Saud Bin Saqr Al-Qasimi: Praised the Pivotal Role Played by the National Defense College As an Academic Institution 2

Strategic Annual Journal / Issued by National Defense College/ Issue 07 – June 2020

Jamal Al Suwaidi: The Impact of Exponential The Race to Dominate Technological Development Space: Should the on Terrorist Operations UAE Join?

Strategic Environment Analysis Is Vital For Decision-Making & Strategy Building

Terrorists breaking UAE ‘LAWS’

National Security in the Age of Pandemic

Saud bin Saqr Al-Qasimi: Praised the Pivotal Role played by the National Defense College as an Academic Institution 2

2020: The Preparation Year for the Next 50 Years

“In the year 2020, we will cooperatively work together from all sectors, society groups, citizens, and residents. Since we are all united, we can make significant changes and we can aim higher in our aspirations”.

Mohammed bin Rashid Al Maktoum Issue 7 - June 2020 3

Editorial Our armed forces are a national power of great value and play a vital role in maintaining the Union and its sovereignty as well as the nation’s achievements and aspirations. The armed forces also work with resolute determination to keep abreast of modern threats and challenges in order to fulfill their role to the maximum, and to strengthen their capabilities to accomplish a range of tasks and duties with the utmost efficiency; thereby ensuring victory and deterrence against all those who try to undermine our achievements, sovereignty, and capabilities. Despite the challenges posed by modern warfare in its various forms, weapons, tools and tactics, our armed forces are at high readiness to deter and confront simultaneous threats, emphasizing The Preparation Year for the a strong and distinctive resolve to play a pivotal role in safeguarding international peace and regional stability. The military education and the training system pay great attention to all levels and Next 50 Years areas of concern, taking advantage of the significant and committed support given by the leadership, with the role of the National Service essential in complementing and strengthening the national capabilities of the state. Our National Defense College continues to move forward to realize its vision, mission, objectives, and to achieve a prominent position locally, regionally, and internationally—all thanks to Allah the Almighty, the support of our wise leadership, and our clear vision and goals. Our college has embarked on plans to achieve international recognition and attract participants from outside the country, as well as continuing to improve its quality program, which focuses on developing the critical thinking skills of the graduates who are fortified with strong will and determination to serve our blessed United Arab Emirates. They also gain advanced strategic knowledge and insights that enable them to realize their aspirations and serve the country with a common perspective and consistent concepts that have a noticeable impact on unifying their scientific capabilities to carry Major General Staff Pilot out their duties and innovate, while seizing opportunities to safeguard the country’s Rashad Mohamed Alsaadi national security and to face challenges effectively. Commandant of the National Furthermore, the NDC faculty members have a prominent role in linking academic programs to reality and managing the educational process in an interactive approach Defense College (NDC) that corresponds well to the level and experience of our course participants and motivates their learning and research. These NDC success indicators have become clearer year by year as a result of the support received from the NDC Supreme Council and the GHQ UAE Armed Forces, in conjunction with the cooperation of state he United Arab Emirates institutions and officials, as well as the competencies and enthusiasm of all the NDC approachesT its Golden Jubilee staff. The graduates from the NDC also represent a national resource, which is of vital celebrations of the 50th anniversary importance in the comprehensive national development, as their number increases of the glorious Union, a vibrant annually, the bond deepens among them, and their cumulative experience keeps representation of civilization in recent growing. The college continues to give attention to the graduates and encourages them decades, despite the stark challenges to keep ahead of events and understand the causes, motives and forms of change, and crises facing other countries maintain discussion and exchange of advice, and apply the knowledge learned in the nowadays from which recovery will NDC course regarding strategic security studies and advanced leadership skills. be arduous. This might take years, In this current issue of the NDC Journal, I would like to extend my sincere thanks possibly decades, especially in certain and appreciation to His Highness Sheikh Saud Bin Saqr Al-Qasimi, Supreme Council Arab countries. Our beloved country, Member, the Ruler of Ras Al Khaimah for his distinguished meeting with the participants of the 7th NDC Course. The meeting was marked by a valued transparency, profound through its wise leadership, bright thinking, and tolerance in discussing a number of national issues, which enriched the vision, noble goals, great deeds, thoughts of the participants. NDC also extends its sincere thanks to His Highness and loyal people, has sought to be a Sheikh Ammar Bin Humeid Alneimi, Crown Prince of the Ajman Emirate for his warm unique role model, a source of good reception of the NDC delegation and for his appreciation of the NDC role in the national and inspiration, and a homeland of qualification of leaders and the level of the NDC learning outcomes in addition to his tolerance and peace. The United Arab continuous support to the college and for nominating candidates from Ajman Emirate Emirates overcame the challenges of to the NDC courses. the past and laid down developmental I would like also to extend my thanks to all those who have enriched this issue with and civilizational foundations for a their articles that cover important fields and provide the readers with added cultural brilliant future and clear ambitions, value, diverse visions and experiences, and qualitative concepts. I would like to which keep pace with the times express my due respect and appreciation to the editorial staff for their strenuous and aim to achieve a sustainable efforts to produce the NDC Journal at the required level and in a timely manner. prosperity and well-being on the basis Finally, indeed, it is my pleasure to congratulate the graduates of the 7th NDC of our national security and legitimate Course, who have worked diligently to acquire knowledge according to the specified vision. The best example on this standards, achieve outstanding scientific and academic results, and benefit to the positive humane leadership is the utmost from taking the NDC course. They have a burning passion to dedicate their UAE’s exemplary model of managing skills to the service of their beloved homeland. They have firm self-confidence and a the COVID19- pandemic. sincere belief in paying back to their country and its wise leadership when returning to their institutions armed with exceptional skills and highest quality knowledge. I wish all of them great success in achieving the very best possible outcomes for the United Arab Emirates. 4 Contents 30 FORECASTING THE FUTURE: MAJOR GLOBAL TRENDS

46 A Framework for Interpreting US Foreign Policy in the Gulf

50 Electricity supply security in the UAE

62 Bringing CVE ‘Front and Center’ in the UAE National Security Lexicon Issue 7 - June 2020 5

Cover

Saud bin Saqr Al-Qasimi Strategic Annual Journal / Issued by National Defense College/ Issue 07 – June 2020 Jamal Al Suwaidi: The Impact of Exponential The Race to Dominate Technological Development To achieve its vision, mission, and objectives, Space: Should the on Terrorist Operations UAE Join? the National Defense College has enriched the

Strategic Environment academic programs of the national defense Analysis Is Vital For Decision-Making & courses with various activities that enhance Strategy Building

the participants’ strategic leadership skills and Terrorists breaking UAE ‘LAWS’ expand their strategic thinking horizons at a National Security deeper level by not just studying academic in the Age of Pandemic theories.

Saud bin Saqr Al-Qasimi: Praised the Pivotal Role played by the National Defense College as an Academic Institution

A Specialized Yearly Journal on Strategic Affairs Issued by UAE National Defense College National Defense Established In June 2014

General supervisor Editorial Board Layout & Design Maj. Gen. Pilot / Lt. Colonel Eng. / Ibrahim Alaly Ali Al Shehhi Rashad Mohamed Al Saadi Lt. Col. Staff Dr. Salim Al Zaabi Ahmed Mahmoud Lt. Colonel Ali Al Mazrooei Editor in chief Dr. Mohammad Bani Yonnes Staff Brigadier Eng. / Photos Archive Ahmed Alkhoori Mohammed Ramadan Translation & Editing Liam Clayton Editorial Manager Awni Al Khatib Staff Lt. Colonel / Yousef Al Hadad Muhammad Elsayed Firasse Beale Sub-Editors Sameera Naser Basaloom Jameela Salem Alkaabi

www.ndc.ac.ae 6

Don't Worry

“The UAE people›s safety is a top priority irrespective of any other considerations and indeed it is our responsibility.”

Mohamed bin Zayed Al Nahyan Issue 7 - June 2020 7 Editor In Chief

The UAE has achieved a prominent status internationally and regionally by solid steps towards the desired goals following a clear vision and precise strategic plans that address the requirements of the past fifty -year phase. The future foresight has become an urgent need at the regional and international arenas being associated with challenges and opportunities within a vibrantly changing environment in terms of the political, economic, security, technical, health, and social dimensions. In response to this need, the UAE’s wise leadership has declared its regionally and internationally exclusive future foresight strategy for the next phase, «Preparing for the next 50 years». This comprehensive outlook aims to achieve a sustainable quality difference at all levels and in a variety of aspects.

Today’s conventional strategic plans have proved to be inflexible and incoherent in terms of addressing the requirements of sustainable future environments. On the other hand, the UAE›s strategy in managing the Covid19- pandemic reflects the high national readiness in handling new developments and challenges following a clear vision and strategic plans praised by the whole world and international organizations.

Brigadier General Staff Engineer The new issue of our journal is the outcome of a full year of academic work during which participants of the seventh NDC Ahmed Al Khoury Course have learned various types of sciences and applications Editor in Chief in strategic and security studies. This will prepare them as future strategic leaders and ensure that they can overcome challenges and threats while having foresight strategies for future scenarios ollowing the steps of the bountiful using all instruments of power to achieve the national security ZayedF (may Allah rest his soul in interests. peace) on his blessed journey of The journal includes a plethora of topics that tackle the current building and developing and to and future national security threats and challenges within the complete the UAE›s exclusive and international and domestic environments. Articles here delve globally admired achievements — deep and reflect informative conclusions following common both regional and global which have theories and practices in security and strategic studies and placed the UAE at the heart of global implementing the comprehensive instruments of national power competitiveness. Having achieved as well as issues related to international relations, risk analysis, a high reputation during the past 50 and strategic leadership. years, the state›s wise leadership As an assertion of the importance of the various current and has declared that 2020 is the Year of future national-security related issues and topics addressed Preparing for the next 50 years. This by the journal , His Highness Sheikh Saud bin Saqr Al-Qasimi, preparation will be by implemented Member of the Supreme Council, Ruler of Ras Al Khaimah a fifty-year future for esight strategy. received the participants of the 7th NDC Course and had an His Highness Sheikh Mohamed bin informative discussion with them on the importance of strategic Zayed Al Nahyan, Crown Prince of studies in identifying and analyzing challenges, threats, and opportunities, and developing plans to manage and overcome Abu Dhabi and Deputy Supreme them to achieve security and stability for the homeland. Commander of the UAE Armed Forces said,» With the willpower, patriotism, loyalty, and solidarity of Finally, I would like to extend my thanks to all those who our people, the UAE will achieve its contributed to this journal. Thanks also go to the editorial board, goal of becoming one of the best hoping that we shall meet again in the coming issues that will countries in the world by the 2071 be enriched with contributions from the faculty members and centennial anniversary of the UAE experts in the current and future topics, and Allah is the arbiter of success. foundation. 8

Meeting with His Highness Saud bin Saqr Al-Qasimi: praised the pivotal role played by the National Defense College as an academic institution

To achieve its vision, mission, and objectives, the National Defense College has enriched the academic programs of the national defense courses with various activities that enhance the participants’ strategic leadership skills and expand their strategic thinking horizons at a deeper level by not just studying academic theories.

In addition to the conferences and seminars conducted pants’ academic knowledge and leadership skills in tandem in this course, several visits were organized to meet with with gaining practical skills. policymakers, strategists, and decision-makers within and These visits and meetings also achieve other critical ob- outside the country, thereby placing the academic mate- jectives including promoting the role of NDC in preparing rial in its strategic context. This is achievable by the direct strategic leaders and instilling strategic thinking. This comes communication and discussion with strategic leaders and from recognizing the importance of integrating federal and decision-makers to give participants a real-life understand- local institutions in developing policies and strategies. Na- ing of the strategic context and its direct impact on deci- tional interests and national security are thereby achieved sion-makers. Furthermore, such meetings improve partici- and promote the synergy of planning and implementation Issue 7 - June 2020 9

between government institutions in in the UAE’s development across all times of peace and crisis. areas. This year, NDC organized a visit To achieve the vision of the UAE›s for the participants to meet H.H. wise leadership and the state’s Sheikh Saud bin Saqr Al-Qasi- aspirations in achieving its mi, Ruler of Ras Al Khaimah, sustainable development Member of the Supreme model and dealing with Council, at his palace. A regional conditions, His stimulating dialogue ensued Highness Sheikh Saud covering strategic issues that bin Saqr Al Qasimi urged highlighted the importance of the participants of the 7th strategic thought and its role NDC Course to study dili- in the progress and stability of gently to make the greatest states. use of the course and to de- H.H. Sheikh Saud praised the pivot- velop their academic and strate- al role played by the National Defense gic skills to ensure greater security, College as an academic institution stability, and prosperity for the nation. that contributes to highlighting and At the end of the meeting, the par- strengthening the prominent status of vision and aspirations of the country’s ticipants expressed their thanks to the UAE Armed Forces. In particular, wise leadership. His Highness for receiving them and he mentioned its leading role in pre- His Highness also expressed his for his dedicating his valuable time to paring and qualifying strategic military pride in the youth of the UAE and enriching their intellectual knowledge and civilian leaders and developing his great confidence in their abilities and deepening their strategic aware- their capabilities to identify national, to carry out the tasks and responsi- ness. The participants also expressed regional, and international securi- bilities assigned to them with a deep their appreciation of his trust in them ty challenges. He affirmed the need sense of patriotism. This embodies and stressed their fervor to follow his to fully understand the principles of the UAE society›s principles of loyalty guidance in supporting the country managing the state›s resources and to the country and its wise leadership and dedicating their academic skills requirements to protect national inter- that spares no effort in supporting its and abilities to proudly defend the se- ests. This will help build an integrat- people. Young people benefit from curity of their beloved homeland. ed national environment in strategic educational opportunities to enrich planning to achieve the their knowledge as a critical factor 10 The race to dominate space: should the UAE join?

he UAE recently celebrated sending its first man into space; but the race to get to space and increasingly the race to use space technology as a tool in promoting national interests and security started sixty years ago. This article examines who are the leading actors, what technology is deployed, how this affects national interests and security, how space is increasingly deployed in hybrid warfare, and asks, “What role or strategy should the UAE adopt?”

Shaikh Sultan bin Saeed bin Mohammed Al Nahyan Participant, UAE NDC

Early space exploration man began space exploration, the was undertaken in the late 1950s pace of change has been relent- by both the United States and the less. Like many areas of technolo- USSR. The term ‘space race’ was gy, the cost of entry fell dramatical- coined in this context, as each ly, allowing the industry to open up country attempted to outperform to commercial players and more the other in terms of achievement. significantly, allowing other coun- This race was used as a proxy to tries to join the US and Russia in demonstrate scientific excellence, space exploration. However, with power and as a ‘flagship’ for the this opening up come new chal- supremacy of the two respective lenges and improvements in tech- political systems. nology that have expanded the Over the sixty years since possible uses of space for military Issue 7 - June 2020 11

and espionage purposes. the present information age. A brief overview of the The integration of space and main areas in which space cyber domain causes securi- technology is used illus- ty risks that are not restrict- trates the potential for state ed to military installations, actors to use the technolo- everyday activities include: gy: space-based intelligence weather forecasting, naviga- gathering; surveillance and tion, time stamping of ATM reconnaissance; command transactions, mobile com- and control of forces world- munication, and theft of per- wide; and jamming, spoof- sonal data. ing, energy weapons and It is the threat to a cyber space attacks. nation’s military and secu- What concerns mil- rity infrastructure that most itary analysts is the pos- concerns military strategists; sibility for adversaries or examples of which include: competitors, either directly or as noted by Dr. Patrick J. Cullen disruption to battle field commu- through a proxy, to gather intelli- and Erik Reichborn-Kjennerud in nications, intelligence surveillance, gence or inflict serious harm. This 2017. Hybrid warfare – conducted missile warning systems, posi- can happen on a large scale and by state or non-state actors – is tion navigation and timing; sat- in a way that is relatively easy to typically tailored to remain below ellite command and control, and implement, but where detection obvious detection and response space launches. As nations be- and identification can be difficult. thresholds, and often relies on the come more sophisticated in their Space is quickly becoming a key speed, volume and ubiquity of dig- use of space technology, there is component in hybrid warfare; ital technology that characterizes a fear that one state could develop 12

and use the capability to launch a struction (WMD) in outer space, treaty repeatedly emphasizes that weapon, either into space towards prohibits military activities on celes- space is to be used for peaceful another satellite or to attack a tial bodies, and details legally bind- purposes, leading some analysts ground target. ing rules governing the peaceful to conclude that the treaty could Actions of this nature could exploration and use of space. 109 broadly be interpreted as prohibit- cripple a state’s ability to detect an countries are parties to the treaty, ing all types of weapons systems, attack, or control and communi- while another 23 have signed but not just WMD, in outer space. cate with its force should it need not yet ratified. The treaty, howev- There is increasing concern to defend itself. The US Defence er, does not prohibit the launching about security in space and the Intelligence Agency noted in their of ballistic missiles, which could be UN is moving towards recogniz- report “Challenges to Security in armed with WMD warheads. The ing the reality of advancement in Space” published in January 2019, space technology and the recog- that early on, the world was alert to nition that space is a warfight- the potential threat, and drew up ing domain. NATO already a treaty to limit such actions: the announced it considers 1967 “Outer Space Treaty” bans space a “warfighting the stationing of weapons domain” at the NATO of mass de- Leaders Summit, held in London 3-4 December 2019. Kyle Mizokami be- lieves the landmark announcement ce- mented the notion that, like the air, land, and sea domains, space is a potential battlefield whose control is vital in a future conflict. Of particular interest for the UAE is the emergence of Iran as a space actor. In April 2019 the Centre for Strategic and International Studies published “Space Threat Assessment 2019” and noted that although Iran is still growing their space industry, there have been developments in recent years, the au- thors note: “The U.S. intelligence community has concluded that Issue 7 - June 2020 13

Iran’s continued work to develop the International Space Station space launch vehicles will shorten (ISS) and the first Arab country the timeline to create a successful to have a sustainable astronaut ICBM since the two systems use program. What is most important similar technologies;” and “Iran now is for the country to continue has an extensive record of using to invest and develop expertise to electronic forms of attack against serve the interests of the state. space systems, including uplink There are further bene- jamming, downlink jamming, and fits associated with investing spoofing.” Such capability, from a in space. It creates a favour- country that is a clear threat to the able and positive image for GCC region, should be of concern the country and places us to the UAE. in a select group of nations Without appropriate strate- who have acquired the re- gies in place, our national interests quired technical knowledge are likely to be severely damaged and expertise. Furthermore, by the type of attack or disruption it boosts national morale, en- caused by a foreign aggressor us- couraging our youth to explore ing space technology. Given that career options in STEM (Science, countries such as Iran are develop- Technology, Engineering, Math). 7. http:// ing such capability, it is imperative It also supports cooperation in theconver- that we continue to be an investor space with other space-faring na- sation.com/space-may- in space technology, develop our tions, enabling knowledge transfer. soon-become-a-war-zone-heres- human capital and enter into part- Finally, it stimulates demand and how-that-would-work-125460 nerships with leading countries creates opportunities for the econ- 8. https://thespacereview.com/arti- such as the US. By developing omy in terms of the supply chain cle/574/1 such a capability, we are contrib- and possible spin-offs from the 9. https://www.unoosa.org/docu- uting to regional peace – our ability R&D oriented towards space ex- ments/pdf/spacelaw/treatystatus/ to react is a deterrent to Iran. ploration. AC105_C2_2019_CRP03E.pdf The UAE has made sig- 10. Kyle. Mizokami: https://www. nificant progress in developing References popularmechanics.com/military/ its space industry, most recently 1. Defense Intelligence Agency “Chal- a29566355/nato-space-war/ demonstrated by being the first lenges to Security in Space” Janu- 11. https://www.rand.org/content/ Arab country to send a man into ary 2019 dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/ 2. www.dia.mil/Mili- RR1500/RR1577/RAND_RR1577. tary-Power-Publications pdf 3. https://aerospace. 12. https://www.newamerica.org/in- csis.org/aerospace101/coun- Without ternational-security/reports/twen- terspace-weapons-101/ ty-first-century-proxy-warfare/ appropriate 4. https://www.gps. 13. https://www.technologyre- gov/governance/agencies/ view.com/s/613749/satel- strategies in homeland/ lite-space-wars/ 5. https://techcrunch. place, national 14. https://www.theatlantic.com/in- com/2018/12/21/the-gps- ternational/archive/2012/10/syri- interests wars-have-begun/ as-digital-proxy-war/264309/ 6. https://asia.nikkei. 1515 https://www.csis.org/war-by-proxy are likely to com/Business/China-tech/China- be severely s-version-of-GPS-now-has-more- damaged satellites-than-US-original 14 The Impact of Exponential Technological Development on Terrorist Operations

he United Arab Emirates is making great strides toward utilizing ever more sophisticated technology to protect the nation and its resources, as a deterrent to those who seek to undermine its successive achievements. The UAE’s success in tailoring smart technologies to bolster national security and combat extremism and terrorism has made it a role model for many countries. However, despite the potential of modern technology to make our lives easier, it has also consistently been misappropriated to support terrorist activities, irrespective of their ideologies and beliefs. First of all, we must acknowledge that terrorists

H.E. Minister Prof. Jamal Sanad Al-Suwaidi Deputy Chairman of the Board of Trustees of the Emirates Centre for Strategic Studies and Research

have managed to abuse technolog- as social media, instant messag- ical progress, to give momentum to ing applications and Virtual Private their operations. This ranges from Networks (VPNs). Recent exam- propaganda, recruitment, coordi- ples show that the Islamic State in nation, and funding, to inciting vio- Iraq and Syria (Da’esh) has man- lence, identifying targets, preparing aged to broadcast its operations for attacks and communicating on social media platforms via high with agents on the ground, even definition cameras connected with at a time where all activities have drones, while in New Zealand last come under surveillance and con- year a right-wing extremist made a trol. These activities are most ap- live broadcast on Facebook of his parent in terrorists’ exploitation of shooting attacks at two mosques virtual spaces on the Internet, such in Christchurch. In both of these Issue 7 - June 2020 15

examples, technology provided nications, transport, and energy suf- content on the Internet, the dark terrorists with global channels to fering huge financial losses as well web remains a challenge that achieve their goals of propaganda as leaving a psychological impact should be taken seriously, especial- and recruitment. on individuals and societies. ly when it is relatively easy for ter- The latest indications suggest ter- The dark web is part of the Inter- rorist organizations to use it beyond rorists are now expanding their net but is not accessible through government control. It is worth not- efforts to possess technological search engines like Google. To ac- ing that many of these websites on capabilities that enable them to de- cess it, one needs to use special the dark web are simply that dis- liver cyber-attacks against digital in- software that hides the user’s iden- cuss various areas of interest that frastructure. A recent security study tity. Indications show that terrorists may not necessarily be nefarious in concluded that terrorist organiza- turned to the dark web to create nature. However, because informa- tions have been able to acquire promotional and financial websites tion about these sites remains un- malware and other advanced digi- with violent and extremist content. known out of a desire for absolute tal systems for launching cyber-at- Unlike normal websites, it is very dif- privacy, these websites may serve tacks. These digital weapons were ficult to stop websites on the dark extremist movements in promoting purchased on the black market or web due to their hidden, generally their ideologies. dark web, specifically through the dispersed and unregulated nature. It seems that terrorists’ use of so-called Cybercrime-as-a-Service, While countries have intensified technology has also which any organization can use to their efforts to intercept and extended to the purchase or even lease technology suspend terrorist com- world of devices to carry out criminal activ- munications, and cod- ity. Although there is a consensus remove ex- among security experts that terror- tremist ists are unlikely to have the ability to inflict significant damage to vital infrastructure in the immediate future, smaller-scale attacks, such as the use of Ran- som- ware, have seen service sectors such as healthcare, telecommu- 16

ed currencies, such as bitcoin. cruise missiles was by Houthi rebels Although they came late to the Individual in Yemen, and groups loyal to Iran sector, after other criminals donations to in southern Iraq, against oil facil- who were attracted by the terrorism via ities in the Kingdom of Saudi advantages of digital cur- Arabia in September 2019. rencies for the drug trade coded currencies The use of these technologies and money laundering, terrorists remain limited suggests that terrorists intend to have made huge progress in devel- innovate and use smarter iterations oping fully controlled digital portfo- of them. They endeavour to abuse lios and exploiting coded curren- exponential development in artificial cies in their fundraising campaigns, intelligence and use it to automate made by terrorists in the use of beyond the reach of conventional drones and make them more effec- drones as part of their operations. financial systems and institutions tive in identifying their targets. It is The success of Da’esh in using tracking terrorism. Although individ- worth noting that modern versions drones, in which they have become ual donations to terrorism via cod- of these aircraft already have some major global consumers of the ed currencies remain limited, we basic forms of artificial intelligence. technology, to carry out airstrikes should not forget that funding can However, technology is advancing and surveillance operations marked come from anywhere in the world rapidly, with artificial intelligence the emergence of a new threat to in this manner and terrorists do not research carried out by private infrastructure and society. Similar- need huge budgets to achieve their companies set to make its way ly, other groups have tried to use goals. into open markets for future com- drones in their terrorist activities. There is yet more progress being mercial applications. This will make The most recent use of drones and Issue 7 - June 2020 17

it difficult to contain or prevent the It is difficult to evidence, and identify and block spread of smart drones and their extremist content on the Internet. use by terrorists. contain or prevent In addition, there is a need to Another dangerous aspect the spread of build automated capabilities of terrorist adaptation of smart drones to track and intercept drones. technology is in 3D printing. There is another trend that This will enable the manufactur- and their use by lies in the transformation towards ing of weapons with 3D printers. A terrorists smart technologies, which promote member of the Neo-Nazis in Ger- government practices in combating many attacked a synagogue in terror funding. Although technology October 2019 using a gun, parts will increase in the future. solutions require huge investments, of which were produced by a 3D Technology plays a significant role they have become inevitable for a printer using computer models in supporting terrorists’ agendas safer future. In conclusion, it must downloaded from the Internet. This then, but at the same time, it pro- be stressed that international coop- is an example of a serious new vides defense solutions as key eration in this field is of paramount threat, especially in countries with foundations of national security importance for the United Arab strict policies on arms possession. systems and protection measures. Emirates. When using these differ- With the growing quality and ac- In this context, the United Arab ent technologies, terrorists know no cessibility of 3D printers, it is likely Emirates is adopting machine geography and do not distinguish that terrorists’ effectiveness in cre- learning and artificial intelligence between nationalities. ating their own weapons and am- to improve its accessibility to dig- munition with these technologies ital information, collect electronic 18

Terrorists breaking UAE ‘LAWS’

he danger of non-state actors making use of the availability of drones in terrorist acts to undermine the UAE national security is high. In the past, due to aerial drone system complexity and its high expense of operation, their use was confined to governmental entities in support of executing their services to the people of the UAE. Recently drones have made their way to individuals for use in sports and recrea- tion. These are so widespread that some drones are used in dangerous areas. Dubai International Airport had its share of these drone incidents. There have been incidents where a couple of drones caused the shutdown of the airport; the last one being in September 2019.

Col. Staff Eng. Salem Butti Al Qubaisi Participant, UAE NDC

The airport had to close its conceivably might happen us- airspace for 15 minutes and divert ing Lethal Autonomous Weapon two international inbound flights to Systems (LAWS). In simple terms, other airports (The National 2019). LAWS are drone systems aug- Now had these drones been mented with Artificial Intelligence armed and under the control of a that will result in the overly simpli- malevolent person, then the harm fied term—’Killer Robots’. There- would have been much greater. fore, the consequences of terror- Technological leaps have ists’ attacks using LAWS could be made aerial drones commercially catastrophic to state security. The available to the public with com- surgical precision, high adaptabil- plexity and power that surpasses ity, and continuous persistence of the ones from the past. The same LAWS makes countering them far Issue 7 - June 2020 19

greater of a challenge compared to conven- in use by mili- tional drones. With the tary all over the multiple initiatives of the world. As re- UAE federal govern- ported in 2006, ment the natural focus “South Korea of increasing defense announced companies in the UAE weapon system, but can select and plans to install is in the development of prod- engage targets without further hu- Samsung Techwin SGR-A1 sen- ucts pertaining to LAWS technol- man input after activation” (UNIDIR try robots along the Demilitarized ogy. Before it is too late, a policy 2017). Considering this definition Zone with North Korea. Armed to constitute a framework for the and the products currently pro- with machine guns, they are ca- control of LAWS sensitive technol- duced by the UAE defense indus- pable of fully autonomous tracking ogy information in the UAE is direly try, one can deduce that some, if and targeting, although human in need. not many, fit the definition and the approval is reportedly required The US government defini- others may easily become so, with before they fire” (Mccormick and tion of Autonomous Weapon Sys- the correct technology modifica- Simpson 2014). tems is, “A weapon system that, tions available. Thus, UN research What if this human approval once activated can select and en- has concluded that, “With smaller was absent? Then the world would gage targets without further inter- and more efficient systems there be at the mercy of an intelligence vention by a human operator. This lies an ability for such systems to that is not bound by ethics or includes human-supervised au- proliferate to individual actors or morals as humans. A Cambridge tonomous weapon systems that groups with malicious intent, such University researcher concluded are designed to allow human op- as terrorists” (UNIDIR 2017). that, “We risk yielding control over erators to override operation of the Armed drones are widely the planet to intelligences that are 20

simply in- ‘if’ the different to defence indus- us, and to things that try will develop LAWS, we consider valuable-things but ‘when’. The UAE’s goal is to such as life and a sustainable en- have a stronger and more resil- vironment” (Mccormick and Simp- a new Cab- inet for Artificial ient economy based on econom- son 2014). This has raised the Intelligence Affairs with a specific diversification to facilitate the concern of many intellectuals and ic strategy supported by a ded- strengthening of other UAE instru- subject matter experts which has icated academic organization to ments of power. led to calls for, “A universal frame- spearhead the national program. The earlier mentioned in- work that governs both [LAWS & The UAE Vision resonates in each ternational framework needs time drones] technologies – such as an emirate too, as found in the Abu before its conception. While many international convention – is the Dhabi Economic Vision 2030 that states have committed to the most appropriate approach” (Fos- states that specifically the defense cause of banning the use of LAWS ter and Haden-Pawlowski 2015). sector along with others, “Are ex- and are actively participating in Focusing on the UAE, the pected to provide the growth that a dedicated UN working group, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the will be necessary to achieve the larger states with clear LAWS de- Future have stated in a report ti- Emirate’s agenda of economic di- velopment programs, are partic- tled 100 Trends of the Future that, versification” (Government of Abu ipating to tailor the proceedings “New technologies will change Dhabi 2008). of the working group to better suit warfare and security priorities sig- With the previous strategies their respective national interests. nificantly. It will enable single citi- in mind, the question becomes not Many states with advanced zens and amorphous networks defense industries have specific to potentially wreak global hav- frameworks to accomplish the goal oc” (MoCAF 2017). The question New of protecting sensitive technolo- that needs attention is “Where are gy information. This is based on UAE industries heading vis-à-vis technologies regulations that the state imposes LAWS? will change on its defense sector companies. The UAE Vision 2021 clear- warfare and For the US, the International Traffic ly focuses on innovation and com- in Arms (ITAR) is enforced for the petitiveness and it is foreseen security priorities purpose of export control frame- as the main drivers for the UAE significantly work to stop any US-controlled economy in the future (MoCAF defense technologies from getting 2018). This led to the formation of to their adversaries. The leading Issue 7 - June 2020 21

department on the ITAR program References are the Departments of State and 1. DTSA. 2013. DTSA Strategic Plan 2013. Official, Alexandria: Commerce where the concerned Defence Technology Security Administration. directorates, “As a general rule 2. DTSA Webpage. 2020. Defence Technology Security Admin- tend toward broad restrictions … istration. 01 01. Accessed 01 29, 2020. https://www.dtsa. due to national security and for- mil/SitePages/default.aspx. eign policy concerns” (US Com- 3. Foster, Melisa , and Virgil Haden-Pawlowski. 2015. “Reg- mitee on Homeland Security and ulation Robocop: The Need for International Governance Governmental Affairs 2008). As Innovation in Drone and LAWS Development and Use.” stated, the general rule is restric- Security and Peace (Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft mbH) 33 (2): tion of export of controlled items, 61-66. Accessed 01 05, 2020. https://www.jstor.org/sta- rightly so because the national ble/10.2307/26427116. interest is at stake. Similarly, the 4. Government of Abu Dhabi. 2008. The Abu Dhabi Economic UAE has an export control regime Vision 2030. Official, Abu Dhabi: Government of Abu Dhabi. that involves several government 5. Gray, Collin S. 2014. Defence Planning for National Security: entities. Federal law by decree Navigation Aids for the Mystery Tour. Carlisle Barracks, PA: number 17 of 2019 article 3 re- United States Army War College Press. stricts any activities pertaining to 6. Kreig, Andeas, and Jean-Marc Rickli. 2019. Surrogate weapons, ammunition, explosives Warfare: the transformation of war in the twenty-first century. and military equipment without a Washington DC: Georgetown University Press. permit from the licensing author- 7. Mccormick, Ty, and Jameson Simpson. 2014. “ANTHRO- ity (Ministry of Justice 2019). The POLOGY OF AN IDEA: LETHAL AUTONOMY.” Foreign Policy licensing authority involves the 18-19. Ministries of Foreign Affairs and 8. Ministry of Justice. 2019. Federal Law by Decree Number International Cooperation, De- 14 Regarding Weapons, Ammunition, Explosives, Military fense, Economy, Interior and oth- Equipment and Hazardous Materials. Abu Dhabi: Ministry of er federal authorities. Justice. Furthermore, the UAE 9. MoCAF. 2017. Future Outlook: 100 Global Trends of 2030. MoD is collaborating with US Official Document, Dubai: UAE Ministry of Cabinet Affairs and MoD Defence Technology Se- the Future, 108. curity Administration (DTSA) to 10. MoCAF. 2018. UAE Vision 2021. Official Document, Dubai: enhance its controls on defence Ministry of Cabinet Affairs and the Future. Accessed 01 05, companies export controls and 2020. https://www.vision2021.ae/en/. technology security — as initiat- 11. Scharre, Paul. 2018. Army of None: Autonomous Weapons ed in April 2019 (DTSA Webpage and the Future of War. New York: Norton & Company. 2020). DTSA’s strategic goal be- 12. The National. 2019. The National. 22 09. Accessed 01 hind this collaboration is embed- 27, 2020. https://www.thenational.ae/uae/transport/ ded in its Strategic Plan where it two-flights-diverted-as-suspected-drone-spotted-near-du- states the need, “[To] cooperate bai-international-airport-1.913502. with U.S. Allies and partners as 13. UAE Government Portal. 2016. UAE Government Portal. 01 they build their capability to pro- 01. Accessed 01 29, 2020. https://government.ae/en#/. tect advanced technology and 14. UNIDIR. 2017. “The Weaponization of Increasingly Autono- critical information” (DTSA 2013). mous Technologies: Concerns, Characteristics and Defini- This collaboration is envisaged to tional Approaches a primer.” The United Nations Institute for shape the UAE MoD Defence In- Disarmament Research UNIDIR Resources 5. dustry strategy with a clear focus 15. US Commitee on Homeland Security and Governmental on protecting UAE future ‘LAWS’ Affairs. 2008. Beyond Control: Reforming Export Licensing from falling into the hands of ter- Agencies for National Security and Economic Interest. Official, rorists. Washington DC: US Government Printing Office, 84 - 85. 22 National Security in the Age of Pandemic

nnually at the National Defense College we poll new participants, as part of our curriculum, on the major threats that they perceive towards the United Arab Emirates. Typical responses include terrorism, oil price shocks, or the malevolent behavior of Iran and its proxies. Rarely does a participant perceive disease as a threat to the safety of UAE citizens and residents, largely due to the excellent in-country health care. The recent outbreak of a novel coronavirus, designated by the World Health Organization as SARS-CoV2- or Covid19-, highlights important national security implications for effectively handling a pandemic crisis. This purpose of this paper is to explore the national security implications of pandemic disease in a highly globalized world and offer policy guidance based on the cases reviewed.

Daniel Baltrusaitis, Ph.D. Dean of the National Defense College

Pandemic as a National walls of Athens while the city was as the plague seen in ancient Security Concern then under siege by Sparta. Over Athens, are a regular occurrence The unexpected influence a period of three years most of the throughout human history. of plague and disease has been population was infected, killing According to the World Health an intermittent security threat 75,000 to 100,000 people, roughly Organization, three pandemics over the course of human history. %25 of the city-state’s population. have emerged per century on Plague has been known to More importantly, the Athenian average since the 16th century. change the course of wars and leader and strategist Pericles died These pandemics typically occur governments. Athenian historian during the plague, which forever at 10 to -50year intervals with Thucydides highlights how plague changed the strategy of the war. the most recent flu pandemics in changed the course of the Second This critical event was instrumental 1957 ,1918, and 1968 (Kilbourne, Peloponnesian War. In the early in eventually leading to Athens 2006). Even more sobering is the stages of this famous ancient war, defeat (Littman, 2009). emergence of new disease, with a massive plague struck within the Sadly, pandemics such more than 300 new animal-borne Issue 7 - June 2020 23

diseases emerging in the past non-effective. Throughout the seventy years, meaning the fall campaigns of 1918, the probability for pandemic epidemic made generals is becoming greater prioritize care and (Caballero-Anthony support of sick and Balen, 2009). troops over battle Significantly, with the enemy the Spanish Flu (Byerly, 2010). pandemic of -1918 During the 1919 is estimated to Great War the disease have killed 50 million was spread by ships people in two years; killing bringing troops to the war almost 30,000 troops before front. Currently, the spread they even got to France. The of contagious disease can be high infection and death rates in accelerated through air travel, U.S. military camps impeded the significantly increasing the need for induction and training schedules across preparation at the state level. As seen the United States, and caused hundreds in the Covid19- outbreak, the uncontrolled of thousands of troops to be classified as spread of the disease rapidly disrupted hospital 24

curfews by security forces are often viewed with suspicion by the public and and health opposition political care systems while causing leaders. The imposition devastation to the economy. of restrictive security measures Although health experts do not Pandemic often leads directly to riots and consider it feasible to completely disease has the potential to violent clashes with state security halt the spread of a pandemic destabilize governments and cause forces (Madhav, et. al., 2017) disease, advanced preparation social unrest. As seen in past and planning are necessary to pandemics, national populations Responding to a Pandemic minimize its consequences (WHO, panic in the face of a fast-spreading, Because of the complexity 2005). Just as nations prepare for invisible disease, stressing the and unforeseeable probability military conflict to meet the national social contract between the of a pandemic response, most interest, so too nations should population and its government. national plans are incomplete prepare for pandemic disease in During the 2003 SARS outbreak, or insufficiently funded. While the same manner. Similar to the riots erupted in parts of China on war or military response fall ‘whole of government’ approach rumors of government plans for clearly under a single authority, to prosecuting war, defeating ‘the forced isolation of SARS patients responsibility for preparing for, and flu’ becomes the central focus (Enemark, 2006). Pandemic implementing national pandemic for government in the middle of a response, or the lack thereof, response plans is typically spread pandemic. The security and well- stress weak governments by across multiple agencies which being of the population becomes amplifying existing political fault have complementary and in a national priority (Enemark, 2006). lines. Imposition of quarantines and many cases, overlapping roles. Issue 7 - June 2020 25

The governance and control of (Caballero-Anthony and Balen, important as preparation for war. pandemic preparedness and 2009). References response is a complex issue, 11. Byerly, Carol R., “The U.S. Military with authority fragmented Pandemic Response as a and the Influenza Pandemic of across multiple organizations National Security Priority 1919–1918.” Public Health Reports. internationally, regionally, and Studies suggest that a 125 ;2010(Suppl 91–82 :)3. nationally (Madev, et. al., 2017). pandemic can have as significant 22. Caballero-Anthony, Mely, and Pandemic preparedness requires an impact on the health and Balen, Julie, “Introduction – The close coordination across public security of a nation as that of State of Pandemic Preparedness in and private sector actors; much being at war. If a significant Southeast Asia, Challenges and the like war planning, successful portion of the population is sick, Way Forward.” In Caballero-Anthony, pandemic planning requires a essential services will be seriously Mely. Pandemic Preparedness in careful outline of command and downgraded, affecting the ability Asia. (2009) S. Rajaratnam School control authorities. The World of the government to provide for of International Studies: 7-1. Health Organization emphasizes a functioning society. The current 33. Enemark, Christian, “Pandemic the importance of clear response Covid19- outbreak demonstrates Influenza and National Security.” authority at the national level, “In how the breakdown of social Australian Defense Force Journal. order to be able to make clear structures can affect the stability July/Aug 32-18:)171( 2006. and timely decisions and to have and security of a nation-state. 44. Holmes, Frederick MD, The Influenza a uniform policy that is endorsed At the national level, Pandemic and The War. (2019) by all officials, it is essential to preparing for a pandemic University of Kansas School of know who is in charge of different response competes for limited Medicine. Available at http://www. activities within communicable national resources with other kumc.edu/wwi/medicine/influenza. disease control, and how that national priorities such as national html. might change if a limited outbreak defense or education. Whole 55. Kilbourne ED, Influenza pandemics becomes a major emergency” of government approaches are of the 20th century. Emerging (WHO, 2005). necessary to promote cooperation Infectious Disease. 2006 Jan;:)1(12 Unfortunately, pandemic between government agencies 14-9. planning is often secondary as well as the policy, academic, 66. Littman RJ, The plague of Athens: to traditional security planning and civil society communities to epidemiology and paleopathology. pursuits, leaving national plans generate comprehensive and Mount Sinai Journal of Medicine. deficient. The findings of a cost-efficient strategies (Caballero- 2009 Oct; 67-456:)5(76. regional conference on Pandemic Anthony and Balen, 2009). Given 77. Madov, Nita, et. al., “Pandemics: Preparedness in Asia indicates the magnitude and seriousness Risks, Impacts, and Mitigation.” In that pandemic planning and of the challenge, states should Jamison DT, Gelband H, Horton preparedness in most, if not all, consider pandemic preparation as S, et al., editors. Disease Control countries remain insufficient to Priorities: Improving Health and respond to the problem. The Reducing Poverty. 3rd edition. response to the recent Covid2019- Preparing Washington (DC): The International pandemic shows that national plans Bank for Reconstruction and are still inadequate. States lack for a pandemic Development / The World Bank; the resolve to stockpile essential response 2017 Nov 346-315 :27. medical protective equipment and competes for 88. World Health Organization. WHO devices necessary for a pandemic limited national Checklist for Influenza Pandemic response. Current national Preparedness Planning. 29-1 :2005. plans remain reactive rather than resources with premeditated because pandemics other national are often seen as a medical rather priorities than a national security concern 26 Autonomous Weapons and the Key Ethical Questions: A Few Observations

ver the last three generations, unforeseen and unparalleled advances in engineering and especially in computing, have entirely transformed the lives of most humans and there is no likelihood that the constantly-accelerating speed of technological development will decrease, much less stop. For most of the last fifty years, the speed of computer processors, or their overall processing power, has doubled every two years or so.

Professor Joel Hayward Faculty, UAE NDC

This has enabled the creation and We should not be surprised that employment by militaries of weapons artificial intelligence has entered that act upon decisions made largely the military sphere, which has or fully by ‘artificial intelligence’; this always been profoundly shaped is, by computers without much or by emerging technologies and any human decision-making. This which has, during peacetime but article will try to highlight some of especially during wartime, included the ethical implications of employing a ubiquitous demand for constantly autonomous weapons, an issue more effective weapons. For many considered important not only by decades certain weapons have philosophers and other academics, included an element of autonomy. but also by policy-makers and Land mines, for example, work with ‘users’. an automatic mechanical response Issue 7 - June 2020 27 to pressure that involves no without a human operator making human agency. If a vehicle the actual decision to take life 1. or person places sufficient By fully autonomous, one means weight upon the mine, it something different to a drone, will explode with no human which is remote-controlled by operator making it do so. an operator even if that operator But this is very far from the is thousands of miles away from sophisticated and highly the weapon. Instead we mean legal autonomous weapons a weapon that has been pre- now available to the programmed but which operates world’s militaries – weapons self-sufficiently according to intended for both defense and its own artificial intelligence. offense. Because such artificial intelligence is essentially pre-programmed No one will contest the moral right on autonomous missile defensive algorithms, critics allege that it of military personnel to protect systems to provide a protective will be mistake-prone, incapable themselves or civilians by using umbrella from neighboring states of nuance, and entirely lacking defensive weapons which will react with threatening missile capabilities. the human judgment that would to enemy stimuli according to pre- Neither case violates the basic make actions accountable to programmed commands by an human right to self-defense nor any laws and norms; that is, make operator who does not play a role existing international humanitarian them ‘moral’. Critics further in the weapon’s operation once the law. assert that fully autonomous weapon itself detects the imminent offensive weapons are, without threat. Autonomous Gatling guns Offensive autonomous weapons, the humane desire of ‘in-the- on a ship, for example, can be on the other hand, have garnered loop’ operators to minimize pre-programmed to fire against significant controversy, with greatest harm to non-combatants, likely an incoming missile that human concern expressed at the prospect to cause non-compliance with operators might be slower to identify of fully autonomous machines human rights and international and respond to than the speed causing the deaths of humans of the machine’s own computer. Likewise, a number of states rely 28

humanitarian law 2. or actual wartime observation has hatred or a desire for vengeance. never been stated by critics, and It is a weak argument that we know from history that the Al least for the present, the question autonomous machines will, ipso second assumption has already of whether an autonomous facto, be less likely than humans been disproven. Warfighters have weapon or system can evaluate to comply with international frequently been unable to identify the proportionality (meaning humanitarian or human rights laws non-combatants and ensure that the appropriateness of scale) or with the Laws of Armed Conflict. no harm would befall them. Large- of any offensive operation is This would require one to believe two scale non-combatant fatalities and ethically interesting but a moot unproven assumptions: firstly, that maiming remain a persistent feature point. Proportionality is seldom human decision-making on issues of warfare. Indeed, we find too many determined by combatants during pertaining to the identification and established cases of combatants military operations. It is established non-targeting of non-combatants accidentally killing or wounding non- earlier and monitored throughout by cannot be replicated by computers, combatants because of the former’s senior planners, including lawyers at least in real-time, and secondly, poor judgment or deliberately and other civilians, and no one is that human warfighters themselves harming non-combatants because suggesting that weapons systems, have a proven record of correctly of their innate inhumanity or let alone autonomous ones, will identifying and not targeting or temporary bloodlust. Advocates themselves assume responsibility for harming non-combatants. How the of autonomous weapons would the establishment and maintenance first assumption could be ever tested argue that their machines cannot of proportionality. and verified through experiment experience or operate with anger, Issue 7 - June 2020 29

The question of accountability is little of moral concern in the also relatively straightforward. Large-scale development of autonomous According to existing law, weapons, which, while not states are accountable non-combatant having a human operator for the conduct and fatalities and in the decision-cycle misconduct of their maiming remain a during the performance militaries and the of their functions, are use and misuse persistent feature designed to undertake only of any weapons that of warfare tasks programmed into them via they employ. Liability for complex algorithms that to all the misuse or imperfect intents mimic the human mind. So performance of weapons is long as the weapons function as not transferable to programmers programmed, and they are used or manufacturers. It is true that an for tasks that states conceive and autonomous weapon might cause intend to comply with international an effect that was neither foreseen would create a perfect law, the worst they might do is to nor wanted by the state, but that killing machine, stripped of the rob warfare of some of the glory that would not absolve the state of empathy, conscience, or emotion human courage and self-sacrifice responsibility any more than an that might hold a human soldier might seem occasionally to bestow unforeseen or unintended war crime back 3.” Yet this ignores the fact upon it. committed by human warfighters that autonomous weapons are would. purposefully created by humans for References specific functions and programmed 11. Alex Leveringhaus, Ethics and The only meaningful ethical by them to perform desired specific Autonomous Weapons (Oxford: dilemma perhaps relates to whether tasks. They are not created (at Palgrave Macmillan, 2016). it is reasonable and moral to leave least not yet) with the capacity to 22. International Committee of the Red a decision over the life and death function outside of, or to choose to Cross, Artificial Intelligence and of humans to a machine. The reject or modify, their programming. Machine Learning in Armed Conflict: human desire to stay in control There is little difference between a A Human-Centred Approach of technology and the media- weapon with an operator within (Geneva, 6 June 2019), p. 2. generated ‘terminator’-type threat of the kill decision and one with no 33. “Fully Autonomous Weapons”, robots killing people have created a operator so long as the killing itself is Reaching Critical Will, undated, widespread belief that autonomous conceived and intended as a moral accessed at: http://www. weapons are not human and are act. reachingcriticalwill.org/resources/ therefore not humane. According To offer some concluding remarks, fact-sheets/critical-issues/-7972fully- to one article which expresses this this article has argued that, at autonomous-weapons. fear of inhumanity, “Algorithms least for the time being, there is 30 FORECASTING THE FUTURE: MAJOR GLOBAL TRENDS

he problem with forecasting the future of world politics is that human nature and behavior are difficult to predict. What is rational, say from Khamenei’s or Xi Jinping’s or Kim Jong-un’s perspective, may seem completely irrational to others. Still, policymakers, economists in particular, always talk about rationality or the rational actor model in policy making. However, historians never do that. Why? Because when historians look back into history, they encounter nothing but sheer foolishness, or complete irrationality in policy making (think of Hitler’s attack on the Soviet Union when he had the whole of Europe under his thumb or Japan’s attack on Pearl Harbor or Saddam Hussein’s invasion of Kuwait).

Professor Mohan Malik, Ph.D. Faculty, UAE NDC

International Relations to each other. Nonetheless, for textbooks teach us that for- long-term planning purposes, eign policy is a cold calculation policymakers must have some of costs and benefits. In reality, sense of the future from a holistic foreign policy is a mix of “5 Ps”: perspective. passion (ideology), power, profit, In this context, trend anal- pride and prejudice. Forecasting ysis is very popular, even though the future of world politics is diffi- it is wrong to extrapolate the fu- cult because there are too many ture from trends. Based on eco- forces at work at any given time. nomic trends in 1949, a World We need a multi-disciplinary ap- Bank study predicted three Asian proach. But we all have our blind countries (Burma, India and the spots. We are either economists Philippines) would be economic or historians or demographers powerhouses by 1979. Not Ja- or scientists and we do not talk pan or South Korea. Likewise, Issue 7 - June 2020 31

In the last 20 years, the world has witnessed two long wars (Iraq and Afghan- nobody predicted the fall of the istan), the explosion of Islamist Soviet Union. What happened? terrorism, nuclear proliferation in Well, politics came in the way. North Korea and Iran, four pan- The moral of the story is that one Shocks, Setbacks, and demics (SARS, H1N1, Ebola, and cannot separate politics from Surprises Coronavirus), the energy crisis economics forever. Even China International Politics teach- that saw the price of oil touching cannot defy the laws of Econom- es us one thing: rule out nothing, $148 per barrel and then crash- ics. There may be “Socialism everything is possible. The future ing to $40 per barrel, a global with Chinese characteristics” but is not just a straight line. It is full financial crisis, a tsunami ending there cannot be “Economics or of crossroads, shocks, setbacks, in a nuclear disaster, the shale oil Physics with Chinese character- and surprises. Much like human revolution, talk of war between istics.” In any case, economists life, International Politics is also China and its neighbors, Donald cannot foresee the impact of the full of ups and downs, disrup- Trump in the White House, and technologies of the future. tions and reverses. The first two the impact of Twitter on diploma- decades of the 21st century have cy. All these non-linear, tectonic been full of shocks and surprises. events of the last two decades 32

have permanently changed our world, and given policy makers a whole new perspective on future long-term contingency planning. Major Global Trends Against this backdrop and with some caveats, this article identifies key trends that are likely to shape our future: Power Shifts in the Age of Great Disruptions: The post- World War II order – first bipolar and then unipolar – is history. Multipolarity is emerging. But historically, multipolar systems have been more unstable than bipolar and unipolar ones. During power transitions, rising powers become revisionist. Both China and Rus- sia are busy ‘salami slicing’ in the East and the West. Iran is doing the same in the Middle East. Not just China, Russia or Iran, even the U.S. under the Trump administration is seen as a dissatisfied power as it moves away from the post-World War II order. A relative decline in American influence has seen the rise of regional hegem- Is all about resources, markets, ons (China, Russia, Saudi Arabia, and bases (RMB). We are see- Turkey, Iran, Brazil, and Australia) ing the return of mercantilism, working overtime to carve out China, for example, is now striv- trade wars, and neo-colonialism. their separate spheres of influ- ing to establish itself as a dom- Asian economies are becoming ence. inant naval power in the Pacific more and more dependent on and as a ‘resident power’ in the Middle Eastern energy. Conse- A Fragmented and Polar- Indian Ocean just as France, Brit- quently, geopolitical competition ized World: With competing vi- ain and the U.S. did in the 20th from East Africa to East Asia is sions of world order and globali- century. intensifying as exemplified by zation, and contrasting rule sets the naval base race to acquire in economy, technology, politics, The Changing Nature of forward bases from the Western space and cyberspace – a new Conflicts: Oceans, sea-beds, Pacific to Western Indian Ocean. world order is emerging. As glo- outer space and cyber space are The growing naval rivalry over balization gives way to region- the new arenas of rivalry. The old small island states in the Pacific alization of commerce and cur- form of land-grabbing coexists and the Indian Oceans bears re- rency, and economic issues get with post-modern cyberwar. Map markable resemblance to naval mired in domestic politics, trade re-making is not over. A race is competition to acquire access could become a contentious and on to dominate in new ‘strategic to markets, resources and bas- competitive issue in the future. frontiers’ such as oceans, the es amongst rising industrializing North and South Poles, cyber- powers in earlier eras in history. The New ‘Great Game’: space and outer space via ‘gray Issue 7 - June 2020 33

Initiative’ and the U.S.’ ‘Free and Open Indo-Pacific’.

No ‘multilateral nirvana’: Far from being mechanisms for dispute resolution, global and regional organizations have now become the new arenas of shad- ow-boxing, multilateral maneu- vers and machinations to gain relative advantage.

Implications The next 15 to 20 years in the Indo-Pacific region are fraught with risks – this is where some of the world’s most powerful states are forging new alliances, conducting arms races, pursuing mercantilist policies, extracting resources, viewing competitors with growing distrust and engaging in the containment of peer competitors. The security dilemma is worsening as nations – big and small – engage in ‘band wagoning’– balancing and hedging games. Consequently, the vast region from East Africa to East Asia and the Polar regions economic divorce or ‘decoupling’ are emerging as major arenas of zone’ operations, i.e., with little between China and America is al- contestation as countries coop- or no use of military force in ways ready under way. New technolo- erate, compete, collide, and col- that change regional balances of gies are the crux of this split. The lude with each other. power and undermine existing emergence of two separate digi- Small and middle powers trade, financial and military- ar tal blocs, driven by security con- are usually the first to experience rangements. cerns, will have global economic geopolitical power shifts as they implications. come under pressure to choose ‘One World, Two Systems’: sides. Most strive to play one Tech wars over new disruptive Clash of Visions and Val- great power off against the other technologies (AI, hypersonic, en- ues: With the march of author- to their advantage but many fall ergy-directed weapons, quantum itarianism, religious radicalism, prey to great power intervention computing, big data, robotics, and right-wing populist national- and intrigues. Small and middle drones, IoT) are intensifying with ism, democracy seems to be in powers also tend to be strong the potential to cause supply retreat. I characterize this coming supporters of regionalism and chain disruption and a bifurcation ideological contest as mainly be- international institutions so as to of the global economy. Technol- tween Techno-Totalitarianism and constrain/moderate great power ogy concerns involving national Digital Democracies as repre- competition and ensure that big security interests are highly sen- sented in China’s ‘Belt and Road powers abide by laws, rules, and sitive and competitive. A partial norms. 34 Illuminating the Unseen Elephant: How Complexity Theory Can Help Turn Security Challenges into Opportunities

he annexation of Crimea, the rise of far right nationalist parties in Europe, the activities of the Wagner group in the Syrian Civil War and the spread of disinformation and propaganda on social media during the 2016 US Presidential Election, although seemingly unconnected, these four events are part of a concerted effort to increase the influence and geopolitical reach of the Russian Federation. While the connections are widely recognized now they were once shrouded in secrecy.

Patrick Bell, Ph.D. Faculty, UAE NDC

What the connection be- citizens. regarding the nature of systems. tween these events reveals is that But how can decision Systems are all around us the larger strategic picture is of- makers link seemingly unrelated — whether the environment, the ten unseen — especially by those events? This comes from under- geopolitical system of nations who are the targets of operations standing the dynamic processes and states or the people who oc- contained within these events. through which these events inter- cupy their territory. Each of these Illuminating the connections be- act. Using complexity theory, de- examples is a system in itself — tween these events is crucial in cision makers can not only under- existing and interacting with the order to create opportunities for stand, but anticipate the actions other systems. These systems af- strategic decision makers to pro- of strategic actors — be they fect and are affected by the world actively address the perennial se- friend or foe. The first step in ap- around them. Each actor thinks curity dilemmas that impact the plying complexity theory comes they understand their system and security and safety of a state’s from changing one’s perspective yet has an incomplete picture. Issue 7 - June 2020 35

Just like a set of blind men attributes of actors such as how gin individually but soon encoun- who are each sensing a different large or small they are, to the ac- ter other ripples, thus changing part of an elephant, events and tor’s actions. More specifically, the overall pattern as they inter- the actors that populate them it focuses on their interactions. act. For example, how will the appear to be unconnected when These interactions are like many Russian Federation’s use of mer- in reality they are interdependent. ripples in a pool of water that be- cenary forces in Ukraine or Syria Applying complexity theory re- impact other groups in Crimea frames this perspective, so that or Western Europe? they can view this more holistic 2) It also refocuses picture 1. the frame from individual effects One change one’s per- to effects that cannot be attrib- spective by learning the language Complexity uted to any single actor. These of complexity. To be sure this theory are referred to as second or third language may seem unfamiliar, order effects. For example, how but once comprehended, it will reframes the will Russian support of Bashar become clear that complexity is critical thinking Al Assad impact support of right commonplace, even intuitive. of decision wing nationalists across Europe? makers Learning the Lan- 3) guage of Complex It refocuses the Systems frame from a fo- To begin with, cus on behavior complexity theory at one point in reframes the critical time, to effects thinking of decision over time which makers in four dis- impact the equi- tinct ways. librium or bal- 1) It ance that exists refocuses the frame within the sys- from a focus on the tems themselves. 36

are not static but dynamic entities. Actors, be they states, non-states or even in some cases individuals, respond to their environment by changing their strategies in response to other actors. They learn over time and respond differently to the same stim- ulus. Identifying these adaptive behaviors is crucial when responding to challenges, especially at the strategic level. This process has been studied in various contexts including that of strategic studies. An example of this process is that of the tactical interac- tion cycle described first in the work of Douglas McAdam 2. How Al Qai’da or ISIS changed its behavior in response to US and coalition efforts to disrupt or destroy their networks is an example of adaptation. Another important behavior is that of self-organization. Self-organization occurs as systems become more complex over time through These behaviors both positively or negatively im- as their interactions increase. This pattern can be pact the course of systems and are referred to as seen in various contexts including collections of feedback loops. For example, how did using covert states, non-states or individuals. When this behav- active measures such as disinformation and prop- ior cannot be traced to a single factor, this behavior aganda on social media stoke racial tensions and is denoted as emergent. Identifying the processes lead to less voter participation among African Amer- through which self-organization or even emergence icans in the 2016 US presidential election? occur is crucial to predicting the development of 4) Each of these processes; interac- the system. The development of the Euromaidan tion, order effects and feedback loops, are referred protests in Ukraine in 2013-2014 and the umbrel- to in complexity theory as system dynamics. When la protests in Hong Kong in 2019 are examples of taken together, these dynamics reframe decision self-organization and emergent behavior. making from one focused on analysis of individual A third type of behavior is what systems theo- parts to synthesis at a more holistic level and allow rist Donella Meadow’s refers to as “system traps 3 ” . strategic decision makers to see larger patterns. System traps refers to behaviors that are inherent in Such patterns impact the function or purpose of the structure of a system which lead the system to the system itself. What becomes apparent at this display disequilibrium. Of the three main “archetypes” more systemic level is that the whole is more than of traps, the one most familiar to security studies is the sum of its parts. escalation — otherwise known as the security di- From Language to Behavior lemma. The international proliferation of weapons of Once one becomes familiar with the language mass destruction is an example of escalation. of complexity one can start to understand the be- Finally, among the most important behaviors havior of systems. Using complexity theory, strate- in a system is that of information flow. How, and just gic decision makers can identify the systems they as importantly what, information flows within the are in and the processes that impact their progress system is critical to determining the behavior of the toward obtaining their strategic objectives. system. Beyond being the lifeblood of any strategy, Among the most important behaviors is adap- information has changed in three important ways. tation. Systems, and the actors that populate them Understanding these changes is crucial to deter- Issue 7 - June 2020 37

mining the behavior of contemporary systems. First, the volume of information has increased by orders of magnitude with global IP traffic increasing from 100 GB per day in 1992 to a forecasted 157,000 GB per second in 2022 4. Second, the velocity with which this information is being communicated has increased with millions of messages communicated each minute 5. Third, the variety of sources has increased with 80 % of the data being communicated in an unstructured format by 2025 6. When combined with new technologies such as social media, the impact of information flows on system behavior is among the most important system dynamics. The use of social and traditional media by organizations such as Al Jazeera in Qatar or the Internet Research Agency in the Russian Federa- tion are only two examples of how information flow can impact system behavior. ducements” to disrupt the power imbalance experienced From Behavior to Action by insurgent groups when confronting more powerful By beginning to understand system behav- opponents. For more information on this process see ior one can design strategies that turn contempo- McAdam (1983) “Tactical Innovation and the Pace of In- rary challenges into opportunities. More specifically, surgency”, American Review of Sociology Vol. 48 (De- applying complexity theory can alert those at the cember). strategic level to be aware of the second and even 3. For more information on system traps see Meadows third order effects that result from the interactions (2008) Edited by Wright, D. Thinking in Systems: A Prim- of events that do not seem to be connected when er, Earthscan, International Institute for Environment and observed from the operational or tactical level. By Development, London understanding the system dynamics inherent in all 4. For more information on this see the Cisco white pa- systems, decision makers can more effectively in- per on Global internet protocal (IP) traffic. Accessed at tegrate their critical thinking and confront the chal- https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/solutions/collateral/ lenges of contemporary security dilemmas such as service-provider/visual-networking-index-vni/white-pa- climate change, hybrid warfare, lethal autonomous per-c11-741490.html#_Toc532256789 weapons, pandemic diseases and the proliferation 5. For more information on this see https://blog.micro- of weapons of mass destruction. In other words, by focus.com/how-much-data-is-created-on-the-internet- applying complexity theory decision makers will be each-day/ able to see not just the elephant’s tail or trunk, but 6. Data for analysis is structured in two categories, struc- the whole elephant. tured and unstructured. For more information on this see https://solutionsreview.com/data-management/80- References percent-of-your-data-will-be-unstructured-in-five-years/ and https://www.datamation.com/big-data/struc- 1. Adapted from description found in Meadows, D. (2006) tured-vs-unstructured-data.html “Thinking in Systems” A Primer” 2. This cycle describes a pattern in which opposing sides learn from each other’s tactics. Employing “negative in- 38

Understanding Iran’s ‘Grey Zone’ Strategy

ttacks on oil tankers near the UAE’s shores, as well as audacious drone strikes against Saudi oil installations have highlighted the increased intensity of asymmetric operations in the region. These events serve as a clear reminder of Iran’s favored ‘modus operandi’ for waging conflict against its regional adversaries; namely, operating in a ‘grey-zone’ area where lines between the state of war and peace are deliberately blurred. Tehran has grown quite proficient in leveraging the advantages of ‘grey zone’ operations to its favor.

Amb. Grigol Mgaloblishvili Faculty, UAE NDC

A quick look at Tehran’s cur- tion and to operate with relative im- rent approach to subvert its adver- punity by conducting its subversive saries makes it clear that, “Iran typi- operations just below the threshold cally operates below the threshold of of an open conflict. conventional warfare, using a blend Since Iran has emerged as of military and paramilitary tools, in- the region’s foremost practitioner cluding proxy forces, missiles, cyber of ‘grey zone’ operations, it is im- tools, maritime forces and informa- perative for the regional countries tion operations to shape and coerce in general, and the UAE in particu- regional actors to its advantage1.”- lar, to understand Tehran’s strategic This highly sophisticated approach approach2. This article thus will ex- enables Tehran to minimize the risks amine how Iran attempts to leverage of conventional military confronta- advantages of a ‘grey zone’ strategy Issue 7 - June 2020 39

in order to expand its war-fighting tac- regional influence. Giv- tics that allow it en the significant impli- to avoid escalating cations that Iran’s ‘way conflict to the point of war’ poses on region- of conventional al security, the paper will warfare3 . In this re- focus on answering the spect, the central following questions that tenets of Iranian force are highly relevant for fur- structure consist of: ther considerations, “What a guerrilla naval force are the underlying factors capable of disrupt- that shape Tehran’s prefer- ing oil exports from the ence for a ‘grey zone’ strat- Gulf region; an arsenal of egy?” “What is the strength missiles and drones ca- of Iran’s strategic approach?” pable of conducting long- And “What are Tehran’s ‘grey range precision strikes; zone’ strategy’s vulnerabili- well-developed proxy forc- ties”? es capable of conducting Iran’s preference for conventional and unconven- ‘grey zone’ strategies are clear- tional operations throughout ly dictated by its relatively inferi- the region and offensive cy- or military and economic capa- ber capabilities4 . The blend of bilities to confront its traditional these capabilities has enabled adversaries in a direct manner, Tehran to overcome its military such as the United States and and economic weaknesses and its regional allies. Hence, in recent skillfully exploit its adversaries’ decades Tehran has grown adept vulnerabilities. at leveraging the advantages of Other than reducing its asymmetric warfare by developing weaknesses, Tehran’s preference the capabilities that enable it to em- for ‘grey zone’ strategies also re- ploy indirect means for its subversive flects its traumatic experience of actions. As such, Tehran has devel- the costly military conflict with Iraq oped a force structure and indirect during the 1980s. It has been argued 40

militarily and economically stronger out direct, overt and large-scale mil- that, “No single event has defined adversaries, as well as the legacy of itary intervention7” and with relative Iran’s revolutionary ideology, politics, the Iran-Iraq War. impunity. Thus, the main strength of perspectives on society and secu- These factors led to for- Tehran’s ‘grey zone’ strategy lies in rity more than the Iran-Iraq War5.” mation of a strategic culture that its ability to create ambiguity and to There are at least two reasons why centers on investing and develop- obscure the lines between the state this conflict still matters for -under ing non-attributable instruments of of war and peace by employing ef- standing the rationale of Tehran’s statecraft. Whether it is networks of fectively the non-attributable instru- decision-making process. First, the proxy groups, offensive cyber capa- ments of statecraft. legacy of this lengthy military conflict bilities or arsenals of drones, it en- Alongside the noticeable facilitated the formation of a strate- ables Tehran to undermine adver- gains, however, the pursuit of a gic culture that centers on aversion saries by disguising or denying the ‘grey zone’ strategy has incurred to full-scale conventional combat, extent of its military engagement; significant costs and, in multiple even after the three decades that and where necessary, running a instances, has backfired on Iranian have passed since the conflict end- campaign of plausible deniability. interests. Its naval provocations as ed. Second, Iran’s adherence to Iran’s agility in using non-attributa- well as its support to proxy forces ‘grey zone’ strategies were heav- ble tools in a highly effective man- have significantly damaged its inter- ily influenced by the perceived ner has played an important role national reputation and have deep- success of its asymmetric forces, in spreading Tehran’s influence in ened its regional isolation. By un- namely the Islamic Revolutionary the region with minimum costs and dermining the regional stability and Guard Corps (IRGC), during the risks of re-engaging in a full-scale supporting malign actors, “Iran has war, and afterwards6. Hence, two conflict. In other words, this strate- perpetuated its image as an outli- important factors that explain Iran’s gic approach has enabled Tehran, er in the international community8.” adherence to asymmetric warfare “To subvert and destroy states with- This image permitted its adversaries are its relative weaknesses against Issue 7 - June 2020 41

to consolidate international support consequences of its strategic ap- ing Iran’s Asymmetric ‘Way of for imposing financial sanctions on proach. Thus, understanding Iran’s War’”, 2020 Iran with relative ease. Moreover, ‘grey zone’ strategy acquires par- 5. Behnam Ben Taleblu, “The Iran- Tehran’s aggressive stance towards ticular importance as its relevance Iraq War: It Still Haunts the Mid- its neighbors has created unlikely is unlikely to recede in the coming dle East to This Day”, The Na- avenues of dialogue and cooper- months and years. tional Interests, May 15, 2019 ation among those regional actors 6. Eisenstadt, Michael. “Operating that have historical rivalries with References in the ‘Grey Zone’: Counter- each other – notably Israel and the 1. Dalton G. Melissa. “How Iran’s ing Iran’s Asymmetric ‘Way of Arabian Gulf states9. The common hybrid war tactics help and hurt War’”, 2020 denominator these regional actors it”, Bulletin of the Atomic Scien- 7. Galeotti, M.E. ‘Gerasimov Doc- share is an interest in curbing the tists, 2017, Vol. 73. NO 5, 312- trine’ and Russian Non-linear spread of Iranian influence in the re- 315 War, 2014. gion. In short, Tehran’s ‘grey zone’ 2. Eisenstadt, Michael. “Operating 8. Dalton G. Melissa. “How Iran’s strategy, alongside apparent gains, in the ‘Grey Zone’: Countering hybrid war tactics help and hurt has also led to unintended con- Iran’s Asymmetric ‘Way of War’ it”, Bulletin of the Atomic Scien- sequences that have shattered its ”, 2020 tists, 2017, Vol. 73. NO 5, 312- international reputation and weak- 3. Dalton G. Melissa. “How Iran’s 315 ened its regional standing. Despite hybrid war tactics help and hurt 9. Dalton G. Melissa. “How Iran’s all this pushback, it seems likely that it”, Bulletin of the Atomic Scien- hybrid war tactics help and hurt Iran will continue its ‘grey zone’ ac- tists, 2017, Vol. 73. NO 5, 312- it”, Bulletin of the Atomic Scien- tivities in order to expand its regional 315 tists, 2017, Vol. 73. NO 5, 312- influence. The gains of operating in a 4. Eisenstadt, Michael. “Operating 315. ‘grey zone’, from Tehran’s perspec- in the ‘Grey Zone’: Counter- tive, significantly eclipse the negative 42 Strategic Environment Analysis Is Vital For Decision-Making & Strategy Building

ew leaders in the private or the public sector would deny the importance of developing an effective strategy, but how many really know where to start? In fact, the essential starting point for effective strategy and decision-making is a robust analysis of the strategic environment. This article explains why strategic environment analysis is vital for decision making and strategy building. To develop a clear and implementable strategy that supports national interests, it is important that a robust analysis is undertaken and competent decisions are made.

Mona Al Shamsi Participant, UAE NDC

One of the most respected decision-making, which empha- writers on statecraft and strategy sizes input, or information gath- development is Terry L. Deibel ering; transformation, or analysis who provided a logical process of the problem; and output, or a to follow (Deibel, 2007). It begins decision. Both models recognize with assessing the environment, that the starting point and foun- followed by analysis of threats, dation for good decisions and challenges and opportunities, strategy is gathering information, and finally, the development of a or assessing the environment. course of action to address them. This article will now consid- Similarly, Zuzana Papulova and er this essential stage, which pro- Andrea Gazoya (Papulova & Ga- vides the foundation upon which zoya, 2016) provide a model for all good strategies are built. Issue 7 - June 2020 43

In their paper “The role of of a process that involves the ty of sources that is transformed Strategic Analysis in Strategic analysis of information, trans- to become useful. This is broadly Decision Making”, Papulova and forming input. This is an impor- supportive of the approach out- Gazoya propose a model (Papu- tant point, a good strategy is line in the NDC strategy which lova & Gazoya, 2016): based on good decisions, which uses the terms assess, analysis In it, they show that deci- are based on gathering a broad and plan. sions are the considered output range of information from a varie- The starting point and

Input Transformation Output PERCEPTION UNDERSTANDING CONSIDERATION Information Gathering Analysis of Problem Decision 44

foundation for a good strategy is, as Papulova shows, the INPUT, the information gathering. This review now considers this important aspect, gathering information; this is an essential stage in strategy development and provides the foundation upon which all good strategies are built. The process to gather information is commonly referred to as “scanning”. Fairbanks and Buchko (Fairbanks & Buchko) set out a case to use a structured tool, Maree Conway (Conway, new, strange and weird ideas, as yond just what is happening to- 2013) has also considered this well as persistent challenges and day. subject, and Éverton Luís Pelliz- trends today. It is about recog- • Environmental scanning zaro de Lorenzi Cancellier et al, nising that the future will not be has a wider scope than tradi- considered “the relation between like the past, and that we there- tional data collection; consider the scanning of environmental fore need to spend some time everything – such as social, eco- information, strategic behaviour understanding the trends and nomic, political and technical in- and performance” (Pellizzaro de likely influencers on the future of dicators. Lorenzia Cncellier, Blageski, & our organisations. High quality • Environmental scanning Rosseto, 2014). They defined scanning is the core of effective allows for participants to analyze scanning as “a manner through futures work. the interactions of events and which managers acquire relevant Drumm McNaughton (Mc trends; therefor allowing extrapo- information about what happens Naughton, 2018) suggests four lation outside the company so that fu- reasons why environmental scan- • Environmental scanning ture courses of action are taken” ning needs to be front and centre is a critical and ongoing part of What then, is scanning? in developing a strategic plan: the planning process in which in- Referring to Conway once again: • Environmental scanning formation on external events and “Environmental scanning is the focuses on anticipating the trends are continuously collect- art of systematically exploring future instead of described and considered through- the external environment” (Con- ing current conditions; out the planning process; way, 2013). Conway argues this by doing so, the scanning is not just at is to better understand the pace strategist con- a point in time; a of change. For example, how is siders a wide good strate- technology changing and how area be- gist should will these changes affect the fo- keep cus for the strategy? The second purpose of scanning is to identify opportunities and challenges; continuing with the technology example, strategists would need to consider how the use of Autono- mous Weapons Systems might be incorporated into a revised military strategy. Environ- mental scanning explores both Issue 7 - June 2020 45

place. Military strategists understand the need for having a clear and well-thought through strategy, and the basis for strategic planning is primarily based on the writings of military strategists. But the principles, and particularly the need to have a foundation based on environmental scanning are appropriate and applicable for any sector and any industry.

References 11. Conway, M. (2013). Environmental Scanning: What it is and how to scanning and reconfirm his un- development in any industry or do it. Retrieved January 2020 ,1, derstanding sector should be based on a sol- from Thinking Futures: http:// What is interesting is that id foundation supported by a ro- thinkingfutures.net the McNaughton article is refer- bust scanning process. 22. Deibel, T. (2007). Foreign Affairs ring to the education sector, and The importance of scan- Strategy: Logic for American yet the points made are as equal- ning (environmental analysis) Statecraft. Cambridge University ly relevant to a strategist working is, therefore, clear and its need Press. on statecraft. The Deibel model as the foundation for analysis is 33. Fairbanks, s., & Buchko, A. (n.d.). describes developing a strategy demonstrated in Papulova’s three The Strategic Environmental in similar terms. stage process, one that ends Scan Tool: Performanced Based The takeaway is that al- with the consideration process Stategy. Retrieved January ,1 though much of strategic analy- of taking decisions; nobody can 2020, from DOI.org: . https://doi. sis is based on principles outlined predict exactly what will happen org/-795-78743-1-978/10.1108 originally by military strategists in the future but more reliable 120181008 such as Sun Tzu and Clausewitz, decisions and hence more relia- 44. Mc Naughton, D. (2018, May political practitioners such as ble strategies are developed on 3). Strategic Planning and Machiavelli or codified in method- the back of thorough and well Environmental Planning. Retrieved ologies around developing strat- researched scans of the environ- January 2020 ,1, from The egies for statecraft by exponents ment. Moreover, as McNaught- Change Leader .com: https:// such as Deibel, in on (Mc Naughton, 2018) notes, thechangeleader.com/strategic- today’s world, scanning is not a one-off pro- planning-and-environmental- strategy cess, it is part of an on-go- scanning/ ing and iterative process 55. Papulova, Z., & Gazoya, A. (2016, that recognises the December). Role of Strategic world is a dynamic Analysis in Strategic Decision and changing Making. Procedia Economics and Finance No 579-571 ,39 ,39. 66. Pellizzaro de Lorenzia Cncellier, E. L., Blageski, E. J., & Rosseto, C. R. (2014). Environmental Scanning Strategic Behaviour and Performance in Small Companies. JISTEM Inf Syst Management volume 3. 46 A Framework for Interpreting US Foreign Policy in the Gulf

any people in the Gulf find it difficult to interpret U.S. foreign policy and to forecast how it might react to significant events in the region, for example the May and June 2019 sabotage attacks on four shipping vessels off of the UAE coast, the September 2019 attacks on Saudi Aramco oil facilities, or the attack that killed Iranian general Qassim Soleimani in Baghdad in January 2020. People speculate what interests drive U.S. policies and responses, with many different answers and theories. A framework for interpreting U.S. foreign policy in the Gulf would help observers to better understand the dynamics involved in shaping U.S. responses to events in the region.

Sterling Jensen, Ph.D. Faculty, UAE NDC

This framework is built on observers to assess and forecast two main pillars: first, a correct U.S. responses to significant events understanding of U.S. interests in in the Gulf. the Gulf and how they compare with other U.S. interests in the world; and US Strategic Interests second, a correct understanding of Like any state, the U.S.’s how U.S. foreign policy is formulated, national interests are largely related resourced and executed. This looks to its security, economy and values. at the separation of powers within the The U.S.’s main interests in the U.S. government between Congress, Middle East are preventing the the White House and public opinion. spread of terrorism, stopping WMD Without correctly understanding proliferation, allowing freedom of these two pillars, it will be difficult for navigation, the free flow of energy Issue 7 - June 2020 47

(oil and gas), promoting U.S. values terrorism, will shape U.S. security policy is formulated, resourced and and protecting U.S. allies. U.S. strategy in the future. More emphasis executed. The U.S. government is foreign policy is shaped by threats, on great power rivalries could lessen divided into three separate powers: challenges and opportunities to the urgency of U.S. interests in legislative, executive and judicial. those interests. However, many in the the Middle East. Additionally, the The most important branches region are confused as to which of shale oil revolution has helped the for formulating, resourcing and these interests is driving U.S. foreign U.S. become the world’s largest implementing foreign policy are the policy and how they are prioritized producer of oil, which means it is less legislative and executive branches. in any given event. For example, dependent on Middle Eastern oil. So The legislative branch (the the U.S. might prioritize one threat while the Middle East might remain House of Representatives and to a Middle Eastern ally more than an important region to secure U.S. Senate, or Congress) makes laws, another. Priorities of U.S. interests are interests, the changing environment oversees the spending of the shaped by public opinion, lawmakers might make it less important than government budget, has the power and assessments made by the White regions such as Asia or Europe. This of the purse and declares war. It is the House, which is discussed later. leads on to how U.S. foreign policy is only federal government body that In addition to identifying U.S. formulated and resourced. can raise funds through taxes, and the interests in the region, it is important President must have any government to compare these interest with US Congress, the White House and budget approved by Congress. The interests elsewhere. For example, Public Opinion Senate must also ratify any treaty the the 2017 U.S. National Security Many outsiders underestimate the government makes with a foreign Strategy declares that great power impact of the U.S. system of checks country. So if the legislative branch, rivalry (Russia and China), rather than and balances on how U.S. foreign which is elected to office in two 48

(House of Representatives) and six Many Congressional members, bill, the Congressional action limited (Senate)-year cycles, does not agree both Republicans and Democrats, the government’s ability to support with a President’s foreign agenda, disapproved of the President’s policy Saudi-led efforts to stabilize Yemen. they can limit the President’s ability on Yemen. They therefore passed The executive branch (the to resource and execute a foreign a bill to withdraw support for the White House) enforces the laws and policy. A recent example of this was Saudi-led Coalition. While President has the authority to formulate and seen with U.S. policy in Yemen. Trump’s administration vetoed the execute foreign policy. The President, Issue 7 - June 2020 49

who is the head of the executive Congress passed a resolution to limit 2006 or support for the so-called branch and is elected every four the President’s ability to take military ‘Arab Spring’ in 2011. Public opinion years, is also the Commander in action against Iran and potentially is shaped by freedom of the press, so Chief of the Armed Forces. However, other countries, without first notifying the media also plays an indirect role the President is not authorized to Congress. This interdependency in shaping U.S. foreign policy. declare war on a foreign country. This between the legislative and executive is the authority of the Congress. The branches was designed to encourage Assessing and forecasting President is authorized to defend the compromise and prevent one branch U.S. foreign policy is complex and country by using the armed forces and from becoming too dominant. highly nuanced. It is also difficult for conducting foreign policy abroad. Lastly, public opinion shapes many U.S. citizens unfamiliar with Foreign policy is limited, though, how the legislative and executive the political system to understand when the President and Congress branches prioritize U.S. foreign the workings of foreign policy. have different views on how to policies. As politicians are elected in However, U.S. foreign policy is largely address a national security problem. two, four and six year terms, they transparent, especially given the U.S. For example, the January 2020 killing are continually assessing public laws on freedom of speech and of of Iranian general Qassim Soleimani opinion in order to get re-elected. For the press. Those who understand was authorized by the White House example, policies on some issues how to correctly assess and analyze without formal Congressional such as Iran, Israel and terrorism are US strategic interests, with a detailed approval or notification. If this action largely shaped by public opinion. understanding of the nexus between were to lead to the U.S. going to war While many U.S. interests are not Congress, the White House and with Iran, Congress would have to determined by public opinion, such public opinion, will find it less difficult pay for the war effort, which Congress as some alliances with Arab Gulf to interpret and will better forecast might believe taxpayers would not countries, they can be impacted by how US policy will respond to a given be willing to support. Therefore, in public opinion, for example preventing event in the region. response to the Soleimani killing, the sale of U.S. ports to DP World in 50

Electricity supply security in the UAE

ince the formation of the UAE on 2nd December 1971, the national economy has grown enormously. By just looking to the gross domestic product (GDP) numbers for the past forty years, we will see that it has increased from USD 75.1 billion in 1980; to USD 130.1 billion in 1990, USD 258.1 billion in 2000, USD 466.6 billion in 2010 and reached USD 686.6 billion in 2017 which means the growth rate of GDP is around %100 every ten years. This fast growth in economy and population has resulted in a continuous growth in electricity demand as well.

Ali Awadh Al Menhali Participant, UAE NDC

The primary driver of this de- increasing electricity demand is put- mand has been the high consump- ting more and more pressure on the tion of electricity and the rapid urbani- electricity supply system in the UAE in zation and industrialization in the UAE. order to provide prosperity and sta- The electricity demand increased bility. Moreover, the government in re- from 69,914 GWh in 2007 to 131,031 cent decades has been attending to GWh in 2017 (Federal Competitive- the growing demand by building new ness and Statistics Authority (FCSA) generation plants based on hydrocar- 2018). This means that the average bon sources. This has increased the annual growth in electricity consump- amount of carbon dioxide emissions tion is around 8% which is very high significantly. The emissions increased compared to the average global rate from 69.1 million tons in 2013 to 77.8 of around 3.5% (Global Energy Statis- million tons in 2017 (bayanat 2020), tical Yearbook 2019). The constantly which makes UAE one of the world’s Issue 7 - June 2020 51

top countries in carbon dioxide emissions per capita (Knoema World data atlas 2018). The UAE current generation strategy is based on building huge centralized generation plants in relatively small areas such as the Taweelah generation compound and the Barakah nuclear plants. This means that all these locations are considered as very sensitive locations from the security point of view. An ad- versarial neighboring country such as Iran can target these locations with its drones or ballistic missiles, similar to what happened in Biqa- yq and Khurais oil plants in Saudi Arabia. If this occurred, it would severely disrupt UAE electricity supplies. Although the government has drawn up a short-term plan (UAE government vision 2021) which includes generating 27% of the elec- very slowly (where the tricity demand from clean energy electricity generated from clean sources and reduce its per capita sources reached only 0.35% as of 2018). The government has also developed greenhouse gas emissions (carbon a long-term strategic plan (UAE Energy Strategy 2050) which targets an en- dioxide) (UAE Goverment 2020), the ergy mix that combines nuclear, renewable and clean coal in order to reach execution of this vision is proceeding 52

50% of the country’s demand gener- uted generation system may use re- generation models via gas combined ated from clean sources by investing newable sources of energy or non-re- cycle allow for the production of fresh around AED 600 billion and reduce newable sources. It can work while water as a by-product from waste the carbon footprint of power genera- being connected to the current grid heat recovery. This is done by sea tion by 70% thus saving AED 700 bil- and it also can work as a stand-alone water multi-flushing using the waste lion. Although this long-term strategy system. Also, it will drastically de- heat from the steam turbines. That looks promising, it does not address crease the cost of supplying power to is why all power generation facilities the issues from the security point of the consumers from the government are located near sea shorelines. Most view and also it still puts a heavy fi- due to elimination of transmission of the UAE’s fresh water needs are nancial burden on the government.. element in the network. Moreover, it addressed by power generation. A In my opinion, the government opens the power generation market good example is the emirate of Abu should consider the concept of dis- for small scale investors (i.e. SMEs). Dhabi which produced 100% of its tributed generation as a response to Furthermore, it dilutes the bank of fresh water needs by desalination us- the current policy issues. Distributed targets for any adversaries and it ing power generation plants in 2017 generation is an approach which em- increases the network resilience to- (Federal Competitiveness and Statis- ploys small-scale generation points wards technical failures. As well, it will tics Authority (FCSA) 2018). Any pro- that can be implemented on multiple speed up the government response posed policy that undertakes distrib- levels; a household level, a neighbor- to the ever-growing demand. Finally, uted power generation as the sought hood level, or a small city level. The it decouples water generation from target has to address the water idea of distributed generation is to the power generation which allows problem. Moreover, while integration build small-scale, renewable power for implementing separate and more of distributed generation into distribu- generation plants in the neighbor- efficient solutions on the water gen- tion systems has many advantages, hoods where the generation plants eration front. It is worth mentioning however, our current traditional pow- can be connected directly to the dis- here that distributed generation was er systems are not designed to incor- tribution network thus eliminating the implemented in the UAE before on porate the power generation sources transmission network from the mod- a small scale by using hydrocarbon directly into the distribution network. el. power plants, but those plants were Accordingly, such integration has to Overall distributed genera- decommissioned and the UAE cur- be carefully studied to understand its tion brings a lot of advantages to the rently does not have distributed gen- impact and come up with solutions energy field. For instance, it reduces eration stations. ahead of time in order to maintain the the government investment since Bringing distributed power power network running smoothly. the cost is borne directly by the con- generation to the UAE requires ad- In light of all the above, I pro- sumer (considering it is applied at the dressing a unique problem for the pose to consider covering all the household level). Moreover, a distrib- region – fresh water. Current power UAE’s electricity demand by develop- Issue 7 - June 2020 53

ing fully distributed generation plants benefits of distributed generation but lief that a fully distributed model rep- that employ renewable energy and limits the role of the government and resents the essence of the future that non-renewable energy at the neigh- its influence on the power generation is driven by data analysis and artificial borhood level. The government can framework. It is known that one of intelligence. allow the neighborhood residents to the disadvantages of renewable en- In conclusion, it is in the UAE’s establish co-operatives that invest, ergy is its instability due to continu- national interest to ensure the stability, operate and manage power gener- ous climatic changes. Accordingly, it security and prosperity of the people ation in their neighborhoods. Power is very important to highlight that the in UAE by ensuring uninterrupted, generation can be done via renew- proposed model in this option is to sustainable and affordable electricity able resources. Internal distribution adopt distributed generation plants supplies which will guarantee sus- within the neighborhoods can be which use a mixture of hydrocarbons, tainable and continuous growth for managed by the same cooperatives/ clean coal, nuclear and renewables in the economy. SMEs; while distribution in between order to achieve a highly stable and neighborhoods (transmission) can reliable system. Although the pro- References be managed by a central body com- posed solution is to use a mixture of 1. 2020. bayanat . http://data. prising a council representing the in- energy sources, renewable sources bayanat.ae/en_GB/data- volved cooperatives/SMEs. Account- should be dominant in this option set?groups=energy&organiza- ing for the export/import of electricity in order to achieve the government tion=ministry-of-energy-industry. or water across neighborhoods can goals of higher usage of clean energy, 2. 2018. Federal Competitiveness be managed by the private sector. decreasing carbon dioxide emissions and Statistics Authority (FCSA). Cooperatives/SMEs will generate to the least and to decrease the de- Accessed 2018. https://fcsa. revenue from internal consumers (in- pendency on the natural gas to gen- gov.ae/ar-ae/Pages/Statistics/ cluding members) and from exporting erate electricity. Statistics. excess electrical power to the nearby The government needs to 3. 2019. Global Energy Statistical neighborhoods. The market model look at this mixed energy sources Yearbook . https://yearbook. followed should be as free as possible concept and thoroughly study the enerdata.net/electricity/electrici- to allow competition among neigh- possibility of applying it to resolve cur- ty-domestic-consumption-data. borhoods. The government role will rent policy issues. In my opinion, the html. be only of regulatory nature. The val- fully distributed model provides the 4. 2018. Knoema World data at- ue of such an idea can be increased optimal compromise between viabili- las. https://knoema.com/atlas/ by employing certain types of renew- ty, efficiency, government burden and ranks/CO2-emissions-per-capable energy such as waste-to-energy security. Still, transforming the current ita. to generate the needed power which model of a fully centralized system to 5. 2020. UAE Goverment https:// will add more value by reducing or the proposed model requires a mul- www.government.ae/en/in- eliminating the waste produced by ti-decade transformation plan where- formation-and-services/envi- the neighborhoods. by old centralized production assets ronment-and-energy/environ- Overall, this blended ap- are either phased out or privatized to ment-and-government-agenda/ proach brings all the aforementioned cooperatives/SMEs. It is my firm be- environment-in-vision-2021. 54 The Covid-19 Outbreak and Implications for National Security Decision-Making

or every country, the current coronavirus outbreak (the virus causing Covid-19, also known as SARS-CoV-2 or 2019-nCoV) is one of those unique moments when senior decision makers wrestle to devise policy responses as they are confronted with a myriad of challenges. These pressing challenges include incomplete data, lack of knowledge, time constraints, scarce financial, material and human resources, conflicting priorities, bureaucratic red tape, and intense pressure from public opinion, media and political contenders as noted by Dempsey (2017).

Yacouba Gnegne, Ph.D. Faculty, UAE NDC

This begs the question as to how gence agencies, risk experts, were some countries more suc- and global figures such as Bill cessful in preventing the Cov- Gates, in recent years and even id-19 coronavirus from exacting in January and February 2020. its toll, while others found it nigh Deeply rooted cultural biases, impossible to reduce the odds of lack of constructive deliberations the Covid-19 pandemic spinning and the ‘tyranny of the present’, out of control? have trapped policymakers in Sadly, Covid-19 coronavirus is the dilemma of making right de- a ‘gray rhino’, in that it was an cisions. unsurprisingly likely but neglect- While it can be argued that no ed disaster. It happened despite one could have foreseen the warnings from several intelli- outbreak and extent of the pan- Issue 7 - June 2020 55

demic for this very year, the stark Indeed, for any analyst of reality is that we did know it national security de- could happen almost every year, cision making, this especially since the 2014 Ebola is a frustrating outbreak. As a matter of fact, outcome. An in recent years the United Arab extensive lit- Emirates (UAE) National Defense erature ex- College has been training nation- ists which al civilian and military future lead- examines ers on responding to epidemic past fail- crisis scenarios. ures and Furthermore, Covid-19 corona- success- virus has been in the process es to pro- of evolving in China since late tect national December 2019, if not before. security, es- The World Health Organization pecially in the (WHO) issued its first situation re- United States. It port on 21 January 2020. There- seems that lessons fore, it is no surprise when Micah from past investigations Zenko wrote in Foreign Policy and case studies have not been that the coronavirus is the worst learned. problems. At the same time, a intelligence failure in U.S. history, Every country, each situation is number of pragmatic, practical more glaring than any previous unique and there is no ‘one-size and reproducible features should disastrous strategic surprises, fits all’ response to national secu- have allowed every country to including Pearl Harbor, the Ira- rity act on a level playing field in de- nian revolution of 1979, or even cision-making. 9/11. First, policymakers should adopt the long 56

and large view as standard, were blind to the pandemic risk which is particularly challenging and the few who prepared for in democracies where elector- this hazard generally put in It is important al calendars tilt in favor of the place botched measures. to listen to every short term. All past, present and While the majority of prob- voice, including emerging issues, their causes, lems allow some lapse of when they impacts and implications, have time before anything is to be analyzed and tackled in implemented, others de- question long- real or quasi-real time. As such, mand a quick response. At held world views it is important to listen to every any time, significant signals or assumptions voice, including when they ques- should be detected and dealt tion long-held world views or as- with as appropriate. South Ko- sumptions. As Michael Dempsey rea started producing testing kits noted, issues are usually more for Covid-19 coronavirus imme- Best decisions carefully thought out and the diately after the first patient was are made with best decisions made with inputs reported in China. inputs from from all relevant agencies and Second, in relation to the long departments, as well as subject and large view, governments all relevant matter experts, and not just the need to systematically identify agencies and traditional security-focused staff and account for policy lags and subject matter members. Many governments political and operational exter- experts nalities of every day’s decisions and any failures to confront problems. Some of this silently and take process may grow decades to erupt. An important implication here is the need to carefully assess risks. When a risk is irreversible, leaders should follow the principle of precaution and avoid it by any means. A plague can bring a prosper- ous nation to its knees or precipitate redistribution of power. The principle of proportionality is also relevant. As it happens, countries ought to balance their re- Issue 7 - June 2020 57

sponse to the spread of coro- ic war which is not a military navirus, accounting for various confrontation involving stra- national priorities and future tegic bombers or ballistic generations. In effect, the Cov- missiles. The time has come id-19 pandemic has proven to to develop ‘germ gaming be a real test for both princi- scenarios’ and get ready for ples. the next biological battle, Third, governments should whether it is a natural haz- work more on the final stage ard or bio-weaponization by of the decision-making cycle: rogue actors. With a ‘white implementation and review. swan’ in the form of a demo- Most decisions vanish in the decision-making, as proven by graphic time bomb already set implementation phase. The role the Covid-19 pandemic. The au- in motion by high fertility rates in of the national security team thorities kept calm and assured Africa, Middle East, and Central is particularly important in co- the public of the availability of and Southern Asia, the ‘dooms- ordinating and overseeing the substantial strategic reserves of day clock’ is already ticking. work of operational agencies food and medicine. on national security and foreign The 2014 Ebola outbreak in West References policy issues. A modern-day Africa was indeed a wake-up 1. Dempsey, Michael P., 2017. A and well-functioning national call. Ebola was confined to three Guide to Better National Securi- security architecture is one that West African countries (Guinea, ty Decision-Making. War on the effectively runs the interagency Liberia and Sierra Leone) essen- Rocks. December 4, 2017 process for analyzing threats, tially because its symptoms were 2. World Health Organization (WHO), challenges and opportunities, not silent and the virus did not 2020. Novel Coronavirus (2019- crafting options, and then takes spread through the air. We may nCoV) Situation Report – 1. 21 its recommendations, repeatedly face grimmer times if the next January 2020 if necessary, to the head of the pandemic is very communicable 3. Zenko, Micah, 2020. The Corona- Executive Branch. In this regard, and deadly. Now everyone must virus Is the Worst Intelligence Fail- a country such as the UAE is a see that the interconnected and ure in U.S. History. Foreign Policy, model of high policy integrity and nuclear-deterred world needs to March 25, 2020. effectiveness in national security prepare for the next catastroph- 58 The Evolution of Collective Self Defense Insights from a UAE partner: NATO

ollowing the carnage of World War II, the creation of the United Nations (UN) aimed to put an end to inter-state violence through a system of collective security. If there were any threats to international peace, breaches of the peace or acts of aggression, the UN Security Council would decide on what measures to take to restore international peace and security. There was one proviso, however. Under Article 51 of the UN Charter, states could defend themselves against armed attack and they could band together to do so in defensive military alliances (collective self defense). Perhaps the best-known example is the European and North American alliance with which the UAE enjoys a formal partnership: the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) established in 1949. Article 5 of its founding treaty provides for the collective defense of its member states in accordance with the UN Charter.

Brooke A. Smith-Windsor, Ph.D. Faculty, UAE NDC

NATO was established conventional. The terrorist at- principally to defend Western Eu- tacks on the United States by Is- rope from the menace of armed lamist extremists hijacking com- invasion or nuclear attack by the mercial airliners were not foreseen Soviet Union during the Cold War. when the UN and NATO were es- Conventional and nuclear deter- tablished in the 1940s. So what rence prevailed in preventing ei- was the Alliance to do? It is here ther eventuality. Nevertheless, where we witness a significant on September 11, 2001, one of evolution in NATO’s interpreta- NATO’s member states did suffer tion of collective self defense. a violent attack. The perpetrator, On September 12, 2001, NATO however, was not a state and the member states for the first time in means employed were far from the alliance’s history invoked Arti- Issue 7 - June 2020 59

cle 5. Edgar Buckley, NA- ciated with Article 5 and TO’s Assistant Secretary this approach evolved, in General for Defence Plan- 2018, to include hybrid-at- ning and Operations from tacks as well. The Europe- 1999 to 2003, recalls that an Center for Countering alongside viewing the use Hybrid Threats established of the aircraft as missiles, in Finland (a NATO partner the scale of the attack nation) in 2017, describes (amount of physical harm hybrid threats as, “Coor- inflicted) and its external dinated and synchronised direction (from Afghani- action that deliberately stan) were the determining targets democratic states’ factors. The result was the and institutions’ systemic deployment of NATO Air- vulnerabilities, through a borne Warning and Con- wide range of means (po- trol System (AWACS) air- litical, economic, military, craft to help safeguard US civil, and information).” airspace and the launch of Both state and non-state Operation Active Endeav- actors may be involved our in the Mediterranean exploiting “thresholds of Sea. The latter aimed to demon- this way, 2001 was a milestone in detection and attribution as well strate alliance solidarity in the NATOs’ understanding of its Arti- as the border between war and fight against terrorism and to help cle 5—henceforth to encompass peace.” For NATO, such threats deter and disrupt sea-borne ter- defence against non-state actors came into stark relief in a Euro- rorist activity. Although technically inflicting significant physical harm pean context with Russia’s 2014 not an Article 5 operation, NATO’s on alliance territory orchestrated annexation of Crimea and alleged contribution to the US-led war on from abroad. disinformation campaigns and terror in Afghanistan – Interna- The reinterpretation con- malicious cyber activities in the tional Security Assistance Force tinued. In 2014, defense against sovereignty and election pro- (ISAF) – followed soon after. In cyber-attacks was formally asso- cesses of established and aspir- 60

ant NATO member states. eration. Furthermore, com- What does hybrid pared to an isolated cyber-at- defense mean in practice? tack, the attribution challenge First, NATO is clear that the (identifying the responsible primary responsibility for re- parties) may prove slightly sponding to hybrid threats easier given the number of or attacks rests with the tar- measures employed by the geted member state. Sec- hybrid attacker. Why? Be- ond, capacity building for cause in the second phase hybrid defense is provided of a hybrid campaign, an ad- to individual member states versary launches a more se- on request. The develop- rious operation, “whereby the ment of NATO Counter-Hy- effect of measures becomes brid Support Teams may stronger, means more violent be seen in response to the first That said, using the previously cit- and plausible deniability decreas- phase of hybrid activity when, ed 9/11 response as a guide, it is es.” Lastly, whether preparing “the adversary is constantly mon- fair to speculate that NATO would for collective defense or deter- itoring the situation, exercising invoke Article 5 only in the event rence vis-à-vis a hybrid threat, a reasonably subtle means of influ- of significant physical destruction civilian-military, so-called “com- encing whilst gradually improving or large-scale human causalities prehensive approach” is recog- its assets.” Third, reminiscent of on the territory of one of its mem- nized as being essential. “Highly its approach to cyber threats, the ber states. Reaching that thresh- networked challenges require Alliance is deliberately ambiguous old may, in fact, be quicker in the highly networked responses” is about the point on the escalation face of hybrid action compared as a popular NATO mantra in this ladder where Article 5 would be to a limited cyber-attack. Why? context. It should come as no invoked in response to hybrid ac- Because it is the combination of surprise, therefore, that in Europe tivity. There is no official NATO the aforementioned elements of a 2018 joint declaration between definition of “hybrid-attack” in the power employed by an adversary NATO (a military alliance) and the public domain. This approach in a hybrid campaign that makes European Union (a socio-eco- may be interpreted as a deliber- them particularly potent. As with nomic bloc) identified countering ate policy of deterrence—to instill NATO’s 9/11 response, external hybrid threats as a key shared in an adversary uncertainty as to direction of the hybrid-attack also priority. the threshold for NATO retaliation. would likely be a pivotal consid- Issue 7 - June 2020 61

In conclusion, NATO’s in- 3. North Atlantic Treaty Organ- in the meeting of the North terpretation of collective self de- ization, “NATO – EU Rela- Atlantic Council in Warsaw, fense now provides for respons- tions”, Factsheet, accessed 8-9 July 2016, accessed 12 es to terrorist attacks perpetrated 12 March 2020, chrome-ex- March 2020, https://www. from abroad, as well as cyber tension://oemmndcbld- nato.int/cps/en/natohq/offi- and hybrid attacks. Since 9/11, boiebfnladdacbdfmadadm/ cial_texts_133169.htm. there has been little choice given https://www.nato.int/nato_ 7. North Atlantic Treaty Or- the changed nature of a state’s static_fl2014/assets/pdf/pd- ganization, Wales Summit international adversaries as well f_2019_02/20190208_1902- Declaration, Issued by the as the domains and means of factsheet-nato-eu-en.pdf Heads of State and Gov- operation open to both state and 4. North Atlantic Treaty Organ- ernment participating in the non-state actors. As a NATO ization, Brussels Summit meeting of the North Atlantic partner, the UAE is well placed to Declaration, Issued by the Council in Wales, United reflect on the rationale behind this Heads of State and Gov- Kingdom, 4-5 September evolution in developing its own in- ernment participating in the 2014, accessed 12 March terpretation of self defense under meeting of the North Atlantic 2020, https://www.nato. Article 51 of the UN Charter and, Council in Brussels, 11-12 int/cps/en/natohq/official_ should it one day materialize, a July 2018, accessed 12 texts_112964.htm. collective defense alliance among March 2020, https://www. 8. North Atlantic Treaty Organ- the Gulf states. nato.int/cps/en/natohq/offi- ization, The North Atlantic cial_texts_156624.htm. Treaty, 1949, accessed 12 References 5. North Atlantic Treaty Organ- March 2020, https://www. 1. 1-Edgar Buckley, “Invoking ization, “Operation Active nato.int/cps/en/natolive/offi- Article 5,” NATO Review, Endeavour,” last updated 27 cial_texts_17120.htm. 1 June 2006, accessed October 2017, accessed 12 9. United Nations. Charter of 12 March 2020, https:// March 2020, https://www. the United Nations, 1945, www.nato.int/docu/review/ nato.int/cps/en/natohq/top- accessed 12 March 2020, articles/2006/06/01/invok- ics_7932.htm. https://www.un.org/en/ ing-article-5/index.html. 6. North Atlantic Treaty Or- charter-united-nations/index. 2. Hybrid COE, “Hybrid ganization, Warsaw Sum- html. Threats,” accessed 12 mit Communiqué, Issued March 2020, https://www. by the Heads of State and hybridcoe.fi/hybrid-threats/ Government participating 62 Bringing CVE ‘Front and Center’ in the UAE National Security Lexicon

ince the end of the Cold War, the conceptual boundaries of security have undergone a dramatic change and broadened to include a new range of issues and actors. While traditional notions of security are statist and involve the application of military force and securing the nation against external threats, non-traditional security problems are trans-national in scope and coequally affect either threats to states and citizens by non-state actors and/or threats to livelihood and wellbeing. In the policy sphere, this ‘conceptual broadening’ of security has resulted in a shift, not only in how national security bureaucracies understand and respond to security problems, but in the sorts of the issues that are labeled ‘national security problems’ in the first place.

Joshua Snider, Ph.D. Faculty, UAE NDC

Amidst the myriad of instrumentalize religio-political movements such as Al Qaeda emerging security threats faced forces to achieve certain ends. In and ISIL and the ongoing trends by national security managers, contrast, in other cases, religio- of Jihadi conflict volunteerism the challenge posed by religiously political actors strive to unseat or demonstrate the ongoing appeal motivated extremism is particularly radically alter the political formation of extremist ideology and the need insidious. In states all over the of states, through a mix of violent for states to incorporate specific world (and within every religious and non-violent means. In Muslim- counter-violent extremism (CVE) tradition), some individuals and majority states, the religio-political policy into state national security groups use sectarian language extremism associated with Islamist planning. In essence, we see and imagery to alter the ideological movements has proven to be that the struggle against Islamist- moorings of the modern nation- a potent force and existential inspired religio-political extremism state. Religio-political extremism challenger to notions of modern is a prototypical non-traditional manifests in several contexts. In nationalism and citizenship. Over security problem to the extent that some cases, leaders of states the past twenty years, the rise of it, i) does not respect borders, ii) Issue 7 - June 2020 63

does not involve ‘securing the state’ from external security problem and how state responses to this state actors and iii) strategies to combat extremism problem via CVE policy can have the dual effect of rarely involve the application of military power alone. stemming the tide of extremist sentiments while also While military force can be used to combat extremism demonstrating UAE leadership on the global stage. (usually in conflict or post-conflict settings), CVE policy Definitions/Scope of Activity is more often than not conducted quietly, via a mix of There is a need to disambiguate two core intelligence gathering, information sharing, community concepts; first CVE and the sorts of activities that fall policing, pastoral care and social work. within its purview, and then some discussion on the This article elucidates the UAE’s approach to UAE-specific context of the threat of religio-political CVE, highlighting how it has leveraged the ‘threat’ and extremism and how this is understood in a UAE ‘challenge’ posed by religio-political extremism into an setting. ‘opportunity,’ successfully integrating CVE agendas Countering violent extremism or ‘CVE’ is a into its national broad categorical security strategy – descriptor that both domestically denotes a range and internationally. To of state and non- unpack this theme, state responses to we will explore the activism emanating UAE’s unique context from violent and for extremism, the non-violent religio- evolution of its CVE political identity policy, and the movements. While distinct domestic and states have been international contours responding to terror of its CVE agenda. All and insurgency of this will be offered groups and for in attempt to show generations, how religio-political the rise of what extremism functions David Rapoport as a non-traditional calls terror’s “4th wave” represents 64

something of a game-changer the other hand, tend to be local. concerns. Similar to other religio- and necessitates the development The UAE’s concern with Islamist- political extremist movements, the of a more sophisticated basket inspired religio-political extremism blurred lines between rhetorical/ of responses. In this sense, is centered on local iterations of the intellectual activism and modalities ‘CVE responses’ tend to be Muslim Brotherhood, historically the of support lead directly to violence comprehensive and more attuned Jam’iat al-Islah movement, which or indirectly via material support to root cause dynamics associated operated openly and quasi-legally for persons who advocate the use with religio-political activism for thirty years from the 1970s of violence at home or abroad. and the complex socio-cultural through the mid2000-s. Unlike the Suppression activities began in dynamics which see people adopt challenge posed by Brotherhood- the early2000-s and escalated the idiom of violent activism. CVE inspired Islamist groups in other following the Arab Spring. By all program designs vary, but the GCC states, Jam’iat al-Islah accounts, the group›s activities core aim is to identify and interrupt remained non-violent and focussed and public presence have been an individual’s radicalization to its attention on religious and curtailed. violence at an early stage. It does education institutions, most notably CVE and the National Security this by de-emphasizing kinetic the latter. Jam’iat al-Islah activism Agenda responses and addressing longer- posed numerous problems. While the UAE’s initial interest term ‹push factors,› such as Domestically, there were concerns in CVE came from a desire to stem material dispossession/economic that Ikhwan narratives might erode the tide of Ikhwan narratives, the vulnerability, indoctrination, national cohesion, challenge loyalty momentum in CVE policy continued radicalization and/or violent to the leadership, and strip away long after Islah’s influence was transformation. the UAE›s culture of hospitality, quashed. Rather than being As a category of religio- tolerance, and understanding. articulated through a particular political identity politics, Islamism is Internationally, there were concerns policy, law, or single implementing a descriptive term that can be used that the distinctly trans-national agency, it is more helpful to see to identify movements in different nature of Jam’iat al-Islah ideology, the UAE›s CVE policy as one that parts of the world. Irrespective of combined with its connection to happens informally at multiple the supposed universality of the the broader Brotherhood paradigm levels of government across various Islamist ideology, both the origin and its tangential relationship to agencies. That said, the evolution and growth of movements on one Jihadist movements in the Levant, of the UAE’s CVE’s agenda and its hand and threat perception on posed its own set of security incorporation into the UAE national Issue 7 - June 2020 65 security policy occurred as a result of several reforms. These include i) key legislative changes, ii) the creation of new institutions, iii) the broad inclusion of moderation and CVE discourses in national security policymaking at foreign and domestic levels and iv) active UAE participation and sponsorship of CVE-related ‹track 2› initiatives. Between 2004 and 2014, key changes in the legislative sphere served the dual function of formalizing a national position on acceptable and unacceptable modalities of religio-political Brotherhood, both in the UAE and Hedayah and Sawab Centers, activism while simultaneously abroad. Also, an anti-discrimination and to some extent, the General codifying core national values law was issued in July 2015 following Authority of Islamic Affairs and concerning tolerance and peaceful a decree by UAE President His Endowments (al-Awqaf) are all coexistence. Federal Decree # 1 Highness Sheikh Khalifa bin Zayed noteworthy and have distinguished ‘Combating Terror Crimes’ was Al Nayhan, which criminalizes any the UAE as a center of excellence enacted in 2004 and provides act of discrimination based on in the fight against religio-political necessary guidance on what religion, caste, doctrine, race, color extremism. These ‘CVE institutions’ constitutes terror activity, and or ethnic origin. serve distinct purposes, and all Federal Decree # 7 enacted in In addition to legislative reflect a core understanding that 2014 clarifies Federal Decree # 1 reform, one of the main innovations one of the best ways the UAE by designating terror organizations. to emerge from the CVE agenda could participate in the global CVE Significantly, this legislation was the creation of dedicated CVE- conversation was to help build criminalized membership or related institutions and repurposing capacity via knowledge transfer. affiliations with many religio-political existing institutions in the service Hedayah was established in 2012 movements, including a range of of CVE agendas. Amongst these, and is a think tank and research groups affiliated with the Muslim 66

center that works on global ‘best practices’ in areas related to (deradicalization) and prevention CVE generally with a focus on activities, it also directs overseas issues outside the UAE. Sawab The UAE›s participation in ‘track 2’ developed assistance to Muslim was established in 2015 and is CVE-related initiatives includes the causes, which by default, makes a digital communications hub Muslim Council of Elders and the it a CVE capacity-building designed to degrade Islamist Marrakesh Declaration, devoted to organization. extremists and particularly Daesh/ the protection of religious minorities The final area of innovation in ISIL propaganda. The center is in Muslim-majority countries. In the UAE›s overall CVE agenda is the a joint venture between the UAE addition to participating in coalitions emergence of what might be called and the USA under the framework and international forums, another ‹CVE diplomacy› or the deliberate of the Global Coalition to Counter emerging facet of the UAE›s CVE inclusion of CVE in various strategic Daesh (GCCD). Finally, the diplomacy is the bilateral capacity and diplomatic initiatives. Here we General Authority of Islamic Affairs building and the extent to which see a direct and unambiguous and Endowments (al-Awqaf)) CVE is becoming a focal point of link between CVE and the UAE›s plays an important, if not entirely development assistance. Some of external national security interests. appreciated role in the direction the UAE›s most stalwart allies in the In 2015, the UAE led the UN and implementation of CVE Muslim world face a very serious Security Council›s Contact Group activities at both international and challenge from religio-political on Countering Extremism with domestic levels. While not a ‹CVE actors and require support, and participation in other ‘track 1’ efforts institution› in the traditional sense, for optics’ reasons, would prefer including, i) the Global Counter- it is instrumental in the fight against to reduce dependence on Western Terrorism Forum (GCTF), ii) The religio-political extremism at the donors in the delivery and funding Global Coalition to Counter Daesh local level. To the extent that it of CVE programming. (GCCD) and iii) the Islamic Military mediates sectarian disengagement Alliance to Fight Terrorism (IMAFT). Issue 7 - June 2020 67

article/un-warns-isis-resurgence> [Accessed 1 April 2020]. 44. Rapoport, D., 2002. The Four Waves of Rebel Terror and September 11. Anthropoetics: the journal of generative anthropology, [online] 2(8). Available at: [Accessed 1 April 2020]. 55. Koehler, D., 2017. Understanding Deradicalization: Methods, Tools And Programs For Countering Violent Extremism. Abingdon: Routledge, pp.9-1. 66. US Department of State, 2019. Breaking Pathways To Violent Radicalization: A Review Of Countering Violent Extremism Intervention Programs. Washington DC: US Department of State - Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization build institutions and boost its own Operations. presence on the international stage. 77. Wiktorowicz, Q., 2003. Islamic In moving forward, the UAE might Activism: A Social Movement Theory further leverage this success of its Approach. Bloomington: Indiana CVE agenda and think about ways Moving Ahead University Press, pp.34-1. of linking CVE capacity-building Religio-political extremism is 88. Freer, C., 2018. Rentier Islamism: agendas to the provision of much- clearly one of the leading security The Influence Of The Muslim needed development assistance challenges of our age, and there Brotherhood In Gulf Monarchies. across Africa, South and Southeast is a critical need for states to New York: Oxford University Press, Asia. incorporate CVE agendas into pp.139-129. national security strategies. Security 99. Kruse, M., 2016. Countering Violent References practitioners and scholars must Extremism Strategies in the Muslim 11. Caballero-Anthony, M. (ed.). 2016. transcend outdated ‹statist› Cold World. The ANNALS of the American An Introduction to Non-Traditional War mentalities and appreciate Academy of Political and Social Security Studies – A Transnational the importance of non-traditional Science, 1(668), pp.209-198. Approach. Sage Publications, security threats, ostensibly 1010 Hedayah, the international center London. delinked from concepts of state of excellence for countering violent 22. There is a vast scholarship sovereignty, borders, and/or extremism. 2020. [online] Available addressing definitions and traditional warfighting. The struggle at: [Accessed 31 March 2020]. different parts of the world. See, for one such emerging security threat, 1111 Kruse, M., 2016. Countering Violent example, Musallam, A., 2010. From and it must be taken seriously. Extremism Strategies in the Muslim Secularism To Jihad: Sayyid Qutb This article has shown how the World. The ANNALS of the American And The Foundations Of Radical UAE perceives the threat posed by Academy of Political and Social Islamism. Westport: Praeger. religio-political extremism, how it Science, 1(668), pp.209-198. responded and how it elevated this 33. Wilson Center. 2020. U.N. Warns Of response into a broader agenda ISIS Resurgence. [online] Available to strengthen existing partnership, at:

ince the 1980s, the United States has committed significant military resources to maintain stability in the Gulf region. This commitment has stemmed in large part from a desire to ensure the free flow of oil through the Strait of Hormuz, which has long been essential to the vitality of the global economy. Over the past decade, however, US domestic oil production has increased significantly, ending a prolonged decline that began in 1970.

Nikolas Gardner, Ph.D. Faculty, UAE NDC

While in 2008 the United the US has attained “energy inde- States produced approximately 6.8 pendence”. As US dependence on million barrels of oil per day (bpd), by foreign oil has decreased, American 2018 this figure had more than dou- military and political leaders have bled to 15.3 million, making it the questioned the necessity of main- leading producer of oil and natural taining a significant military presence gas liquids in the world (BP Statis- in the Middle East. In 2019 General tical Review of World Energy, 2019, Paul J. Selva, then Vice Chairman 16.) On several occasions in 2018 of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, asserted and 2019 weekly exports of Amer- that the US was, “Not wholly de- ican oil and other energy products pendent on the movement of Sau- exceeded imports (Husari, 2019). di, Kuwaiti, Qatari, and Emirati oil in and This has led to claims that out of the Gulf to sustain our economy” Issue 7 - June 2020 69

US oil imports have diminished as American domestic production has increased

(Husa- ri, 2019). President Donald Trump went further, claiming that, “We are independent, and we do not need Middle East oil” (Egan, 2020). pro- Not surprisingly, US oil imports duced have diminished as American domes- domestically and those tic production has increased. But is it required by American refineries. Oil really the case that the United States extracted from shale formations, is no longer dependent on foreign oil? which accounts for the vast ma- A closer examination of the global oil jority of the increase in American market reveals this assumption to be production, consists primarily of incorrect, for several reasons. First, the light, sweet crude. However, many United States still uses more oil and pe- American refineries are configured troleum products than it produces, by to process heavier crudes, which a significant margin. While American oil must be imported (Levine et.al., production exceeded 15 million bpd in 2014, 5). Thus, in 2019, the United 2018, the US consumed more than 20 States imported nearly 6.8 million million bpd (US Department of Trans- bpd to meet this demand. While the portation). Not only does America use majority of this imported oil came more oil than it produces, it also imports from Canada, Mexico and else- more oil than it exports. This is due to where in the western hemisphere, a ‘mismatch’ between the grades of oil the US continued to import approx- 70

imately one million bpd from the Gulf increase production, the extent to more immediate pressure to repay (EIA, 2020). which individual companies will do outstanding debt and provide posi- Even if it no longer imported for- so depends on their own capacity tive returns for their investors. Thus, eign oil, the United States would remain and calculations about profitability. when oil prices fall below USD 30 subject to fluctuations in the global Thus, the US government remains per barrel, as they have in early price of the commodity. Different types of crude sell at different prices, de- dependent on Gulf oil producers 2020, these companies must curtail pending on factors such as grade and to compensate for global supply production in order to cut expens- transportation costs. But in general shortages that drive up domestic es, or worse, go out of business terms, the price of oil is determined oil and gasoline prices. In 2018, for entirely (Daiss, 2020). If these low by global supply and demand (Lev- example, President Trump asked prices persist, shale production will ine et.al., 2014, 6). As a result, war Saudi Arabia to increase its produc- decline, once again increasing US and political upheaval thousands of tion to replace oil removed from the dependence on foreign oil. As has miles from the United States can global market by sanctions against been the case with high oil prices, drive up the prices American con- Iran (Egan, 2020). addressing low prices before they sumers pay for gasoline and other While its consumers con- threaten American shale production petroleum products. The US gov- tinue to feel the negative effects of will require negotiation with OPEC ernment is not well equipped to re- shortfalls in global oil production, producers, particularly Saudi Ara- spond to rapid changes in the price American oil companies are vulner- bia. of oil. In OPEC member states as able to supply gluts. In comparison Thus, it is misleading to claim well as other large producers such to NOCs in other large oil producers that the United States has attained as Russia and Mexico, national oil such as Saudi Arabia and Russia, anything resembling energy inde- companies (NOCs) control most shale oil companies in the US face pendence. Not only do US refiner- oil reserves and production. These relatively high production costs. Oil ies remain dependent on the import states can increase or decrease can be pumped from existing Saudi of grades of crude oil unavailable production relatively quickly in order and Russian fields for less than USD domestically, but US consumers to influence oil prices, particularly if 5 per barrel, but American shale remain exposed to higher global oil they have large reserves as do Rus- producers break even only at USD prices while producers are exceed- sia and Saudi Arabia. In compari- 35-45 per barrel. Moreover, unlike son, the US government has little their state-owned competitors, pri- influence over the private compa- vate companies face nies that produce oil in the United States. While higher prices may provide an incen- tive to Issue 7 - June 2020 71

ingly vulnerable to lower prices. En- Institute. 2014. https://www.api. suring stability in the Middle East, References org/oil-and-natural-gas/ener- and particularly the Gulf, therefore 1. BP Statistical Review of World gy-primers/crude-oil-and-prod- remains very much in America’s Energy, 2019. uct-markets (accessed 22 March national interest. While American 2. Daiss, Tim. “Who will Cave 2020). dependence on oil from the Gulf re- first in Saudi-Russia Oil Price 6. US Department of Transporta- gion has diminished in recent years, War?” Asia Times. 18 March tion, “Overview of U.S. Petro- the Middle East still accounts for a 2020. https://asiatimes. leum Production, Imports, Ex- third of global oil production, and com/2020/03/who-will-cave- ports, and Consumption.” 2019. more than 20% of the world’s oil first-in-saudi-russia-oil-price- https://www.bts.gov/content/ supply transits through the Strait of war/ (accessed 20 March overview-us-petroleum-produc- Hormuz (EIA, 2019). Ensuring the 2020). tion-imports-exports-and-con- uninterrupted flow of this oil, and 3. Egan, Matt. “Trump Says sumption-million-barrels-day (ac- maintaining strong relations with American Doesn’t Need Mid- cessed 25 March 2020). GCC oil producers, are essential to dle East Oil. It’s Not That Sim- 7. US Energy Information Adminis- the US economy and the American ple.” CNN Business. 8 Janu- tration (EIA), “The Strait of Hormuz shale oil industry. We should there- ary 2020. https://edition.cnn. Is The World›s Most Important fore be skeptical of predictions of an com/2020/01/08/business/ Oil Transit Chokepoint.” 20 June imminent American departure from oil-middle-east-trump-iran/in- 2019. https://www.eia.gov/to- the Gulf region and the consequent dex.html (accessed 24 March dayinenergy/detail.php?id=39932 emergence of a security vacuum to 2020). (accessed 24 March 2020). be filled by other great powers. Cri- 4. Husari, Ruba. “Shale Oil and 8. US Energy Information Adminis- ses in the Middle East will never be the Illusion of US Energy In- tration (EIA). “How Much Petro- the only concern of American lead- dependence”. Middle East In- leum Does the United States Im- ers responding to domestic issues stitute. 15 July 2019. https:// port and Export?” 3 March 2020. and security threats elsewhere. Oth- www.mei.edu/publications/ https://www.eia.gov/tools/faqs/ er powers, particularly China and In- shale-oil-and-illusion-us-ener- faq.php?id=727&t=6 (accessed dia, may take an increasing interest gy-independence (accessed 24 March 2020). in safeguarding regional stability. 25 March 2020). Nevertheless, continued American 5. Levine, Steven et. al.. “Under- dependence on oil from the Gulf standing Crude Oil and Product will mean that the United States will Markets”. American Petroleum preserve a significant presence in the region for the foreseeable future.