partitioning of Palestine was the basis for the formation of the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry in 19lj-6„ Established by the Anglo-United States Agreement, the Committee was to investigate the feasibility of Mr*
Truman1s proposals on behalf of Zionism*
On 20 April 19^6 the Anglo-American Committee of
Inquiry submitted its report to Britain and the United
States, respectively* The report included some ten recom mendations on the situation in Palestine;®^
1* Reiterating Truman1s request, the Report acknowl
edged that Palestine was the only hope for the Jews,
and called for the immediate entry of 100,000 Jews* 2* Nullifying the White Paper of 1939, the Report urged
Britain to facilitate further Jewish immigration and freedom for sale of land*
3® The report said that "Palestine shall be neither a
Jewish state nor an Arab State*" The report said
86. The Department of State Bulletin, 12 May 19^6, pp* 784-787. 66 that Palestine should remain under the Mandate until . a new United Nations trusteeship could be arranged. The report was essentially an acceptance of President
Truman's proposals, in accord with Zionist wishes,
Truman"Bevin Dispute
The source of the dispute, between statesmen, relates mainly to the difficulty over admitting 100,000 Jews into Palestine, The British refused because of the diffi culties that would develop from such a large number entering Palestine, Mr, Truman insisted because the Zionists said it was the only solution to the Jewish Problem,
On 30 April 1946 President Truman endorsed the reso lutions recommended by the Committee, saying he was happy that the Committee called for the entry of 100,000 Jews; abrogated the White Paper; and called for more immigration and unlimited land purchase by Jews in Palestine, l On 2 July 1946 President Truman met with American Zionists and indicated that "the government of the United
States was prepared to assume technical and financial responsibility for the transportation of these immigrants 88 (100,000 Jews) from Europe to Palestine," He made that
8?, Ibid,, p, 783c
88, The Department of State Bulletin, 14 July 1946# p< 7 0 , 67 known to Britain, but the British government would not com mit itself or endanger the security of Palestine*
Mre Truman appeared to be a champion of Zionism by his own conviction; Mr. Bevin became the ”Champion of Arabs,” according to Zionists and pro-Zionists, by limiting Jewish immigration.®^ President Truman promised to consult the Arabs, before making any decisions.^ But, apparently, under Zionist influence and pressure, it mattered little what the Arabs thought. The President had, in fact, com mitted American support as early as 1945 to the cause of Zionism.91
Zionist Terrorism in Palestine: Its Meaning and Consequences
Zionist terror in Palestine was directed primarily against Britain and the Mandate authorities as early as
19i+5. Ever since the Biltmore Programme in 1942$ the Zion ists became openly anti-British. Britain became a threat to
Zionist demands, and therefore, had to abandon Palestine.
The plan to drive Britain out of Palestine was con ducted by the Haganah, the Palmach, the Irgun Zvai Leumi,
89e Hurewitz, op. cit., p . 261}..
90. The Department of State Bulletin, 26 May 19^1-6, Po 917, _ _
91. For a comparison of President Truman’s position on Zionism in 1946 and Lord Balfour's position on Zionism in 1919, see "Secret Foreign and Political Department -of the Government of Great Britain," op. cit., pp. 1-8. 68 and the Stern Gang. All of these Jewish military organiza tions were banned by the government of Palestine, and were 92 illegal under Palestine's laws.
The methods used were bloody and violent. The Zion ists attacked and destroyed major British installations; incited Arab-Jewish rebellions and were bent on creating an explosive situation for Britain in Palestine. The British paid dearly to maintain the Mandate, but only until they gave into Zionist terror in Palestine.^
In 1939* when Britain refused to allow unauthorized Jews into Palestine, the Haganah blew up ships that carried those Jews, to force Britain's hand to accept them, at the same time, creating unfavorable propaganda against Britain.
For example, on 26 November 1940 the Haganah blew up, in
Haifa Port, a ship carrying 1,800 Jews, which resulted in the death of 2?6 Jews.^
Palestine at the United Nations
The Zionists, who considered Britain as a setback to the Zionist program, were successful in creating an
92. "United Nations Special Committee on Palestine: Report to the General Assembly," op. cit., Vol. X, p. 23®
93® For accounts of Zionist terror in Palestine see Taylor, op« cit.; Menachem Begin, The Revolt; Story of the Irgun (New York: Schuman, 19^1); Samuel Katz, PaysoF^ITre lHew~York: Doubleday, 1968).
; 94® Lilienthal, The Other Side of the Coin, pp. 99-100. 69 intolerable situation for Britain in Palestine* Conse
quently, following the Zionist acts of terror, Britain
decided to refer the Palestine issue to the United Nations General Assembly*
Partition of Palestine, 19^7-19^9 Noting Britain's failure to resolve the Palestine
question in a manner acceptable to both Arab and Jew, Great
Britain decided to refer the Palestine question to the
United Nations on 28 April 19l|7c^ On this date, the General Assembly convened in a
special session, requested by Britain on 3 April to form a special committee on Palestine* The purpose of the com mittee was to report to the next regular session of the
General Assembly its findings and recommendations on Pales
tine* On 15 May 1947 the United Nations Special Committee on Palestine was created by the General Assembly to submit
its proposals on Palestine no later than 1 September 1947=
(This committee shall be referred to as the UNSCOP)»
United Nations Special Committee on Palestine
Between 15 May and 1 September 1947 the eleven members (Australia, Canada, Czechoslovakia, Guatemala,
95« On British efforts to resolve the Palestine question with the Arabs and the Zionist Jews, see Khouri, op. cit., pp. 36-42* 70 India, Iran, Netherlands, Peru, Sweden, Uruguay and Yugo slavia) of the DNSCOP conducted their investigations in
Palestine and New York,^ The UNSCOP consulted Arabs and Jews, and on the basis of the investigation, they came up with several proposals on the future of Palestine, The
UNSCOP unanimously called for an end to the Mandate and independence for Palestine, But on the nature of a future government for Palestine, the members disagreed. The UNSCOP suggested three possible solutions. Proposal (1) called for the partitioning of Palestine into an independent Arab and
Jewish State (linked together with an economic union as an option), Jerusalem was to be internationalized. Proposal (2) suggested the establishment of a unitary Arab state, since the Arabs were the majority in Palestine, Proposal
(3) called for a single state with a federal, cantonal or binational structure. The first proposal was the majority proposal. The remaining two were the minority proposals,
Partition with Economic Union
The majority members of the Committee favored the majority plan with economic m i o n (the vote was seven, to
96, "United Nations Special Committee on Palestine^ Report to the General Assembly,” op, cit,s Vol. I, pp„ 1-9, 9?» Ibid,, Ch, V, pp„ L[.2"65c 71 four)e^ The UNSCOP was aware that the Jews, who made-up less than 30 percent of Palestine’s population, owned only 6 percent of the total land area of 10,000 square miles.
The rest of Palestine was Arab so some members felt that a just solution would be one of the other two proposals, where the majority would be dominant. However, the UNSC0P did propose safeguards for Arab rights in the Jewish state, and made the same proposals for the Jews in the Arab state.
The Jewish State
The projected Jewish state was to have ^6,^7 percent of the total land of. Palestine, The Jews owned only 9*83 percent of the $,893 square miles assigned to the Jewish state. The number of Jews in the Jewish state would be
1{.98,000, and there would be ^97,000 Arabs,^
For the prospective ’minority-by-IOOO1 Arabs, the plan allowed freedom of religion, speech and equality with the ’majority~by-1000* Jews, Moreover, to insure that Arab land would not be confiscated, in order to increase Jewish ownership, the plan clearly stated in Chapter 2, paragraph
8, that, “No expropriation of land owned by an Arab in the Jewish state (by a Jew in the Arab state) shall be allowed
98, Ibid,, Ch, "VII, p, 14.7$ (The Seven countries were: Canada, Czechoslovakia, Guatemala, Netherlands, Peru, Sweden and Uruguay),
99, Ibid,, pp. Sami Hadawi, Palestine: Loss of a Beritage'^TSan Antonio: Naylor, 1963), pT~2$T" 72
except for public p u r p o s e s * "100 all cases of expropria
tion full compensation as fixed by the Supreme Court shall be paid previous to dispossession* jn the Jewish state, where the Jews owned only 9 ,8 3 percent of the area, Arab land could be expropriated only for "public purposes," and only by paying for land acquired* "Public purposes" was not meant to authorize expropriating 90 percent of the land, and without compensation. Stretched beyond reasonable imagina tion, the Jewish state might double or triple its land ownership, but not increase it by 900 percent!
The Arab State
The prospective Arab state would control some ^2,88 percent of Palestine (4,i|.76 square miles), Jewish ownership in that proposed state was 0*84 percent. The Arab state included 725,000 Arabs and 10,000 Jews, The Jews owned less than 1 percent of the land, and Jews constituted less than 10P 1*5 percent of the total population,
Jerusalem
The city of Jerusalem, according to the UNSCOP,
"shall be placed under an International Trusteeship System
100* "United Nations Special Committee on Palestine: Report to the General Assembly," op, cit,, Vol. I, p, 1$0,
101, Ibid,
102* Ibid*, pp, 47-56j Hadawi, op, cit,, p, 25, 73 by means of a Trusteeship Agreement which shall designate the United Nations as the Administering Authority, in accordance with Article 81 of the Charter of the United Nations«,
Partition and Pressure Politics
The majority plan to partition Palestine that was recommended by the UNSCOP was placed before the General
Assembly on 22 November 19^7* Between 22-26 November l9l}-7 an informal ”straw vote" was taken on the partition plan, but failed to indicate the required two-thirds vote to pass the plan* The key countries that voted against partition, besides the Arabs, were Haiti, Liberia, Philippines, China,
Ethiopia, and Greece.
The pressure employed to urge member governments to vote for the partition plan was applied primarily by Ameri can statesmen and international Zionism, often the latter working through the former.
The first attempt was to pressure President Truman to use his official capacity as President to urge other nations into voting for the partition plan. The President was known to have approved partition since 19^6, and the time had now come for soliciting his support. Mr. Truman
103. 'United Nations special Committee on Palestine: Report to the General Assembly," op. cit., Yol. I, pp. 57-58* Ik wrote in his Memoirs; The facts were that not only were there pressure movements around the United Nations unlike any thing that had been seen there before, but the White House too was subjected to a constant bar rage, I do not think 1 ever had as much pressure and propaganda aimed at the White House as I had in this instance. The persistence of a few of the extreme Zionist leaders--actuated by political motives and engaging in political threats— dis turbed and annoyed me. Some were even suggesting that we pressure sovereign nations into favorable votes in the General Assembly,1^4
The Zionists failed to move President Truman into using his influence to pressure other nations on behalf of partition, but they did succeed in soliciting the support of other prominent United States officials for partition,The men
solicited by Zionists used their official positions to pres
sure and threaten nations who voted against partition. They
threatened nations with Congressional reprisals affecting
foreign aid bills. They used American businessmen with interests in Liberia and other countries as a leverage for pressure on behalf of Zionism, Mr, Dean Rusk acknowledged these pressure movements, but he said that these men were not acting on official instructions. Those nations whose
interests were threatened by these American officials
Truman, op, cit., II, p, 158,
105« For the names see Taylor, op. cit., pp, 103- 10l}G Lilienthal, What Price Israel, pp, Sydney Fisher, The Middle East; A History (New York: Knopf, 1969), p. 6I4.6. 75 yielded to pressure and voted for partition*Mr* James Porrestal# who was Secretary of the Navy in 194-7j> stated in his memoirs that "the methods that had been used to bring coercion and duress on other nations in the General Assembly bordered closely upon scandal," ^ 7 without this pressure from Americans on behalf of Zionists, according to Professor
Safran, it is doubtful whether partition would have been accepted by the General Assembly,^ 8
Professor Safran also believed that "out of igno rance and State Department objections" President Truman ordered the American delegation to support partition,109
The American delegation, in trying to make partition accept able to the Arabs, voted against the inclusion of the Negev desert in the Jewish state. The Negev desert was all Arab as there was not a single Jewish settlement in the Negev,
The Negev desert was vital to the proposed Jewish state as an access to the Red Sea, even though it did not harbor any
Jew.110 The Zionists objected, and Mr, Chaim Weizmann went
106, Ibid.
107= Walter Millis (ed.), The Forrestal Diaries . (New Yorks Viking, 1951)» P« 363, 108. Nadav Safran, The United States and Israel (Cambridges Harvard University Press, f%3If P° 35T"
109. Ibid., p. 41.
110. Sir John Bagot Glubb, A Soldier With the Arabs (New York: Harper, 1957), p . 64, 76 to see Mr„ Truman who immediately ordered the American dele gation to reverse its offer of the Negev to the A r a b s . m
By 29 November 194-7 the pressure employed by Zion ists and their American supporters seems to have paid off.
The General Assembly, by a vote of 33~13* with 10 absten tions, passed the partition resolution.^ ^ Liberia, the
Philippines and Haiti voted for partition, after they had voted against partitions China and Ethiopia abstained. Had it not been for the pressure exerted on behalf of Zionism, the partition plan would never have been passed or the Jew ish state created.
The General Assembly requested the Security Council to effectuate the resolution, and called upon the British,
Arabs, and the Jews to put the plan into operation. The
British government, prior to the passage of the partition resolution, had indicated that it would withdraw from Pales tine, thus terminating the Mandate, by 1 August 1948 if not before.
111. Taylor, op. cit., pp, 102-103*
112. United Nations General Assembly, Resolution l8l (11), 29 November 1947* ' "** ~™~
113* Lilienthal, op. cit., pp. 64-73; Taylor, op. cit., pp. 103-104; Safran, op. cit., p. 35; Khoury, op.~cTte, pp. 43-67. 77 Consequences of Partition
Arab Response
Arab reaction to the partition of Palestine had come
as early as 16 September 1947 when the UNSCOP voted in favor of partition as a solution to the Palestine problem* Repre sentatives of the Arab states met in Sofar* Lebanon, and
declared that the establishment of a Jewish state in Pales
tine would lead to uncontrollable violence which the Arab governments were not prepared to prevent.
The Arab Palestinians demanded that justice be done
to them. Palestine was 70 percent Arab, and the Arabs.owned more than 93 percent of the total land. They declared that any solution that would not be based upon the consent of the majority of the inhabitants of Palestine would be rejected.
The United Nations, they declared, was entrusted with the maintenance of peace and security, and the establishment of a Jewish state in an Arab country would endanger peace and
security. The Arab Palestinians reaffirmed the fundamental
right of all nations, great and small, to self-
determination. The establishment of. a Jewish state would be a repudiation of the principles for which the United Nations stood. The establishment of a Jewish state in an Arab
country would be unjust, dangerous, and a menace to world 1
1 lij-c Jon and David Kimche, A Clash of Destinies (New York: Praeger, 1960), pp. 56-57» 78 peace and ordere The Palestine Arabs, on the basis of their being the majority inhabitants of Palestine, refused to accept the United Nations partition resolution of 29 Novem ber 1947=11^
Zionist Response
The partition resolution was a partial fulfillment of the long sought Zionist goal in Palestine, Although not all of the areas claimed by the Zionists was assigned to the
Jewish state, some ^6,47 percent of Palestine was so assigned,
: The Zionists, however, were faced with major prac tical problems. The Arabs made up roughly $0 percent of the new Jewish state*s population, and owned 90 percent of the land. The proclamation of a Jewish state would be met with opposition by the Arabs, and its effectuation could only come by force. Apparently, the Zionists were not yet ready by November 1947 to proclaim their Jewish state,
Mr, Weizmann tried to obtain President Truman1s sup port before declaring the Jewish state. The formal backing of Mr. Truman could be helpful, should the Arabs resist the
Jewish state by force. But Mr. Truman refused to see any Zionist leader. The Zionists then called upon one Eddie
115® For a further exposition of the Palestinians views, see Professor Hadawi, op. cit., "himself a Palestinian and considered an expert on the Palestine problem by his countrymen. 79 Jacobson, a friend o f Mr. Truman, to arrange for a meeting between the President and Mr. Weizmann* Mr. Jacobson, a prominent American Jew, did use his influence on behalf of
Zionism and managed to arrange the meeting for 18 March
19i|-8o ^^ Mr. Weizmann left that meeting with an assurance that the United States would recognize and support the Jew ish state as soon as the British Mandate expired.^^
Early United States-Israel Relations
The British government announced in November 1947. that the Mandate for Palestine would terminate as of 15 May
1948 and that British troops would evacuate before 1 August
1948c. The reason for this early withdrawal was the cost involved in maintaining British personnel in Palestine.
Britain was in the midst of an economic crisis, and the
United Nations did nothing to effectuate the resolution of
1947e In fact, the United States sought to extend the
British Mandate until a settlement could be reached on implementing partition. The British declined, and the hastening of the termination of the Mandate, was defended as a necessary step to expedite the solution of the Palestine problem.
116. Truman, op. cit., II, pp. 160-161.
117° Weizmann, op. cit.j Abba Eban, My People (New York: Random, 1968 ), p .""4427 80 Mr, Eliahu Epstein, agent for the Provisional Gov
ernment of Israel, sent a note to President Truman informing him that as of one minute after 6:00 PoM,, Washington time, 1lj. May 1948 the State of Israel would be declared,11® That date was set one day before the Mandate came to an end. At
6:11 PoM,, 14 May 1948, President Truman announced de facto recognition of the State of Israel, without notifying the men in charge of executing American foreign policy,11^
American de .jure recognition followed on 31 January 1949$ The British Mandate, which expired on 15 May 1948 left a vacuum in Palestine, Palestine was on the verge of a civil war, with no internal authority to supervise the transition.
Rationalizing his support of partition, and the immediate recognition of the Jewish state. President Truman offered humanitarian reasons as his motive; "It was my belief that world peace would, in the long run, be best
served by a solution that would accord justice to the needs and the wants of the Jewish people who had so long been per
secuted,"1^ "Justice" may have come for Zionists, but only at the expense of the Arabs, who were painfully forced to
118, The Department of State Bulletin, 23 May 1948, p« 673,
1190 Truman, op, cit,, p, 164L
120, Ibid,, p, 135* 81 experience partition of their country® As the Arab Pales tinians saw the matter, they had to pay the price for
Western guilt over Western Jewish persecution® When asked about the fate of the Palestine Arabs, Mr, Truman's reply was not even purportedly humanitarian® "I am sorry, gentle men, but I have to answer hundreds of thousands who are anxious for the success of Zionism; I do not have hundreds of thousands of Arabs among my constituents®"121
Secretary of the Navy, James Forrestal, realized that American statesmen were heavily pro-Zionist due to a large Jewish vote® Mr® Forrestal did not ask Americans to abandon the Jews or support the Arabs® In the 1 presi dential campaign, he cautioned Americans about being too pro-Zionist, and tried to keep the matter of Israel out of party politics in the states® The politicians said that they feared their opponents might win the Jewish vote if they should remain impartial® Forrestal said "I think it is about time that somebody should pay some consideration to 1P? whether we might not lose the United States®"
121® Quoted in M® T® Mehdi's, A Nation of Lions ® ® ® Chained (San Francisco; New Wbrid Press, l9b2), p . 95®
122® Lilianthal, op® cit®, p, 98® 8 2 The Arab-Israeli War of 1914-8
The Arabs in the Jewish State
The Arabs in the Jewish states according to the partition plan, were guaranteed equality and were offered protective clauses against Jewish expropriation of Arab lando The Arabs owned 90 percent of the land and were almost equal to the number of Jews in the new proposed Jew ish state*
The Zionists, however, were faced with a dilemma* Ever since their movement began, it denied that Arabs and
Jews could live together* The Zionists not only detested living and mixing with the Arabs, but called for a Jewish
Palestine, “as Jewish as England is English," according to
Mr* Weizmann. The presence of an Arab population that was equal to the Jews posed a basic threat to Zionism*
The Zionist answer was that ”a few calculated massa cres will soon get rid of them (the Arabs)*”123 Although
123* Glubb, op* cit*, p* 8lj David Ben-Gurion acknowledges the fact that the Arabs were evicted before the Mandate expired, thus giving validity to the Arab story that the Arab armies moved in only after 1j> May 194-8 when news of Zionist evictions reached them* Ben-Gurion wrote in Rebirth and Destiny of Israel (New York: Philosophical Library, 1934JT™PPT330™^31s ""Until the British left, no Jewish settlement, however remote, was.entered or seized by Arabs, while the Haganah * * * captured many Arab positions and liberated Tiberias and Haifa, Jaffa and Safad » * * so, on . that day of destiny, that part of Palestine where the Haganah could operate was almost clear of Arabs*11 83 the state of Israel was proclaimed, on 14 May 19I4-8 the Israelis openly began; driving the Arabs out of their homes as early as April 19lj-80 A Jewish state could not be said to be Jewish with an Arab population equal to the Jews* The
Zionist Jews wanted the Arabs out, and their method was large scale massacres* The most notable massacre was that of Deir Yasin*
Deir Yasin was an Arab village lying on the west of
Jerusalem* Unlike most villages in Palestine, Deir Yasin was a village whose inhabitants predominantly worked in
Jerusalem but lived at Deir Yasin, where they commuted daily to Jerusalem to earn their living,.
Deir Yasin, according to one Jewish Zionist observer, was reasonably friendly towards the Jewish Agency in Palestine, Some of its inhabitants, at times, were known to have cooperated with the Zionists, It was also reported that Deir Yasin was subject to suspicion by some Palestinian
Arabs, as the leaders of Deir Yasin rejected the deployment of Arab irregular troops in their village.^^4 Deir Yasin was not a military camp and did not par take in the fighting against the Zionists* Its several hundred inhabitants tried to remain neutral in the tension
12lt.6 Harry Levin, I Saw the Battle of Jerusalem (Hew York: Schuken Books, T9I>0T7~p'* 5?« that developed before the war, which began on 15 May 1948$ following the declaration of the State of Israel, On Friday morning* 9 April 1948 during the Battle of Jerusalem (which was contested by the Jewish Agency and
Jordan alike) two units from the Irgun Zvai Leumi (about eighty soldiers) and one unit from the Lohamei Herut Israel (about forty strong) invaded the village of Deir Yasine The invasion was part of a calculated plan (that met with the approval of the Haganah) to capture and erect in Deir Yasin a military airfield in preparation of the war that was soon to come01^ The invasion of Deir Yasin* which began at dawn* was over by noon of the same day* Friday* 9 April 1948= During this period about 254 human lives were taken* mostly belong ing to little children* women and old men. Henceforth* the attack on Deir Yasin became known as the massacre at Deir Yasin, Dr, Jacques de Reynier of the International Red Cross verified the presence of 254 corpse,m0st of which
125« Begin, op, cit,, pp, 162-165# Katz* op, cit,, pp, 214-21?; Kennett Love, Suezt The Twice Fought War (New York: McG-raw Hill* 1969)* pp, 54-43 = 126, Giubb, op, cit,* pp, 80-81j Hadawi* op. cit,* pp, 33-34; Bethmann* op, ciT.* pp, 39-40; Love* op, cit,; Terence Brittle, Israel: Miracle in the Desert (New York: Praeger* 1967)* ppl Tf9^ TTtT'F"1’6da Utley* Mill the Middle 8 5 were found in a well at Deir Yasine According to the same Jewish Zionist observer, and others, who reported on the friendliness of the village towards the Jewish Agency, the corpse were thrown into a well to "cover up the orgy of slaughter and deliberate murder, "^ 7
Menachem Begin, Commander in Chief of the Irgun Zvai
Leumi from 1 9Zj.8, led the attack on Deir Yasin and bears the blame for the outcome of" the invasion, ^ 8 jn his book.
The Revolt, 1951, Begin wrote that his forces suffered heavy casualties. His "heavy casualties" numbered 4 dead and %0 wounded. Begin denied any massacre, but put Arab losses at
12 dead and 120 wounded while it is known that at least 254 bodies were found at Deir Yasin by Mr, de Reynier, The horror of the massacre prompted David Ben-Gurion, then head of the Jewish Agency, to denounce and apologize for the massacre in a cable to King Abdullah, David Ben-Gurion1s cable came after the massacre and made no mention of the
East Go West? (Chicago; Henry Regnery, 1957), PP» 117-118; WTTT, Polk, D, M, Stamler and E, Asfour, Backdrop to Tragedy: The Struggle for Palestine (Bostoni"’ Beacon Press, 1^577rppr^0=i§T7^ — —
127* Levin, op, eft,; Prittie* op, cit,; Jon Kimche, Seven Fallen Pillars: "‘ The Middle East, T9T5-T950 (London: Seeker and Warburg^T^Oj, p « 2T7r~H7™SaZdensT™TFrael: The View From Masada (New York: Harper and Row, 195F], p, 170; A, B, Magil, Israel in Crisis (New York; International Publications,™!^^!, pV 120, 128, Lilienthal, What Price Israel, 8 6 HaganatVs involvemente In fact5 Ben-G-urion absolved the
Jewish Agency and its army* the Haganah, of* any collusion,'• Mr, Ben-Gurion's denial hardly conforms with a letter sent
by Major Shlatiel* the Haganah Commander in Jerusalem* to Ranaan* the Irgun Zvai Leumi Commander in Jerusalem, in which Major Shlatiel was quoted as having said "the capture
of Deir Yasiri and holding it is one stage in our general plan,1,12<2
The impact of Deir Yasin has been a subject of con
troversy in the history of the Palestine problem. In fact, it represents one of its darkest chapters. It is dark in
the sense that very little has been written on it, and most of what has been written was, often inaccurate or too little.
While the majority of writers deny any such massacre, others attempt to rationalize it, one way or another. However^ while most of the writers differ one way or another, most of them agree that the impact of Deir Yasin had been very
favorable to the Zionist programme in Palestine, as it led
to a drastic reduction of the Arab population in Pales
tine,1^0 thus enabling the Jewish state to become truly Jew ish, as "Jewish as England is English.”
129, Begin, op. cit.
130, Begin, op. cit.; Katz, op. cit.; Bethmann, op. cit.; Glubb, op. cit-.T^adawi, op. citV; Pritt i e, op. cit.; Levin, op. cit.; Polk, Stamler ahd”XSfour, op. cit.; Earl 87 Samuel Katz, who succeeded Begin as Irgun Commander
in 19lj-9 (he also helped translate Begin1 s book into English in 19£Q"19i?1) wrote that the impact of Deir Yasin "had decisive and ironic consequences. . . . It struck terror in
their (meaning Arabs1) hearts, reduced their will to resist, and added impetus to their flight from the country.
Begin, who denied the massacre, also wrote that the incident at Deir Yasin "helped us to carve the way to our decisive victories," and his figures of 625#000 Arabs out of
800,000 fleeing their homes was his raison de etre.^82 ]yjr E« Berger, a pro-Zionist writer, and Mr. Uri Avnery, an Israeli M.P., wrote that the massacre of Deir Yasin led to the exodus of 200,000 Arabs from the Jewish state.^83 The Arabs of Palestine were reminded, according to Mrs. Vester of the American Missionary Hospital in Palestine, that "if they did not get out at once, they would suffer the same fate of the people of Deir Yasin. "^ 4 Berger, The Covenant and the Swords Arab-Israel Relations, 19li-Q° 195^^hondon"r RoutTScige and Keg'in'Paul, Ltd.. 196577°^ P o 127 e 131. Katz, op. cit. 132. Begin, op. cit. 133* Berger, op. cit., pp. 126-132; Uri Avnery, Israel Without Zionists’ (New York: Macmillan, 1968), p7"Wr: — “ ~ . 134-e Utley, op. cit. 88 Prior to Deir Yasin# according to Mr. E. Berger$ the expulsion of Arabs was not a national policy by Jews. Expulsion became a national policy as of July 19ii.8 d Major O'Ballance, a British military expert^ wrote that "many Israeli sympathizers were appalled at the ruthless way in which the Arab inhabitants were ousted from their home So1, 1 British historian Arnold Je Toynbee wrote that the Jews became persecutors for the first time in history since A.D. 135s and "the Jews had even less excuse in A.Do 1948 for evicting Palestinian Arabs from their homes than Nebuchadnezzar and Titus and Hadrian. " ^ 7 Over 200*000 of the 497$000 Arabs in the new Jewish state were evicted prior to the formal launching of the state of Israel. Some left in protest against partition, and others were horrified by Deir Yasin. The Zionists said that they asked the Arabs to stay and build Israel, but they failed to warn the Arabs of their fate if they chose to remain in the Zionist Jewish state. Massacres and evictions began before Israel was formally proclaimed. On 1f> May 1948 the official Declaration of Independence by Israel offered 135. . Berger, op. cit. 138. Edgar 0!Ballance. The Arab-Israeli War, 1948 (New York: Praeger, 1957)« . 137. Toynbee, op. cit., VIII, pp. 289-290. 89 this pledge for the Arabsi We call upon the sons of the Arab people dwelling in Israel to keep the peace and play their part in building the state on the basis of full and equal citizenship6 « e «, The state of Israel will main tain complete equality of social and political rights for all of its citizens, without distinc tion of creed, race or sexe^3o Zionist writers acknowledged the massacre of Arabs as early as April 194-8. Pro-Zionist writers mentioned eviction of Arabs as a national policy conducted by the State of Israel as of July 19^8° The Zionist deeds before and after independence hardly give any meaning to the Israeli plea for Arabs to remain« The Arabs left to save their lives, and some of those who remained were massacred or evicted until they became a minority of 10 percent in the Zionist Jewish state, which had promised them equality and justice. The Position of the Arab States The Arab countries that took an active part in the Palestine issue in 1948 were Jordan, Syria, Egypt, Lebanon and Iraq, Jordan was the only country that had any interest or designs on Palestine, It is often recalled that as late as 1948 King Abdullah of Jordan was in favor of intervening in Palestine on behalf of the Arab Palestinians, The other Arab states favored non-intervention. Instead, they 138. Lilienthal, The Other Side of the Coin, p. 222 90 proposed to arm the Palestinians to defend and maintain Palestine, an idea which the Grand Mufti of Jerusalem wel comed, The Mufti was against intervention, and urged the formation of a Palestinian government and an army to defend Palestine, Jordan1s King Abdullah wanted to annex Pales tine, and it was reported that he met in November 1947 with some members of the Jewish Agency in contemplation that Abdullah was to annex the Arab state to Jordan and come to terms with the Zionist Jewish state.^ 9 Neither the Arab Palestinians nor the other Arab states knew about King Abdullah’s plan. Unlike the Zionist Jews, the Arabs in Palestine had neither an army nor sufficient arms to stand before the advancing Zionist Jewish forces. The Palestinian Arabs stood helpless before Deir Yasin and other massacres which led to their ultimate eviction and displacement. According to Lt. General Glubb, the Arab states had no plan regarding the invasion of Palestine, The Arabs were unaware of Jewish strength and of their own military poten tial. The only man who had a plan was King Abdullah, and following the many requests received from the Palestinians to help and protect them, King Abdullah decided to send in 139. Jon and David Kimche, op, cit., pp. 59~60. 91 the Arab Legion "to occupy only the Arab state bordering Jordan,, The Jordan invasion was not a surprise to Israel-, It was agreed that King Abdullah would occupy .the Arab state. The other Arab states decided to intervene only after hearing about Zionist Jewish expulsion of Arabs from most of Palestine, Prior to thats the Arabs stated that they were not ready or prepared to check the violence that might erupt in Palestine. The Official War The war in Palestine began on 1$ May 1948 when the Arab armies entered Palestine from Egypt, Lebanon, Syria, Jordan, and Iraq. Although "six armies representing million Arabs” marched into Palestine, the total number of the Arab soldiers at the start of the war was estimated to be somewhere between 20,000 and 23,000.^^ The guesses on the Israeli forces differed widely. Some have said 10,000 others have said perhaps 19$000, The Arabs, however, esti mated the Zionist Jewish force to be as much as 65,000 men, for the 194-8 war, British Zionists said that at the out break of the war the Zionist Jews had 19,000 men. That is, during the first phase of the war (15 May to 11 June 1948), 140. G-lubb, op. cit., p, 63. 141 o Ibid., pp, 92-931 Jon and David ICimche, op. cit., pp, 162,-ZZ7 . . 92 the Zionist Jews had 19,000 men. However, there was a truce from 11 June to 8 July 194.85, and during this period, the Israeli forces rose from 19,000 to 60,000, while the Arabs increased from 20,000 to 40,000e As it turned out, the Arabs never outnumbered the Israelis. The Israelis out numbered the Arabs. The first phase of the war was from 15 May to 11 June 1948® The United Nations arranged a truce from 11 June to 8 July 1948® The first truce was broken by the Arabs, apparently because Egypt refused to renew the truce. Jordan was in favor of renewal, as the Arab state was almost under the control of the Arab Legion.Parts of the Arab state were taken by the Israelis, but King Abdullah stood to gain, rather than lose. Egypt chose to renew the war because it lost the first phase. The Egyptians were facing a domestic political crisis, and they needed the war to bring stability at home and regain what was lost during the first phase. The second phase of the war began on 8 July and lasted until 19 July 1948 when another truce was arranged by the United Nations. The Arabs this time accepted, but Israel refused. It was during the second phase that the 142. Ibid. 143® G-lubb, op. cit., pp. 149-150. 144® Ibid. 93 Israelis occupied 20 percent of the Arab state and were in control of the entire Jewish state® Jerusalem was contested between Jordan and Israel® Although the city was to become international;, Israel invaded the Arab quarter and wanted to annex Jerusalem® Jordan checked Israel and saved most of Jerusalem from falling into Israeli hands® The deciding factor in the war, according to some military observers, was the arms purchased from Czechoslo vakia by Israel® The United Nations placed an embargo on all arms to Palestine and the Arab states, but Russia, through Czechoslovakia, offered arms to Israel and sold them fighter planes and other heavy equipment that was not made locally by the Jews®^^ The Arab states, save Jordan, hoped to redeem all of Palestine® In the process, they failed, lost 20 percent of the Arab state, and never redeemed an inch of the Jewish state® Jordan saved most of the Arab state bordering it® The Role of the United Nations United Nation's Mediators Count Pblke Bernadotte® On 1? May 1948 Count Ftolke Bernadotte of Sweden was appointed as the United Nations* Mediator in Palestine®Count Bernadotte managed to arrange for the one month truce in 145o Ibid®, p® 191. _ 14-6. United Nations Documents, A/534 $ 17 May 1948® 94 Palestine, which lasted from 8 June to 11 July 1948® During this one month truce. Count Bemadotte suggested on 27 June 1948 that the Arab Palestinians who had left their homes be allowed to return, without restrictions, to their property and homes*But for Israel to allow the Arabs to return was only a part of the compromise Count Bemadotte suggested* He suggested that if the war was to end and peace maintained, the Jews would have to give the Negev, Lydda and Ramieh back to the Arabs, as there were no Jews in those areas, The Bemadotte plan would reduce the Jewish state from 5»579 square miles to 2 ,1 2 4 square miles with no provision for economic union with part of the Arab state, which was to be annexed to Jordan, Israel refused to abandon the assigned and annexed territories, and refused to allow the Arabs to return to their homes, Mr, Aubrey Eban voiced Israel’s objections on 7 July 1948®^® J Count Bemadotte, however, insisted that the refu gees be allowed to return to their homes with no restric tions and with full compensation paid to them. In his final report to the United Nations, he wrote: No settlement can be just and complete if recogni tion is not accorded to. the right of the Arab refugee to return to the home from which he has been dislodged by the hazards and strategy of the armed conflict between Arabs and Jews in Palestine 147® United Nations Documents7 S/863, 3 July 1948, 148, United Nations Documents, S/87O, 8 July 1948* 95 o o o it Mould be an offense against the principle of elemental justice if these innocent victims of the conflict were denied the right of return to their homes while Jewish immigrants, flow into Palestine^ and indeed, at least offer the threat of permanent replacement of the Arab refugees who have been rooted in the land for centuries. 14-9 Count Bemadotte wrote to Secretary of State "Marshall on 16 August 1948 informing him that the condition of the refugees was desperate. Thirty percent were children under five years of age; over ten percent were pregnant women and nursing mothers. The Mediator urgently needed aid to feed these refugees, while trying to get them back to their homes. Israel made it known during the summer of 1948 that it would not repatriate the Palestinian Arabs or return those parts of Palestine acquired during the war.Count Folke Bemadotte and Colonel Serot, a Senior (French) United Zations Observer, were murdered by the Israelis on 17 1 52 September 1948. ^ Count Bemadotte was shot seven times. Colonel Serot, seventeen times. The murderers were known to l49o United Nations Documents, A/648® 17 September 1948® — : — 150. The Department of State Bulletin, 29 August 1948® pp* 226-227. ™ - ■■ ■ ■ — 151. United Nations Documents, S/870, 8 July 1948. 152. United Nations Documents, 3/1004® 18 September 1948. 96 the Israeli government* but no action was taken,Mr, Ralph Bunche* Count Bernadette^ successor* held Israel responsible for this "Murder in Cold Blood* through a letter he sent to Israel's Foreign Minister* Mr, Mo she Shertok, The 191+9 Arab-Israeli Armistice Agreements Through the efforts of Mr, Ralph Bunche* United Nations Mediator* a General Armistice Agreement was con= eluded between Israel and the Arab states, Ch.ce Egypt signed the Armistice on 2lj. February 1949 Lebanon followed on 23 March; Jordan on 3 April and Syria on 20 July, Following the Agreement* the Arabs and Israel established a Mixed Armistice Commission (MAC) between Israel and each neighbor ing Arab state* with the United Nations Chief of Staff of the Truce Supervision Organization as chairman, of the four commissions respectively. Of all the Articles included in the Agreements* each party had the right to revise and suspend any article except Articles I and III, Article I prohibited the use of mili tary threats and aggressive actions against any party, and established the Security Council as the final judge, 1£3» The Department of State Bulletin* 26 September 1914-8„ p, 399, — 154» "Murder in Cold Blood*" The United Nations Bulletin* V (1 October 1948), 756-761, — 97 Article III mutually forbade the use of the military, para military, or non-regular forces* The partition plan had assigned Israel 56®47 percent of the total land of Palestine* Following the war, Israel was in actual control of 77®40 percent of the total land in Palestine* Israel did not withdraw to its boundaries of 1947s nor did it implement resolution 194 (III) of 11 December 1948® Consequently, as of 1949» the United Nations General Assembly estimated the.Arab refugees rendered home less to be more than 700,000*^^ The total number of Arabs in the Jewish state was estimated to be 497»000«, The 203#000 had come from those areas occupied by Israel after the 1948 war* Later, in 195)0# the total number of Arab refugees was estimated at 9 6 0 , 0 2 1 The 1949 General Armistice Agreements did not bring peace between the Arabs and the Israelis* It was,a truce rather than a peace treaty* The Arabs demanded that Israel implement resolution 194 (III) in order to effectuate a peaceful settlement, but Israel refused, and the ensuing years were neither peaceful nor pleasant, for both Arab and Israeli* l55u "Report of the Commissioner General of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for the Palestinian Refugees in the Near East, 1 July 1966-30 June 1967#" United Nations General Assembly Official Records, Twenty- Secohcl 13 T 7 p T 3 ^ * 156* ibid 1 ■ 98 Definition of a Palestinian Refugee Introduction The need for a new definition of the terra "Pales tinian refugee" arises out of the ambiguities that surround the term. In some circles, where the terra “Palestinian" no longer exists, the Palestinian refugees are commonly referred to as "Arab refugees,“ "Near East refugees," "Middle East refugees" or "stateless persons," In other circles, where the term Palestinian is recognized, the Palestinian refugees are commonly referred to as "Arab refugees from Palestine," "Arabs in exile," "Palestine1s Arab refugees," "Palestinian Arab refugees” and, more commonly used, the term "Palestinian refugee," More recently, with the rise of the "Palestinian commando movement," the Palestinian refugees are referred to as Palestinian, whether they live in an UNRWAPRNE tent or a Beirut penthouse. This transformation, or reawakening of Palestinian nationalism, has injected a new element of pride and dignity into the Palestinian refugee, who resents bitterly being called, or referred to as a Palestinian refugee. The search for a new identity, or the reactivation of an identity that was submerged within the context of the turbulent Arab- Israeli conflict, has brought about the formation of a new 99 Palestinian, Today$ the Palestinian considers himself to be the sole master of his fate, and that no just solution to his problem could be realistically achieved without his direct participation and approval. The Palestinian today can take pride in the fact that the word "Palastini" (Palestinian) is no longer a handicap* a demoralizing social stigma or a flagrant insult. The word Palestinian refers today to the Palestinian people who have been deprived of their right to national self- determination; who have been forced to accept an alien Zion ist group within their country; who have been painfully forced to accept the partition of their country and who are now fighting for their rights under principles of inter national law which have been accorded to them and reaffirmed annually since 1949$, but remain to be effectuated. It is this transformation and evolution of the hew Palestinian that makes it necessary to look for a new definition for the Palestinian refugee. However* it is only after a discussion of current definitions that one can pro ceed towards a new definition. The United Nations Conciliation Com mission for Palestine Definition The UNCCP was established by. the General Assembly on 11 December 19i}.8e The UNCCP which was composed of Turkey* France and the United States* was entrusted with the task of 100 facilitating a settlement of the Palestine conflict along certain directives specified by the General Assembly* The UNCCP is the first known authority to have attempted at defining a Palestinian refugee* Their defi nition reads: “Persons who had fled from Israel controlled territory* Commentary* 1* The definition is vague, poor and unqualified* Such misleading, or leading, terms as “Persons,“ "fled" and "Israel controlled territory," which make up the definition, were not qualified* 2* The word "Persons" does not include or exclude Palestinians, and this can be a severe handicap should one attempt to use it to determine the number of refugees* However^ while "Person’s" is all inclusive, the word "fled" is also all exclusive* 3* The UNCCP restricts the number of refugees to those who "fled" from "Israel" controlled territory* The subject of the plight of the Palestinian is among the most controversial subjects in the history of the Palestine problem and the Arab-Israeli conflict* 157* United Nations General Assembly Official Records, Pifth'~Se¥sTon7*^uppTemenFT!o7~T5_TA7T3^775ev:7 i ), New York 1951 $ "General Progress Report and Supplementary Report of the United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine covering the period from 11 December 1949$ to 23 October 1950," Ch* III, p* 13* 101 While some authors believe that they were either expelled or fled voluntarily, the general consensus is that neither classification is true by itself. The fact is that some Palestinians fled and some left voluntarily$ some were physically expelled, some were pressured to remain and others were pressured into leaving their homes. The word "fled" restricts the definition to a single category and excludes all others. ■ !(.» In the same manner that the UHCGP restricts the number of refugees to those who "fled," it also restricts it to those who fled from "Israel con trolled territory." Prior to 1£> May 194$ when the new state of Israel was established on Palestinian soil, Palestinians were driven and evicted from their lands and homes. David Ben Gurion wrote: "On that day of destiny (1$ May 1948)$ that part of Palestine where the Haganah could operate was almost clear of Arabs.111 $8 Zionist and Israelists, who maintain that while the expulsion of Palestinians as a matter of policy was not official prior to 1$ May 1948 it was practiced "unofficially," and that the number of Palestinians evicted or terrorized into fleeing their homes was 1$8. David Ben-Gurion, op. cit., pp. $3d-$31« . 102 put at 200,000e The TIN GOP definition ruled out these 200,000, as it had ruled out those who did not flee, and the offspring of all “Palestinian refu gees* “ 5° It is clear by now that the UNGOP1s definition excludes several hundred thousand “Palestinian refugees” and fails to serve as an adequate defini tion* The International Refugee Organi zation Definition The IRO definition was not formulated for the Pales tinian, per se* Rather, it was meant to serve all refugees, Palestinian or otherwise* Dr* G* J* Van Heuren Goedhart, who became the first United Nation's High Commissioner for refugees in 1950, felt that there was a need for a broad definition of a refugee* His broad definition of a refugee includedg Any person who is outside the country of his nationality or, if he has no nationality, the country of his former habitual residence, because he has or had well-founded fear of persecution by . reason of his race, religion, nationality or political opinion and is unable to or, because of such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of the government:of the country of M s nationality, or, if he has no nationality. 15>9* Berger, op* clt*, pp* 12^-132; Avnery, on* cite, pp* 197-198* 103 to return to the country of his former habitual residence*, ^ Conaaentary,, 1o Dr. Goedhart's definition, which is both accurate and general, can be adapted to suit, in part, our definition of a “Palestinian refugee.11 2. While Dr. Goedhart * s definition excludes the off spring of refugees, it does so with the best inter est of the refugees at heart. In order to eradicate future refugees and stateless persons, it was hoped that all countries would accord a child the right to acquire at birth the nationality of the country he is born in and that no one is to be deprived of his nationality.^^ It is only unfortunate that not all countries have signed the. 1950 convention relating to refugees and stateless persons. As such. Dr. Goedhart* s definition lacks inclusion for hundreds of thousands of Palestinians who were borne outside Palestine, but were denied the right to citizenship of the country they were b o m in, e.g. Syria, Lebanon, Egypt. 160. United Nations General Assembly Official Becoyds. 'Statute of the Office of^nie^United' 'llatlons sioner for Refugees," Ch. II, Art. 6, paragraph 13, 11 December 1950. _ 161. John George Stoessinger, The Refugee and the World .Community (Minneapolis: The University ofHwinnesota Press, 195^17 PPo 180-181* 104 The UNRWAPRNE Definition In surveying the records of UNRWAPRHE from 1 May 1950-30 June 1970, this author has come across one defini tion proposed by the DURWAPRHE in 1950 when the UNRWAPRUE first started its operationse The purpose of the UNRWAPRHE definition was to pro vide a working.definition to its personnel in order to facilitate the administration of relief services. Since the Agency was to provide relief services to Palestine refugees in the Rear East, a definition of a Palestinian refugee was necessary: For working purposes, the Agency has decided that a refugee is a needy person, who, as a result of the war in Palestine, has lost his home and his means of livelihood, A large measure of flexi bility in the interpretation of the above defini tion is accorded to chief district officers to meet the many borderline cases which inevitably arise,16)2 ■ Commentary, 1® The Agency's definition is a working definition that was intended to identify those persons who were eligible to receive relief services. As such it is flexible, not static. 162, United Rations General Assembly Official Records, Fifth^es^Ton^^SupplementToT l9 (A/TE^lTRevr 1 ) . New York, 1951? “Assistance to Palestine Refugees: Interim Report of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East,11 Ch, III, paragraph 15? p» 3, 105 20 The Agency* s definition does-not exclude many Pales tinians from being counted as -refugees, but does restrict the number of those who are to receive services, by emphasizing their need, 3» The refugee's offspring are included, as they have lost their home in Palestine, and are, as such, refugees„ Aj-o The sole restriction that exists, and unintention ally, is for those Palestinians-who did not have a home in Palestine or did have one but have not lost their means of livelihood. This rules out their being '’Palestinian refugees" but still leaves them as "Palestinians," 5><> While this definition befits a "Palestine refugee, " it is inadequate for a non-refugee Palestinian, An Israeli View The state of Israel has no official definition of the term "Palestinian refugee," In fact, in some official circles as that of Golda Meir, the present Premier of Israel, there is no such thing as a Palestinian, as there was no such thing as a Palestinian, To them the Palestinian Arabs are Syrians rather than Palestinians, as Palestine was referred to as "that southern part of Syria,” As such the Israelis and Israelists (those who champion the Israeli cause) alike refer to the Palestinian refugees as "Arab 106 refugees” and to the Palestinian commandos as "Arab terror ists. ” However, while no official definition has been advanced, some Israelis, as Dr* Walter Pinner, of the Eco nomic and Social Research Institute of Tel Aviv, have attempted at defining an "Arab R e f u g e e When the UH set up UHRWA, a refugee was defined as a person who in May 1948 had been living in Pales tine for at least two years, who (in consequence of the conflict of 194-8) had lost his home and,, means of livelihood and who still is in need* Commentary* 1* Dr, Pinner’s definition lacks a reference to any UTT body, and since the General Assembly set up the TJNRWAPRNE in 1949$ we can assume that the definition is attributed to the General Assembly, While the General Assembly has no definition of its own, per se, two of its specialized agencies, namely the United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine and the TJNRWAPRNE, have defined the term "Palestin ian refugee" (discussed earlier). Dr, Firmere s definition is almost identical to the UNRWAPRNE but for one exception. This exception, or rather 163, Walter Pinner, The. Legend of the Arab Refu gees: A Critical Study of UNRWATsReports and StatTstlc s (Tel' Aviv: ^onoiHTc'iinH Social^Research InsfTtute'jT 19577$ : P e 7^ ® _ 164, Ibid,, p, Vi, 10? fabrication, is the limitation that Dr. Pinner places on the Palestinian refugee<> According to this limitation Any Palestinian who has not lived in Palestine from May 19lj-6-May 1948 is not eligible to be counted as a refugee, even if he has lost his home and/or his means of livelihood in consequence of the conflict of 1948» The same limitation also rules out any Palestinian b o m during May 1948-May 1948o Given this narrow view of an arbitrary definition, Dr„ Pinner arrives at his stated objective, which is the “Exchange theory*" According to Dr. Pinner8 s definition, 539,000 Arabs left areas taken by Israel in 1949. By the same token, "537#074 Jewish refugees came from the Arab World"to Israel. The Arab states, according to Dr..Pinner, should settle their refugees as the' Jews settled their refugees.^ Dr. Pinner8 s theory, however, while it takes into account certain facts that support the theory, it chose to leave those that negate it, e.g., Dr. Pinner makes no room for the UHRMAPKHE figures that placed the number of Pales tinian. refugees in 1949 at one million? and the nature of the so-called "Jewish refugees" from the Arab World. 165. Ibid., p. x. 166. Ibid., pp. 66-71? 54-56? x. 108 The HJewish refugees” from the Arab World were citi zens of Arab states who were encouraged and financed to immigrate to Israel by the World Zionist Organization which established some offices in Arab states to fulfill such an objective* The majority of those "Jewish refugees" left their countries of birth on a voluntary basis without losing the right to return to the country of their birth while the Palestinian refugees were evicted, displaced and were denied the right to return to the country of their birth* Dr* Pinner’s definition, or perversion, was created to serve Dr. Pinner’s ends# rather than that of human justice# intellectual honesty and academic objectivity* The Need for a New Definition The inadequacy of most of the previous definitions of a Palestinian refugee makes it necessary to formulate a new definition of the term* One that would transcend the major shortcomings of all previous definitions. But# before attempting to do so# it is necessary# if not imperative# to define a Palestinian* After all# a Palestinian refugee is a Palestinian nonetheless. , The major difference between them# . as far as the scope of this study is concerned# is that a 167. See United Nations General Assembly Resolution 194 (III)# paragrapE^TT^T^enemHerniT^lW^T^wEich created the United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine# op* cit.# for the rights of the Palestinians; on Jewish refugee’s from the Arab World# see A* M* Lilienthal, The Other Side of the Coin (New York: Devin-Adair, 196577" 109 Palestinian refugee is a person who is in need and avails himself of the total, or partial, services provided to him by the WRWAPKMEs while his counterpart, whom we shall call a Palestinian, has no present need of either the total, or partial, services of the UHRWAPBHE (although he could have used in the past the services provided by IMRWAPRNE to become self sufficient, or he may need, as a result of unforeseen circumstances, the services of UHRWAPRNE at a future date), Who is a Palestinian? It is difficult, if not impossible, to define satis factorily in a single sentence the word "Palestinian" in a manner that would serve the basic needs of this study« Thus, as it is with many other definitions like democracy, fascism or communism, we must address ourselves to the basic charac teristics that make up a Palestinian, Thus, when the word Palestinian is used, we can understand its limitations, scope and ascribed meaning. Characteristics of a Palestinian, 1, A Palestinian is a person who was forced to accept, in 1947$. the partition of his country, Palestine, into separate Arab and Jewish states, thus denying the Palestinian people as a whole their right to national self-determination under article 73 of the Charter of the United Nations, 110 2.o A Palestinian is a person who as a result of the hazards of the war in Palestine left his home and/or property, whether it was on a voluntary basis or otherwise, but may avail himself of the rights granted under principles of international law or in equity by United Nations General Assembly Resolution 194 (ill) paragraph 11 of 11 December 1948 which states: Resolves that the refugees wishing to return to their homes and live at peace with their neighbors should be permitted to do so at the earliest practicable date, and that compensation should be paid for the property of those choosing not to return and for loss of or damage to property which, under principles of international law or in equity, should be made good by the Governments or authorities responsible* '68 3* A Palestinian is a person who can prove, within reasonable limits, that he was b o m (whether in or outside of Palestine) to a Palestinian family, and considers himself to be a Palestinian, whether he has a present nationality, or no. nationality at all, '1 . " . ' but is willing to forsake his present nationality, or statelessness, for a Palestinian nationality, should such a nationality be available to him. l68e “General .Progress and Supplementary Report of the United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine covering the period from 11 December 1949 to 23 October 1950," op, cit. m Characteristics of a Palestinian Refugee. 1«, A Palestinian Refugee is a Palestinian^ nonetheless, but, unlike his counterpart, the Palestinian who is not a refugee, is eligible and avails himself of the total or partial services rendered by the TORWAPRNE to needy Palestinians, 2e A Palestinian refugee who has become independently self-sufficient to the extent that he no longer requires total, or partial, TORWAPRNE services, is no longer a Palestinian refugee but a Palestinian, 3, A Palestinian who has not availed himself in the i past of services rendered by the TORWAPRNE, whether total or partial, but will at a future date, as a result of unforeseen circumstances, avail himself of the total and/or partial services rendered by TORWAPRNE to eligible needy Palestinians, becomes a Palestinian refugee once services are rendered to him, 4o The Palestinian refugee, like his counterpart the non-refugee, is also entitled to the same rights granted to all Palestinians under Resolution 19if- (III) paragraph 11 of 11 December 1948e 5>, A Palestinian refugee need not be one who lives in an TORWAPRNE camp, but could be one who lives away 112 from an UNRWAPRNE camp but avails himself of the UNRWAPRNE services. CHAPTER 3 PRELUDE TO UNRWAPRHE Introduction Prior to the establishment of the UHRWAPRNE by the United Nations General Assembly on 8 December 19ij-9 several organizations were established by the United Nations General Assembly to deal with the Palestine refugee problem* The Palestine refugee problem existed prior to the creation, on 1$ May 19ll-8 of the state of Israel* It is estimated that over 250,000 Palestinian Arabs were rendered homeless as a result of a Zionist policy to evict, directly or indirectly, the large Arab population that was included within the Jewish state as a result of the 29 November 19i|7 partition. On 15 May 19^8, following the declaration of the establishment of the state of Israel the first Arab-Israeli War began. On 17 May 194-8, two days after hostilities began, the United Nations appointed Count Folke Bernadotte as its official mediator in Palestine, It was largely 1. David Ben-Gurion, Rebirth and Destiny of Israel (New York: Philosophical Library, 1934), PP. 530-$31; Earl Berger, The Covenant a n d .the Sword: Arab-Israel Relations, 19I1-8-195fe~ [London: Routledge and Kegan paulj- Ltd,, lyopj,-- Pp7"l2lFT32 Uri Avnery, Israel Without Zionists (New York: Macmillan, 1968), pp, 197-198; Fred” Khouri, The Arab-Israeli Dilemma (New York: Syracus e Uni ver si ty . P re sis, 19&WJT * *™™ 113 111}. through the efforts of Count Bemadotte that the United Nations, and other organizations that cooperate with the United Nations, began its long involvement with the Pales tine refugee problem* Count Bemadotte's initial efforts met with success, when a truce was arranged between the Arabs and Israelis* The truce was to last for four weeks, i.e* * from 11 June- 8 July 19l}-8y in order to allow the mediator to tackle the basic causes of the conflict, namely the 29 November 1914-7 partition and the Palestine refugee problem* On 2? June 19I4.8 , Count Bemadotte suggested that the Palestinian Arabs who had left their homes be allowed to return, without restrictions, to their property and homes* Count Bemadotte also suggested that Israel would have to give the Negev, Lyddah, and Ramieh back to the Palestinian Arabs, as there were no Jews in those areas (the main prin ciple used in deciding what areas go to the Arab or Jewish p states)* Israel refused to accept Count Bemadotte* s sug gestions, and on 7 July 1948* Aubrey (now Abba) Eban voiced Israel's objections*8 On 8 July 1948 the last day of the cease fire, but before hostilities resumed on 9 July 1948 Count Bemadotte 3* 2, United Nations Documents, S/863, 3 July 1948* 3o United Nations Documents, S/8 70, 8 July 1948, 115 reported to the United Nations: It is e „ o undeniable that no settlement can be just and complete if recognition is not accorded . to the rights, of the Arab refugee to return to the home from which he has been dislodged by the hazards and strategy of the armed conflict 6 » » the exodus resulted from the panic created by the fighting in their communities^ by rumors concern ing real or alleged acts of terrorism, or expul sion* It would be an offense against the prin ciples of elemental justice if those innocent victims of the conflict were denied the right to return to their homes while Jewish immigrants flow .into Palestine,4 According to the United Nations General Assembly the condition of the Palestinian refugees, as a result of Israelis refusal to allow them to return back to their homes and/or property, become so desperate that By July 1948, more than half a million refugees were drifting aimlessly and hopelessly in the neighboring Arab states, and the bitterness engendered threatened to destroy any hope that the work of the United Nations Mediator on Palestine could be carried successfully. The Arab nations themselves fed and cared for refu gees of Arab nationality in the early months, but the problem was too great for their limited resources,5 Early United Nations Involvement On 1 August-1948 the International Refugee Organi zation's (IRO) General Council unanimously voted agains,t the 1|_, United Nations Documents, A/648$ 17 September 19480 ” . 5» "Assistance to Palestine Refugees: Interim Report of the Director of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East," United Nations General Assembly Official Records, Fifth 116 inclusion of either “Arab or Jewish Middle East refugees” under IRO jurisdiction, stating as its reason the "essen tially non-political and humanitarian character of the organization, unable to afford embroilment in a major political conflict0 The IRO felt that the "Arab refugee problem was a localized one and should be solved by the local governmentse Count Bernadette, noting the inability of the Arab governments to care for 500,000 Palestinian refugees, and the exclusion of the Palestinian refugees from IRO jurisdic tion, was forced to appeal to all nations for assistance to the Palestinian refugees on humanitarian grounds. The con dition of the refugees was desperate and the mediator called for immediate action. The United Nations International Children* s Emer gency Fund (UNICEF) was the first international body that contributed money and dispatched some of its personnel in early August 1948« Following UNICEF * s action. Count Berna dette established a disaster relief project under the con trol of a United Nations Director of Disaster Relief Session, Supplement No, 19 (A/ll^l/Rev, 1), Part One, Chapter I, p, 1, 6, John George Stoessinger, The Refugee and the Wor 1 d Coromunity (Minneapolis; The University of Minnesota tress, 1956), p. 98, 7,. Ibid,, pp, 98-99, 117 assisted by the World Health Organization (WHO) and other voluntary agencies which performed an outstanding service to humanity On 16 August 19ij-8 Count Bernadotte wrote United States Secretary of State Marshall requesting urgent aid to meet the desperate needs of the Palestinian refugees. Count Bernadotte stated in his letter to Secretary of State Marshall that 30 percent of the refugees were children under 5 years of age, and that over 10 percent were pregnant women and nursing mothers,^ Count Bernadotte's efforts to procure international aid for the task of caring for the Palestinian refugees met with such a cooperative response that the United Nations General Assembly deemed it necessary to establish an agency to coordinate relief services due to the magnitude of the task. Such an organization was established on 19 November 1914.8 but the founding father of United Nations aid to Pales tinian refugees did not live to see the fruits of his labor. On 17 September 19I4.8 Count Folke Bernadotte, United Nations Mediator on Palestine, was brutally assassinated with Colonel Serot in the Jewish sector of the city of 8 , "Assistance to Palestine Refugeess Interim Report of the Director of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East," op, cit. _ 9® The Department of State Bulletin, 29 August 1948, pp, 22^227. 118 Jerusalem by Israeli Jews known to the Israeli government*^ Mro Ralph Bxmchep Count Bernadette's successor as Mediator on Palestines, held Israel responsible for this "Murder in Cold Blood." 11 Although Count Bernadette is no longer with us, yet the fruits of this noble man, who dedicated his life to peace and justice, have led to the direct involvement of the United Nations with those innocent victims of the conflict who were denied the right to return to their homes while Jewish immigrants flow into Palestine. United Nations Relief for Palestine Refugees (UNRPR) On 19 November 1948 the United Nations General Assembly unanimously passed Resolution 212 (III) which authorized the Secretary General to "take all necessary steps to extend aid to Palestine refugees." (For the full text of Resolution 212 see Appendix B). Paragraph 9 requests the Secretary General to appoint a Director of UNRPR to "plan and implement relief programmes” in conjunc tion with the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), the League of Red Cross Societies (LRCS) and the 10. The Department of State Bulletin, 26 September 1948. ^— ----- 11. "Murder in Cold Blood, 11 The United Nations Monthly Bulletin, V (1 October 1948) 119 American Friends Service Committee (AFSC) who "undertook to carry out the distribution of relief supplies procured by the United Nations for the refugees, then estimated at 700,000e"1^ The UNICEF continued its supply of food and medicine to children and pregnant mothers, but the UNRPR was responsible for the distribution of relief0 Similar help came from the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) and the WHO* The resolution in paragraph 3 authorized the Secre tary General "to advance immediately a sum of up to $5*000,000 dollars from the Working Capital Fund of the United Nations," The resolution also urged member states to contribute 32,000,000 dollars to carry put relief operations till 31 August 1911.9« The UNRPR was set up, according to Mr, Howard Kennedy, first UNRWAPRNE Director, "with the idea that the problem would be resolved in a matter of months,How ever, it was soon discovered that some other approach was needed to.solve the problem, and until then, the UNRPR, in conjunction with the ICRC, LRCS, AFSC, UNICEF, UNESCO and WHO "carried out a splendid work, about which the world 12,- "Assistance to Palestine Refugees; Interim Report of the Director of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East," op, cit,, paragraph 5, p, 1® 13® Ibid,, paragraph 6, p, 1, 120 knows all too little, until it was handed over to TJHRWAPRHE on 1 May 1950® The Palestinian refugees,, who were esti mated to be about.700^000 by 1 November 19^8 were fed, clothed and housed without serious physical deterioration or the incidence of epidemics„^ The TJNRPR was successful in organizing a comprehen sive but temporary relief programme0 It's main purpose, which was a humanitarian one, was reasonably achieved by coordinating and administering relief services from 19 November 1940-1 May 1950 to over 700,000 Palestinian refu gees, who by 1 May 1950 were estimated to be over 950,000.^ The Palestine refugee problem was, and still is, primarily political and economic, besides being a humani tarian one® The UNRPR was equipped to dispense relief services, thus taking care of the humanitarian aspect of the problem. To tackle the roots of the refugee problem, namely the political and economic problems, the UNRPR was not equipped to handle. For such a task another organization was needed. 14« Ibid., paragraph 5s P® 1» 15c Ibid. 16. Ibid., paragraph 7s p. 2. 121 United Nations Conciliation Commission '^foFTal'e s t ine~TulCCP ) On 11 December 19ij.S the United Nations General Assembly adopted Resolution 1914- (III) which established a UNOCP consisting of three members (Turkey, France and the United States of America) "to carry out the specific func tions and directives given to it by the present resolution and such additional functions and directives as may be given to it by the General Assembly and by the Security Councile" The purpose of the UNCCP was to establish contact with the disputing parties and "take steps" to assist them in reaching a final settlement of all questions outstanding between them along certain principles and directives speci fied by Resolution 194 (III)* (For the full text of Reso lution 194 (III) see Appendix C.) The main principles and directives were related to: 1o The Conciliation Effort: The Resolution in para graph 5 calls upon the governments and authorities concerned to enter into direct, or indirect nego tiations, "with a view to the final settlement of all questions outstanding between them." The reso lution did not favor "partial" issues as the basis for negotiations, but rather, an overall "package deal" of "all questions outstanding,” 122 2. Jerusalem and the Holy Places; The. resolution in paragraph 8 resolved that Jerusalem should be placed under effective United Nations controle Jerusalem, according to paragraph 12$ was to be the head quarters of the UNCCP, which was entrusted to appoint a United Nations representative to administer Jerusalem in cooperation with the local authorities* 3® The Palestine Refugee Problem: The resolution in paragraph 11 stated clearly that "the refugees wish ing to return to their homes and live at peace with their neighbours should be permitted to do so at the .earliest practicable date, and that compensation should be paid for the property of those choosing not to return and for loss of or damage to property which, under principles of international law or in equity, should be made good by the governments or authorities responsible," The Resolution also instructed the UNCGP to '/facilitate the repatriation, resettlement and economic and social rehabilitation of the refugees and the payment of Compensation," The resolution in paragraph 1lj. called upon "all governments and authorities concerned to cooperate with the Conciliation Commission and to take all possible steps to assist in the implementation of the present resolution," The resolution was known to the parties beforehand; the 123 resolution established certain guidelines upon which there can be no disagreement; the resolution gave the UUGCF certain latitudes and freedom of action "for the effective discharge of its functions and responsibilities,,11 With this in mind# the UNOCP set on its work to implement the direc tives of resolution 19l{- (III), The UNCCP Between Israeli Rigidity and Arab Flexibility Under' the chairmanship of Mr, Palmer# the UNCCP began its activities with high hopes for a settlement of the problem. The period under consideration runs from 11 December I9l|-8a23 October 19lj-9» during which the UHCCP approached both parties on the following questions?^7 1o The Conciliation Effort 2* Question of Jerusalem and the Holy Places 3, The Refugee problem i|_. The Territorial Question Given the principles espoused by Resolution 194- (III)# and the positions held by both Arab and Israel# the UHCGP was deadlocked within the framework of the Arab- Israeli Conflict, But# as the record shows# the UHCCP was deadlocked between Israeli rigidity and Arab flexibility, 17« "General Progress Report and Supplementary Report of the United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine# covering the period from 11 December 1949 to 23 October 1950#" United Nations General Assembly. Official Records# Fifth "sesaion7~£H4ujTSm^^ 1)# New York# 1951# pp. 1-31» 124- The Conciliation Effort*^8 The UNOCP, in carrying out the directives specified in paragraphs I{.s 5 and 6, visited, between 12-25 February 1914-9, the governments of Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Iraq, Syria, Lebanon and Israels The Arab governments, aware of Israel’s prior posi tion regarding the Palestinian refugees, insisted that before any negotiations on a general peace, Israel must accept, in principle, paragraph 11 regarding the Palestinian refugees* The resolution in paragraph 11 established irrevocable rights for the Palestinian refugees, and unless Israel declared its acceptance of paragraph 11, negotiations would be handicapped from the start,^9 Israel, in violation of paragraphs 11 refused to accept, in principle, the rights granted to the refugees under paragraph 11, Israel also called for a general peace and direct negotiations with the Arabs, The UNO CP met again, from 21 March-5 April 1914-9 with the Arab states, which decided that, while the refugee problem is the most pressing, "they will not insist upon its settlement before any negotiations on other aspects of peace,The Arab states, with the exception of Iraq, 18, Ibid,, pp, 2-9, 19, Ibid,, p, 2, 20, Ibid, 21, Ibid 125 declared their willingness to send delegates to a neutral, city to establish contacts with Israel through the UUGCPS i.e,* indirect negotiations under paragraph 5>0 On 7 April 19ij-9 the IMG CP met with; Ben-Our ion and relayed the Arabs viewso . On 27 April 1949 Israel and the Arab states (exclud ing Iraq and Saudi Arabia, who stated that they would adhere to the point of view expressed by the other Arab states) met in Lausanne, 'Switzerland, under the auspices of the XJ¥CGPo The UHCCP, to help workout a peace settlement, established as a basis for negotiations a protocol which was signed by both parties on 12 May 1949° The Protocol of 12 May 1949 (as it is officially referred to) declared that: The United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine, anxious to achieve as quickly as pos sible the objectives of the G-eneral Assembly * s resolution of 11 December 1948$ regarding refugees, the respect for their rights and the preservation of their property, as well as territorial and other questions, has proposed to the delegations of the Arab states and to the delegation of Israel that the working document attached hereto be taken as a basis for discussions with the Commission , „ 0 The interested delegations have accepted this proposal with the understanding that the exchanges; of views which will be carried on by the Commis sions with the two parties will bear upon the territorial adjustments necessary to the above- indicated objectives. To this document was annexed a map on which were indicated.the boundaries defined in the General Assembly's resolution 181 (II) of 29 November 19470 This map was taken as the basis of discussion with the Commission. It was by virtue of the signing of this Protocol, on 12 May 1949, that the Commission was able to obtain from the two 126 parties_their views on all outstanding ques tions,, 22 Jerusalem and the. Holy Plaoes0^^ The OTCCE declared that in their meetings with the Arab states in Beirut, the Arabs were "prepared to accept the principle of an inter national regime for the Jerusalem area, on condition that the United Nations should be in a position to offer the necessary guarantees regarding the stability and permanence of such a regime*"24 The Arab States, from Beirut to Lausanne, adhered to the principles of paragraph 8 regarding Jerusalem and the Holy Places* Israel, however, while recognizing that the UNCOP was bound by Resolution 194 (III) paragraph 8, "declared itself unable to accept the establishment of an inter national regime for the city of Jerusalem,"2£ an attitude that was in total violation of the Protocol of 1.2 May 1949» paragraph 8 of Resolution 194 (III)# and Resolution 181 (III) of 29 November 1947 which called for the same prin ciples stated in paragraph 8 -of Resolution 194 (III)o The Refugee Problem*2o The UNCOP, bound by para graph 11, and the Protocol of 12 May 1949 sent a Committpe 22, Ibid,, p, 3, 23, Ibid,, pp, 10-11, 24, Ibid,, p, 10, 25, Ibid, 26, Ibid,, pp, 12-18, 127 to investigate ttie condition of the Palestinian refugees* The Committee members, who had. a chance to see for them selves the deplorable conditions of the refugees "realized that the desperate uncertainty of the future for these unfortunates made it imperative that measures be taken toward a prompt and permanent solution of the question* The Arab States, which were aware of the rights granted to the refugees under paragraph 11, (and their reaffirmation by the Protocol of 12 May 194-9), not only reaffirmed their support for them, but, to facilitate their solution, suggested to the DNCCP that "the problem cannot be fully solved by the return of the refugees to their homes* » * * The settlement, either temporary or permanent, of a considerable number of refugees in the Arab countries must also be contemplated, in order to achieve a complete and final solution of the problem* The State of Israel, aware of paragraph 11, and a signatory to the Protocol of 12 May 194-9 which reaffirmed the rights of the refugees as entailed in Resolution 194- (III) paragraph .11, refused to accept paragraph 11 before, during or after the negotiations conducted by the UNCCP*^ 27* Ibid., p* 12* 28. Ibid*, p* 18* 29* Ibid., p. 12* 128 In a clear violation of the said resolution and protocol, Israel refused to repatriate and/or compensate the refugees* According to Ben-Gurion "the Government of Israel considered that a real solution of the major part of the refugee ques tion lay in the resettlement of the refugees in Arab states*"^0 The Arab states, who realized that not all of the refugees (close to 751 $000 in November 19ij-9) could be repatriated, insisted that Israel should, in accordance with paragraph 11 repatriate some and compensate others, Israel, however, wanted neither to repatriate or compensate any refugee. Following some pressure, mainly from President Truman, Israel agreed to let 100,000 refugees in with several clauses attached, but even the UNOCP found Israel’s bid unsatisfactory,31 Like the question of Jerusalem, Israel refused to be bound by the rights surrounding the refugee problem, even though both were binding and Israel signed the Protocol of 12 May 1949 as her sign of acceptance of those rights. The Territorial Question,32 Resolution 194 (III) made no provisions to solve the territorial question except with reference to Jerusalem, The Protocol of 12 May 1949 3031 30, Ibid., p. 13, 31, Ibid., p. 14. 32. Ibid,, pp. 19-21 129 however, which was signed by both Israel and the Arabs, - , established the partition plan of 29 November 1947 as the basis of discussion. The Arabs, who had rejected the 29 November 194-7 partition plan up to this point, were mlling to accept it as the final borders, rather than mere demarcation lines. Israel, however, refused to go back to the boundaries of 194-7 stating that it "could not accept . . . a certain pro portionate distribution of territory which had been agreed upon in 1947®" Instead, "the Government of Israel now asserts its title to the territory over which its authority is actually recognized . . . of the territory now consti tuting the State of Israel, there can be no cession.”34 The UNCGP was unable to bridge the gap between the rigid position of the Israelis towards the principles out lined for a peaceful solution in Resolution 194 (III) and the Protocol of 12 Hay 1949 which were adhered to by both Israel and the Arabs. The Arab States, however, were the only ones who adhered to the principles in question, and as such, the TJNCCP decided to discontinue for the time being its efforts at reaching a political solution of the 33® Ibid., p. 19. 34« Ibid., pp. 19-20. 130 problem.The efforts of the UNOCP were geared towards another approach, mainly an economic approach to the prob lem. 36 The United Nations Economic Survey "" " mTHonlWESMl : On 23 August 194.9 the UN COP, in pursuant of para graph 12, Resolution 194- (III)» which authorizes the UNCOP to appoint subsidiary bodies under its authority "for the effective discharge of its functions and responsibilities," established an Economic Survey Mission (referred to as the UEBSM)e The UNESM represents a new approach to the deadlock reached at the Lausanne talks between the Arabs and the Israelis. Noting Israel8s intransigent position towards the problem of the repatriation and/or compensation of the Palestinian refugees, as outlined in Resolution 194- (III) and the Protocol of 12 May 194-9 an economic approach to the problem of the refugees could, either solve the refugee” problem, or break the deadlock reached at Lausanne. This new approach fulfills, in part, the second half of paragraph 11 of Resolution 194- (III), which calls for "repatriation, resettlement and economic and social rehabil itation of the refugees and the payment of compensation," 35e Ibid., p. 4-e 36. Ibid., p . 17® 131 By 23 August 191}-9 it was evidently clear to the UNCCP that Israel rejects the principle.of repatriation in total, and compensation in part» This was Israel's rigid position all through the negotiations at Lausanne, and later. New York® With this-' in mind, the UNESM would have no recourse but to capitalize on the "resettlement and economic and social rehabilitation of the refugees, 11 and leave the matters of "repatriation , « . and the payment of compensation" out of its economic approach as Israel would not accept them. The Arabs, however, indicated their willingness to / ' resettle, whether on a temporary or a permanent basis, a considerable number of the refugees, in order to achieve a complete and final solution of the problem® The Arabs insisted, however, that Israel should allow the Palestinians to exercise their right to choose between compensation and/ or repatriation as specified by paragraph 11 of Resolution 19l+ (III) and the Protocol of 12 May 19i{-9 (which was signed by Israel) which reaffirmed the rights granted to the Pales tinian refugees. It was expected by the Arab states that repatriation would decrease the number of Palestinian refugees to be resettled in the Arab world, and the payment of compensation would ease the resettlement of the Pales tinian refugees and enable them to begin a new life in the Arab world. The Arab States indicated from the start that 132 their economic conditions were too limited to care for the refugees, let alone resettle and socially rehabilitate them* It appears that given the rigid position of the Israelis, and the flexible position of the Arabs, the UNESM expected to capitalize on Arab willingness to resettle some Palestinian refugees in their lands«, Since the main obstacle to partial resettlement was the economic inability of the Arab states, the UHESM was charged with "examining the economic situation in the countries affected by the recent hostilities in Palestine e » , and recommending 6 » „ to facilitate repatriation, resettlement and economic and social rehabilitation of the refugees and payment of compen- sation."^? Under the chairmanship of Mr, Gordon Clapp, formerly of the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA), the UNESM began its work in 23 August 1949 with the hope of devising schemes to develop the area in order to reintegrate the refugee into the economic life of the area. It was soon discovered, how ever, that any comprehensive developing scheme would require political cooperation between Israel and the Arab states. The UNESM warned.that: The region is not ready, the projects are not ready, the people and governments are not ready for large-scale development of the region®s basic river systems or major undeveloped areas. To • press forward on such a course is to pursue folly 37* Ibid, 133 and frustration and thereby delay sound economic . growth03o In November 19i+9 the UNESM* after three months of exhaustive study in the field, submitted an interim report to the United Nations General Assembly.39 its interim report, the UNESM "recommended the creation of a new agency, which would not only carry out relief on a diminishing scale," but would inaugurate a works programme in which able- bodied refugees could become self-supporting and at the same time create works of lasting benefit to the refugees and the countries concerned. It is clear that the UNESM wanted to put an end to "relief" by creating projects that would employ the refugees and make them self-sufficient. However,, the political realities of the situation, which were known to the UNESM, made it necessary to abandon projects on a large scale. Instead, the UNESM, in its final report^ (which was signed 3938 38, Quoted in Fred J, Khouri, The Arab-Israeli Dilemma (New York: Syracuse University Press, 196b), p. 129s 39. United Nations Documents. A/1106, Fourth Ses sion, Ad Hoc Political CommTiteB, Annex, Vol, 1, 191^9, Jj-Oo lf As si stance to Palestine Refugees s Interim Report of the Director of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East. " op. cit., paragraph 6, p. 2 . ^4-1. .Final Report of the United Nations Economic Survey Mission for the Middle East, " United Nations Publica tions, 1949, II parts I and II. in Paris# in December 1950), suggested, the creation of •'pilot demonstration projects" in Syria# Lebanon, Jordan and Gazae Such small scale projects included small irrigation works, small dams, road building, canal repair and others The W E S M recommended that the General Assembly set up a special agency and supply it with $49?000,000 to carry out a relief and works programme for an eighteen month period* On 8 December 1949 the recommendations of the UNESM were embodied in Resolution 302 (IV) in which provided for the setting up of a UHRWAPRHE. The TMESM anticipated the setting up of the UHRWAPRNE in January 1950? but unforeseen circumstances pre vented its organization until. April 1950* It therefore assumed its field duties only on 1 May 1950? some months behind its schedule*^ The TJNRPR, which was established on 19 November 1948 officially handed all operations to the UNRMAPRNE on 30 April 1950 and ceased to exist afterwards* Unlike the TJNRPR, the UNCCP is still alive, though inactive at the present time* The UNCCP has been activated several times "to find a solution to the refugee problem* "V-J- 42, Ibid. 43® "Assistance to Palestine Refugees: Interim Report of the Director of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East," op. cit., paragraph 7, p. 2 . 4 4 ® Khouri, op. cit., p. 131. 135 Following the breakup of the Laussane and New York talks in 1950# the UNCCF made another futile attempt in August 1951, and in the early 1960,s . The UNCCP was not a total failure0 Although it failed to bring about a peaceful settlement between the Arabs and the Israelis in accordance with. Resolution 192ji (III) , it has had its minor successes* For example# the UNCCP# from 1949-1960# has been able to negotiate the release of "Arab safe deposits blocked in Israel . o e and the release of ^2#790#045 of Arab refugee accounts in Israelo The establishment of UNRWAPRNE did not# in any way, undermine the UNCCP. Rather# article 20 of Resolution 302 (IV) of 8 December 1949 (which established a UNRWAPRNE)s Directs the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East to consult with the United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine in the best interests of their respective tasks. With particular reference to . paragraph 11 of General Assembly Resolution 194 (III) of 11 December 1948.46 The UNCCP was entrusted with the task of founding a political solution to the problem. The UNESM# which was entrusted with the task of founding an economic solution to the problem# "realized the inseparability of political and engineering planning." The UNRWAPRNE# which was established 45« Ibid.# p. 133. 46. Ibid.# p . 129. 136 to carry out the recommendations of the UNESM* which called for diminishing relief and increased self-supporting schemes$ was not expected nor equipped to solve the politi cal differences between the Arabs and the Israelis, The UNRWA?RNE was expected, to consult with the UNOCP, which was entrusted with the task of founding a political solution. For its part, the U1RWAPRNE has done a tremendous job in handling the refugee problem by meeting their needs. In doing so, the UNRWAPRNE, like the TMTSO and the UNEF, has contributed much to maintaining stability and creating a more favorable environment for a political solution of the Palestine refugee problem within the context of the Arab- Israeli conflict. CHAPTER 4. AN ANALYSIS OP THE TJNRWAPRNE, 1 MAY 1950-30 JUNE 1971 The Establishment of UNRWAPRNE On 8 December 1949* the United Nations General Assembly, pursuant of the recommendations of the United Nations Economic Survey Mission (UNESM), unanimously adopted Resolution 302 (IV) which established a UNRWAPRNE», Resolution 302 (IV) is a lengthy one, twenty-two paragraphs in all. However, the most pertinent paragraphs are 6 and 7® (For the full text of Resolution 302 (IV) see Appendix D«, The resolution in paragraph $ maintains that while "continued assistance for the relief of the Palestine refu gees is necessary to prevent conditions of starvation and distress among them" it is done "without prejudice to the provisions of paragraph 11 of General Assembly Resolution 194 (III) of 11 December 1948«" The preamble to Resolution 302 (IV) reaffirmed "in particular the provisions of para graph 11" of Resolution 194 (III)® Reaffirming paragraph 11 has become a standard procedure in any dealings with the Palestinian refugees, for fear that if the rights of the Palestinians are not acknowledged, then any action. 137 138 especially one that involves relief and works projects, might prejudice the right to repatriation and/or compensa tion under paragraph 11 of Resolution .194 (III)* As such, the Palestinians, and especially the refugees, have become suspicious of any action that does not reaffirm their rights under paragraph 11. Paragraph 6 authorizes the UNRWAPRNE to spend up to $33»700,000 "for direct relief and works programmes for the period 1 January to 31 December 1950*11 Although the URESM recommended $49,000,000 for a period of 18 months, paragraph 6 limited the sum to $33,700,000 and 12 months* Paragraph 6 also specified that "direct relief should be terminated no later than 31 December 1950 unless otherwise determined by the General Assembly at its fifth regular session." Paragraph 7, which established the UNRWAPRNE, instructs the TMRWAPRNE "to carry out in collaboration with local governments the direct relief and works programmes as recommended by the Economic Survey Mission." The UHESM "recommended the creation of a new agency, which would not only carry out relief on a diminishing scale, but would inaugurate a works programme in which able-bodied refugees could become self-supporting and at the same time create works of lasting benefit to the refugees and the countries \ 139 1 concerned." The UNESM wanted to put an end to direct relief by establishing pilot demonstration projects that would employ the refugees and make them self-sufficient. The UERWAPENE was also instructed in paragraph 7 to "consult with the interested Near Eastern Governments con cerning measures to be taken by them preparatory to the time when international assistance for relief and works project is no longer available." The Task of UNRWAPRNE The tJNRWAPRNE, in carrying out the recommendations of the UNESM as instructed in paragraph 7 of Resolution 302 (IV)f was faced with two tasks, 1. The temporary task of providing subsistence, medical care, shelter and education for the refugees. 2. The continuing long-term task which aims at assisting the refugees to become self- supporting. 2 12 1. "Assistance to Palestine Refugees; Interim Report of the Director of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East, " United Nations General Assembly Official Records, Fifth Ses- "sion. Supplement No” T9 (A/lIj3l/Rev. 1), p. 2. 2. "Annual Report of the Director of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East, 1 July 1958-30 June t959," United Nations General Assembly Official Records, Fourteenth Session, Sup- piement No. 11+ {A^2TJT^~pT~T7~ 140 The Size of the Task The UNESM, which requested $^9,000,000 for an 18 month period to deal with the Palestine refugee problem* based its recommendations on the belief that there were, in November 19li-9$ about 7^1,000 Palestinian refugees. This figure was obtained from mathematical calculations In May 195)0, when the UNRWAPRNE assumed its field duties, the number of Palestinian refugees was estimated to be over 95>0,000e^' In June 195)1* one year after the UNRWAPRNE began its operations, the exact number of Pales-, tiniah refugees for the year 1950 was put at 957*000This means that the UNESM was off by 206,000 refugees, a sub stantial number that definitely upsets the $49,000,000 allotted to solve the problem of 751,000 people over an 18 month period* Thus, the size of the task that faced the UNRWAPRNE. was close to one million Palestinian refugees, in 1 May 1950, when the UNRWAPRNE began its operations* 3«, . "Assistance to Palestine Refugees: Interim Report of the Director of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East,,T . op* cit*, p* 2* 4» Ibid* 5» "Assistance to Palestine Refugees: Report of the Director of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East,11 United Nations General Assembly Official Records, Sixth Session, Supplement The Administration and Organization oFTfae"'PER WAP RME Introduction Although the United Nations General Assembly made no provision for either the administration or organization of the UNRWAPRNE in Resolution 302 (IV), yet it established an Advisory Commission under paragraph 8 consisting of repre sentatives of France, Turkey, Britain and the United States "to advise and assist" the Director of the UNRWAPRNE "in the execution of the programme." According to the Director of UNRWAPREE, the Advisory Commission "limits its concern to the provision of overall guidance on Agency policy. It does 6 not deal with the Agency's functional operations.” The development of rules of procedures and organiza tion began in the final week of April 1950 and were com pleted by May 1950, the same month the UNRWAPRNE began its operations. The effort included inheriting the UNRPR, fusing the work of the ICRC, LRCS and the AFSC. According to Mr. Howard Kennedy, the first Director of UNRWAPRNE "it 6. "Annual Report of the Director of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East covering the period 1 July 1951 to 30 June . 1952$" United Nations General Assembly Official Records, Seventh Session, Supplement No. I^^TA/STTTJTnFr^TTT™^- was possible to complete this work on schedule and at the same time avoid any serious dislocation of service,"^ The Organization of the OTRWAPRHE Paragraph 9 of Resolution 302 (IV) requests the Secretary General of the United Nations to appoint a Direc tor for the UNRWAPRNE "in consultation with the governments represented on the Advisory Commission." Paragraph 9 (a) holds the Director responsible to the General Assembly for the operation of the programme. Paragraph 9 (b) empowers the Director, as chief executive officer to "select and appoint his staff in accordance with general arrangements made in agreement with the Secretary-General." The term "Director" of the UNEWAPENE was officially changed as of 1 July 1961 to "Commissioner-General." As such, although both titles will be used throughout this study, the.title of Commissioner-General will be used except when the need arises to make an accurate report and hence the title Director will be used. In May 1950, the UNRWAPRNE established it's head quarters in Beirut, Lebanon. The .Headquarters Office con sists of the Office of the Commissioner-General, the Office of the Deputy Commissioner-General, a Reports Office and a 7e "Assistance to Palestine Refugees; Interim . Report of the Director of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East," op. cit., p. 3. 143 Programmes Officee Attached to the Commissioner-General1s office is the UNRWAPRNE* s New York Liaison Office and the secretariat of the Advisory Commission. Reporting to the Commissioner-General are five advisors in the fields of public relations, legal questions, engineering# comnrunity facilities and agriculture. The seven functional divisions, the chiefs of which also report to the Commissioner-General, are the Divisions of Administration, Supply, Health, Educa tion, Social 'Welfare, Economics and Finance. The HHRWAPRHE, throughout the years, has added public information services and liaison offices in New York, Geneva and Cairo; the transport of persons and goods within UNRWAPRNE1s area of operations; market research, purchasing, control and ware housing of supplies and equipment; personnel, administration, 8 translation, and the protection of UNRWAPRNE1s property. The UNRWAPRNE established five districts each under a.chief district officer responsible to the Commissioner- General for the overall programme in his district (districts were subdivided into areas, each under a Palestinian refugee 8. "Assistance to Palestine Refugees: Report of the Director of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East,” op. cit., p . 1'5; "Annual Report of the Director of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East covering the period 1 July 1951 to 30 June 1952," op. cit,, p. 11; "Report of the Commissioner-General of the United. Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East, 1 July 1967-30 June 1968," United Nations General Assembly Official Records, Twenty-Third Session, SuppTSeElTNhT 13^lA772TT)TppT^9-4^. 144 official). The five districts were; Lebanon, Syria, Jordan, Gaza and Israel. The office of the UMRWAPRNE repre sentative to Israel was officially closed as of 30 June 1952, as a result of the turning over of relief administra tion of all Palestinian refugees in Israel to that govern ment as of 1 July 1952.9 Following the 196? Israeli occupa tion of Gaza and the Western Bank of Jordan, the UNRWAPRNE established separate offices for the Western Bank of Jordan and contacts with the Israelis regarding the execution of THfRWAPRWEss duties become inevitable.^ The Chief Executive Officer . The Commissioner-General (previously Director) under paragraph 9 of Resolution 302 (IV) is the chief executive officer of the UWRWAPRNE. He is the only person who must be .appointed by the Secretary-General in consultation with the Advisory Commission. All other employees are hired by the Commissioner-General. From 1 May 1950 to May 1971$ the chief- executive officer was always an American. Sir John Rennie, who took over in May-June 1971, was -the first Commissioner-General who was not a citizen of the United States. The chief 109 9 . Ibid. 10. "Report of the Commissioner-General of the United Rations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refu gees in the Near East, 1 July 1967-30 June 1968,” op. cit., pp. 39-40. executive officers were s 1o Howard Kennedys Mr® Kennedy was the first Director of the OTRWAPREEe He served from 1 May 1950-30 June 1951# when his term expired, 2, John EL Blandford9 Jr,: Mr® Blandford served from ij. July 1951 "7 March 1953® He retired on 7 March 1953® 3® Leslie J® Carvers Mr, Carver, who was Mr, Bland- . ford1s Deputy Director, administered the UHRWAPRNE from 7 March 1953=14 June 1954# when a successor to Mr, Blandford was appointed, 4® Henry Richardson Labouisaes A lawyer and former United States Ambassador to France, Dr, Labouisse became Director from 15 June 1954-15 June 1958® He resigned his post on 15 June 1958# at the age of 54° 5® Leslie J, Carvers For the second time Mr, Carver served as Acting Director, This time he served from 15 June 1958-15 February 1959# when a successor to Dr, Labouisse was appointed, 6, John H» Davis: Dr, Davis served from 15 February 1959= January 1964® During his third year# the title of Director was changed to Commissioner-General on 1 July 1961, Dr, Davis retired in January 1964® 7® Laurence Victor Michelmore; Dr, Michelmore# who was working at the United Nations in different organs W 6 since 19l4-6s served from January 1964.-May 197% Dr* Michelmore served longer than any other Director or Coirnnissioner-Generale He retired in May 197% at the age of 62o 8 e Sir John Rennie; Sir John Rennie, the first non- American appointed to head the UHRWAPRNE, was Deputy Commissioner-General to Dr, Michelmore since November 1968, In May-June 1971 Sir John Rennie became the sixth chief executive officer of the UNRWAPRNEc The Employees and Staff of UNRWAPRNE The UNRWAPRNE, in carrying out its present task of providing relief, and future task of enabling as many Pales tinian refugees as possible to become self-sufficient, made it a policy "to employ Palestinian refugees whenever pos sible,"^ With the enormous manpower available to it, the UNRWAPRNE had no difficulty in obtaining local staff "with the exception of a few professional and highly technical skilled persons,"12 1 % "Assistance to Palestine Refugees: Report of the Director of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East, " op, cit., p , 1*?, 12 12, "Annual Report of the Director of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East covering the period 1 July 1951 to 30 June 1952," op, cit,, p, 11, 147 Table 1, showing the IMRWAPRNE's "Manning Table Posts" from 30 June 1951=30 June 1971? reveals the extent to which the TORWAPREE is dedicated in achieving its ultimate goal, i,e.« the self-sufficiency of the Palestinian refugees. With the exception of the years 1953=1958, for which no data was available, the remaining years reveal the vast differ ence between the number of people in the local posts (which are all occupied by Palestinian refugees) and the Inter national posts (which includes both UNRWAPRNE posts and others participating United Nations Organization posts)* Cooperation and Coordination of Relief ancTlVorks Effort '' Introduction The UNRWAPRNE came at a time when the provision of relief to Palestinian refugees was undertaken by several organizations* The UNRPR, which coordinated relief efforts in the Middle East was cooperating with the ICRC, LACS, AFSC, UNICEF, WHO, UNESCO and the IRO. This is in addition to the numerous religious, charitable and humanitarian organizations which have materially,assisted in bringing . relief to the Palestinian refugees* Resolution 302 (IV), especially in paragraphs 1, 2, 3 and 4, expressed gratitude to all organizations that "con tributed in kind or in funds to the alleviation of the 148 TABLE. ra UNRWAPRNE MANNING TABLE POSTS 30 JUNE 1951-30 JUNE 1971 International Year Local Posts Posts Grand Total June 1971 14,033 127 14,160 11 1970 13,750 133 13,883 II 1969 13,088 124 13,212 II 1968 11,855 097 11,955 December 1967 12,901 n o 13,011 II 1966 11,404 112 11,516 1965 11,495 126 11,621 1! 1964 11,936 148 12,084 If 1963 11,941 180 12,121 I t 1962 11,609 180 11,789 1961 11,295 164 11,459 : I960 10,703 146 10,849 II 1959 10,092 128 10,220 IS 1958 N o Data Available II 1957 n ii It II 1956 11 11 M II 1955 11 11 II SI 1954 11 11 11 II 1953 SI it If 11 1952 6,000 140 6,140 June 1951 5,840 133 5,973 aSource: United Nations General Assembly Official Records* Annual Reports of the Director* s and Coramissioner- General1s o f th e UNRWAPRNE from 1 May 1950-30 June 1971. conditions of starvation and distress amongst the Palestine" refugeeso” The UNR WAP RITE and Other United Nations.Organizations Resolution 302 (IV) in paragraph 18 urged the UNICEF» IRO, WHO, UNESCO and FAO "to furnish assistance within the framework of the pro gramme. " The principal organizations involved with the UNRWAPENE are UNICEF, UNESCO, WHO and FAO« Other organizations that cooperated with UNRWAPRNE on a semi-regular basis are UNHQ,, TAB, ILQ, UNTAA and IBRD, 1, The World Health Organization (WHO): WHO assists the UNRWAPRNE in carrying out medical relief by pro viding technical direction, employees and grants in order to provide adequate health services for the Palestinian Refugees, 2, The United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO): UNESCO, and the UNRWAPRNE, jointly operate schools, to educate the Palestinian refugees, and vocational training centers, to enable the refugees to become self- supporting, UNESCO also supplies money, staff and materials for education and training services, 3, The United Nations International Children's Emer gency Fund (UNICEF)s UNICEF cooperates with the 150 UNRWAPME in supplying milk and other items of diet to children and eligible mothers among the refugees^ especially the undernourished ones who suffer from a serious protein deficiency in their diet. Ij.® Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO)s FAO advises the UHRWAPRNE on nutrition and directly assists in the programme. The remaining United Nations Organizations offer specialized assistance as requested by the UNRWAPRNE. The International Refugee Organization (IRO) which was dissolved in 1952 as a result of United States termination of funds, was limited -in its cooperation to two years. The United Nations Headquarters (UNHQ) enables the UNRWAPRNE to call on the specialized services available at UNHQ. The Technical Assistance Board Channels UNRWAPRNE * s request for technical assistance to the specialized agencies in the area. The International Labor Organization (ILO) assists the UNRWAPRNE in analyzing manpower requirements, training needs, place ment services and other labour problems. The United Nations Technical Assistance Administration (XJNTAA) advises the UNRWAPRNE on social welfare. The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) prepared studies for the UNRWAPRNE on economic development in areas related to the UNRWAPRNE programme. Finally, there is the United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine (UNCCP) and 151 the United Nations Truce and Supervisory Organization (UNTSO) which maintain close relations with the UNRWAPRNEe At its time, the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) 1956" 1967 was assisted in its operations by the experience of the UNR¥APRNEe The UNRWAPRNE and Other International Voluntary Organizations The number of international voluntary organizations and other non"governmental organizations that have provided assistance for the Palestinian refugees are too numerous to mention in this study. In fact, during 1 July.1970-30 June 1971 there were more than 200 such voluntary organizations from 26 countries aiding the Palestinian refugees. Suffice it to say that some of these organizations, namely the ones large enough to warrant mentioning in the annual report of the Commissioner-General of UNRWAPRNE, financed special projects and made it possible for the UNRWAPRNE "to carry out programmes which might otherwise have been allowed to lapse, Resolution 302 (IV) which expressed its gratitude to private groups and organizations in paragraph 2 , urged in 13, "Report of the Commissioner-General of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refu gees in the Near East, 1 July 1970-30 June 1971?" United Nations General Assembly Official Records, Twenty-Sixth Session, Supplement No, i3 (X/UIjTjy, p ,'"12« For the com plete list of the names of the voluntary organisations see pp, 90-95. 15a paragraph 18 such private groups and organizations "to furnish assistance within the framework of the programmes" Needless to say# the response has been more than overwhelm ing throughout the years# and in 1970-1971, over 200 such private groups and organizations assisted in material# funds or manpower to aid the UNRWAPRNE in carrying out its duties effectively. The UNRWAPRNE and the Host Governments Resolution 302 (IV) called upon the governments con cerned in paragraph 17 to accord the UNRWAPRNE "the privi leges# immunities# exemptions and facilities which have been granted to the United Nations Relief for Palestine Refugees# together with all other privileges#, immunities# exemptions and facilities necessary for the fulfillment of its func tions," • The problems of the UNRWAPRNE in its relationship with the host governments will be discussed later under the legal aspects of the work of the UNRWAPRNE, Suffice it to say that the main problem of the UNRWAPRNE is similar to the problem confronting the United Nations itself# namely the question of sovereignty,. The United Nations has no sover eignty of its own# per se, in any country. Whatever amount • . ' , •' . ■ of sovereignty the United Nations has, _or desires# that depends largely on how much sovereignty the sovereign state 153 is willing to allot it. Thus United Nations sovereignty stems from the good will of the sovereign, state. The United Nations is as sovereign as its member states would allow it . to be. Since most states desire to become sovereign in all matters within their territorial limits, it is difficult, if not impossible for the United Nations to encroach upon the sovereignty of member states without serious repercussionse The Operations of the UNRWAPRNE, . 1 971 Introduction The UNRMAPRNE had been in existence since 1 May 1950o The present mandate will expire on 30 June 1972, and the task of renewal is up to the twenty-sixth session of the General Assembly. Throughout the years, the mandate of the UNRMAPRNE has never been renewed for more than 2 years at a time. Most often, its mandate was for 12 months. Although the UNRMAPRNE will not be dissolved on 30 June 1972, as pledges for its renewal have already been made, it remains to be seen whether renewal will be for the usual 1 to 2 years or more. The present, and former Commissioner- General 1s of the UNRMAPRNE, have expressed their dissatis faction with these short mandates. They have expressed, at times, their request for a 3 year mandate, rather than the traditional 1 or 2 year mandates. 1$k When the UNRWAPRNE assumed its field duties on 1 May 1950$ there were about one million Palestinian refugees (960,021 to be precise)* By 30 June 1971$ 21 years after the "UERWAPRHE began its operations, the total number of Palestinian refugees rose to about one and a half-million (1,lj.68,l6l to be precise)*^ During these 21 years, the OTRWAPRNE has provided the Palestinian refugees with numerous types of services and works programmes* Table 2 reveals that not all registered refugees availed themselves of all services provided by.the UHRWAPRHEo However, regard ing services rendered by the OTRWAPRHE to the Palestinian refugees, they were in line with the principle of "diminish ing scale*" Although not all refugees had become self- sufficient, yet relief services had been diminishing in pro portion to other services rendered* Relief Services . The TJERWAPRNE was expected to provide relief services on a diminishing scale, until all Palestinian refugees could be removed from relief rolls* It was expected that the nations in the area would make use of works programmes to enable the Palestinian refugees to become self-sufficient*; The failure of projects and works programmes, which is measured by the continuing dispensation lit-6 Ibid., p* 67. T A B L E 2 TOTAL REGISTERED POPULATION ACCORDING TO CATEGORY OP REGISTRATION, 30 JUNE 1950-30 JUNE 19?1a ”R" Category b/ "S" Category c/ "N" Category d/ 1 2 5 4 5 6 7 8 Babies and Other members Persons eligible to Persons not eligible to Year Pull ration Half-ration children regis Total receiving no receive general receive rations or Grand Total recipients e/ recipients e/ tered for 1-2-3 rations education and services with certain 4 - 5 - 6 - 7 services h/ medical services exceptions June 1950 iJ £/ tl 960,021 960,021 g/ June 1951 826,459 51,034 2,174 879,667 24,455 904,122 £/ June 1952 805,595 58,755 .18,547 882,673. 32,738 915,411 l j June 1953 772,166 64,817 54,765 .871,748 45,013 916.761 June 1954 820,486 17,540 49,232 687,058 54,793 941,851 June 1955 828,551 17>228 60,227 905,986 63,403 969,389 June 1956 830,266 16,987 75,026 922,279 74,059 996,338 June 1957 830,6n 16,755 86,212 933,556 18,203 4,462 62,980 1 ,019,201 June 1958 636,781 16,577 110,600 963,958 19,776 . 5,901 65,713 1,053,548 June 1959 843,759 16,350 150,092 990,181 21,548 6,977 68,922 1 ,087,628 June i960 649,634 16,202 150,170 1,016,006 22,639 8,792 73,452 1,120,889 June 15-61 854,268 15,998 169,750 1,039,996 23,947 9,515 77,566 1,151,024 June 1962 862,083 15,805 176,772 1,054,660 20,004 ■ 9,027 91,069 ' , 1,174,760 June 1965 866,369 15,705 . 197,914 1,079,908 21,195 . . 10,420 98,567 1,210,170 June 1364 863,264 15,617 226,494 1,105,395 23,369 13,168 104,653 1,246,585 June 1965 859,048 15,5.46 251,151 1,125,725 . 29,387 . 18,589 . 107,122 1 ,280,823 June 1966 845,750 15,593 284,025 1,145,147 39,485 24,367 108,750 1,317,749 June 1967 • 845,790 15,528 312,649 1,173,767 .39,997 ■ 25,331 106,991 1,346,086 June 1968 824,366 14,704 316,166 1,155,236 60,219 ■ 26,900 121,939 1,364,294 June 1969 806,366 13,466 326,185 1,146,017 73,738 27,315 148,004 1,395,074 June 1970 804,576 15,602 342,009 1 ,160,187 77,735 27,238 160,059 • 1,425,219 June 1971 821,338. 9,688 352,143 1 ,183,169 . 91,442 26,683 166,867 1 ,465,161 / aThese statistics are based on the Agency’s registration records, which do not necessarily reflect the actual refugee population owing to factors such as unreported deaths, false registrations or undetected absences from the area of UNRWAPRNE operations. ^The ”R" category of registration (columns 1 to 5) covers refugees with some or all members eligible for basic rations and entitled also to receive general education, medical services and other Agency assistance. CThe "S!1 category of registration (column 6 ) includes refugees whose income is. above that of 11R” category refugees, but below that of "N" category Table 2--Total Registered Population According to Category of Registration* 30 June 1950-30 June 1971 — Continued refugees, being eligible for general education, medical services and some other UNRWAPKSE assistance, but not for basic rations, category (column 7 ) includes refugees whose income is such as to disqualify them for basic rations, general education and medical services, or who have received assistance to enable them to become self-supporting, women married to unregistered persons etc, eBefore 195^-9 half rations were issued to bedouins and babies as well as to frontier villagers in Jordan, Since then, bedouins have been regarded as eligible to receive full rations and babies have also been eligible for full rations after their first anniversary if the ration ceiling permits. Half rations are issued only to frontier villagers on the West Bank (9,688), Frontier villagers displaced to east Jordan as a result of the hostilities of June 1967 (3,379) are issues with full rations under the normal programme and are there fore included in the figure of full ration recipients (column 1), Also included in column 1 are Gaza Poor (900) and Jerusalem Poor (1,6543* f / ' • i Details not available, ®This grand total included refugees receiving relief in Israel who were UHRWAPRNE’s responsibility through 30 June 1952, ^The total of 352,143 comprises: i ) 18,254 infants under the age of one year who receive services but no rations; ii) 293,806 children (CRS) aged one year and over who are not receiving rations because of ration ceilings; and iii) 40,083 displaced children (CRS who receive rations donated by the Jordan Gov ernment on an emergency and. temporary basis, ^Source; "Report of the Commissioner-General of the United Nations ^ Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East, 1 July 1970- vn Table 2— Total Registered population According to Category of Registration, 30 June 1950-30 June 1971'— Continued 30 June 1971#11 United Nations General Assembly Official Records, Twenty-Sixth Session, Supplement HoT 13 (A/81^13j# p® 67, 158 TABLE 3 RECAPITULATION OF CHANGES IN COMPOSITION OF TOTAL REGISTERED POPULATION 1 JULY 1950-30 JUNE 1971a Nature of Changes Total 1950-1971 Additions Births 773*721; New registration 48*213 Miscellaneousb 9*771 Total 829*708 Deletions Deaths 157*601 False and duplicate registration 75*631 Miscellaneous'-’ . 89*165 To tal 322,397 Total registered population at 30 June 1971 1,468,161 aThis. table recapitulates changes affecting the total number of registered population over 21 years. Transfers within or between areas are not shown herein. In comparing the figures in this table with those in Table 2, it should be borne in mind that deletions from the ration rolls do not necessarily entail deletions from the total registered population. Persons ceasing to draw rations because of absence or self-support continue to be registered within the total population. On the other hand, some deaths and false and duplicate registrations are reported among persons registered, but not receiving rations, and this accounts for the minor differences under these headings in the 2 tables. In the earlier years of the Agency's history, the distinc tion between ration recipients and registered population was incompletely recorded. •159 TABLE 3> Continued ^Nature of changes.reported under "miscellaneous" was not specified during the census operation. Figures reflect those amendments which resulted in addition or dele tion in the total registered population, and removal of refugees in Israel from TMRWAPRNE registration records, and correction of deletions previously made by error which were included in the figures of new registration in the reports of previous years, °Source: "Report of the Commissioner-General of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refu gees in the Near East, 1 July 1970-30 June 1971»" United Nations General Assembly Official Records, Twenty-Sixth "SessTon^ Supplement No, 13 (A/dl+1'3')j'"p• 69, 160 of relief services by the UNR¥APRNES in no way reflects upon the bHRWAPRKE success in meeting its duties and obligations* Up to 30 June 1970, relief costs were greater than any other service provided by the UERWAPREfEe Since then, the UNRWAPRHE has been spending more money on education than reliefe With the belief, and hope, that the Palestinian refugees, if properly educated and trained, could, through the placement services of the UNRWAPRHE, find jobs which would remove the Palestinian refugee and his (or her) family from the rolls of relief services, thus enabling the UNRWAPRHE to provide relief on a diminishing scale while assisting the Palestinian refugees to become self- sufficient* Eligibility and Registration* The UNRWAPRNE has 5 camps, one in Lebanon, one in Syria, one in Jordan, one in the West Bank and one in Gasa* In order for a Palestinian to qualify for UHRWAPRNE1s services, he must be in need, living in an area where the UNRWAPRHE operates and registered with the UURWAPRUEc The degree of the Palestinian refugee’s need deter mines what services can be rendered to that particular person* As Table 2 shows, not all of the registered Pales tinian refugees avail themselves of all the types of services rendered by the UHRWAPRHEe 1.61 Basic Rations. Although not all of the Palestinian refugees receive full rations$, yet for those who are eli gible and do receive full rations* this is what it consists of per month per person; 10*000 grams of flour* 600 grams of pulses* 600 grams of sugar* ^00 grams of rice and 375 grams of oils and fats0 This basic ration provides the recipient with 1*500 calories per day in the summer and 1 *600 calories per day in the winter6 In the winter months* which last from Hovember-March* the flour ration is increased to bring up the 1*500 calories to 1*600 calories* In the past* the UNRWAPKNE used to distribute one piece of soap (150 grams) to each ration beneficiary« However* since March 1970* as an economy measure, tiie issue of soap was restricted to ration beneficiaries in the emergency camps of Jordan and Syria* The UNRWAPRNE also distributes 1*5 litres of kerosene to ration beneficiaries and to babies and children registered for services* in camps in east Jordan* the West Bank, Lebanon* and Syria during the 5 winter months In Gaza only one litre was allocated to each ration bene ficiary* whether or not he (or she) lived in the camps*^ Table 2 reveals the number of refugees registered for full rations * half rations and also those who receive no rations at all. ' 15. Ibid*, pp* 70* 15-16. 162 i A Supplementary Feeding, The supplementary feeding programme is specially directed towards infants, preschool and school children, pregnant and lactating women, and special medical cases. Because the basic rations contain no animal protein or fresh food, the UNRWAPRNE supplements the diet with milk, skim milk, cornflower soya milk (GSM), hot meals, vitamin A and D capsules, and canned meat. In general, the nutrition of the Palestinian refugees has been ”satisfactorily maintained."^? Camps and Shelters. 'When the UNRWAPRNE took over from the UNRPR, there were 60 tent camps in existence for housing the Palestinian refugees. Table I4., showing the numbers of established camps and total registered population from 30 June 1950-30 June 1971, reveals that while the number of established camps have been steadily decreasing, the registered number of persons living in these established camps have been steadily increasing. The 1967 war brought , about 10 more emergency camps. Table 5 shows that while the number of emergency camps have been fixed at 10, the number of persons actually living in them have been increasing. A comparison between Table Ij- and Table 2 shows that the number of Palestinian refugees living in camps makes up about one third of the total number of Palestinian refugees 16 16. Ibid., pp. 16-17. 17c Ibid., p . 16. .163 TABLE lj.a ' POPULATION OF ESTABLISHED CAMPS 30 JUNE 1950-30 JUNE 1971 Numbers of Persons Year Camp s Registered Persons Living June. 1950 60 267,598 Same June 1951 71 276,294 Same June 1952 63 281,128 Same June 1953 64 282,263 Same June 1954 59 305,630 Same June 1955 - 57 335,752 Same June 1956 58 358,681 Same June 1957 58 360,598 Same June 1958 58 396,761 Same June 1959 58 414,467 Same June 1960 : 58 421,518 Same June 1961 57 442,862 Same June 1962 57 456,400 Same June 1963 57 470,282 Same June 196I4. 54 'lj.83,463 Same June 1965 54 501,245 Same June 1966 54 517,518 Same May 1967 54 532,990 Same June 1968 54 454,232 Same June 1969 53 434,952 490,748 June 1970 53 440,259 496,973 June 1971 53 447,166 501,853 • ^Source: United Nations General Assembly Official Records* Annual Reports of the Directori'T™anS Commissioner- General1s of the UNRWAPRNE from 1 Hay 1950-30 June 1971« TABLE 5a P OP ULATI ON OP EMERGEN CY CAMP S' 30 JUNE 1968-30 JUNE 1971 Number of Number of Persons Year Camps Actually Living *30 (A) Jordan June 1968 6 78,400 June 1969 6 90,900 June 1970 : 6 103,678 June 1971 6 103,223 (B) Syria June 1968 4 7,746 June 1969 4 9,041 June 1970 4 15,491 June 1971 4 15,148 Total (A and B) June 1968 10 86,146 June 1969 10 99,941 June 1970 10 119,169 June 1971 10 118,371 aSource; "Report of the Commissioner-General of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refu gees in the Near East, 1 July 1967=30 June 1968,” United Nations General Assembly Official Records, Twenty-Third Session, Supplement 1Io7 i3 ”“Ta7T2T31, p« "Report of the Commissioner-General of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East, 1 July 1968- 30 June 1969," United Nations General Assembly Official Records, Twenty-FourRi™S^8T6irr^i#RT3ment No, 1I|. (A/761ij.}s p® 71 $ "Report of the Commissioner-General of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East, 1 July 1969=30 June 1970," United Nations General Assembly Official Records, Twenty-Fifth Session^ *SuppIeEenFTro7l3 TZ7BlJTJ77™ppT™75 ” 7 6 j "Report of the Com missioner-General of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East, 1 July 1970- 30 June 1971 $> " United Nations General Assembly Official 16£ TABLE 5, Continued Records, Twenty-*Sixth Session, Supplement Mo. 13, (A/81|_13), P * 7^T" registered with the WRWAPRNB. The majority of established camps exist in Jordan/ with Lebanon second, Syria third, and Gaza last. In Jordan, the majority of established camps are located in the West Bank, where there are 20 established camps, as opposed to ij: in East Jordan. However, East Jordan has 108,277 people living in I4. established camps, while the West Bank has 70,38? people living in 20 established camp a.1® Although most Palestinian refugees do not live in established camps, yet the economic status of those who live in the villages and cities "differs little from that of 19 refugees in camps." 7 Those living outside the established camps, however, are eligible for the same range of services except that the UHRWAFRNE does not provide sanitation services for them. Throughout the years, the UNRWAPRNE has replaced tents with shelters and better living facilities. However, those who still live in tents, are in a "deplorable condi tion. 181920 18. Ibid., p. 7I/ 19. "Report of the Commissioner-General of the United nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refu gees in the Hear East, 1 July 1967-30 June 1968," op. cit., p. 62. 20. ''Report of the Commissioner-General of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refu gees in the Near East, 1 July 1970-30 June 1971$n op. cit., p » 19. ■ 16? Special Hardship Cases Clothing. Every year the UNRWAPRNE receives dona tions of used clothing to meet the needs of the Palestinian refugees. The amounts vary from 1$00.0-1 $14.00 tons of cloth ing, and annually it costs the UNRWAPRNE over $30,000 to pay for the transportation of these clothings from abroad. Case-Work Programme. Special assistance is given by the UNRWAPRNE to the most needy Palestinian refugees. Due to budgetary limitations only a few hundred have been assisted. Amongst those assisted were blind, deaf, crippled and destitute people, widows with minor children, aged people and T.B. cases. Assistance was usually given in the form of small cash grants, clothing, kerosene and blankets. Health Services ,The UNRWAPRNE*s health programme, comprising of pre ventive, curative and environmental sanitation services, has been maintained "at a level comparable with the provisions made by the Governments of the Arab host countries for their own populations."23 However, unlike the host countries, the UNRWAPRNE has buttressed its programme to protect the health 21. Ibid., pp. 19 22. Ibid., p. 20. o r* 23. Ibid., A 168 of children* nursing mothers and medical cases from serious malnutrition* The TjffifRWAPBNE* in carrying out its health programme* is provided with technical assistance and supervision by the WHOo The local ministries of Health have also been coopera tive with the UHRWAPREEo The UNRWAPRNE has been able to prevent serious epidemics and the spread of communicable diseases in the refugee camps* For example* in 1971, when the Middle East was suffering from a cholera epidemic, the UNRWAPRNE was "largely successful" in controlling the spread of the disease*^ The success of the UNRWAPRNE1s health programme can be attributed to its efficient curative and preventive medical services* Curative and Preventive Medical Services Health Centers, Hsopitals and Laboratories. The UNRWAPRNE operates several health centers and hospitals for medical consultations, infections, dressings, eye treat ments, laboratory examinations, dental services, and dis pensing of medicine* Table 6 puts the numbers of institutions providing services to the Palestinian refugees-~as of 30 June 1971 at all.* Ibid*, p* 22. 169 TABLE 6 IN-PATIENT MEDICAL CARE AS AT 30 JUNE 1971 A 0 Hospitals Providing Services to Palestine Refugees Administering Body Number of Institutions Government and local authorities Voluntary societies or private UNRWAPRNE I In addition, there are nine maternity centres; one in Syria, two in West Bank and six in Gaza, B, Hospital Beds by Type of Service and Field Number of Beds Available East West All Type of Service Jordan Bank Gaza Lebanon Syria Fields General medical and surgical 221 222 348 166 79 1,036 Tuberculosis 23 0 84 32 20 159 Maternity 25 33 87 9 7 161 Pediatrics lj.0 f 55 60 22 0 177 Mental 21 75 0 57 2 155 All services 330 385 579 286 108 1,688 Co Rehydration/nutrition Centers East West All Jordan Bank Gaza Lebanon Syria Fields Number of centers 9b 1 6 3b 3 22 Number of cots 84 10 98 30 21 243 aThese are; Kalkilya Hospital, West Bank; the pediatric ward in UNRWAPRNE Swedish Health Center, Gaza, and the Bureij Tuberculosis Hospital in Gaza, operated jointly with Government Public Health Authority. 170 TABLE 6* Continued ^Three centers in east Jordan and one in Lebanon were out of operation for part or all of the year because of circumstances beyond the Agency's control. Two new centers came into operation in east Jordan early in 1971= ^Source: "Report of the Commissioner-General of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refu gees in the Near East, 1 July '1970-30 June 1971," United Nations General Assembly Official Records, Twenty-6ixth Session, Supplement No, 13 (A/Blf-13), j><> 76° 171 75$ 3 of which are administered by the UNRWAPRNEo The numbers of beds available is put at 1$688<, Table 7 records the number of patient visits accord ing to services rendered from 1 July 1970-30 June 1.971# .-to Palestinian refugees at all UNRWAPRNE points and its subsi dized clinics. During that year 1970-1971 the UNRWAPRNB handled £$429#133 visits. Control of Communicable Diseases. The UERWAPRNB maintains adequate surveillance of diseases reported and carries out large mass immunization programmes to curb the spread of infectious disease. Table 8 shows the type of infectious diseases reported among Palestinian refugees during the period 1 July 1970-30 June 1971. Maternal and Child Health. The TJNRWAPRNB has 8l maternal and child health clinics to provide antenatal, natal and postpartum care for mothers and health supervisory services for children up to 2 years of a g e , ^ Statistical data on the operations of the maternal and child health services are shown in Table 9« Health Education. The UNRWAPRNE provides the Pales tinian refugees with a comprehensive health education pro gramme. Emphasis is put on educating mothers in maternal 25 25. Ibid., pp. 24-25 TABLE 7a OUT-PATIENT MEDICAL AND DENTAL CARE 1 JULY 1970-30 JUNE 1971 Number of visits (first and re-visits combined) East West All Type of Service Jordan Bank Gaza Lebanon Syria Fields Medical consultation 504,307 251,471 529,014 410,482 370,279 2,065,553 Injection 363,344 189,026 525,440 230,339 181,851 1,490,000 Dressing and/or skin treatment 228,477 162,865 337,446 190,926 96,691 1,016,405 Eye treatment 153,916 130,796 357,858 90,580 34,164 767,314 Dental treatment 13,823 13,713 21,973 30,545 9,807 89,861 / All types 1,263,867 747,871 1,771,731 952,872 692,792 5,429,133 aSources Report of the Commissioner-General of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East, 1 July 1970- 30 June 19719" United Nations General Assembly Official Records, Twenty-Sixth Session, Supplement No. T3 (A/b^l3)9 p* 75® ' ■ TABLE 8a INFECTIOUS DISEASES REPORTED AMONG- PALESTINE REFUGEE POPULATION 1 JULY 1970-30 JUNE 1971 Number of Cases East West All Reportable Diseases Jordan Bank Gaza Lebanon Syria Fields Cholera 3 45 109 7 13 177 Ankylostomiasis 0 0 32 2 0 34 Bilharziasis 0 0 16 3 0 19 Chiokenpox 1,1^5 572 649 1,604 546 4,516 Conjunctivitis 6,990 .2,240 3,832 1,757 5,706 20,525 Diphtheria 1 0 0 1 0 2 Diarrhoea! Diseases (0-3 years) 16,398 8,671 14,378 14,418 13,708. 67,573 Dysentery 1,753 229 616 • 445 321 3,364 Enteric group fevers 0 0 29 2 86 117 Gonorrhoea 6 0 „ 4 6 7 23 Infectious Hepatitis 127 51 612 78 143 1,011 Influenza 1,163 75 103 928 1,398 3,667 Leishmaniasis cutaneous 0 1 0 0 5 6 Malaria 0 0 2 0 1 3 Measles 862 98 661 1,005 150 2,776 Meningitis (cerebrospinal) 0 0 0 3 2 5 Mumps 1,403 573 237 754 644 3,611 Pertussis 88 4 43 70 8 213 Poliomyelitis 6 1 18 6 3 34 Syphilis 0 0 26 12 10 48 Tetanus 0 0 1 0 0 1 Tetanus neonatorum 0 0 11 1 0 12 173 TABLE 8s Continued Trachoma 221 57 209 22 327 836 Tuberculosis (pulmonary) l|i> 17 88 100 3 254- *30 &Source: "Report of the Commissioner-General of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Hear East, 1 July 1970- 30 June 1971 >11 United Nations General Assembly Official Records* Twenty-Sixth Session, Sup pi ementNoT'" 13 (A/8I4.13Ts>" P®” 77» * TABLE 9a MATERNAL AND CHILD HEALTH* 1 JULY 1970-30 JUNE 1971 East West Jordan Bank Gaza Lebanon Syria Total A e Antenatal Services Number of antenatal clinics 11 24 9 18 19 81 Pregnant women newly registered 7,221 4,384 10,482 3,997 2,721 28,838 Average monthly attendance 1,622 1,333 3,202 1,110 802 8,369 Serological Tests 1,122 1,123 6,271 668 948 10,132 ' Tests Positive 0 0 20 7 8 32 Home Visits 1,277 0 ' 139 294 327 2,367 B. Infant. Health Care Number of infant health clinics 11 23 9 18 19 80 Infants 0-1 year registered (average) 6,274 3,269 8,896 3,942 2,670 22,324 Number attended (monthly average) 4s391 3,033 8,076 3,083 2,088 20,671 Infants 1-2 years registered (average) 6,064 3,288 8,438 4,113 3,077 22,280 Number attended (bi-monthly average) 4*0f>0 2,671 3,642 2,472 1,917 14,722 Infants 2-3 years registered (average) 3,333 2,896 1,646 643 1,996 10,514 Number attended (tri-monthly average) 1,309 2,066 473 297 1,100 2,242 TABLE 9j> Continued Smallpox Vaccinations 3,262 1,931 6,337 3,232 2,438 17,200 TAB Immunizations (full) 1,595 3,295 6,736 2, 608 2,431 16,665 DPT Immunizations (full) lj-,4-09 3,737 8,247 . 3,823 3,149 23,365 BCG Vaccinations 5,202 3,423 6,752 3,665 3,268 22,310 Polio Vaccinations 5,153 3,643 8,233' 3,357 2,795 23,181 Home Visits 7,613 10,542 8,718 13,472 9,567 49,912 School Health Services Number of health teams 2 1 1b 1 1 6 School entrants examined 7,518 3,547 6,742 3,963 3,442 25,212 Other pupils examined 4,822 9,695 0 1,040 27,408 42,965 Follow-up examinations 2,214 524 0 1,144 5,099 8,981 Teachers and Attendants examined 1,439 539 224 165 924 3,291 School inspections 427 517 1,008 93 329 2,374 TAB boosters 651 6,125 30,851 0 11,110 48,737 Diphtheria or diphtheria/ tetanus boosters 8,763 4,464 6,678 4,243 4,491 28,639 DPT Immunizations "(full) 0 0 0 0 328 328 Smallpox revaccinations 0 6,995 0 1,606 12,462 21,063 BCG vaccinations 5,866 1,493 7,746 2,771 17,876 Cholera vaccinations 42,850 17,620 69,833 27,103 32,204 189,610 ^Source: "Report of the Commissioner-General of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East, 1 July 1970- 30 June 1971$” United Nations General Assembly Official Records* Twenty-Sixth Session, Supplement No* 13 (a/8I{.13) » pp» ^-79, bpost of School Medical Officer was vacant because of the shortage of 176 Medical Officer’s in Gaz0 177 and child clinics and children in schools for the protection of health, Nursing Services, Nurses play an important role in the preventive and curative health programmes. They have considerable responsibility in maternal and child health clinics, layette distribution, home visiting, supervision of infant feeding, certification of expectant women and nursing mothers for supplementing ration distribution purposes, school health, health education, individual and mass immuni zation, T,B, and V.D, control, etc, , , ,^7 of 30 June 1971 there were 168 graduate nurses and 290 auxiliary nurses. Besides the nurses, there were 59 traditional mid wives (dayahs), Due to the shortage of qualified nurses, the TJNRWAPENE had to recruit a number of nurses from other nationals. Nutrition, Nutrition surveys are made to care for, amongst others, the underweight and undernourished infants under 2 years of age, i,e,, the most vulnerable group of the population. During past surveys there was evidence of goiter in school children and anemia in pregnant mothers and oft preschool children,2827 26 26, Ibid,, p, 27, . 27, Ibid,, p, 28. 28, Ibid,, p» 28, 178 Environmental Sanitation* The purpose of the UNRWAPRNB in here is to provide adequate sanitation to pre vent the outbreak of serious epidemicsv In doing so.,. the UNRWAPREE provides the refugee camps with safe water supply, disposal of wastes, water drainage, control of insect and roden vectors, provision of public baths and slaughter houses, Medical Education and Training, , The "DHRMAPRRE is financing several students in various fields of medicine to meet the acute shortages in staff. As of 30 June 1971, there were 312 Palestinian refugee students on UNRWAPRNE university scholarships in health sciences. Of these 312 in medicine, 20 were in dentistry, I4.8 in pharmacy, 5> in veterinary medicine, and 1 in public health,^0 Education and Training Services The UHRWAPHME has been providing the Palestinian refugees with elementary and. preparatory education since. 1951® The UHRWAPRHE also provides technical training in. its vocational training centers. The UNRWAPRHE does not provide the Palestinian refugees with secondary and university edu cation, although limited scholarships have been made avail able in both levels,* 30 29« Ibid,, pp. 28-29, _ _ 30, Ibid,, p, 29, 179 Unlike the relief services* which mainly use dona tions in kind, education largely depends on cash donations. However, despite the WRWAFBZE1s mounting financial diffi culties, the education and training programme has functioned reasonably well,^ In 1970 the UHRWAPRNE began a gradual change from relief services to educational and training services. Such a change is evident in the financial accounts of the UNRWAPRHE, which show that for the first time since 1950$ educational costs have exceeded relief costs. This new change, which is aimed at educating and training the Pales tinian refugees, mainly the youth, achieves, in part, the goals of the UNRWAPRHE, An educated or skilled Palestinian refugee stands a better chance in securing a job than an uneducated or unskilled one. In an area that is desperately short of educated and skilled labor, the UERWAPRRE's place ment office should have little difficulty in finding jobs for its graduates. Once the educated and skilled Palestin ian refugee secures a job, he (or she) becomes self- sufficient and is removed from the rolls of the UNRWAPRHE, In addition to the removal of the self-sufficient Palestin ian refugee, the UNRWAPRHE could remove his (or her) family and/or relatives from relief rolls, either from full ration to half ration, or to no rations at all with options for 31« Ibid,, pp, 30-42, 180 health and education servicese Either way, a Palestinian refugee has been made self-sufficient and possibly a whole family could be removed from the UHRWAPPJTE * s already heavy burden of caring for these refugees. This method will not remove all refugees from relief rolls, but it could be a new chapter in decreasing relief and increased self- sufficiency for the Palestinian refugees within the unsolved turbulent Arab-Israeli conflict. The WRWAPRHE, in cooperation with the UMESCO, la currently operating ^97 schools to educate 176, ?2ij. children in the elementary and preparatory school level. The six training centers currently have 2,440 students. In addition there are 872 university students on OTRWAPRNE scholarships. Table 10, which contains statistics for the.number of students enrolled at the UNRWAPRNE schools from 1951-1971 reveals that there has been a steady increase in enrollment. Table 11 contains the statistics of students in TJURWAPRETE, government and private schools as of 1971= Since the UHRWAPRNE does not provide secondary education, the students have to seek it elsewhere, if they can afford it. Table 12, which has statistics for the vocational and training pro gramme, shows the variety of training areas available. In January 1971, the UERWABRNE began with UNESCO a world-wide appeal for "Educational Aid_for the Palestine TABLE 10 UNKWAPRNE-UNESCO SCHOOLSs NUMBER OF ELEMENTARY AND PREPARATORY PUPILS, 30 JUNE 1951-30 JUNE 1971 . Field . 1951 1952 1953 . 1954 .1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 i960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 19715/ Jordan Elementary 16,3^5 15,882 30,118 39,188. 42,144 43,649 42,431 4i,6oo 39,519 38,223 38,309 41,000 45,531 50,220 55,713 60,802 65,849 45,593 53,357 60,5)4 62,488 Preparatory 67 790 1,612 2,662 4,274 5,357 6,714 6,898 7,437 8,)84 8,492 8,868 9,625 11,113 12,838 9,043 10,939 13,830 15,367 Secondary - - 22 82 200 3)4 495 578 612 598 875 - ---- " b/ - b/ " b/ ’ Total 16,3^5 15,802 30,205 40,000 43,836 46,711 47,0)9 47,452 46,811 45,733 46,344 50,259 54,023 59,088 65,336 71,915 78,687 54,636 64,296 "*74,164 77,855 Vest Bank Elementary - - - -- 18,957 20,4ll 21,735 22,540 preparatory ------‘ - - 4,587 5,532 6,386 6,822 Total 23,544 25,993 28,119 29,362 ■ Elementary 19,543 22,551 25,702 31,107 34,016 35,087 34,876 25,164 34,806 36,633 36,591 37,885 38,470 38,905 4l,l64 1.0,757 41,362 35,395 38,351 41,051 43,085 . Preparatory 61 164 675 1,781 3,339 4,937 6,4io 7 > 9 5 8,244 8,481 9,84l 10,641 12,797 13,627 15,0)2 15,61a 16,710 12,358 15,251 16,372 16,956 Total 19,604 22,715 26,377 32,888 37,355 40,024 41,286 42,658 43,050 45,114 46,432 48,526 51,267 52,532 56,196 56,401 58,072 47,753 53,602 57,42) 60,04i Lebanon Elementary 4,564 6,291 9,332 1.1,695 12,567 12,983 13,155 13,936 14,881 15,422 16,292 17,124 17,411 l8,04l 19,856 19,547 20,744 21,312 22,426 23,791 25,587 Preparatory - - 86 384 620 948 1,003 996 1,325 1,668 ' 2,159 2,676 2,680 3,491 3,710 3,648 3,451 5,168 6,046 6,267 7,186 Total 4,564 6,291 9,4l8 12,079 13,187 13,931 14,158 14,932 16,206 17,090 18,451 19,800 20,091 21,532 23,546 23,195 24,195 26,480 28,472 30,058 32,773 Syrian Arab Republic Elementary 2,599 2,695 5,410 8,758 9,700 10,288 11,042 11,332 12,256 13,354 13,685 14,430 15,618 16,463 17,631 18,720 19,564 21,088 21,702 23,024 Preparatory -- 166 864 671 9)6 1,180 1,562 1,916 2,592 3,589 4,122 4,459 4,946 5,204 5,740 6,449 7,471 7,912 8,748 2,599 2,895 5,576 9,622 10,371. 11,224 12,222 12,894 14,172 15,946 17,274 18,552 20,077 21,409 22,915 24,46o 26,013 27,178 28,559 29,614 31,772 Grand total Elementary 43,051 47,619 70,562 90,748 98,427 102,007 101,504 102,031 101,462 103,632 104,877 110,4)9 117,0)0 123,629 1)4,344 139,826 147,519 l4l,454 155,633 168,611 176,724 Preparatory 61 164 1,014 3,819 6,242 9,68) 12,867 15,410 18,199 19,639 23,026 25,823 28,428 30,932 33,649 36,145 59,448 38,137 45,289 50,767 55,079 Secondary .22 82 200 3)4 495 578 612 598, 875 - - - - - ' - • - ■ - Total 43,112 47,783 71,576 94,589. 104,751 111,890 114,705 117,9)6 120,239 123,883.128,501 137,137 145,458 154,561 167,993 175,971 186,967 179,591 200,922 219,378 231,803 aIncluding a total of 95,4.01 non-eligible children attending UNRWAPRNE- UNESCO schools. Non-eligible may refer either to non-eligible refugee children- or to non-refugees. In Jordan, non-refugee children in Agency schools are offset by reducing the subsidies payable to the Government in respect of refugee pupils attending government schools. The Government of Syria and the Authorities in Gaza partially offset the cost by providing teachers. In Lebanon, non-eligible refugees pay school fees. 191 TABLE 10, Continued ^East; Jordan only, cSource: "Report of the Commissioner-General of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East, 1 July 1970-30 June 197% " United Nations General Assembly Official Records, Twenty-Sixth Session, Supp 1 emen't"' NoV T3 (A/8l{il3)," p7 80, ' ’ ’ ’ r—~~~ i Z9L TABLE 11 DISTRIBUTION OF REFUGEE PUPILS RECEIVING EDUCATION, AS, OF 31 MAY 1971 Number of Number of Number of Refugee Pupils in pupils in Pupils in Government Number Elementary Preparatory and Private Schools Total Number of Classes at Classes at of Refugee UNRWAPRNE UNRWAPRNE- UNRWAPRNE- Pupils UNESCO UNESCO UNESCO Government Private Receiving- Field Schools Schools Schools Schools Schools East Jordan 153 62,488 15,367 15,8.90 1,435 95,180 West Bank 8.6 22,540 6,822 17,656 2,107 49,125 Gaza ■ 108 43,085 16,956 7,447 67,488 Lebanon 61 25,587 7,186 1,187 6,370 40,330 Syrian Arab Republic 89 23,024 8,748 12,142 347 44,261 i TOTAL 497 176,724 55,079 54,322 10,259 296,384 ; aSources "Report of the Commissioner~General of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East, 1 July 1970^ 30 June 1971,” United Nations General Assembly Official Records, Twenty-Sixth Session, Supplement No, 13 (A/8k.13)s P® #3* 184 TABLE 12 UMRWAPRNE-UNESCO VOGATIONAL AND TECHNICAL EDUCATION PROGRAMME, 1970-1971 SCHOOL YEAR Grand Total Metal Trades Fitter Machinist « ® «, 0 = e = e o 130 Instrument Mechanic 0 = = * * e «, 32 General Mechanic »eeee..eo.e © © 160 Diesel Plant Site Mechanic « „ „ „ © © 107 AutO Mechanic eeooeeoeee Ij+O Refrigeration and Air-conditioning Panel Beater and Paint Sprayer » © . f t Sheetmetal Worker eoe.ee.e 16 Blacksmith/Welder „ © © © © © © © 128 W e 1 d er©,,©,©©. oe,eeo« 24 Moulder ©©©©©©©©o © © © © 12 Electrical Trades Electrician (industrial) © © © © © © © © 194 Radio TV Mechanic ©©©©©©©© » © © 105 Auto Electrician © © © .© © © © © © Building Trades Builder/Shutterer © © , 112 Plasterer/tile Setter < 16 Plumber ©©©©©©©< Carp en ter / Wb odraa chi ni s t 156 plumber/Sheetmetal © © < 32 Technicians a Land Surveyor © © © © © © © © e 48 Quantity Surveyor. © © » © © © e Construction Technician © © © © © e | Architectural Draughtsman © 108 Telecommunication Technician 21 Engineering Draughtsman © © e © 48 185 TABLE 12, Continued Grand To tal Commercial& ^ Business and Office Practice (men) '• 0 •««»«. « 203 Secretaries (women) 00oooo<,ooeo<,eoo lOij. Para-Medical Assistant Pharmacist c c .■*.*.«> o o e. o » . « 0 0 60 Laboratory Technician51 » » » <, <> <> » <> « » « » o -> ij.0 Vocational Courses for Girls "(Other than CommercTaT) Home and I n s t i t u t i o n a l Management®- „ I n fa n t L eader8- 0 » » o e » , * „ * «, * D ressm aking © © © © © © © © © © © © © Clothing Production © © © . © © © © « H a ir d r e ssin g © © © © © © © © © -© © © © 2,1)40 ^Indicates post secondary-level courses© All other courses are post preparatory© Present totals Men, 2,090; Women, 350© ^Sources "Report of the Commissioner-General of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refu gees in the Near East, 1 July 1970-30 June 1971," United Nations General Assembly Official Records, Twenty-Sixth Session, Supplement No. 13 (A/8413), P© 84-. 186 refugee s cAmbassador Man sour Khali d of the Sudan was appointed as special representative to raise funds from various capitals in the Middle East, North Africa, Europe, North America and the Far East» In addition to the elementary and preparatory edu cation, the vocational training centers and the university scholarship programme, the UNRWAPRNE has other beneficial programmes for other age groups in the refugee camps such as; 1„ Youth Activities Programme. T h e UNRWAPRNE has 29 Youth Activity Centers to train, in cooperation with the YMGA, young refugee men in leadership and com munity servicese 2, Preschool Children's Activities, ^ The UNRWAPRNE, in cooperation with voluntary agencies, has 26 centers to serve children 3-6 years of age* The children are provided with a hot meal and milk to ensure well, nourishment. In 1971 there were 3,800 . children enrolled in these supervised educational centers. 32. Ibid,, p. 30 33. Ibid,, P • 35 34. Ibid, 3e Women' s Activities, T h e UNRWAPRNB has 13 centers to help young women in a variety of cultural and social activities, e,g.* literacy classes,. remod elling of secondhand clothing, cooking with UWRWAPKEB rations and others. ko Teacher Trainings T h e IMRWAPRWB operates centers to train teachers to teach at all levels of the UHRWAPRNE’s educational institutionse 5o University Scholarships»37 The UNRWAPRNE is pres ently financing 872 Palestinian refugees in various fields of study. The majority of the students are . in medicine and. engineering, 6, Adult Training Courses,3® The UHRWAPRWE provides training to adults who lack the academic qualifica tions for admission to vocational centers. About 2,000 adults were trained during 1970-1971* 7* Training of the Handicapped, 39 The TJHRWAPREB, through education and training, enables the blind, deaf and crippled to become self-supporting and 35? Ibid,, pp, 35-560 36, Ibid,,. PPo. 36=39. 37* Ibid,, pp. 39-4.0. CO Ibid,, p, 42. 39. . Ibid. 188 integrated in the community. Many of the handi capped are children. 8. Combating Idleness. ^ The problem, of idlenesg in a refugee camp is a fact which is distressing and unavoidable. The UMRWAPRNE has encouraged the refu gees to find means of occupying themselves in groups or individually in order to improve their lot. Such programmes included community development such as self-help projects; individual assistance for skilled people to open up a workshop; sewing and embroidery for women and activity centers for idle refugee youth. 9« individual Assistance.^1 The UNRWAPKNE has helped several persons resume their old trade skills, such as carpenters, barbers and bicycle repairers, to resume their occupations by small loans and materials in order to become self-sufficient. 10.. Migration. j n June 1951 the UNRWAPRIiE set up an experimental migration policy. Under this plan, the l)-0. "Annual Report of the Director of the United Rations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Rear East, 1 July 1958-30 June 1959," op. clt., pp, 17=18. VI. Ibid. 1},2. "Annual Report of the Director of the. United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East covering.the period 1 July 1951 to 30 June 1952," op. cit., p . 38. 189 IJHRWAPRNE would provide $400 per adult and $200 per child to refugees who lacked the funds to travele This policy was suspended by the UHRWAPENE in accordance with the host government wishes, but was resumed in later years. 11. Placement Services. T h e TJNRWAPRNE*s Placement Service has succeeded in finding employment in Arab states for a large percentage of its trainees from the Vocational training centers. The oil companies have recruited several people through the UERWAPRME placement services. This is, perhaps, the single most important task of the future goals of the OTRWAPKHEc With an increased emphasis on education and training services, the number of graduates could ultimately increase to the extent where relief costs and numbers on relief rolls will invariably decrease to a satisfactory level. The Middle East is in dire need of educated, skilled and semi-skilled labor. Self-Support Activities The UNRWAPRNE was established to carry out the recommendations of the IMESM, which called for an agency 43e "Report of the Commissioner-General of the United Rations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refu gees in the Near East, 1 July 1964-30 June 1965$” United Nations General Assembly Official Records, Twentieth Session, Supplement No. 13 “(AT^O”fJJ7~P^ T3T" 190 that would provide relief on a diminishing scale and assist the Palestinian refugeesg through works projects, to become self-supporting. Until the Palestinian refugees become self-supporting, the UNRWAPRUB was expected to provide relief services. The DHESM, realizing the political and economic con ditions of the area, warned that the area was not ready for large scale projects. Instead, the UNESM suggested pilot demonstration"projects which could pave the way for large scale, projects. Even so, the pilot demonstration projects were not expected to create major breakthroughs, Mr, Gordon Clapp, Chairman of the UNESM, realized the inseparability of both political and economic factors in solving the Palestine refugee problem. The UNRWAPRUE, armed with the final report of the UNESM as a guide line, began its efforts to prepare the refugees for works projects. From the start, the UNRWAPRNE ■ was unable to fulfill the goals set to it. The reasons for this were: 1, Both the Palestinian refugees and the Arab states looked with suspicion on these works programmes, for fear that they might prejudice the rights of the Palestinian refugees under Resolution 19li- (III), paragraph 11. It was not until the Arab League approved of cooperation, provided the rights of the 191 Palestinian refugees under paragraph 11 are affirmed, that the TJNRWAPRNE began to win some con fidence in the Palestinian refugee population* 2 e The area designated for development programmes was not conducive to a satisfactory fulfillment of the objectives set by the TMESM, ea gc, Gaza was over crowded and lacked any natural resources; Lebanon was limited in area; Jordan, which had the bulk of the Palestinian refugees, lacked the necessary funds and technical skill; Egypt was not expected to take in any Palestinian refugees; Israel, which had about 25,000 Palestinian refugees in 1950, used the Pales tinian refugees to solve its manpower shortage prob lem and Syria had limited projects designed for the Palestinian refugees. In November 1951, the Director, and Advisory Com mission, of the UNRWAPRNE recommended to the General Assembly a plan that would cost $250 million dollars over a period of 3 years. The plan, which was to begin on 1 July 195l, called for $50 million dollars for relief and $200 million dollars for reintegration. By 1954-, It was expected that the Palestinian refugees would be reintegrated into the economic life of the area without losing the rights to. com pensation and/or repatriation under paragraph 11 of *1 ^ 2 Resolution 191|- (III) In January 19^2 the General Assembly -unanimously recorded its approval in Resolution 513 (Vi)? which called for $2^0 million dollars over a 3 year period,^ The URRWAPRME began its reintegration programme by winning the confidence of the Palestinian refugees, Efext came"the negotiations with governments over prospects in their areas. The URRMAPRNE negotiated with Lebanon# Egypt# Jordan# Syria# Iraq and Libya, Lebanon# which endorsed the programme# did not feel that there were opportunities for Palestinian refugees to become self-supporting within the boundaries of the country. As such# no programmes were initiated in Lebanon# and UNRWAPRNE vocational center graduates had to be placed in jobs outside Lebanon,^ Egypt authorized soil and water surveys in the Sinai desert to benefit.the Gaza refugees# but at a cost of over 44, “Assistance to Palestine Refugees: Special Report of the Director and Advisory Commission of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East#" United Nations General Assembly Official Records# Sixth Session# "SuppiemenirTSo, 15A"TA7lW572ddT™ 1)# pp. 1-6. 4S>e "Annual Report of the Director of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees, in the Near East covering the period 1 July 195>1 to 30 June 1952#" op..cit,# pp. 6-7. 46, Ibid.# p, 8. : 193 $100$000 that yielded no adequate return* As such, Gaza was confined to projects like vocational centers*^? Jordan, which had the majority of the Palestinian refugees, cooperated fully in establishing new programmes within its borders* • Libya and Iraq welcomed Palestinian refugees with skills, and the UNRWAPRNE took care of their migration*^"® Syria, which expressed interest in bettering the lives of the Palestinian refugees within its borders, asked for $30 million dollars*^ Of all the countries consulted, only Jordan and Syria agreed to enter into programmes that would enable the Palestinian refugees to become self-supporting* Lebanon and Gaza were to be used as large centers to train them in specialized skills* Iraq and Libya (as well as other Arab countries) were open markets for skilled Palestinian refu gees* Thus, of all the countries concerned, only Jordan had the best offer, as it had about half the number of Pales tinian refugees* Syria would not take in any more Pales tinian refugees, although its land could absorb all of the k-7o Ibid*, pp* 8-9* 1&8, Ibid*, p* 9* 49e “Annual Report of the Director of the United Rations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Rear East covering the period 1 July 1952 to 30 June 1953#" United Nations General Assembly Official Records, Eighth Session, Supplement No. 12 "pp. 10-11. - 1 % Palestinian refugees0 Due to political and economic insta bility j, Syria had failed as a source for future Palestinian refugee integration* By 1954 it was clear that the progress of the reha bilitation programme had been "negligible*The two major areas, Jordan and Syria, showed little progress* However, the expenditures in Syria were far less than those in Jordan* In fact, Jordan became the sole project for reha bilitation with more than million dollars earmarked for water projects such as the Yarauck-Jordan Valley and the development of the Bank of Jordan* Despite the dim pros pects, the DHRWAPRNE was instructed to continue its self- support programmes beyond 1954® By 1958 the large scale integration programmes have been abandoned* Henceforth, emphasis was placed on vocational training centers, but the acute financial crisis that faced the UNRWAPRNE in 1957, to the present day, has made it difficult to initiate large scale training centers * By 1958 the total amount spent under the self-support programme was $lj-5,069,520 million dollars over a period of 7 years*^ The-number of ration 50. "Annual Report of the Director of the Halted .Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East covering the period 1 July 1953 to 30 June 195J+, " Uni ted Nations General Assembly Official Records, Ninth sFi¥ron7^upinrement™fo*r~T7^AT^? 17~J7*^™"3 * ’ 51 * "Annual Report of the Director of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East covering the period 1 July 1957 to 30 June 195 reductions were 23$797 (in the permanent holders) and 1i|.0,279 (in the temporary holders) during those same yearse^2 By the end of the programme, the causes of the fail ure were given ass 1, The absence of a solution to the Palestine problem along the lines of General Assembly resolutions regarding repatriation and compensation, 2 C The meagerness of the physical resources made avail able for development, 3, The attitude of the Palestinian refugees and? in some cases, of the governments of the area. The strong'desire of the refugees to return to their homelands has not diminished and its strength should not be underestimated. Resistance to self-support programmes on a large scale by the Palestinian refu gees is evidently clear, for fear that it may carry serious political implications. Political objec tions to small-scale projects are less in degree. Both the host governments and the Palestinian 19^8," United Rations General Assembly Official Records, ThirteerrEh Session, SuppT^ehT%oTnir°%%73?3TT^'ppT?T^23, 5>2 , “Annual Report of the Director of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East covering the period 1 July 1936 to 30 June 1957$” United Nations General Assembly Official Records, Twelfth Session, SupplemenT^oT^1^™lA/3^9FJ7™pp7^2p296 " 196 refugees, despite assurances to the contrary, fear that large-scale projects might prejudice the rights to compensation and/or repatriations^ Emergency Operations Gaza: 29 October March 1957s The Israeli invasion of Egypt on 29 October 1956 was the first major emergency that confronted the TMR¥APRNE« As a result of that invasion, the Gaza Strip, and parts of the Sinai Desert were occupied by Israeli forces from 29 October 1956~ij. March 1957# when the UNEP arrived in the area. The UNRWAPRNE, confronted with its first emergency operation, decided to remain in the Gaza Strip and take care of over 213,000 refugees whose lives "depended upon UNRWA's fortnightly distribution of rations and other services, The UNRWAPRNE did not believe that the occupying Israeli forces could assume responsibility for the refugees. Despite 53c "Annual Report of the Director of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East covering the period 1 July 1954 to 30 June 1955*" United Nations General Assembly Official Records, Tenth S e s s T o n T ^ S ^ p T ^ 51(-o "Special Report of the Director of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East covering the period 1 November 1956 to mid- December 1956," United Nations General Assembly Official Records, Eleventh Sess^on7^^plemeirfc~No7~T^A™TX732T27 Add, 1T, p, 1, 197 the difficulties caused by the Israeli military presence, the UNRWAPRNE decided to carry on its works'^ The problems that confronted the OTRWAPENE were tre mendous For example, supply lines from Port Said and El Arish were immobilized, and emergency supplies were trans ported at a higher cost by air and land from Lebanon, Later, Haifa was used as a port for serving the Gaza area and the Israeli authorities, like the Egyptian authorities before them, assumed the cost of transporting the goods to Gaza,^ The Israeli authorities, in violation of the convention on Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations, expelled several employees of the UNRWAPENE as "enemy nationals," The UNRWAPRHE protested, but in vain* The results were that a serious problem in the UNRWAPKNE1s manning staff occurred by expelling and/or detaining employees of the UNRWAPREE® The curfews did not help either, especially when the refu gees were in dire need of rations and medical services,-'^ Schools were closed from November-December 1956 and very few students returned after their reopening. Another main 57*56 55= Ibid* 56, "Annual Report of the Director of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine. Refugees in the Hear East covering the period 1 July 1956 to 30 June 1957," op. oit., pp, 7-8, 57. "Special Report of the Director of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East covering the period 1 November 1956 to mid- December 1956," op* cit,, pp* 1-5* 198 problem was the declaration by Israel that only the.Israeli pound is legal tender in the strip# and the Israelis offered a lower exchange rate for the Egyptian pound Perhaps the most distressing effects were the mili tary casualties suffered by the people in the Gaza Stripe The UHRWAPRNE reported that about 275 civilians were killed in Khan Tunis# 111 in Rafah and 66 in other areas of the StripThen there was the Kafr Qasim massacre, a brutal massacre on the part of Israele On 29 October 1958 coincidental with Israel’s inva sion of the Sinai Peninsula, the Israelis imposed a daily curfew on all Arab villages in Sinai from 5s00 p«,me to 6:00 a6me Kafr Qasim was one of the Arab villages in Sinai. The Mayor of the village, who was notified at 1{.:1|.5 p»m. of the curfew, informed the Israeli, army that a number of villagers who were working in the fields had not yet returned, and that they were unaware of the curfew* The Israelis replied that they would take care of them. After 5:00 p 6m,, villagers, of whom 1lj. were women and children began their return to their village, Kafr Qasim, On the way, the Israeli soldiers, under orders from Lieutenant Joubrail Dahan, fired and machine gunned to death all of the ij-3 villagers, Lt, Dahan, who gave the orders and 5958 58. Ibid,, p. 2, 59. Ibid,, pp, 3-l|., 19? took part in shooting the 43 villagers* was released.from prison by.an Israeli military court and appointed by the Israeli army as officer responsible for Arab Affairs in the Arab city of Ramleho^® The total number of Palestinians killed by Israeli soldiers, from the invasion to Ij. March 1957s when Israel pulled out its forces, is difficult to determine. However, from what has been recorded at least 1|.95 civilians were killed in the Gaza Strip, Other estii- 61 mates put it much higher than that. The emergency operations in Gaza cost the UNRWAPRNE $lf.7l|.,8l 1, The UNRVAPESE .presented a claim for $309,658 to Israel, for losses incurred.as a result of Israeli military occupation. Pending settlement of this claim, all of the . additional expenses and losses have had to be met out of the UNRWAPRNE8 s working capital,60 6261 60, Manchester Guardian, 19 December 1968; Fred J„ Khouri, The Arab™IsraeTT'TETeiEa (New York: Syracuse Uni versity PressT^T^EBTT"P® 2T^7™Kehne11 Love, Suez: The Twice Fought War (New York; McGraw Hill, 1969),. pT%TST°%rfred~MT Lilienthal, The Other Side of the Coin (New York: Devin- Adair, 1965)7^715557— ~ — . 61, Love, op, cit, 62, "Annual Report of the Director of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East covering the period 1 July 1956 to 30 June 1957?11 QPo cit,, p, 8, 200 The emergency operations in the Gaza Strip had no direct affect on the OTRWAPRHB8s work in Jordan* Lebanon and Syria during the period in question,, Lebanon; 195>8, ^ The civil war in Lebanon* which erupted after 10 May 1958* was a serious problem for the operations of the UNRWAPRNEo Unlike Gaza* the crisis in Lebanon had serious repercussions on the UNR¥APRNE,s activi ties in Syria and Jordane Beirut was the headquarters for the OTRWAPR1E* and the centre of the distribution of supplies to Syria and Jordane Thus* the UNRWAPREE had to face the immediate task of caring for 100*000 refugees in Lebanon and insuring the flow of supplies to Jordan and Syria, The problems facing the UNRWAPRNE were rather dim* Following the outbreak of the civil war* a general strike closed the port of Beirut» All road traffic from Beirut to Syria and Jordan was stopped. The Syrian-Jordanian border was closed. As such* supplies could not be unloaded from the port in Beirut* and if they could* how would they reach areas in Lebanon* let alone Syria and Jordan? 63s “Special Report of the Director of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East covering the period 1 November 1956 to mid- December 1956*" op, cit.* pp. 4-5. 64* "Annual Report of the Director of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East covering the period 1 July 1957 to 30 June 1958*" op. cit.* pp. 6-7. 201 To meet its task locally$, the UNRWAPRNE used array escorts to transport supplies in Lebanon, Tripoli$, which was cut off by road, was supplied by the sea. Although local water was.cut off, the UNRWAPRNE tankers maintained regular supplies of water to camps. To meet its task in Syria and Jordan, the UNRWAPRNE had to divert ships to Latakia (to supply Syria and Jordan), to Aqaba (to supply Jordan) and to Port Said (to supply Jordan), The UNRWAPRNE in Lebanon, as in Gaza, carried on its operations under adverse conditions. However, the costs incurred in Lebanon, which were much more less than those incurred in Gaza, were estimated at $100,000, The UNRWAPRNE carried on its activities without any serious delay, and the second emergency operation added greater importance to the already established position of the UNRWAPRNE, In times of emergency there was no one to care for the Palestinian refugees but the UNRWAPRNE, The UNRWAPRNE could not depend on the local governments to provide immediate relief to the . Palestinian refugees. As such, the UNRWAPRNE became a fact of life for the Palestinian refugees, an indispensable agency for the maintenance of the Palestinian refugees in normal times and especially, in times of emergency. The Six Day Wan 19^7, The Six Day War, and its aftermath, posed a greater problem to the Palestinian 202 refugees than it did to the UDTRWAPKMEe According to Dre Michelmore, the Commissioner-General^ "Ho factual and neces sarily brief account can, however, portray the overwhelming sense of bewilderment and shock felt by the inhabitants of the areas affected by the hostilities as the cataclysm swept over them.For the second time in a lifetime, the Pales tinians have been rendered homeless. The areas directly affected by the outbreak of hos tilities were the Gaza Strip and the Western Bank. Lebanon, East Jordan and Syria remained essentially the same, though East Jordan became over populated with the new plight of over 200,000 persons. The UHRWAPRHE, after successfully dealing with two emergency.operatipns in the past, was able to swiftly resume its services to the Palestinian refugees. In addition, the UHRWAPRHE regulated the tremendous amount of aid that poured in from various countries to aid the victims of the con flict. In 1948 the UHRPR was created especially to coordi nate, relief effort, but the UHRWAPRHE, already established for 17 years in the area, resumed normal operations almost immediately after the outbreak of hostilities. 65. "Report of the Commissioner-General of the United Rations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refu gees in the Hear East, 1 July 1966-30 June 1967," United Rations General Assembly Official Records,- Twenty-Second Session, SuppImenFTIoTN3^T&/W13T7*pT^. 203 On 1lj. June 196?, the UNRWAPRNE and Israel, in an exchange of letters,agreed to let the UERWAPRHB.continue its services to Palestinian refugees in the Gaza Strip and the West Banke The immediate problems facing the DNRWAPRNE were supply lines and the movement of its staffe In addition to the already existing Palestinian refugees, about 350,000 more persons were rendered homeless and became in need of the UNRWAPRUE services0 As in 1956, when the Suez Canal was closed, the UNRWAPRHE diverted its ships to ports in Israel, The UNRWAPRHE also arranged to ship supplies stored in Port. Said to Gaza, ^ The UHRWAPRHE suffered over $800,000 damages as a result of the war, but generous contributions helped pay for the emergency costs of meeting the newly created situation and temporarily eased the financial difficulties of the UNRWAPRWEc IXJTRWAPRNE• s greatest problem was helping the human tragedy of the problem. As mentioned earlier, about 350,000 Palestinians became refugees for a second time. This time, however, it was established that not all were expelled or had left willingly. Some left willingly, others were expelled, but the majority of them were prevented from returning back to their former places of residence. In 66, Ibid,, pp. 99-100 6?V Ibid,, PP» 10-11, : - 20k fact, Israel had destroyed several villages in part, and others in total, to prevent any hopes of return and limit the numbers of those who want to return,^ The most serious problem that arose was the problem of the return of the 350,000 Palestinian refugees» When those Palestinian refugees fled from the West Bank to East Jordan, many established camps in the West Bank were left empty and East Jordan, with no place to house these newly created Palestinian refugees, was faced with a dilemma. On Ij. July 1967, the General Assembly passed reso lution 2252 (ES-V) calling upon Israel to facilitate the return of those who were displaced after the outbreak of hostilities to their former places of r e s i d e n c e , On 10 July Israel issued rules and regulations concerning the return of those persons,7^ Israel had first established 10 August 1967 as a deadline for receiving applications, but this was later extended to 31 August 1967, The rules stipu lated that only those persons whose former residence was the West Bank and had proof thereof, and left between 4 June and 68, Ibid, 69, "Report of the Commissioner-General of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refu gees in the Near East, 1 July 1967-30 June 1968," op, cit,, p. 1, 70, "Report of the Commissioner-General of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refu gees in the Near East, 1 July 1966-30 June 1967," op, cit,, pp, 10-14. 205 5 July 1967 could apply, along with several other necessary . documents requested,, Israel, however, reserved the right to deny admission to persons who were “security risks." Despite the limited time, the lengthy requirements and the reserved clause, the UNRWAPRNE, in cooperation with Jordan and Red Cross officials, submitted ^0,000 applications covering 150,000 persons. Israel said that it had only received 32,000 applications covering 100,000 persons. Prom the 32,000 applications covering 100,000 persons, Israel considered 5*122 applications covering 18,236 persons. By August 31, 1967, only lij.,150 people were allowed to return. Israel, continuing its policy of discouraging Palestinians from returning, was very selective in who was to return. The UNRWAPRNE noticed that of those permitted to return, very few were from Jerusalem and 'UHRWAPRM'E camp inhabitants. In some cases, a son, a daughter, or both, were prevented from returning thus leaving the parents with the difficult choice of “either leaving a son or daughter behind or of losing their opportunity to return.“7^ The DNRWAPRNE, faced with the task of caring for old and new refugees, established 10 emergency camps. As Table 5 shows, 6 were in Jordan and 4 were in Syria. The number of refugees registered in the emergency camp in Jordan was 78,l|-00 by June 1968, while Syria had 7^746, a total of - 71 - Ibid., p. 13= V 206 86,1 ij.6 refugeese Of the rest of the refugees, some,were able to find refuge with friends and relatives, some remained in the open air and others were housed in govern ment and public buildings* According to the UBRWAPRHE the ’’intolerably crowded conditions, with totally inadequate cooking and sanitation facilities, under which these unfor tunate. people were living, posed a serious health hazard, not only for the refugees themselves, but also for the sur rounding communities*”^ Once again, and for the third time, the UHRWAPRHE proved itself an indispensable agency that was ready and competent to deal with the normal and emergency needs of the Palestinian refugees. Post 196?, Post 196? UHRWAPRNE saw the rise of a new element in the Middle East situation, namely the Pales tine Commando (Pedayeen) Movement, in addition to the turbu lent Arab-Israeli War, which continued until the 1970 cease fire* Prior to the ’’Rogers Cease Fire," there were almost daily Israeli raids, bombing and shelling of Jordan, which hampered the free movements of the MRWAPRHE* In Lebanon there were minor incidents, such as the 1968 invasion on Beirut International Airport and the April hostilities between Lebanon and some Pedayeen organizations* However, the most serious problem that faced the UNRWA?RNE. was in 72* Ibid*, p* 12* I 207 Jordan, where from 1969 on, there was mounting tension between the Government and the Fedayeeno The climax was reached in September 1970, when open war erupted in Amman for 10 days# during which the WRWAPRNE suspended its opera tion. During those 10 days some refugee camps were shelled and Palestinian refugees killed. The UNRWAPRNB itself suffered 13 dead during the Civil War iri Jordan. The tragedy was again repeated in 1971? again# at a greater loss to both sides'# but mostly# to the UNRWAPRNE and the Pales tinian refugees. Financial Operations When the United Nations General Assembly established the UNRWAPRNE in 1949# it made no provisions for a steady source of income for it. The belief then was that in a few years the UNRWAPRNE would have enabled the Palestinian refugees to become self-sufficient# thus terminating inter national assistance. Throughout the years the UNRWAPRNE has been financed through voluntary contributions from governments and non governmental sources. Like its mandate# the voluntary con tributions were given either annually or biannually# depend ing on the tenure of the mandate. Thus# in the absence of a stable guaranteed source of income, the UNRWAPRNE had been placed in a delicate financial situation since its estab lishment. 208 Table 13# which contains statistics for income# expenditure and working capital for the UURWAPRNE from 1 May 19i>0~30 June 1971# reveals the following pertinent facts: 1 $ The income column shows a very high irregularity* with.figures stretching from $23#2^9#354 in 1953“ 1954 to $68*705#280 in 1951-1952* The $68*705*280 , for 1951-1952 marked the beginning of the program towards self-assistance* and the following years* which showed a decline in contributions * also sig nify the failure of the self-assistance programme and the large reserves accumulated since 1952* 2 e The expenditure column* being more regular than the income column* shows a relatively more steady increase in expenditures* With the exception of 1956-1957 (probably due to the Suez War of 1956) < expenditures have been rising steadily over income and resulting in an annual deficit* In fact* had it not been for the single bulk contribution of 1951- 1952# the UHRWAPENE would have never made it to 1972* 3« The reserves of the UNRWAPRME have been constantly declining due to the increased,expenditures and: decreased income = Like expenditures* reserves fol low a more regular pattern in a steady decrease* In 1969 the Commission-General wrote that "there is.at TABLE 13 SUMMARY STATEMENT OF INCOME, EXPENDITURE AND WORKING CAPITAL 1 MAY 1950-31 DECEMBER 1971a ■ Adjustments Balance of To Working Working. Capital® Capital Total Increases (Operating Income Expenditure (decreases) Reserve) 1 May 1950 to 30 June 1951 14.0,823,606 33,598,972° 7,224,634 1 July 1951 to 30 June 1952 68,705*280 28,573,058 215,792 47,572,648 1 July 1952 to 30 June 1953 27,308,092 26,778,934 518,220 4.8,620,026 1 July 1953 to 30 June 1954 23,259,354 29,192,012 (157,264) 42,530,104 1 July 1954 to 30 June 1955 24,267,661 29,222,705 (114,217) 37,460,843 1 July 1955 to 30 June 1950 23,956,892 32,198,550 (164,814) 29,054,371 1 July 1956 to 31 December 1957 43,451,645 52,464,139 1-96,575 20,240,452 1 January to 31 December 1958 33,660,669 32,777,564 36,519 21,160,076 1 January to 31 December 1959 34,030,605 35,015,817 110,688 20,285,552 1 January to 31 December 1960 36,458,022 34,674,460 150,084 22,219,198 1 January to 31 December 1961 36,692,345 39,051,521 194,943 20,054,965 1 January to 31 December 1962 35,655,014 35,688,844 615,154 20,636,289 1 January to 31 December 1963 35,696,057 36,207,078 448,589 20,573,857 1 January to 31 December 196ij. 35,161,731 37,192,861 (922,665) 17,620,062 1 January to 31 December 1965 35,134,878 37,618,472 155,708 15,292,176 1 January to 31 December 1966 36,328,051 37,498,420 152,209 14,274*016 1 January to 31 December 1967 43,069,129 40,540,693 (115,529) 16,686,923 1 January to 31 December 1968 41,108,171 43,987,105 (156,048) 13,651,941 1 January to 31 December 1969 42,300,749 46,161,048 681,949 10,473,591 209 TABLE 13 SUMMARY STATEMENT OP INCOME* EXPENDITURE 'AND WORKING CAPITAL, Continued 1 January to 31 December 1970 43,071,425 47,937,938 27,590 , 5,634,668 1 January to 31 December 1971 (estimated) 46,150,000 48,559,000 — 3,225,668 ' 786,289,376 784,939,191 1,875,483 ' : ' aThe figures in this table are based on the Agency9 s audited accounts through 1970, modified to reflect, for each period, the income and expenditure (including commitments) applicable to the budget for that period, regardless of when the income was actually received or the expenditure actually incurred. This basis of reporting was first adopted in the Commissioner-General11 s report for 1961-1962 and a few minor changes have since had to be made in the figures con tained in that report (see Official Records of the General Assembly, Seventeenth Session, Supplement No. ^bh "* b These adjustments represent principally the liquidation in subsequent years of liabilities and commitments at less than amounts originally charged to expenditure account. Also included are adjustments arising from revaluation of inventory, recovery of assets previously, charged to expenditure, and price varia tions on supplies not chargeable to a particular budget heading. These adjust ments are shown separately because of the difficulty in identifying the specific prior year to which the adjustments pertain. The adjustments made in the period 1 January to 31 December 1964 and 1 January to 31 December 196? also include trans fers of $1,761,792 and $460,854, respectively, to bring up the.provisions for deferred staff costs to the level required by the Agency’s revised social security arrangements. The adjustments made in the period 1 January to 31 December 1968 include a transfer to the Agency8 s reserve for unliquidated commitments of $431,664 reflecting a commitment in 1968 for capital construction financed by funds included in the income of the preceding financial year. The adjustments made in the period 1 January to 31 December 1969 include a transfer of accumulated 210 net exchange differences on provident fund liabilities. TABLE 13 SUMMARY STATEMENT OP INCOME, EXPENDITURE AND WORKING CAPITAL, Continued , cincludes $2,646,909 deficit of United Nations Relief for Palestine Refugees paid by UNRWAPRNE. dSource; "Report of the Commissioner-General of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East,. 1 July 1970-30 June 1971," United Nations General Assembly Official Records, Twenty-Sixth Session, Supp 1 3), P ® 567”” ~ ' eShown in United States dollarsa 212 the time of writing no assurance that 1970 will not ■witness a major crisis in the Agency1 s • affairs, In 1971 the UHRWAPRNE. was left with $3$225# 668 in reserves* the lowest in its entire yearse Prom 1950"1970„ relief costs have taken a major share of the UNRWAPRNE1s income6 However* since 1970$ there has been a change of emphasis from relief to education. With the hope and belief that more Palestinian refu gees could become self-sufficient with added education, the TJNRWAPRNE increased its expenditures in education and train ing services while decreasing its relief costs, e,g, from 31 December 1963-30 December 1970$ relief costs increased from $17,223,000 to $19,252,000, Educational costs, how ever, rose from $1^,075,000 to $21,7.63,000, Health costs and common costs have not increased drastically, but relief costs have definitely been reduced since 1969, when relief costs were $21,134,000, Table 14, which contains a detailed statement of income to the TJNRWAPRNE from 1 May 1950-31 December 1971$ 73o "Report of the Commissioner-General df the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refu gees in the Near East, . 1 July 1968-30 June 1969," United Nations General Assembly Official Records, Twenty-FourtE SdssTonTtBuppIe^ 213 TABLE 1l|. DETAILED STATEMENT OP INCOME TO THE UNRWAPRNE 1 MAY 1950-31 DECEMBER 1971a Contributor Total lo lo Contributions by Governments Abu Dhabi 190*927 Argentina 127*000 Australia 4,552,837 Austria 136,300 Bahrein 33,867 Belgium 768*717 Bolivia 5.000 Brazil 25*000 Burma 9,546 Cambodia (now known as The Khmer Republic) 7,141 Canada 26,918*996 Central African Republic 2,198 Ceylon 12,800 Chile 3.000 China 153,279 Congo (Democratic Republic of) 20,000 Cuba 5.000 Cyprus 3,962 Denmark 4,106*259 Dominican Republic 6.000 Dubai 20,000 El Salvador 500 Ethiopia 35,500 Federal Republic of Germany 16,058*422 Finland 495*500 France 17,989,169 Gambia 30 Gaza authorities 1,600*425 Ghana 42.000 Greece 352.017 Haiti 6,000 Honduras 2,500 Holy See 86,965 Iceland 31 * 939 India 412*532 Indonesia 250,268 Iran 115.017 Iraq \ 602.000 Ireland 398,876 TABLE 11j. DETAILED STATEMENT OP INCOME TO THE UNRWAPRNE— Continued Contributor Total Israel 3*555*002 Italy 2,278,152 Jamaica 7,370 Japan 1,322,500 Jordan 2,529,105 Kuwait 2 ,542,860 Lao s 4,687 Lebanon 932,745 Liberia 49.500 Libyan Arab Republic 81*4,000 Luxembourg 53,000 Malawi 280 Malaysia 46,738 Malta 5.000 Mexico 135,691 Monaco 7,433 Morocco 365,236 Netherlands 1,743,184 New Zealand 2 ,648,600 Niger 4,920 Nigeria 45,600 Norway 1,921,441 Oman 10.000 Pakistan 698,755 Panama . - 500 Philippines 23.500 Qatar 148,728 Republic of Korea 1 1 ,5 0 0 Republic of Viet-Nam 33.000 Rhodesia and Nyasaland 39,200 Romania 16,667 Saudi Arabia 3,999,081 Sierra Leone 13,666 Singapore 5.000 Spain 2,412,002 Sudan 157,364 Sweden 15,675,532 Switzerland 4,005,331 Syrian Arab Republic 1,886,944 Thailand 10,925 Trinidad and Tobago 5,500 Tunisia 45,ooo Turkey 135,759 United Arab Republic 5,475,976 215 TABLE 14 DETAILED STATEMENT OF INCOME TO THE DNRWAPRNE- Contlnued Contributor Total United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland 118,728,004 United States ,of America 501,348,592 Uruguay 5,ooo Yugoslavia 648,700 Sundry Governments through World Refugee Year Stamp Plan 238,211 Total Government Contributions 752,378,970 lie Contributions by Intergovernmental Organizations United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organizations 4,267,302 World Food Programme 1,250,000 World Health Organization 1,092,752 European Economic Community 227,000 7,137,054 III. Contributions from Non--Governmental Sources 14,061,892 IV. Miscellaneous Income and Exchange Adjustments 12,711,460 TOTAL INCOME 786,289,376 aThe figures in this table through 1970 s-re based upon the Agency’s audited financial statements^ modified to show for each year the Governments’ contributions applicable to that years. regardless of when payment was actually made0 ^ ’’Report of , the Commissioner-General of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East* 1 July 1970-30 June 1971?" United Nations General Assembly Official Records, Twenty-Sixth Session,HSuppTement No. 13*™TI7B4f3 ),"ppTT7^F9, cShown in United. States dollars, 216 reveals some interesting factss 1e Of the total income received, §786»289p376, the UeSeAe paid more than two-thirds of it, $501#348,592 to be exacto 2o The highest four paying states are the U«S»Ae ($501,348,592), Britain ($118,728,004), Canada ($26,918,996) and France ($17,989,169)« Their total, $664,984,761, accounts for more than 85 percent of the total amount* The lowest four paying countries are Gambia ($30), Malawi ($280), El Salvador ($500) and Honduras ($500)* Their total, $1,310, accounts for less than 1/2028 of 1 percent* 3<. Canada has contributed more than all of the Arab states put together* 4° The USSR and Albania, for example, have not paid anything towards financing the UNRWAPRNE* 5® Bolivia, Brazil, Burma, Cambodia, Central African Republic, Congo, Cuba, Dominican Republic, El Salva dor, Ethiopia, Gambia, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Laos, Malawi, Malta, Mexico, Rhodesia and Nyasaland, Thailand# Egypt and Uruguay have stopped their con tributions to the mmWAPRHE, 6* Of all the Arab states concerned, Egypt, with a total of $5,475,976 is the largest single contribu tor while Tunis, with a total of $45,000 is less than all of the other Arab states * 21? Consultation with the UN COP . Resolution 302 (IV) in paragraph 20 directs the UNRWAPRNE to consult with the UNCOP "in the best interests of their respective tasks, with particular reference to paragraph 11 of General Assembly Resolution 1914- (III) of 11 December 1 11 - In accordance with the instructions of the General Assembly, the UNRWAPRNE has continued, in general, to con sult with the UNCOP throughout the years. In particular, the UNRWAPRNE and the UNOCP have cooperated closely with regard to the release of blocked Palestinian Arab refugee bank accounts in Israel.?^ Status of the Palestinian Refugees fr”t5e°TTo3'T~C o un t r Tes The status of the Palestinian refugees in the host countries differs from one host country to another. As their rights and obligations depend on the country they are living in, it is only appropriate to examine each country separately. 7h® "Annual Report of the Director of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East covering the period 1 July 1954 to 30 June 1955," op. cit., p« 8 ; "Annual Report of the Director of the United.Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refu gees in the Near East, 1 July 1958-30 June 1959,11 op. cit., p . 8. 2 1 8 Lebanon The Palestinian refugees are regarded as being in Lebanon on sufferance? and not as of right/ As such$ they are not granted residence visas nor are they allowed to become citizens. Due to the precarious balance between Muslims and Christians in Lebanon, the Palestinian refugees,, who are predominantly Muslim, would upset the balance between the two religious groups. As such, only selected Palestinians have been enabled to acquire citizenship. The Palestinian refugees have no political rights or military obligations. They are treated as foreigners in Lebanon, but unlike most foreigners they are "subject to certain other restrictions."?^ 1. Since Lebanon does not agree to the settlement of Palestinian refugees on its territory, or to the entry of more Palestinians as refugees, it has been very difficult for the Palestinian refugees to acquire property in Lebanon.?” 75>* "Annual Report of the Director of the United Nations Relief' and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near . East covering the period 1 July 19^1 to 30 June 1952," op. cit., p . 45. 76. Ibid 219 2. In order to discourage the Palestinian refugees from remaining in Lebanon, the government has. made it difficult for them to obtain work permits,, 3» Palestinian refugees over the age of 1f> must hold identity cards or they may be deported to the coun try of refuge from which they had. come 78 k* Palestinian refugees are restricted in their move ments inside Lebanon In general, the status of the Palestinians in Lebanon has been good* However, that of the Palestinian refugee, has been far from good. It must be understood that Lebanon is a small country with limited resources. If the Palestinian refugees are discouraged from remaining in Lebanon, it is only due to internal political and economic . factors, rather than prejudice against the Palestinian refu~ Syria . * The government of Syria created on 25 January 19i{.9 ) a Palestine Arab Refugee Institution to "manage the affairs of the refugees, including, interalia, the census of refu gees, registration of births, deaths, marriages, divorces*, 77- Ibid., pp. 45-46. 78. Ibid., p. 46. 79- Ibid. 220 transfers and registration of moveable and immoveable prop erties owned by Palestinians in Palestine. Palestinians residing in Syria enjoy all civil rights which are normally enjoyed by Syrians. They are not discriminated against nor are they discouraged from living, working and meeting freely in Syria as any other Syrian or Arab national. The status of the Palestinian refugees in Syria is far better than in Lebanon, and the fact that an Institution was created to govern the Palestinian refugees, reflects the flexibility of the Syrian government towards the Palestinian refugees.®** Jordan Palestinians, whether refugees or otherwise, are regarded as Jordanian citizens and have equal access to all ? rights, duties and obligations as Jordanian citizens. 8 Gaza Up to 1967, Palestine mandatory laws have remained in effect, but new regulations have, from time to time, been issued by the Administration. Prior to 6 June 1967$ Gaza was governed by an Egyptian military governor. Following CD O Ibid. 81. Ibid., pp. 46-1^7. 82. Ibid., p. 47. 221 the June 1967 War, Gaza, like the West Bank and Palestinian refugees in Israel, have come under Israeli military rule»®3 Israel and the Occupied Territories Prior to 6 June 1967, those Palestinians who remained in Israel, whether refugees or not, were not treated as equals in Israel. Rather, they were second class citizens subject to severe restrictions and were governed by military laws. Their movements were subject to a permission from the military ruler of the area, and life was pretty much regulated and confined to restricted areas.84- Today, as in 1967# the areas occupied by Israel are administered by the government of Israel and have been sub jected to military rules and regulations, as were their counterparts in Israel proper. "Inhabitants of these areas were subject also to the psychological stress of living under an occupying authority and to restrictions of move ment, curfews and the anxieties inseparable from military 89 security measures." ^ Perhaps the most serious aspects of living under an occupying power is the wanton demolition by 83. Ibid. 84* Sabri Jiryis, The Arabs in Israel (Lebanon: Institute for Palestine Studies, 'T97tTn'~Alfre5 M. Lilienthal, What Price Israel (Chicago: Henry Regnery, 1953). 85. "Report of the Commissioner-General of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refu gees in the Near East, 1 July 1967-30 ■ June 1968," op. eita, P. 1. — 222 Israel of shelters housing refugees, whether they were built from the UNRWAPRNE funds or funds raised by the refugees themselves. Large scale demolition took place in Gaza and Jerusalem contrary to the Fourth Geneva Convention and con tinued OTRWAPREE protests,In several cases, little time was given for the occupants to remove their belongings, thus resulting in greater misery and suffering for the.Palestin ian refugees. According to the present Commissioner- General, the “demolition by the Israeli authorities of shelters and other structures in the occupied territories, particularly in Gaza^ by way of deterrent or punitive action, continues to be a matter of serious concern,"^7 Despite protests by the WRWAPREE, the Israelis "have not agreed to stop the practice of demolishing shelters, Legal Aspects of the Work of the UNRWAPRNE The UNRWAPRNE is a public international organization that is a subsidiary organ of the United Nations General 86, "Report of the Commissioner-General of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refu gees in the Near East, 1 July 1969-30 June 1970," United Nations General Assembly Official Records, Twenty-FifW™ Session, Supplement WoTl3™lA78^T3T, ppT"l|..3"45» 87, "Report of the Commissioner-General of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refu gees in the Near East, 1 July 1970-30 June 1971s" op, cit,, p » ii-5« - .88, Ibid, ' 223 Assembly» As such* the convention, on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations is applicable in the case of the UNRWAPRNEo When the UNRWAPRNB began its operations on 1 May . 195>0, several problems of a legal character arising out of the legal status of the UNRWAPRNB arose between the UNRWAPRNB and the host countries* The problems that arose, however, have been detrimental to the UNRWAPRNB1s programme and the principal sufferers were the Palestinian refugees,,®^ The difficulties that arose prompted the United Nations General Assembly to remedy the situation. On 28 February 1957 the General Assembly ruled in Its resolution 1018 ■'(XI)'that the host governments ’’wish to cooperate fully" with the UNRWAPRNB in accordance with the terms of the convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations, On 12 December 1958 the General Assembly passed Resolution 1315 (XIII) reaffirming that the UNRWAPRNB "is a subsidiary organ of the United Nations,Despite the 89o "Annual Report of the Director of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East covering the period 1 July 1953 to 30 June 1954," op, cit., p, 33* 90, "Annual Report of the Director of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency.for Palestine Refugees in the Near East covering the period 1 July 1958 to 30 June 1957," op, cit., p, 8 . 91= "Annual Report of the Director of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East, 1 July 1958-30 June 1959," op, cit, 9 p, 33, 22k heeds of the General Assembly and the acknowledgements by the host governments of such rights and privileges, problems continued to exist between the OTRWAPRNE and the host gov ernments . Legal Matters The primary problems that arose throughout the years between the I3HRWAPRHE and the host governments centered on the legal status of the .TJNRWAP-RNE. While the status of the TJNRWAPRNE has been accepted at times, minor officials, and the host governments themselves, do not realize fully what acceptance of those rights and privileges entails. As such, several problems arose regarding matters as: 1«, Matters of non-commercial nature arising out of the application or non-application of the United Nations Convention on Privileges and Immunities, e«g», immunity from jurisdiction; exemption from excise and income taxes; 20 Claims against governments arising out of failure to refund excise and other taxes, e.g,, excess rail charges; 3, Matters of a strictly legal nature arising out of commercial contractual relationships with other 92 parties. 92. "Annual Report of the Director of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency, for Palestine Refugees , in 225 Throughout the years* the UNRWAPRME has said that its relations with the host governments were '’satisfactory," but "there remains a residue of problems which continue to handicap and burden the work, of the Agency*In its appeal to the host governments* the UNRWAPRNB has referred to a basic principle expressed by committee IV (2) at San Francisco: If there is one certain principle it is that no member state may hinder in any way the working of the organization or take any measures the effect of which might be to increase its burdens* finan cial o r other „ “m- . The host governments* and especially Israel as the occupying power of the Gaza Strip and the West Bank* still burden the work of the UNRWAPRNE, which has led to claims filed by the UNRWAPRNE against each of the host countries, Claims Against Governments Throughout its history* the UNRWAPRNE filed several claims against the host governments. The claims can be the Near East covering the period 1 July 1952 to 30 June 1953," op. oit,, pp, 25-27* 93« "Annual Report of the Director of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East* 1 July 1.958-30 June 1959*" op. cit., p e 33, 94» "Report of the Commissioner-General of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refu gees in the Near East* 1 July 1966-30 June 1967*" op, cit.* p» 92* 226 divided into two separate categories; peacetime claims and wartime claims« peacetime Claimse Peacetime claims have been filed against the host governments for refunds on excise taxes, income taxes* excess rail charges, municipal taxes, parking fees for UHRWAPRNE aircraft, customs duties, and others. As of 20 June 1971, the following claims were out standing;^ 1. Lebanon; 59^,000 Lebanese pounds pertaining to the reimbursement of taxes in the Lebanon. 2. Syria; A claim for 272,577 Syrian pounds and another claim for damages to a vocational centre for 2,767 Syrian pounds are still outstanding. 3<> Jordan; While several claims, remain outstanding, and several claims have not been completed yet, a preliminary claim for loss and damages in Jordan (during and after the 1970 Civil War) for $551}.,843®06 was filed. 4® Egypt; Two claims are still outstanding. One for $80,637.07, and another for 40,401,854 Egyptian pounds. 95® "Report of the Commissioner-General of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refu gees in: the Near East, 1 July 1970-30 June. 1971 $ " op. cit., pp. 47-48. 227 Jj>e Israel i The UNRWAPRNE has filed claims against Israel for compensation due to the demolition activ ities by Israel in Gaza and the Western Banke Ho response has been received yet* 6* Excess rail charges against Lebanon? Jordan and Syria: This claim, for $1*5 million dollars, is still outstanding. Wartime Claims. 1« 1956s The war damages suffered by the UNRWA?RHE in 1956 under the hands of the Israelis resulted in three claims for $376,il-i-3. The 1956 claim was finally settled in 1968.96 2. 1967: The June 1967 war led to a full investigation by the UNRWAPRNE on the war damage incurred. By 31 August 1968 the UNRWAPRNE. formulated the following claims. 97 a. $708,6l0.1jL3 against Israel alone. b. $83,286.64 against Israel and Jordan. Both countries were charged for half the amount each. — — — ■ 96. ’’Report of the Commissioner-General of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refu gees in the Near East, 1 July 1967-30 June 1968," op. cit., P» 93. . — 97. "Report of the Commissioner-General of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refu gees in the Near East, 1 J u ly 1968-30 June 1969," op . c i t . , p. 43. 228 Co $12*14.9803d against Israel and Egypte Both coun tries were to pay the amount on a fifty-fifty basis. There has been no indication whether these amounts have been paid or not, or what progress has been done either way. However, as of 31 December 1970 the total amount of claims comes to $3,8^8,022. Of this amount only $717#4^7 has not been filed, while $3,11}.0,555 were filed, with some of the governments. Of the $717,467 that were not filed, $409,550 were not disputed, and the remaining $307,917 are under examination.^® 98. "United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near Easts Accounts for the year ended 31 December 1970 and Report of the Board of Auditors,” United Nations General Assembly Official Records, Twenty- Sixth Session, Supplement No. 70 (A/84$7/A CONCLUSION The Intended Role of the UNRWAPRNE The intended role of the UNRWAPRNE, as set by the UNESMj, can be summarized in the following terms: 1«, The temporary task of providing subsistence^ medical care, shelter and education for the refugees. 2c The continuing long-term task which aims at assisting the refugees to become self- supporting. 1 The UNESM, which recommended the establishment of a UNRWAPRNE, expected the UNRWAPRNE to carry out relief on a diminishing scale and "inaugurate a works programme in which able-bodied refugees could become self-supporting. The UNESM expected the Palestine refugee problem to be solved within eighteen months. It also expressed, however, its pessimism regarding the realization of the intended role. Mr. Clapp, the Chairman of the UNESM, warned that the 1. "Annual Report of the Director of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East, 1 July 1958-30 June 1959,” United Nations General Assembly Official Records, FourteenTb. SessTon7~Sup- pTemenT^oT^nnvL^213Tr^T^rr~~™ 2. "Assistance to Palestine Refugees: Interim Report of the Director of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine' Refugees in the Near East, " United Nations General Assembly Official__Records, Fifth. Session, Supplement No I. lV~TA7lZ{3T^Re^^ 1 lT~pT?« 229 • 230 "region is.not ready, the projects are not ready, the people and governments are not ready, for large-scale development of the region's basic river systems or major undeveloped land areas* To press forward on such a course is to pursue folly and frustration*"^ The UNRWAPKNE, aware of its intended role as set by the UHESM, and the dismal prospects of achieving such an end as stated by the Chairman of the UNESM, began its operations on 1 May 1950"with emphasis on short-term pilot demonstra tions projects which could serve as a base for future larger projects* Hardly one year passed since the inception of the UNRWA?RHE, when the United Nations General Assembly unani mously passed Resolution 513 (VI) on 26 January 1952 which authorized the UNRWAPRNE to spend $250 million dollars over a period of three years to reintegrate the Palestinian refu gees into the economy of the areas they reside in* The United Nations General Assembly allotted $50 million for relief, and $200 million for reintegration* The prophecies of Mr. Clapp were realized in 1953$ v ' - two years after the "reintegration" plan was inaugurated* It was clear by then that the goal of reintegrating most of the Palestinian refugees by 1954 "was a practical 3» Quoted in Don Peretz, "The Arab Refugee Dilemma,11 Foreign Affairs Quarterly. XXXIII (October, 194?), 138e 231 impossibility. The reintegration plan, which was expected, to enable several hundred thousand Palestinian refugees to become self-supporting only succeeded in. enabling a few thousand Palestinian refugees to become self-supporting.^ The causes of the failure of the reintegration plan were summarized in 1955 as follows: 1. The absence of a solution to the Palestine refugee problem along the lines of United Hations General Assembly resolutions regard ing repatriation and compensation. 2. The meagerness of the physical resources made available for development. 3. The attitude of the refugees and, in some cases, of the governments of the area. The Present Role of the UURWAPRUE Given the failure of the reintegration plan, the UURWAPRNE limited itself almost entirely to the task of caring for the temporary needs of the Palestinian refugees. After all, the Palestinian refugees must be fed and sheltered. But this does not necessarily mean that the 4® "Annual Report of the Director of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East covering the period 1 July 1953 to 30 June 1954#11 United Nations General Assembly Official Records, Ninth Session, Supplemen^^No. I'T^TWSTTTT, R. jT""****™™™^* 5« Peretz, op. ext., p. 140. 6. "Annual Report of the Director of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East covering the period 1 July 1953 to 30 June 1954#" op. cit., p. 5 » 232 WRWAPRNE neglected the long-term task given it by the General Assembly; on the contrary$ it has carried out this responsibility "within the limits imposed by the avail ability of funds and the political acceptability of the projects.Despite the lack of necessary funds, short-term mandates and several emergency crises, the TJNRWAPKME has succeeded throughout the years in enabling thousands of Palestinian refugees to become self-supporting. If large scale self-support activities cannot be achieved rapidly, then small scale self-support activities over a longer period of time could prove to be of significant value and importance. From 1 May 1950-30 June 1970 the UNRWAPRNE‘s relief costs have been greater than its educational costs. As of 1 July 1970, however, educational costs have exceeded relief costs. This new change, which is aimed at educating and training more Palestinian refugees, mainly the youth, achieves, in part, the long-term goal of the WRWAPRNE«. It is assumed that an educated or skilled Palestinian refugee stands a better chance in securing a job than an uneducated or unskilled one. In an area that is desperately short of educated or skilled workers, the WRWAPRNE should be able to secure a job for its graduates through its Placement 7e "Annual Report of the Director of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East, 1 July 1958-30 June 1959," op,.hit,, p. 1. 233 Services, Cnee the educated and skilled Palestinian refugee secures a job* it is possible that an entire family could be removed from the relief rolls of the UNRWAPRNE, Thus* with more and more Palestinian refugees becoming self-sufficient* the UNRWAPRNE could upgrade and better its services to the remaining Palestinian refugees. This method w ill not remove all of the Palestinian refugees from relief rolls* but it will* at least* reduce the already heavy burden on the meagre resources of the UNRWAPRNE, The Future Role of the UNRWAPRNE There is no doubt that the UNRWAPRNE cannot exist without the Palestinian refugees* but* can the Palestinian refugees exist without the UNRWAPRNE? According to the current* and previous heads of the UNRWAPRNE* the UNRWAPRNE became an indispensable agency for the maintenance of the Palestinian refugees. In normal times* as.in times of crises* the UNRWAPRNE was the only body that was ready* willing and able to care for the immediate needs of the Palestinian refugees. While caring for the needs of the Palestinian refugees* the UNRWAPRNE has also helped con tribute towards the creation of a more favorable climate for the solution of the Palestine refugees problem within the context of the turbulent Arab-Xsraeli conflict. Thus, the disappearance of the UNRWAPRNE "would cause unacceptable 23k O hardship and remove an essential element of stability" from the area* The Palestinian refugees w ill always need relief services until a just solution is found for them0 Whether the UNRWAPRNE or another body regulates that aid is second- ary0 However, given the existence of the UHRWAPRNE and its proven record of efficiency in caring for the basic needs of the Palestinian refugees it is expensive to dissolve it for another body, and tragic for the Palestinian refugees should there be no successor at all,^ Prior to .the inception of United Nations aid to the Palestinian refugees, some Arab countries took upon them selves the task of caring for the temporary needs of the Palestinian refugees. According to Mr. Kennedy, the first Director of the UNRWAPRNE, the Arab states "fed and cared for refugees of Arab nationality in the early months, but the problem was too great for their limited resources. 8. "Report of the Commissioner-General of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refu gees in the Near East, 1 July 1970-30 June 1971$" United Nations General Assembly Official Records, Twenty-sixth”* Session, Supplement No. 13 (A/81{.'13j, p. 13. 9o "Annual Report of the Director of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East covering the period 1 July 1956 to 30 June 1957$” United Nations General Assembly Official Records, Twelfth p. 2. 10. "Assistance to Palestine Refugees^ Interim Report of the Director of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in'the Near East," o p . c it. , p. 1. Later# when the TJNRWAPRNE was firmly established in the Arab world# the Arab states refused to assume "administrative responsibility for the relief programme,^ According to the UHRWAPREE "this reluctance or inability to accept responsibility for the care and maintenance of the refugees derives largely from political and financial c a u s e s , The main political cause that underlies Arab refusal is the conviction that Israel is responsible for the present situa tion of the Palestinian refugees# and if anyone is obligated to assume the burden# it should be Israel# which has neither compensated nor repatriated the Palestinian refugees in accordance with ad hoc United Nations resolutions. But# contrary to the "widespread belief that the host countries have been deliberately and Inhumanly keeping the refugees in a state of destitution and dependence on international charity as a weapon in the prosecution of their political aims# " the Arab host countries have borne a heavy burden in "promoting the rehabilitation of the refugees as 11, "Annual Report of the Director of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East covering the. period 1 July 1953 to 30 June 195hi>11. op° cit,# p« 5<> 12, Ibid, 13, "Report of the Commissioner-General of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refu gees in the Near East# 1 July 1966-30 June 1967#" United Nations General Assembly Official Records# Twenty-second Session# Supplement NoT^O^lATF’Tl'Jr? p« 19, 236 individuals"^ despite the grave difficulties that face them at home, Israel, however, has not formally acknowledged any moral or legal responsibility for the plight of the Pales tinian refugees, even though it had voted for several reso lutions that acknowledged the rights of the Palestinian refugees to compensation and repatriation* Thus, in the absence of any w illing party to assume fu ll responsibility for the maintenance of about 1*5 m illion Palestinian refugees, the TJURWAPRNE is the only body in existence that should "continue on its present lines and with its present programmes because it is necessary so long as the future of the Palestine refugees is not resolved. But, it is no longer sufficient nor practical to renew the mandate of the HWRWAPRNE without solving the problem of financing the nHRWAPRNE. The present services of the UHRWAPREE, le t alone the extended or expanded, cannot be maintained under the existing financial conditions. "To meet deficits from the working balance is no longer pos sib le." ^ Thus, in renewing the mandate of the XJNRWAPRNE, which expires on 30 June 1972$ the United Nations General 1lj.e Ibid. 15>. "Report of the Commissioner-General of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refu gees in the Near East, 1 July 1970-30 June 1971," op. cit., p. 13. _ 16. Ibid. Assembly should consider the following? 1„ The WBWAPRHE should be provided with secure and adequate sources of funds to carry out its existing programme? or any additional tasks assigned to it by the General Assembly.^ ? 2. Short-term renewals of one and two years are not conducive to administrative efficiency and financial stability if the UHRWAPRHE is to plan its programme effectively. The Commissioner-General in 1961j. requested a mandate for five years as a reasonable - extension, 3c The rights of the Palestinian refugees to repatria tion and/or compensation have not been implemented yet? though they have been annually reaffirmed by the United Nations. In the light of past events? these rights have hampered large scale operations by the UERWAPRNE? for fear that such rights would be prejudiced should the Palestinian refugees be fully reintegrated into the economic life of their host countries. Any future programme for the UNRWA?ENE 17. Ibid. 18. "Report of the Commissioner-General of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refu gees in the Near East? 1 July 1963-30 June 196A,11 United • Nations General Assembly Official Records? Nineteenth Ses- lilonTHSuppI^^ ' 238 must taken into consideration these unimplemented rights. The future role of the UKTRWAPBEE cannot be radically different from the present role of the UNRWAPRNE, Any radical changes must be accompanied by radical changes in the financial position of the UHRWAPRHE, Although the UERHAPRITE would be satisfied with receiving an income com mensurate with its expenditures^ it is desirable to see an increase in the income of the UHRWAPRHE to enable it to increase its self-support programmes in the educational and training fields. According to the previous Commissioner- General there was* up to 6 June 1967# "a slow but steady process of rehabilitation had been at work among the refu gees and# in recent years# had begun to make an evident impact in improving their economic and social condition , , , the process of. rehabilitation was being achieved not by ambitious-and costly works projects and schemes of mass resettlement but by the operation of normal economic and human factors," As in the past# small-scale projects have succeeded where large-scale projects have failed# and if the economic aspects of the Palestine refugee problem cannot be dealt with totally# maybe a series of small-scale projects 19o “Report of the Commissioner-General of the United.Rations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refu gees in the Near East# 1 July 1966-30 June 1967#" op, cit»# . P* 19> . ” . ' 239 over a long period of time could be the partial remedy to the existing deadlock of lack of adequate funds for the UNRWAPRITEj, unimplemented resolutions concerning the rights of the Palestinian refugees and the failure of large scale projects which could prejudice the rights of the Palestinian refugees to compensation and/or repatriation. As far as the OTfRWAPRNE is concerned, the most effective contribution it could make would be the "maintenance of its existing serv ices, possibly with some extension to new groups of dis placed persons, coupled with an expansion of its programme of education and training for the children and young.refu gees. But not even the existing UHRMAPKNE services can be maintained,'let alone extended or expanded, unless the chronic problem of financing the Agency is tackled with determination and realism. The Future of the Palestinian Refugees The Palestinian refugees, as well as the,non-refugee Palestinians, have been annually granted the right to repa triation and/or compensation by the United Nations General Assembly, and, at times, the Security Council; 1. General Assembly resolution 19^ (III) of 11 December 1948 which established the principle of repatriation and/or compensation. 20. Ibid., p. 21. 2. General Assembly resolution 217 (III) of 10 December 1948 in article 13 (2) states "Everyone has the right to leave any country, including his own, and . to return to his country.11 3. General Assembly resolution 302 (IV) of 8 December 1949 which created the UNRWAPREE and reaffirmed resolution 194 (III)= 4» From 1949 to the present, the UNRWAPRHE has been renewed annually (and at times biannually) and with each renewal the principles in resolution 194 (III) were reaffirmed. 5» The Protocol of 12 May 1949, signed by both Israel and four Arab states (Egypt, Syria, Jordan and Lebanon) under the auspices of the TJECCP reaffirmed paragraph 11 of resolution 194 (III), 6. Security Council resolution 237 of 14 June 196? called upon Israel to facilitate the return of Palestinians who left areas which fell under Israeli occupation in June 1967. 7. General Assembly resolution 2252 (ES-VI) of 4 July 1967 and 2452 (XXIII) of 19 December 1968 which reiterated resolution 237 of 14 June 1967® 8. General Assembly resolution 2672 of 8 December 1970 stated that "full respect for the inalienable rights of the people of Palestine is an indispensable element in the establishment of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East." . The United Nations has adopted and passed the above mentioned resolutions but has not taken any steps to imple ment the basic rights of the Palestinian people. The Pales tinian people were denied the right to national self- determination under the charter of the United Nations when the United Nations General Assembly adopted resolution 181 (II) of 29 November 1947 to partition Palestine into sepa rate Arab and Jewish states. Any just settlement of the Palestine refugee problem must take into account the rights of the Palestinian people as a whole. It is only when the Palestinians feel that a wrong has been set right, could there be a just and lasting peace for the Palestinian people as a whole. Until June 1967$ the Arab-Israeli conflict was a product of the Palestine problem. In fact, at the heart of the Arab-Israeli conflict lay the Palestine refugee problem and the Arab-Israeli conflict centered around the rights of the Palestinian people as a whole. On the one hand the Arab states took it upon themselves to bring justice to the Palestinians by way of repatriation and/or compensation, in accordance with ad hoc United Nations resolutions. On the other hand Israel, has. continually refused to repatriate and/or compensate the Palestinians in defiance of those resolutions* Since a just solution to the Palestine refugee problem must consider the rights of the Palestinian under the pertinent United Nations resolutions, Israel's rigid position created a deadlock* From 15 May 19ij.8 to 6. June 1967 five major peace proposals to the Arab-Israeli conflict were submitted to both sides, Israel rejected all five of them, as they would have obligated her to honour the rights of the Palestinian people to compensation and/or repatriation in accordance with ad hoc United Nations resolutions. The P 1 five major peace plans were the Bemadotte plan,of 191}$, the UNCOP Protocol of 12 May 19l{$#^ the Dulles proposal of 26 August 195S>,23 the Eden proposal of 9 November 1955*^" and the Kennedy proposal of 11 May 1961,^ All five plans. 21. United Nations Documents, S/863, 3 July 19l|.8; S/870, 8 JulyHl^r""”™ " ”- 22. "General Progress Report and Supplementary Report of the United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine, covering the period from 11 December 1949* to 23 October 1950," United Nations General Assembly Official Records, Fifth Session, Supp1emeht No, 18 (A/1367/Rev, ~1), New York, 1951, PP- 1-31. 23. The Department of State Bulletin, 5 September 1955, pp. 37QT^lJo; Fre(fllT^KEour£7~~Trhe°A.rab -Israeli Dilemma (New York: Syracuse University Press, 1968), p * 7437™" ™"” 24. J. C, Hurewitz, Diplomacy in. the Near and: Mid dle East, "Vol, II (New York:" D* Van°^osTrand~~5oTr^T955TT™~° ppVljri™>4l5; Alfred M, Lilienthal, _The Other. Side of the Coin (New York: Devin-Adair, 1965)T~FT^2B4T~ E, L, M« Burns, Between Arab and Israeli (London: George C, Harper and Co*, ra7Tl*^55T7^pT'T25-127. 25. "Exchange of Letters Between Presidents John F, Kennedy and Nasser,Middle Eastern Affairs, XIII (November, 1962), 269-276, : ^ ^ 243 which were rejected by Israel * insisted that justice cannot be served without taking into consideration the rights of the Palestinian refugees to compensation and/or repatriation* Perhaps of all the five proposals# none were so strong as President Kennedy’s proposal in which he stated; We are willing to help solve the tragic Palestine Refugee Problem on the basis of the principle of repatriation or compensation for properties , „ * I wish to state unequivocally that this govern ment's position is anchored and will continue to be anchored in the firm bedrock of support for General Assembly recommendations concerning the refugees# and of active# impartial concern that those recommendations be implemented in a way most beneficial to the r e f u g e e s , 26 The "Six Day War" of June 196? created new changes in the Arab-Israeli conflict. Prior to June 196? a just solution to the Palestine refugee problem in accordance with ad hoc United Nations resolutions would have dissolved the Arab-Israeli conflict. Following the June 1967 war# how ever# the Arab-Israeli conflict became a dysfunction of the Palestine problem and assumed a separate identity. With this new development# a just solution to the Palestine refu gee problem will not dissolve the Arab-Israeli conflict# nor would a peaceful solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict necessarily solve the Palestine refugee problem. What is at stake today is no longer the rights of the Palestinians# but the rights of Egyptians# Syrians and Jordanians vis-a-vis 26, Ibid, ) Israele Thus today we have two issues at stakes the Pales tine problem and the Arab-Israeli conflict (which can be broken down into three separate issues/ the Egyptian-Israeli problem| the Jordanian-Israeli problem and the Syrian- Israeli problem)e It is'difficult, at this early stage of the game, to assess whether this new change is for the better or not* But, suffice it to say that there exists today an opportunity for a separate peace between Israel and each of the other four disputing parties (the Palestinians, the Egyptians, the Jordanians and the Syrians). From past peace efforts, especially the efforts under the UHCCP, one can conclude that a separate peace between Israel and each of the dis puting parties is much more desirable and practical as it would prevent one party*s problems with Israel to be used as a pretext for not achieving peace with another party. For example, in the past Israel had stated that the matter of repatriation and/or compensation to the Palestinian refugees is subject to the payment of compensation for property left behind by.migrating Jews from Algeria, Tunis, Morroco, Libya, Yemen, Iraq, Egypt, Lebanon and Syria. The 539,000 Pales tinian refugees (which.is Israel *s count as to the "real" number of refugees) eligible for repatriation are subject to 245 the subtraction of 537,074 Jewish refugees (who came from the nine Arab countries mentioned) It should be clear by now that the only way to break the deadlock is to “de-Arabize" the Palestine problem and "de-Palestin!ze" the Arab-Israeli conflict. After all, Palestine is the focal point of struggle between two people, the Palestinians and the Israelis, and if peace is to be achieved, it can only be done by direct contact between the Palestinians and the Israelis. The inclusion of other Arab states would only create pretexts for Israel. Thus, if Israel is genuinely interested in peace, peace based on justice, then it is up to Israel to take the first step, as more than one million Palestinians live under Israeli rule in areas occupied by Israel. If Israel chooses not to do so, or if it insists on combining the Palestine problem within the framework of the Arab-Israeli conflict, then it is Israel, and not the Arabs, which will be accused of using the Palestine refugee problem as a political weapon to prosecute its aims. In the meantime, it should be the duty of every Arab country to assist, in any feasible manner, the efforts of the Palestinians to redeem their right to a just and lasting peace. What that peace will mean or entail will have to be 27. Walter Pinner, The legend of the Arab Refugees: A Critical Study of UNRWA's Reports and S^atriTTcli'^TTel Aviv: Economic and SociaT~Research Institute, 15157), p . x. worked out between the Israelis and the Palestinians,, It is also the moral obligation of the United Nations and the big powers, in the interest of international peace and security, to see that an equitable solution to the Palestine refugee problem is found, and as expediously as possible. If the Palestinians and the Israelis cannot agree, then the big powers might consider the creation of a United Nations Special Committee on Israel (like the United Nations Special Committee on Palestine) which would recommend a just and equitable solution based on the majority wishes of both the Palestinians and the Israelis, Maybe the partition of Israel into two separate states, one to be called Israel, and the other Palestine (as in 1947) could reconcile the present irreconcilable views held by both sides, Israel, which is a Zionist-Jewish state has no place for non"Jews in its future schemes for an Israel that would harbor five million Jews* The Palestinians who did not live in Israel prefer a democratic unitary binational state where equality for both Arab and Jew would be the essence of that state. However, the Arabs who lived and/or are living under Israeli rule# prefer a Palestinian state where they could rule them selves rather than live as unequal citizens in a Zionist- Jewish state. In the meantime, and until a just solution is found, the UNRWAPRNE must be allowed to continue its operations to 247 the Palestinian refugees under better financial conditions that would enable it to perform its goals more effectively. While the UNRWAPRNE continues its humane task of caring for the Palestinian refugees# and until a just solution is found for them* one should not forget the words of Count Polke Bernadotfe (the founding father of United Nations aid to the Palestinian refugees who was assassinated by the Israelis in Jerusalem on 17 September 1948) that were written in his final report to the United Nations twenty-four years ago: No settlement can be just and complete if recogni tion is not accorded to the right of the Arab refugees to return to the home from which he has been dislodged by the hazards and strategy of the armed conflict between Arabs and Jews in Pales tine e » « It would be an offense against the principle of elemental justice if these innocent victims of the conflict were denied the right of return to their homes while Jewish immigrants flow into Palestine, and indeed, at least offer the threat of permanent replacement of the Arab refu gees who have been rooted in the land for centu ries,^ 28, United Nations Documents, A/648* 17 September 1948 APPENDIX A PALESTINE'S POPULATION 1922-1947a YEAR ARAB JEWISH Pr© Mandate 644,000 5 6 ,0 0 0 1922 661,000 84,000 1923 681,000 90,000 1924 702,000 95,000 1925 717,000 122,000 1926 740,000 150,000 1927 759,000 150,000 1928 775,000 152,000 1929 795,000 157,000 1930 818,000 165,000 1931 848,000 175,000 . 1932 874,000 192,000 1933 89 6 ,0 0 0 235,000 1934 ,917,000 283,000 1935 942,000 355,000 1936 971,000 384,000 1937 995,000 396,000 1938 1,012,000 4 1 1 ,0 0 0 1939 1,04 4 ,0 0 0 446,000 1940 1,069,000 4 6 4 ,0 0 0 1947 1,222,000 5 0 8 ,0 0 0 aSee Sami Hadaid.$ Palestine; Loss of a Heritage (San Antonio 1 Naylor, 196J)s p , 25J E, W. Bethmann, Decisive Years in Palestine: 1918-1948 (New York: Amen- can Friends of thes Middle East, lnce, 1957) 2 P* dOo APPENDIX B TEXT OP RESOLUTION 212 (III) ASSISTANCE TO PALESTINE REFUGEES ADOPTED BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OP THE UNITED NATIONS ON 19 NOVEMBER 1948 Whereas the problem of the relief of Palestine refu gees of all communities Is one of immediate urgency and the United Nations Mediator on Palestine in his progress report of 18 September 1948# part three, states that “action must be taken to determine the necessary measures1’ (of relief) and to provide for their implementation^ and that "the choice is between saving the lives of many thousands of people now or permitting them to die”i Whereas the Acting Mediator, in his supplemental report of 18 October 1948, declares that “the situation of the refugees is now criticaland that “aid must not only be continued but very greatly increased if disaster is to be averted"$3 Whereas the alleviation of conditions of starvation and distress among the Palestine refugees is one of the 1. See Official Records of the Third Session of the General Assembly, Supplement II, p «, $2, 2o See document A/689, paragraph 4® 3® Ibid,, paragraph 8, 2 5 0 minimum conditions for the success of the efforts of the United nations to bring peace to that land. The General Assembly 1, Expresses its thanks to the governments and organizations which, and the individual persons who, have given assistance directly or in response to the Mediator's appeal; 2, Considers on the basis of the Acting Mediator's recommendation, that a sum of approximately 29,500,000 dollars will be required to provide relief for 5 0 0 ,000 refu gees for a period of nine months and from 1 December 19ij-8 to 31 August 191*.9; and that an additional amount of approxi mately 2,500,000 dollars will be required for administrative and local operational expenses; 3, Authorizes the Secretary General, in consulta tion with the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions, to advance immediately a sum of up to 5,000,000 dollars from the Working Capital Fund of the United Rations, the said sum to be repaid before the end of the period specified in paragraph 2, from the voluntary governmental contributions requested under paragraph if.; Urges all States Members of the United Nations to make as soon as possible voluntary contributions in kind or in funds sufficient to ensure that the amount of supplies and funds required is obtained, and states that, to this z5i end, voluntary contributions of non-member States would also be accepted? contributions in funds may be made in cur rencies other than the United States dollar, in so far as the operations of the relief organization can be carried out in such currencies; 5>o Authorizes the Secretary General to establish a Special Fund into which contribution shall be paid, which will be administered as a separate account; 60 Authorizes the Secretary General, to expend the funds received under paragraphs 3 and 4 of the present reso lution; ' 7° Instructs the Secretary General, in consultation with the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions, to establish regulations for the administration and supervision of the Fund; 8 . Requests the Secretary General to take all necessary steps to extend aid to Palestine refugees and to establish such administrative organization as may be required for this purpose, inviting the assistance of the appropriate agencies of. the several governments, the spec ialized agencies of the United Rations, the United Nations International Children1s Emergency Fund, the International Committee of the Red. Cross, the League of Red Cross Socie ties and other voluntary agencies, it being recognized that the participation of voluntary organizations in the relief 252 plan would in no way derogate from, the principle of imparti ality on the basis of which the assistance of these organ izations is being solicited; 9. Requests the Secretary General to appoint a Director of United Nations Relief for Palest in ex Refugees to whom he may delegate such responsibility as he may consider appropriate for the overall planning and implementation of the relief programmesj 10e Agrees to the convoking, at the discretion of the Secretary General, of an ad hoc advisory committee of seven members.to be selected by the President of the General Assembly to which the Secretary General may submit any matter of principle or policy upon which he would like the benefit of the committee's advice| 11,.. Requests the -Secretary General to continue and to extend the implementation of the present relief programme until, the machinery provided for by the present resolution is set up? 12, Urges the World Health Organization, the Food and Agriculture Organization, the International Refugee Organization, the United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund and other appropriate organizations and agencies, acting within the framework of the relief pro gramme herein established, promptly to ..contribute supplies, specialized personnel and other services permitted by their 253 contributions and their financial resources, to relieve the desperate plight of Palestine refugees of all communities; 13. Requests the Secretary General to report to the General Assembly, at the next regular session, on the action taken as a result of this resolution. APPENDIX C TEXT OP RESOLUTION 194 (III) PALESTINE— PROGRESS REPORT OP THE UN MEDIATOR ADOPTED BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE UNITED NATIONS ON 11 DECEMBER 1948 The General Assembly, having considered further the situa tion in Palestine, 1. Expresses its deep appreciation of the progress achieved through the good offices of the late United Nations Mediator in promoting a peaceful adjustment of the future situation of Palestine, for which cause he sacrificed his life; and Extends its thanks to the Acting Mediator and his staff for their continued efforts and devotion to duty in Palestine; 2, Establishes a Conciliation Commission consisting of three States Members of the United Nations which shall have the following functions: (a) to assume, in so far as it considers necessary in existing circumstances, the func tions given to the United Nations Mediator on Palestine by resolution 186 (S-2) of the General Assembly of 14 May 1948; (b) to carry out the specific functions and directives given to it by the present resolution and such additional functions and directives as may be given to it by the General Assembly or by the Security Council; (c) to undertake, upon request 255 of the Security Council, any of the functions now assigned to the United Nations Mediator on Palestine or to the United Nations Truce Commission by resolutions of the Security Council; upon such request to the Conciliation Commission by the Security Council with respect to all the remaining func tions of the United Nations Mediator on Palestine under Security Council resolutions^ the office of the Mediator shall be terminated; 3o Decides that a Committee of the Assembly, con sisting of China, France, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom and the United States of America, shall present, before the end of the first part of the present session of the General Assembly, for the approval of the Assembly, a proposal concerning the names of the three States which will constitute the Conciliation Commission; Requests the Commission to begin its functions at once, with a view to the establishment of contact between the parties themselves and the Commission at the earliest possible date; 5« Calls upon the Governments and authorities con cerned to extend the scope of the negotiations provided for in the Security Council1s resolution of 16 November 19##^ - 1e At the 186th plenary meeting on 11 December .I9I4.8 , a committee of the Assembly consisting of the five States designated in paragraph 3 of the above resolution 2$6 and to seek agreement by negotiations conducted either with the Conciliation Commission or directly, with a view to the final settlement of all questions outstanding between them; 6, Instructs the Conciliation Commission to take steps to assist the Governments and authorities concerned to achieve a final settlement of all questions outstanding between them; 7« Resolves that the Holy Places--including Nazareth— religious buildings and sites in Palestine should be protected and free access to. them assured, in accordance with existing rights and historical practice; that arrange ments to this end should be under effective United Nations supervision; that the United Nations Conciliation Commis sion, in presenting to the fourth regular session of the General Assembly its detailed proposals for a permanent international regime for the territory of Jerusalem, should include recommendations concerning the Holy Places in that territory; that with regard to the Holy places in the rest of Palestine the Commission should call upon the political authorities of the areas concerned to give appropriate formal guarantees as to the protection of the Holy Places proposed that the following three States should constitute the Conciliation Commissions France, Turkey, United States of America, The proposal of the Committee having been adopted by the General Assembly at the_same meeting, the Concilation Commission is therefore composed of the above- mentioned three States® . 257 and access to them; and that these undertakings should be presented to the General Assembly for approval; 8, Resolves thats in view of its association with three world religions, the Jerusalem area, including the present municipality of Jerusalem plus the surrounding villages and towns, the most eastern of which shall be Abu Dis; the most southern, Bethlehem; the most western. Bin Karim (including also the built-up area of Motsa); and the most northern, Shu*fat, should be accorded special and separate treatment from the rest of Palestine and should be placed under effective United Nations control; Requests the Security Council to take further steps to ensure the demilitarization of Jerusalem at the earliest possible date; Instructs the Conciliation Commission to present to the fourth regular session of the General Assembly detailed proposals for a permanent international regime for the Jerusalem area which will provide for the maximum local autonomy for distinctive groups consistent with the special international status of the Jerusalem area; The Conciliation■Commission is authorized to appoint a United Nations representative, who shall cooperate with the local authorities with respect to the interim adminis tration of the Jerusalem area; 258 9« Resolves that, pending agreement on more detailed arrangements among the Governments and authorities concerned, the freest possible access to Jerusalem by road, rail or air should be accorded to all inhabitants of Pales tine; Instructs the Conciliation Commission to report immediately to the Security Council, for appropriate action by that organ, any attempt by any party to impede such access; 10, Instructs the Conciliation Commission to seek arrangements among the Governments and authorities concerned which will facilitate the economic development of the area, including arrangements for access to ports and airfields and the use of transportation and communication facilities; 11, Resolves that the refugees wishing to return to their homes and live at peace with their neighbours should be permitted to do so at the earliest practicable date, and that compensation should be paid for the property of those choosing not to return and for loss of or damage to property which, under principles of international law or in equity, should be made good by the Governments or authorities responsible; Instructs the Conciliation Commission to facilitate the repatriation, resettlement and economic and social rehabilitation of the refugees and the payment of compensa tion, and to maintain close relations with the Director of 259 the United Nations Relief for Palestine Refugees and# through him# with the appropriate organs and agencies of the United Nations; 12. Authorizes the Conciliation Commission to appoint such subsidiary bodies and to employ such technical experts# acting under its authority# as it may find neces sary for the effective discharge of its functions and responsibilities under the present resolution; The Conciliation Commission will have its official headquarters at Jerusalem. The authorities responsible for maintaining order in Jerusalem will be responsible for taking all measures necessary to ensure the security of the Com mission. The Secretary-General will provide a limited number of guards for the protection of the staff and pre mises of the Commission; 13. Instructs the Conciliation Commission to render progress reports periodically to the Secretary-General for transmission to the Security Council and to the Members of the United Nations; 1lj.e Calls upon all Governments and authorities con cerned to cooperate with the Conciliation Commission and to take all possible steps to assist in the implementation of the present resolution; 15. Requests the Secretary-General to provide the necessary staff and facilities and to make appropriate arrangements to provide the necessary funds required in carrying out the terms of the present resolution. APPENDIX D TEXT OP RESOLUTION 302 (IV) ASSISTANCE TO PALESTINE REFUGEES ADOPTED BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE UNITED NATIONS ON 8 DECEMBER 1 9l|-9 The General Assembly, Recalling its resolutions 212 (III) of November 19)4.8 and 19li- (III) of 11 December 19l|-8, affirming in particular. the provisions of paragraph 11 of the latter resolution. Having examined with appreciation the first interim report of the United Nations Economic Survey Mission for the Middle East (A/1106) and the report of the Secretary-General on assistance to Palestine refugees (A/1060) and A/1060/ ADD, 1), 1° Expresses its appreciation to the Governments which have generously responded to the appeal embodied in its resolution 212 (III), and to the appeal of the Secretary General, to contribute in kind or in funds to the allevia tion of the conditions of starvation and distress amongst the Palestine refugees; 2, Expresses also its gratitude to the Inter national Committee of the Red Cross, to the League of Red Cross Societies and to the American Friends Service Com mittee for the contribution they have made to this 261 262 humanitarian cause by discharging, in the face of great difficulties, the responsibility they voluntarily assumed for the distribution of relief supplies and the general care of the refugees; and welcomes the assurance they have given the Secretary-General that they will continue their coopera tion with the United Nations .until the end of March 1950 on a mutually acceptable basis; 3, Commends the United Nations International Chil dren's Emergency Fund for the important contribution which it has made towards the United Nations programme of assist ance; and commends those specialized agencies which have rendered assistance in their respective fields, in particular the World Health Organization, the United Nations Educa tional, Scientific and Cultural Organization and the Inter national Refugee Organization; lj.e Expresses its thanks to the numerous religious, charitable and humanitarian organizations which have mate rially assisted in bringing relief to Palestine refugees; 5® Recognizes that, without prejudice to the pro visions of paragraph 11 of General Assembly resolution 194 (III) of 11 December 1948, continued assistance for the relief of the Palestine refugees is necessary to prevent conditions of starvation and distress among them and to further conditions of peace and stability, and that con structive measures should be undertaken at an early date 263 with a view to the termination of international assistance for relief| ■ . . 6. Considers that, subject,to the provisions of paragraph 9 (d) of the present resolution, the equivalent of approximately $33,700,000 will be required for direct relief and works programmes for the period 1 January to 31 December 195)0 of which the equivalent of $20,200,000 is. required for direct relief and $13,5>00,000 for works programmesj that the equivalent of approximately $21,200,000 will be required for works programmes from 1 January to 30 June 1951, all inclu sive of administrative expenses; and that direct relief should be terminated not later than 31 December 1950 unless otherwise determined by the General Assembly at its fifth regular session; 7o Establishes the "United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East"i (a) To carry out in collaboration with local gov ernments the direct relief and works programmes as recom mended by the Economic Survey Mission? (b) To consult with the interested Near Eastern Governments concerning measures to be taken by them prepara tory to the time when international assistance for relief and works projects is no longer available, 8, Establishes an Advisory Commission consisting of representatives of France, Turkey, the United Kingdom of 264 Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the United States of America, with power to add not more than three additional members from contributing Governments, to advise and assist the Director of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East in the execution of the programme? the Director and the Advisory Commission shall consult with each Near Eastern Government concerned in the selection, planning and execution of projects; 9o Requests the Secretary-General to appoint the Director of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East in consultation with the Governments represented on the Advisory Commission; (a) The Director shall be the chief executive officer of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees,in the Near East responsible to the General Assembly for the operation of the programme. (b) The Director shall select and appoint his staff in accordance with general arrangements made in agreement with the Secretary-General, including such of the staff rules and regulations of the United Nations as the Director and the Secretary-General shall agree are applicable, and to the extent possible utilize the facilities and assistance of the Secretary-General, (c) The Director, shall in consultation with the Secretary General and the Advisory Committee on Administrative 265 and Budgetary questions, establish financial regulations for the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East; (d) Subject to the financial regulations established pursuant to clause (c) of the present paragraph, the Director, in consultation with the Advisory Commission, shall apportion available funds between direct relief and works projects in their discretion, in the event that the estimates paragraph 6 require revision, 10o Requests the Director to convene the Advisory. Commission at the earliest practicable date for the purpose / of developing plans for the organization and administration of the programme, and of adopting rules of procedure; 11o Continues the United Nations Relief for Pales tine Refugees as established under General Assembly resolu tion 212 (III) until 1 April 1950, or until such date thereafter as the transfer referred to in paragraph 12 is effected, and requests the Secretary-General in consultation with the operating agencies to continue the endeavour to reduce the numbers of rations by progressive stages in the light of the findings and recommendations of the Economic Survey Mission, 12. Instructs the Secretary General to transfer to the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East, assets and liabilities of the 266 United Nations Relief for Palestine Refugees by 1 April* 1950$ or at such date as may be agreed by him and the Director of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East. 13. Urges all Members of the United Nations and non-members to make voluntary contributions in funds or in kind to ensure that the amount of supplies and funds required is obtained for each period of the pirogramme as set out in paragraph 6; contributions in funds may be made in currencies other than the United States dollar in so far as the programme can be carried out in such currencies. 111. Authorizes the Secretary-General, in consulta tion with the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions, to advance funds deemed to be available for this purpose and not exceeding $5,000,000 from the Working.Capital Fund to finance operations pursuant to the present resolution, such sum to be repaid not later than 31 December 1950 from the voluntary governmental contributions requested under paragraph 13 above? 15. Authorizes the Secretary-General in consulta tion with the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions, to negotiate with the International Refugee Organization for an interest free loan in an amount not to exceed the equivalent of $2 ,800*000 to finance the programme subject to mutually satisfactory conditions for repayment? ■ . ■ 26? 160 Authorizes the Secretary-General to continue the Special Fund established, under General Assembly resolu tion 212 (III) and to make withdrawals therefrom for the operation of the United Nations Relief for Palestine Refu gees and, upon the request of the Director, for the opera tions of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine in the Near East, 17« Calls upon the Governments concerned to accord to the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East the privileges, immunities, exemp tions and facilities which have been granted to the United Nations Relief for Palestine Refugees, together with all other privileges, immunities, exemptions and facilities necessary for the fulfillment of its functions. 18. Urges the United Nations International Chil dren's Emergency Fund, the International Refugee Organiza tion, the World Health Organization, the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, the Food and Agriculture Organization and other appropriate agencies and private groups and organizations, in consultation with the Director of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East; to furnish assist ance within the framework of the programme. 19<> Requests the Director of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the 268 Near Easts (a) To appoint a representative to attend the meet ing of the Technical Assistance Board as observer so that the technical assistance activities of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East may be coordinated with the technical assistance pro grammes of the United Nations and specialized agencies referred to in Economic and Social Council resolution 222 (IX) A of 15 August 1949? (b) To place at the disposal of the Technical Assistance Board full information concerning any technical assistance work which may be done by the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East, in order that it may be included in the reports sub mitted by the Technical Assistance Board to the Technical Assistance Committee of the Economic and Social Council; 20„ Directs the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East to consult with the United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine in the best interests of their respective tasks, with par ticular reference to paragraph 11 of General Assembly reso lution 194 (HI) of 11 December 1948; 21, Requests the Director to submit to the General Assembly of the United Nations an annual report on the work of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine 269 Refugees in the Near East, including an audit of funds, and invites him to submit to the Secretary-General such other reports as the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East may wish to bring to the attention of Members, of the United Nations, or its appro priate organs; 22, Instructs the United Nations Conciliation Com mission for Palestine to transmit the final report of the Economic Survey Mission, with such comments as it may wish to make, to the Secretary-General for transmission to the Members of the United Nations and to the United Nations and to the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East, LIST OF REFERENCES Articles “Is the M o d e m State$ Israel, a Fulfillment of Prophecy," Link, III (November-December, 1970), 3-12. 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Londons Oxford IfeiversiTy^pFes¥J^T95i}-® Truman, Harry S. Memoirss Years of Trial and Hope. New Yorks Doubledayj Utley, Freda. Will the Middle East Go West? Chicagos Henry Regnery, 1957® Weizmann, Chaim. Trial and Error. Illustrated Edition. Londons Harperrand“BrotEe rs, 1949. Documents The Department of State Bulletin. 1945“1955® “Exchange of Letters Between Presidents John F. Kennedy and Nasser,“ Middle Eastern Affairs, XIII (November, 1 9 6 2 ), ' “Secret Foreign and political Department of the Government of Great Britain." India Office Archivess Exten sion B, No. 552, August, 1920. United Nations Bulletin. "Murder in Cold Blood," V ~~~™ "Tl "OctoBeFT^P'), 756-761. United Nations Documents. A/554# 17 May 1948® United Nations Documents. S/863, 3 July 1948. United Nations Documents. S/870, 8 July 1948® United Nations Documents. A/648, 17 September 1948. United Nations Documents. 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