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Into a New Era, 1961– 1970

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Into a New Era, 1961– 1970 chapter 7 Into a New Era, 1961– 1970 1 The Note Crisis and the Tightening Propaganda Environment If the Night Frost Crisis had made both US and British officials increasingly worried about Finland’s position as a truly independent country, the Note Cri- sis proved these fears justified in many Western eyes. The crisis and its con- sequences not only had a profound impact on Finnish domestic politics, but also altered the British and American approach towards the country as well as undermined its international position. For Western propaganda, the years fol- lowing the crisis marked a clear turning point in the operations’ scale, nature of execution and reception. The Note Crisis1 began in dramatic fashion when President Kekkonen was informed about the Soviet Union’s note to Finland while he was on holiday in Hawaii a couple of weeks after his official meeting with John F. Kennedy. The discussions with the American President formed a part of Kekkonen’s tour of the West, which both the British and the US administrations had started to organise a couple of years earlier. In May 1961, the idea of bringing the Finnish leader to Britain finally turned into reality when he visited London and met with Prime Minister Macmillan. This visit famously produced a brief commu- niqué according to which Britain “expressed her understanding towards the Finnish policy of neutrality”.2 Since its signing, this declaration has been cele- brated in many Finnish circles as proof of Western support for the foreign pol- icy Kekkonen led with great conviction.3 When one looks at the situation from 1 The Note Crisis began on October 30, 1961, when the Soviet Union handed a note to Finland in which it, based on the fcma Treaty and referring to the threat of war, proposed consulta- tions in order to secure the defence of both countries. This threat of war was connected to West German militarisation and the Berlin crisis. The Soviets postponed any military consul- tations after a meeting between President Kekkonen and Nikita Khrushchev in Novosibirsk in November 1961. The crisis had a great relevance not only to the international situation, but also on Finnish domestic politics. After the note was postponed Olavi Honka, a leading can- didate to challenge Kekkonen in the 1962 presidential election, withdrew his candidacy. As a result of the crisis and Honka’s withdrawal, Kekkonen was re- elected with an overwhelming majority. See, for example, Meinander 2012, pp. 342– 344. 2 Memorandum: ‘Tasavallan Presidentin tapaaminen pääministeri Macmillanin kanssa Admi- ralty Housessa 12.5.1961’, by Max Jakobson, May 16, 1961, uka, box 22/ 4, tpa.. 3 For example, Suomi 1992, p. 383. © Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, 2020 | DOI:10.1163/9789004416420_009 Into a New Era, 1961–1970 351 a Western perspective, however, this declaration can be interpreted as being more of an act of goodwill. As far as the British Government really was con- cerned, Finland’s position in regard to its eastern neighbour remained far from neutral. When one estimates the true value of the British ‘recognition of Finn- ish neutrality’, the different objectives the parties had set for these meetings should also be kept in mind. Whereas British and American officials aimed to get to know Mr Kekkonen better, perhaps convince him of Western power and potential support to Finland, and to learn about his views on developments in the Soviet Union, the Finnish leader’s goal was to win some public understand- ing for his policies from the West, which would strengthen both his national and international pedigree as well as offer him some space to manoeuvre his foreign policies. Mr Kekkonen prepared for this task conscientiously by for in- stance hiring John Haycraft, an English teacher provided by the British Coun- cil, to live as a member of the President’s household in spring 1961.4 Kekkonen gained more or less what he wanted also from the two meetings with President Kennedy in Washington. Although the discussions between the two focused mostly on the Berlin Crisis, Kennedy and, in particular, Secretary of State Dean Rusk assured the Finnish leader that the US Government un- derstood and respected Finland’s desire to maintain a good relationship with the Soviet Union and did not wish to interfere in Finnish affairs in a way that would harm this relationship.5 Again, this statement should not be interpreted as proof of American approval of Finnish foreign policies let alone neutralism as such, but rather as a mere notification of how the US wished to see Finland’s position. In reality, US officials remained neither convinced of Finland’s possi- bilities to remain impartial or truly independent in the long run nor impressed with the potential scenario in which the concept of neutralism won increasing support in Europe. The first Western reactions to the Soviet note over military consultations reflected more of a sense of alarm than total surprise. Both the US and the British governments took the situation seriously and contemplated the matter in various forums. Although it is not entirely irrelevant for this study to spec- ulate whether Urho Kekkonen had, in fact, been behind the note in order to 4 ‘The British Council, Finland: Representative’s Annual Report, 1961– 1962’, BW 30/ 14, NA. 5 Memorandum: ‘Tasavallan Presidentin keskustelut presidentti Kennedyn kanssa Valkoisessa Talossa 16.10.1961’, by Max Jakobson, October 16, 1961; Memorandum: ‘Tasavallan Presidentin Washingtonissa 16. – 17.10.1961 käymät viralliset keskustelut’, by Max Jakobson, November 14, 1961, both uka, Vuosikirja 1961– 1962, tpa; ‘Memorandum of Conversation’, October 17, 1961; L.D. Battle to M. Bundy; ‘Memorandum of Conversation Between the President and Presi- dent Kekkonen of Finland’, October 28, 1961, both National Security Files, box 70, jfkl..
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