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Churchill, the First Berlin Raids, and the Blitz: a New Interpretation

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Churchill, the First Berlin Raids, and the Blitz: a New Interpretation Harvey Β. Tress Churchill, the First Berlin Raids, and the Blitz: A New Interpretation Supplementing the bombing of industrial targets in western Germany begun in May, on 25 August 1940 — two weeks prior to the start of the true Blitz — the British began a series of attacks on Berlin. The recently opened files and hitherto unused newspa- pers suggest that the British Government's official histories are sometimes helpful chiefly despite themselves and that Churchill's military contribution was larger, bet- ter, and subtler than has been known. We can be certain that the step in question was not casual, matter-of-course, or routine. For one thing, raids on enemy capitals, as in the case of those on Hanoi, are not undertaken or taken lightly. For another, the bombing of distant Berlin, entailing long exposure to mechanical, weather, and com- bat hazards, was likely to be relatively expensive. This series, which included some sizable efforts, occurred at a time of maximal need and when August's aggregate strategic bombing was costing no mean 15 per cent of the heavy bomber force1. Whatever is now thought about German intentions, in the summer of 1940 the leader- ship understandably believed that a fearful invasion could begin suddenly on almost any day and probably would before October. In his memoirs Churchill wrote: »As the month of June ground itself out, the sense of potential invasion at any moment grew upon us all.« According to a later chapter, »in July there was growing talk and anxiety on the subject ... preparation to resist invasion was the supreme task before us all . ,«2. And several early July entries in the diary of Sir Edmund Ironside, then commander in chief (C in C) of Army forces in England, reflect the state of mind de- scribed on the thirteenth: »It is curious how one goes to bed wondering whether there will be an attack early the next morning.«3 On 3 July the Joint Intelligence Commit- tee of civilian and service agencies warned that a German invasion attempt could take place within two weeks4. And in the middle of July, Ultra (the captured machine, sim- ple computer, and team which were decyphering most German radio communica- tions) reportedly revealed that the Germans definitely were planning and preparing to invade Britain once the Royal Air Force (RAF) had been rendered, in Hitler's words, »unable to deliver any significant attack against the German crossing«5. According to F. H. Hinsley's recent official history's radiointerception narrative, on 29 July German bombers were known to have been »forbidden to bomb harbour facil- ities in British Channel ports«, recalling »a similar restriction in relation to the French ports [imposed] in advance of the attack on France«; in mid-August Ultra revealed that additional squadrons and »30 men with a perfect knowledge of English« were be- ing transferred to a German air commander specializing in close-support operations; »in the first days of September [decrypts] revealed that divebombers were about to as- semble at airfields near the Straits ...«6. According to Churchill a »great southward flow of invasion shipping began« on 1 September7. Illustrating the »striking« and »marked« change, official histories note that Ostend Harbor held eighteen barges on 31 August versus two hundred and sev- enty on 7 September®. On the seventh the Chiefs of Staff Committee (COS) warned that invasion might be imminent'. Churchill included most of September in a »period of extreme tension and vigilance«10. Admittedly, dangerous shipping concentrations were not apparent during most of the two weeks here in question; but Churchill, referring to June in his memoirs, described 65 MGM 2/82 the feeling of the times: Twice in two months we had been taken completely by surprise. The overrunning of Norway and the breakthrough at Sedan, with all that followed from these, proved the deadly power of the German initiative. What else had they got ready — prepared and organised to the last inch? Would they suddenly pounce out of tne blue with new weapons, perfect planning, and overwhelming force .. .?n In July he warned the military that invasion fleets might be forming undetected in the Baltic, able to attack quickly through the Kiel Canal12. As for his view of an invasion's prospects, after the war Churchill »often wondered ... what would have happened if two hundred thousand German storm troops had actually established themselves ashore« u. Turning from the »supreme« concern to the antecedents of the first Berlin raid, on 20 July the Prime Minister wrote the Air Staff: »In case there is a raid on the centre of Government in London, it seems very important to be able to return the compliment the next day upon Berlin.«14 Noteworthily, this does not smack of looking forward to an opportunity for an intrinsically worthwhile attack on specific strategic installations or a shaky population in Berlin. Ending a story not told in Churchill's memoirs, the official histories, or elsewhere, on 17 August the Air Staff instructed Bomber Command: »You are not... to carry out attack on Siemens works tonight. Operation is postponed indefinitely ...«15. I found no proof of this surmise in the files but, since the mentioned plant is in Berlin (below), Churchill probably had initiated the superseded order: he had expressed interest in the Berlin question and, anyway, bombing the enemy capital was obviously a matter of high policy. The order and the countermand (presumably also his) will profitably be placed in context below. According to the minutes, on 23 August the War Cabinet discussed British bombing not at alllé. But, as the official air historians — Sir Charles Kingsley Webster and No- ble Frankland — put it, on the night of the twenty-fourth »the first bombs fell on cen- tral London ...« ; the other two concerned official historians said little more about the number of bombs; one (Collier) noted dramatically that ten districts »suffered heav- ily« from »bombs intended for targets far away«, which some of »about a dozen« German bombers assigned targets »near the perimeter of the capital« dropped17. Sug- gestively, the London Times of the Monday following this Saturday night incident gives the best perspective and the only published casualty figures; according to a news article, fatalities numbered »about four« and a Ministry of Home Security official, re- turned from a Sunday inspection, »said that the damage was very small indeed« (issue of 26 August, p. 4). The Sunday Times had known only that in the center »explosions [were] heard apparently in the east« (p. 1, »Late News«). Churchill's memoirs imply that German intentionality was widely assumed and spread responsibility for the response: The sporadic raiding of London towards the end of August was promptly answered by us in a retaliatory attack on Berlin. ... The War Cabinet were much in the mood to hit back, to raise the stakes, and to defy the enemy. I was sure they were right...18. Also saying nothing about the British attack's scale, the official air historians and Col- lier simply noted that the first bombing of Berlin followed that of London by one day; thereby, without identifying the makers of the British decision19, they implied that the sequence itself is self-explanatory. Shortly after remarking that »a political demand for retaliation« developed »as the bombing of British towns proceeded«, Butler an- nounced: »It was in reprisal for [the London incident] that a few [Ν. B.] British bombers were sent to Berlin the following night«. Insinuating in the next sentence that the Cabinet authorized the Berlin raid, he quoted without dating it a discussion which in fact took place on 29 August20! Obscuring the spirit of the 20 July note which none of them quoted, the official historians all stressed that specific military and industrial targets within Berlin were assigned21. The first War Cabinet meeting after the 24 August London incident took place on the twenty-sixth; discussion of neither the incident nor of a decision to respond was re- corded; the Chief of the Air Staff (CAS) merely stated without recorded reaction: »We had despatched a large number of aircraft to bomb military targets in Ber- lin ...«22. In fact, I found no trace of prior Cabinet approval in the files, including in those of the Defence (sub-) Committee of the Cabinet23. Of course, the ministers may have met informally or been polled singly on the twenty-fifth. But no one said or wrote so and at the time they apparently acquiesced in a pretense that no real decision had been taken. As on the twenty-sixth talking as though the bombing of capitals was routine, on 29 August the Chief of the Air Staff simply informed the Cabinet: »The bombing of the Berlin targets on the previous night had been most successful.«24 And the 30 August weekly COS report to the Cabinet was explicit: »Longer nights have extended the range of night bombing operations which have followed the same lines as last week and included for the first time attacks on industrial targets on the out- skirts of Berlin.«25 The official historians and Churchill would have happily men- tioned the implied standing authorization or any other not irregular decision process. In fact, a specific decision had been made, and not by air marshals or heavenly bodies. The twenty-fifth of August was a day of confusion and crossed signals. A planned ef- fort to impress neutrals attending a trade fair near Leipzig, to include heavy bombing of the Leuna synthetic oil plant fifteen miles from the city and »diversionary attacks« within it26, was evidently scheduled for this day.
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