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66-12,604 MUSTAFA, Urabi S., 1927- THE UNITED STATES AND JORDAN WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO THE PALESTINE QUESTION.

The American University, Ph.D„ 1966 Political Science, international law and relations

University Microfilms, Inc., Ann Arbor, Michigan THE UNITED STATES AND JORDAN WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO THE PALESTINE QUESTION

by

Urabi S. Mustafa

Submitted to the

Faculty of the Graduate School

of The American U n iversity

in Partial Fulfillment of

the Requirements for the Degree

of

Doctor of Philosophy

in

Internat ional Relat ions

Signatures o f Committee

Graduate Dean:

Date

The, American University AMERICAN UNIVERSITY Washington, D. C. LIBRARY JUL 1 1966

Wa s h in g t o n , d . c.

A PLEASE NOTE:

Several pages are not original copy with blurred and indistinct print. Some pages are cropped at right, left and top margins. Filmed as received.

UNIVERSITY MICROFILMS TABLE OF CONTENTS

PAGE

PREFACE ...... i

CHAPTER

I . INTRODUCTION...... 1

I I . HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE...... 27

King~Crane Commission ...... 31

B r itish Mandate for P a l e s t in e ...... 33

Palestine During War I I ...... 43

I I I . EARLY UNITED STATES-JORDANIAN RELATIONS...... 53

The United Nations and P a lestin e ...... 54

Establishment of Israel ...... 59

War or P la y ? ...... 60

First Truce ...... 62

D efiance and A s s a s s in a t io n ...... 66

S p lit in the Arab Camp...... 67

All Palestine Government ...... 70

Broken Truce ...... 72

Jericho Congress ...... 73

Armistice Agreements...... 75

United States' Recognition of Jordan. • ...... 76

Israel Ignores its Promises ...... 77

Final Annexation Steps ...... 81 CHAPTER PAGE

IV. THE UNITED STATES AND JORDAN 1950-1956 ...... 84

Harmony of In te r e sts ...... 85

Tripartite Declaration of 1950 ...... 85

The Middle East Command...... 88

Assassination and Instability...... 88

Revolt in Egypt ...... 91

King Hussein's Coronation ...... 92

The Baghdad Pact ...... 93

The D ism issal of Glubb Pasha ...... 98

The Suez C r i s i s ...... 102

The American P o sitio n ...... 104

Jordan and the Suez Crisis ...... 104

V. THE UNITED STATES AND JORDAN 1957 ONWARDS...... 107

The Eisenhower Doctrine...... 107

Split Between King Hussein and the Nationalists. . • 110

Zerqa Affair ...... 112

The United States Open Support ...... 115

U nity and Union ...... 118

Troubles of 1958 ...... 120

The King's Visit to the United States. 124

The United Arab Republic Breakdown ...... 125

Relaxation in Jordan 127

VI. ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE TO JORDAN...... 130

Agriculture...... 131 3

CHAPTER PAGE

Highways...... 132

Education ...... 132

Public Health ...... ••• 133

Industry...... 134

Public Administration ...... 134

Tourism ...... 135

Military A id ...... 136

The Seven Year Plan 1964-1970 ...... 136

Water Resources ...... 137

Johnston P lan...... 138

East Ghor Canal 141

CONCLUSION...... 143

BIBLIOGRAPHY...... 146

APPENDIX...... 154

TABLES 1 and 2*3,4,5 ......

MAPS { 6 > ...... PREFACE

This dissertation examines American-Jordanian relations since 1946, and suggests policy guide lines for both countries.

Since more than two-thirds of the Jordanian population are Pales­ tinian refugees, the Kingdom's policies have been and still are influenced by their attitudes and actions. The Palestinian problem and its physical and psychological consequences are therefore central to an understanding of Jordan's foreign policy. Palestinian attitudes toward the West, es­ pecially Great Britain, were crystalized soon after World War I and dur­ ing the Mandate; while during the critical 1946-1949 period, their attitudes and ideas about the United States and also about the other Arab countries, including Jordan, were formed. Jordan's location, its Holy

Places, poverty and refugees, have made it extremely sensitive to events and developments in I sr a e l and the other Arab s t a t e s . As exem plified by

American dejure recognition of Israel and Jordan on the same day, January

31, 1949, the Palestinian question and its related problems have domi­ nated the course of American-Jordanian relations. Due to the lateness of the period in discussion, I have not been able to use archival material.

The Chairman and members of my dissertation committee, Professors,

Harry N. Howard, Halford H oskins, Kerim Key and Charles 0 . Lerche, have helped me immeasurably through their kind advice and guidance. I am grateful to the American Friends of the Middle East for their understanding and assistance in this endeavor. I am also grateful ,to many of my relatives and Jordanian friends, and especially to Mr. H.A. Hasan. To officers of

i the Office of Near Eastern Affairs in the Department of State go my thanks for supplying me with valuable material and information. And last, but not least, 1 thank the happiness of my life , and my wife, whose balanced criticism , patience and assistance have helped me greatly in bringing this dissertation to a conclusion.

i i CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

American-Jordanian relationship, has passed through four stages.

The f i r s t , p rio r to 1 9 4 6 ,,a period which did n o t w itness much more than contacts of an educational and religious nature. During World War II,

Jordan was firmly in the Allied camp, but its participation was, mainly, through Great Britain. The second stage covered a period of three years, from 1946 to 1949. During this time, the American-Jordanian relationship i centered around the Palestinian question. The third stage extended from

1950 to 1957. During this period the relationship between both countries was improved considerably yet the United States1 role in Jordan remained secondary to that of Great Britain. Such British-American role was des­ tined to be completely reversed since 1957.

As a political entity, modem Jordan came into existence after

World War I. The local Arabs and the British colonial administrators \ found ground for cooperation. The Arabs sought to achieve independence and unity, while the British sought protection of the Near Eastern trade routes to India. Following a vague understanding reached through the

Hussein-McMahon correspondence, the Arab R evolt was proclaimed in Mecca, on June 5, 1916.

The following two points, in the correspondence were of great im­ portance: 2

1. S h erif Hussein demanded in h is le t t e r o f J u ly 14, 1915:

England to acknowledge the independence of the Arab countries, bounded on the north by Mersina and Adana up to th e 37° o f la titu d e , on which degree falls Birijik, Urfa, Mardin, Midiat, Jezirat (Ibn Umate), Amadia up to the border of Persia; on the south by the Indian Ocean, with the exception of the position of Aden to remain as it is; on the east by the borders of Persia up to the Gulf of Basra; on the west by the Red Sea, the Mediterranean Sea up to Mersina.1

2. McMahon's rep ly , on October 2 4 , 1915, was:

The two districts of Mersina and Alexandretta and portions of Syria lying to the west of the districts of Damascus, Horns, Hama and Aleppo cannot be said to be purely Arab; and should be excluded from the lim its demanded.

With the above modification, and without prejudice to our exist­ ing treaties with Arab chiefs, we accept these lim its.

As for regions lying within those frontiers wherein Great Britain is free to act without detriment to the interests of her ally, France, I am empowered in the name of the Government of Great Britain to give the following assurances and make the following reply to your letter:

Subject to the above modifications, Great Britain is prepared to recognize and support the independence of the Arabs in all the regions w ithin the lim its demanded by the S h e rif of Mecca.

From the Hussein-McMahon correspondence it "seems clear that Great

Britain was undertaking, conditional on an Arab revolt, to recognize Arab independence south of the 37th parallel, except in Baghdad and Basra, and exclusive of districts where French interests predominated." These dis­ tricts were "portions of Syria lying to the west of the districts of

Damascus, Horns, Hama and Aleppo" or in other words the "sea coasts" of the

Great Britain, Parliamentary Papers. 1939, Misc. No. 3, Cmd. 5957; Royal Institute of International Affairs 1915-1945, Information Papers No. 20 p. 5-6 and 144-149; Hurewltz, J.D ., Vol. II, Diplomacy in the Near and Middle East, A Documentary Record; 1914-1956, D. Van Nostrand Co., Inc., Princeton, N.J., N.Yi and London, 1958, pp. 13-17, Zeine N. Zeine, The Struggle for Arab Independence. Khayat, Beirut, 1960, Chapter I, pp. 241-247 and plates No. 1* 2, 3, 4 and 5. See Map No. 1. Vilayet of Aleppo and Lebanon." Although Hussein agreed to renounce "the in clu sio n of the V ilayets o f Mersina and Adana in the Arab Kingdom" he maintained the position that "the entire Vilayet of Aleppo and Beirut are purely Arab Vilayets"^and should be included in the Arab Kingdom. The most that Sherif Hussein agreed to was the acceptance of the occupation of the coastal areas of the Vilayets of Aleppo and Beirut by France only for the period of the war. "...the eminent Minister should be sure that, at the first opportunity after this war is finished, we shall ask you for what we now leave to France in Beirut and its coasts...The citizens of Beirut w ill decidely never accept dismemberment..it is impossible to allow any de­ rogation that gives France, or any other power, a span of land in those regions..."

Howard, Harry N ., The P a r titio n of Turkey 1913-1923, U n iversity of Oklahoma Press, Norman 1931, p. 190. While Britain through Cairo Office was making deals with Sherif Hussein, they were making other contradictory ones with other Arab Sheiks distinguished among them was Ibn Saud of Nejd. "It is of no little interest to note that England appears to have made diametrically conflicting engagements with these Arab chieftains. The British definitely had promised an Arab state under Hussein including the territory south of the 37th parallel.. .the India Office had promised a part of these territories..to Ibn Saud.. .neither chieftain knew of the engagements to the other - a fact which was to lead to very serious complications following the war. If the Arabs were kept in ignorance, the French were not informed of the engagements..." (Ibid., p. 191). Toyn­ bee's views on the engagements were "the best that can be said is that the engagements were so general in nature as to be misleading to all other par­ ties - except the British." (Ibid., p. 444). 2 Crad. 5957, op. c it.« letters 4-7 inclusive; As early as November 23, 1915 France had agreed th a t Aleppo, Hama, Horns, and Damascus to be in the Arab dominion and to be administered by the Arabs but under the French influence. E.Woodward and R.Butler, Documents on British Foreign Policy, 1919-1939, First series, Vol. IV, London, H.M.S.O., 1947, p. 481). Hussein "also sustained his claim to the Basra and Baghdad Vilayets, but offered the British the right of temporary occupation..." On January

30, 1915, McMahon "informed Hussein that he had received orders to accede to all his demand...The British were forced to tread easily...lest the

Arabs be alienated and go to the side of Turkey."1-

Nothing more was mentioned, in the correspondence, about the dis­ puted territories of Baghdad and Basra, and the coastal areas of the

Vilayets of Aleppo and Beirut. Thus, there was confusion concerning those territories. Was Great Britain giving in to Hussein's points of view, or, was their destiny left to be decided after the war?

Consequently, the Arabs sided with the A llies, and the revolt was proclaimed. Seizing upon this opportunity, the British lent material as well as political support to the revolt—famous among whom was T.E. Law­ rence—were sent to Hijaz. By the end of August 1916, almost all Hijaz

(with the exception of Medina which did not surrender until October 30,

1918) came under the control of the insurrectionists led by the Sherif.

On November 2, 1916, he was proclaimed King of the Arab cou n tries by a group of religious people, ulema, and notables. His position received great power sa n ctio n on January 3, 1917, when h is au thority was recog­ nized simultaneously, by Great Britain and France. Their proclamation, however, only recognized the Sherif as King of Hijaz.

On July 6, 1917, Aqaba was captured by Faisal, whose forces also took Amman on September 25, 1918. On October 3, 1918, Faisal accompanied

^Howard, op. c i t . . pp. 189-191 by T.E. Lawrence, entered Damascus, and immediately proceeded to set up an Arab government.

Previous to the above dovelopments, th e Arabs had been stunned when they learned about the Sykes-Pic ot Agreement of May 1916. In the main it provided that: (1) France and Great Britain were prepared to recognize and protect an independent Arab State or a Confederation of

Arab States in the areas (A) and (B) marked on an annexed map, under the su zerain ty o f an Arab c h ie f; (2) In area (A) France, and in area (B)

Great Britain, would have priority of right of enterprise and local loans;

(3) In area (A) France, and in area (B) Great Britain, should alone supply advisers or foreign functionaries at the request of the Arab State or Confederation of Arab States; (4) In the blue area France, and in the red area Great Britain, would establish such direct or indirect ad­ ministration or control as they desired and as they thought fit to arrange with the Arab State or Confederation of Arab States; (5) in the brown area there was to be established an international administration, the form of which was to be decided upon after consultation with Russia, and subsequently in consultation with the other Allies, and the represent - 1 atives of the Sherif of Mecca.

The Balfour D eclaration came as another unhappy su rp rise to the

Arabs. It was in the form of a letter, dated November 2, 1917, from

Mr. Balfour to Lord R othchild, which said:

1 J.O. Hurewitz, Diplomacy in the Near and Middle East, vol. II, A Documentary Record: 1914-1956, D. Van Nostrand Co., Inc., Princeton, New Jersey, New York, and London, 1958, pp. 18-22; Documents on British Foreign Policy. 1919-1939, 1st series, vol. 4, pp. 241-251; Howard, oj>. c it. . pp. 181-186. His Majesty's Government view with favor the establishment in Palestine of a National Home for the Jewish People, and w ill use their best endeavours to facilitate the achievement of this object, it being clearly understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine or the rights and political status enjoyed by the Jews in any other country.

Thus b efo re the year 1917 was out "the Arabs f e l t themselves doubly double-crossed by the Sykes-Picot Agreement of May 1916, and by 2 the Balfour Declaration of November 1917." Fighting side by side with

Faisal, T.E. Lawrence did not believe that his people, the British, would honor their promises to the Arabs. In his own words: "It was evident from the beginning that if we won the war these promises--by Great Brit­ ain to the Arabs—would be dead paper, and had I been an honest adviser o f the Arabs I would have advised them to go home and not r isk th eir lives fighting. I risked the fraud, on my conviction that Arab help was necessary to our cheap and speedy victory in the East, and that better 3 we win and break our word than lo se ."

Howard, Harry N., The King-Crane Commission. Khayats, Beirut, 1963, p. 4; Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons, vol. 99, col. 838, November 2 , 1917; Weizmann, Chaim, T r ia l and Error, Harper, N .Y ., 1949 Chapter XVIII; Leonard, Stein, The Balfour Declaration, Vallentine, Mitchell, London 1961, p. 681; Hurewitz, op. c it. , pp. 25-26. 2 Yale, William, The Near East, Ann Arbor, The University of Michigan P r e ss, 1958, p.- 260. q Garnett, David: The Essential of T.E. Lawrence, Jonathan Cape, London, 1951, p. 205. Lawrence was hoping to "defeat his country and its A llies in the council-chamber"; and indeed, at.the peace conference he worked hard with Faisal but without much success; but about three years later after the settlement of the Palestine, Transjordan and.the Iraqi questions, Lawrence felt that Britain had fulfilled its promises to the Arabs and "so we—the British—were quit of the war-time Eastern adven­ ture, with.clean hands." But the facts showed that the British hands were not quite that clean unless the words "advice" and "independence" could mean something different. (Ibid. , pp. 117-118, 205, 232-233). . 7

Due to the Arabs' uneasiness, Commander David Hogarth, the dis­ tinguished authority on the Near and Middle East, was sent on January 4,

1918 to convey a message of assurance to Hussein now King of the Hijaz, whose forces had rendered excellent service in the struggle against the

Ottoman Empire.'*’ Great B rita in , by issu in g the "D eclaration to the Seven", gave more assurances to the Arabs on June 16, 1918. 2

How were both banks of the Jordan—Transjordan and Palestine—to fit into the picture in light of the various British promises to the

Arabs? In general, it may be said that Transjordan fell within the ter­ ritory promised to the Arabs and its independence was to be recognized by

Great Britain. As for Palestine, however, there were different interpreta­ tions. The British argued that they meant to exclude it from the Arab

■^Great Britain, Parliamentary Papers, Cmd. 5964; Great Britain and Palestine 1915-1945, op. c it. . p. 147; Howard, The King-Crane Commission, pp. 4-5.

^British Cmd. 5964, Great Britain and Palestine 1915-1945, op. c it. , pp. 148-149: When rumours leaked out about the conflicting British promises to the Arabs, seven Arab leaders, from various parts of the Arab world, residing in Cairo presented a memorial to the British Government . asking for an explanation. The answer was delivered to them on June 16, 1918 by Commander D.G. Hogarth. His Majesty's Government emphasized that "Areas in Arabia which were free and independent before the outbreak of war" and "Areas emancipated from Turkish control by the action of the Arabs themselves during the war" their "complete and sovereign independ­ ence" to be recognized by Great Britain. And "Areas formerly under Ottoman dominion, occupied by the Allied forces during the present war" their "future government" to "be based upon the principle of the consent of the governed, and this policy has and w ill continue to have the sup­ port of His Majesty's Government." While "Areas s till under Turkish control...it is the wish and desire of His Majesty's Government that their oppressed peoples.. .should obtain their freedom and independence, and toward this, His Majesty's Government continue to labour." Kingdom. They tried to rest their argument on the phrase "portions of

Syria lying to the west of the D istricts, of Damascus, Horns, Hama and

A lep p o.. .should be excluded from the lim its demanded by the S h erif."

The Arab interpretation differed sharply from the British. The Arabs maintained that Hussein did not approve the British reservations about those portions, and that their future was to be agreed upon after the war. In fact they felt that it was impossible to consider Palestine as part of the disputed portions because it was farther south.*

A look at the map^clearly shows that those portions of Syria to I the west of the Districts of Damascus, Hama, Horns and Aleppo fa ll com­ pletely to the north of Palestine and consisted of the coast of the

Vilayet of Aleppo and that of the Vilayet of Beirut—to the north of the

Sanjak of Acre—which later became known as Lebanon. It is also very clear that the entire of Palestine falls not to the west of the "districts o f Damascus" but to the w est of the Sanjak of Hauran and the Sanjak of

Maan. Indeed, the southern part of the Najeb lies within the Sanjak of

Maan. Even if we look at the map^of the Sykes-Picot Agreement (which was

■^During the Palestine Conference held in London in February-March 1939, the B r itish rep resen ta tiv es—including Lord Maughan, the Lord Chancellor—agreed that "Arab contentions regarding the meaning of the disputed phrase have greater force than has appeared hitherto" but did not "agree that it is impossible to regard Palestine as covered by the phrase." British Cmd. 5974, p. 24; Howard, King-Crane Commission, op. c it. , p. 3; Great Britain and Palestine 1915-1945, o£. cit., p. 6. 2 Map No. 1 prepared by the British Government.

^Map No. 2 taken from the coloured map attached to the original agreement. negotiated behind the Arabs' backs, and never recognized by them), we can notice that that part of Palestine lying between the Gulf of Aqaba all the way to a distance of a few miles south of Jerusalem city, falls as is the case with Transjordan, within zone B, designated, in addition to zone A, as an independent Arab state. The international zone was to be carved out of the Vilayet of Beirut, from a point just to the north of

Acre all the way down (by going beyond the Vilayet's lim its, Nablus) to zone B. It is more likely that following the Balfour Declaration, Great

Britain decided to include in Palestine, not only the "international zone," but also a part of zone B in order to secure more breathing space to the promised "Jewish Home," in addition to the British major interest in securing the Suez Canal Zone. With the recent opening of the archives of the British Foreign Office up to 1915, these disputed points may be c la r if ie d .

When the war came to an end, the Allies ignored their agreements and eventually employed sheer force to deny,, to a great extent, their promises to the Arabs. The presence of Faisal in Damascus, together with

British forces alongside Arabian troops, irritated the French, who saw in him a British means for reducing their position in Syria. He tried without much success, to negotiate with the French in Paris. On September

15, 1919 an agreement was reached between the British and the French which gave France military control in Syria, and gave the British concessions in Palestine and Mosul.

After fruitless negotiations in Paris in 1918-1919, Faisal returned to Damascus, where he was offered the throne of Syria, on March 8, 1920, 10 by a congress of Syrian notables.'*' He accepted, and on the very next day the first Syrian government was formed. France and Great Britain refused to grant recognition to the new kingdom. At the same time the Allies signed agreements on April 25, 1920 in San Remo, under which Syria and

Lebanon became French mandates, while Palestine and Iraq became British mandates

The French moved quickly to assure their control of Syria. The

Arabs tried to resist the French onslaught by arms but were defeated after bitter fighting at Maisalon on July 24, 1920. The next day the French forces entered Damascus. All of Syria rapidly came under French control.

Faisal, who found himself a king without a kingdom, was given the Iraqi throne by the British.

Transjordan, which was to be a part of the Palestine mandate as­ signed to Great Britain, became a no-man's land crowded with many Arab nationalists who left Syria but continued to harass the French. Near anarchy ensued as bedouins raiding on th e s e ttle d population became so frequent that the country was rapidly becoming a center of lawlessness and disorder. In August 1920, the British High Commissioner for Palestine, eventually declared that Great Britain would help in setting up local governments in Transjordan, through the use of political advisers. Three governments were set up, one in Karak, for the south, a second in Amman,

■4lurewitz, Diplomacy in the Near and Middle East, ypj, :-II,r PP- 76-77.

^Ibid., p. 76; British Cmd. 675; Howard, Partition of Turkey, op. cit., pp. 242-243. 11

for the Belqa, and a third in Ajlun, for the north. Furthermore, small bodies of armed forces were organized to keep order and help in keeping

the road between Amman and Palestine safe.

The attempts to establish local governments were ineffective, how­ ever, and the situation deteriorated further. Not only were the raids

increased, but Transjordan became a center for military attacks on the

French in Syria. As a result of this situation the French threatened to

take over the country unless the British would establish order in Trans­

jordan, and stop all military attacks from there. At this juncture, Amir

Abdullah appeared at Maan, in November 1920, w ith the purpose of r e s to r ­

ing his brother, King Faisal, to the lost throne of Syria.

The Amir’s arrival in Transjordan caused much excitement through­

out the country. Abdullah proceeded northward to Karak where he was met by the British adviser of the local government, Captain Alec Kirkkride.

The British attitude toward Abdullah’s entry was not receptive, but at

the same time the British did not try to stop him by force. The situation was characterized by a wait-and-see attitude on the part of the British.

The people of Karak were very happy to welcome Faisal's brother, and the

local government "not only gave over their powers to him but begged him

to form a government on a national scale.Im m ediately following these

developments, Karak, Amman and Ajlun were linked together in one ad­ ministration with Amman as its center.

Abdullah’s swift occupation of Transjordan was accomplished at a

time when Mr. Winston Churchill, Secretary of State for the Colonies,

•*Ann Dearden, Jordan (London: Robert Hale Limited, 1958) p. 44. 12 had just arrived in Cairo to preside at a conference on Middle Eastern

Affairs. Colonel T.E. Lawrence was present at the conference as an ad­ viser on Arab affairs. He was, without doubt, helpful in the creation of Transjordan and in granting Iraq, at least a partial form of independence.

After considerable discussion, it was decided to let Abdullah stay in Transjordan as the representative of the Mandatory Power of Great Brit­ ain. A subsidy was to be given to the Amir provided that he agreed to bring an end the attacks on the French in Syria, and provided he renounced his claims to the Iraqi throne in favor of his brother, Faisal. This meant a change in the original roles of the two brothers as proclaimed in March

1920 by the Syrian Congress which gave Faisal the throne of Syria and that of Iraq to Abdullah.

The meeting between Abdullah and Churchill took place in Jerusalem on March 29, 1921. Churchill*s proposals were that Abdullah prevent action against the French, to renounce his rights and claims to Iraq, and to undertake to maintain order in Transjordan. He was also to recognize the British mandate over Transjordan as part of the Palestine mandate, and to set up an Arab government and administer the territory in the name of the mandatory. Abdullah was to receive for six months, a monthly subsidy of L5,000. A British representative of the High Commissioner was to be stationed in Amman as adviser to the Amir's government and to help set up the administration. The British were to recognize the independence of 1 Transjordan at some future date. After some hesitation, Abdullah accepted

1 Royal Institute of International Affairs, Great Britain and Palestine. 1915-1939, p. 14; Benjamin Shwadran, Jordan A State of Tension, Council for Middle Eastern Affairs Press, New York, 1959, p. 132. 13 the proposals the following morning.

According to Abdullah's version of the negotiations, Churchill had sa id :

The French will not tolerate Faisal's return to Syria. If you remain here, behave well and pursue the right course in this matter both here and in the Hejaz, we hope that France may change its mind, and, after a few months, give you your due; Syria w ill then be yours again.1- And as far as the Balfour Declaration was concerned, Church­ ill declined to discuss it, noting that the matter was left to the High Commissioner; but Abdullah replied that the Palestinian Arabs reject completely the declaration and we cannot accept, by no means, their destruction for the sake of the world Jewry.

On April 11, 1921, the first Transjordanian government was formed.

Through the creation of Transjordan (carved out of Greater Syria), Great

Britain achieved more than one objective: it secured smoother relation­ ships with France, by ending the raids on Syria; it brought law and order to the eastern side of the Jordan River and an end to the bedouin raids on the settled population on both sides of the River; it secured a safe and unbroken line of communications to Iraq on the route to India; and finally it might have felt that it had, partially, fulfilled its previous promises to the'Arabs.

To the dismay of the Arabs, they found themselves, after World War

I, in a position worse in many respects than they were before. They changed a weak master for two strong ones. Their land was divided into several parts, assuring more than ever, the control of the new masters:

This is not to mention the Balfour Declaration which resulted in a great

■^Abdullah, Mjr Memoirs Completed (Washington: 1954) pp. 32-33. 2 Al-Madi and S. Musa, The History of Jordan in the Twentieth Century in Arabic (Amman: 1959) pp. 149-150. 14 d isa ste r for the Arabs, e sp e c ia lly those of P a lestin e . As newcomers to contemporary international politics, the Arabs learned the hard way and at a very heavy p rice, about modern p o lit ic a l concepts such as "power politics," "universal morality," "self interest" and the reality of

" self-d eterm in ation ." Although th eir dream for independence and unity had turned out to be a mirage, their contact with the West opened their eyes to the reality of the world in which they were living. This awaken­ ing greatly helped them on the road toward progress.

After Abdullah was established in Transjordan, the British Govern­ ment submitted a new draft of the Palestine Mandate. This included

Article 25, which provided:

In the territories lying between Jordan and the eastern boundary of Palestine as ultimately determined, the Mandatory shall be entitled, with the consent of the Council of the League of Nations, to post­ pone or withhold application of such provisions of this mandate as he may consider inapplicable to the existing local conditions, and to make such provision for the administration of the territories as he may consider suitable to those conditions, provided no action shall be taken which is inconsistent with the provisions of Articles 15, 16 and 18 which are mainly concerned with freedom, equality for investment, and keeping order and stability.

This was officially approved by the Council of the League of

Nations on September 16, 1922.

On May 26, 1923, the Axnirate of Transjordan was declared an auton­ omous state under mandatory jurisdiction, and on February 20, 1928, a treaty was signed between Transjordan and Great Britain that recognized

Transjordan’s independence, but left financial matters and the conduct

■1-Great Britain, Parliamentary Papers, 1922, Cmd. 1785; Hurewitz,vol.II, op. cit. , pp. 106-111. 15 of foreign affairs in the hands of the British.^- A modification of the

Anglo-Transjordanian treaty, which gave Transjordan the right of consul­ ar representation to the neighboring countries, was agreed on in the ea rly 1930s; and at the same time the nucleus of th e famous Arab Legion was organized. In 1939 the treaty was revised making the Amir the

Commander-in-Chief of the m ilitary forces. During the Second World War the Amir sided firmly with the Allies, and played an active role in crushing the Iraqi rebellion in 1941, and later provided much assistance in the Syrian campaign.

On March 22, 1946, a new "Treaty of Alliance" was signed between

Great Britain and Transjordan recognizing Transjordan as a "fully in­ dependent state," but giving Great Britain at the same time the right to station forces on its soil and to continue its supervision over the Arab

L egion.2

A constitution for Transjordan was published on February 1, 1947, and became effective one month later. It provided for a parliament con- 3 sisting of two houses--Chamber of Deputies and Council of Notables.

At the same time the name of the Amirate was changed to the "Hashemite

Kingdom of Transjordan."

*Great Britain, Parliamentary Papers, Cmd. 3488; H. Sharabi, Governments and Politics of the Middle East in the Twentieth Century (New York; D. Van Nostrand Company, Inc. 1962) p. 182.

2Ib id , p. 182 3 Government of Transjordan, The O fficial Gasette. February, 1947; Raphael Patai, The Kingdom of Jordan (New Jersey. Princeton University Press, 1958) p. 46, ~~ 16

On March 15, 1948 a new treaty was signed with Britain, limiting the stationing of British forces in Transjordan only to Amman and

Mafraq. Great Britain was to defend Transjordan if attacked and to continue subsidies for the duration of the treaty through 1968.*

On November 29, 1947, the General Assembly o f the United Nations o passed a resolution to partition Palestine. It was rejected by the

Arab states, and accepted by the Israelis. Like the rest of the Arab countries, Transjordan participated in the Arab-Israeli war which started after the British mandate over Palestine came to an end on

May 15, 1948. When hostility ceased, Israel was in control of more than that which was allotted to it by the United Nations. On April 26, 1949, an armistice agreement was signed between Israel and Transjordan. Three weeks later Abdullah annexed Arab Palestine which was occupied by the

Arab Legion and the Ira q i army. He o f f i c i a l l y proclaimed the union, and gave it the present name of "The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan."

A new parliament--from both banks of the Jordan River—was elected on April 1950, and the two houses formally approved the union. Great

Britain recognized the new state three days later and extended her ob­ lig a tio n s to defend the new borders o f the Jordanian Kingdom. On July

20, 1951, while King Abdullah was entering the Mosque of Omar in

Jerusalem to perform the Friday prayers, he was shot by a young Pales­ tinian refugee named Mustafa Ishsho, His death deprived the young King­ dom of a strong, ambitious and experienced leader who can truly be called

*Great Britain, Parliamentary Papers 1948. Cmd. 7404. 2 U.N. General Assembly Resolution 181 (ll). . 17 the father of Jordan.* Talal became the new King, but was forced to re­ sign on August 11, 1952, because of ill health. During Talal's short reign a more liberal constitution was adopted.'*' A Regency Council was instituted to carry out the duties of the royalty until May 2, 1953, when King Hussein was sworn in as King on his eighteenth birthday.

Since the death of King Abdullah, political life in Jordan has been dominated by three major groups: the Palace, the Army and the

Nationalists. With the exception of the short period, 1955-57, during which the Nationalists were partially dominant, the Palace group, with the backing o f th e army has been the dominant one.

On March1 2, 1956, King Hussein increased his popularity by dis­ missing Lieutenant General John Bagot Glubb, Commander of the Arab

Legion; and on November 28, 1956, the Treaty of Alliance and Friendship of 1948 with Great Britain was abrogated by Jordan (and came to an end 2 on March 13, 1957). On January 19, 1957, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Syria signed in Cairo a joint ten-year pact with Jordan during which the

Hashemite Kingdom would get thirty-six m illion dollars annually in re­ placement of the British Subsidy.

In December 1956 the Nationalists may have pushed their interests far by coming out openly for the Federation of Jordan with one or more

Arab states. This, as expected, did not please the King; and on April

10, 1957, Premier Nabulsi (the leader of the largest national party--

*| ■■■See Appendix A. 2 Patai, op. cit., pp. 63, 64. 18

National Socialist Party) was dismissed on the charge o£ plotting to overthrow the King. The reaction of the Nationalists and their support­ ers, expressed in large demonstrations in Amman and other towns on

April 24, was met with strong police measures. Jordan closed its Syrian border and the Iraqi radio pledged full support against any attempt to attack Jordan.

At this juncture a new chapter in the history of Jordan was opened. The United States swiftly and strongly came out in support of

King Hussein. The cold war, the strategic position of Jordan with its long borders with Israel, and its inclusion of most of the Palestinian refugees increased the American interest in the tiny kingdom. The White

House issued a statement to the effect that the United States regarded as vital the independence and integrity of Jordan.^

On April-25, the United States' Sixth Fleet was instructed to cut short a visit to the French Riviera and proceed to the Eastfern Mediter­ ranean. Within a few days, April 28, 1957, the United States offered, and King Hussein accepted, a grant of $10 m illion to help him in his 2 struggle against the opposition. Relations between Jordan on one side and Syria and Egypt on the other continued to deteriorate, contrary to 3 Jordan's relations with Saudi Arabia (whose King was on an official v isit

■^Department of State: United States Policy in the Middle East, September 1956 - June 1957, p. 69. 2 Patai, o£. c it., p. 69. 3 Department of State's U.S. policy in the Middle East, op. c it. , p. 42; Department of State Bulletin, February 25, 1957. to the United States in January 1957 and came back hoping, as it seemed, to enjoy a bigger role in Arab politics) and the United States, although

King Hussein did not accept, officially, the Eisenhower Doctrine, While

Egypt and Syria refused to pay their pledge to Jordan, after the new developments, Saudi Arabia d id ; and at the same time the United States of America effected, on June 15, the payment of $5 million to Jordan as the first half of the $10 million pledged.in the previous month. By the end of June the United States allocated $20 million more to Jordan for military and economic aid. In September 1957, an airlift of United

States arms to Jordan began. The Jordanian Government declared that those arms would be used for defensive purposes "against Israel or any country that tried to attack Jordan."^

When Egypt and Syria united in February 1958, the Hashemite King­ dom reacted in the same month by forming a federation between Jordan and

Iraq. Following the Iraqi revolt of July 1958 (which ended the Hashemite federation and took Iraq, after a few weeks, out of the Baghdad Pact, and . threatened the very existence of Jordan) the West again came to the aid of the Hashemite Kingdom by sending British troops, at the time of the

American landing in Lebanon (which was at the time plagued by civil war) 2 on July 15, 1958, one day after the Iraqi revolt. When the situation became stable enough in that area, the American and British troops withdrew

^Patai, op. cit., p. 71.

^Department of State Bulletin. August 4, 1958, pp. 181-199.

^Ibid., October 27, 1958, p. 65. 20 but the American aid to Jordan was to be increased by about $50 million annually, as of 1964. Jordan continued to be one of the best friends of the United States of America outside the Western World.

Although the United States of America became very much involved in the affairs of Jordan since 1957, its relationship with it goes back to a much earlier date. It was a part of the American general approach to the Middle East, such a relation was gradually changing, though generally good, depending on the United States foreign policy objectives and on the development of the Jordanian affairs. The first contacts between both countries go back to the 1820s during the Presidency of

James Monroe, in the missionary enterprises which continued to expand until the present.'1' Another early contact came in 1848 through an ex­ ploration of the Jordan River and the Dead Sea by an American expedition 2 headed by Commander W.F. Lynch of the United States Navy.

Prior to World War I the American interests in the Middle East were relatively limited; it included activities of missionaries, edu­ cators, businessmen and other Americans living in that area.

Between the wars, American involvement increased as demonstrated by the King-Crane Commission, the Zionist pressure on the White House and the State Department concerning the Palestinian question, and the expanding American interests in business, mainly of o il.

i De Novo, J .; American Interests and Policies in the Middle East 1900-1939, The University of Minnesota Press, 1963, p. 8. 9 W.F. Lynch, Narrative of the United States Expedition to the R iver of Jordan and the Dead Sea (London: Richard B en tley, 1849). 21

The King-Crane Commission's v isit to Amman was another American-

Jordanian contact before the establishment of the Hashemite Kingdom. It took place on June 30, 1919, and was a colorful one. The Jordanian delegation, like the rest of the Arab delegations, in Palestine and

Syria, rejected the Balfour Declaration. The Commission, which was try­ ing to get the facts about the political conditions in the Middle East, in­ v e stig a te d and reported i t s recommendations. The report, which showed clearly the injustice, the impracticality and the strong opposition to the Zionist program, remained a secret for more than three years, in the files of the Department of State in Washington.'*' Zionist pressure might have been one of the primary reasons for delaying the publication of the report at that time. Although under heavy Zionist pressure, President

Wilson had given personal endorsement to the Balfour Declaration, and the Congress, in 1922, had endorsed the Declaration in principal, the

Department of State declined any endorsement of the Zionist program.

Although the United States, between the wars, reverted to a policy of isolationism, American overseas interests continued to expand. To this end American representatives, unable to participate actively, sat as observers in several international conferences, and signed bilateral agreements. The Arab East American diplomacy, therefore, was focused on traditional American interests such as missions, relief efforts,

1 Howard, oj>. c i t . . p. 311. 22

schools, expanding archeological ventures and business enterprises, es­

pecially oil. Prior to the independence of the various Arab countries,

the United States arranged for the protection of its interests by making

agreements with the Mandatory powers.

In Palestine, protection of American interests was secured, in­

directly, through Great Britain. To this end a convention between the

United States and Great Britain was signed in London on December 3, 1924.^

Several important points were agreed upon in the convention: the U.S.

consented to the administration of Palestine by Great Britain pursuant

to the mandate; United States nationals were to enjoy "all rights and

benefits secured under the terms of the mandate to members of the League

. of Nations and their nationals:

American property rights in the mandated territory to be respected; the U.S. to receive a copy of the annual report made by the manda­ tory; subject to local laws, the nationals of the United States to be "permitted freely to establish and maintain educational, phil­ anthropic and religious institutions in the mandated territory"; consular rights between both countries were to apply to the mandated territory; and finally, all points, in the convention, were not to be affected by any changes in the terms of the mandate unless such changes have been assented to by the United States.2

During the 1930s, tension and instability in Palestine resulted

in violent Arab uprisings bringing the Arab-Jewish question to the

foreign agents of the American foreign policy. The Zionists gathered

■^Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States. (FR), 1924, vol. II, pp. 212-222; League of Nations: Treaty Series, vol. 36, 1926, p. 161.

2Ib id . 23 forces to press Roosevelt's administration^to intervene and force Brit­ ish compliance with the Zionist interpretation of the Balfour Declara­ tion. The Zionists and their sympathizers flooded the Department of

State, during the fall of 1938, with petitions and telegrams. "Mr. Paul

M. Ailing, Assistant Chief of the Near Eastern Division, noted that about 2 65,000 telegrams had been received." The Arabs, limited in number in the United States, could not counter the Zionists' pressure; they tried to explain their case, mainly, through diplomatic channels. They argued the "justice" of their position relying in their argument, on the prin- 3 ciple of "self-determination." The State Department, preferring to spare the British additional troubles, remained neutral on the Palestinian q u estion . 4

During the Second World War, new American air bases, American forces, lend-lease agreements, economic and technical assistance, a constant traffic of American ships and cargoes and visitations by high level Americans, including President Roosevelt^, brought the United States into the Middle East. Although the Americans were content to leave diplomatic initiatives to the British, the signs of their policy interests

1Ibid.. FR, 1938, vol. II, p. 953; FR, 1939, vol. IV, pp. 332- 736; B r itish Cmd. 5964 and 5974.

2DeNovo, o£. c i t . , p . 342.

3FR, 0 £. cit.. 1936, vol. Ill, pp. 434-459; FR, 1937, vol. II, pp. 881-922.

4FR, o£. cit.. 1938, vol. II, pp. 889-1002; FR, 1939, vol. IV, pp. 694-696. 24 were visible in renewed concern about oil supplies--which led to some friction with Great Britain; in a concern about the Palestinian question which was an issue in the 1944 American elections; in a concern to con­ tinue the air base agreement with Saudi Arabia and in American support for Lebanese and Syrian independence after 1943. In general, the Amer­ ican activities, during the war, were innocent of policy objectives with respect to the Middle Eastern countries themselves; the American purpose was to help win the war and withdraw. The United States remained es­ sentially uninvolved and its prestige among the local populations remained very high.

At the end o f World War I I , the United S tates found i t s e l f forced to mobilize its efforts to prevent the expansion of communism. Drained by the war, Great Britain was too weak to hold the line and protect

Western interests in the Middle East in the face of aggresive Russia.

In the Middle East as in some other parts of the world, communists were on the move. The civil war in Greece, the Soviet pressure on Turkey and the establishment of a short lived communist regime in Azerbdijan under­ scored the Soviet threat. The United States reacted strongly and steadily to the Soviet moves. Through political, economic and military aid to

Greece, Turkey and Iran, it frustrated Soviet designs,'*'

To the Arabs, communism was only a potential danger, but the im­ mediate and real danger was seen in those who were occupying some parts of their lands—namely the Zionists, France and Britain. But their view

~*~The Department of State Bulletin, vol. XVI, No. 413, June 1, 1947, pp. 1070-1073. 25 of the United States was different; they saw in it as a champion of free­ dom, justice and self-determination. This is the picture which as a result was painted to them through Wilson's Fourteen Points and the various American institutions in the Arab world. Indeed, the United States did enjoy a great reservoir of good w ill among the Arabs. But to their dismay,

American support o f Zionism during the Truman adm inistration condemned traditional American-Arab friendship.

This support was exemplified by the pressure brought to bear on the British Prime Minister, Clement Atlee, for the immediate admission to

Palestine of 100,000 Jews, by the securing of the necessary votes to pass the United Nations Resolution for the partition of Palestine, and by according the state of Israel almost immediate recognition. Such acts by the President, Mr. Truman, disappointed many Arabs who believed that such 1 a p o lic y was not in lin e w ith United S ta tes in te r e s ts , ideafe and teach in gs.

It was not much later that the United States was trying to build up western sponsored alliances, in the face of the communist pressure, in the Middle East. The United Nations' recommendations for the partition of Palestine, which ignored the principle of self-determination, and which culminated in the Arabs' defeat, by the western supported Zionists, and the displacement of almost a whole nation, to make room for another,

1 How prophetic Sir Muhammad Zafrullah Khan was when he noted during the Palestine debate in the United Nations: "Remember that you may need friends tomorrow, that you may need allies in the Middle East. I beg of you not to ruin and blast your credit in those lands." Alfred Lilienthal, There Goes the Middle East. (New York, the Devin-Adair Company, 1957), p. 15. 26 was a major cause for the stubborn Arab refusal to join any Western alliance (with the exception of Iraq, 1955=1958, whose leaders, un­ fortunately paid with their lives as a price in the bloody Iraqi revolt of July 14, 1958). Through arms deals and economic agreements the

Soviet Union gained a foothold in the Middle East.

After the Palestinian fiasco, Jordan was in control of the largest portion of the small bit left to the Arabs from Palestine. This resulted in overburdening the New Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan with more than half a million Palestinian Arab refugees, who brought with them discontent, tension, instability and miseries. The United Nations' assistance was just enough to keep their bodies and souls together. In spite of additional

British assistance, Jordan was still in need of foreign aid if it were to maintain stability. The United States did not hesitate to extend in various aid forms a hand to the pressed Kingdom. CHAPTER I I

HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

The course of American-Jordanian relations cannot be separated

from the development of the Palestine question. As a political entity,

Palestine was created after World War I; and prior to that, all its

territory (or some parts of it) was occupied, through the ages, by sev­

eral nations.

Since the destruction of Jerusalem at the hands of the Romans in

135 A.D. and the spread of the Jews all over the world, until World War I,

Jewish history ceased to be that of Palestine. Since the reign of Omar,

the second Moslem Caliph, entered Jerusalem in 637 A.D., the Holy Land re­ mained in Moslem hands except during the time of the Crusades. Those Jews who were living in Arab lands enjoyed a great deal of freedom.^ The era

of persecution of the Jews did not begin in the Arab world it began in

Europe.^

Toward the end of the eighteenth and throughout the nineteenth

century the ideas of the American and the French revolutions helped to

^Palestine Royal Commission Report. His Majesty*s Stationery Office London, 1937, Cmd. 5479. pp. 6-7. Several waves of them followed on the heels of the Arab conquest, especially along the north-west of Africa and into Spain where "Jewish life attained the highest point it had reached since the loss of its old homeland. All walks of life were open to them., it appears in those days in Spain the relations between Arabs and Jews were quite harmonious. It is significant to note that the Spanish Jews, like those in other parts of the lands accepted assimilation in almost everything but religion. 28

free the Jews, in the west, from restrictions which were not imposed on

other c it iz e n s . Freedom came gradually and at d iffe r e n t tim es in d i f ­

ferent countries; while it came toward the close of the eighteenth cen­

tury in the United States and France, it had to wait about three-quarters

of a century longer before coming to Italy and Germany. In England it

came about 1890.

Since the dispersion of the Jews all over the world, their link to

Palestine had been mainly spiritual, and only to a very small degree,

physical. Their number in Palestine in 1845 was not more than 12,000.

This number was increased to about 55,000 by the time Allenby entered

Jerusalem in 1917.*

In August 1897,. the first world Zionist Congress was held in Basel,

Switzerland. The main accomplishments were the establishment of the Zion­

ist Organization, and the formulation of the Basel program, which became

the cornerstone of all Zionist groups. The program stated: "The aim of

Zionism is to create for the Jewish people a home in Palestine secured by 2 public law." The representatives of the most oppressed Jews in the world, namely of Poland and Russia, played the most important role in 3 shaping out the resolutions of the Basel Congress.

A world-wide Zionist movement was the result of the Basel Congress.

There were several differences not only among Jewish leaders of East and

^Don Peretz, The Middle East Today (New York: Holt, Rinehard and Winston, Inc., 1963) p. 251.

2Ibid.. p. 248.

^Walter Z. Laqueur, The Middle East in T ran sition (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1958) p. 208. 29

West Europe but also among the Zionists themselves. Some wanted to see

Palestine, simply, a center for the revival of Jewish spiritual and cul­ tural heritage rather than a political state for millions of Jews. Others emphasized the need for a physical refuge in Palestine or in any other territory like Uganda or Argentina. When Great Britain offered the Zion­ ists, in 1902, the opportunity to colonize Uganda, with full control over the area and granting them f u ll powers o f lo c a l autonomy under B r itish general control, many Jewish leaders welcomed the offer, but the majority, mostly made up of East Europeans, turned the offer down in favor of try­ ing to get Palestine instead.

Prior to World War I the Zionists were not able to secure the approval of any great power to approach Turkey on their behalf to start colonizing Palestine. Anyhow after some probing, the Ottoman Sultan made it clear that he was unwilling to surrender any of his authority over

Palestine or admitting large numbers of Jewish immigrants into it. Diaspora

Jews wrongly imagined Palestine as described in the Bible or by Herzel, as a land without a people awaiting a people without a land.1

J-One of the Jews observed in 1891: "We abroad have a way of think­ ing that Palestine today is almost desert, uncultivated wilderness, and that anyone who wishes to buy land there can do so to his heart's content. But that is not the case. It is difficult to find any uncultivated and unused land anywhere in the country. We abroad have a way of thinking that the Arabs are all savages, on a level with the animals and blind to what goes on around them. But that is quite mistaken. The Arabs, es­ pecially the townsmen, see, through our activities in their country, our aims, but they keep silence and make no sign, because for the present they anticipate no danger to their own future from what we are about. But if the time should ever come when our people have so far developed their life in Palestine that the indigenous population should feel more or less cramped then they w ill not readily make way for us.."(Hans Kohn Nationalism and Imperialism in the Hither East. London, G. Routledge and Sons, Limited, 1932, pp. 291-292). 30

By World War 1, Zionism had grown from a v isio n a ry idea to a strong world Zionist Organization with considerable finances. The Zionist leaders felt the time was expedient to press their claims to a homeland in Palestine; they started political maneuvers, especially Dr. Chaim

Weizmann who was bom in Russia and, at the time, a British citizen; he was a noted chemist, closely associated with British war leaders, and was destined to be the first president of modern Israel.

Hard-pressed in war, Great Britain was looking for a dramatic appeal to rally world Jewry to the side of its A llies. Perhaps winning the back­ ing of the American Jews and weaning Austrian and German Jews away from their Governments, was a British goal.

Mr. Lloyd George stated: "The Zionist leaders gave us a definite promise that, if the Allies committed themselves to giving facilities for the establishment of a national home for the Jews in Palestine, they would do their best to rally Jewish sentiment and support throughout the world to the Allied cause. The idea was that a Jewish state was not to be set up immediately by the Peace Treaty without reference to the wishes of the majority of the inhabitants (the Arabs).

To calm down the Arabs, on November 7 , the B r itish and French

Governments issued a joint Declaration of which was the following:

■'‘British Crad. 5479, pp. 23, 24; Lloyd George, Truth About Peace Treaties, vol. II, Chapter 23. 31

The object aimed at by France and Great Britain is the complete and definite emancipation of the peoples so long oppressed by the Turks, and the establishment of National Governments and administra­ tions deriving their authority from the initiative and free choice of the indigenous population.

The Arabs were very much enraged and disappointed when they learned about the Balfour Declaration. However, an agreement was signed on 2 January 4 , 1919, between F a isa l and Weizmann.

The King-Crane Commission. While the Zionists welcomed both the

Balfour Declaration and a mandate over Palestine which "was framed un- 3 mistakably in the Zionist interest," the Arabs opposed both very strongly, and demanded instead independence and u n ity; and i f th e mandate had to be imposed they preferred the United States, to be the mandatory power, to any other power, as was clearly indicated in the King-Crane Commission's

1 Ib id . . p. 25

2 David Hunter M iller, Mjr Diary at the Conference of Paris, with Documents, vol. Ill, Appeal Printing Company, 1928, New York, pp. 188- 189; George Antonius, The Arab Awakening. Hamish Hamilton, 1955, London, pp. 437-439. Faisal did not object to Jewish immigration to Palestine provided the Arabs obtain their independence; and in return, Weizmann promised Zionist assistance for the development of Arab economy. But Faisal made his agreement conditional; he insisted that if Arab national­ ists' aspirations were not fully realized he would "not then be bound by a s in g le word of the present agreement which sh a ll be deemed void and o f no account or validity, and I shall- not be answerable in any way whatso­ ever." Needless to say, the Arab aspirations did not materialize, the fact which rendered Faisal-Weizmann agreement "void and of -no account or v a lid ity ."

3 Hurewitz, J.C., The Struggle for Palestine. Norton, New York, 1950, p. 18. 32 report, which opposed unlimited Zionist designs for Palestine.'*' When the report was published it was met with mixed feelings; while the Zionists and th e French condemned i t , i t was praised and welcomed by the Arabs and by a large segment of the American press. Being kept secret for about three years and with America turned isolationist, the report was not of practical importance, although it was a very valuable historical document.

Concerning Palestine the Commissioners "made their recommendations simply on the basis of the facts as they found them in Palestine at the time, when only about ten per cent of the population appeared to be Jewish. De­ velopments within Palestine since 1919 would seem, in part at least, to justify the recommendations of the commission, since Palestine became a battleground among the fo rces o f Zionism and Arab N ationalism and B r itish

Imperialism, centering around the control of the Suez Canal and the East­ ern Mediterranean Sea." These difficulties continued throughout the inter­ war period, the Second World War and afterwards, and ultimately in the struggle which led to the partition of Palestine and the establishment of the State of Israel during 1947-1949. Indeed, the last chapter of the

Palestinian tragedy is yet to be written.

■^Howard, op. c it.. pp. 73, 85, 86; The Commission's investigation was to determine the w ill of the people, mainly in Syria. It was strongly opposed by the French, who refused to participate in it, and by the Zion­ ists who wanted to exclude Palestine from the investigation. After some confusion and delay the Commission (appointed by President Wilson, and only from American to emphasized impartiality) was able to start its work in June 1919; and within a few weeks, the investigation was completed and the findings submitted to the Department of State. (Ibid., pp. 73, 85, 86, 311). 33

The concept of a 'national home1 was not known in international

law, and was not clarified in the mandate. Was it a vehicle for the

creation of a Jewish State? or was it an end in itself? and if so at * what point could it be considered established? the definition seemed

to be determined by British policy, the efforts of the Zionists to materi­

alize their claims and the strength of the Arabs to resist the new danger.

Thus, the stage was set, more or less, for a game of power without much

regard to the principle of self-determination.^

British Mandate for Palestine. Although the mandate for Palestine

did not come officially into operation until July 24, 1923 after the 2 signing of the Treaty of Lausanne, the history of its execution may be

said to have begun on July 1, 1920, when Sir Herbert Samuel, a British 3 Jew, assumed office as the High Commissioner of Palestine. The Zionists were very happy with his appointment, while the Arabs were immensely dis­

appointed at seeing a Jew in such a position. Just about six months before

-^David Hunter H iller had advised President Wilson at the Paris Peace Conference "the rule of self-determination, would prevent the establish­ ment of a Jewish state in Palestine." (Ibid., p. 27). If every people were allowed to go back where their ancestors or simply co-religion used to live about 2000 years ago (as in the case of the Jewish immigration to Palestine after the mandate) the map of the world would have to be completely altered with unheard of world wide conflicts.

^League of Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 36, 1926, p. 161. 3 Esco Foundation for Palestine, Inc., Palestine - A Study of Jewish. Arab and British Policies. vol. I, (Yale University Press, New Haven, 1947), p. 256. 34 he took office, the High Commissioner expressed his views on the Pales­ tinian issue as follows:

The immediate establishment of a complete and purely Jewish state in Palestine would mean placing a majority under the rule of a minority; it would therefore be contrary to the first principles of democracy.. .The policy (then should be)...the promotion to the ful­ lest degree the conditions of the country allow, of Jewish immigra­ tion. • • in order that with the minimum of delay the country may be­ come a purely self-governing commonwealth under the auspices of an established Jewish majority.

After taking office, the High Commissioner seemed to change, some­ what in order to be more in line with British official policy. In the first week of July 1920, he made a statement of policy before a gathering of Palestinian representatives: "Measures shall be adopted to secure the gradual establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people. These measures will not in any way affect the civil or religious rights or diminish the prosperity of the general population of Palestine."

During his visit to Cairo in March 1921, Churchill refused to see the representatives of the Palestinian Arabs who were demanding the re­ pudiation of the Jewish national home policy; and he made it clear, after arriving in Palestine, that:

Great Britain had, through Mr. Balfour, promised to facilitate the development of the Jewish national home in Palestine and this necessarily involved Jewish immigration. It was on the basis of the Balfour Declaration that Great Britain had received the mandate; and that on this basis the mandate would be implemented.

1Ibid., 262

2I b id .

3Ibid., p. 265 Thus from the beginning the Palestinian Arabs were alarmed by the flood of the Jewish immigration which doubled their number between 1918 and 1925. The Arabs could see that they, themselves, would be the minor­ ity if the flood of the newcomers could not, somehow, be checked (indeed even worse than what they thought happened to them, about twenty-five years later, when most of them became refugees). The new settlers con­ tinued to live in their own cities and settlements without much contact with the Arabs, the thing which widened more and more, the gulf between both communities. Disturbances ranging from peaceful strikes to armed attacks and counter-attacks by Arabs, Jews and British were very frequent.

It is clear from the chart of the Jewish immigration to Palestine, th a t the number of th e newcomers was r e la tiv e ly low during the depression years; but it jumped sharply in 1933, when Hitler came to power and the pressure on the Jews grew worse in East Europe. It jumped from 9,353 in

1932 to 30,327 in 1933--more than a three-fold increase. This does not include the illegal Jewish immigration which was estimated to be 22,400 in the two years 1932-33 alone. The Arab legal immigration was ranging from 202 in 1920 to 903 in 1935; and their illegal immigration, especially from Hauran, was in the hundreds, too, but "mainly casual, temporary and 1 season al."

In addition to the usual protests to the British High Commissioner and the League of Nations, the Arab reaction to the new waves of Jewish / . immigration was, more than ever, intensified; besides demonstrations and armed a tta c k s, a campaign, in which the Supreme Moslem Council took an 36 a c tiv e p art, was organized in 1933 to prevent more Arab land from passing to Jewish hands.*

The Balfour Declaration and the idea of a Jewish national home in

Palestine whs reaffirmed, but the Jews were not to share in any degree in the government of the country; subordination of the Arab population, culture or language was not contemplated; and Jewish immigration not to 2 exceed the economic absorption of the country.

When British policy was put to the test and it became evident that the task was much more bloody and d if f ic u lt than a n ticip a ted , sev era l investigating commissions were sent to Palestine from time to time, through­ out the mandate.

"The various commissions of inquiry had preached from the same O text." The first, the Haycraft Commission,was sent in 1921. A second, the Shaw Commission was sent in 1930. Its report did not please the Zion­ ists; and consequently Great Britain sent another in 1930, the Hope Simp­ son Mission. The findings of all the commissions were, more or less, sim ila r . The grievances of the Arabs were unchanged, and the same w ith those of the Jews.

The underlying causes for the dissatisfaction of the Arabs were their desire for national independence and their fear of the establishment

1 1Ib id . . p. 63.

^Great Britain, Parliamentary Papers. 1922, Cmd. 1700, pp. 17-21; Antonius, op. c it. , Chapters 14, 16.

3Cmd. 5479, o£. c it. , p. 57. 37 of the Jewish national home in Palestine. In addition, there were other subsidiary factors such as Jewish immigration, which they feel, if con­ tinued, would turn them, in a short time, from a majority to a minority; their alarm at the..continued purchase of their land by the Jews, which resulted in making thousands of Arabs landless;^ the refusal of Jews to employ Arab laborers; and inadequate funds for Arab education. Although the number of schools was increasing, nevertheless it remained inadequate.

"Out of an Arab population of school-age estimated at about 260,700 only 3 42,700 approximately are at present accommodated in government schools." 4 The Jewish grievances and demands might be illustrated as follows:

1 Ibid., p. 176 - The Shaw and Hope Simpson Commissions reported that the plain fact "that there is no further land available which can be occupied by new immigrants—the Jews— without displacing the present population— the Arabs—...I t is clear...that of the land which remains with the govern­ ment at the present time the area is exceedingly sm all...It cannot be argued that Arabs should be dispossessed in order that the land should be made available for Jewish settlement."

Ibid.. p. 251 - Hope Simpson reported: Attempts are constantly being made to establish the advantage which Jewish settlement has brought to the Arabs. The most lofty sentiments are ventilated at public meetings and in Zionist propaganda...The present position, precluding any employment of Arabs in the Zionist colonies, is undesirable from the point of view of both justice and of the good govern­ ment o f the country. I t was extrem ely d if f ic u lt to meet the demands o f both sides besides those of the British, who wanted to maintain their control over the country. Thus not much was done to improve the situation which continued to deteriorate in proportion to the increased German Jews who flooded the country.

3Great Britain, Palestine Roval Commission op. cit., pp. 272-274

4Ibid. 38

Display of ’'pro-Arab” sentiment by British officials, failure to carry out the mandate, toleration of the Government of subversive Arabs, and failure of the Government to introduce a land system appropriate to the needs of the country they wanted to be opened to Jewish immigration as the case with Palestine. Great Britain's position was very difficult in the lig h t o f such con trad ictin g demands and grievances and when ..the newcomers reached 61,854 in 1935, surpassing all previous records, the worst revolt ever to grip the country exploded in 1936. In their despair, the Palestinian Arabs proclaimed, on April 21, 1936, a general strike which was accompanied by violence ranging from demonstrations in the streets to armed attacks, directed mainly against the government, although the Jews were not spared either. The country was placed under martial law and the number o f B r itish troops brought to the country reached, w ith in a few weeks, "about 20,000."^ The strike was very effective and costly in liv e s and w ealth . As u sual, P a le stin ia n Arabs, C hristians and Moslems were united in action. "There was the same consolidation of the Arab nationalist forces, a ll parties uniting and Christian making common cause with Moslem.11,

During the first six months of the disturbances the Jews lost about 80 liv e s , and the government about 37; but at the same tim e, the Arabs lo s t 3 over 1,000, mostly killed by troops and police.

*Ibid. , p. 73; Great Britain and Palestine, op. cit. , pp. 115-45J Hurewitz, The Struggle for Palestine, op. c it. . chap. V, Al-Madi. oj>. c it. . pp. 453-458. 2 Britain's Palestine Roval Commission, op. c it. , pp. 75. 3 The Political History of Palestine under British Administration, Memorandum by His Britannic Majesty's Government presented in 1947 to the United Nations Special Committee on Palestine, p. 10. 39

A fter many appeals for peace from sev era l Arab r u le r s , m ostly those of Iraq, Transjordan and Saudi Arabia, the Palestine Arab Higher

Committee agreed to call off the strike on October 12, 1936, and to accept getting in touch with the British Royal Commission (known as the Peel Com­ m ission ) which was coming to P a le stin e in November 1936,

Conducting a lengthy investigation, the Commission submitted to the B r itis h Government a d eta iled report on July 7, 1937, in which the 1 termination of the mandate and the partition of Palestine were recommended.

According to th e p a r titio n plan, which was recommended fo r the f i r s t tim e, a Jewish state was to be created including most of the coastal region and the Northern part of the country; the second part including Jaffa, Jerusa­ lem and Bethlehem, connected by a corridor, under the mandatory power; and the rest of Palestine to be united with Transjordan. Soon the British

Government announced its acceptance of the recommendations. The plan was o f f i c i a l l y rejected by both Arabs and Jews, although many Z io n ists w el­ comed i t ; and at the same tim e, Amir Abdullah and some o f h is fo llo w e rs, 2 Palestinians and Transjordanians, were suspected of favoring the plan.

The United States Government "announced its neutrality toward the

Royal Commission's scheme, by declaring that its concern in the matter" was "based exclusively on its obligation and purpose to provide for the

1 Hurewitz, The Struggle for Palestine, p. 72; Great Britain and Pales­ tine, op. cit. , Chapter II.

2 Hurewitz, The Struggle for Palestine, p. 78. 40 protection of American interests in Palestine on a basis of equality with 1 those of other governments and their nationals."

On September 8, 1937 a Pan-Arab Congress was held at Bloudan, Syria.

The Congress passed several resolutions demanding the withdrawal of the

Balfour Declaration, ending the Mandate, and the independence of Palestine.

Soon after the congress the rebellion exploded again with growing intensity and continued u n til World War I I , although toward the end i t lo s t much momentum and order.

During this difficult period the United States Policy makers were in touch with British officials as well as with Arab and Zionist leaders. 3 Nevertheless the American official position remained more or less neutral.

During 1938, Great Britain started to have another look afc. the

Palestinian problem. It is true that more Jews were leaving Germany under

Nazi pressure; but it is true, too, that Great Britain's position was steadily deteriorating in the Arab world, mainly as a result of its Pales­ tine policy., To make things more uncomfortable to Great Britain, Italy and Germany, which already undermined British prestige in Europe and Africa, were making friendly gestures to the Arab nationalists, in the form of propaganda and granting many scholarships to Arab students. Great Britain

*Ibid., p. 76; Great Britain and Palestine, oj>. c it. , pp. 106-107; FR, 1936, vol. Ill, pp. 434-459; FR,“T?37, vol. II, pp. 881-922.

^Al-Madi, op. c it., p. 458.

3FR, 1937, vol. II, pp. 881-922; Ibid., 1938, vol. II, pp. 889- 1002. 41 was worried about the propaganda to the extent of concluding with Italy in April 1938, an agreement under which Rome promised to abandon its Ara­ bic broadcasts. Prime Minister Chamberlain later explained in Parliament that specific oral assurances had been received from the Italian Foreign

M inister th a t h is Government "would abstain from crea tin g d if f ic u lt ie s and embarrassment to His Majesty's Government in the administration of

Palestine."'*'

In trying to help in the realization of the Zionist dream, Great

B rita in lo s t much goodw ill throughout the Arab and Moslem world and in lives and wealth as well. Great Britain might have felt, too, that Pales­ tine Arabs were paying too much of a price for the mistakes of others, by admitting more and more Jewish immigrants to the country. A change of policy seemed necessary, if the British position was to be strengthened in the Arab East, especially when the clouds of war were lengthening over

Europe.

After the failure of the London Conference of February 1939, the o British Government issued another White Paper in which it stated a policy.

It announced the Government's intention to grant Palestine, within ten years, fu ll independence which would be conditional upon the establishment of good relations between the two peoples. The constitution was to be drafted by Arab, Jewish and British representatives, five years after the restoration of peace and was to include safeguards concerning the Holy

^Hurewitz, The Struggle for Palestine, op. c it. , p. 86.

3Great Britain, Parliamentary Papers. Cmd. 6019; Hurewitz, Diplomacy in the Middle East, pp. 218-226, (vol. II.) 42

Places, the special position of the Jewish National Home, and British commercial and strategic interests. It ruled out, unequivocally, the es­ tablishment of Palestine as a Jewish state. Concerning immigration, it rejected the argument that economic capacity was to be the determining factor in the number of the new comers. To that it added the political factor as well.

The mandatory could, therefore, no longer overlook the harmful effect of immigration upon the political conditions in the country. The indefinite growth of the national home through immigration 'against the strongly expressed w ill of the Arab people would mean ^ 'rule by force', a condition contrary to the spirit of the mandate.

Consequently the number of Jewish immigrants to Palestine, in the five years, beginning April 1, 1939, was limited to 75,000, two-thirds of them on the basis of absorptive capacity and the rest as "contribution to­ ward the solution of the Jewish refugee problem." After that period Jew­ ish immigration would depend on Arab approval. The sale of land was to be regulated in order to avoid an early appearance of "a considerable 2 landless Arab population."

The Arab rea ctio n to the White Paper was in g en era l, unfavorable, with the exception of Transjordan, the only Arab State to commend the 3 White Paper. The Jewish reaction was violent. Demonstrations were staged in several Jewish cities. Ben-Gurion wrote:

1Ibid., p. 102.

2Ibid. , pp. 101, 102.

%reat Britain and Palestine, 1915-1945, oj>. c it. . pp. 126-127; Al-Madi* oj>. c it. . pp. 457-462. 43

The Jewish demonstrations of yesterday marked the beginning of Jew­ ish resistance to the disastrous policy now proposed by His Majesty's Government. The Jews w ill not be intimidated into surrender even if th e ir blood be shed.-*-

The immigration provisions of the new policy, were the only ones that Great Britain tried to put into effect. To combat the new policy

"the quasi-government—the Jewish Agency—publicly sanctioned, and privately organized, illegal immigration. In the meantime the government started reversing i t s p o licy toward the Haganah which was enjoying " se m i-o ffic ia l recognition." Its membership during the first part of 1939 reached 18,000.

All of them were trained and many were equipped with "Lewis guns, grenades and r ifle s ." ^

Cleverly, the Zionists started to put pressure on the American

Department of State in order to reverse the British new policy; but it did not give in an "reaffirmed its evasive stand...that Washington was power­ less to prevent changes in the terms of the Palestine Mandate."^

Palestine During World War II. Throughout the period of the War, the Palestinian Arabs stopped all military activities against both the

British and the Jews. Besides ceasing their hostilities, the Palestinian

Arabs put their resources at the disposal of the Allies and about 9,000

^Esco, o£. c it., vol. II, p. 910. 2 Hurewitz, Struggle for Palestine, op. c it. . p. 109.

3Ibid., p. 105. 44 1 volunteers served in the British forces. After the war broke out Ben-

Gurion defined accurately the Zionist policy at the time, when, he pro­ claimed "we shall fight the White Paper as if there is no war; and we 2 shall fight the war as if there is no White Paper."

The Jewish Agency wanted to organize a separate m ilitary force mainly for the defense of Palestine. A separate Jewish brigade with its own insignia and flag was not approved by the British until September 1944.

Prior to this date the Jewish volunteers, who numbered about 35,000, in addition to 15,000 serving as special police forces in Palestine, were 3 . serving in regular British military units. The Zionists' pressure to in­ crease the number of their volunteers was not only because of their hatred of Hitler but also to increase their military strength in order to imple­ ment their political goals. Indeed, when the time came their preparations proved to be useful in fighting both the British and the Arabs. While the

Zionists were helping the A llies in the War on one hand they were dis­ crediting their effort, through their terrorist activities and organizing illegal immigration during the War and afterwards. Indeed all the Zionist

■^At the same time the other Arab countries put their civilian and military services at the disposal of the Allies, especially the Transjordan­ ian Army which, besides its major role in subduing the Iraqi revolt took an active part in ending the Vichy Administration in the Levant States. (Esco, 0j>. c it., vol. II, pp. 1080-1088)

Barnet Litvinoff, Ben-Gurion of Israel« New York, Praeger, 1954, P. 132.

3Ib id . 45 military organizations took part in such activities, although at various levels and at different times. The ultra extremist group, Stem, started its terrorist activities, as early as 1942, against the British military and civilian personnel and installations, although the Arabs were attacked 1 too, from time to time.

The other m ilitary groups were the Irgun, which was an extremist one, and the Haganah, which was sem i-official and relatively not as ex­ tremist as the Irgun. Indeed, both groups "the Irgun and the Haganah" fought side by side but not under a unified command. This joint force was 2 called the "Resistance Movement." Throughout the war and after, both groups concentrated on assassinations, attacking civilian installations, and bringing thousands of illegal immigrants into the country.

Although Sir Harold MacMichael, the British High Commissioner in

Palestine, barely escaped assassination in August 1944, Lord Moyne, the

British Minister of State in the Middle East was assassinated by the 3 Z io n ists in C airo, on November 16, 1944. The Z io n ist a tta c k s, too, caused much destruction of government property during 1944. Soon after the war, the Zionist attacks were intensified more than ever. The British counter measures were extremely mild compared to those used against the Arabs, especially during their revolt of 1936. Such mild measures were not much

1-Hurewitz, the Struggle for Palestine, op. c it., p. 165.

^Menachem Begin, The Revolt, Story of the Irgun, New York, Henry Shuman, 1951.

^Al-Ahram Newspaper (A rab ic), November 17, 1944. 46 more than occupying, for a while, the headquarters of the Jewish Agency,

"evacuating all non-essential personnel from Palestine," and those who remained had to live in some fortified areas surrounded by barbed wire 1 fences, sarcastically called by the Zionists "British Ghettoes".

A great deal of the money, which helped the terrorists to buy wea­ pons and ammunition, was collected in the United States, tax-exempt and supposed to be used for charity purposes.

To undo the 1939 White Paper and realize their goals, the Zionists' activities during the war, and after, were not only of a military nature but of a political nature as well. At the Twenty-First Zionist Congress, which met at Geneva, Switzerland, in August 1939, it was decided to enlarge the Zionist political apparatus in London, and to strengthen the Zionist organization in the United States in Order to increase the Zionist pressure 2 on a political plane.

In Great Britain the Zionist pressure was a major reason for the

Labor Party's policy statement of April 1944, in which the Party's na­ tional executive urged the removal of the ban on Jewish immigration and even recommended th a t:

The Arabs be encouraged to move out as the Jews move in. Indeed, we should re-examine also the possibility of extending the present Palestine boundaries, by agreements with Egypt, Syria, or Trans­ jordan. 3

It seemed that the Labor Party went even beyond what the Zionists

1 Begin, pp. cit., p. 50. 2FR, 1941, vol. Ill, pp. 596-597, 601-602. 3 Hurewitz, The Struggle for Palestine, p. 215. 47

were asking. The Arabs showed much resentment and protested, strongly,

against the Laborites who in fact, ignored to a great extent, their

promises after coming to power in 1945.

As early as 1940, the Zionists "decided to make the United States

their power base in the diplomatic maneuvers and campaigns which led to

the establishment of Israel during 1947-1948. Ben Gurion noted that 'aside

from the Yishuv—the Jews in Palestine—itse lf, we had no more effective

tool at our disposal than the American Jewish community and Zionist move­

ment."^ In order to protect American interests, the American diplomats

in the Middle East had, repeatedly, advised the American Government against 2 supporting the Zionist: cause.

In May of 1942, the Zionists called an extraordinary conference at

the Hotel Biltmore in New York City. After extensive discussions the

Zionists reformulated their program which became known as the Biltmore

Program. In brief, it called for making Palestine a completely independent

Jewish state, "having its own army, flag and administration, unfettered

by the policy of the mandatory power...it implied that the mandatory power

should surrender vast stretches of unoccupied land not yet purchased by 3 the Jewish settlers in Palestine". Few dissenting voices were raised at

*Harry N. Howard, "The United States and I sr a e l: C o n flicts o f In­ terests," Issues, Summer 1964, p. 16; Ben-Gurion,"0n the Road to the State'j XIII Jewish Observer and Middle East Review 3, January 31, 1964, pp. 14-16.

2FR, 1941, vol. I ll, pp. 596-597, 601-602, 609-610; FR, 1942, vol. IV, pp. 538-540, 556; FR, 1943, vol. IV, pp. 755,757-763; FR, 1944, vol. V, pp. 629-630, 631-633.

^ESCO, op. c it. , vol. II, pp. 1014-1016, 1085-1087. 48 the time but were drowned out in the Zionist uproar.^

After the Biltmore Conference, Zionist propaganda became extremely active in the United States with the intention of creating American public opinion favorable to the Zionists' aims. They did their best, too, in trying to influence and pressure many people in key positions and high places like the White House, the Department of State and Congress, After damaging the position of Britain in the Arab world, for the sake of their own interests, indeed the Zionists were not hesitant in trying to sacrifice the American interests as well. The American Zionists were coordinating their efforts on a national scale by a network of 76 states and regional branches, which were further subdivided into some 380 local committees.

One outcome of the campaign was the adoption of pro-Zionist plants by both major parties in the 1944 presidential elections, and by the C.I.O. as well as the A.F.L. in their national conventions of that year. Another was the passage of pro-Zionist resolutions by 33 state legislatures.2

The Arab response was mostly in the form of protests by the individ­ ual Arab governments and through the Arab League which was o f f i c i a l l y form­ ed on March 22, 1945. For example, Amir Abdullah of Transjordan sent a

*0ne of the dissenters was Dr. Judah L. Magnes, the first presid­ ent of the Hebrew University in Jerusalem. He belonged to the Ihud Party, which called for a bi-national state, and believed in reconciliation and peaceful coexistence with the Arabs. He had never subscribed to the idea of Jewish nationalism. Another group of American Jews which organized it ­ self after the Biltmore Conference, and came to be known as the American Council for Judaism, affirm "that Judaism is a religious faith and not a national entity, and that Jews in their spiritual affiliations should be loyal citizens of the respective countries which are their homeland." (Ibid., pp. 1016, 1094-1098).

2Hurewitz, oj>. c it. . p. 210^ (The Struggle for Palestine). 49 telegram on March 3, 1944 to President Roosevelt protesting the pro-

Zionist attitude of the American Congress. Roosevelt assured the Amir that the American Government would not take any decision concerning the

Palestinian question without prior full consultation of both Arabs and

Jews.* Through the Americans in the Arab lands (business people, educators, diplomats, etc.), the Arabs tried to explain their case. At the same time during the meeting between Roosevelt and Ibn Saud, aboard the heavy cruiser

U.S.S. Ouincv in the Eastern Mediterranean in 1945, the American President assured the Arabian monarch that he "would sanction no American move hos- tile to the Arab people." In the previous year, the American President 3 gave the Arabian monarch the same assurance.

The Zionists could not push President Roosevelt too far as the case with his successor, Truman. One of their leaders—Dr. Neumann— ad­ mitted frankly:

To cross him (Roosevelt,) to offend him...was to court disaster for the Zionist cause...The 'going became easier1 after Harry Truman took office...The successor to F.D.R., we are told was a far less complex personality than his illustrious predecessor—less adroit and sophisticated, simpler and straightforward. He accepted the Zionist line reluctantly and under pressure, at first, but having accepted it, he followed through honestly and firmly. In the end he found himself in direct conflict with Britain's Bevin. He did not shrink from the

*A1-Madi, oj>. c it. . p. 462; FR, 1944, vol. V, p. 582.

2Lilienthal, Alfred, What Price Israel, (Chicago: Henry Regnery Co., 1953), p. 91.

^FR, 1944, vol. V, pp. 624-626; the President had assured again, the Arabian monarch, about his policy concerning Palestine in a message dated April 5,. 1945 (Department of State, A Decade of American Foreign Policy 1941-1949, Washington 1950, pp. 810-811; Department of State Bulletin, October 21, 1945, p. 623). 50

encounter but he stuck to his guns and forced the State Department to acquiesce in his pro-Zionist policy.

Being subjected to Zionist pressure, Mr. Truman gave in to their

demands. Shortly after he came to the White House, he asked the British

Government to issue one hundred thousand (100,000) certificates for Jew­

ish immigration to P a le stin e . The B r itish Government declin ed h is demand

pending full consideration of the whole Palestine question.

The Arabs responded with sharp protests and astonishment at Truman's

attitude. King Ibn-Saud in a letter to Mr. Truman implied that the Pres­

ident had broken earlier American promises to the Arabs, because of his

support to the Zionists. In his answer, President Truman, denied that

his pleas for large scale immigration and his backing of the Agency's

participation plan "in any sense represent an action hostile to the Arab 2 people." Was President Truman really convinced of his argument? Mr.

Truman's pro-Zionist endorsement allegedly "was made against the counsel 3 of his foreign affairs advisers." The story of the 100,000 Jewish im­

migrants was just a ring in a chain of Mr. Truman's pro-Zionist policy which harmed g r e a tly the American goodw ill end in te r e s ts in th e Arab w orld.

The Zionists did their best to bring to Palestine as many Jewish im­

migrants as possible. This was done largely in the name of humanitarianism

^ L ilie n th a l, op. c i t . , p. 92 and 9 3 .

^New York Times, September 2, 4; October 5, 1946.

%urewitz, op. cit. . p. 265 j (The Struggle for Palestine). as a cover for the real motive, nationalism.1

The Zionists did their best, too, to discourage and oppose the plana, of Presidents Roosevelt and Truman to solve the problem of all war refugees—of color, race or religion—on a world-wide scale. In the words of Roosevelt:

They—the Zionists—know that they can raise vast sums for Pales­ tine by saying to donors, *there is no other place this poor Jew can go.* But if there is a world political asylum for all people irrespec­ tive of race, creed or color, they cannot raise their money.2

When Hr. Morris Ernst tried to convince his Jewish friends with the soundness of Roosevelt's plan for the refugees they did not hesitate to accuse him with "treason." Indeed, a generaous admission of Jewish dis­ placed persons to the United States, and other countries, would have eradicated the necessity for a "Jewish State." Yet the "human flotsam in concentration camps impressed the Zionists, in addition to money raising, only in two respects—as manpower and as justification for Jewish state­ hood." A Yiddish paper commented on the subject, at the time, "by pres­ sing for an exodus of Jews from Europe; by insisting that Jewish D.P.'s do not wish to go to any country outside of Israel; by not participating in the negotiations on behalf of the D.P.'s; and by refraining from a campaign of their own—by this they (the Zionists) certainly did not help

^Alfred Lilienthal, op. c it., pp. 30, 31; When the Kerensky Government overthrew the Czarist regime in Russia, Weizmann minimized the effect the emancipation of Russian Jewry would have on the Zionist cause: nothing can be more superficial and nothing can be more wrong than that the sufferings of Russian Jewry ever were the cause of Zionism. The fundamental cause of Zionism has been, and is, the ineradicable national striving of Jewry to have a home of its own—a national center, a na­ tional Jewish life. 52 to open, the gates of America for the Jews. In fact, they sacrificed the interests of living people—their brothers and sisters who went through a world of pain—to the politics of their own movement."*

Besides humanitarian and religious factors, the imaginary magic of the "decisive" Jewish vote was a very important reason behind Mr. Truman’s pro-Zionist policy. Mr. Truman's inability to resist the Zionist pressure and h is eagerness to win the e le c tio n s , for h im self and for h is party, 2 seemed to dictate his pro-Zionist policy. His stand was quite clear dur­ ing a meeting held in Washington in October 1948, attended by the American

Ambassadors in the Middle East. After they explained to him fully the harmful effect of his Palestine policy on the American interests in that sensitive area, Mr. Truman summed up his position with the utmost candor;

"I'm sorry, gentlemen, but I have to answer to hundreds of thousands who are anxious for the success of Zionism; I do not have hundreds of thousands

3 of Arabs among my constituents."

•^Ibid.» pp. 33-37; Ben-Gurion himself wrote in the Israeli paper, Davar. "I shall not be ashamed to confess that, if I had power, as I have the w ill, I would select a score of efficient young men—intelligent, de­ cent, devoted to our ideal and burning with the desire to help redeem Jews, and I would send them to the countries where Jews are absorbed in sinful self-satisfaction. The task of these young men would be to disguise themselves as non-Jews, and to act upon the brutal Zionism, plague these Jews with anti-semetic slogans such as 'bloody Jew', 'Jews go to Palestine,' and similar 'intimacies.' I can vouch for the results brought by thousands of emissaries who have been preaching for decades to deaf ears." Ibid. . p. 107-108.

^Barnet Litvinoff, op. cit. , pp. 193-194.

% llis Harry,BJ, Challenge in the Middle East. (New York, the Ronald Press Co., 1956) p. 91. CHAPTER I I I

EARLY UNITED STATES-JORDANIAN RELATIONS

After the Second World War, the United States found itself very much involved in Middle Eastern affairs. American interests centered on

American cultural and humanitarian institutions, oil and the strategic location of the Middle East. As a world communication center, connecting three continents by land, air and sea, the Middle East has an extremely important strategic location. Oil from the Middle East is important to the United States since it is used to supply West Europe with its needs.

Throughout its modern history, the Soviet Union was never tired of reminding the whole world of its interests in its southern neighboring coun­ t r i e s . A fter the Second World War, th e g ia n t communist country was on the move trying to achieve its goals. In trying to protect its interests, and those of the free world, in the Middle East, the United States was confronted with several conflicting issues: the struggle with the Soviet

Union; the Palestinian question with all its implications; the contest among Western interests deriving mainly from liquidation of entires; the conflict between Arab states; the problem of nationalism and the rising expectation of the masses in the Middle East.

American-Jordanian relations since 1946 went through three stages: the first stage, 1946-1949 prior to the formal unity of both banks of the

Jordan River; the second stage from 1950-1956 and the third stage extend­ ing from 1957. In the first period American-Jordanian relations were not close in spite of the fact that Transjordan sided with the allies in World 54

War I I and contributed to the a llie d cause. The United S ta tes Government declined to recognize the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan when it became in­ dependent in March 1946. It was officially informed about the independence by the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Transjordan. A telegraphic reply only, acknowledged that the message had been noted by the Government of the United States.^*

After the rejection of the recommendations of the Anglo-American

Committee and of the London Conference by both Arabs and Jews, Great Brit­ ain announced its decision to submit the whole problem to the judgment of the United Nations.

The United Nations and Palestine. By submitting the Palestinian question to the United Nations, its scope became internationalized and much more com plicated then ever.

On April 28, 1947, a special session for the General Assembly of the United Nations was convened at Lake Success to consider the Palestin­ ian troubles which plagued the international body, ever since.

Department of State, Digest of International Law. Publication No. 7553, 1963, pp. 171-172; Department of State Bulletin XIV. No. 357, May 5, 1946, pp. 765-766. On April 23, 1946, Secretary of State, James Byrnes wrote to Senator Francis Myers that while the Department "has found noth­ ing which would justify it in taking the position that the recent steps taken by Great Britain, with regard to Transjordan, violate any treaties existing between Great Britain and the United States including the Con­ v en tion o f December 3 , 1924, or deprive the United S tates o f any rig h ts or interests which the United States may have with respect to Transjordan", the Department of State considered that "it would be premature for this government to take any decision at the present time with respect to the question of its recognition of Transjordan as an independent State." 55

The General Assembly appointed a special committee (UNSCOP) to in­ vestigate the whole problem and submit its report to the regular session

of the General Assembly in September 1947. During this period Zionist

propaganda was increased tremendously, especially in the United States and

in the United Nations g a lle r ie s . Mr. Truman shed some lig h t on the in ­

tensity of the Zionist pressure and stated clearly, "many Jews, however, chose to believe that our Palestine policy was the same as the Zionist program for the s ta te o f I s r a e l. Whenever i t fa ile d to conform, they 2 would charge that we had turned pro-Arab."

After finishing its inquiry, UNSCOP presented two plans after fa il­

ing to agree on one; a majority report for partition, and a minority one

for a unitary state but with a federal structure. The General Assembly designated a special committee to consider both plans. After slight ad­

justment in the partition plan it was scheduled for final vote on November

26, 1947; but, due to the pressure of the Zionists who felt then their

lack for the necessary two-thirds majority, the vote was postponed to No­ vember 29, 1947. In the meantime the Zionist pressure continued to in­

crea se.

Mr. Truman sta ted :

The facts were, that not only the pressure movements—of Zionists --around the United Nations, unlike anything that had been seen there before but the White House, too, was subjected to a constant barrage. I do not think I ever had as much pressure and propaganda aimed at the White House as I had in this instance—the partition of Palestine.

^U.N. General Assembly Resolution 106 (S -l), May 15, 1947.

^Harry Truman, Years of Trial and Hope, vol. II, Doubleday & Co., New York, 1956, p. 157. 56

Some Zionist leaders were even suggesting that we pressure sovereign nations into a favorable vote in the General Assembly.*

Largely through the combined pressure of the Zionists and the

White House, the United Nations General Assembly a c c e p t e d , on November

29, 1947, the partition plan for Palestine by a majority of 33 to 13, with 2 10 abstentions and one absent.

While the Zionists welcomed the partition plan,^the Arabs denounced it very bitterly; they felt that the injustice implied in the details of the partition was almost as great as the injustice of the partition itself, as a principal. Such details, in their eyes, represented additional in­ sults to their injuries. Thus the United Nations body was in their opinion an arena of international power politics rather than of justice.

The General Assembly, in the meantime, had asked the Security Coun­ c il to make sure that its partition recommendations were to be carried out.

A committee was formed for this purpose but without specific detailed pro­ cedure. Great B r ita in was w illin g to enforce the U nited Nations recommenda­ tions only if both sides—Arabs and Jews—would accept them; and when the

Arabs opposed the recommendations, the British announced on December 3,

1947, that they would end their mandate as of May 15, 1948.

*Truman, o£. c it., p. 158; Hurewitz, op. cit. . p. 309.

2U.N. General Assembly Resolutions 181 (II), November 29, 1947.

^U.N. O fficial Records, Second Session Supplement No. 11, A/364, Vol. I. According to the partition plan 10,000 Jews only would be left in the Arab state, but 497,000 Arabs in the Jewish state. About 43 per cent of the area of Palestine would be assigned to the Arab state, and 56 per cent to the Jewish state, and about 1 per cent to the interna­ tional area—Jerusalem and Bethlehem. This division came at the time when the Jews were owning only about 6 per cent of the area of Palestine and constituting only about one-third of its total population, 1800,000. 57

The Zionist pressure was s till mounting on the White House for the

implementation of the partition plan. Hr. Truman stated:

The Jewish pressure on the White House did not diminish in the days following the partition vote in the United Nations. Individuals and groups asked me usually in rather quarrelsome and emotional ways, to stop the Arabs, to furnish American soldiers, to do this, that, and the other. As the pressure mounted, I found it necessary to give instructions that I did not want to be approached by any more spokes­ men for the extreme Zionist cause. I was even so disburbed that I put o f f seein g Dr. Chaim Weizmann, who had asked fo r an interview w ith me.*

But Mr. Truman who did not hesitate to oppose the wishes and ad­ vice of the Department of Defense and the Department of State, on the

Palestine matter, could not resist the wishes of Mr. Jacobson, who con- 2 vinced him to see Dr. Weizmann on March 18, 1948.

It is worth noting that both major powers, the United States and

the Soviet Union did support, for the first time, at the United Nations,

such a major decision as the Palestine Partition Plan.

The Palestine Commission appointed by the Security Council, to

facilitate, peacefully, the implementation of the partition could not succeed in its efforts because of the rapid deterioration of the situa­

tion in Palestine even before the British started evacuating the country.

The strategy of the Jews was to gain control over the territory allotted

to them by the United Nations, to pressure intact Jewish settlements in

the proposed non-Jewish areas, and to keep open the lines of communication

especially with the city of Jerusalem.

To implement their goals, the Zionists directed their military

*Truman, op. c i t . . v o l. I I , p. 160.

2Ibid., p. 161. 58 operations completely against the Arabs instead of the British, who were, until then, their main target. They did not only try to subdue the Arab towns in the would-be Jewish territory but, also tried to occupy several places outside of it, like Jafa and many other towns which fell into their hands before the end of the mandate. In the meantime they did not hesitate to commit some massacres, as in the case of Deir Yassin. On April 10,

1948 the v illa g e was attacked and 254 Arab men, women and ch ild ren were butchered in cold blood and their mutilated bodies thrown into a well.

This unfortunate Zionist action contrasted very much with the generous treatment enjoyed by over 1,700 Jews who surrendered to the Transjordanian troops in the old city of Jerusalem*^

Although the Jewish Agency denied all knowledge of it; throwing the blame on the Irgun organization, and sent a message of sympathy to King

Abdullah, it became clear later that the troops of the Haganah, which was under the control of the Agency, had played a part, in the massacre, and 2 that they were merely acting on official instructions. Such massacres were the main reason which forced the Arabs to flee their homes. And with the exception of a few cases, whenever the Zionists occupied a town their "vans with loudspeakers" drove through the streets ordering all the inhabitants to evacuate immediately, and such as were reluctant to leave,

O were fo r c ib ly ejecte d from th e ir homes.*3 In some c a se s, where some towns

^Edgar O 'Ballance, The A ra b -Isra eli War. 1948 (London: Faber and Faber Limited, 1956), p. 103. 2 Manachem Begin, The Revolt: Story of the Irgun. New York, H. Schuman, 1951. pp. 162-165; O 'Ballance, op. c i t . , p . 58. 3 O'Ballance, op. c it. , pp. 108-147. 59 happened to be in battle zones or were difficult to defend, Arab leaders advised the inhabitants to leave or stay at their own risk.

When violent troubles occured in Palestine after the partition plan, the General Assembly convened in a special session to consider the establishment of a temporary trusteeship over Palestine at the recommen­ dation of the United States.1 The Zionists were enraged and attacked the 2 new trend "as the most terrible sellout of the common people since Munich".

Anyhow, the recommendation d id not win enough support.

It can be said that the United Nations could not take any action

prior to the end of the mandate, which might have prevented the hostilities which were bound to come.

Establishment of Israel. While trusteeship status for Palestine was being debated at the United Nations, and while the mandate was draw­

ing to a close, Zionist propaganda, especially in the United States and

Europe, "left no stone unturned" with the intention of preparing the

public and statesmen for the acceptance of Israel as a new nation.

On May 13, 1948, Dr. Weizmann wrote a personal letter to President

Truman in which he stated;

The unhappy events o f the la s t few months w ill n ot, I hope ob­ scure the very great contributions which you, Mr. President, have made toward a definitive and just settlement of the long and trouble­ some Palestine question. The leadership which the American Govern­ ment took under the inspiration made possible the establishment of ■a Jewish State. Tomorrow at midnight, on May 15, the British Man­ date w ill be terminated, and the P ro v isio n a l Government o f the Jew­ ish State w i l l assume f u l l r e sp o n sib ility fo r preserving law and order within the boundaries of the Jewish State. I deeply hope

^.N. Doc. A/C 1/280, April 22, 1948; Department of State Bulletin, vol. XVIII, No. 462, May 1948, pp. 592-593.

2 Hurewitz, The Struggle for Palestine, p. 312. 60

that the United States w ill promptly recognize the Provisional Govern­ ment of the new Jewish State.

On Friday afternoon at 4 o'clock, May 14, 1948 (eight hours be­ fore the mandate officially ended), Ben-Gurion read the Proclamation of independence of the Jewish nation as a state to be called "Israel."

On that very day, eleven minutes after the new state was pro­ claimed, President. Truman, without even consultation with the State De­ partment, had recognized Israel. He wrote:

Now that the Jews were ready to proclaim the State of Israel, however, I decided to move at once and give American recognition to the new nation. I instructed a member of my staff to communicate my decision to the State Department and prepare it for transmission to Ambassador Austin at the United Nations in New York, About thirty minutes later, exactly eleven minutes after Israel had been pro­ claimed a state, Charlie Ross, my press secretary, handed the press the announcement of the de facto recognition by the United States of the provisional government of Israel.2

War or Play? When h ostilities broke out and it became evident that the irregular fighters could not alone check the Zionist tide, the regular Arabian armies entered Palestine at the end of the Mandate on May 3 15, 1948. By this time the Zionists were already in control of about

20 per cent of the country's total area. Contrary to what was expected, when the hostilities ceased and the armistice agreements were signed and implemented, Israel was firmly established in about 77% of the Palestine^

^Chaim Weizmann, T r ia l and Error, (New York: Harper C o ., 1949) pp. 477-478. 2 Truman's Memoirs. vol. II, op. c it. . p. 164. 3 Al-Madi, oj>. c it. . p. 466.

^Al-Tal, Abdullah, Karithat Falastine (Palestine Disaster), in Arabic, Dar Alqalam Publishing House, Cairo, 1959, pp. 603-604. (For more information about Al-Tal see Appendix "B". 61

area; and this is not to mention the tragedy of about 800,000 Palestinian

Arab refugees spreading in many parts of the neighboring Arab countries.*

Within a few days from the entry of the Arabian armies into Pales­

tine they were occupying the territories which were, by then, in Arab hands. Within a few days the Egyptians were occupying the Nejeb area

(only three Jewish settlements were occupied, while the rest were left more or less beseiged) all the way up to Isclud, less than twenty miles

from Tel-Aviv. In the meantime they occupied the Hebron area and es­

tablished contact with the Transjordanian army in Jerusalem's southern proper. The Arab Legion was in complete control of the Old City of

Jerusalem (after capturing over 1,700 Jews), occupying some parts of the

New City, Sheikh Jarrah, and cutting completely the Jerusalem-Tel-Aviv

road after inflicting heavy losses on the Israelis. In the North-Eastern sector, the Syrians were able to occupy a small area around Samakh in­ cluding Mishmar Hayardin, in the north, w h ile the Lebanese and the Qawuqji

troops were in occupation of a few other places. In the central sector the strong and well equipped Iraqi army occupied the mountain ranges and

the plains, in front, to a distance of a few miles, filling the gap be- 2 tween the Syrian army and the Arab Legion.

The withdrawal of the Arab Legion from the vital positions in the mid-sector, by May 17, its relatively late relief to the hard pressed 3 Old C ity o f Jerusalem and the d en ia l of the Iraq i army to follow up i t s

*UNRWA Review, Information Paper No. 1, Beirut, 1962, pp. 2-3, "A Brief History of UNRWA 1950-1962". O'Ballance, oj>. c it., Chapter V. 3 Al-Madi, op. c it., pp. 486-489; John Glubb, A Soldier with the Arabs, Hodder and Stoughton, London, 1957, pp. 111-118. 62 victory at Jenin^were early signs of what was going on behind the scene.

Soon it became more clear that the chapters of the tragedy were written, secretly and largely, very early in the game, before May 15.

First Truce. While fighting, real and imaginary, was going on in

Palestine, the Security Council selected Count Folke Bernadotte of Sweden 2 as the United Nations mediator in the Palestinian dispute. In the mean­ time the Security Council ordered a cease-fire. After studying the situa­ tion the Count asked both sides for a four-week truce, beginning June 11, 3 4 1948. The Israelis were very happy to accept the Bernadotte request.

The Arab masses and the military officers in the field were very much against accepting the truce, but due to strong outside pressure and to differences among Arab leaders, the Arab League finally accepted the truce.'* The United States peace role in the United Nations and outside g of it, was essential in securing the truce. During the truce the Israe­ lis had acquired (supposedly illegally) very large quantities of military,

^■O'Ballance, o£. c it.. pp. 117-118.

^UN Document 186 (S-2) May 14, 1948.

^UN Document S /773, May 22, 1948.

^UN Document S/804, June 1, 1948; O 'B allance, o£. c i t . . Chapter V. ^UN Document S/108, June 1, 1948; v o l. XVIII. g The United States Government did its best to convince the concerned governments to accept the truce;and the following telegram on June 9, 1948 was sent by the Americans through its Consul General in Jerusalem to the Government of Transjordan which demonstrated very clearly: "We have been instructed by the Department of State to say that the United States is most favorably interested in the note which Count Bernadotte put to the Arab and Jewish authorities concerning cease-fire and truce. The U.S. Govern­ ment very much hope that Count Bernadotte's cease-fire proposal w ill be unconditionally accepted by both parties by noon Grenwich Mean Time June." (Al-Tal, o£. cit. , pp. 205-206). 63 including American flying fortresses and British beamfighters, in addi­ tion to highly trained pilots and military officers, from several coun­ tries including several hundred from the United States.'*' At the same time, Israel continued to receive, openly, from some communist countries

large quantities of arms.

The Arabs, on the other hand, had increased their forces by about one-third although "under American influence, the British agreed early in 2 June to stop shipping arms to the Arab states" in deference to its pre­ vious agreements with them. In addition, Great Britain withdrew its officers from the Arab Legion and stopped paying the subsidy for one month. During the truce, King Abdullah- was very active; he visited

Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Iraq, attempting to secure Arab acceptance to

extend the truce; but the Arab League Council, held in Cairo, refused, on July 1, the extension. King Abdullah (who was nominally, in command o f the Arabian Armies) became very angry and sen t a s p e c ia l envoy to

Cairo asking for the reversal of the League's decision; but the envoy re­

turned carrying the resignation of the Transjordanian Premier; then the 4 King decided to go along with the decision.

Second Truce. While the Arab League members refused the extension

^O'Ballance, ojj. cit. . Chapter VI; Al-Madi, oj>. cit. . p. 507. 2 Hurewitz, oj>. cit. . p. 322, (The Struggle for Palestine).

3A1-Madi, oj>. cit.. p. 521.

^Ibid., pp. 507-508. 64 of the truce, Israel was willing to accept it.'*' Fighting erupted for about ten days; but on July 18, in response to a Security Council order, at the initiative of the United States, both sides accepted a second and 2 permanent truce. Thus again the United States role was an essential one in achieving peace. Just before the second truce came into effect the

American Government had sent through its Consul General in Jerusalem, to the Government of Transjordan the following telegram: ’’The United States

Government gravely disquieted by the present course of developments in

Palestine hopes that the Transjordan Government w ill find it possible to cooperate in carrying out the cease-fire, which is proposed for all parts of Palestine, to come into effect at 1800 hours local Arab time tonight.

We shall be glad to transmit to the Department of State any answer the 3 Transjordan Government w ishes to send."

During the ten day fighting the Arabs suffered the first major blow when, on July 12, Lydda and Ramleh were delivered to Israel without any fighting.^ The Arab masses were enraged and demonstrations were staged

*U.N. Document S/872, July 8, 1948.

2U.N. Document S/902, July 15, 1948.

3A1-Tal, og. c it. , p. 290. 4 Glubb, oj>, c it., Chapter IX; Al-Madi, o£. cit,,, pp. 509-511. The Arab Legion were denied the opportunity o f defending Lydda and Ramleh when Glubb Pasha let both cities, and several villages in their vicinity, fall into the hands of the Israelis without any fighting. After practicing th e ir scarin g inhumane t a c t ic s , the I s r a e lis e je c te d the in h a b ita n ts, who numbered about 60,000, from their homes, as usual. "They fled for safety toward Ramallah. As the bulk of them withdrew over the open country on a blazing hot day, some Israeli mortars opened up to help them on their way, and it is reported that several women and children died of heat and ex­ haustion during this exodus." (O'Ballance, op. c it.,' p. 147). 65 in many c itie s, including Amman and around the Palace. Glubb Pasha claimed that he d id not have enough fo rces to defend Lydda and Ramleh and th at the

Government knew in advance about the disaster. But the Government denied any previous knowledge of such a plan and put the blame on Glubb Pasha.

Records of fighting show that around July 12, almost a ll the Arab Legion troops were free and not engaged in fighting anywhere. People were wonder­ ing who actually was in command and felt that Arab politicians and not the armies were to be blamed for the disaster of the Axab-Israeli ficti- 1 tiou s war.

Xn the meantime while the atmosphere in Palestine was relatively calm, Count Bernadotte announced his proposals to solve the complex prob­ lem. In brief, they were "Transjordan and Palestine should form an ec­ onomic union in which there might be both an Arab and a Jewish s t a t e .

Jerusalem and the Negev were to be under Arab control and the whole of

Galilee would go to the Israelis. Haifa was to become a free port and 2 Lydda a free airport—and the rest as in the U.N. Partition Plan. Both the Arabs and the Israelis rejected the proposals.

During the second truce, as during the first, the Israelis not only made use of their right to supply food and medicine to their beseiged

•^Ibid., Chapter VII; Al-Tal, op. c it., p. 248. It is worth: noting that, according to the memoirs of the late Premier Hazza al-Majali, and to A l-T al*s memoirs, Glubb rep eated ly d eclin ed the demands of King Ab­ dullah to send, on May 15, troops to Jerusalem which was hard pressed; and eventually on May 18 upon direct orders from the King, and without the approval of the British General, Colonel Al-Tal moved on with his men to save the Old City. (Al-Madi, jop. cit., pp. 488*489).

2A1-Tal, o£. cit.. p. 523. 66 positions, like Jerusalem, but even violated that right by sending, as well, soldiers and war material, under the nose of the United Nations observers, manning the truce lin es.*

Defiance and Assassination. On July 26, the Israelis surprised the world by declaring the New City of Jerusalem "Israeli-occupied ter- 2 ritory" and appointed a military governor. This was in defiance of the

United Nations resolutions governing the internationalization of the Holy

City. The announcement was the first step toward making the New City of

Jerusalem the Israeli capital, as they did later. Such defiance of the

United Nations, the body which gave Israel its birth certificate, was only the first in a long list of defiance of the United Nations resolutions related to the Palestinian question.

On September 16, the United Nations mediator, Count Bernadotte 3 finished his final proposals, which were not much different from the original ones. The next morning the world was shocked to learn that the

Jewish terrorists had murdered the Count, in their occupied section in

Jerusalem, presumably because they did not like his proposals.

For twenty-four hours no action was taken by the Israeli authori­ ties. Then Ben Gurion roused himself. . . .There was no public outcry in Israel over this assassination and little sympathy was expressed. The general fe e lin g was that ju st another enemy of the Jews hajd f a l ­ len, and the only regret felt was that it might cause difficulties to Israeli diplomats in their dealings with other countries. The

■^U.N. Document S/902, Ju ly 15, 1948; Hurewitz, oj>. c i t . . p. 316; Al-Madi, oj>. c it. . p. 512.

^Al-Difa Newspaper; July 27, 1948 (in Arabic).

^U.N. Document A648, September 18, 1948. Department o f S tate Bulletin, vol. XIX, No. 483, October 3, 1948. 67

murderers were never brought to justice and no determined attempt to find them was made.f.

The American, Ralph Bunche was appointed as the new United Nations

acting mediator; and when Count Bernadotte's conclusions were under

discussion at the General Assembly, Secretary Marshall strongly urged

their acceptance "in their entirety as the best possible basis for bring­

ing peace to a distracted land." But about a month later in the heat of

the presidential election campaign, Mr. Truman stated that he would not

approve any changes in the boundaries of the General Assembly's partition resolution not 'fully acceptable' to Israel. And a week later, when, at

the Security Council, the American representative was prepared to support sanctions against Israel, he was forced to reverse himself, the next day, 2 on instructions from the White House.

Split in the Arab Camp. The ambitions of King Abdullah to enlarge his Amirate, by annexing Syria and Palestine, according to the "Greater 3 Syria Plan" were, for a long time, very well known. To check his am­ bitions, the Arab League members, including Transjordan, agreed, before

May 15, 1948, to let the Palestinians themselves decide the future of

their country. But although the King repeatedly declared adherence to this, his Majesty was working secretly in other directions. On February

^O'Ballance, o£. c it. , p. 169.

^Hurewitz, op. c it. . pp. 322-323,. (The Struggle for Palestine).

3 Abdullah's Memoirs, op. c it. , pp. 27-42. The great majority of the Syrians had rejected his schemes, not that they were against unity as such, which was cherished by most Arabs, but mainly because of his close alliance with Great Britain and for their willingness to have a republican regime. 68

8, 1948, Abu Xlhuda, the premier of Transjordan had an agreement with Mr.

Bevin, allowing Transjordan to annex the bordering Arab territory in

Palestine, according to United Nations partition. The British Foreign

Secretary emphasized the point that Transjordan should not try to in­

fringe on the Jewish territory or on the Jerusalem area, supposedly to be

•I internationalized. In the same month, contacts took place between the

United States and Transjordan, according to which the partition plan would be effectuated, with Abdullah's assistance; and in return the United 2 States would recognize Transjordan. The Arabs were not happy about such

deals, but they were very much enraged when they learned about his secret

deals, directly negotiated, with the Israelis, before, during, and after

th e h o s t i l i t i e s . Between April 12, 1948 and May 4, 1949, the King had

about fifteen conferences (in Amman and Shundeh) with top Israelis, in- 3 eluding Golda Meir, Elyahn Sason, Moshe Dayan, Moshe Sharret and others.

The last meeting, before the hostilities, was on May 11, 1948, just

four days prior to the entry of the Arabian Armies to Palestine. It was

attended by the King, Golda Meir and Al-Tal, the Colonel who brought the

Israelis to Amman. Mrs. Meir, who was very tense, had requested at the

beginning that the Transjordanian army should not enter the western bank

on May 15, 1948 but the King turned down her request on the grounds that

such a step would be too obvious, especially after his agreement with

the Arab League members, to join in the entry. Eventually, it was

^Glubb, oj>. c i t . , pp. 62-63. 2 Shawdran, op. cit., p. 249. ^

3A1-Tal, Q£. c i t . , pp. 65 , 437-452. agreed that the Arab legion's troops were "to invade and occupy only such parts of Palestine as had been allocated to the Arabs under the United X Nations p a r titio n r eso lu tio n o f November 1947. Jerusalem , dear to both sides, was to be divided, but they could not agree on the dividing line.

This meant the Holy City was left for grabbing; and this might be the reason why the only fierce fighting between both sides was only in the city and its corridor to the west. The Old City of Jerusalem was so dear and so important in the eyes of the King, that in spite of the objection of the Transjordanian premier, Abu Xlhuda, (because he did not want to break his word to Bevin) and the strong opposition of General Glubb, His

Majesty himself, directly ordered Colonel Al-Tal, the Commander of the sixth regiment, to move from Jericho and save the Old City; and so he did.

Indeed, with the exception of Jerusalem and its corridor, the rest of the

Hashemite lines (Transjordanian and Iraqi) were almost completely quiet until the armistice. It was evident that the policies of both countries were very close, and clearly dominated by King Abdullah. The unity of the command of both armies made sure of the freezing of the Iraqi army, 3 the thing which caused the resignation of its Chief of Staff.

^O'Ballance, oj>. c it. , pp. 78-79; Al-Tal, oj>. c it., p. 68; Al-Tal agreed with O'Ballance on this point, adding that the Israeli side ap­ proved, at the time, of Transjordan's annexation of the Arab parts, in addition to an outlet on the Mediterranean.

2A1-Madi, o£. c it. . p. 488-489.

3Al-Tal, op. cit.. pp. 329-331. The freezing of the Iraqi array in fact caused uneasiness among the young officers and some trouble in the Iraqi political circles. 70

On the first day the Arabian armies entered Palestine, there was an argument over the telephone between King Abdullah on one side, and Al

Quwatly, the President of Syria, and Assam Pasha, the Secretary General of the Arab League, on the other side; both suggested to the King, strengthening sufficiently the Arab irregular forces, instead of committ­ ing the regular armies, but he refused. The King wondered if that was due to some distrust of him.'*' Indeed, he was mistrusted from the beginning to the point that the Egyptians, for example, refused to let him inspect 2 their forces as a commander in chief, or give him detailed information.

Within a few weeks after that, relations became strained between the King and the rest of the Arab League members when the troops of Al-Jihad Al-

Muqaddas (who were fighting side by side with the Arab Legioneers in

Jerusalem and who did almost all the fighting in the Holy City before May

18, when Al-Tal's troops relieved them), were exposed to arrests and bad treatm ent. The fia s c o o f Lydda and Ramleh and the t o ta l freezin g o f the

Iraq i army "Maku Awamir" (no o rd ers), were ju s t symptoms o f Arab d iffe r e n c e s.

All Palestine Government. All this made the Arab masses and the

Arab government doubt that the Hashemite armies were coming to Palestine to liberate it, but instead, to help in implementing secretly a policy con trastin g sharply from th at agreed upon by a l l Arab governments. In

^Abdullah's Memoirs, op. c it. , p. 23; Probably the King's agreement with Mrs. Meir, only four days earlier, was already known although there was not any definite proof of that at such an early stage, or it could be just his imagination. o Ibid., p. 24; In the light of the King's secret deals with the enemy, many Arabs believed that the Egyptians were justified in their suspicions. 71 order to block the Hashemites designs and to keep the name of Palestine alive, (and because of the rivalry between the Hashemites, especially

King Abdullah, on one side, and the Grand Mufti, and his supporters,

Egypt, Syria and Saudi Arabia, on the other side), the Arab League de­ cided to establish the "All Palestine Government." It was proclaimed on

September 20, 1948. All Arab governments, with the exception of Trans­ jordan, soon recognized it.^

Realizing that the new government, if firmly established, would bring an end to his hope for annexing a part of Palestine, King Abdullah opposed it very strongly. Seeing a new danger in the Gaza government,

Israel too, showed its strong opposition, first, through its propaganda organs, and later, by force.

The K ing's answer to the Gaza government came very q u ick ly in th e form of intensive political activities, on the scene and behind it, re- 2 suiting in the Amman conference. It was timed to meet the same day on

^Ahmad Hilmi Pasha—whom King Abdullah tried to win over to his side by appointing him military governor of Jerusalem—became its premier; w h ile the Grand M ufti—Amin el-H u ssein i became i t s p resid en t and Gaza was proclaimed the seat of the new government. King Abdullah declared that his oppositions were on the grounds that the new government was not re­ presenting the Palestinian Arabs and was not strong enough to stand in the face of Israel. 2 It is believed that the King and his Palestinian supporters (mostly members of the old Defense Party) and those who were not happy about the performance of the Arab Higher Committee, in one case or another, were the ones behind organizing the Amman conference which, they claimed, was re­ presenting the Palestinians. Its Chairman was Sheikh Suleiman al-Farouki (an old enemy of the Grand Mufti, and strangely enough, a refugee from Ramley, the twin city of Lydda which, was delivered as explained earlier, (p. 105), to the Israelis without any fight. 72 which the National Council of the 11 All Palestine Government" was held, in

Gaza, on October 1, 1948. The conferees repudiated the Gaza government and authorized King Abdullah to solve the Palestine question, the way he saw fit. In addition to that the pressure was increased, more than ever, on the members of al-Jihad al-Muqaddas.^ Behind the scenes, there were frequent contacts between I sr a e l and Transjordan, including some through 2 th e ir resp ectiv e em bassies, in London and P a r is.

Broken Truce. On October 14, 1948 Israel surprised the world by breaking the truce and attacking the Egyptians at several points in the 3 Nejeb area.

The Security Council ordered a cease-fire to take place on October

19, but Israel ignored it and continued their attack until October 22.^

As a result, the Egyptians lost a large part of the territory which was under their control. When the Security Council passed a resolution, on

November 4, 1948^ ordering both sides to go back to the lines prior to the attack, Israel refused; and the Security Council did not do anything about it. All through the Israeli attack on the Egyptians, the famous

Arab Legion, and the r e la tiv e ly large and strong other Hashemite army o f

^Al-Madi, op. c it. . pp. 533-535.

2A1-Tal, o£. c it., pp. 65-68.

^Shwadran, crp. c it., p. 267; Al-Ba1 th Newspaper, October 15, 1948 in A rabic.

^A l-Tal, oj>. c i t . , p. 409; U.N. Document (S /1058), October 26, 1948.

^377th Meeting of the Security Council, November 4, 1948. 73

Iraq did not fire a shell. Only a few skirmishes took place in the North and North-eastern sectors of the area.'*'

As soon as the cease-fire became effective in the Nejeb, many Is- 2 raeli forces were shifted, swiftly, to the Northern sector. Realizing th a t the Egyptians were busy nursing th e ir wounds and assured about the neutrality of the strongest Arab armies in the field, the Iraqi and the

Arab Legion, the Israelis broke the truce again and attacked in the North c lea rin g i t o f Qawuqji fo rces and even occupying, tem porarily, a few

Lebanese villages.

Jericho Congress. Another Palestinian Congress, like the previous one in Amman, was held in Jerich o, on December 1, 1948 (under the c h a ir­ manship of Sheikh Muhammad al-Jabari, one of the Kings1 supporters. The

Congress adopted several resolutions, the most important of which were

*0*Ballance, o£. c it. , Chapter IX; Assured of the non-interference of the Hashemite armies (according to Al-Tal) Israel diverted most of its forces to the Nejeb area. The Egyptians demonstrated great courage but were very heavily outnumbered. The successful and heroic defense of Al Faluga, which was completely surrounded and repeatedly attacked by the Israelis for several weeks, made the Arabs very proud.

According to O'Ballance, o£. c it.. p. 184, "The Egyptian defeats were by no means due to lack of courage or soldierly qualities, on the part of the individual Egyptian or Sudanese soldier, who fought bravely and extremely well, especially, in defense."

Strangely enough, Glubb Pasha had a meeting with the high officers of the Arab Legion, just two days prior to the Israeli attack on the Egyptians, in which he preached the virtues of restraint and order. The same, performance was repeated again by the British General before the second Israeli attack on the Egyptians which took place on December 23, 1948. It might be worth mentioning that the same lecture was given by King Abdullah, and Glubb, in connection with the disaster of Ramleh and Lyddah. (A l-T a l, op. c i t . , pp. 407-425).

0*Ballance, op. c it., p. 188. 74 those calling for the immediate annexation of the Arab Palestine to Trans­ jordan. For this, King Abdullah was strongly criticized by the Council of Ulemas of al-Azhar University in Cairo, by the Secretary General of the Arab League and by most of its members. On December 13, the Trans­ jordanian Parliament unanimously approved the Jericho resolutions as recommended by the Cabinet. A week later, His Majesty appointed Sheikh

Jarallah as the new Mufti of Jerusalem, thus not only revenging himself on Haj Amin el-Husseini, but also defying the Arab League and repudiating 1 the Gaza Government.

While the uproar against the resolutions of the Jericho Congress was taking place in the Arab world, the Israelis welcomed them and con­ tinued their secret negotiations with the King for a peaceful solution.

On December 23, the I s r a e lis surprised the w orld by breaking, again, the truce, and attacking the Egyptians in the Nejeb. The performance of

October 14 was repeated. The Egyptians fought courageously but were again 2 outnumbered by their enemies and unassisted by their brothers. They lost all their positions in the Nejeb with the exception of the Gaza Strip*

1 Al-Madi, o^. c it., pp. 533-537.

2 When the Egyptians were attacked, they called upon the other Arab governments for help; but, with Lebanon and Qawuqji forces out of the field, with the Syrians unable to do more than limited skirmished, with. King Abdullah "not even bothering to reply", and with "Maku Awamir" s till the standing policy of Iraq, the Egyptians call for help was not answered (O'Ballance, o£. c it. , p. 198), (Al-Tal, oj>. cit. . p. 453). Demonstra­ tions of support for the Egyptians took place in many Arabian places; in Iraq, the Cabinet and the Parliament, whose sentiments were with the people, were dissolved by the Regent, and Nuri a-Said formed a new Cabinet. In one of the se c r e t m eetings on January 7 and 30, 1949 th e King congratulated E. Sasoun and wished the Israelis were able to occupy Gaza, and said happily his famous statement "the southerners—Egyptians— 75

Besides territorial losses, the Egyptians lost their Premier, al-Nuqrashi

Pasha, who was assassinated on December 28, 1948. Ignoring a Security

Council Resolution ordering a new cease-fire to be enacted on December

29,^ Israel continued the attack until January 7, 1949 when the Acting

Mediator, Dr. Ralph Bunche, who succeeded the late Count Bernadotte,

announced that Israel and Egypt had agreed to a cease-fire order and

that both had indicated willingness to enter into direct negotiations

for an armistice agreement.

Armistice Agreements. The truce of January 7, 1948, between the

Egyptians and the Israelis, was soon to be followed by peace negotia­

tions, between the adversaries, at Rhodes. On February 24, 1949, the

armistice agreement was signed, leaving the Egyptians in control of only 2 the Gaza S tr ip .

Between Israel and Lebanon, the armistice was negotiated on the

border, at Ras el-Naqura, and signed on March 23, 1949; and the d ivid in g 3 line became the old Palestinian-Lebanese international boundary.

The Israeli-Jordanian armistice agreement, signed at Rhodes on

April 3, 1949, was concluded after prolonged secret negotiations, and

were badly beaten, and the northerners—the Syrians and the Lebanese— were helpless" (Al-Tal, op. cit.. pp. 425, 430, 464). It seemed, con­ trary to the beliefs outside the Arab world that there was no real fight­ ing but only a well planned drama written, directed (directly or in­ directly) by some Arab leaders, Israelis and other outside powers.

^396th Meeting of the Security Council, December 29, 1948.

^U.N. Document S/1264.

^U.N. Document S/1296. As a r e su lt o f the p o lit ic a l in s t a b ilit y and a coup d'Etate, on March 29, 1948 by H. Al-Zaim, the Israeli-Syrian A rm istice agreement came la t e , Ju ly 20, 1949. (U.M* Document S /1353). 76

extensive diplomatic activities carried out by both countries, Great Brit­

ain, the United States and the United Nations. Left alone, after letting

his brothers down and trusting, instead, the enemies of his people, King

Abdullah was destined to reap what he planted; and not before long His

Majesty's turn was up. According to the secret arrangements (prior to

the end of the second Nejeb campaign), Jordan was to receive the Iraqi

occupied territory, the territory occupied by the Arab Legion and al- 1 Majdal, as a Jordanian sea port. The first signs of the Israelis' change

of mind became evident during one of the secret meetings on January 15,

1949, just about one week after the end of the hostilities in the Nejeb

area. The next day, the King had a meeting with the British Ambassador, in

Amman, in the presence of the Jordanians who were negotiating with the

I s r a e lis the previous n ig h t. The Ambassador promised them s a tis fa c to r y

r e s u lt s . 2 United States' Recognition of Jordan. At last, on January 31,

1949, the United States Government recognized Jordan, almost three years

after its independence. For some time informal and friendly relations have existed between the United States Government and the Government of

the Kingdom of Transjordan. Consistently with its feeling of friendship

for Transjordan, the United States Government has supported that country

for membership in the United Nations. On January 31, the United States

1 Al-Tal, ojv, c it. . pp.453, 489; Washington Post, October 19, 1965 (d ecla ra tio n by Moshe Dayan o f Isr s d .)

2 The Department of State Bulletin. February 13, 1949, p. 205; Department of State Digest of International Law, vol. II, Washington, D.C., 1963, p. 172. 77 extended de jure reco g n itio n to th e Government o f Transjordan. As far as Jerusalem was concerned the United States continued to consider it in the light of the United Nations Resolutions provided for and relat­ ing to full territorial internationalization of Jerusalem.

Israel Ignores its Promises. The American recognition pleased

King Abdullah very much. He was hoping that the United States Govern­ ment would help him in convincing Israel to keep its promises which it 2 started to ignore the previous day.

While the King was preparing for the final touch of the negotia­ tions, to his dismay, their recent hardened attitude was followed by overt military action resulting in their occupation of the Eastern Nejeb 3 area.

1 U.N. General Assembly R esolutions 181 ( I I ) , November 29, 1947; 194 ( I I I ) , December 11, 1948 and 303 (IV ), December 9, 1949. When I s ­ rael removed its foreign office from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem the United States opposition to the Israeli move was made clear in words and by the retentions of the American Embassy in Tel Aviv (Department of States, American Foreign P olicy B asic Document 1950-1955. v o l. I I , Washington, D.C. 1947, pp. 2254-2255. And when Jordan announced in March 1960, its decision to construct, in Jerusalem, offices for the King, the Cabinet, and the Parliament, the United States made it clear that it would recog­ nize such a Jordanian step. (Department of States, Digest of Inter­ national Law, vol. I, Washington, D.C. 1963, pp. 594-595).

2 Al-Tal, op. c it. , p. 464.

3 Al-Madi, 0 £. c it., p. 529; Without even warning, the Israeli army dispatched some of its units against the Jordanian troops, occupying the Eastern Nejeb—from th e Aqaba a l l the way up nath in Wadi Arabah to a distance of 55 miles. On March 7 the Israelis crossed the line, but Glubb ordered his men to withdraw to a point 40 miles to the north of Aqaba. On the 9th the Israelis mounted another attack with tanks and artillery but without success, Soon Glubb ordered all his troops in this sector to withdraw leaving it wide open to the Israelis, who, two days later reached Aqaba. 78

On March 10, Jordan complained officially to the Security Council about the Israeli attacks, but without any results. Jordan too invoked its treaty of 1948 with Britain by requesting military assistance. After some hesitation Great Britain refused the request, claiming it was being 1 pressured by the Unfed States, and promising, instead, to defend the 2 international Jordanian boundaries.

The Aqaba affair was just the first blow to Jordan by Israel.

The second and the biggest one came soon after they refused to accept the occupation, by the Jordanian troops for the territories which were s till held, at the time, by the Iraqis; and to this effect they made their 3 position, formally, to Dr. Bunche on March 13. Soon after the secret contacts between both sides were again intensified and in the meantime the King was in touch with British and American officials through their representatives in Amman. However, this did not help. Bevin, in fact, informed him that he could not do anything and advised him to ask Mr. Tru­ man to temper down the Israelis and to this end the King appealed to the 4 American President.

On the night of March 24, the most decisive secret meeting took place in Shuneh Palace; it was a moving scene to witness His Majesty, after the usual dinner, begging the Israelis to be reasonable and to live

1 Ibid., p. 530; Al-Tal, o£. c it. , pp. 520-522.

2 Ibid., pp. 529-530; Shwadran, o£. c it.. pp. 275-276.

3 Al-Madi, o£. cit. . p. 530.

4 Al-Tal, oj>. cit.. pp. 489-510. 79 up to th e ir prom ises. Their answer was cold and d e fin ite and more of an ultimatum.* The minimum o f their demands was to move th e ir lin e s about two miles and in some areas more, all along the Iraqi occupied ter­ ritory, including the fertile triangle. Contrary to the advice of the

Jordanian negotiators, the King felt that he did not have much choice and both sides initialed their armistice agreement, providing the approval of both governments. The King was still hoping that something good might come from Mr. Truman but to his disappointment the reply to his appeal arrived on March 29, advising him to give in to the Israeli demands (which he already had done) and promising him to stand against any new Israeli 2 encroachment on th e Hashemite Kingdom. For a f in a l d raft another secret meeting was held, in Shuneh, between both sides including Abu el-Huda, 3 the Jordanian Premier. It was a very friendly meeting. On April 3, 1949 the Israeli-Jordanian armistice agreement was signed formally at Rhodes.

It was, more or less, a dictated and secretly approved agreement, contrary to what was b eliev ed at the tim e. The rea ctio n o f the Arab m asses, e s ­ pecially the Palestinians, was very violent, but they could not do much

*George Kirk, Survey of International Affairs—the Middle East 1945- 1950, London, O x fo rd University Press, 1954, pp. 297-298.

2A1-Madi, og,. cit.. p. 531; Al-Tal, oj>. c it., pp. 512-515; After the agreement was initialed the Israelis surprised the King by offering him a gift from Ben Gurion; it was a copy of the Old Testament with a map for Old Israel (including Jordan, some parts of Syria, Iraq and Hi- jaz.) The witty King sent to the Israeli Premier, in return, a dagger. It was a suitable gesture but too late.

Ibid.. pp. 529-575; On April 10, Moshe Sharret, who was visiting the United States, at the time, sent a congratulatory telegram to the King, and on May 4 he paid a secret personal v isit to his Majesty which resulted in making the people feel that the King was going too far in smoothing the way for the Israelis which was a strong factor in the assassination of the King later on. 80 more than protest and demonstrate. Mr. Eytan, an Israeli specialist on

Arab Affairs, who took part in the secret negotiations wrote:

It was agreed that the talks at Rhodes should continue as a facade, but that the real negotiations should be conducted in secret with the King at his winter palace at Shuneh. Only the King's closest confidants were to know; the rest of the world was to go on watching the show at Rhodes. The conversations at Shuneh w ill not quickly be forgotten. There was the excitement of travelling in enemy territory under cover of night.

Indeed the blow was very sev ere on th e Arabs liv in g on th e border 2 lin e s •

^Eytan, oj>. cit.. pp. 39^41; Glubb, o£. c it., p. 241. o The land of Qalqilya and the surrounding villages, which the Zion­ ists could not buy or have by force, were delivered to them without fir ­ ing a shot. "Qalqilya, and villages north and south of it were some of the most prosperous farms in all Arab Palestine. To these agricultural communities the armistice came as little short of a death warrant, since the new frontier cut round the bottom of the h ills—on which the towns and villages were built over-looking the coastal plains—and nearly everywhere, took from the hillside villages their great acres of farmland. These lands, verdant with orange groves and bountiful market gardens, all the products of Arab labor, were quickly absorbed by the Israelis who harvested the lost Arab oranges and tilled the lost Arab fields right under the eyes of the dispossessed villagers, who lost 324,286 acres, which is 41.6 per cent of all the land they possessed—.some villages lost about 9 0 per cent of their lands. Of this, a great proportion was of the highest quality including much irrigated land as w ell as fruit plantations, whilst 69 per cent of the remnant was uncultivated, rocky h ills. The villagers affected—some 120,000—were doomed to gradual star­ vation. Since they still had their houses to live in, they did not qualify for United Nations refugee relief. Not until 1952 were some of them— very few—assisted with half rations from UNRWA. Meanwhile they sold their possessions, including their furniture and even their doors and windows, tried to live on herbs from hillsides, and were driven in their distress to desperate remedies—infiltration across the border to steal from their own lost paradise." (Dearden, Ann, Jordan. Robert Hale Limited, London, 1957, PP« 132-133). indeed the "infiltration" of the hungry re­ fugees or semi-refugees drew very strong retaliatory, measures by Israel especially when some Israelis might be killed. For example, Qalqilya was attacked by the Israelis on October 11» 1956, the Arabs' loss was 48 while the Israelis' casualties were 30 soldiers, dead and wounded. (The Times Magazine, October 22, 1956, p. 30). Again Qalqilya was hit, 81

According to Article VI, the villages, which were to be added to

Israel, were to enjoy special protective measures. These were completely

ignored by Israel.*

On May 12, 1949, the adversaries went a little further toward a 2 peaceful settlement by signing the Lausanne Protocol. Its main points were: (1) The boundaries to be, with some adjustments, according to the

United Nations Partition Plan; (2) the right of the refugees for repatriation

if they wish, otherwise for compensation; (3) Jerusalem to be inter-nation­

alized. Unfortunately the Protocol remained a dead letter because Israel, soon after, did not want to go through with any of these points. Jordan,

too, objected to the third point.

Final Annexation Steps. After the armistice agreement was signed,

steps leading toward the unity of both banks of the Jordan River were cautiously intensified. On May 3, 1949, three Palestinians were appointed

on September 4, 1965 by the Israeli troops who managed to blow up eleven irrigation pumps with losses in civilian and military lives on both sides. (New York Times. September 5, 1965); Falastine Newspaper. September 5, 1965 (in Arabic). This is not to mention the almost continuous sporadic shooting across the border. And the same is true of several areas on the fr o n tie r s .

*Dearborn, op. cit., p. 138. To be 'protected in their full rights of residence, property and freedom.1 Inhabitants wishing to leave were 'to be entitled to take with them their livestock and moveable property' and 'to receive, without delay, full compensation for the land which they have left.* Israelis forces were forbidden to 'enter or be stationed in such villages.' This Article the Israelis treated as though it had never been written. Their soldiers entered the region soon after the armistice was signed. Departing Arabs never received any compensation and some even had their property confiscated. Pearson, Drew., Israeli Arabs are Restricted. Washington Post. Washington, D.C., January 13, 14, 1966. 2 U.N. Documents (A/927), O fficial Records of Fourth Session, vol. II; Al-Madi, oj». c it. . p. 537; Gabbay, Rony E., A Political Study of the Arab- Jewish Conflict. Librairie Minard, Paris, 1959, chapter 4. 82 to the Cabinet, and in June, the military governor of the western bank was substituted by a civilian high commissioner. However, in December 1949 this position was cancelled and all the districts on the western bank and those on the eastern bank, came under the direct supervision of the Ministry of the Interior. During the same month, tariff barriers between both sides came to an end and all the Palestinians—refugees and non-refugees—were granted Jordanian citizenship.^

The implementation of the expressed approval of the Cabinet and Parlia­ ment of the Jericho Congress Resolutions, December 1948, was soon to be 2 carried out. In December 1950, the House of Representatives (Majlis al-

Ummah) was d isso lv ed and in March a new one was elected w ith 20 o f i t s members from the w estern bank. On A pril 21, 1950, a new Cabinet was formed with members from both banks. On April 20, a new Senate (Majlis al-A’yan) from both banks was appointed by the King. On April 24, the Cabinet in­ troduced, to both houses of Parliament, the historical resolution for a complete unity between both banks. This was approved by Parliament, and on the same day His Majesty, the King, took the last step and signed the 3 resolution.

The reaction to the unity of both banks of Jordan was strong in the

Arab League, and on June 13, Egypt asked that Jordan be thrown out of the

*A1-Madi, o£. c it., p. 533.

^After Jericho Congress, two more Congresses were held at Nablus and Ramallah, where similar resolutions to those of Jericho were taken. Ibid. . pp. 535-536.

^Ibid. , pp. 538-542; Al-Difa Newspaper, April 25, 1949, (in Arabic). 83

League; but after extensive discussion it was agreed to consider the

annexed part as a trust until the Palestine question could finally he 1 solved in the interest of the Palestinians.

The reaction of the masses and the nationalists, was, in general

a mixed one; they were happy because they cherish any closer ties between the artificially divided Arab lands; but were frustrated when

they learned about the secret arrangements with the Israelis, just before, during, and after the supposed war. They believed that such

arrangements did lead to total freezing in the field of the largest army

in the field, the Iraqi, and to the partial freezing of the best trained,

the Jordanian one, especially during the Nejeb campaigns. They believed,

further, that if their governments were able to maintain unity and cooperation in the field as they promised, Israel would not be established,

and if it was to be established, it would be in a much smaller territory.

On April 27, 1950, Great Britain recognized the unity of both banks and extended its protection to the new territory, according to the

1948 treaty, with some reservations concerning Jerusalem, which was 2 supposed to be internationalized.

Al-Madi, og. c it. , p. 544; Great Britain, Parliamentary Debates. House of Commons, vol. 474, cols. 1137-1138, April 27, 1950.

2 Al-Madi, og. c it. , p. 543; Shwadran, op. c it., pp. 297-298. CHAPTER IV

THE UNITED STATES AND JORDAN 1950-1956

As a result of the Palestine tragedy and the unity between both banks of the Jordan, the Hashemite Kingdom found itse lf swamped by troubles, internal and external. What did unity bring to the happy Kingdom? Indeed, i t brought many tro u b les. The number of th e Kingdom's inhabitants was suddenly tripled while the added territory (about 2,000 square miles) was relatively small, mountainous and unproductive. The newcomers brought to the Kingdom more p o lit ic a l so p h istic a tio n and d isco n ten t. Soon they were causing much trouble by street demonstrations, called for by some Jordani­ ans or other Arab leaders who were able to convince them in their devotion to the improvement of their conditions or even to regaining their lost paradise, Palestine.

In addition to the internal trouble, the Kingdom found itself fac­ ing outside troubles too. With its long borders with Israel—about 400 miles, longer than any other Arab border with Israel—and its hungry people on these borders, it was extremely hard to prevent "infiltration11 which resulted in frequent border incidents with Israel. Jordan was also des­ tined to have much trouble with some other Arab states at one time or an­ oth er.

In addition to the United Nations help to the refugees,'*' Jordan had to get outside assistance. This was mainly furnished by Great Britain, according to the treaty of 1948. 85

Harmony of interests. Under these new circumstances, how did the

Vest and Jordan look to each other? Jordan's strategic importance (in

location and as a highway for oil from the Persian oil fields to the Med­

iterranean) , its inclusion of most of the Holy Places in Palestine (mainly

those in Jerusalem and Bethlehem), and its involvement in the Palestinian problems (refugees, long borders with Israel besides its troubles with

the other Arab Governments) increased the Western interest in it.

On the other hand, considering the m ultiplicity of Jordan's prob­

lems (financial, military and political), receiving outside assistance became inevitable if the overburdened Kingdom "were to remain stable and independent. Indeed, the West was willing to keep it as such and was ready to pay the price. Thus, here was the basis for mutuality of interests between Jordan and the West (and w ill remain as long as the prevailing conditions and policy objectives of both sides, remain unchanged).

Consequently, the assistance needed by Jordan continued to come from the West; and during this period the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan was mainly supported by Great Britain with the United States only playing a secondary role. This relationship remained unchanged until November 1956 when the

British-Jordanian treaty was abrogated by Jordan, and, by the consent of both parties, was eventually terminated in February 1957. Since April 1957 the British-American role was reversed with the United States playing the major one in supporting Jordan.

Tripartite Declaration of 1950. The Truman Doctrine of 1947 was just the beginning of an American reaction to the increased communist

^U.N. Documents A/1451, A/1905; UNRWA Reviews, Inform ation Paper No. 1, Beirut, September 1962, "A Brief History of UNRWA 1950-1962". 86 pressure in that area of the world, which started with Greece and Turkey.

Other major steps were taken in the form of military and economic assistance in the Middle East. American policy was quite successful in preventing the Soviet Union from engulfing any part of the Middle East, although it was destined to gain some influence, since the m id-fifties, in some parts of the vital Middle East. This part of the world was just another area caught in the mounting cold war exemplified by the communist success in taking over Czechoslovakia in 1948,; the Chinese Reds' victory in 1949, the Berlin blockade in 1948-49, the first Soviet atomic bomb in 1949, and the Korean war.

As a result of the Arab-Israeli conflict, unrest and instability prevailed in that area. In Jordan, violent demonstrations broke out when the people learned about the resumption of earlier secret negotiations be­ tween King Abdullah and the Israelis. This strong reaction brought an end to the hope of both sides to conclude a permanent peace when the Government of Jordan declined to go along with the King in this endeavor.

Mr. Walter Eytan wrote:

Conversations with him (Abdullah) and some of his closest advisers were carried on intensively, especially between November 1949 and March 1950. A draft treaty was prepared and initialed, but the King, under the rising pressure of an Arab extremism which scared his ministers, was unable in the end to carry it through. Desultory talks went on, but after a while it became clear that nothing could come of them, despite the personal efforts of the King.

■^Eytan, Walter, op. c it.. pp. 42-43; The Economist, July 21, 1950; Al-Masri (Egyptian daily newspaper), March 19, 1950; Glubb, John, op. c it. . pp. 258, 340-341; Kirk, George, The Middle East 1945-1950, Oxford Uni­ versity Press, London, 1954, pp. 309-311. 87

In Syria three military coups took place within about a year, but

failed to achieve stability. Egypt too had its troubles. Al-Naqrashi

Pasha, the Egyptian Premier was assassinated. Soon guerrilla warfare,

against the British, started in the Canal Zone.

In addition to all these troubles, incidents of Arab infiltration

and Israeli retaliation were not infrequent on the Armistice lines.

In this atmosphere of instability and war-like activities, the Tri­

partite Declaration was announced, on May 25, 1950. This was a declaration made by the United States, Great Britain and France, which expressed read­

iness to "supply the Arab States and Israel with arms" for the purposes of

assuring their internal security and their legitimate self-defense and to

permit them to play their part in the defense of the area as a whole. They

declared their opposition to the development of an arms race between the

Arab S tates and I s r a e l. The three governments expressed " th eir deep in te r ­

est in, and their desire to promote the establishment and maintenance of

peace and stability in the area and their unalterable opposition to the use

of force or threat of force between any of the states in that area. The

three governments, should they find that any of these states were prepar­

ing to violate frontiers or armistice lines, would, consistently with

their obligations as members of the United Nations, immediately take action, both within and outside the United Nations, to prevent such violations."^

In general, the Arab reaction to the Declaration was not favorable.

^U.S. Department of State, American Foreign Policy. 1950-1955. Basic Documents, Washington, D.C. 1957, pp. 2337-2338; Department of State Bulletin, June 5, 1950, p. 886; Khalil, oj>. c it.. pp. 316-317; Hurewitz, op. c it. . Diplomacy in the Middle East, vol. II. Van Nostrand Co. Inc., Princeton, New Jersey, 1956, pp. 308-309. 88

They saw in it confirmation to the Israeli territorial gains. In Jordan,

the reaction was very strong against it, although it was felt, in some

quarters, in the light of the prevailing conditions, at that time the

Declaration added some protection to the Kingdom. The Arab League,

officially rejected the Declaration on the grounds that it presented an

infringement on the independence and freedom of its members

The Middle East Command. In order to check the communist tid e,

the United States followed a policy of setting up defensive pacts, in

several areas, around the communist bloc; and the Middle East was no

exception. Thus, attempts were made to devise a Middle East Command which could link the United States, the United Kingdom, Turkey and the 2 Arab world in a system based on the Canal Zone basis. To the West, the

communists were the number one enemy. To the Arabs, the communists were

no more than a danger and not an immediate threat; but the real enemies

in their eyes, were those who were occupying or controlling some parts

of their homelands, the Zionists, the British and the French. Thus

the Arabs* response was negative. Indeed their neutrality was, largely,

a reaction to Western policies in that area, especially the support of the

Z io n is ts .

Assassination and Instability. Since the unity of both banks of the

Jordan, King Abdullah became a frequent visitor to Jerusalem to perform the

Friday prayers in the Aqsa Mosque (the third Holy shrine in the Moslem

*tbid., p. 607; Khalil, Muhammad, The Arab States and the Arab League, vol. 1 & II, Khayats, Beirut, 1962, pp. 621-623.

^American Foreign Policy 1950-1955. pp. 2180-2185; Stevens, Georgiana, The United States and the Middle East. Prentice-Hall Inc., Englewood C liffs, New Jersey, 1964, pp. 155-157. 89 world). On Thursday, July 19, 1951, he was warned by the American Ambassador in Amman that there was a plot against his life and was advised against going to Jerusalem, the next day.1 The King thanked the Ambassador and traveled to the Western bank as scheduled, with more guards than usual.

While His Majesty was entering the Mosque, Friday, July 20, 1951, he was shot in th e head by a young P a le stin ia n , M ustafa Ish sh o. The King died 2 instantly. With his loss, Jordan lost its founder, a great symbol of stability, who was considered one of the most controversial and colorful personalities in the Arab world. Due to the illness of the Crown Prince,

Talal and his absence from the country at the time, Prince Naif was pro- 3 claimed Regent,

On August 18, the trial of the accused in the assassination of King

Abdullah began. It was revealed that the plot was hatched outside Jordan by Colonel A. Al-Tal. On August 28, ten days after the beginning of the trial six of the ten men accused in the assassination were sentenced to death, including two in absentia (Al-Tal was one of them). Many Arab and

Moslem lead ers appealed to the R egent, N a if, to commute the sen ten ce, but due to the pressure on Naif by his friends and by the British Ambassador in 4 Amman, th e four were hung on September 4 , 1951.

1 Al-Madi, oj>. c it.. -p. 552.

^Ibid., pp. 553-554; Al-Difa, Jordan, July 21, 1951.

^Al-Madi, op. cit.. p. 556. It was believed that Naif and his follow­ ers were pro-British, while Talal and his friends were nationalists. Naif and his friends, did their best to deny Talal the throne but they were not successful. 4 Kirkbride, Alec, A Crackle of Thrones, Joh Murray Co., London, 1956, p. 167. On September 6, 1951, Talal was proclaimed King, and three days later, Amir Hussein, the sixteen-year-old son of Talal, was proclaimed

Crown Prince, an act which was aimed at stopping Naif from attempting to 1 capture the throne for himself.

King Talal who was very popular among the young Arab nationalists, did not waste much time in effecting few but important changes in the

Constitution and in the foreign policy of Jordan. As for the changes made in the Constitution, the Cabinet became responsible to the Parliament in­ stead of being responsible to the King; a high court was to be appointed to try Cabinet members if the need should arise; education declared free and compulsory; and laws to be enforced in favor of laborers. As far as the foreign policy was concerned, His Majesty began a campaign to bring it more in line with Egypt, Syria and Saudi Arabia, and away from Great Britain and 2 Iraq. On March 24, 1952, Jordan signed the Arab Mutual Defense Pact (which was signed, June 17, 1950 by the other Arab League members). And five days later Jordan approved cooperation, with Cyria and Saudi Arabia, in re­ building the Hljazl Railroad. But this trend was not destined to last long

King Talal became ill again, and this time, almost to a hopeless degree.

On May 18, 1952 he and his Queen, Zain, and two of their sons left for Lau- 3 sanne for treatment. On August 11, 1952, by unanimous decision of both

1 2 Al-M adi, ojj, cit., p. 561. Ibid., p. 567. 3 During this period the Regent of Iraq, Abdul Illah, and the Premier, Nuri Al-Said, were frequent visitors to Amman. Both of them, Prince Naif and Jordan's Premier, Abdul Huda, visited Lausanne; then a ll of a sudden Talal appeared in Amman, on July 3, but the Regency Council continued to exercise the royal prerogatives, since His Majesty was still considered ill. Until now, what was actually going on between Amman, Baghdad and Lausanne is still a secret. It might be a good guess to consider it, in general, a 91 houses of Parliament, Talal was dethroned and his son, Hussein was pro­ claimed King. A Regency Council was to continue exercising the royla prerogatives until His Majesty, who was born on November 14, 1935, reached his eighteenth birthday. After about one month, the second son of Talal,

Prince Mohammad, was proclaimed, by the Regency Council, Crown Prince.

Revolt in Egypt. While plotting and counter plotting for the throne was going on in Jordan, a revolt exploded in Egypt, the largest state in the Arab world. On July 23, 1952, King Farouk was dethroned and a revolu­ tionary council, under the leadership of Muhammad Nagib, took over the government. This change was destined to influence events not only in Egypt, but a lso in the e n tir e Arab world, including Jordan. The coup d*Etat had completely destroyed the old order, in less than a year. The Constitution was abolished, political parties were dissolved, the monarchy was abolished and a republic was proclaimed. A three-year transition period was declared, during which the country was to be ruled by amilitary committee. Later on a political party representing all elements of the population was established.

Shortly thereafter Nasser, who was the real power in the ruling junta, removed Nagib (who looked too compromising and traditionalist to the young officers) and took over power. Without waisting much time he embraced the slogans of "progress" of the Radical--Arab Nationalists, who were, at that time,

quarrel for the throne between Talal, Naif and their supporters, in this quest it is believed that Queen Zain was very active. (Al-Madi, o£. c it.. pp. 568-571). King Hussein emphasized the fact that Abdul Ilah was against him, and that he tried his best to convince the Jordanian Prime Minister to help him in depriving Hussein of the throne but the loyal Premier did exactly the opposite. King Hussein, Uneasy Lies the Head, Bernard Geis Associates, New York, 1962, p. 190. 92 calling for Arab unity, socialism, neutrality and freedom, in addition to regaining the Arabs' lost paradise, Palestine.* The oppressed, poor and artificially divided Arab masses saw in Nasser their hope for the future.

Indeed, the same slogans were called for by other leaders and parties in the other Arab states but never caught the people's imaginations as Nasser did. This was probably due to Egypt as being the center of gravity in the

Arab world and to Nasser's shrewdness and his magnetic personality. Nasser became the first love of the Arab masses, particularly the Palestinians.

What did Nasser's popularity mean to Jordan? Plainly, it largely meant stability as long as close relations were maintained with the tower­ ing Arab leader, and vice versa. And the record of the political events, in the past several years, demonstrated that very clearly.

King Hussein's Coronation. On May 2, 1953, Hussein was crowned King 2 Hussein I of Jordan. Under his guidance, Jordan's policy was more or less a compromising one between the positions of Cairo and the West, and at the same time trying to stay on good terms, as much as possible, with its neighbors. It can be said that Jordan's policy was, prior to spring of 1957, somewhat closer to Cairo's line of policy; but since that date the reverse

^Although more than fourteen years have passed since the "Free Officer's" revolution, the Arab nationalists throughout the Arab world could not implement his goals. They have yet to devise more suitable instruments of ruling; to tailor more prosperous economic systems; to enjoy genuine personal rights and freedom of expression and to realize a fit formula for Arab union. 2 King Hussein, Uneasy Lies the Head, og. c it. . p. 58; He was not quite eighteen, but the date of the coronation was moved up to May 2, 1953 because his cousin, King Faisal was to be crowned on that day. According to the Moslem calendar, Hussein was a little more than eighteen years old at the time. 93 is true. He did his best to avoid antagonizing Israel, nevertheless, he never had any secret arrangements with it. Hoping to shoot its way, in vain, to peaceful negotiations in the early 1950s, Israel committed sev­ eral acts of aggression against Jordan, as the case of Syria and Egypt.

Many innocent civilians were the victims of such aggression. Israel was condemned in most cases by the mixed am istice commissions ,^and even some- 2 times by the Security Council. The United States was one of the sponsors for each of these Security Council resolutions, which condemned Israel.

Jordan invoked its defensive treaty with Great Britain after the

Israeli aggression on Qibya, on October 14, 1953, but Great Britain ignored the matter but promised to do something about it in the future. Again

Great Britain did not carry out its promises after the Israeli aggression on Qalqilya territory on October 10-11, 1956 (in which the King himself took part in fighting back the enemy). A few days later, defensive agreements were signed among Jordan, Iraq , Syria and Egypt; and th is was follow ed soon 3 by cancelling the British-Jordanian Treaty of 1948. 4 The Baghdad Pact. It is no secret that the United States was not alarmed with the Egyptian revolution of 1952, because its leaders were

■^Hutchison, E .H ., V iolen t Truce. The Devin-Adair C o., New York, 1956, pp. 184-193.

^U.N. Document S/2157, May 18, 1951; U.N. Document S/3139 Rev. 2 , November 24, 1953; U.N. Document S/3378, March 29, 1955. 3 Al-Madi, op. c it. , pp. 583-594, 645-646; The Israeli newspaper, Hapoker, emphasized that the Qalqilya battle was very costly and proved the superiority of the Jordanian soldier over the Israeli. Ibid., p. 591.

^Department of State, American Foreign Policy. 1950-1955. op. c it., pp. 1257-1259; Khalil.,,op. c it. , p. 368; H.M.S.O., London, Cmd. 9429, p. 3. 94 committed to reform their country* American diplomatic support helped the new regime to achieve an agreement with G r e a t Britain in 1953 to withdraw 1 its forces from the Sudan and in 1954 to evacuate its Canal Zone bases*

The United States too supplemented its Point Four aid with $40 million in economic assistance, and a similar promise of military aid remained to be n eg o tia ted . During h is v i s i t to Egypt i n 1953, S ecretary D ulles had discussed the old Middle East Command idea with Nasser. The Egyptian leader*s answer was negative* S till trying to rid Egypt of the British, he felt that it would be political suicide for the new regime, and "self- defeating" for the sponsors to accept it. Nasser argued that the danger of communism was from within and not from without and thus the only real de­ fense against it was unity and internal strength. Dulles found out, too, 2 that the real problem to the Arab states was "Israel instead of Communism."

Dulles stated:

A Middle East Defense Organization is a future rather than an im­ mediate possibility. Many of the Arab League countries are so engrossed with their quarrels with Israel or with Great Britain or France that they pay little heed to the menace of Soviet Communism.

But if Nasser were not prepared to go against the wishes of the Arab masses, Nuri as-Said of Iraq was. On February 24, 1955, Iraq and Turkey signed a treaty of mutual defense, which was the foundation for what was

*Great Britain, Parliamentary Paper* 1953, Treaty Series No. 47, Cmd. 8904; Hurewitz, op. c it. . pp. 335-337.

^The Department of State B u lletsT June 15, 1953, pp. 831-835; Stevens, op. c it. . pp. 157-159; Hurewitz, Diplomacy in the Near and Middle East, vol. tt.* pp. 337-342.

3Ibid. . p. 342. 95 1 c a lle d th e Baghdad Pact.

To counter the Pact, Egypt sponsored an Arab collective security pact (reaffirming the one which Jordan signed in 1952). Syria and Saudi

Arabia expressed willingness to sign the pact and join forces with Egypt

in a p o lit ic a l and propaganda campaign again st the Baghdad P a ct.

The supporters of the Baghdad Pact and those against it did their best to win Jordan to their side. The pressure, external and internal, causing the resignation of more than one Cabinet and resulting in extremely 2 violent demonstrations which threatened to split the country in two.

To make things worse, a few days after signing the Pact, on February

28, 1955, Israeli forces attacked an Egyptian military post in the Gaza

Strip, killing over fifty of its defenders. For this, the Israelis were 3 condemned by the Security Council. This Israeli act was very humiliating

to Egypt. At the time when Israel was flooded with Western arms and fi­ nancial aid, the Arabs, including Egypt, relatively speaking got very little

aid. The Gaza incident, and the other incidents which followed, demonstrated very clearly the dire need of Egypt for arms to match the Israeli's modem weapons. The pressure of the young officers was increased tremendously

on Nasser, more than ever before. The two-year-old search for arms in the

*~Ibid. . p. 390-391; Great Britain, Parliamentary Papers, 1955, Cmd. 9429. The United States d id not jo in the Pact as a member, and probably to avoid further antagonism to the majority of the Arabs—including Saudi Arabia—whose sentiment was very much against the Pact which included Iraq, Turkey, Great Britain, Iran and Pakistan.

2A1-Madi, o]>. 6it.,2pp. 610-624.

3U.N. Document S/3378, March 29, 1955. West was intensified but without much results. At the same time the West was not fiim enough with Israel to prevent it from attempting more aggres- ive acts on its neighbors. Thus, Nasser was in a very difficult position, and it seemed to him that the only way out was to purchase arms from the

Soviet Union and the other communist countries. On September 27, 1955, the towering Egyptian leader had signed an agreement with Czechoslovakia for arms in exchange for Egyptian cotton and rice. The Arabs including hundreds of thousands of Jordanians--including the King, himself, for some time—saw in Nasser a mystical sort of a savior.^ To the Arabs, indeed,

Nasser became their George Washington or Bismarck. This arms deal which was followed by others, made by other Arab countries, marked a turning point in the international relations of the Middle East. From now on, the Soviet Union became a Middle Eastern power challenging the Western supremacy in that area.

The hard pressed Arabs felt more secure and breathed somewhat more freely; but they had to be more careful in dealing with the local communists as well as with the communist countries. After the setting up of the Bag­ hdad Fact and after signing the arms deal, two political centers became very clear and distinct in the Arab world. One was committed to the West, represented by Baghdad, and the other committed to "positive neutrality" based on cooperation with a ll, represented by Cairo.

King Hussein realized that such a split in the Arab world was not in the interest of the Arabs, in general, and of Jordan in particular.

*King Hussein, op. c it.. p. 107. 97

Thus he tried his best, in person, to bring the two poles closer together but in vain. And after the visits to Jordan of the Turkish President,

on November 2, 1955, and early in the following month, of General

Templer, the Chief of the British Imperial General Staff, His Majesty

fe lt that Jordan would benefit tremendously by joining the Baghdad Pact.

Besides the moral gains, he believed that if Jordan were to join the

Baghdad Pact, more gains could be expected in the form of more arms, economic aid, and the changing, in favor of Jordan, of the Anglo-

Jordanian Treaty.1

The big question which was facing the King was how to convince

Nasser of what the Baghdad Pact could mean to Jordan? He wrote:

One thing 1 was resolved upon. 1 would enter no alliance without first informing President Nasser and seeking his views. Though I was worried by communist infiltration and the increased threat from Israel, I would do nothing behind his back.2

He exp lain ed , h is views in w r itin g , about Jordan and the Baghdad

Pact to Nasser, through his Commander-in-Chief, A. Amir. Nasser responded through one of his top officials. In biref, he agreed with the King that: "any strength for Jordan is a strength to the Arab world,

therefore 1 can see no objection." His Majesty was pleased, but not

for long. Suddenly Cairo launched a heavy barrage of propaganda against 3 Jordan. In a matter of hours Amman was to rn by r i o t s .

The King was amazed by C a iro 's stand, but stuck to h is guns. On

December 13, four members of the Cabinet resigned; and soon after

Premier S. Mufti resigned too. Mr. H. Majali formed the new government; but o i

*King Hussein, 0 £. cit.. Chapter VII. 9 3 Ibid., p. 109 Ibid., pp. 109-110. 98

December 19, three of its members resigned including the Minister of the

Interior. The Premier tried in vain to replace them. The Government was dissolved and a caretaker government was formed with the promise of hold­ ing elections in three or four months. But members of the dissolved

Parliament contested the legality of the decree on the ground that it lacked sufficient number of signatures. The signature of the Minister of the Interior, who had resigned just before the decree was formed, was mis­ sing. The Jordanian High Court upheld the contestants and the old deputies had to be reinstated.1 As King Hussein has written: "Now all hell broke loose. Riots such as we had never seen before, led by communists again, disrupted the entire country.'* The army was called out to put things back in order, and a ten-day curfew was imposed on the country. This was the end. Jordan never joined the Baghdad Pact.

The D ism issal o f Glubb Pasha. The d ism issa l of S ir John Bagot Glubb on March 1, 1956 after twenty-six years in the service of Jordan had shaken the very foundations of the British influence in the Hashemite Kingdom.

When they decided to keep out of the Baghdad Pact, the King's popularity soared overnight. Suspecting that Glubb Pasha was a major factor in the Palestinian fiasco, the Arab nationalists were determined to get rid of him, but his influence was so strong that it was very difficult to do so. His friends and agents were all over the country and in very high posts.

Probably realizing that it would be much easier to cooperate with the nationalists and seeing in Glubb a rival to his authority, the King decided to remove him. The King emphasized the fact that some of his ministers

^Al-Madi, oj>. c it. . pp. 617-624. 99 and even the Prime Minister sometimes used to consult him and the British

Embassy on matters of the greatest importance without even bothering to 1 inform the King about i t .

Glubb Pasha, the King wrote, was standing in the face of Arabizing the army or modernizing it, especially the air force. To keep things completely under his own thumb, Glubb, contrary to the King's wishes, kept the security policy as part of the army, under his own command. The King was shocked when he learned from the British General that in case of an

Israeli attack he was planning to withdraw the army to the eastern bank.

Indeed, the old story of 1948-1949, seemed to be very much alive on a 2 very high le v e l, and Glubb Pasha would carry i t ou t.

The King did not throw all the blame on the General and he mentioned 3 that he was presumably taking his orders mainly from Whitehall. With Glubb the gulf was growing between the army and the people. On the night before his dismissal he presented the King with a long list of army officers whom he wanted to be dismissed. Their mistake, in the opinion of the King, was that they were nationalists. The King himself wrote the orders of Glubb's dismissal and asked the Premier to execute them at once. The King was worried about the outcome of such a step. He wrote: "This is one of the most important days of my life. I don't know what its end w ill be, but

*Ibid. , pp. 139-140; Glubb, oj>. c it. , pp. 420-428. Glubb*s argu­ ment was that due to fin a n c ia l and tech n ic a l d if f ic u lt ie s i t was not feasible to strengthen the army and the air force as fast as the King wan­ ted. The motives for -his dismissal were that the King was partly in­ fluenced by an illusion that Glubb had neglected to provide ammunition, partly by a desire to exercise authority and by his imagination of being the hero of his country. 2 3 Ibid., Chapter. 9. Ibid.. p. 132. one can only live once and only with honor." Within less than one day

Glabb Pasha left the country with full honors.1

Pressure mounted on the King to revoke his decision. It came from

Prime Minister Eden down to the British Ambassador in Amman. The Ambassa­ dor took the liberty of awakening the King at 1 a.m., to warn him about the dismissal of the General, who was supposed to be a Jordanian employee.

Indeed, he was being paid by Jordan but received his orders only from Lon­ don. The Ambassador said: "You must be aware, sir, that the step you have taken has caused a tremendous uproar in London. I must advise you that

Her Majesty's Government feels that unless you change your decision im­ mediately on this matter, unless Glubb Pasha is permitted to continue his work here and we are given a change to clear this whole matter up, the consequences, Your Majesty, could be very serious as far as yourself, the 2 monarchy and the whole future of Jordan is concerned." The King replied:

"I know my country, and I know my responsibilities. I am going to carry out what I believe to be right in the best way I can. I believe, Mr. Duke, that what I have done is for the good of my country and I am not going to alter my decision, regardless of any consequences. I would rather lose

The reaction to Glubbs' dismissal was not welcomed. Mr. A. Eden described it as "very serious indeed." The Manchester Guardian, March 2, 1956 wrote: "Jordan now appears to have decided to join Egypt and Saudi Arabia in harrying Great Britain in the Middle East." The Times Star of Cincinnati, Ohio, March 3, described the event as "a-loss to Jordan, to Britain and her allies." "Political Life in the Middle East has escaped from Western control", The Economist. March 10, 1956. 2 101 my life than change my mind*" The Ambassador came back at three o'clock in the morning, but he was not allowed to see the King. The King himself gave the news of Glubb's dismissal to his people. The people danced in 2 the streets from joy and happiness. The King's popularity rose to new heights as a result of this action.

The Jordanian Government declared that in spite of Glubb's dis­ missal it s till wanted to maintain friendly relations with Great Britain as though nothing had.happened and gave his assurances that they would keep abiding by the Anglo-Jordanian Treaty. The result to this was complete shock in Great Britain, on the official and non-official lines; but soon this was changed into a more practical approach. No penalizing measures were adopted against Jordan or against its King. Great Britain might have hoped that through its financial aid to Jordan it might still be able to exercise its control even without Glubb being there on the scene. On

March 23, Great Britain announced that they intended to give Jordan about

£10 million to be used partly in building up the military forces and partly 3 in economic aid during fiscal year 1956/57.

Soon after Glubb's dismissal, Egypt, Saudit Arabia and Syria de­ clared that in case Great Britain should stop its subsidy to Jordan, they were ready to pay this subsidy to Jordan themselves.

On April 11, 1956, King Hussein visited Syria where he was welcomed with great enthusiasm and toward the end of May, the Syrian President

1Ibid. , pp. 145-146.

^Al-Difa (Jordan,) March 2, 1956.

3Ibid. , p. 333, Al-Madi, o£. c it.. pp. 632-633. 102 visited Amman in return.

On October 21, 1956, the first free parliamentary elections were held in Jordan.* The results of the elections were shocking to the

traditionalists who were defeated badly by the pro-Nasser nationalists of a ll shades. And as the leader of the strongest party in Parliament,

Suleiman Nabulsi was entrusted with forming the new government which was composed of nationalist elements. For over five months, Nabulsi followed

a pro-Nasser p o lic y . 2 On October 24, 1956, a Mutual Defense Pact was signed in Amman, between Egypt, Syria and Jordan. In theory, at least, it put the armies of the three countries under Egypt's command.

The Suez Crisis. No doubt the hostility of Nasser toward the West­ ern sponsored Baghdad P a c t, h is arms deal w ith the East and h is advocacy of '’positive neutrality," which Dulles thought immoral, were major acts and attitudes which the West did not appreciate. And when the Egyptian leader let it be known that the Soviet Union had shown an interest in building the High Dam, the West offered, in December 17, 1955, to help fi­ nance the big project instead.

After long-drawn out negotiations, it became clear in 1956 that the

Soviet Union then had been interested in financing the Dam. Then Secre- 3 tary Dulles withdrew the offer, on July 19, 1956. "The withdrawal was made in such a way as to be a deliberate, public, and inescapable insult

*Sharabi, o£. c it. , p. 180; Al-Madi, oj>. cit.. pp. 636-637.

2lfeid., P. 646 q Department of State, American Foreign Policy Current Documents, 1956, Washington, D.C., 1959, pp. 603-604. 103 to the Egyptian President and his people. The upstart Nasser was to be taught a lesson."'*’

The blow was very hard, and as expected, threw Nasser into a violent rage. It did not take him long to respond with full force. On 2 July 26, 1956, Nasser announced the nationalization of the Suez Canal

Company, promising the cheering crowds th at the Dam would be b u ilt by the royalties of the Canal. Jubilation in the Arab world was frenzied.

The Arab masses saw in him their Saladin; he stood in the face of the Vest 3 and hit back. "A champion against the imperialists at last."

The nationalization of the Canal was more shocking to the West than the withdrawal of their aid to Nasser for building the Aswan High Dam.

No doubt the tremendous popularity of Nasser in Jordan, as in the other Arab countries, after the nationalization of the Canal had helped those indebted with him to a major victory in the October elections as mentioned earlier.

It became clear to the West, mainly to Great Britain, France and

Israel that Nasser, as a symbol of Arab nationalism with strong supporters and followers throughout the Arab world, was a dangerous force against their interests in that area. The French were not very pleased about his support to the Algerian freedom fighters. Great Britain was annoyed by his influence, indirectly, on King Hussein to get rid of Glubb, and Is­ rael was annoyed by the Fedeyen and worried about Nasser's arms deal and

^Stevens, op. cit. . p. 162 2 Department of State, op. c it. . pp. 604-606; Al-Ahram Newspaperr . Egypt, July 27, 1956; Khalil, op. c it., pp. 742-771 in Arabic. 3 Stevens, op. cit. . p. 162; Department of State, oj>. c it. , pp.603-604. 104 rallying the forces of Syria and Saudi Arabia. Added to all this the fact that tho,se countries had lost tremendously by losing their control over the Canal Zone. Thus they were plotting together to break the back of

Arab nationalism, by destroying its symbol, Nasser. On October 29, 1956,

Israel attacked Egypt and two days later, Great Britain and France joined the attack. After six days of hostilities, all parties agreed to a cease­ fire, complying with the United Nations General Assembly resolution. It 1 was a condemnation of world public opinion for the aggressors.

The American position. No doubt that the Soviet Union, (itself an aggressor in Hungary) stood firm against the aggressors, but the firm United

States stand had the major weight in stopping them. Such a stand was in support of justice, peace and law. In a radio and television address to the nation, President Eisenhower said; "There can be no peace without law.

And there can be no law--if we were to invoke one code of international *2 conduct for those who oppose us—and another for our friends."

The American moral and prudent stand kept the African and Asian faith in the United States and the United Nations. Otherwise, the inter­ national body might have collapsed as a result of this injustice.

No doubt the Eisenhower policy in regard to the Suez crisis re­ sulted in regaining a great deal of the lost American good w ill through­ ou t the Arab world.

Jordan and the Suez C risis. Soon after the tripartite aggression,

Jordan invited the Arab armies to enter its territory for offensive or de-

*Ibid. , pp. 646-703; Department of State, United States Policy in the Middle East, September i. 9 5 6 -June 1957, pp. 135-204. 2Ibid., p. 150 105 fe n siv e purposes. Consequently, on November 2 , 1956 sev era l Syrian m ili­ ta ry units moved to the northern part o f the Kingdom. On November 7 , the

Iraqi troops entered the middle and eastern sector, while the Saudi troops took up p o sitio n on November 15, in the southern part.*

Immediately after the aggression, the Jordanian Government issued a statement assuring the people that it would stand by Egypt in conformity with the military agreement with Jordan, Syria and Egypt. In addition to this, King Hussein expressed to Nasser, his willingness to participate in. the fight. The Egyptian leader thanked him and asked him to keep his troops in Jordan in order to localize the conflict and avoid needless dam- 2 age.

On November 27, the Jordanian Government announced i t s in ten tio n to accept financial help from Egypt, Syria and Saudi Arabia and in the 3 meantime to bring to an end the British-Jordanian Treaty.

The Suez Canal fiasco cost Great Britain her already waning in­ fluence in the Arab world, and the same could be said about France. The

Arabs saw in Israel, more than ever, an offshoot of European imperialism, an exp an sion ist enemy located in th eir m idst. Their a ttitu d e was hard­ ened much more than before and the world did not see in Israel a small, innocent, peace-loving state.

As for Nasser, although he lost the Suez battle, he won the dip­ lomatic war.

*A1-Madi, op. c it. . p. 647; Falastine Newspaper issued November 1- 17, 1956. 2 A l-M a d i, oj>. c it., p. 647; King Hussein, ojj. cit., p. 154. 3A1-Madi, op. c it., pp. 651-653. Thus at the end of 1956, British-Jordanian relations were very str a in e d , w h ile American p r e stig e was very much enhanced in Jordan as well as throughout the Arab world. CHAPTER V

THE UNITED STATES AND JORDAN 1957 ONWARDS

This period witnessed a split between King Hussein and the nation­ alists, resulting in his winning the upper hand. It also witnessed friendly relations between the United States and Jordan. At the same time

British-Jordanian relations were normalized and improved considerably, especially after the summer of 1958. Toward the end of this period a kind of rapprochement prevailed between the King and the nationalists as a result of a relatively relaxed atmosphere in the Arab world since the first Arab Summit Conference in January 1964, and as a result of a more impartial and balanced American policy in that area.

The Eisenhower Doctrine. Many Arabs thought that the American stand during the Suez Canal crisis was not simply a wise and moral one, but also a sign of acceptance of the nationalists' policy, primarily that of neutrality. But they soon found out that they were mistaken. S till their policies were not accepted, and probably, least of all, their vio­ lent approach to implement such policies.

Believing that the Arab nationalists were, not willing or able to have a meaningful dialogue with the West and probably believing further that th ey could not f i l l th e ir own vacuum and check the communist in ­ roads, the United States decided to move in with the purpose of isolat­ ing Nasser, stopping the nationalist drive, denying the communists any 108 further gains and assuring the stability of the area* The vehicle devised for such a policy was the so-called Eisenhower Doctrine. It was proposed by President Eisenhower on January 5, 1957, approved by Congress as a joint resolution on March 7, 1957 and signed by the President two days later.1 The Doctrine authorized the President to extend economic and military assistance, including troops if necessary, to any Middle Eastern country asking fo r p ro tectio n again st "overt armed aggression from any 2 nation controlled by International Communism." A fund of $200 m illion was provided for this purpose. The President appointed Mr. James P. 3 Richards as his special assistant to implement the Eisenhower Doctrine.

The Doctrine was a warning to some countries (the communists and their sympathizers) and assurance to others (who were likely to be the victims) that they could count on the United States support if their security was undermined.

The Arab nationalists were not pleased with the Doctrine because they saw in it a vehicle for their isolation. To them, the main danger s till was not the communists, thus, from the beginning, they denounced i t .

In the meantime, King Saud's backing became, in a sense, a target of contention between President Nasser and the United States, who

■^Department of State, American Foreign Policy, Current Documents 1957, Washington, D.C., 1961, pp. 790-831; Department of State, United States Policy in the Middle East. 1956-1957, p. 23. (For more details see Appendix D).

^Ib id . . p . 44

3Ibid., p. 29. 109

who extended to His Majesty an invitation to visit Washington in January

1957. On January 16, 1957 King Hussein paid a visit to Saud for the

purpose of holding discussions on the assistance to be given to Jordan,

as was promised earlier by Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Syria. On his way to

the United States, King Saud stopped in Cairo on January 19, 1957 where

he met with the leaders of Egypt, Syria and Jordan* An agreement (Arab

solidarity agreement) was reached to supply Jordan with JD 12.5 million to

be paid as follows: Egypt, JO 5 million; Saudi Arabia, JD 5 million and

Syria, JD 2.6 million. This was to substitute the British subsidy to

Jordan up to that date. The duration of the agreement was to be for ten

years. It was understood that King Hussein promised to end the British-

Jordanian Treaty and never to join the Baghdad Fact. The conferees declared

their common opposition to the Eisenhower Doctrine.^ Although, King Saud

was spumed in New York, he was very warmly welcomed in Washington. Three

weeks after the Cairo agreement, he agreed to renew the American airbase

a t Dahran fo r fiv e more years in return for $50 m illio n in economic and

military aid. King Saud was persuaded to praise the Eisenhower Doctrine

in public, and had undertaken to impress the other Arab leaders with its

-m e r its .2

Back in Cairo, King Saud had a meeting on February 26, with Pres­

ident Nasser, King Hussein and President Quwatly of Syria. King Saud was

rebuffed by Nasser and the conferees did not agree on anything. This was

'i

1 ‘Stevens, Georgians, op. c it. , p. 165; Al-Madi, op. c it., pp. 648- 651; King Hussein, op. cit. , p. 54.

^Department of State, United States Policy in the Middle East. 1956-57, op. cit. , p. 42; Stevens, Georgiana, op. c it., p. 166. 110 the beginning of the end for the Arab solidarity agreement.

To an extent, the United States was successful in the first round with Nasser to keep King Saud on friendly terms with the United States and in weakening the Arab opposition to the Doctrine*

In March 1957, the Richards' mission began its travels to line up adherents for the Doctrine. * Except for those non-Arab nationalists al­ ready committed to the West, the mission was seemingly not successful.

With the exception of Libya and Lebanon, no Arab country dated risk the popular outrage certain to greet any endorsement of the Doctrine. "It offered protection against communist aggression which the Arabs did not fear, and said nothing about an enemy, s till occupying part of Egypt, they had good reason to fear, Israel. In attempting to isolate Egypt and Syria it violated the popular ideal of Arab unity. In seeking to enlist the

Arab states as partisans in the Cold War — and in the view of many Arabs in the wrong side at that — it violated the principle of neutralism or 2 non-alignment." As we shall see later, the Jordanian Government did not invite Mr. Richards and thus he did not visit that country during his tour which covered fifteen Middle Eastern Countries.

The Split Between King Hussein and the Nationists. On February

4, 1957, negotiations began in Amman between Great Britain and Jordan to terminate the Treaty. The termination was officially signed by

^Department of State, American Foreign Policy. Basic Documents 1957. p. 42; Stevens, op. cit*. p. 166.

^Stevens, on. c it.. p. 166; Department of State, United States Policy in the Middle East. 1956-1957; p. 70. —— — I l l representatives of both parties in Amman on the 13th of the following month.'1' On July 7, 1957, the last of the British forces left Jordan.

While th e United States Government was working on winning King

Saud, it was not yet clear what was going on, if anything, between Wash­ ington and the Palace in Amman. It is very likely that the United States decided to move in after it became apparent that Great Britain's influence was weakened, after Glubb*s dismissal and it is no secret that since the nationalists came to power after the October 3, 1956 elections, there was a crisis of confidence between them and the Palace. While the Palace was exagerating very much the influence of the communists in Parliament and on the policy of the government, the nationalists probably were somewhat too emotional and tactless. The split with the army at the time, without a clear majority on one side, together with the outside pressure from 2 several countries, increased the suspicion and worries in both quarters.

Lack o f prudence on the part of th e n a tio n a lis ts and th eir Prem ier,

Suleiman Nabulsi was quite clear on December 21, 1956, when he addressed a big political meeting in Amman. For thirty minutes he stood up and glorified President Nasser. Not once did he mention the role of Jordan in the Middle East. As a matter of fact he ignored completely all the

King's popular stands, as the dismissal of Glubb Pasha. Ten days later,

■^Al-Madi, oj>. c it., pp. 563-660. 2 King Hussein wrote: "It was hard for me to pin down the movement, when I first began to realize, the increasingly dangerous turn events were taking. I had been worried for many months and I think it was in the first week of 1957 that I knew we were in for really serious trouble." King Hussein, op. c it.. pp. 155. 2 Al-Madi, oj>. c it. . pp. 663-665; King Hussein, oj>. c it., pp. 154-155. %ing Hussein, op. cit. . p. 161. 112

Nabulsi allowed the Soviet Tass Agency to set up a bureau in Jordan. As expected the King was not happy about such an establishment.

On February 2, 1957, the King released a letter to the Premier in which His Majesty warned Nabulsi against the danger of communism and reminded him of the Jordanian anti-communism law. As soon as Nabulsi received the letter, the King made it public. On the next day, some cabinet ministers had an audience with the King in which they requested him to 'tone down' h is le t te r ; but he refused and to ld them to consider i t as a d ir e c tiv e on p o lic y . About one week la te r th e King came out with a second violent attack against communism.'*' The Egyptian and Syrian Govern­ ments were upset by the King's attitude. In the Arab solidarity meeting of February 26, "on one side were Nasser and Quwatly (President of Syria) 2 fo r communism, on the oth er, m yself (Hussein) and King Saud." Some sources believed that one of the main reasons for the difficulty between the King and Nabulsi was that the King was "willing to accept the American aid, even if it meant agreeing to the Eisenhower Doctrine,, .the King began to take steps, through contacts with the American Embassy and consultation 3 with old politicians."

Zerqa Affair. On April 3, Nabulsi announced his decision to es­ tablish diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union. There were rumors at the time suggesting that the Government was considering recognition of

Communist China.^

■^RLng Hussein, op. c it. , p. 161. o Ibid.. pp. 160-161. Quwatly and Nasser were for the Arabs cause and not fo r communism. 3 Shwadran, Benjamin, oj>. c it. , p. 347. ^Ibid., p. 348; Al-Madi, 0 2 . cit.. p. 667. 113

On April 8, an armored regiment had surrounded the capital, Amman,

and when the King asked the Chief of S ta ff, A li Abu Nuwar, about such a move, he explained that it was purely routine. According to the wish of

the King, the regiment was removed the following day. On April 10, His

M ajesty ordered the resig n a tio n of the Cabinet; and on the same day 1 Nabulsi complied.

Attempts were made in vain to form a new Cabinet for five days; but

on A pril 15 when H. K halidi became Premier, N abulsi became Foreign M inister

and S. Mufti was about to be asked to form the Cabinet on April 13,he was

advised by Abu Nuwar to draw the attention of His Majesty to the situation

in the army and that the country was extremely explosive. "Unless a

Cabinet satisfactory to the people and all parties is formed and announced

on the radio no later than nine o'clock tonight then I—Abu Nuwar—and my 2 colleagues w ill not be responsible for anything that might happen."

Abu Nuwar was summoned to the Palace. Shortly after, a telephone message came in to Abu Nuwar indicating that there was unrest in the Zerqa camp where the o ffic e r s were unable to control th e ir men. The King was

enraged and drove to Zerqa taking Abu Nuwar with him. On the way they met some trucks jam-packed with troops and civilians yelling "long live the

King" and "down with the traitors." Abu Nuwar asked the permission of the

King to go back to Amman. He was allowed to go back but only to the Palace.

King Hussein proceeded to Zerqa where he calmed down the loyal troops and

1 King Hussein, op. c it. . pp. 162-163, 166. The King wrote that on April 10 a telegram from Nasser to Nabulsi was intercepted which read: "Do not give in . Remain in your p o sitio n ." Ibid. . p. 168. 114 straightened things out. Abu Nuwar was relieved of his post the next day and left with his family for Syria.'*'

Ali Hiyari was appointed Chief of Staff, but four days later he took o f f for Syria and H. M ajali became the new C hief of S ta ff. A pro­ cess of weeding out the opposition and installing loyals to the Palace followed suit.

General H iyari announced in Damascus that th ere was no p lo t against the King, and the whole thing was prepared by the Palace to g et r id of the opposition. "1 proclaim to Arab and international public opinion that there was no plot for a coup d'etat against King Hussein. The whole thing is an imperialistic plot aimed at certain objectives forcing Jor- 2 dan out of the Arab liberation policy of Egypt and Syria."

It seems that Hiyari was not the only one who had such an opinion about the story of the plot. "Indeed, at least one Western authority

(and many Arabs) believe the alleged plot was fiction and the April 3 crisis was an American contrivance from start to finish."

Each side accused the other of plotting. Probably both were plot­ ting, and most probably only time w ill tell what the story really was.

At any ra te the P alace won and the country moved more than ever to the

West especially the United States.

Although the King paralyzed, the opposition, at least temporarily, the country was destined to have more trouble for a few more days. On

April 21, 1957, the Foreign Minister, Nabulsi, charged that certain

^Al-Madi, op. c it. . pp. 671-672; King Hussein, op. c it. , pp. 165-179. zThe New York Times. April 24, 1957. 3Stevens, oj>. c it., p. 167. 115 foreign diplomatic representatives were interfering in their affairs.

In the meantime Premier Khalidi declared that the Government was going ahead with its plan to establish diplomatic relations with Russia* The

Syrian and Egyptian radio and press intensified their campaign against the

King and accused the American Embassy in Amman of creating the convulsion in Jordan through direct interference in her affairs. * The Premier emphatically denied the charge but the nationalists continued to 2 intensify their activities.

The Pelted States Open Support. On April 22 a National Congress was held in Nablus attended by twenty-three members of Parliament and other personalities and politicians. It formed a Steering Committee which demanded th at:

The Khalidi Government resigned and a new one be formed, based on the Nationalist Socialist Baa'th, Palestine Arabs, and National Front parties; the new government reject unequivocally the Eisenhower Doctrine; the Government expel the American Ambassador, Lester D. Mallory, and the

American military attache, Col. James Sweeney. These demands were presen­ ted to the Cabinet, coupled with a threat of demonstrations on April 24 3 i f the demands were not accepted. The Cabinet p r a c tic a lly assured the

National Steering Committee that its demands would be met. Thus, the scheduled demonstrations were cancelled. But the King turned down the demands. The National Steering Commitee then decided to go ahead with its

^Al-Ahram. Egypt, April 21, 22, 1957. ^Al-Difa, Jordan, April. 22, 1957. 3A1-Difa, Jordan, April 23, 1957; Al~Madi, op. cit.. pp. 675-677. 116

threat. Sure enough, It made good its threat and demonstrations took place in all Jordan cities, with considerable strength in the western bank.

At this juncture, the United States decided to come openly to the

support of Jordan. On April 23, 1957, during a press conference, Secre­

tary of State, Dulles, declared:

We have great confidence in and regard for King Hussein, because we really believe that he is striving to maintain the independence of his country in the face of very great difficulties, and he does not want to see Jordan fall under the domination of other countries which have indicated a desire to work contrary to what the King con­ siders to be the best interests of his country. It is our desire to hold up the hands of King Hussein in these matters to the extent that he thinks that we can be helpful. He is the judge of that.1

On the next day, April 24, at a news conference, James Hagerty,

Press Secretary to the President, said that he had been authorized to say

that both the President and the Secretary of State regarded the independence

and integrity of Jordan as vital to the national interest of the United

States and to world peace. This reminder was appropriate because of the

threat to the independence and integrity of Jordan by International com- 2 munism as King Hussein h im self sta te d .

This was interpreted both in the United States and Jordan as an

invitation to King Hussein to ask for American assistance.

In the meantime, unit# of the Sixth Fleet, including the aircraft

Department of State Press Release 237, April 23, 1957; Department of State, United States Policy in the Middle East 1956-1957. pp. 68-69; Department of State, American Foreign Policy; Current Documents, 1957, op. cit. . pp. 1023-1024.

2I b id . , p. 1024; Department of State, United States Policy in the Middle East 1956-1957. p. 69. U 7 carrier, the U.S‘.S. Forrestal. were ordered to rush to the Eastern

Mediterranean. 1

On the evening of April 24, Khalidi's Cabinet resigned and the

King asked Ibrahim Ha shim to form a new cabinet which was done im m ediately. Most o f the new Cabinet members were o ld con servatives and all loyal to the throne. On April 25, the King explained to the nation his analysis of the crisis and what to expect. He placed the police and security forces under the command of the army; he dissolved the

Barliament, abolished all political parties, suspended the constitution, declared martial law and imposed a total day and night curfew in all major cities including Amman. Soon, hundreds from the opposition were 2 sent to jail and others had to flee the country.

On April 28, King Hussein flew to Riad where he and King Saud issued 3 a communique emphasizing their friendship and cooperation. The next d morning he submitted a request to the State Department for economic aid, and a few hours later (perhaps for the first time in history), the request 4 was granted. Jordan was given $10 million in recognition of the steps taken by the King., the Government, and the people of Jordan to maintain integrity and independence of the nation. The American Ambassador in Amman plainly indicated that this was only the first measure declaring that the Unite

^"Stevens, pp. c i t . . p . 167 2 Al-Madi, op. c it.. pp. 677-680* Some of the people who were sent to jail or left the country were members of the dissolved Parliament like Sheikh Ahmad Daour and A-Rimawi. 3 Department of State, American Foreign Policy. Current Documents 1957. pp. 1024-1025. 4 Ibid.. pp. 1025-1028. 118

States would "maintain a continuing review of Jordan's problems with His

Majesty's Government to determine what further steps may be required."

The Ambassador was r ig h t. The United S tates continued looking a fte r

Jordan's needs ever since. It is worth noting that the King of Jordan and h is Government emphasized that they had no in ten tio n o f in v itin g Ambassador

Richard^ or of having anything to do with the Eisenhower Doctrine "but the speed with which the United States responded to his need suggests there was nevertheless an understanding."^ The Americans in Washington and in Amman were inclined to agree with the King on his public stand. Indeed, the

United States certainly displayed extraordinary consideration for His

Majesty to avoid embarrassing him with his fellow Arabs. This indicated to o , to what length the United States Government was w illin g to go to break the pro-Nasser front in Jordan. Since that date Jordan continued 2 more than ever to side with the West.

Unity and Union. Since 1955, Syria followed the same policy lines as those of Egypt. Syria was a partner in the Unified Arab Command in

1955. Following in the footsteps of Egypt, Syria turned to Russia for arms. During the Suez crisis, the Syrian President, Quwatly was paying a state visit to the Soviet Union (this was the first official visit made by an Arab leader to the Soviet Union). Syria was also Egypt's partner in the Arab Solidarity Agreement and had the same attitude toward develop­ ment of events in Jordan in 1957. While King Saud placed his troops under the command of King Hussein, the Syrian army surrounded two Jordanian

^Shwadron, Benjamin, op. c i t . . pp. 356-357. Stevens, Georgians, oj>. c it. . p. 167. 119

c i t i e s , Irb id and Rumtha. But in the follow in g month they withdrew from

Jordan.

The year 1957 witnessed some reverses for the Arab nationalists.

Saudi Arabia and Jordan were drawn c lo se r to the w estern camp and the

conditions in Syria were not far from resulting in a crisis. The

communist influence was increased; three officials from the United States

Embassy in Damascus, alleged to be plotting against the Syrian Government were expelled—>which led to the expulsion of the Syrian Ambassador to

Washington, and a war scare developed following troop concentration on

the Syrian-Turkish borders (which in turn brought Egyptian mechanized units

to the northern part of Syria, in addition to the Soviet threat to Turkey 1 and the massing of troops on their common borders.) About this time,

the Baa'thist influence in Syria became very strong. Through A. Hourand

who was a member of the Parliament and through influential officials in

the army the Baa'th Party started to win ascendency.

A Special Parliamentary Commission to study a project of unity

w ith Egypt was s e t up. The Commission recommended stro n g ly such a ste p ,

after exploring its possibilities with the reluctant Egyptian President.

On February 1, 1958, the first Arab Unity in their modern history, 2 was proclaim ed. The Arab masses rea ctio n was sim ply jo y . The popularity

o f P resident Nasser and the Arab n a tio n a lis ts was in creased .

The United S tates Government recognized the United Arab R epublic,

^•Department of State, o£. c it.. pp. 1034-1058; U.N. Documents A/3699, A/3673, A/PV.714. 2 Khalil, op. cit., vol. 1, p. 601. 120 1 2 on February 2 5 , 1958, and the Arab Union on May 28, 1958.

Troubles of 1958. Lebanon found itself caught in a civil war in

May 1958. Probably, the basic issue which led to the revolt was its line in foreign policy. Lebanon endorsed the Eisenhower Doctrine and its policy was definitely pro-West. Another important issue was that Pres­ ident K. Chamoun, at that time, was trying to amend the constitution so he might be able to run again for the presidency. Such problems were further complicated by inter-Arab differences and the cold war issues.

When Nasib al-Matni, owner of the anti-government, pro-Nasser newspaper,

Telegraph, was assassinated on May 8, 1958 in Beirut, disturbances spread on a large scale. On the very next day the United States Information

Service Library (USIS), in Tripoli, was sacked and burned with fifteen 4 persons killed and 128 wounded.

On May 12, armed insurrection broke out in Beirut and in several other places. The Government of Lebanon appealed to the United States for help in accordance with the Eisenhower Doctrine. The latter res­ ponded by sending shipments of police equipment, reinforcing the United

"^Department of State, American Foreign Policy. Current Documents 1958, Washington, D.C., 1962, pp. 1071-1072. "" 2 Ibid. , p. 1069. In the recognition announcement it was stated that "the Government of the United States of America has today recognized that the necessary constitutional and legislative measures have been taken by Iraq and by the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan for the establishment of the Arab Union and has extended its good wishes to the Union on this occasion." (Department of State Press Release No. 293; The Depariment of State Bulletin. June 16, 1958, p. 992). 3 Al-Ahram Newspaper, May 9, 1958, Egypt (in Arabic) 4 Al-Havat Newspaper, May 10, 1958, Lebanese (in Arabic) 121

States Sixth Fleet in the Eastern Mediterranean and by speeding shipments

of ta n k s. 1

Lebanon accused the United Arab Republic of interference, and 2 complained in vain to the Arab League and then to the Security Council.

Debate was postponed until after the Arab League Council had dealt with

the problem. When the Arab League Council, which was meeting in Libya,

failed in finding a satisfactory solution, Lebanon complained again to 3 the Security Council. After much debate, a Swedish resolution calling

for the sending of a United Nations Observation Mission to Lebanon "so

as to ensure that there is no illegal infiltration of personnel or supply

of arms or other material across the Lebanese border," was introduced

and passed.^

On July 14, 1958, a bloody military coup swept away the Iraqi

Government. The reaction of Washington and London was very fast.

American marines landed in Lebanon the next day, on July 15, in order to

protect American lives and by their presence there to encourage the

Lebanese sovereignty and integrity. On the evening of the same day Pres­

ident Eisenhower, over a nationwide radio-television hook-up, had in­

formed the American people about the development in the Middle East.

He stated that "the independence and integrity of Lebanon is vital to

the national interest and world peace. The American landing was required

to support the principle of justice and international law upon which peace

^Shwadron, Benjamin, op. c i t . , p. 376. ^UJI. Security Council, S/4007, May 23, 1958. 3Ibid. . S/PV-823, June 6, 1958. %.N. Security Council, Ibid., S/PV-828, June 11, 1958. 122 and stable International laws depend."'*' He emphasized too, that a plot to overthrow the Government of Jordan on July 14 was discovered.

In the meantime, British troops landed in Jordan. The United

States supported the British move and, in the meantime, sent equipment 2 and other material. Jordan complained on July 17, to the Security 3 Council against an interference from the United Arab Republic. But the

Council was practically paralyzed while the problem was under discussion at the United Nations. Several messages on the problems of the Middle

East were exchanged between the Soviet Union and the West but without 4 conclusive results.

On August 13, 1958, President Eisenhower addressed the United

Nations General Assembly stating a few suggestions that might help in stabilizing the conditions in the Middle East. His program stressed the fact that economic and social assistance was essential in helping those countries toward progress and putting an end to interference in the domestic affairs of the various countries in that area and calling on the United Nations to take a more active role in the affairs of Jordan.

^•Department of State pulletinT August 4, 1958, p. 181; Department of S ta te , American Foreign P o lic y Current Documents 1958. op. c i t . , pp. 969-972.

2Ibid., pp. 982-983; Walastiue Newspaper of Jordan, July 16, 1958, (in Arabic); Al-Madi, oj>. c it. , p. 692.

^United Nations Security Council, S/PV-831, July 17, 1958; Depart­ ment of State, American Foreign Policy Current Document 1958. op. cit. , P. 981.

^Ibid., pp. 987-1047; United Nations Security Council S/4064, July 23, 1958”; S/4067, July 29, 1958; S/4071, S/4074, S/4075, August 1, 1958. 123

The American President stated that indirect aggression on Jordan "may lead

to conflicts endangering the peace...we must recognize that the end of

peace in Jordan could have consequences of a far-reaching nature... .Since

the United Nations sponsored the Palestine armistice agreements upon which

peace in the area rests and since it also sponsored the care of the Pales­

tine refugees....I hope that this Assembly w ill be able to give expression 1 to the interest of the United Nations in preserving the Peace in Jordan."

The Arab states introduced a draft resolution in which the Arab League

members agreed to respect the "independence and sovereignty" of each other.

The members of the United Nations were relieved of the pressure and passed 2 the resolution.

While the debate at the United Nations General Assembly was s till

going on, the s itu a tio n in Iraq calmed down. On August 2 , 1958 th e United 3 States recognized the new Iraqi regime.

Jordan, after losing its twin in the Union, found itself lonely again.

But the United States stood firm ly by the hard-pressed Kingdom. Jordan

was in desperate need of oil after its communication with Iraq and Syria were cut off. The nationalists tide was, at the time, high and King Saud

■^Department of State, American Foreign Policy Current Document 1958, op. c it. . pp. 1082-1089; The Department of State Bulletin, September 1, 1958, pp. 337-342; The New York Times, August 14, 1958.

^United Nations Document A/Res./1237 (ES-III); Department of State Bulletin, September 15, 1958, p. 411; Department of State, American Foreign Policy Current Documents 1958. op. c it. , pp. 1047-1048. —————

^Ibid., pp. 1070-1071. Iraq withdrew from the Union July 15, but it took until August 2 when King Hussein issued a decree stating that the Union had ceased to exist (Ibid., pp. 1069). 124 was not willing to. antagonize them. Thus, he declined King Hussein*s request to allow the American planes, loaded with oil, fly over his country on their flight from the Persian Gulf to Jordan. Eventually oil was brought 1 to Jordan from Cyprus by American and British planes flying over Israel.

The King’s Visit to the United States. King Hussein had his first 2 visit to the United States in the Spring of 1959. His Majesty conferred with President Eisenhower and several other high officials including Vice

President Nixon and Secretary of State, Herter. President Eisenhower ex­ pressed the feeling that the United States Government was very concerned about the threat of communism to the Arab world. The King agreed with the

President and assured him that Jordan was standing firm against such danger and added that Jordan was a small country and needed, perhaps more than any­ thing else the feeling that it was not alone.

The second visit for King Hussein to the United States, was made in

September 1960, At the United Nations General Assembly he delivered a speech in which he supported the United States point of view on the question of the United Nations Secretary-General. He criticized the neutralists’ stand on the issues of the Cold War. He asserted that Nasser was not the only Arab leader who could speak in the name of all the Arabs. At the same time he denounced the Z io n ists " in ju stice" in P a le s tin e , and the

French stand, at the time, in Algeria. No doubt the American Government

1 2 King Hussein, oj>. cit., Chapter 13. Ibid. , Chapter 16.

^United Nations General Assembly Meeting No. 882, October 3, 1960; King Hussein, op. c it. , pp. 265-272. 125 was pleased by the King's stand on the Issues between the East and the West.

During his visit to the United Nations, he had a meeting with the Iraqi

Foreign Minister, which resulted in Jordan's recognition of the Iraqi re­ gime.

Soon a fte r President Kennedy came to the White House, he sought a solution for the complicated Arab problems, especially the Palestinian one.

To this end he sent special messages, May 11, 1961, to the Heads of the

Arab States among whom was King Hussein. Mr. Kennedy emphasized the w illing­ ness of the United States, through the United Nations and outside it, to help in solving the Palestine problem, in raising the economic and social standards fo r the Arab people and in securing more s t a b ilit y in th e area.'*'

The United Arab Republic Breakdown. In September 1961, the first

Arab unity experiment failed just a few weeks after the United Arab Re­ public'Government's ill-fated attempt to socialize the economic system of 2 its northern region,. Syria.

The breakdown of the United Arab Republic relieved and heartened

King Hussein, who without much waiting recognized the new Syrian Govern­ ment. Cairo retaliated by cutting off its diplomatic relations with Jordan.

A fter the success of the se p a r a tist movement in Damascus, the Iman of Yemen did not hesitate to criticize the socialist measures of President

Nasser, the thing which pushed the latter to dissolve the federation with

^Department of State, American Foreign Policy Current Documents. 1961. Washington, D.C., 1965, pp. 671-673. (For more details please see Appendix E); Council on Foreign Relations, Documents on American Foreign Relations. . o Al-Ahram, September 30, 1961. 126 the Yemen. Egypt retained the name and the flag of the old United Arab

Republic.

In September 1962, the Yemeni revolt exploded. Nasser supported the new Republican regime, and Saudi Arabia supported the royalists. Jordan came out in support of the royalists as expected, but went beyond its means when it started sending some m ilitary men and war material to the hard pressed royalists. Such a step was not popular in Jordan, as demonstrated by the defection of some Jordanian flyers with their planes to Egypt. Prob­ ably the King was advised against such costly adventure; and after the

American recognition of the Republican regime, July 24, 1963,^ Jordan's help to the Royalists gradually diminished.

When the Ba'athists came to power in Iraq, on February 8, 1963, and in Syria on the 8th, of the following month, the pressure started mounting 2 on Jordan especially after the Cairo unity agreement of April 20, 1963.

Bloody demonstrations in favor of a union between the United Arab Republic,

Syria and Iraq, lasted a few days in Jordan. Probably motivated by these disturbances in addition to the pressure of the Zionists and their friends on the White House for more security guarantees to Israel, President Ken­ nedy made the following announcement on May 8, 1963 in a press conference:

We support the security of both Israel and her neighbors... .We strongly oppose the use of force or the threat of force in the Near E ast....In the event of aggression, or preparation for aggression, whether direct or indirect, we would support appropriate measure in

^Department of State Press Release No. 385, J u ly 24, 1963; The De­ partment of State Bulletin. August 12, 1963, p. 249.

^Al-Ahram Newspaper. April 21, 1963 (in Arabic). 127

the United Nations and adopt other courses of action on our own to prevent or to put a stop to such aggression, which, of course, has been the policy which the United States has followed for sometime.

But soon disunity and more differences between the Ba'athists and Nasser r e s u lte d . On November 18 o f the same year, the B a 'a th ists lo s t power in 2 Iraq to A. Arif and to the Nasserites. This increased relaxation in

Jordan.

Relaxation in Jordan. Due to the relatively relaxed atmosphere of the Cold War and due to the relatively improved relations between the United

States and the United Arab Republic, for the last few years, the pressure on

Jordan was somewhat lessen ed . The rela x a tio n became more r e a l in Jordan, 3 since the first Arab Summit Conference of January 1964. The Arab leaders agreed to stop interference in the affairs of each other, and to start on an

Arab plan for the exploitation of the Jordan River as an answer to the 4 Israeli Flan, and also agreed to create a Palestine entity.

On January 20, 1964, Mr. U. Alexis Johnson, Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs, shed light on the American policy in the Middle East.

1 The New York Times. May 9, 1963; Council on Foreign Relations: Documents on American Foreign Relations, 1963, p. 268.

2 The New York Times. November 19, 1963.

3 Al-Ahram, January 14-18, 1964.

4 The Arabs and Israelis failed to agree on a unified plan to make use of the Jordan River. The disagreement was mainly for political reasons. Anyhow, Israel unilaterally went ahead with its own scheme which was to be fin ish e d com pletely in 1966. Although pumping water to the Nejeb started in the summer of 1964, the Arabs wanted to divert the head water before it comes down the valley into Israel. The Jewish state threatened re­ taliation if the Arabs were to go ahead with their plan. 128

He summed up the American objectives In that area, as peace and stability, limiting hostile Soviet influence, trying to achieve accommodation between

Israel and its Arab neighbors, continuity of oil flow to West Europe, and access to the air and sea routes. He stated further that the United

States policy would continue as before, without rigidity, as in

President Kennedy's Statement of Hay 8, 1963. He made it clear that the

United States "will always endeavour to act in such a way as not to damage their — Middle Eastern peoples — interests. But in the final analysis our policies will be based on the United States interests as we see it."*

In April 1964, King Hussein went to Washington to explain on behalf 2 of the Arab leaders the Arab Plan. This he did very eloquently. After talks between King Hussein and President Johnson, a communique was issued in which it was stated "King Hussein put forward the views of Jordan and the other Arab states on various Middle East problems and their impact on relations between the two countries ... A common concern for preserving and strengthening peace in the area was evident throughout the talks. The two leaders declared their firm determination to make every effort to increase the broad area of understanding which already exists between Jordan and

i-The New York Times, January 21, 1964; The Department of State Bulletin. February 10, 1964, pp. 208-211. Address made before the Citizens Committee on American Policy in the Near East, Washington, D.C.

2The New York Times. April 14, 1964; Department of State Bulletin. May 4, 1964, p. 697; The National Broadcasting Co., Meet the Press, vol. 8 No* 12, April 19, 1964* As in his speech two days earlier the King tried to defend the Arabs* right to carry out their intended Jordan water plan as an answer to the Israeli one. He expressed gratitude for the United States assistance to Jordan and hoped for increased American-Arabian friend­ ship and understanding. 129 the United States."'*'

After the second Arab Summit Conference, the King went again to

France to exp lain the Arab c a se . In addition h is ro le was an important 2 one in bringing Nasser and King Faisal closer during the Conference.

At present the conditions in Jordan are relatively satisfactory.

Due to moderation and tolerance, as demonstrated by the release of all political prisoners; to foreign assistance, mainly from the United States, coupled with wise economic planning and thrifty expenditures; to the willing­ ness of the Jordanians to help themselves; to the failure of the national­ ist governments, to a great extent, in implementing their goals; and due to Jordan’s moderate foreign policy, especially within the Arab orbit, the stability of the country became secured more than ever. '

^Public Papers of the President of the United. States, Lyndon B. Johnson, 1963-1964, vol. I, Washington, D.C., 1965, pp. 461-462. 2 The New York Times. September 10, 11 and 14, 1964. CHAPTER VI

ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE TO JORDAN

As explained earlier, Jordan was in need of external aid since its creation after World War I. This need was increased and became more urgent after the Arab-Israeli conflict and the unity of both banks of the Jordan River, which increased the area of the country to about 96,000 square kilometers and the population to more than three-fold. Indeed, it is no exaggeration to say that without this assistance the Hashemite King­ dom of Jordan would in all probability have long ceased to exist as a political entity in the crossfire of politics in the turbulent Arab world.

As far as the West was concerned, Jordan depended on Great Britain for the fulfillment of most of its needs up to 1957 while the United

States was playing a secondary role in this endeavor. After the Suez

Canal fiasco, the roles of the two Western powers was reversed. Since the United States moved in to help the hard pressed Kingdom in shouldering its problems, the American aid averaged yearly about $55 million, much more than all the previous years combined. Stability with all its implica­ tions, was the major factor in drawing both countries together.

It can be said that prior to 1957 American aid to Jordan was large­ ly to head off social unrest and to meet some urgent needs. But later when the aid was increased, long range planning, for the development of the country's economy, became the goal. In the meantime the Jordanians did their best to help themselves by trying to make use of the aid in the 131 best possible way. The aid was used mainly for the development of various 1 economic and social fields, while military aid was very small. 2 Agriculture. Jordan is mainly an agricultural country and as a result, U.S. aid has been designed to strengthen and modernize this sector of the country. The aid was aimed at educating farmers and increasing the amount o f land c u ltiv a te d .

The education of farmers took in nearly all aspects of agriculture.

I t included h o r tic u ltu r e , agronomy and animal husbandry. A lso, emphasis was placed on the control of disease. The education of farmers which was helped by U.S. aid is being carried on by the Rural Development Department.

Due to the scarcity of water, Jordan was forced to implement better and more extensive irrigation systems. The East Ghor Canal project is an example of the potential benefits accruing from irrigation systems.

USAID/j has stimulated continued development of irrigation projects in Jor­ dan.

The agricultural productivity in Jordan depends mainly on the amount of rainfall. If the rain falls heavily then the result is good and vice versa. The main exports of agriculture in good seasons are olive oil, olives and vegetables. In 1962, it was estimated that over JD 23 million was the 3 national income from agricultural and animal products.

^United States Agency for International Development. United States Economic Assistance to Jordan 1952-1962, Amman, Jordan, 1962. 2 United States Agency for International Development, op. c it.. pp. 14-18; Report of a Mission organized by the International Bank for Recon­ struction and Development at the request of the Government of Jordan, The Economic Development of Jordan, Johns Hopkins Press, Baltimore, Maryland, 1957, pp. 78-85. ^Ministry of Information, Department of Culture and Guidance, Developing Jordan, the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, Amman, 1965, p. 15. 132

Highways. United States aid to Jordan for highways was first in iti­

ated in 1953. At that time, there were few roads in the country. The

highway system subsequent to 1953 began to improve and indeed cut traveling

time in half between major cities with the help of Point IV Aid.

As a result, Jordan now has modern roads connecting Jerusalem to the

Dead Sea and Amman. Other roads connecting Amman to the road to Damascus

on the Syrian border was also built during this period. United States aid

to Jordan is now aimed at maintaining the present system of roads, which were completed in 1962.

On September 30, 1965, H.E. Wasfi Tell, Prime Minister of Jordan

signed an agreement in which Jordan would receive a loan from the United

States in the amount of $1,640,000 for the construction of a new highway, 2 the Shouneh-Damiah Highway.

Education. At the request of the Jordanian Government, the United

States began a comprehensive program of financial and technical assistance

to help Jordan overcome the serious shortage of teachers, lack of class­ rooms and sc h o o ls, and shortages in equipment and su p p lie s.

To overcome the shortage of qualified teachers, the United States

Mission and the Ministry of Education developed a plan to establish train­

ing centers. These training centers—construction began in 1952— in­ cluded classrooms, a library, and boarding facilities for 100 individuals.

Four training centers were opened and proved to be a boom to Jordan, in

Ibid., pp. 251-277; United States Economic Assistance to Jordan. op. cit., pp. 19-21.

^Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, Jordan Development Board, Monthly Economic News Bulletin, September/October 1965, p. 20. 133

that Jordan not only began providing secondary school educators for its

own school system, but also began exporting teachers to other Arab coun­

tr ie s .

Further programs were developed to provide personnel to man the

training centers. Some of these programs provided training in the United

States for teachers. As a result, many specialists have been trained who now are implementing knowledge acquired abroad in the Ministry of Education.

Trade schools were also constructed. These trade schools provided boys an opportunity to learn a trade in order that they might make a living.

Specialized training was given for boys and/or girls in agriculture, home econom ics, and arts and c r a fts .

Most of the programs were initiated through USOM which not only helped plan and implement the above programs, but also assisted with supplies, classroom equipment, subsidization of salaries and food. The benefits to

Jordan have been invaluable. Jordan has the second highest percentage of education in the Arab world and it has become compulsory and free.^ 2 Public Health. United States aid in public health began with the creation of the Cooperative Health Service whose function was to handle and investigate requests, to survey needs and to implement projects.

The first problem to receive the benefit of United States aid was the high mortality rate among infants. To solve this problem, a Maternity and Child Health Program was developed and implemented. The success of

this program is attested to by the decrease in the mortality rate.

1developing Jordan, op. cit., p. 11. 2 Ibid.. pp. 12-13. 134

Another area that demanded a tte n tio n was tu b e rcu lo sis, a major health problem in Jordan. With United States aid, a T.B. Center was com­ pleted which originally was started in 1948.

The other area to receive substantial aid was public sanitation.

The following are some of the projects supported by the United States:

(1) Garbage trucks were provided to the Amman Municipality for the collec­ tion of garbage; (2) A water system for the town of Ma'an was constructed;

(3) Programs to eradicate malaria from the country were begun in 1958 and expanded in 1959 and (4) A sewerage treatment plant was built.

Industry. Due to the fact that Jordan is mainly an agricultural country, its industrial sector has received little aid. At present, the exploitation of phosphate and potash are the main recipients of United

States aid. The U.S. Financial Development Fund has provided help in other industries, but to a limited extent. This fund has assisted in the fi­ nancing of an automobile battery plant, an electric tubing factory and a textile factory.

A great potential for development exists in this sector of Jordan's economy. With greater financial and technical assistance, substantial progress could be achieved.

In 1963, industry contributed about jd 14 million to the national income as compared to JD 1 million in 1952,^ 2 Public Administration. When the United States began aiding Jordan,

^Ibid., pp. 21-22.

^United States Economic Assistance to Jordan 1952-1962. op. c it. , p. 24. 135 no serious thought was given to the long-term problems of administration.

At that time, projects were administered by Jordanian and American per­

sonnel with executive authority generally resting wj[,th the Americans.

This situation existed until 1957 when administrative responsibilities were delegated to the newly created Jordan Development Board with American

personnel assuming an advisory role.

Weaknesses in the public administration of Governmental services

included inadequate accounting systems and procedures with resulting lack

of budgetary control, inadequate procedures for the collection of revenues,

a lack of trained and qualified personnel, a lack of information of a

statistical nature, and a civil service system which provided little secu­

rity and opportunity for advancement.

Since 1962, progess has been made and reforms in f is c a l management

and tax administration are being implemented.

Tourism. Jordan received assistance from the United States in

order that it could be more competitive with other tourist attractions in

the Middle East. The bulk of the aid has been used to increase the number

of hotels, to improve the quality of hotels and services, and to restore

and develop antiquities.

Loans were obtained by the Jordanian Government with US AID assist­

ance for the construction of first class hotels. Other loans on a short­

term basis were obtained for the improvement of existing tourist facili­

ties. Antiquities were found and restored with United States aid. The

main beneficiaries of assistance were Petra, a mountain stronghold of the

fabled Nabteans, and Jerash, one of the better preserved Roman cities in 136 the area.*-

Military Aid. By the end of 1965 the American military aid to Jor­ dan totaled about $37 m illion. Such aid was extended for internal securi­ ty and for defensive purposes. It was meant for keeping the balance of power in the Middle East. The United States had agreed recently to sell 2 3 to Jordan a number of M-48 tanks, (50-100) and a few planes.

The Seven-Year Plan—1964-1970.^ The Plan is called for to strengthen the economy of Jordan as much as possible within the shortest possible time.

Jordan's major economic problems could be traced to the following: (1)

The Balance of Trade, which has been in a state of chronic deficit since the creation of Jordan as a political entity. This problem wight be ex­ emplified from the fact that Jordan's exports in 1963 did not exceed 33 per cent of its imports, although this represented an increase of 6 per cent over the exports of 1961; (2) foreign aid is a necessity for the very ex­ istence of Jordan. For example the Government income for the year 1963-

1964 did not cover more than 46 per cent of its expenditures, thus a large ratio of the foreign aid has to be used for the budget support; (3) per capita income has remained relatively low in spite of the large increase in national income in recent years. The per capita income in 1963-64 was

1Ibid. » p. 24.

^The New York Times, December 3 0 , 1965.

^The Washington Post, April 3, 1966.

^Government o f Jordan (M inistry of Economy), The Seven-Year P lan , 1964-1970. Amman, Jordan, 1966, (in Arabic). 137

JD 75 ($210.00); (4) the level of unemployment which was very high in 1961 reached 14 per cent. In order to meet such difficulties the Seven-Year

Plan envisaged the primary goals of reducing the deficit in the balance o f trade to a minimum, thus reducing the r e lia n c e upon foreign aid as a source of financing, increasing the per capita income and the general standard of living and reducing the rate of unemployment.

To achieve these goals, Jordan has to keep receiving financial and technical assistance from the West. But in the meantime it is trying to help itse lf, which is believed could be done by encouraging, to maximum, the profit motives and by introducing general reorganization to its various economic sectors including the financial policy (as expenditure, tariff and taxes) and administration (like board of development and public administra­ tion, budgetary department, employees affairs and judicial department).

It should be emphasized that Jordan is calling upon free and private enterprise (and not upon socialism) to help develop its economy. It can be noticed from Table 2 that the Government's role is to minimize sectors which private investors are expected to fill.

Water Resources Development. Unlike many Middle Eastern countries,

Jordan has neither oil nor much water. To utilize the waters of the Jordan

River, several plans were drawn by the mandatory power—Britain—and later by Israel, the Arabs and the United Nations—UNRWA—with the support of the

United States.

Jordan tried as early as 1939 to make use of the Jordan River waters in irrigating the East Ghor land. The Bunger Flan in 1952 was another attempt, and the same could be said about Baker-Harza Flan of 1955. 138

As far as the United States was concerned it sponsored the Unified

Plan (Johnston Plan), and later the East Ghor Canal. 1 Johnston Plan. Mr. Eric Johnston was appointed by President

Eisenhower as his personal representative with the rank of Ambassador, for

the purpose of sending him on a mission to the Middle East "to undertake

d iscu ssio n s with c erta in o f the Arab s ta te s and I s r a e l, looking to the

mutual development of the water resources of the Jordan River Valley on a

1 The Unified Development of the Water Resources of the Jordan Valley Region, by Chas. T. Main, Inc. (under the direction of T.V.A. at the request of the United Nations), Boston, 1953.

Department of State. Digest of International Law, vol. Ill, (prepared by and under the direction of Marjorie M. Whiteman), Washington, D.C., 1964.

Stevens, Georgians, The Jordan River Valley. International Peace, New York, 1956.

______. Jordan River Partition, Stanford University Press, 1965.

Department of State, American Foreign Policy Basic Documents, 1950-1955, pp. 2231-2236.

East Ghor Canal Authority, Monthly Reports. Amman, 1960-1965,

Report on The Water Resources of Transjordan and their Development. M.G. Ionides, Director of Development, Transjordan Government, 1937r 1939.

UNRWA Bulletin of Economic Development, No. 14, Special Report on Jordan, Beirut, July 1956.

Report on the Jordan Water Problem, by American Friends of the Middle East, Washington, 1964.

New Outlook. Yoram Nimrod, vol. 8, Nos. 4, 5, 6, Tel-Aviv, "The Unquiet Waters", June-September 1965.

Arab Information Center, The River Jordan, E. Rizk, New York, 1964.

I 139 regional basis for the benefit of all the people of the area."'*’ For this purpose Mr. Johnston made four trips to the Middle East, (October 1953,

June 1954, February 1955 and September 1955). The United States was wil­ ling to contribute $200 million for the scheme (2/3 of its total expense) if both sides would agree on a unified plan. After strenuous negotiations, both parties were drawn very closely together by October 1955.

All details of the scheme were agreed upon with the exception of two points: Israel was still questioning neutral supervision by the

United Nations or some other international body, and still reluctant to 2 accept 40 per cent of the total amount of water in the scheme.

Mr. Johnston was very optimistic at the time he left for the Middle

East on October 1953. He estimated that the 'one inch line' had been reached during the October talks. Yet, as he himself implied in the rest of his public report, this might be a very long inch indeed in the Near 3 East. Mr. Johnston was quite right about the length of that 'inch* in the

Near East.

By October 1955, the mission came to an end. In fact both, the

Arab countries and Israel rejected the plan although,in reality, for completely different "reasons. While the Arabs' rejection was on the open,

Israel's rejection was implied in its insistence on its reservations and its military aggression against its neighbors. The plan was rejected on political grounds more than on technical

^The Department of State, Digest of International Law, op. c it. . p. 1017. 2 American Friends of the Middle East, op. c it. . p. 43. ^Stevens, Georgians, The Jordan River Valley, op. c it. . p. 277. 140 ones. "So far the factual material...shows. . .that there had been Arab agreement at the technical level but opposition at the political level.

In the Arab world as in Israel, proposals of compromise and agreement were 1 the subject of an increasingly violent internal political fight."

Indeed more than one reason contributed to the failure of the plan.

Probably the most important of which was that all through the negotiations it was made clear that the settlement of the Arab refugees was a major reason for th e crea tio n of the plan. Mr. James Wadsworth sta ted in

November 1965 at the United Nations General Assembly that: "The lands which were hoped to be brought under irrigation through the plan, w ill not only assist in providing many, many thousands of Arab refugees and their other fello w Arabs w ith new and s e lf-r e sp e c tin g means o f liv e lih o o d , i t w ill create new jobs...this project alone wont solve the refugees problem, 2 but it is a very substantial start, a start that must be made...."

Although the Arabs agreed on the basic point that the refugees problem and economic development were two different things, nevertheless they were worried that the unified plan might undermine the United Nations

General Assembly Resolution 194 (III). It can be said that "the contention that the purpose of the irrigation plan was to settle the refugees per­ manently in their countries of residence and to deny them the right to return to th e ir former homes was a major contention o f the Arab opponents 3 to the Plan."

*New Outlook, op. c it., vol.8, No. 4 (71), pp. 38-49. 2Department of State Bulletin. Janaury 2, 1956, p. 31. 3 New Outlook, op. c it., vol. 8, No. 5(72), July 1965, p. 31. In addition to the question of the refugees, the political atmos­ phere in the area at the time did not help carry the negotiations to the hoped for conclusion. The intensification of Arab differences as a result of the Baghdad Pact, withdrawal of the Americans from financing the Aswan

Dam, and the frequent I s r a e li m ilita r y attacks on the Arab co u n trie s, at the time, especially after Ben Gurion came back to power, all these reasons made the success of the mission impossible.^

In June 1956, Israel resumed work on its Ten Year Plan, (modified

Seven Year Plan) both sides followed, unilaterally, different ways. The

American position supported the present separate plans. "In the absence of on agreement thereon, we have supported the right of the riparians to proceed with national water programs provided these did not conflict with the general principles and allocation patterns envisaged in the Unified Plan.

East Ghor Canal. As in the case of the Johnston Plan, one of the major reasons for the East Ghor Canal is to help indirectly in solving, to an extent, the Palestinian refugee problem. An agreement for the scheme was sig n ed , in Hay 1958 between the United S ta tes and Jordan and in 1959 work was actually under way. It was a joint project toward which the

United States contributed $14 million and Jordan $5 m illion. The main canal was finished in June 1963 although it took until about the end of 1965 to finish the irrigation system itself. The length of the canal is about 43 miles and the width of the irrigated land on each side of the canal ranges

1Ibid., p. 33. 2 State Department, Digest of International Law, vol. Ill, pp. 108. from 1.5-2.5 miles. The area of land already under irrigation is about

31.000 acres. Conservative estimates indicate that there are no less than

179.000 acres of potentially cultivable land in Jordan; 31,000 acres are in the present East Ghor project while some 92,500 are in other areas of the Jordan Valley. Another 49,000 or so are scattered elsewhere in the sm all Kingdom.

It can be said that unlike the Unified Plan the East Ghor Canal is a complete success. The fact that the question of the refugees was not brought up, and the limited number of negotiations (only two, the United

S ta tes and Jordan) made the success of the East Ghor much e a s ie r , contrary to the case with the Unified Plan. CONCLUSION

United States-Jordanian relations today are good, and its relat­

ions with the rest of the Arab world are, on the whole, as satisfactory as could be expected. In order to maintain stable relations, or to improve them still further, the United States should develop complementary policies embodying immediate objectives and long-range goals.

Without doubt, the Arab-lsraeli problem is the most complex issue involving American-Jordanian relations. Because of the influence of the United States both inside and outside the United Nations and of its special relations with Israel and Jordan, the United States could perhaps aid in bringing about a settlement. An impartial policy with an effort to widen the area of agreement would be very helpful in this en­ deavor, and would greatly improve Arabian-American relations.

In order to promote stability and combat communism in the Arab world in general, and in Jordan in particular, a policy of encouraging closer Arab relations and raising the standard of living would be wise.

Generally, Arabs are aware of the danger of communism, which is alien to their culture, and at the same time are very eager to cooperate more

closely to raise the standard of living in their own countries. Toward these ends, the Arab nationalists have achieved considerable success to date. Due to internal and external factors, they have suffered setbacks and made mistakes, but still they are very willing to learn. The United 144

States, with patience and wisdom, could assist them on the road to pro­

gress .

Encouragement o£ cultural and intellectual contacts would be fruit­

ful for all. It would help the United States to understand better, Arab

problems and aspirations, and would help the Arabs to learn much about and

from the West. Technical and economic assistance, especially for needy

countries like Jordan, is a prerequisite for raising the standard of liv ­

ing and meeting successfully the wave of rising expectations of the masses.

Today, tensions of the cold war appear to be diminishing. If,

however, they are intensified in the future, it would be wise for the

U nited S ta tes to spare the Arabs involvem ent, and perm it them to concentrate

their energies on solving their multiple social and economic problems.

Since World War I I , most Arab sta te s have chosen the path o f neu­

trality, which was largely a reaction to the traditional Western policies

in the Arab w orld, a few, however, went to extremes of anti-Americanism,

or tolerated local communists beyond a reasonable point. Neutrality has

proved useful in solving many international problems, and such a policy i does not imply that those Arab states who are not committed to the West

are against it. It is very likely that finding a just solution to the

Palestine problem, granting independence to Southern Arabia, and Western xinderstanding of Arab problems w ill help foster more Western-oriented

Arab policies.

Political conditions in the Arab world in general influence greatly,

either directly or indirectly, conditions in Jordan. Therefore, if the

United States were to follow general policies such as those mentioned

above, the.effect on Jordan probably would be favorable as w ell. The 145 stability which Jordan has enjoysd for the last three years is the result of wise American economic assistance, willingness of the Jordanians them­ selves to improve conditions, minimal involvement in inter-Arab affairs, and a reasonable degree of freedom of expression. At present, Jordan has a great asset in the person of His Majesty, King Hussein, who has been courageous enough to admit his past mistakes, and intelligent enough to guide the Kingdom firmly within the inter-Arab orbit. A Jordanian policy continuing along these lines, yet flexible enough to deal with changing circumstances, w ill enable the Kingdom to shoulder its own problems and to become self-sufficient in the near future.

It is very clear that both the United States and the Arabs have a great deal at stake in cooperating with one another. Although there is naturally an area of difference between them, the area of mutuality of interest is much larger. If both sides are willing to teach and learn, to give and take, with realism and understanding, the future of their relations is bright.. BIBLIOGRAPHY

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Welzmann, Chaim, Trial & Error. Harper, New York, 1949.

Yale, William, The Near East, Ann Arbor, The University of Michigan Press, 1958.

Zeine N. Zeine, The Struggle for Arab Independence. Khayats, Beirut, 1960.

The Brookings Institute, Major Problems of United States Foreign Policy. Washington, D.C. 1954.

The American Friends of the Middle East, The Jordan Water Problem. Washington, D.C., 1964. APPENDIX A

EXCERPTS FROM THE CONSTITUTION

The King

The 1952 Constitution declares (Article 1) that the "government is a hereditary monarchy, and its form representative."

The monarch has been vested with wide powers over the executive branch, the legislature, and the judiciary. He appoints (Article 35) the prime minister and may dismiss individual ministers or the entire Cabinet.

He a lso appoints (A r tic le 36) the members o f the upper chamber (C ouncil of

Notables) of the legislature and designates its president. No member may be expelled from that body without the king's approval (Article 75). The king may dissolve the elective Council of Representatives, the lower chamber (Article 34). But if that action is taken, "general elections shall be held so that the new Council w ill meet in extraordinary session within a period not exceeding four months from the date of the dissolution"

(Article 73). The king must confirm all laws and enjoys the right of

legislative veto which may, however, be overridden by a two-thirds vote

of both chambers (Article 93). Judges are appointed and dismissed by royal decree (Article 98). No amendment of the Constitution may come t into effect without his approval (Article 32). He has the power to declare war (Article 33). The decisions of the Council of Ministers (Cabinet),

the judgments of courts, and the currency are issued in his name. He is immune from a l l manner o f l i a b i l i t y for h is acts (A r tic le 3 0 ). ^

The Cabinet. There is no statutory table of organization of the

Council of Ministers or Cabinet. The respective powers of the prime ministers, the ministers, and the Council of Ministers are determined

by the Council and confirmed by the king. The most important changes in

the structure of Jordan's Government, particularly in the implied or real

arrangement of power relations within it, took place after the annexation

of the West Bank in 1950 rather than after the promulgation of the present

Constitution two years later.

The Legislature. The Council of Representatives, the lower chamber

in the National Assembly, comprises 40 deputies, who are required to be

above the age of 30 and are elected by universal male suffrage. The upper chamber or Council of Notables (majlis al-aayan) is appointive. It is made up of 20 members, who serve for eight years and are chosen from among

former premiers, high judges, religious dignitaries, retired general 2 officers, and other above the age of 40.

Tiuhammad Khalif, the Arab States and the Arab League, A Documentary Record, Vol. i, Khayats, Beirut, 1962, pp. 55, 75; George L. Harris, Jordan, Hraf Press, New Haven, 1958, pp. 88-91; Government of Jordan, Official Gazette, No. 1476, February 16, 1960, p. 153. APPENDIX B

COL. AL-TAL, ABDULLAH, AND HIS MEMOIRS1

Colonel Al-Tal was in command of some Transjordan army units, in the Jerusalem sector, during the Arab-Israeli war; later, after hostilities ceased he was appointed Governor General of Jerusalem district; and by virtue of his first job, and sheer luck, he found him­ self trusted with bringing, secretly, official Jews to Transjordan to negotiate a settlement with the King for the Palestinian problem.

Colonel Abdullah Al-Tal was very unhappy about such secret contacts. He told some of his trusted young Arab nationalists, especially the Pales­ tinians, about the negotiations and agreed with them to do his best to up­ hold the Transjordanian negotiators and to obtain whatever he could from the highly secretive information. And sure enough, he did.

It is worth noting that Glubb Pasha, the British Commander of the

Transjordanian Army, was officially on contract with the Transjordanian

Government; but, in fact, was the chosen instrument of British policy, in Transjordan, and one of the heads of British intelligence (C.I.D.) 2 in the Middle East. Naturally General Glubb was at odds with Colonel

Al-Tal especially after the Arab colonel, on his own initiative and con­ trary to the wishes of the British General, occupied some parts of the

^l-T al, Abdullah, Karithat Falastine (Palestine Disaster), Dar Alqalam Publishing House, Cairo, 1959. (In Arabic).

2 . 157

Mew City of Jerusalem. Glubb, of whom the British colonial office should be proud, wanted to get rid of Al-Tal, on June 21, 1948 by trying to send him away on a vacation (in the midst of the hostilities) to Britain or 1 France but the young Arab nationalist refused to leave the country.

In his book, (A solider with the Arabs), General Glubb agreed with

Mr. Walter Eytan about Al-Tal*s attitude during the Israel-Jordanian secret negotiations. At the Shunneh talks, Mr. Eytan stated that he, "Al-

Tal, stood out from the rest of the King*s advisers. He spoke about the

King, even in the King's presence, in a way which could be described only as contemptuous, and yet he seemed to feel affection for him and to be 2 genuinely anxious to safeguard his interests"• Mr. Walter Eytan was, at the time, Director General of the Israel Foreign Office, head of the

Israel armistice negotiators, and a participant in some of the secret talks with Transjordan.

The reasons why the King preferred to keep Al-Tal might be that:

(1) Al-Tal was the Arab officer who, contrary to the wishes of Glubb, carried out the direct orders of the King to save the Old City of

Jerusalem on May 18, 1948; (2) his realization that the young officer knew too much about the King's secret deals with the Zionists; (3) Al-Tal's family is one of the most prominent families in Jordan, and families count heavily in the social set-up in traditional Arab societies. Indeed,

Al-Tal used to ignore the wishes of the King and Glubb. For example, he refused more than once, to arrest some members of A1-Jihad al-Muqadas,

(like the other Palestinian irregulars, they gought very courageously

1 2 Ibid., p. 218 op. c i t . , pp. 39-41. under the command of the late Abdul Qadir al-Husseini), or to shut down the nationalist newspapers (especially the Baa'th) which were criticising bitterly Glubb Pasha and the government policy, at the time. A few weeks after the Israeli-Jordanian armistice agreement was signed, Al-Tal re­ signed and slipped away to Egypt, on October 10, 1949. With him he took highly secret documents and informations which were destined soon to

reveal same chapters of the Palestinian tragedy. Without losing much time,

Al-Tal started publishing, in the Egyptian press, the secrets which shocked

all the Arabs, especially those documents with the handwriting of the King

and Elyahu Sason. Sason was, at the time, director of the Arab section in

the Israeli Foreign Ministry. It is worth noting that none of the parties

concerned challenged the authenticity of the revealed secrets. APPENDIX C

EXCERPTS FROM THE RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE KING-CRANE COMMISSION RELATING TO PALESTINE AND SYRIA1

We recommend, in the f if t h p la ce, serio u s m od ification o f the extreme Zionist Program for Palestine of unlimited immigration of Jews, looking finally to making Palestine distinctly a Jewish State.

The Commissioners began their study of Zionism with minds pre­ disposed in its favor, but the actual facts in Palestine, coupled with the force of the general principles proclaimed by the Allies and accepted by the Syrians have driven them to th e recommendation here made.

The Commission was abundantly supplied with literature on the

Zionist program by the Zionist Commission to Palestine; heard much in conferences concerning the Zionist colonies and their claims; and person­ a l l y saw something o f what had been accom plished. They found much to approve in the aspirations and plans of the Zionists, and had warm ap­ probation for the devotion of many of the colonists and for their success by modern methods, in overcoming great natural o b sta c le s.

The Commission recognized also that definite encouragement had been given to the Zionists by the Allies in Mr. Balfour's often quoted statement, in its approval by other representatives of the Allies. If,

■^Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United st«tesT Washington, D.C., 1947, vol. XII, pp. 787-799. 160 however, the strict terms of the Balfour Statement are adhered to—favoring

"the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people, it being clearly understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Pales­ tine"—it can hardly be doubted that the extreme Zionist Program must be greatly modified. For "a national home for the Jewish people" is not equivalent to making Palestine into a Jewish State; nor can the erection of such a Jewish State be accomplished without the gravest trespass upon the "civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Pales­ tine." The fact came out repeatedly in the Commission's conference with

Jewish representatives, that the Zionists looked forward to a practically complete dispossession of the present non-Jewish inhabitants of Palestine, by various forms of purchase.

In his address of July 4, 1918, President Wilson laid down the following principle as one of the four great ends for which the associated peoples of the world were fighting: "The settlement of every question, whether of territory, of sovereignty, of economic arrangement, or of political relationship on the basis of the. free acceptance of that settle­ ment by the people immediately concerned, and not upon the basis of the material interest or advantage of any other nation or people which may desire a different settlement for the sake of its own exterior influence or mastery." If that principle is to rule, and the wishes of Palestine's population are to be decisive as to what is to be done with Palestine, then it is to be remembered that the non-Jewish population of Palestine— nearly nine-tenths of the whole—are emphatically against the entire

Zionist program. The tables show that there was no one thing upon which 161

the population of Palestine were more agreed than upon this. To subject

a people so mindful of unlimited Jewish immigration, and to steady

financial and social pressure to surrender the land, would be a gross violation of the principle just quoted, and of the people's rights,

though it be kept within the forms of law.

It is to be noted also that the feeling against the Zionist pro­

gram is not confined to Palestine, but shared very generally by the people throughout Syria, as our conferences clearly showed. More than

72 per cent—1,350 in a ll—of all the petitions in the whole of Syria were directed against the Zionist program. Only two requests--those for

a united Syria and for independence—had a larger support. This general

feeling was only voiced by the "General Syrian Congress," in the seventh,

eighth and tenth resolutions of their statement:

We oppose the pretentions of the Zionists to create a Jewish

commonwealth in the southern part of Syria, known as Palestine,, and

oppose Zionist migration to any part of our country; for we do not acknow­

ledge their title, but consider them a grave peril to our people from

the national, economical, and political points of view. Our Jewish com­

patriots shall enjoy our common rights and assume the common responsibili­

t i e s .

We ask that there should be no separation of the southern part of

Syria known as Palestine nor of the littoral western zone which includes

Lebanon from the Syrian country. We desire that the unity of the country

should be guaranteed against partition under whatever circumstances.

The fundamental principles laid down by President Wilson in

condemnation of secret treaties impel us to protest most emphatically 162 against any treaty that stipulates the partition of our Syrian country and against any private engagement aiming at the establishment of Zion­ ism in the southern part of Syria; therefore we ask the complete annul­ ment of these conventions and agreements.

The Peace Conference should not shut its eyes to the fact that the anti-Zionist feeling in Palestine and Syria is intense and not lightly to be flouted. No British officer, consulted by the Commissioners, be­ lieved that the Zionist program could be carried out except by force of arms. The officers generally thought that a force of not less than fifty thousand soldiers would be required even to initiate the program. That- in itself is evidence of a strong sense of the injustice of the Zionist program, on the part of the non-Jewish populations of Palestine and Syria.

Decisions, requiring armies to carry them out, are sometimes necessary, but they are surely not gratuitously to be taken in the interests of a serious injustice. For the initial claim, often submitted by Zionist representatives, based on an occupation of two thousand years ago, that they have a "right" to Palestine, can hardly be seriously considered.

There is a further consideration that cannot justly be ignored if the world is to look forward to Palestine becoming a definitely Jew­ ish state, however gradually that may take place. That consideration grows out of the fact that Palestine is "the Holy Land" for Jews, Christ­ ians and Moslems alike. Millions of Christians and Moslems all over the world are quite.as much concerned as the Jews with conditions in Palestine, especially with those conditions which touch upon religious feeling and rights. The relations in these matters in Palestine are most delicate and difficult. With the best possible intentions, it may be doubted 163 whether the Jews could possibly seem to either Christians or Moslems, proper guardians of the holy places, or custodians of the Holy Land as a whole. The reason is that: the places which are also sacred to

Moslems, are not only not sacred to Jews, but abhorrent to them. It is simply impossible, under these circumstances, for Moslems and Christ­ ians to feel satisfied to have these places in Jewish hands, or under th e custody of Jew s. There a re s t i l l oth er places about which Moslems must have the same feeling. In fact, from this point of view, the Mos­ lems, just because the sacred places of a ll three religions are sacred to them, have made very naturally much more satisfactory custodians of the holy places than the Jews could be. It must be believed that the precise meaning, in this respect, of the completely Jewish occupation of Palestine has not been fully sensed by those who urge the extreme

Zionist program. For it would intensify, with a certainty like fate, the anti-Jewish feeling both in Palestine and in all other portions of

the world which look to Palestine as "the Holy Land."

In view of all these considerations, and with a deep sense of sym­ pathy for the Jewish cause, the Commissioners feel bound to recommend

that only a greatly reduced Zionist program be attempted by the Peace

Conference, and even that, only very gradually initiated. This would have to mean that Jewish immigration should be definitely limited, and

that the project for making Palestine distinctly a Jewish commonwealth

should be given up.

There would then be no reason why Palestine could not be included

in a united Syrian State, just as other portions of the country, the

holy places being cared for by an international and inter-religious 164 commission, somewhat as at present, under the approval of the Mandatory and of the League of Nations. The Jews, of course, would have representa­ tion upon this commission. APPENDIX D

JOINT RESOLUTION TO PROMOTE PEACE AND STABILITY IN THE MIDDLE EAST1

Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United

States of America in Congress assembled,

That the President be and hereby is authorized to cooperate with and assist any nation or group of nations in the general area of the Middle

East desiring such assistance in the development of economic strength ded­ icated to the maintenance of national independence.

Sec. 2. The President is authorized to undertake, in the general area of the Middle East, military assistance programs with any nation or group of nations of that area desiring such assistance. Furthermore, the

United States regards as vital to the national interest and world peace the preservation of the independence and integrity of the nations of the

Middle East. To this end, if the President determines the necessity there­ of, the United States is prepared to use armed forces to assist any such nation or group of such nations requesting assistance against armed agres­ sion from any country controlled by international communism* Provided;

That such employment shall be consonant with the treaty obligations of the

United States and with the Constitution of the United States.

*H.J. Res. 117, as amended. H.J. Res. 117 was passed by the House of Representatives on January 30 by a vote of 355 to 61; H.J. Res. 117, as amended, was passed by the Senate on March 5 (72 to 19); the House accepted the Senate version on March 7 (350 to 60). (The Department of State Bulletin March 25, 1957, p. 481). Sec. 3. The President is hereby authorized to use during the bal­ ance of fiscal year 1957 for economic and military assistance under this joint resolution not to exceed $200,000,000 from any appropriation now avail­ able for carrying out the provisions of the Mutual Security Act of 1954, : i as amended, in accord with the provisions of such Act: Provided; That, when­ ever the President determines it to be important to the security of the

United States, such use may be under the authority of section 401 (a) of the Mutual Security Act of 1954, as amended (except that the provisions of section 105 (a) thereof shall not be waived), and without regard to the provision of section 105 of the Mutual Security Appropriation Act, 1957:

Provided further; That obligations incurred in carrying out the purposes of the first sentence of section 2 of this joint resolution shall be paid only out of appropriations for military assistance, and obligations incurred in carrying out the purposes of the first section of this joint resolution shall be paid only of appropriations other than those for military assistance.

This authorization is in addition to other existing authorizations with respect to the use of such appropriations. None of the additional authoriza­ tion contained in this section shall be used until fifteen days after the

Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate, the Committee on Foreign Af­ fairs of the House of Representatives, the Committees on Appropriations of the Senate and the House of Representatives and, when m ilitary assistance is involved, the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and the House of Representatives have been furnished a report showing the object of the proposed use, the country for the benefit of which such use is intended, and the particular appropriation or appropriations for carrying out the pro­ visions of the Mutual Security Act of 1954, as amended, from which the 167 funds are proposed to be derived: Provided; That funds available under this section during the balance of fiscal year 1957 shall, in the case of any such report submitted during the last fifteen days of the fiscal year, remain available for use under this section for the purposes stated in such report for a period of twenty days following the date of submission of such report. Nothing contained in this joint resolution shall be construed as itself authorizing the appropriation of additional funds for the purpose of carrying out the provisions of the first section or of the first sen­ tence of section 2 of this joint resolution.

Sec. 4. The President should continue to furnish facilities and military assistance, within the provisions of applicable law and established policies, to the United Nations Emergency Force in the Middle East, with a view to maintaining the truce in that region.

Sec. 5. The President shall within the months of January and July of each year report to the Congress his action hereunder.

Sec. 6. This joint resolution shall expire when the President shall determine that the peace and security of the nations in the general area of the Middle East are reasonably assured by international conditions created by action of the United Nations or otherwise except that it may be termi­ nated earlier by a concurrent resolution of the two Houses of Congress. APPENDIX E

PROSPECTS OF UNITED STATES POLICY IN THE MIDDLE EAST:

Letter From the President of the United States (Kennedy) to the King of Jordan (Hussein), May 11, 1961 (Excerpt)1

While, since inauguration on January 20, I have perforce been large­

ly occupied with the several international crises of immediate concern, I have given considerable thought to other international areas that deserve

the careful attention of us all.

My thoughts have often turned to the Middle East, an area which

has contributed so much to the religious and cultural heritage of the

world today and whose potential for further rich contributions to civiliza­

tion is great.

As an American, I am proud that the concepts of our founding patriots

of Abraham Lincoln, Woodrow Wilson and Franklin D. Roosevelt have played

such a great part in the emergence of vigorous, independent Arab states,

respected as sovereign equals in the international community.

In recent weeks I have noted some speculation as to the direction

of the policies of the new. United States Administration with respect to

the Middle East.

Let me assure you that the concepts inherited from the sources

^Department of State, American Foreign Policy Current Documents , 1961, Washington, D.C. 1965, pp. 671-673. 169> mentioned above are part of the very fiber of this nation and that as its

President 1 intend to uphold them*

You will find us at all times and all places active in the struggle for equality of opportunity; for government of the people, by the people and for the people; for freedom from want and fear; and for the applica­ tion of justice in the settlement of international disputes*

Translating these great precepts into United States policy in the

Middle East for the next few years, I want you to know that:

Firstly, the United States w ill, to the best of its ability, lend every appropriate assistance to all Middle East states that are determined to control their own destiny to enhance the prosperity of their people and to allow their neighbors to pursue the same fundamental aims.

Secondly, the United States remains ever ready to contribute both within and outside the United States to the search for solutions to dis­ putes which dissipate the precious energies of the Middle Eastern states and retard the economic prosperity which all free peoples rightly desire.

Thirdly, with a view toward improving the welfare of the people of the Middle East, the United States is prepared to continue to support national development programs which are effectively designed to make available American commodities under the Food for Peace Program and to encourage educational exchanges and to facilitate political and economic p rogress.

While tensions unfortunately have sharpened in certain other areas of the world, the Middle East during the past three years has been re­ latively tranquil. This has been due largely to the statesmanship on the part of the area's leaders, who have given priority to constructive 1.70 programs of economic development.

Secretary Rusk and I have been struck by the unanimity of views expressed to us by representatives of the various Middle East states, emphasizing that the present relative tranquillity should be preserved.

Underlying tensions do, however, remain, not the least of which is the unresolved Arab-Israel controversy. 1 know deep emotions are in­ volved. No easy solution presents its e lf. The American Government and people believe that an honorable and humane settlement can be found and are willing to share in the labors and burdens which so difficult an achievement must entail if the parties concerned genuinely desire such participation.

We are willing to help resolve the tragic Palestine refugee prob­ lem on the basis of the principle of repatriation and compensation for property, to assist them in finding an equitable answer to the question of the Jordan River waters-resources development, and to be helpful in making progress on other aspects of th is complex problem.

I am pleased the United Nations General Assembly recently under­ scored the necessity to implement more rapidly its previous recommenda­ tions on the refugee problem. In this connection I wish to state un­ equivocally that this Government's position is anchored and w ill continue to be anchored in the firm bedrock of support for General Assembly re­ commendations concerning the refugees and of action and impartial concern that those resolutions be implemented in a way most beneficial to the r efu g ees.

The United States, as a member of the Palestine Conciliation Com- 171 mission^and as a nation keenly Interested in the long-range advancement of the people of the Middle East take seriously the task entrusted to the Commission and of the United Nations. We are determined to use our influence toward a just and peaceful solution.

What precise steps the Commission may be able to take are of course not yet clear, but I can assure you that there w ill be no lack of United

States interest in seeing that all parties directly concerned will co­ operate fully with whatever program is indicated by the Commission so that the best interests and welfare of all the Arab refugees of Palestine may be protected and advanced.

Given the long history of friendly relationships between the Arab people and the interdependence of all men who wish to remain free, I want to be certain that you and other Arab leaders have no misunderstand­ ing of our attitude toward the Arab people. It continues to be one of sincere friendship, with mutual respect for the others1 points of view, mutual and active concern for the betterment of mankind, and mutual striv­ ing to eliminate the causes of international tensions. I am sure the future w ill bring ever friendlier and more productive relationships be­ tween our countries and the freedom-loving peoples.

^The other two members were France and Turkey. TABLE 1

Private and Public Sectors for the Seven-Year Plan (thousands DJ)

Public Sector rivate Sector

Agriculture and water 42,892 16,270 Tourism and hotels 3,131 9,700 Education 3,828 3,125 Public housing 4,000 31,720 Public works and Aqaba Port 18,846 12,300 Highways, Railroads and Airports 6,169 Health and social welfare 2,450 735 Mining 6,587 20,790 Industry and electricity 7,636 10,980j Unspecified investment of commercial and other services 7,952 21.7

Total 103,491 127.3A5

/

Government of Jordan, op. cit., p. 4

i TABUS 2

1 Jewish Immigration to Palestine 1920-1945

Year No. of Imm:

1920 5,514 1921 9,149 1922 7,844 1923 7,421 1924 12,856 1925 33,801 1926 13,081 1927 2,713 1928 2,178 1929 5,249 1930 4,944 1931 4,075 1932 9,553 1933 30,327 1934 42,359 1935 61,854 1936 29,727 1937 10,536 1938 12,868 1939 27,561 1940 10,445 1941 3,839 1942 3,581 1943 8,558 1944 14,491 1945 13,156

1 British, Government, Secretary of State for the Colonies: Palestine Royal Commission Report (London: His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1937} Arab Information Center, Immigration to Israel, Paper No. 2, New York, I960, p. 6. -j in y 9\| XA O' XA XA < co < • • CM • • H ^ nr-O rn J

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© © © © a/ a/ Annual data renreaent TellYeries; total through TABLE IV

Comparison o£ Regional Plans Dunums of land to be irrigated Main Plan Arab Plan Cotton Plan* Unified Plan Israel 416.000 234.000 1.790.000 Comparable Jordan 490.000 490.000 430,000 figures are Lebanon 35,000 350,000b not Syria 30,000 119.000 30,000 available Total 936.000 878.000 2.600.000 MCM of water per year Remainder after Israel 394 182 1,290' •withdrawals4 Jordan 774 698 575 720 Lebanon — 35 450.7 35 Syria 45 132 30 132 Total 1,213 1,047 2,345.7 * This plan includes the Litani River as well as the Jordan system. * Includes lands outside the Jordan Valley. * Includes 620 mem per year from the Litani River. 4 Includes a definite allocation of 25 mem per year from the Yarmouk River. •

S ource : Adapted from Don Peretz, "Development of the Jordan Valley Waters,”Middle East Journal, Vol. 9, No. 1 (Winter 1955), p. 407 and Summary of the Unified Plan of 1955.

SOURCE: Kathryn B. Doherty, Jordan Waters C onflict, International Conciliation, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace,N.Y., No. 553, May, 1965. TABLE V

DISTRIBUTION OF WATER UNDER VARIOUS PLANS TO DEVELOP JORDAN VALLEY

SOURCE OF WATERS OF n 2 3% JORDAN WATERSHED 7 7 %

DISTRIBUTION OF WATERS 33% OF JORDAN WATERSHED 6 7 % TVA PLAN - 1953

20% ARAB PLAN - 1954 8 0 %

ISRAEL 7-YEAR PLAN 1953 5 0 %

FINAL JORDAN VALLEY ] 4 0 % PLAN-OCT. 1955 6 0 %

ISRAEL 3 ARAB STATES ( Jordan , Lebanon^Syria)

SOURCE: Georgians Stevens, Jordan River Partition, Stanford University Press, 1965, P-~e Turkish Adm;n/strat.ive Districts compriaea /n TSy/ia and Pe//est/r>e 3b

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.1/ ..‘i *^/u //* //,. Vi/.* > /'«»/ grrrmrnt 1 of Hfffi: tifnoduudjroiii llie ailvuml map attached to the original agreement. Sources Zeine N. Zeine, The Struggle for Arab Independence, Khaymts, Beirut, I960 rnsun. RUSSIA N

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ALLIED PLANS FOR THE PARTITION OF THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE 1915-1917 [Modified from Harry N Howard, The Partition of Turkey. 1913-1923 (Norman University of Oklahoma Press- 1931). 4B, >r Source? Howard* Harry* N« * The KlngiCrmt Commlsglon* An Aaeri-oaw Xnuuiry in The Middle East. Khayate, Bei r u t 196*3. " M £ . „?*f»y'i 4';.

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MAP VI

The Shuna Agreement of March 1949

Armistice Line imposed by Israel Cease-fire Line, as claimed by Jordan Miles

•Affula

Beth Sh HaderaT / /

athanya/ &0 j ATulkarm / " \ J o R -D A N ►Nablus

Petah'Tiqvah relAviv

SOURCE; George Kirk, The Middle East 1945-1950. Oxford University Press, Oxford, London, 19547