Primate theory of mind 1 Theory of Mind in Nonhuman Primates Laura S. Lewis1,2,* & Christopher Krupenye3,4,* 1. Department of Human Evolutionary Biology, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA, USA 2. School of Psychology & Neuroscience, University of St Andrews, St Andrews, UK 3. Department of Psychological & Brain Sciences, Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore, MD, USA 4. Department of Psychology, Durham University, Durham, UK This chapter is currently in press and will be published at Cambridge University Press in the volume “Primate Cognitive Studies”, edited by Michael J. Beran and Bennett L. Schwartz. Please use the following citation: Lewis, L. S. and Krupenye, C. (in press). Theory of mind in nonhuman primates. In B. L. Schwartz & M. J. Beran (Eds.), Primate Cognitive Studies. Cambridge University Press. Correspondence:
[email protected] (LSL) and
[email protected] (CK) Primate theory of mind 2 Abstract: Social life demands complex strategies for coordinating and competing with others. In humans, these strategies are supported by rich cognitive mechanisms, such as theory of mind. Theory of mind (i.e., mental state attribution, mentalizing, or mindreading) is the ability to track the unobservable mental states, like desires and beliefs, that guide others’ actions. Deeply social animals, like most nonhuman primates, would surely benefit from the adept capacity to interpret and predict others’ behavior that theory of mind affords. Yet, after forty years of investigation, the extent to which nonhuman primates represent the minds of others remains a topic of contentious debate. In the present chapter, we review evidence consistent with the possibility that monkeys and apes are capable of inferring others’ goals, perceptions, and beliefs.