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One Rule for Them, One Rule for Us ONE RULE FOR THEM, ONE RULE FOR US Integrity double standards in the European Parliament This in-depth report is an update to the 2014 Transparency International EU study on the EU integrity system Transparency International EU (TI EU) is a regional office of the global anti-corruption movement, Transparency International. Working closely with the International Secretariat in Berlin, Germany, TI EU leads the movement’s EU-focused advocacy in close cooperation with over 100 national chapters worldwide, but particularly with the 23 chapters in EU Member States. TI EU’s mission is to prevent and address corruption and promote integrity, transparency and accountability in EU institutions and in EU internal and external policies, programmes and legislation. www.transparency.eu Authors: Angels Giménez Bofarull, Leo Hoffmann-Axthelm, Matilde Manzi, Vitor Teixeira Editor: Leo Hoffmann-Axthelm Design: www.beelzePub.com Photography: © Cover photo: © Sebastien Pirlet / European Parliament is licensed under CC BY 2.0 Page 8: © Leo Hoffmann-Axthelm Page 11: © Leo Hoffmann-Axthelm Page 14: © roma1880 via Pixabay Page 15: © European Parliament, licensed under CC BY 2.0 Page 16: © LeJC, licensed under CC BY-SA 3.0 Page 18: © Maarten van den Heuvel via Unsplash Page 19: © European Parliament, licensed under CC BY 2.0 Page 21: © European Parliament, licensed under CC BY 2.0 Page 24: © Steven Lek, licensed under CC BY-SA 4.0 Page 25: © European Parliament, licensed under CC BY 2.0 Page 28: © Olnnu, licensed under CC BY-SA 3.0 Page 29: © Simon Shim via Unsplash Page 32: © Gerd Altmann via Unsplash Page 34: © Didier Weemaels via Unsplash Page 37: © Michael Walter via Unsplash Page 38: © CherryX, licensed under CC BY-SA 3.0 Page 42: © European Parliament, licensed under CC BY-NC-ND 2.0 Page 44: © JLogan, licensed under CC BY-SA 3.0 Page 46: © European Cyclists’ Federation, licensed under CC BY 2.0 Page 47: © BP Miller via Unsplash Page 50: © Miguel Discart Page 52: © Nick Fewings via Unsplash Page 54: © European Parliament, licensed under CC BY-NC-ND 2.0 © 2021 Transparency International EU. All rights reserved. ACKNOWLEDGMENTS Any mistakes are the responsibility of the authors alone and do not reflect the views of the members of the advisory group or any other persons consulted externally, either through interviews or our feedback and review process. Members of the advisory group to not bear responsibility for the final text. Transparency International EU would like to thank everyone who contributed to all stages of the research and preparation of this report. In particular the Senior Advisory Committee composed of: Mario Monti — Former EU Commissioner and former Prime Minister of Italy Reinhard Priebe — Former Director, European Commission Emilio de Capitani — Former Head of the Civil Liberties Committee Secretariat, European Parliament Jean Paul Jacqué — Former Director in the Legal Service, Council of the EU Alberto Alemanno — Professor of European Union Law & Policy, HEC Paris Lisbeth Kirk Iversen — Founder, EU Observer Monique Goyens — Director General, European Consumer Organisation (BEUC) We would also like to thank the Editorial Committee from the Transparency International Secretariat Every effort has been made to verify the accuracy of the information included in this report. All information was believed to be correct as of January 2021. Nevertheless, Transparency International EU cannot accept responsibility for the consequences of this information’s use for other purposes or in other contexts. This project was made possible with the support of: This publication reflects the views of the authors only. Project funders cannot be held responsible for any use that may be made of the information contained therein. ONE RULE FOR THEM, ONE RULE FOR US Integrity double standards in the European Parliament Acknowledgments ..................................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 1 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ....................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 4 POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS ....................................................................................................................................................................................................... 6 METHODOLOGY AND LACK OF COOPERATION ............................................................................................................................................................. 8 INTRODUCTION .........................................................................................................................................................................................................................................10 ADMINISTRATIVE TRANSPARENCY ....................................................................................................................................................................................14 Internal structure and functioning .......................................................................................................................................................................................... 15 Politicisation of recruitment ........................................................................................................................................................................................................ 18 Access to documents ........................................................................................................................................................................................................................ 19 2 LEGISLATIVE TRANSPARENCY .................................................................................................................................................................................................23 Trilogue transparency between Commission, Parliament and Council ............................................................................................. 24 Lobby transparency .............................................................................................................................................................................................................................. 31 ALLOWANCES FOR MEPS ............................................................................................................................................................................................................. 34 General Expenditure Allowance ..............................................................................................................................................................................................35 Parliamentary Assistance Allowance .................................................................................................................................................................................38 ETHICS ...............................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................41 Reform of the Rules of Procedure .........................................................................................................................................................................................43 Revolving doors .......................................................................................................................................................................................................................................44 Side-jobs ........................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................45 Conflicts of interest ............................................................................................................................................................................................................................. 47 Sanctions and the Advisory Committee ..........................................................................................................................................................................48 Rules for EP staff ..................................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 51 Whistleblowing rules .......................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 51 Endnotes .......................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 57 List of abbreviations .............................................................................................................................................................................................................................65
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