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FINLAND and PROSPECTS for NATO MEMBERSHIP Raimo Väyrynen Finnish Institute of International Affairs

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FINLAND and PROSPECTS for NATO MEMBERSHIP Raimo Väyrynen Finnish Institute of International Affairs N ORDIC C OUNTRIES Juni 2009 Nordic Countries Office Stockholm Västmannagatan 4 11124 Stockholm Tel. 004684546592 Fax: 004684546595 email: [email protected] 2 - 2009 FINLAND AND PROSPECTS FOR NATO MEMBERSHIP Raimo Väyrynen Finnish Institute of International Affairs Finland’s intentions vis-a-vis NATO are for many outsiders a puzzle. The issue also divides the Finnish public and its class politique. For some, the country which is not any more in the shadow of its Eastern neighbor, be it the USSR or Russia, has legitimate reasons to join the alliance that promises security and freedom. Finland should join all international organizations whose membership consists of democratic countries. For others, joining NATO would unnecessarily increase the vulnerability of the country in a crisis and thus even undermine its national security that is now based on strong territorial defense and general conscription. Historical context of the Finnish Moscow’s approval of them in various (non)alignment bilateral deals. The divided opinion of the Finns on the The other view, which is surfacing now but relationship with NATO cannot be could not be mentioned during the Cold separated from the shadow cast by the War, was that the nuclear deterrence Cold War as the divisions can be traced extended by the United States to Europe back to the political experiences during protected also Finland. In this perspective, that period. The official view, promoted NATO has been an alliance producing especially by Presidents J.K. Paasikivi deterrence - and ultimately defense in the (1946-1956) and Urho Kekkonen (1956- case of an attack - that contained the Soviet 81), was that Finland should manage its expansionist plans and thus protected the relations with the Soviet Union on a entire Europe. On the conceptual level this bilateral basis and avoid any undue might have been the case, but contrary Western interference in them. In effect, evidence is provided, for instance, by the NATO’s policies, and the German role in meeting of the NATO Council held in the them, were considered in Helsinki to have fall 1968 in the aftermath of the occupation contributed to both the so-called note crisis of Czechoslovakia by the Soviet and in 1961, prompted in part by Soviet Warsaw Pact forces. Information leaked reactions to the Multilateral Force (MLF) from this meeting hinted that in the case of plan in the Baltic Sea, and other problems the Soviet attack on Northern Europe, in the Finnish-Soviet relations. Kekkonen’s NATO would come to the rescue of efforts to integrate Finland in Western Sweden but not of Finland. European free-trade and payments arrangements were made contingent on The Finnish discussion on NATO is on one level a non-debate. Finland has been an N ORDIC C OUNTRIES Juni 2009 active member of the Partnership for Peace they are routinely downplayed. To meet (PfP) and the Euro-Atlantic Partnership NATO’s formal target of military Council (EAPC) guiding its activities. In spending, two per cent of the GDP should that context, the Finnish armed forces have be used for that purpose. Today, Finland been standardized to match the material has allocated 1.4. per cent for this purpose. and operational specifications of NATO. The standard response to costs of the They have been tested and practiced in membership in NATO is that now only NATO-led crisis management operations, seven NATO members meet this goal and especially in Afghanistan in the northern that, in reality, the economic costs for part of which Finland has deployed a bit Finland would be rather limited. over 100 persons. Now Finland is sending additional 90 troops to protect the The first assessment of the issue by the presidential elections of Afghanistan, but Ministry of Defence in 2004 concluded only on a temporary basis. Also the that the additional costs of membership Finnish air fields and harbors are made would be about 70 million euros, though compatible with potential joint operations the media received the piece of with NATO. Technically, for Finland, the information with skepticism. The transition to a membership in NATO supporters of membership also tend to would be, in all likelihood, quick and stress that even as a NATO member smooth. Finland will remain a sovereign country. Finland will decide itself whether it will Arguments pro and con stick in the future to the general conscription - which is, by the way, The issue of the Finnish membership in becoming an exception in Europe - and NATO is, first of all, political in nature. participate in specific crisis management Among the supporters of the membership, operations. In other words, we would only the argumentation moves on two different gain and not lose anything. levels. The first level of arguments deals with the nature of the Finnish society and Another level of argumentation concerns the influence exercised by the country on the national security of Finland. It is the international scene. According to this commonly said that it is too late to take view, Finland as a democratic and market- insurance when the house is on fire. It is based country should sit at the same table recognized that while the new with other European countries sharing the assertiveness of Russia does not pose a same values. In so doing, Finland would direct threat to the Finnish security, it may also be able to exercise its legitimate have raised the political hurdles for influence on the decisions made in the applying for the membership. It is alliance. It is felt that now, even though a lamented by the supporters of membership member of the PfP, Finland is ostracized that we should have applied in the 1990s from the activities of NATO’s inner core when Russia was still weak. To and placed on par, say, with the Central accommodate Putin’s and Medvedev’s Asian counties. Because Finland is not, in Russia, its potential threat should not be the NATO context, in the right peer group, emphasized at all in public as a reason for it was not, for instance, invited to the 60 th applying the NATO membership. It is anniversary summit of the Alliance in early likely that in such a situation Moscow April 2009. would probably react by political criticism which we should, however, stoically Naturally, the supporters of the receive as the price that needs to be paid membership are aware of the demands that for a better choice. it would create obligations for Finland, but N ORDIC C OUNTRIES Juni 2009 The opponents of the membership fall in anti-Americanism which leads to oppose different factions. For some in the extreme the membership in NATO for entirely left, it is enough to say that NATO is an different political reasons. Perhaps these imperialist alliance led by the United views reflect two faces of Finnish States that is bent to attack other countries, nationalism; conservative and radical ones including Afghanistan and Iraq. If Finland of which the former stresses independent were to join it, the likely outcome would statehood, while the latter combines be that our boys and girls will have to fight nationalism with an alternative view of in the future imperial wars. This view is in preferable international alignments. a distinct minority in Finland. However, the Finnish participation in crisis One particular strand in the Finnish debate management operations enters the national has concerned the changing nature of debate also in another way. In conservative NATO. Both the critics and some circles, it is stressed that the main task of supporters emphasize that NATO is still the Finnish armed forces is to defend the the old-fashioned military alliance with an sovereignty and territorial integrity of its iron-glad defense commitment embodied own country and not to participate too in Art. 5 of the North Atlantic Charter. actively in foreign operations. The critics tend to argue that the defense commitment to the security of other NATO For the Finns, participation in international members would embroil Finland in war if operations may be teaching useful lessons the war breaks out in Europe. in the military arts, but it should be kept limited so that the capacity to defend the A different perspective is offered by those country’s own territory is not jeopardized. who see NATO increasingly as a crisis In this respect, contrast is made with management organization in which the Sweden which that largely dismantled its defense clause is secondary due to the low territorial army and has invested instead likelihood of an interstate war in Europe heavily in international operations. Indeed, between the members and non-members of the official Swedish attitude is unfailingly NATO. While Russia is a cumbersome positive towards international operations partner, the real test of NATO is in crisis (Sveriges samarbete… 2008). You can areas such as Afghanistan. This often hear in Finland a half-joke that intermediary view has appeared both in Sweden can afford such a solution because official documents and research reports there are 350.000 Finnish reservists (Effects of Finland’s Possible… 2007; standing between Russia and Sweden. Salonius-Pasternak 2007). In sum, Finnish reservations about joining Political opinions NATO spring in part from historical experiences and in part from political Political divisions on the elite level mirror stances taken by various parties. differences in the public opinion which Historically, it is deep in the Finnish have been fairly constant over the period mentalité that the country has had to since the 1990s when it became possible to defend its independence since 1917, ask in the polls about Finland’s primarily against the Soviet Union, by its relationship with NATO. In the most own forces because no one else will come recent comprehensive study of the Finnish to our rescue at the moment of truth.
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