New Perspectives on South-East Europe

Series Editors: Spyros Economides, Associate Professor in International Relations and European Politics, London School of Economics and Political Science, UK Kevin Featherstone, Eleftherios Venizelos Professor of Contemporary Greek Studies and Professor of European Politics, London School of Economics and Political Science, UK Sevket Pamuk, Professor of Economics and Economic History, the Ataturk Institute for Modern Turkish History and Department of Economic, Bogaziçi (Bosphorus) University, Turkey Series Advisory Board: Richard Crampton, Emeritus Professor of Eastern European History at St Edmund Hall, University of Oxford Vladimir Gligorov, Staff Economist specialising in Balkan countries, the Vienna Institute for International Economic Studies, Austria Jacques Rupnik, Senior Research Fellow at the Centre d’études et de recherches internationales of Sciences Po, France Susan Woodward, Professor, the Graduate Programme in Political Science at the City University of New York, USA South-East Europe presents a compelling agenda: a region that has challenged European identities, values and interests like no other at formative periods of modern history and is now undergoing a set of complex transitions. It is a region made up of new and old European Union member states, as well as aspiring ones; early ‘democratising’ states and new post-communist regimes; states undergoing liberalising economic reforms, partially inspired by external forces, whilst coping with their own embedded nationalisms; and states obliged to respond to new and recurring issues of security, identity, well-being, social integration, faith and secularisation. This series examines issues of inheritance and adaptation. The disciplinary reach incorporates politics and international relations, modern history, economics and political economy and sociology. It links the study of South East-Europe across a number of social sciences to European issues of democratisation and economic reform in the post-transition age. It addresses ideas as well as institutions; policies as well as processes. It will include studies of the domestic and foreign policies of single states, relations between states and peoples in the region, and between the region and beyond. The EU is an obvious reference point for current research on South-East Europe, but this series also highlights the importance of South-East Europe in its eastern context; the Caucuses; the Black Sea and the Middle East.

Titles include:

Ayhan Aktar, Niyazi Kizilyürek and Umut Özkirimli (editors) NATIONALISM IN THE TROUBLED TRIANGLE Cyprus, Greece and Turkey William Bartlett, Jadranka Bozikov and Bernd Rechel (editors) HEALTH REFORMS IN SOUTH EAST EUROPE Vesna Bojicic-Dzelilovic, James Ker-Lindsay and Denisa Kostovicova (editors) CIVIL SOCIETY AND TRANSITIONS IN THE WESTERN BALKANS Kevin Featherstone, Dimitris Papadimitriou, Argyris Mamarelis and Georgios Niarchos THE LAST OTTOMANS The Muslim Minority of Greece 1941–1949 Alexis Heraclides THE GREEK–TURKISH CONFLICT IN THE AEGEAN Imagined Enemies Soeren Keil and Bernhard Stahl (editors) THE FOREIGN POLICIES OF POST-YUGOSLAV STATES From Yugoslavia to Europe Markus Ketola EUROPEANIZATION AND CIVIL SOCIETY The Impact of the EU Accession Process on Turkish NGOs

New Perspectives on South-East Europe Series Standing Order ISBN 978–0–230–23052–1 (hardback) and ISBN 978–0–230–23053–8 (paperback) (outside North America only) You can receive future titles in this series as they are published by placing a standing order. Please contact your bookseller or, in case of difficulty, write to us at the address below with your name and address, the title of the series and the ISBNs quoted above. Customer Services Department, Macmillan Distribution Ltd, Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire RG21 6XS, England The Foreign Policies of Post-Yugoslav States From Yugoslavia to Europe

Edited by

Soeren Keil Senior Lecturer in International Relations, School of Psychology, Politics and Sociology, Canterbury Christ Church University, UK Bernhard Stahl Professor of International Politics, Department of History and Governance, University of Passau, Germany Selection and editorial matter © Soeren Keil and Bernhard Stahl 2014 Individual chapters © Respective authors 2014 All rights reserved. No reproduction, copy or transmission of this publication may be made without written permission. No portion of this publication may be reproduced, copied or transmitted save with written permission or in accordance with the provisions of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988, or under the terms of any licence permitting limited copying issued by the Copyright Licensing Agency, Saffron House, 6–10 Kirby Street, London EC1N 8TS. Any person who does any unauthorized act in relation to this publication may be liable to criminal prosecution and civil claims for damages. The authors have asserted their rights to be identified as the authors of this work in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. First published 2014 by PALGRAVE MACMILLAN Palgrave Macmillan in the UK is an imprint of Macmillan Publishers Limited, registered in England, company number 785998, of Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire RG21 6XS. Palgrave Macmillan in the US is a division of St Martin’s Press LLC, 175 Fifth Avenue, New York, NY 10010. Palgrave Macmillan is the global academic imprint of the above companies and has companies and representatives throughout the world. Palgrave® and Macmillan® are registered trademarks in the United States, the United Kingdom, Europe and other countries. ISBN 978–1–137–38412–6 This book is printed on paper suitable for recycling and made from fully managed and sustained forest sources. Logging, pulping and manufacturing processes are expected to conform to the environmental regulations of the country of origin. A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library. A catalog record for this book is available from the Library of Congress. To our families Claire and Malindi & Stefanie and Lotti This page intentionally left blank Contents

List of Illustrations ix

Acknowledgments x

Notes on Contributors xi

List of Abbreviations xiv

Part I Point of Departure

1 Introduction: The Foreign Policies of the Post-Yugoslav States 3 Soeren Keil and Bernhard Stahl

2 Allies Are Forever (Until They Are No More): Yugoslavia’s Multivectoral Foreign Policy During Titoism 18 Katrin Boeckh

Part II Early Departure – Early Arrival

3 From the Balkans to Central Europe and Back: The Foreign Policy of Slovenia 47 Ana Bojinovi´cFenko and Zlatko Šabiˇc

4 Croatia’s Fast-Forward Foreign Policy: From Yugoslavia to the EU 69 Senada Šelo Šabi´c

Part III Early Departure – Late Arrival?

5 Policy Consensus During Institutional Change: Macedonian Foreign Policy Since Independence 97 Cvete Koneska

6 Complex System, Complex Foreign Policy: The Foreign Policy of Bosnia and Herzegovina 122 Adnan Huski´c

vii viii Contents

Part IV Joint Departure – Different Arrivals

7 An Orpheus Syndrome? Serbian Foreign Policy After the Dissolution of Yugoslavia 147 Mladen Mladenov

8 From Creeping to Sprinting: The Foreign Policy of Montenegro 173 Jelena Džanki´c

9 Foreign Policy as a Constitutive Element of Statehood and Statehood Prerogative: The Case of Kosovo 198 Gëzim Krasniqi

Part V On Empirical Arrivals and Theoretical Departures

10 Conclusion: Foreign Policy Analysis and the Post-Yugoslav States 223 Amelia Hadfield

Index 247 Illustrations

Map

1.1 Map of the post-Yugoslav and neighboring states 6

Tables

3.1 Bilateral relations of Slovenia and individual post-Yugoslav states by two-fold typology 59 3.2 Comparison of Slovenian and Yugoslav foreign policy substance and strategy 60

Figures

8.1 Support for EU integration 188 8.2 Support for NATO 188 8.3 Friendly towards EU member states 189 8.4 Support for the US and Russia 190 8.5 Montenegro and the post-Yugoslav space 190

ix Acknowledgments

Many people deserve recognition and thanks for their support through- out this book project, and there are too many to mention them all. However, some we would like to highlight. First of all, we would like to thank Andrew Baird at Palgrave for his support for this project. We are also indebted to Spyros Economides, Kevin Featherstone and ¸SevketPamuk for their support and their enthu- siasm for this project. They have been really kind to us and encouraged us to publish this book in their series New Perspectives on South-East Europe. We would furthermore like to thank Canterbury Christ Church Uni- versity, and here especially Dr David Bates. This book is based on a research workshop that was held in Canterbury in May 2012, and Canterbury Christ Church University kindly provided the financial sup- port for this workshop via the REF 2012/2013 fund. The University of Passau also kindly funded a follow-up workshop in November 2012, and has provided financial assistance for the final edits of the manuscript. We are also really grateful to Trish Moore, who brought a fresh set of eyes to the project. Furthermore, this project would not have been possible without the hard work of Christine Wüst, who was in charge of the final editing, the index and the overall coordination of this book project. Without her, we would have been unable to finish it to this high standard, and she has really contributed massively to the finalization of this project. We also wish to thank a number of family members, friends and col- leagues for their support, in particular Zeynep Arkan, Florian Bieber, Sarah Lieberman, Valery Perry and Jens Woelk. Finally we would like to thank our families, Claire and Malindi and Stefanie and Lotti for their love and support. Without their patience and encouragement it would have not been possible to complete this volume and spend so many hours on researching the foreign policies of the post-Yugoslav states. This book is dedicated to them.

Canterbury and Passau May 2014

x Contributors

Katrin Boeck, PhD, is Senior Researcher in the Institute for East and Southeast European Studies, Regensburg and Extraordinary Professor for East and Southeast European History at the Ludwig-Maximilians- University of Munich. Her areas of research are ethno-national conflicts and their consequences, state and church relations in socialist coun- tries, institutions in late Stalinism and the discourse of values during transformation, with a regional focus on the Ukraine and the coun- tries of Yugoslavia. Her main publications are: Von den Balkankriegen zum Ersten Weltkrieg. Kleinstaatenpolitik und ethnische Selbstbestimmung auf dem Balkan (1996); Stalinismus in der Ukraine: Die Rekonstruktion des sowjetischen Systems nach dem Zweiten Weltkrieg (2007); (with Ekkehard Völkl) Ukraine. Von der Roten zur Orangenen Revolution (2007); Serbien. Montenegro. Geschichte und Gegenwart (2009); The Empire Is Dead, Long Live the Empire! Long-Run Persistence of Trust and Corruption in the Bureaucracy (2010).

Ana BojinovicFenko´ is Assistant Professor and Researcher at Univer- sity of Ljubljana, Faculty of Social Sciences in Slovenia. Her research focuses on international regionalism (in the Mediterranean region), for- eign policy of (small) states and external action of the EU (particularly the enlargement and neighborhood policies). Her recent article titled ‘Compatibility of Regionalizing Actors’ Activities in the Mediterranean Region: What Kind of Opportunity for the European Union?’ was published in the Journal of Southeast European & Black Sea Studies in September 2012.

Jelena Džankic´, PhD, is a Marie Curie Fellow at the European University Institute in Florence, Italy. Her research focuses on the interplay between citizenship, state and nation building processes and Europeanization in the post-Yugoslav states. Her other research interest includes the pol- itics of Montenegro, and her book Citizenship in Bosnia Herzegovina, Macedonia and Montenegro; Effects of Statehood and Identity Challenges is forthcoming in June 2015.

Amelia Hadfield, PhD, is Senior Lecturer in International Relations at Canterbury Christ Church University, United Kingdom. Her research

xi xii Notes on Contributors examines both the nexus of foreign policy analysis and international relations theory, and key facets of EU foreign policy, including neigh- borhood, development and EU–Russia relations. Co-editor in chief of the online journal Politics and Governance, her work on EU foreign affairs appears in the Annual Review of the Journal of Common Market Studies (July 2013), with research on foreign policy featuring in the textbook that she co-edited with Steve Smith and Tim Dunne: Foreign Policy: Theories, Actors, Cases (2012).

Adnan Huskic´ is a PhD candidate at the University of Graz and Lec- turer in International Relations and Politics at Sarajevo School of Science and Technology in Bosnia and Herzegovina. His research focuses on the role of external actors in post-conflict power-sharing arrangements. He works for the Friedrich Naumann Stiftung für die Freiheit in Bosnia and Herzegovina and provides frequent comments and analyses for media in the Western Balkans.

Soeren Keil, PhD, is Senior Lecturer in International Relations at Canterbury Christ Church University in the United Kingdom. His research focuses on the political systems of the post-Yugoslav states, as well as territorial autonomy as a mode of conflict resolution and the foreign policy of new states (particularly in the Balkans). His book Multinational Federalism in Bosnia and Herzegovina was published in December 2013.

Cvete Koneska holds a PhD in Politics from the University of Oxford. Her research focuses on post-conflict politics in the Balkans, ethno- national conflicts and foreign policy (EU and NATO integration). Her book After Ethnic Conflict: Policy-Making in Post-Conflict Bosnia and Macedonia will be published in November 2014.

Gëzim Krasniqi is a PhD candidate in Sociology and Research Assistant on the CITSEE project at the University of Edinburgh. His main research interests are politics, nationalism, nationalist movements and citizen- ship. He has published several articles on the politics of the Balkan region in general and Kosovo in particular.

Mladen Mladenov is a PhD candidate and Lecturer in International Relations at the University of Passau in Germany. His research interests lie in the field of Serbian foreign policy as well as in an experimental approach to Europeanization research in Serbia. Notes on Contributors xiii

Zlatko Šabicˇ is Professor of International Relations at the University of Ljubljana, Faculty of Social Sciences. His research focus is on inter- national institutions. His recent project was Regional and International Relations of Central Europe (2012), in which he has co-authored a chapter (with Annette Freyberg-Inan) on relations between Central European states and the Balkans.

Senada Šelo Šabic´ works as a scientific associate in the Institute for Development and International Relations in Zagreb. Her research inter- ests include Croatian foreign policy, Western Balkans and Turkey, EU enlargement, development cooperation and migration. She is editor-in- chief of the Croatian International Relations Review and is an external teacher at the Faculty of Political Science, University of Zagreb. She is the author of a monograph State Building under Foreign Supervision: Inter- vention in Bosnia and Herzegovina 1996–2003, in addition to several book chapters and articles. She has received several distinguished academic grants, the most recent being the Fulbright Scholars’ Program Fellowship in 2011.

Bernhard Stahl is Professor of International Politics at the Univer- sity of Passau in Germany. His research areas cover European foreign policy (German, French and EU foreign policy in particular), prefer- ably vis-à-vis SEE, identity theory and comparative regionalism. From 2004 to 2008 he worked as Professor of European Integration on behalf of the Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ) in Serbia. His recent publications deal with domestic legitimation of military interventions (e.g. Germany and Libya) and identity-related problems in the accession process (e.g. the EU and Serbia). Abbreviations

AFP Analysis of Foreign Policy AKR New Kosovo Alliance BIA Security Information Agency (Serbia) BiH Bosnia and Herzegovina BRICS Brazil-Russia-India-China-South Africa CEFTA Central European Free Trade Area CEP Centre for European Perspective CFSP EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy CoE Council of Europe Comecon Council for Mutual Economic Assistance Cominform Communist Information Bureau Comintern Communist International CoMoCo SEE Council of Ministers of Culture of South-East Europe CPSU Communist Party of the Soviet Union CPY Communist Party of Yugoslavia CSCE Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, now OSCE DoI Declaration of Independence DOS Democratic Opposition of Serbia DPPI SEE Disaster Preparedness and Prevention Initiative in South-East Europe DPS Democratic Party of Socialists (Montenegro) DS Democratic Party (Serbia) DSS Democratic Party of Serbia EC European Commission EPC European Political Cooperation ERI SEE Education Reform Initiative of South Eastern Europe ESDP European Security and Defense Policy EU European Union EULEX European Union Rule of Law Mission (Kosovo) FBiH Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina FDI Foreign Direct Investment FENA Federal News Agency (BiH)

xiv List of Abbreviations xv

FP Foreign Policy FPA Foreign Policy Analysis FRY Federal Republic of Yugoslavia FYROM Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia GDR German Democratic Republic GFAP General Framework Agreement for Peace GTF Regional Cooperation Council Gender Task Force HDZ Croat Democratic Union ICJ International Court of Justice ICO International Civilian Office (Kosovo) ICR International Civilian Representative ICTY International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia IDA International Development Association IR International Relations ISAF International Security Assistance Force (Afghanistan) ITN Britain’s Independent Television News JNA Yugoslav People’s Army JSO Special Operations Unit KFOS Kosovo Foundation for Open Society LDK Democratic League of Kosovo LDP Liberal Democratic Party (Serbia) LSCG Liberal Alliance of Montenegro MAP Membership Action Plan (NATO) MARRI Migration, Asylum and Refugee Regional Initiative MEP Member of the European Parliament MFA Ministry of Foreign Affairs MFAEI Ministry of Foreign Affairs and European Integration (Croatia), now MFEA MFEA Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs (Croatia) MPAs Maritime Protected Areas NACC North Atlantic Cooperation Council NALAS Network of Associations of Local Authorities of South-East Europe NAM Non-Aligned Movement NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization NGO Non-Governmental Organization xvi List of Abbreviations

NKVD People’s Commissariat of Internal Affairs (USSR) ODA Official Development Assistance OHR Office of the High Representative OIC Organization of Islamic Conference OSCE Organization for Security & Co-operation in Europe OZNA Department for National Protection (Yugoslavia), later UDBA PDK Democratic Party of Kosovo PfP Partnership for Peace Program PIC Peace Implementation Council POW Prisoner of War RACVIAC Centre for Security Cooperation RAI Regional Anticorruption Initiative RCC Regional Cooperation Council RS Republika Srpska (BiH) R2P Responsibility to Protect SAA Stabilization & Association Agreement SANU Serbian Academy of Science & Arts SDA Party of Democratic Actions (BiH) SDB State Security Administration (Serbia), now BIA SDS Serb Democratic Party (BiH) SDP Social Democratic Party (Croatia) SFRY Federal Socialist Republic of Yugoslavia SIP Secretariat for Foreign Affairs of the former Yugoslavia SKJu League of Communists of Yugoslavia SNP Socialist People’s Party (Montenegro) SNS Serbian Progressive Party SNSD Alliance of Independent Social Democrats (Croatia) SPC Serbian Orthodox Church SPO Serb Renewal Movement (BiH) SPS Socialist Party of Serbia SRS Serbian Radical Party SRSG Special Representative of the Secretary General (Kosovo) SVEZ Governmental Office for European Affairs (Slovenia) List of Abbreviations xvii

TRNC Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus UDBA Administration for State Security (Yugoslavia) UN United Nations UNESCO United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization UNHCR United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees UNMIK United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo UNPREDEP United Nations Preventive Deployment Force UNTAES United Nations Transitional Authority for Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sirmium UNSC United Nations Security Council US United States USSR Union of Soviet Socialist Republics VMRO-DPMNE Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization – Democratic Party for Macedonian National Unity VONS Defense & National Security Council of the President of the Republic (Croatia) WPON Women Police Officers Network WTO World Trade Organization WWII Second World War ZERP Ecological-Fishing Protection Zone This page intentionally left blank Part I Point of Departure This page intentionally left blank 1 Introduction: The Foreign Policies of the Post-Yugoslav States Soeren Keil and Bernhard Stahl

The integration of the post-Yugoslav states into the European Union (EU) is a prominent topic in the academic literature (Rupnik 2011; Radeljic 2013; Elbasani 2013). The focus of these debates has been on the role of the EU in the transformation of the post-Yugoslav coun- tries, and the successes and failures of the EU’s enlargement process. Too often, however, have the seven states that emerged after the break-up of Yugoslavia (Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina,1 Montenegro, Serbia, Macedonia2 and Kosovo) been treated as passive subjects of the EU’s enlargement process and as ‘playgrounds’ of different international ideas on state-building (Bosnia), self-determination (Kosovo), economic reforms (all seven) and democratization (in particular Bosnia, Kosovo, Macedonia and Serbia). This volume starts with the assumption that the post-Yugoslav states are autonomous actors in a globalized and heavily interdependent world. They strived for sovereignty and national independence because they wanted to become respected and equal members of the interna- tional community. While they are not completely independent in their foreign policy decisions, since the local, regional and international sys- tem provides them with clear limitations and hurdles (be it their limited capabilities in terms of material and institutional provisions, be it the fact that Kosovo is not recognized by a large number of other states, be it their generally limited impact beyond the European region on global affairs), they nevertheless participate in important regional and inter- national forums and they all have developed an active foreign policy, which prioritizes EU integration, but by no means limits their foreign policy to this one issue. In other words, it can be argued that all of the post-Yugoslav states are ‘active participants’ in regional and global

3 4 PointofDeparture affairs. They are not just passive recipients of EU conditionality that fol- low the demands of the EU and other key actors in the region (such as NATO, the USA and Russia) immediately or consistently. As the contri- butions in this volume demonstrate, they are instead autonomous in their foreign policy to the extent that sometimes they will act consis- tently and coherently, sometimes they will act illogically and sometimes they will prioritize a certain foreign policy choice over another because of ideational-historical reasons. It is, for example, difficult to explain why Macedonia chooses not to progress in its EU integration process and to stay out of NATO because of the ongoing name dispute with Greece. As Cvete Koneska argues, this can only be explained when the identity dimension of foreign policy is taken into account. It is furthermore difficult to see how elites in Bosnia, who at least rhetori- cally support EU integration, have failed to agree on any major reform in recent years that would bring their country closer to the EU. Yet, as Adnan Huskic´ demonstrates, once we understand the complex his- tory and decision-making processes in Bosnia, we can see why any kind of reform is such a problematic issue in the country. The picture that the contributions in this volume draw is a mixed one. There are many success stories, including the dialogue between Serbia and Kosovo, which Mladen Mladenov in the Serbia chapter and Gëzim Krasniqi in the Kosovo chapter highlight. Slovenia and Croatia have been able to join the EU and have since become lobbyists for the EU prospects of the other post-Yugoslav states. But even their foreign policies, as Ana Bojinovic´ Fenko and Zlatko Šabicˇ for Slovenia and Senada Šelo Šabic´ for Croatia demonstrate, remain limited and incoherent at times. Other countries have been more obvious success stories in recent years; for example, Montenegro’s high-speed integration into the EU is correctly praised as one of the remarkable developments in the post-Yugoslav states. Nevertheless, as the argument presented by Jelena Džankic´ points out, a lot remains to be done and foreign policy remains dominated by a small number of political elites without consultation and discus- sion either in parliament or among the wider public. What will become obvious to the reader of this volume is that the countries of the post- Yugoslav states remain transition countries. This can also be applied to their foreign policies. These remain in transition, focused on EU integration and Western orientation, yet influenced by historical expe- riences and their own identity. A region in change, then, with countries which are still looking for their own identity and their international role, is probably the best way to describe the post-Yugoslav space at the moment. Soeren Keil and Bernhard Stahl 5

Background

The EU’s engagement with the post-Yugoslav states started as a massive failure. When the ‘Hour of Europe’ was announced by Jacques Poos as an indication that the European Community was – nolens volens – meant to deal with the break-up of Yugoslavia, the violent clashes in Croatia and Bosnia in the early 1990s quickly brought the Community to her limits (Glaurdic 2011). The EU was neither capable of intervention, nor was it politically willing to demonstrate a strong and united front against those who committed war crimes, genocide and ethnic cleansing on the territory of the former Yugoslavia. It is this policy failure, and the recog- nition that the EU is unable to deal with violent conflict directly without the military support of the United States and NATO, that resulted in a new approach in the late 1990s. This approach, born out of the Kosovo crisis and the recognition that a political dialogue and integration of the post-Yugoslav states into the EU are the best strategies for peace- building and long-term stability, became known as the Stabilization and Association Process. It is linked to the EU’s Thessaloniki Agenda, which provided all former Yugoslav states with a clear prospect of member- ship in the EU. This policy framework, formulated between 1999 and 2003, has also been developed in light of democratic changes in Croatia and Serbia, where semi-authoritarian leaders (Franjo Tuąman in Croatia and Slobodan Miloševic´ in Serbia) long dominated the political scene, before democratic opposition parties were able to come to power in the year 2000. Since then, all post-Yugoslav states have been engaged with the European Union in one way or another. While Slovenia managed to join the EU in 2004 as part of the Eastern enlargement, Croatia fol- lowed in 2013, despite more rocky negotiations. Macedonia became a front-runner after Slovenia joined and received EU candidate status in 2005, after the implementation of the Ohrid Agreement, which ended the brief period of unrest between Albanians and Macedonians in 2001, was seen as successful. After its independence in 2006, Montenegro quickly turned into the new front-runner, receiving candidate status in 2009 and starting negotiations on membership in the EU in 2011. Macedonia in the meantime was stuck in its integration process because of the unresolved name dispute with Greece, which has used its veto numerous times in order to deny Macedonia the start of membership negotiations (and NATO membership). Serbia, which was still dealing with the consequences of Montenegro’s and Kosovo’s independence, became an official candidate country in March 2012, and started its 6 PointofDeparture negotiations in early 2014. Bosnia and Herzegovina signed a Stabiliza- tion and Association Agreement (SAA) with the EU in 2009, which, however, was not implemented, and so Bosnia, too, remains stuck in the integration process. In contrast to Macedonia, Bosnia does not proceed because of internal divisions between leading Bosniak, Serb and Croat parties, which are unable to agree on any major policy reform. Kosovo, too, has a rather uncertain European future. Five EU member states (Greece, Cyprus, Romania, Slovakia and Spain) do not recognize Kosovo as an independent country. Yet, since the Belgrade Agreement between Kosovo and Serbia in April 2013, there is an obvious link between the EU integration of Serbia and the European future of Kosovo. Therefore, it can be argued that formally all post-Yugoslav states are engaged in the process of EU integration, which has become their

Map 1.1 Map of the post-Yugoslav and neighboring states Source: http://d-maps.com/carte.php?num_car=69052&lang=en. Soeren Keil and Bernhard Stahl 7 main foreign policy objective. However, this integration process is nei- ther similar nor comparable, and it demonstrates more divergence than convergence. This is one of the fascinating topics of this volume: all countries started from the same point of departure, namely the her- itage of Yugoslavia. All countries want to join the EU and have identified EU integration as their number one foreign policy objective. Yet, some countries have been able to arrive in the EU relatively quickly (Slovenia and Croatia), while others will arrive at a much later point (Bosnia and Macedonia). Serbia, Kosovo and Montenegro remained united in one country until 2006 (when Montenegro became independent; Kosovo followed in 2008), yet in terms of their journey towards membership in the EU it can be expected that they will arrive at different points. While all post-Yugoslav countries share some common problems that they have had to address on their way towards membership in the EU, such as building functional states, market reform from socialist self-management to free market capitalism, establishing democratic gov- ernance and ensuring sufficient minority protection, some have been able to do this much quicker and better than others. Surely, the lega- cies of violence and large-scale destruction in Bosnia and Kosovo, which have resulted in highly polarized and divided societies, matter and help to explain why reforms are more difficult in these countries, but Croatia has faced large-scale violence, too. Yet, it has been able to inte- grate and adapt to EU rules much faster. To understand the divergence and differences between the post-Yugoslav states, we need to examine their foreign policy, focusing not only on their foreign policy objectives and mechanisms but also on their foreign policy identity and the link between domestic policy and foreign policy. Once we understand the complexities in each of the countries under consideration, we will be able to see how this can help explain why these countries take different routes on their journey from Yugoslavia to Europe.

Theoretical considerations

Foreign Policy remains a peculiar field of study. On the one hand, it belongs to the historically first (and foremost) subfields of politi- cal science in general and International Relations in particular. As a consequence, it plays a distinguished role in study programs and teach- ing schemes all over the world. In certain states such as the US or Germany, a vast array of literature exists focusing on the respective resources, decision-making procedures and international implications. On the other hand, most countries and foreign policies in today’s world 8 PointofDeparture are largely under-researched. This applies not only to African states but also the ‘new states’ which developed after the demise of Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union. Foreign Policy knowledge comes across in two ways. The first, ‘tra- ditional,’ way seeks to inductively garner information from the ‘reality as we see it.’ Journalists, practitioners, area specialists, historians and diplomats collect valuable data on a country’s foreign policy by offering descriptions of and assessments on a respective foreign policy. In many countries, this is the prevailing mode of studying Foreign Policy until today. This is largely because Foreign Policy specialists stem from law or history departments and used to work closely with their respective gov- ernments. Studies in this tradition deliver valuable details on practical foreign policy-making, the history of foreign policy including crucial historical events and important individuals of the political scene (e.g. De Haas 2010; Lanteigne 2010; Cox, Lynch and Bouchet 2013). For the countries examined in this volume it was not the end of the Cold War but the demise of Yugoslavia which represented the common regional juncture. Since some Yugoslav republics have been actively involved in this break-up one might reasonably argue that the common formative event was Tito’s death in 1980. This is why we decided to include the foreign policy of Yugoslavia as a common analytical benchmark for all countries to evolve from the latter’s estate. But admittedly, traditional scholarship on Foreign Policy also has its flaws. Its reconstructions of a country’s foreign policy run the risk of being close to the government’s agenda, emphasizing the national master-narrative and stressing the idiosyncratic nature of a country’s foreign policy. Yet, in the scientific community of the West a second way of study- ing Foreign Policy emerged in the 1960s.3 The newly founded Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA) was meant to significantly enhance our knowledge of foreign policy by providing us with scientific research designs which should enable us to answer ‘why-questions.’ By doing so, FPA promised to avoid the flaws of the traditional foreign policy literature, and to detect the crucial factors which determine foreign policy outcomes. Twenty years later, though, the high hopes have largely vaporized (Smith, Hadfield and Dunne 2012, 4). Despite the fact that states have remained the most significant actors in international relations and therefore their foreign policies remain crucial in understanding policy outcomes, FPA fell somewhat from grace in International Relations (IR). In the last two decades, the FPA literature moves at modest speed with decent monographs and seminal articles published every four to five Soeren Keil and Bernhard Stahl 9 years (Rosenau 1966; Smith 1986; Hudson and Vore 1995, Hill 2003; Breuning 2007; Smith, Hadfield and Dunne 2012). The reasons for this are manifold and need not be discussed here (Hudson 2012, 24–26). Mirroring the above-mentioned flaws of the traditionalist approach, one might say that FPA tends to overstate foreign policy similarities and to downplay empirical knowledge, which contributes to theory development but increasingly loses touch with reality. Suffice to say that thanks to FPA a deductive, theoretical and systematic view on foreign policy exists, which provides for definitions, analytical perspec- tives and models, and allowing the possibility to ask and assess good questions. For the purpose of this book, both strands of literature have their mer- its. Taken together, they give us enough leeway to focus on national idiosyncrasies but analytical rigor is also called for – the two together enable the possibility of further studies in this field. Since there is practically no systematic knowledge at all about the foreign policies of the post-Yugoslav states, an account based on the ‘traditional way’ looks rewarding. The reader reasonably expects insights into the his- tory, the society and the mechanisms of foreign policy decision-making in a broad sense. Therefore, guiding questions built on a traditional understanding of foreign policy are:

• When and how did the country become independent? • What did this mean for its foreign policy? How has the country’s foreign policy developed since independence? • What role did/does the Yugoslav legacy play?4 • Who were/are the most important individuals/political figures? What did/does this mean for foreign policy decision-making? • What are the main issues in foreign policy today (2014)?

Yet, FPA also has its merits given its systematic effort to build up an arsenal of analytical tools. First, all studies in this book start with Hill’s definition of foreign policy as ‘the sum of official external relations conducted by an independent actor (usually a state) in international relations’ (Hill 2003, 3). This definition seems flexible enough to cover a wide range of phenomena, such as the foreign policy of sub-state actors (e.g. the state union of Serbia and Montenegro, or Republika Srpska in Bosnia) as well as foreign policy of a contested state (Kosovo). As a second analytical device we make use of Waltz’s three images (Waltz 1959). The individual level has already been mentioned above. FPA has underlined the role of leaders (Breuning 2007) as well as 10 PointofDeparture decision-making (Mintz and DeRouen 2010). The third image – the international system – deserves particular attention following many established IR theories (e.g. neorealism, systemic social-constructivism). Questions regarding the third level are:

• What factors on the systemic/international level are of importance for foreign policy? • How can relations with the other post-Yugoslav states (dyads) be characterized? • Which international actors are of particular relevance for the respec- tive country? • How does foreign policy shape the regional milieu?

Furthermore, the second image deserves attention. Who are the main actors on the domestic level? Implicitly, all studies are oriented towards the ‘governmental politics model’ (Allison and Zelikow 1999), which stresses coalition dynamics, party politics and individual power-seeking. This is in line with the liberal IR mainstream today, which depicts factors on the domestic level as the dominant ones for explaining outcomes at a systemic level. When looking at the case of Croatia, for example, changes to the second image after the death of Franjo Tuąman have resulted in a new foreign policy orientation, which has had regional and global consequences (not least Croatia’s entry into the EU in July 2013). The general political science taxonomy on polity, politics, policy seems useful when it comes to foreign policy decision-making at the domestic level. In general, studies take the constitutional framework as a start- ing point before outlining the practical procedures of decision-making. It might be noted already that owing to cultural peculiarities individ- ual leadership often overplays constitutional constraints. In Serbia and Montenegro particularly, it can be shown that individual preferences top constitutional prerogatives and limitations. Some of the questions asked in this context are:

• What are foreign policy priorities? • What are the institutional mechanisms in foreign policy decision- making and implementation? • Who are the main actors in foreign policy (government, parties, for- mer rebels, religious figures, personalities, etc.) and how do they interact? • What role do the political elite and interest groups play in foreign policy? Soeren Keil and Bernhard Stahl 11

• What is the role of public opinion (are there any highly discussed issues, is there a difference between public opinion and government focus, etc.)?

Another analytical device stems from the FPA research on foreign pol- icy change (e.g. Carlsnaes 1993; Gustavsson 1999): When and how did a particular foreign policy change? The literature on foreign policy change (e.g. Hermann 1990; Rosati, Sampson and Hagan 1994) proposes dif- ferent levels where change can be located. The simplest form entails mere ‘adjustments’ of policies when certain foreign policy instruments are used more intensely. More substantial changes touch upon foreign policy goals, programs and strategies. Fundamental changes, though, would mean an ‘international orientation change’ (Hermann 1990, 5) or a substantial ‘restructuring’ (Rosati, Sampson and Hagan 1994, 236) of foreign policy. Since we can observe that the foreign policies of the post-Yugoslav states remain transitional, fluctuant and incoherent, we would assume to observe many changes. Some will be based on changes of the second image, as discussed above in the case of Croatia. Others will be based on third image changes; for example, the question of a US retreat from Bosnia and Kosovo might raise wider issues about the role of the EU, and also about actors such as Turkey and Russia in the region. Of course, this is a pilot study and we find it overly ambitious to explore the deepest layer of fundamental change in analytical depth.5 Yet, we ask about changes at the (methodologically) more accessible policy and goal levels:

• Did changes regarding instruments or policies occur? • Have foreign policy programs, strategies or goals been altered? • Overall, were there more indications for continuity or for change with regard to the respective foreign policy?

A first glance at the situation of the post-Yugoslav states would ren- der obvious an easy assessment: All states were born in Yugoslavia and will spend their adulthood in the EU. In between, there might be some teething problems and other problems of adolescence (i.e. the ‘double transitions’ to liberal democracies and market economies, overcoming the legacies of the Yugoslav Wars) but the direction as well as the final- ité of the respective foreign policies are clear: becoming a member of the EU. In fact, the two front-runners of the post-Yugoslav states – Slovenia and Croatia – already serve as prime examples for this main track. 12 PointofDeparture

Yet, some evidence calls for caution. On the one hand, empirical observations indicate that the transatlantic-European drift is neither deliberate nor desired. For instance, Bosnia and Herzegovina seems unwilling to proceed with reforms, Greece is blocking Macedonia’s EU progress for a couple of years now, and the EU will hardly be accepting member states with ongoing border problems (Serbia, Kosovo). All of these observations indicate that a smooth, linear foreign policy for these countries is unlikely. Some evidence from the European Foreign Policy literature, which had its high time in the 1990s, cast additional doubt.6 Accession to the EU did not make foreign policy divergence disappear. For instance, divergence of foreign policies has evidently impeded the effectiveness of European Political Cooperation (EPC) as well as the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) in many ways – in par- ticular in crisis situations. Admittedly, the socialization effects of the EPC and CFSP have been insufficient to render substantial foreign policy convergence (Hill 1998). Moreover, member states have learned differ- ent things from the same event (Reynolds 2004), and countries of the same size and in a similar geopolitical environment behave differently (Risse-Kappen 1991), which leads us to the supposition that the com- mon Yugoslav heritage and the common goal of EU integration have probably not triggered a similar foreign policy for the post-Yugoslav states. True, all post-Yugoslav countries share the same starting point, namely the relatively successful foreign policy of the Yugoslav feder- ation. Yet, it can be demonstrated that with the end of the Yugoslav state and the independence of the Republics in the early 1990s, we can also observe foreign policy divergence among the post-Yugoslav states. Slovenia, for example, did not join the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) and distanced itself from the Yugoslav heritage, while Serbia attempted to use the NAM as a vehicle to justify its policies in the 1990s. Other countries, such as Croatia, have retained their links to the NAM without promoting the Yugoslav tradition strongly, trying to strengthen their own profile within the movement. Furthermore, the secession experience (by war, contested or peaceful) might account for the way in which foreign policy was conducted after independence. Our working thesis – motivated by the European For- eign Policy experience outlined above – is that foreign policy divergence prevailed the day after the dissolution of Yugoslavia. But this picture might have changed when either considering the EU (and NATO) ‘pull’ in the last decade or when taking domestic democratization processes into account. Therefore, we ask if processes of change are indeed visible in the foreign policies of the post-Yugoslav states and if so, how do these Soeren Keil and Bernhard Stahl 13 changes play together in the broader picture? We believe that some kind of foreign policy convergence7 of the post-Yugoslav states would help to achieve a security community for the Balkans (Keil and Stahl 2013). The more that accession to the EU becomes a far-away prospect, the more a security community in which violence and war are no longer used as tools of foreign policy looks desirable. Of course, not all country studies refer to all the questions outlined above. Rather, they follow a ‘pick-and-choose’ approach. This enables us, first, to remain flexible and take each country’s idiosyncrasies seri- ously, and second, to refrain from offering an eclectic ‘anything goes’ account. Rather, the richness of empirical data and historical detail has undergone a ‘first cut’ by presenting a catalogue of analytical questions.

Structure of this volume

This volume starts with a chapter on the foreign policy of Yugoslavia until the death of Tito and the rise of Slobodan Miloševic.´ Katrin Boeckh demonstrates how Yugoslavia’s foreign policy was very successful, in particular because of its positioning between East and West and as a leader of the NAM. This success was also based on the popularity of Tito, who was not only admired within Yugoslavia but also abroad, as a charming and trustworthy politician and partner. The second part of the volume looks at the foreign policy of Slovenia and Croatia as those countries that declared their independence first and also joined the EU first. Zlatko Šabicˇ and Ana Bojinovic´ Fenko ana- lyze how Slovenia has been able to position itself as a Central European country (‘away from the Balkans’) and join those countries that became members of the EU in 2004. Senada Šelo Šabic´ points out that the year 2000 was the key to the Croatian case, as the change of government resulted in a change of foreign policy towards EU and NATO integra- tion. Both papers highlight that since Slovenia and Croatia joined the EU they have become key supporters of EU integration of the other post- Yugoslav states, but beyond that lack a clear foreign policy strategy that goes beyond their role in Europe. The third part discusses Macedonia and Bosnia and Herzegovina. Both countries declared their independence from Yugoslavia very soon after Slovenia and Croatia, yet they are stuck in the integration process. As Adnan Huskic´ argues in the case of Bosnia, it is the internal set-up and the constrained relations between Bosniaks, Serbs and Croats that explain the lack of integration process and foreign policy consensus more generally in Bosnia. In Macedonia, according to the argument by 14 PointofDeparture

Cvete Koneska, it is the name dispute with Greece which influences all foreign policy decisions, including relations with the EU and NATO. While both countries remain committed to EU integration as the key foreign policy objective, both authors are not overly optimistic about short-term changes to the current status quo. In the fourth part of the book, there are three chapters. Mladen Mladenov examines Serbia’s foreign policy and concludes that the coun- try is still in search of a coherent foreign policy identity. He discusses Serbia’s decision to find an agreement with Kosovo (without recognizing Kosovo) as well as its continued influence on neighboring states, includ- ing Bosnia and Montenegro. Serbia, so Mladenov believes, remains the key to stability and peace in the region. Yet, the political elites are still not fully committed to transforming Serbian foreign policy to make the country a leader in the region that focuses on reconciliation, good neighborly relations and long-term stability. Discourses on national- ism and Serbia’s continued influence and support for Serbs living in neighboring countries have not only influenced Serbia’s position in the region, but have also had profound impacts on its neighbors, which is most visible in the case of Kosovo. Jelena Džankic´ also argues that Serbia remains an important factor in the foreign policy of Montenegro. However, she also discusses how internal Montenegrin policies and dis- courses influence the country’s foreign policy decisions. She concludes that foreign policy has been dominated by the executive branch, espe- cially the Democratic Party of Socialists (DPS) under the leadership of Milo Ðukanovic,´ who has promoted an independent Montenegrin for- eign policy ever since he came to power in 1997. Finally, Gëzim Krasniqi demonstrates how foreign policy is the key tool for Kosovo to allow it to seek further recognition within the international community. He also points out that Serbia remains an important factor in Kosovo’s foreign (and internal) policy, and demonstrates how Kosovo’s elites have used foreign policy as a way to align the newest of the post-Yugoslav states with strong allies such as the USA and Turkey, and thereby promote Kosovo’s independence and acceptance as an internationally sovereign country. This has had some mixed results: while Kosovo does have strong support from the USA and many EU countries, it remains out- side the United Nations (UN) and other international organizations. In addition, five EU member states have still not recognized Kosovo. In the Conclusion, Amelia Hadfield demonstrates how the study of the foreign policies of the post-Yugoslav states might shape further research questions for FPA as a discipline within IR. Questions of for- eign policy convergence and divergence, as well as the consideration of Soeren Keil and Bernhard Stahl 15 the foreign policy of ‘new states,’ remain key research questions which might be examined by scholars of FPA in the future. This volume aims to contribute to our understanding of the Yugoslav break-up and its consequences by focusing on the foreign policies of the post-Yugoslav states. We hope that it will contribute much in fac- tual knowledge and analytical depth, and will be used by scholars in the future who want to work on questions such as EU enlargement, policy divergence, political change and foreign policy identity of the post-Yugoslav states. The authors attempt to answer many questions, but we find that more questions are left unanswered, and we hope that this volume will lay the ground for further conceptual and empirical analysis of the foreign policies of the post-Yugoslav states.

Notes

1. Following general use of the term, the short form Bosnia will be used. 2. The EU refers to the country as the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM). However, for the reason of readability, we will refer to Macedonia. 3. This is called the ‘second debate in International Relations (IR),’ an epistemo- logical one between the ‘traditionalists’ and the ‘scientists’ (Kurki and Wight 2010). For the Foreign Policy field, this divide turned out to be crucial and persevering, since both camps from that time onwards pursued separate paths that produced very different accounts of knowledge, without taking each other’s insights into account. 4. Yugoslavia was very successful in its foreign policy, as a leader of the Non- Aligned Movement and in its ability to balance between the two blocs during the Cold War. Yugoslav citizens enjoyed a high standard of living as a conse- quence, and were able to travel to many countries in the East and the West without any visa requirements. See on this issue Katrin Boeckh’s chapter in this volume. 5. Our research group will deal with these deeper motives in a separate publica- tion (special issue of the Journal of Intervention and State-building, forthcoming) which will touch exclusively upon the state/nation problem in the region. 6. See, for example, Christopher Hill (1996). 7. To be precise, we do not need ‘convergence’ in a narrow sense but only complementarities.

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Introduction

Yugoslavia’s political development after the Second World War was largely shaped by Josip Broz Tito, the founder of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY), her Prime Minister (1943–1963) and Pres- ident (1953–1980) as well as General Secretary of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia (CPY) from 1939 to 1980.1 The long period of his dicta- torial rule was based on several elements with a notable cohesive effect: not only on repression and prosecution of political enemies, but also on the Yugoslav model of Socialism; respectively Communism, the milita- rization of society, the leitmotif of ‘brotherhood and unity’ against the diverging national aspirations within the country, the cult of personal- ity and of the glorious partisan past, and last but not least on a very special kind of foreign policy (Grothusen 1975; Pavlowitch 1988; West 1995; Lampe 2000), which nowadays would be called ‘multivectoral’; that is, pragmatically open to many alternatives at the same time. Char- acterized by the first Communist heresy in history and by the policy of ‘nonalignment,’ this special aspect of the ‘phenomenon Yugoslavia’ under the Tito regime will be the focus of the following discussion. It will be argued that foreign policy was an impressive unifying factor in Tito’s time, but it left a legacy that afterwards Yugoslav politics could never match. Four aspects are to be highlighted from the beginning. First, Tito was not only the most important political protagonist in Yugoslavia; he was also the incarnation of Yugoslav foreign policy: he initiated it, executed

18 Katrin Boeckh 19 it, represented it and was responsible for it. And he was extraordinarily successful in his time. In the tense situation of the Cold War, he became a global player connecting Yugoslavia to countries both in the East and in the West. Of course, Yugoslav foreign politics was based on the instru- ments all countries use – a ministry and minister for foreign affairs, the diplomatic corps – but these instruments were played by Tito in the end. His personality at large overshadowed the Yugoslav foreign ministers, at their time respected politicians themselves, such as Edvard Kardelj, Kocaˇ Popovic´ and Marko Nikezic.´ They, along with Yugoslavia’s diplo- matic representatives, held high ranks within the Communist Party and as such were trusted elements for Tito’s mission, as long as they were loyal to him. Second, in Yugoslavia after the Second World War, domes- tic policy was much more connected to foreign policy than it was in other states. As a matter of fact, changes in foreign policy were obvious to most Yugoslav citizens as they felt the repercussions in everyday life immediately (Ramet 2006; Calic 2010; Sundhaussen 2012). Third, Tito’s policy of nonalignment and his movement between the two world blocs opened the door for foreign loans and credits from Western countries that stabilized his inner political system. No wonder that biographies on Tito are full of allusions to his personal efforts in the field of foreign policy (Pavlowitch 1992; Simic´ 2009; 2010). While he was in power, this ‘help from abroad’ functioned well. But after his death in 1980, the system imploded, and Yugoslavia found no solution for the eco- nomic crisis that was enhanced by national antagonism. This was the beginning of the end of Yugoslavia. Fourth, the Titoist ‘third way to socialism’ was a special policy in the Balkans during the Cold War but not the only one of its kind, as Albania and Romania developed similar phenotypes of independence from the Communist hemisphere but with different priorities. In Albania Enver Hoxha followed Tito’s separatism and broke with the Soviet Union in 1961, approached the other mighty socialist country, China, and Maoism, and after leaving the Warsaw Pact in 1968, sealed his country off from every foreign influence and isolated it, with totally closed frontiers. Hoxha was the only leading Southeast politician who surpassed Tito’s regency, being in power five years longer, from 1944 until 1985. Another Balkan dicta- tor, Nicolae Ceau¸sescu,used foreign policy as a means to strengthen his own political position within Romania. He played a rather nationalist card within the Eastern block and thus reached a more independent status vis-à-vis the Soviet Union than other socialist countries, even refusing to participate in the Warsaw Pact’s invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968. 20 PointofDeparture

Yugoslavia I: Interwar allies

The Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes (since 1929 Yugoslavia) was proclaimed on 1 December 1918 as a mosaic of different politi- cal and territorial legacies, comprising the pre-war monarchies of Serbia and Montenegro, as well as the former Habsburg territories of Slovenia, Croatia, Dalmatia, Vojvodina and Bosnia-Herzegovina. The existence of the newly created South Slav state was the outspoken will of the US, Great Britain and France. Above all, Great Britain did not lose her geostrategic interest in Yugoslavia over the course of the 20th century (West 1995, 335; Evans 2008; Lane 2012). The South Slav state soon developed its own specific concepts of foreign policy, switching quickly from the expansionist policy of the 19th century to diplomacy and treaty-based foreign policy. Belgrade also understood from the beginning that not only had the Great Powers to be approached as partners, but also smaller neighboring countries in the Balkans. Soon enough, it was the South Slav Kingdom that orchestrated diplomatic connections in Southeast Europe to prevent being endan- gered by the losers of the First World War; the house of Habsburg and Hungary, which had lost huge territories. Thus, Belgrade was in the front line to establish two diplomatic networks in the interwar period: together with Czechoslovakia, the South Slav Kingdom founded the Lit- tle Entente in 1920–1921. This treaty system of bilateral military help was directed against a possibly re-emerging Habsburg monarchy and against Hungary, which was regarded a revanchist country. France sup- ported the Little Entente as a substitute for its strong pre-war connection with the Russian Empire. When in 1921 the last Habsburg Emperor, Charles I of Austria, tried twice to regain his throne in Hungary – in April peacefully, in October with military means – he failed because of the mobilization of Czechoslovakia and of the South Slav Kingdom. In these cases, the Little Entente fulfilled its purpose. In 1934, Belgrade initiated its second diplomatic network, directed against Bulgaria and the threat of isolation by Fascist Italy. For that rea- son, the so-called Balkan Pact between Yugoslavia, Romania, Greece and Turkey was established. The project followed a successful strategy: in bilateral treaties, the signatories guaranteed each other the maintenance of territorial order in the Balkans, conceded to each other respect of their frontiers, and obliged themselves not to take political measures against another country without a common agreement. In the end, Bulgaria was surrounded by allied opponents. Alas, the anti-Bulgarian Balkan Katrin Boeckh 21

Pact lost its meaning when in 1937, after a military coup, Bulgaria changed its political orientation and Yugoslavia made a step towards Sofia by signing a treaty of friendship and collaboration. In the same year, a Yugoslav-Italian treaty of non-aggression and neutrality was endorsed. While it took quite a long time for Yugoslavia to establish diplo- matic relations with the first socialist state in the world, the USSR, this taking place in 1940, unofficial connections were established by the Communist Party of Yugoslavia, led by Tito. During the First World War, he was a prisoner of war in Russia, where he learned Russian. Later, he was most likely educated at the ‘partisan academy’ in the Soviet Union, as great numbers of Communists from Yugoslavia were sent there to be trained in partisan techniques (Timofejev 2011, 741–749). From 1935, Tito worked in the Soviet Union for the Com- munist International (Comintern), a Soviet organization to control other Communist parties. During the 1930s, Tito not only survived the Stalinist terror but willingly obeyed orders to purge the Yugoslav Communist Party (Avakumovic 1967, 127–142; Eiletz 2008). Tito and some of his later comrades were personally acquainted with the Stalinist state and its political and economic organization, the repression of real and suspicious opponents, the well-organized troops of the Inte- rior Ministry, the labor camps and the Stalin cult. These institutions were role models for socialist Yugoslavia; there were no signs that Tito wanted to change this system (Gligorijevic´ 1992; Miloradovic´ 2011, 99). He was later also connected to projects within the Comintern concerning the political design of Southeast Europe: in 1924, the idea of a Balkan federation was discussed within the Comintern. In this vision, a ‘Balkan-Danubian Communist super state’ as a part of the projected world union of Soviet republics was to comprise Bulgaria, Greece, Albania, Romania, Hungary and the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes (Djilas 1991, 75). Tito did not forget this concept. To sum up, the South Slav monarchy, proclaimed in 1918, quickly adapted to the new situation in Southeast Europe after the First World War. It managed to establish a network of treaties backing her foreign interests, and was flexible enough to find new allies even on the side of her former opponents. Similar modes of behavior generated Yugoslavia’s foreign position after the Second World War, while the political system was transformed into a Communist and Socialist one in the tradition of the Soviet Union. 22 PointofDeparture

Yugoslavia II: Moscow’s closest ally after the Second World War

The Yugoslav future seemed clear at the end of the Second World War: Yugoslavia was proclaimed on 29 November 1945 as a ‘People’s Republic.’ Tito, who had established an army of partisans during Yugoslavia’s occupation in the war, was not only the head of the Com- munist Party of Yugoslavia, but also the leader of the socialist state and, following a Stalinist model, the chief of the armed forces. Besides Tito, his old comrades in arms Edvard Kardelj, Aleksandar Rankovic´ and Milovan Djilas decided the most important political questions in Yugoslavia until their influence was diminished (Kardelj in the 1960s) or they were ostracized (Djilas was arrested in 1965, Rankovic´ fell from power and was expelled from the party in 1966) (Pirjevec 2011). Although linked by socialist ideology, during the Second World War and Yugoslavia’s occupation, Tito’s partisan movement did not auto- matically get help from its Soviet ‘brother.’ During the war, Tito asked Moscow several times for military support, but for a long time most of his endeavors were in vain. In February 1943 the Comintern expressed appreciation for the partisans’ struggle, but repeated that it remained unable to send help (Clissold 1975, 144). Stalin was not willing to sup- port Tito as long as the British government did not drop assistance for the ˇcetnici under Draža Mihailovic,´ 2 whohadsidedwiththeTito- partisans as the leading force in occupied Yugoslavia. Only in autumn 1944 were airplanes, tanks, drugs and other materials sent to Yugoslavia, and a credit of US$1 million was allowed for the Tito partisans (Popovic´ 1988, 187–223). While the Soviet Army pushed westward, occupying the countries in East and Southeast Europe, it participated in the lib- eration of Yugoslavia only in the North. Despite this, the Soviets later claimed that they were the decisive factor in the breakthrough in Yugoslavia: it was solely help from the Soviet Union that led to the common victory over ‘fascism’ and the liberation and the indepen- dence of the Yugoslav people (Chor’kov 1989, 186–205). At the end of the Second World War, there were some atmospheric disturbances between ‘Big Brother’ and his ally in the Balkans, but they did not openly trouble Soviet-Yugoslav relations. On the contrary, Tito’s dedi- cation to the Soviet Union seemed endless, and in 1945 he regretted that the ‘Government of old Yugoslavia was openly hostile towards the Soviet Union. Before the Second World War Yugoslavia was a hot-bed of anti-Soviet intrigue.’ His second and new Yugoslavia ‘resuscitated Katrin Boeckh 23 on the basis of fraternity, unity, and equality of all Yugoslav peoples [ ...] will constantly pursue the most friendly policy towards the Soviet Union’ (Clissold 1975, 164–165). After the end of the ‘people’s liber- ation struggle,’ Tito’s Yugoslavia emulated Soviet policy much earlier than the other countries in Eastern Europe, and stood firmly at Stalin’s side. On 11 April 1945 a treaty of friendship, mutual help and collabora- tion was signed in Moscow as the basis for relations between the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia (Clissold 1975, 162–164). Stalin actively promoted Yugoslavia’s sovietization, sending officers of the notorious People’s Commissariat of Internal Affairs (NKVD), agents, agronomists, military personnel and a military mission, solicitors and other Soviet-trained staff to perform the economic, political and social transformation of Yugoslavia strictly after the model of the Soviet Union. The whole political and economic agenda that the Soviet Union had conducted since the 1920s was repeated in Yugoslavia. This meant the elimination of every kind of opposition – the churches (Boeckh 2006, 403–431), old elites, royalists and the ˇcetnik movement under Mihailovic,´ the confiscation of private property, banks and industries. Economically, agrarian-based Yugoslavia tried to follow the Soviet path to industrialization and central planning. This led to the introduction of a five-year plan, officially proclaimed in 1947. The collectivization of agriculture was projected by legislation in 1945 – with only small suc- cesses: in 1953, the number of Peasant Work Cooperatives (seljaˇcke radne zadruge) was 1,152, with about 300,000 members working on nearly 3 per cent of the arable territory (Allcock 2000, 129–130). Even kulaks3 were repressed, as had been the case in the Soviet Union. A Soviet- Yugoslav trade agreement from 25 July 1947 stated that the Soviet Union would deliver to Yugoslavia not only technical assistance, but also equipment for the non-ferrous and ferrous metal industries as well as for the chemical, oil and timber industries, that was necessary in con- nection ‘with the five-year plan for the development of the Yugoslav economy’ (Clissold 1975, 167). The Yugoslav Constitution, adopted on 31 January 1946, followed the Soviet Constitution from 1936, creating a federation of six republics and two autonomous provinces. The Yugoslav secret service OZNA (Odjeljenje za zaštitu naroda/Department for National Protection), founded in 1944 and since 1946 named UDBA (Uprava državne bezbed- nosti/Administration for State Security), was mainly organized by the NKVD (Petranovic´ and Dautovic´ 1988, 276–288). The translation and publication of Soviet literature and the transfer of Soviet methods of pro- paganda favored the dissemination of Soviet ideology (Gibianskii 1985, 24 PointofDeparture

168–172). Between 1945 and 1948 1.2 million copies of books specifi- cally about Lenin were printed in Yugoslavia (Simic´ 2009, 243). Other activities simply copied and pasted Soviet institutions: a ‘State Com- mission for the detection of crimes by the occupiers and their helpers’ (Državna komisija za utvrdjivanje zloˇcinaokupatora i njihovih pomagaˇca) (Kantolic´ 2001, 41–74) was established in Yugoslavia in 1945 with the aim of capturing people who were under suspicion of being anti-Soviet. Thanks to the collection of witness reports, nearly 65,000 ‘war crimi- nals, traitors, and people’s enemies’ – these notions alone mirror the Stalinist dictates – were detected and put on trial. Thus, the Tito state at its beginning reduced the number of possible and real political oppo- nents to a minimum by means of brutal physical liquidation (Nikolic´ 2012, 631–650). Openly, there were no frictions with the Soviet Union. Only now and then was discontent uttered when Yugoslav foreign interests were at stake. As to the disputed status of Trieste and the old Yugoslav-Italian border dispute, which was already prevalent during the interwar years, Stalin did not support Yugoslav claims against the British, the US and the Italians (DimitrijevicandBogeti´ c´ 2009, 14–18). Tito declared in a speech in May 1945 that by virtue of the Yugoslav struggle during the war, Yugoslav sacrifices and Yugoslav exertions for the allied cause, the country has ‘given proof enough that [Yugoslavia is] loyal to the gen- eral cause of the allies.’ Therefore, ‘[t]his Yugoslavia is not an object for barter and bargaining’ (Clissold 1975, 165–166; Ramet 2006, 176). In reaction, Moscow protested against this ‘unfriendly attack.’ In July 1946, Tito sent a telegram to Stalin and reproached him for not having supported Yugoslav interests during a conference of foreign ministers in Paris. This time, Stalin’s reaction was not so fierce, obviously because the correspondence was kept secret (Gibianskii 1996, 165). It was the dominant impression among Western democracies that Yugoslavia was ‘undoubtedly the prize pupil of east-European states within the Soviet orbit,’ as the British Foreign Office’s Southern Department stated at the beginning of 1948 (Lane 2012, 117).

Moscow’s nightmare: The Cominform split in 1948

The Comintern, dissolved in 1943, was refounded in September 1947 in the shape of the Communist Information Bureau (Cominform). This was officially established to strengthen ‘the interchange of experi- ence and the voluntary coordination of action’ of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia, of Romania, of the Soviet Union, of France, of Katrin Boeckh 25

Czechoslovakia, of Italy, of the Bulgarian Workers’ Party and of the Polish Workers’ Party (Clissold 1975, 167–168). In reality, it was a Moscow-dominated organ to control and organize all the Communist parties in Eastern Europe. The fact that it had its headquarters in the city of Belgrade was without doubt a hint that Yugoslavia had a spe- cial position in the Soviet world. But Stalin’s commitment to Yugoslavia was limited. He was, neither during the war nor afterwards, willing to risk his reputation among the Western countries for further Yugoslav expansionism. Consequently, Tito had not much Soviet help when the peace treaty with Italy in 1947 and especially the status of Trieste was discussed. In the end, only the peninsula of Istria was incorporated into Yugoslavia. While the quarrel about Trieste and the hinterland was brought to an end (except for one episode in the 1950s), the southeast frontiers of Yugoslavia – to Bulgaria and Albania – still had the potential to be expanded: here, Tito followed another policy which eventually led to a major clash with the Soviet Union. While the CPY did not object to the Marxist-Leninist doctrine of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union’s (CPSU) leading role within the Communist movement, and allowed Soviet political advisors max- imum influence in internal politics, the Yugoslav Communists did not pay attention to the Soviet Union with regard to their foreign policy aims. In the end, the struggle over the question of the Yugoslav posi- tion within the Communist world led to the Cominform split in 1948 (Fischer, et al. 2004). The trigger for the break in 1948 was Tito’s project of a federation of Balkan states. Tito enforced this idea during the Sec- ond World War, intending to enlarge his concept of nationalities policy and the South Slav federation with Yugoslav domination of neighbor- ing countries. To keep national antagonists as calm as possible, Tito found a federal solution for the neighboring countries. While there was a dispute in the Communist movement over the status of Macedonia and Kosovo during the Second World War (Haug 2012, 104–110), he installed a separate Macedonian republic within Yugoslavia to dimin- ish both Serbian as well as Bulgarian aspirations for the territory, and he conceded Kosovo to be an autonomous region within Serbia. Both regions were to be future elements of a Balkan federation. Furthermore, the Yugoslav government supplied Greek Communist rebels in Greece with military help to broaden Yugoslav influence there. Bulgaria was the core of the federation project, but even Albania, Romania, Greece and further countries in Eastern Europe were under discussion. In November 1944 Kardelj was sent to Sofia with a draft plan for a possible Yugoslav- Bulgarian federation (Armstrong 1951; White 1951; Ulam 1952; Dedijer 26 PointofDeparture

1953; 1971). Stalin objected to this intention, as it appeared that sev- eral countries might possibly get away from Soviet control. Fearing that the CPSU might lose her predominance among the other Com- munist parties while the Cold War was in its infancy, Stalin decided to block the Southeast connections, aspirations for a Yugoslav-Bulgarian pact of alliance and the preparations to construct a federation of Com- munist Balkan states. He ordered Tito and the Bulgarian leader Georgi Dimitrov to Moscow, where he tried to compel them to sign an agree- ment for a common foreign policy line with the Soviet Union. Whereas Dimitrov admitted his ‘failures’ and backed away from the idea of a Balkan federation, Tito remained obstinate. In the following months, antagonism between the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia became evident. In March 1948, the Soviet government decided ‘to withdraw immediately all military advisors and instructors because they are “surrounded by hostility”, that is, they are not treated in a friendly fashion in Yugoslavia’ (Clissold 1975, 169–170). Likewise, all Soviet civilian experts in Yugoslavia were ordered to return. A Com- munist schism followed: on 28 June 1948, Yugoslavia was expelled from the Cominform, not because of ideological conflicts, but because of the different interpretations of Yugoslavian sovereignty and her position towards the ‘Big Brother’ (Procacci 1994; Štrbac 2007). Tito defended the Yugoslav point of view by hinting at the danger of being econom- ically exploited by the pressure to subordinate politically to Moscow and to keep unequal relations with the USSR. ‘Any undesirable interfer- ence from outside, even if it comes from a big Socialist country, hinders and obstructs the Socialist development of a small country and is also harmful for general international reasons’ (Broz Tito 1950, 65). While it took nearly a month before the Communist leaderships of Bulgaria, Romania, Poland and Czechoslovakia were ready to follow the Soviet condemnation of Yugoslavia and the propagandistic assaults on Belgrade (Gibianskii 2004, 68), a witch-hunt in the newly sovietized countries in Eastern Europe nevertheless began, chasing people and even Communist representatives in high positions who were under sus- picion of supporting ‘Titoism.’ In fact, the verdict over Tito and his ‘clique’ was nothing but a pretext for purging the Communist parties from unwanted elements. What Stalin had expected, though, did not occur: the Yugoslav Communist party did not revolt against its leader, and Tito’s comrades remained loyal to him. At the V. Party Congress in 1948, he was elected party chief with an overwhelming majority; although at the same time, the party had to rewrite the whole political doctrine for Yugoslavia, and had to react to a completely new situation Katrin Boeckh 27 that affected not only foreign policy but also the most important fields of the economy and everyday life for each citizen. Very effective was the enormous economic pressure on Yugoslavia introduced by the Eastern satellites. Yugoslavia was covered by a total blockade when it was excluded from the newly founded Comecon (Council for Mutual Economic Assistance; only in 1964 did it receive the status of an observer). The other socialist countries increased prices for exports to Yugoslavia and did not fulfill contracts on deliveries, Romania and the Soviet Union stopped providing Yugoslavia with oil, Czechoslovakia held back machines destined for Yugoslavia and so forth. As a consequence, Yugoslavia was not able to fulfill her first five-year plan. After the Cominform split, Moscow treated Yugoslavia as its main opponent in the Communist hemisphere: propagandistically attacked, economically blocked and under the possible menace of being invaded by the other socialist states when Bulgaria and Hungary staged large- scale military maneuvers in 1950–1951 with Soviet generals and officers (Ramet 2006, 180–182). Even in this situation Stalin was not inclined to risk an international conflict because of renegade Yugoslavia, as the US made it plain that they would not tolerate a Soviet invasion, sign- ing an agreement regarding American military support for Yugoslavia in November 1951 (Baev 2000, 95–106). To prevent any kind of resistance within the country, Tito and his regime for their part launched a hunt for Cominformists; that is, for party members or other persons supporting the Stalinist cause or under suspicion of doing that. According to an official description of the CPY, ‘55,663 Cominformists were registered and 16,288 arrested or sentenced’ (Banac 1988, 149ff, citing Radonjic´ 1985). Most of them, pro- pagandistically attacked as ‘speculators, cold and soulless intellectuals who never had any understanding of the struggle of our working masses, [ ...] old opportunists, liquidators, and cowards [ ...] antiparty elements [ ...] Trotskyites [ ...] spineless characters who aspire to a comfortable life,’ ‘spies’ and ‘non-persons’ (Banac 1988, 145–146) were interned in prisons on the ‘naked island’ (Goli Otok) and on other islands in the Adriatic Sea. Similar to the purge of collaborators after the Second World War, this was the second attempt to get rid of potential opponents within Yugoslavia. While the V. Congress of the CPY in 1948 had expressed the con- viction that Stalinism in practice was the best proof of the progress of the concept of Socialism in the Marxist-Leninist sense, and – as Kardelj put it – for its superiority over the bankrupt society in the capitalist 28 PointofDeparture world; with neither Tito nor the other party members uttering any critical remarks on the Soviet policy under Stalin (Imširovic´ 1991, 15; Simic´ 2009, 245), the VI. Congress of the Communist Party in 1952 asserted that ‘true Socialism’ could be reached only in the shape of ‘Anti-Stalinism’ (Imširovic´ 1991, 51–97). Here, Tito admitted that Soviet foreign policy had become clear to him already at the Tehran Confer- ence in 1943, where he had lost his confidence in the Soviet Union and already foresaw a conflict between the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the CPY (Imširovic´ 1991, 97).

Looking for new and old friends in the 1950s: Western help, the second Balkan Pact and Moscow once again

After the Cominform split, the Yugoslav regime had to find a new ide- ological framework for the political and socialist system that was never as such a matter of discussion. Kardelj’s concept of self-management as a basis for the economic, political and social order was developed in the 1950s, dividing factories, companies and plants into small and theoretically independent (‘self-managing’) units that in practice usu- ally associated in more complex and larger units (Lydall 1984, 69–88). In 1952, at the VI. Party Congress, the CPY changed its name to League of Communists of Yugoslavia (Savez komunista Jugoslavije, SKJu) to demonstrate the process of establishing democratic socialism. At the same time, Yugoslav foreign policy introduced a new course. The way out of the political, military and economic disaster for Tito was to approach the West; first, because he was compelled to do this by the sit- uation and second, he was a pragmatic Marxist. Tito was in fact the first Communist leader who fully teamed up with his political opponent. For him, there were no ideological obstacles to cooperating with capitalist countries. He turned the tables, and declared that it was the other Com- munist countries that were following the wrong ideology: ‘Certain of those supposedly Marxist wiseacres go so far as to back their perverted views with quotations from Marxism-Leninism, although it is precisely on the grounds of the theory of Marxism-Leninism that such views are wrong’ (Broz Tito 1949, 10). Tito explained the change in foreign policy by pointing to the break- ing of Yugoslav trust in her former allies and the great economic difficulties in the course of 1948:

Had we for one moment thought anything of the kind was possible we could easily have taken steps to get what we needed from other Katrin Boeckh 29

places. But we trusted the allies with whom we had concluded agree- ments and we were surprised at this really incomprehensible and unfitting treatment. We thus had to exert the utmost efforts to get the machines we needed from other places, from capitalist countries. That is why we needed foreign exchange – because no one gave us anything on credit. (Broz Tito 1950, 24)

During the course of 1949, propagandist attacks on ‘imperial coun- tries’ in the West stopped, and Yugoslavia reduced its military support for the Communists in Greece. In order to get machines and technical support, Yugoslavia gradually increased trade and concluded agreements with countries in the West. By the beginning of 1949, the US and British governments had decided to support Tito by augmenting their trade with Yugoslavia and export- ing strategic raw materials. They regarded Yugoslavia as ‘a thorn in the flesh of Communist unity, a potential incentive for other satellites to break with the Kremlin, a wedge in the Soviet bloc’ (Heuser 1989, 85; Lees 1997). The ‘wedge strategy’ to gain influence in the Soviet satel- lites in Eastern Europe by attempting to divide them from their centre in Moscow was expressed by the phrase ‘keeping Tito afloat,’ used in autumn 1948 by the British Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin. Beginning in 1951, Great Britain, France and the US supported Yugoslavia on a tripartite basis for the purpose of economic reconstruc- tion. Importantly, they insisted on restructuring the Yugoslav economy on the basis of light industry and the production of food and com- modities, instead of forcing the continued development of heavy and military industry (Bogetic´ 2004, 296–297), a legacy of the Stalinist period in Yugoslavia that became a kind of irrational passion for mon- umental plants and had never been abandoned. On 8 January 1952, the US signed her first commercial agreement with a socialist country after the Second World War. From June 1951 to July 1955, Yugoslavia received from the three countries nearly US$600 million in economic aid, the estimate for military support exceeds US$1.2 billion.4 With the exception of American aid in the Marshall Plan for the Western allies – US$2.8 billion for Great Britain, US$2.4 billion for France, US$1.3 billion for Italy and Germany each and for Holland, Belgium, Luxembourg, Norway, Denmark, Austria and Greece together US$3 bil- lion – no Western country received a higher sum than Yugoslavia (Bogetic´ 2004, 318). Yugoslavia also received credits and loans in the early 1950s from Argentina, Austria, Belgium, Egypt, West Germany, 30 PointofDeparture

Italy, Holland, Switzerland and Sweden. The Western countries intended to undermine the Communist front line by favoring Yugoslavia, which was important because of her geopolitical position. This first episode of Western aid brought about the economic recovery of Yugoslavia and was at the same time the basis for the new Yugoslav foreign policy strategy. In the early 1950s Belgrade established peaceful contacts with neighboring countries, Austria, Italy and Greece, looking for economic and any other cooperation on the basis of ‘full respect of equality and independence.’ The Yugoslav-Italian dispute over the border and Trieste, which resurfaced in 1953, was settled in 1954 by a mutual agreement that was the starting point for flowering trade rela- tions. Two years later, Italy had become Yugoslavia’s largest trading partner (Lampe 2000, 272). At the same time, Tito began to construct ties with the NATO partners Turkey and Greece, recalling the ancient idea of a Balkan federation. This regional organization was to be shaped as a (new) ‘Balkan Pact,’ and finally an agreement ‘on friendship and cooperation’ was signed on 28 February 1953 by Yugoslavia, Greece and Turkey to strengthen regional security (Gota 2011, 116–122). A common General Staff and some institutions for extra-military collaboration were established. But activities to connect Yugoslavia indirectly with Western military orga- nization were quickly abandoned by Tito, who turned again to the Communist countries after Stalin’s death in 1953 (Bekic´ 2004, 125–141). So the Balkan Pact was only an episode, and showed Tito’s readiness to react to political necessities before the relations between Moscow and Belgrade were normalized again. In 1960, the Pact was officially dis- solved when Yugoslavia emphasized a revision of the Greek frontier, and Greece and Turkey on the other side quarreled over the status of Cyprus. During 1953 Tito secretly agreed with the Western countries that they would accept his turn towards the Soviet bloc and continue their finan- cial support, while Yugoslavia would keep a neutral status (Tripkovic´ 2004, 96–97). A first sign of the Soviet reconciliation with Yugoslavia after Stalin’s death was the reestablishment of diplomatic ties with Hungary and Bulgaria, authorized by Moscow in the summer of 1953 (Cvetkovic´ 2009, 117–135). The decisive official step was made by the newly proclaimed Soviet party leader Nikita Khrushchev, who visited Belgrade with a Soviet delegation in May 1955. Even at Belgrade Airport he stated his regret for the deterioration of Soviet-Yugoslav relations and declared that ‘Beria, Abakumov and others – recently exposed enemies of the people’ were responsible for the Yugoslav-Soviet crisis, avoid- ing the name of Stalin (Ramet 2006, 200). The thaw and the process Katrin Boeckh 31 of de-Stalinization were the background for Khrushchev’s interest in re-establishing normal ties with Belgrade. The Soviet Union expected a rise in prestige among Soviet countries, and for Khrushchev this meant a better personal position within the Kremlin if he was suc- cessful in bringing Yugoslavia back into the circle of Socialist brother states. For Tito also, reconciliation on the basis of a pacifist and active coexistence was a plus, as a closer connection between the two coun- tries promised to support Yugoslavia’s socio-economic situation (Maurer 1991, 305–373). The Belgrade Declaration of 2 June 1955 stated the recognition of mutual sovereignty, independence, integrity and equal- ity of both states, and the development of peaceful coexistence with no regard of ‘ideological differences’ (Documents on the detachment from Stalinism 2009, 116–117).When in February 1956 the Cominform was dissolved, Tito’s triumph over Moscow was complete. The Soviet lead- ers’ visit to Belgrade, answered by the return visit in June 1956, made it openly clear that Tito appreciated realignment with the Kremlin. Tito was reassured enough to continue developing his own brand of social- ism with no subjugation to Moscow, while being ready to stay loyal to the Soviet Union. The test for this new situation was the Hungarian Revolution in 1956, which was followed by Soviet intervention. Tito did not object, explaining publicly that in Budapest Communism was endangered by a counter-revolution, and that the Soviet intervention was a lesser evil (Pavlowitch 1992, 63–64). However, caused by growing ideological dif- ferences during the deterioration of ties between Moscow and China, Soviet-Yugoslav relations were constrained, too. A new party program of the CPY provoked massive Soviet criticism of Belgrade’s political ‘devia- tions’ (Pribiceviˇ c´ 1995, 339–340). The 1948 theme appeared again: the Warsaw Pact states introduced an economic blockade of Yugoslavia, while the US reassumed measures for the military support of Yugoslavia. But in the early 1960s the common socialist awareness prevailed, and Tito and Khrushchev re-established their relations anew. In the follow- ing years, Tito did not risk another split with Moscow. In this sense, he followed the Soviet direction concerning the status of the German Democratic Republic (GDR), establishing diplomatic ties with East Berlin in 1957. According to the Hallstein Doctrine, this led to the interruption of contacts with West Germany (Necak´ 2004). During the Prague Spring in 1968 tensions grew again, and a cam- paign of ‘revisionism’ against Yugoslavia was conducted, because Tito together with Nicolae Ceau¸sescu openly objected to the Soviet and Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia. For Tito, this was a heavy blow 32 PointofDeparture against socialism itself and against the ‘progressive forces in the world,’ as he underlined on 23 August 1968 (Girenko 1991, 420). While pragma- tism soon prevailed and Soviet-Yugoslav relations were normalized after the end of the Prague Spring (Tripkovic´ 2011, 127), Belgrade strength- ened Yugoslavia’s defensive capabilities, fearing a possible Soviet attack on other independent communist states. In 1968, the concept of ‘total national defense’ (opštenarodna odbrana) was introduced, and in 1969, the National Defense Law was promulgated (Boeckh 2009, 169). Accord- ing to this principle, each citizen between 16 and 65 years of age was obliged to militarily defend Yugoslavia in case of an attack from abroad. For that purpose, pupils in schools, students and workers in firms and industries received uniforms and weapons and were instructed in the use of weapons and in war strategies. The whole civil defense organiza- tion commanded between seven and eight million armed persons. They were to defend Yugoslavia in a form of guerrilla war together with the conventional Yugoslav People’s Army that had been set up in the 1950s, when 22 per cent of the national income was spent on defense of the country (Johnson 1971; Todorovic´ 1981). Interestingly, the large-scaled military maneuvers in October 1971, called Freedom-71, simulated an attack on Yugoslavia from Hungarian territory, in other words by the Warsaw bloc states. Communist by conviction, Tito’s Yugoslavia was economically more closely connected with the capitalist world from the 1950s until the 1980s. Financial subsidies and imports from the West and Yugoslav for- eign trade with Western Europe and the US used to be much more intensive than with the socialist brotherland USSR (see the table for Yugoslav foreign trade in Lampe 2000, 273). Furthermore, Western countries paid for their strategic interest in Yugoslavia. When, in the late 1950s, Belgrade appeared on the international financial market to attract loans, this step was quite successful, being allowed by the International Development Association (IDA), a part of the World Bank established in 1960 to support developing countries. Yugoslavia received credits from 1964 to 1969 worth US$480 million, from 1970 to 1976 over US$937 million, and from 1977 to 1983 over US$2.76 billion; totaling until 1983 US$4.1 billion (Bogetic´ 2006). Besides the geostrategic inter- ests, it was also Tito’s socialist alternative route that engaged sympathies especially among leftist circles in the West.

The Nonaligned Movement

Especially after the pressure on Yugoslav-Soviet relations created by the Hungarian invasion in 1956, Tito’s aim was to gain a prestigious Katrin Boeckh 33 position for himself and his country within Europe and the world, but to avoid being a puppet state within the Eastern and the Western blocs. Thanks to his political instincts, Tito realized the chances that nonalignment offered when this stance became popular among African and Asian states during the process of decolonization; and he used Yugoslav contacts with Socialist and Communist parties in the Third World to intensify Yugoslav activities in the Middle East (Petrovic´ 2007). After the first meeting in Bandung, Indonesia, Yugoslavia became one of the driving forces for the gathering of the Non-Aligned Move- ment (NAM), which led a course of independence from NATO and the Warsaw Pact during the Cold War (Jakovina 2011a; 2011b). Together with the Egyptian president Abdel Nasser and the Indian Prime Min- ister Jawaharlal Nehru, Tito became one of the leading figures within the movement. A summit of the 23 nonaligned states in Belgrade in 1961 proved Tito’s leading position. Furthermore, Yugoslavia was the only European country in the NAM in its early period. But, to be sure, the movement was not as neutral as it proclaimed itself to be: it was mainly the West that was being blamed for exploitation and slavery, and Tito held back from criticizing Soviet expansionism; ‘imperialism’ was a notion reserved for the Western hemisphere (Beloff 1985). The legal framework for nonalignment was a loose one. Neither did the movement have a charter – although there were criteria for participation in the First Conference in Belgrade – nor did the indi- vidual members codify nonalignment as a principle of national legis- lation. The Yugoslav Constitutions of 1963 and 1974 did not mention nonalignment, nor did the Program and the Statute of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia, adopted in 1958. But it was referred to by the party congresses, where it was declared to be the will of all Yugoslav citizens. In official statements, nonalignment policy constituted the ‘fundamental and lasting foreign-policy orientation of Yugoslavia, the authentic expression of the aspiration of its peoples for freedom and independence. Thus non-aligned policy [was] organically linked with the self-managing, socialist character of the Yugoslav society’ (Kardelj 1979; Bilandžic´ and Nick 1982, 170). For Tito’s personal cult, his foreign contacts and his trips to India, Indonesia, Ethiopia, the United Arab Republic and to other nonaligned countries, as well as the visits of African and Asian statesmen to Yugoslavia, played a considerable role. These activities were hailed in newspapers and other publications: photographs, speeches and excerpts from his talks with foreign state leaders were reproduced in propaganda publications (Šceki´ c´ 1961), and the often exotic presents that the visi- tors left to Tito are still exhibited in the museum near his mausoleum 34 PointofDeparture in Belgrade. The Yugoslav public was reassured that the activities of the nonaligned countries were significant and necessary, and that the meetings of the Yugoslav president with Asian and African statesmen were a valuable contribution to the consolidation of world peace, even in the period of détente in the 1970s, when the meaning of the NAM shrank. Nonalignment policy remained Tito’s personal commitment, and he received visitors from abroad on the island of Brioni, which became ‘a place of international pilgrimage’ for Communists, anti-Communists and for Hollywood stars (Beloff 1985, 162). But Tito himself was the ‘most travelled non-aligned leader of his time’ (Rubinstein 1970, 92–103), his journeys in Western as well as Eastern countries being leg- endary. Among others, in March 1953, he visited London as the first leading politician of a Communist country in Great Britain, and was received by the Queen in Buckingham Palace with Winston Churchill and other prominent politicians present; and in March 1971, Tito trav- eled to the Vatican to see Pope Paul VI, although he had conducted a harsh repression of religion after 1944–1945 and especially against the Catholic Church.5 Tito was highly decorated not only with domestic awards, but also with many foreign awards and decorations, for exam- ple by the highest orders of the state of Denmark (1974), the French Legion of Honor (1956), the West German Federal Cross of Merit (1974), the Swedish Royal Order of the Seraphim (1959), the highest order of the Soviet Union, the Lenin Order (1972), and in 1972, by Queen Elizabeth II, the British order of chivalry the Most Honourable Order of the Bath. From a distance the impact of Yugoslav nonalignment policy seems to be ambivalent. Tito presented himself as a sympathetic ambassador for his country abroad, and he rendered Yugoslavia a voice in the world and in the UN, with nonalignment being an important feature of Yugoslav socialism (Zimmermann 1987). Nonalignment broke the psychological isolation of the Yugoslav Communist Party and opened a way for coop- eration between socialist and ‘capitalist’ countries (Rubinstein 1970, 326), so that Western Europeans appreciated Yugoslavia’s mediation in the Middle East. On the other hand, though, it was a legitimization of Tito’s glamorous lifestyle and it was not directed at sustainable progress within Yugoslavia, at the liquidation of corruption and privileges of the party elites, or at the introduction of democratic structures. Eco- nomically too, nonalignment policy did not pay off, as the nonaligned countries were not active trade partners for Yugoslavia: in 1959, 60 per cent of Yugoslavia’s exchange of goods was allotted to the US, to Western Katrin Boeckh 35

Europe, to Canada and Australia, 27 per cent to Eastern European countries and to China, and only 13 per cent to the countries of the Third World (Bogetic´ 2006, 9).

The policy of open borders: Economic liberalization at home, political assassinations abroad

Taking into consideration the Yugoslav ‘third way’ with regard to social- ism and the nonalignment policy, many foreign observers commented sympathetically on Yugoslavia’s political development under Tito. This was further enhanced by the Constitution, which was promulgated in 1974. This extensive text, with 406 articles, is interpreted as a step towards federalism and towards strengthening the influence of the Yugoslav republics in the fields of education, research, health, social security and culture, even defining them as ‘states’ (Constitution of Yugoslavia 1974, Article 3). On the other hand, the Constitution did not make it possible for the republics to introduce independent foreign policies or to behave as actors in foreign politics – they had no ministries of foreign affairs of their own, and discussions on the right to leave the Yugoslav federation were endless in the 1980s and 1990s. But after 1974, they received some rights in the field of financing and were allowed to raise capital on the international financial markets. As Slovenia and Croatia used this, they could adapt more easily to the new economic structures in the European market after their national independence. Generally, according to the Constitution of 1974, the most important decisions in foreign politics were made by parliament in Belgrade, with the two chambers, the Federal Chamber (Savezno ve´ce) and the Chamber of the Republics and Provinces (Vece ´ Republika i Pokrajina), and the Pres- idency of the SFRY as the leadership organ – with Tito presiding as state president for life (proclaimed as such in the last Constitution of 1963) – that controlled the Ministries of Foreign Affairs, as well as internal affairs and defense. The 1970s in Yugoslavia were still characterized by phenomena con- nected with Yugoslav foreign relations. Namely, the regime conceded some important liberalizations to its citizens. Whereas other state social- ist countries kept their frontiers nearly closed and travelling abroad for their inhabitants was strictly regulated, Yugoslav citizens were able to freely leave the country and return. They could therefore travel abroad to work in Western countries as Gastarbeiter. Many Yugoslav citizens made use of this opportunity. For example, in West Germany in 1970, nearly 400,000 Yugoslavs were employed, being the largest group of 36 PointofDeparture all migrant workers (21 per cent) (Pavlica 1989, 113), while the num- ber of Yugoslav workers abroad in Western Europe was 600,000 in 1970, reaching a peak in 1973 of 860,000 (Zimmermann 1987, 81). The positive effect for the national economy was that workers brought back the money they had earned abroad or sent it to their families in Yugoslavia. Another important factor for the national economy was tourism. In contrast to other socialist countries, mass tourism was fos- tered in Yugoslavia when Belgrade abolished its visa requirements for foreign visitors in 1967. Thus Yugoslavia became the first Communist country to open its borders to tourists. Both of these developments resulted in a higher standard of living for many Yugoslav citizens compared with other socialist countries, and the acquaintance with Western culture (movies, music, entertainment magazines) influenced the way in which people thought (Repe 2004; Janjetovic´ 2011; Zubak 2012). To secure Yugoslavia’s living standards the regime recklessly took foreign loans during the 1970s. While this foreign money supported to a great extent a corrupt political system, the general economic situation deteriorated, and this was exacerbated by the oil crisis in 1973 that hit the country heavily. In 1973, Yugoslavia borrowed about US$16.5 billion, increasing the foreign net debt to US$19.5 billion in 1981. In the 1970s, Tito reached the eighth decade in his life, but noth- ing had changed in his socialist convictions. On the contrary, he was not willing to allow compromises or liberalization in his ideology. So, although losing physical strength, he was still energetic enough to remove Foreign Minister Mirko Tepevac from his position in 1972 because of his pro-Western inclinations, as had also been the case with one of his predecessors, Nikezic,´ in 1968. Feeling himself to be the undisputed ruler of Yugoslavia, and on good terms with Western coun- tries and with Western Social-Democratic parties, he and his entourage were entangled in political crimes committed outside Yugoslavia in the West. Namely, the Belgrade regime initiated assassinations of dissi- dents and of political opponents living in Western countries, executions being carried out by agents of the secret service UDBA. Between 1946 and 1990, according to the Croat newspaper Veˇcernji List of 28 June 2013, UDBA killed 69 persons. The victims were often people declared to be Croatian or Serb, or other ‘Yugoslav’ nationalists that Belgrade wanted to get rid of because they spread propaganda against Tito’s Yugoslavia. It was and is hardly possible to detect the murderers, but Katrin Boeckh 37 nonetheless some were brought before German courts. Tito’s responsi- bility for the orders to liquidate opponents is assumed by authors such as Bože Vukušic,´ as well as by the Higher Regional Court (Oberlandesgericht) Munich, in a court decision against an UDBA killer in 2008. These acts of state terrorism constituted an element of Titoist foreign policy that will be scrutinized for as long as the murderers are alive. Astonishingly, these politically motivated assassinations abroad as well as the prosecution of opponents within Yugoslavia did not disturb Western sympathies for the country. In the end, the Titoist state used the same brutal methods in the 1970s as it had applied in the 1940s, though more precise and individual, and even outside Yugoslavia. But generally, the open prose- cution of opponents throughout Yugoslavia’s existence hardly affected Tito’s positive image in the West. Tito died in 1980. His funeral in the Yugoslav capital was a last demon- stration of his popularity abroad, as 122 countries sent representatives, among them Leonid Brezhnev, Margaret Thatcher, Saddam Hussein and the chancellor of West Germany, Helmut Schmidt. The Yugoslav press, full of reports about the event, declared the Hotel Intercontinental in Belgrade the ‘centre of the world’ (Sovilj 2010, 152; Halder 2013, 227ff.) and the meeting of the politicians in Belgrade the ‘summit of mankind’ (Mljekarstvo 1980, 7). In the end, Tito’s diplomacy had covered the crimes of his regime and the fact that he fronted a dictatorship. After his death, he was glorified as a courageous partisan leader, as ‘David against Stalin-Goliath,’ as a charismatic personality who kept together the antagonisms inherent in the state of Yugoslavia. But this leaves aside the fact that Tito did not represent a democracy and was never elected freely; he was also reluctant to introduce economic and political reforms that would help Yugoslavia make real progress for her citizens. After 1980, a collective leadership fulfilled the president’s duties, including foreign policy – and that with the same disinclination to introduce reforms that Tito had shown. In the year of Tito’s death, it became obvious that his economic policy had brought about short-term successes, such as the rising living standards in the 1970s, but there were no sustainable effects. Only after 1980 did information about the foreign debt hesitantly reach the public (Batovic´ and Kasalo 2012, 19). The crisis sharpened when five-year loans from 1977 to 1980 had to be repaid between 1982 and 1985, which led to new debt (Jovic´ 2008, 147–148). In 1981, the dinar was devalued to 29 per cent of its previ- ous value. In 1985, Yugoslavia’s foreign debt reached more than US$20 billion, while real wages fell continuously and inflation grew massively 38 PointofDeparture

(Pavlowitch 1992, 91). This was the legacy of Titoist foreign policy. The Yugoslav policy of nonalignment continued until 1990. It was the only political principle of the Titoist regime that survived him; with his death, self-management and socialism vanished, as did ‘brotherhood and unity.’

Conclusion

To conclude, it is important to note that a reflection on Yugoslav for- eign policy under Tito helps us greatly in understanding Titoism as such. Yugoslavia under Tito was the most active socialist country con- cerning politicians’ travels abroad and the receipt of foreign loans. Roots for this peculiarity were to be found in pre-war developments within the first and monarchist Yugoslavia and within the Soviet tradition by which Tito was influenced. Tito’s Yugoslavia clung to the socialist princi- ples even after it was excluded from the Soviet orbit in 1948, and despite this found a way to attract Western money to support the still underde- veloped country. Although relations between Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union and the Western hemisphere were asymmetric, Yugoslav contacts to Western countries proved to be less constrained and more constant, as there were no conflicts regarding ideological basics and interpretations. Thanks to Tito’s diplomatic instincts and his multivectoral poli- cies, socialist Yugoslavia gained an international standing that had no relation to her political and/or economic position. Thanks to this inter- national meaning, the Titoist regime found a large part of its legitimacy in the eyes of the Yugoslav citizens – and the financial sources that helped to keep the system stable.

Notes

1. Since 1952: ‘League of Communists of Yugoslavia’ (Savez komunista Jugoslavije/SKJu). 2. The Serb nationalist and monarchist paramilitary organization formed as a resistance against the Ottoman Empire in 1904. 3. Kulaks were independent, wealthy farmers in the Russian Empire. The expres- sion was later used for any farmer who rejected collectivization. 4. These numbers, cited from Bogetic´ (2004, 316–317), do not include foreign social help funds to alleviate the disastrous consequences of droughts in 1950, 1952 and 1954. 5. In 1953, Yugoslavia cancelled diplomatic relations with the Vatican, when the Archbishop of Zagreb, Alojzije Stepinac, who had been sent to prison after a Titoist show trial, was proclaimed cardinal. Only in 1970 were the diplomatic ties re-established. Katrin Boeckh 39

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Ana Bojinovi´cFenko and Zlatko Šabiˇc

Introduction

This chapter presents an empirical analysis of the substance and strategy of Slovenian foreign policy. Before analyzing Slovenian foreign policy as policy – what and how in terms of values, objectives, instruments and strategy (Carlsnaes 2006) – it turns to Slovenian foreign policy as pro- cess – formulation, decision-making, implementation and feedback – to discuss the internal foreign policy environment (Hill 2003). The chapter pursues two goals: first, an assessment of the extent to which Slovenian foreign policy in substance and strategy is a continuation of the foreign policy of the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY), and second, an analysis of Slovenian foreign policy towards other states from the region of the former SFRY, where special attention is put on explain- ing continuities and fundamental shifts in this policy over the last 20 years. After an historical introduction about independence, recognition and relevant external material and demographic semi-material factors of its foreign policy environment (Hill 2003), the chapter discusses the institutional mechanism of Slovenian foreign policy-making. Therein, the development of foreign policy, relations of Slovenia to the other post-Yugoslav states and the importance of historical continuity and change in the country’s foreign policy since independence are outlined. The chapter features an empirical analysis of secondary and relevant primary sources, including foreign policy strategic and legislative docu- ments, and is concluded by a synthesis of the main arguments with a conceptual insight for further investigation.

47 48 Early Departure – Early Arrival

Slovenian international recognition and factors of foreign policy environment

The Republic of Slovenia represents the first nation-state formation of the people of Slovenia, who previously lived in various multi-ethnic empires and states.1 The idea of Slovenians living in their own state emerged after French Illyrian rule in the first half of the 19th cen- tury, and especially during the Spring of Nations in 1848, and evolved through literary and cultural means among Slovenian people within the Austrian and later Austro-Hungarian Empires, but without any recog- nized political institutionalization. After the collapse of the two empires, Slovenians searched for the realization of their national claims within the framework of a South Slavic cooperation (Rupel 2011, 57–60).2 In all these multi-ethnic state formations, Slovenians represented a coherent ethnic unit with their own language3 who lived in Central Europe at the frontier of Germanic, Latin, Hungarian and Slavic nations. Slovenian national space is thus historically strongly related to – or ‘imposed’ by – these societies and their geopolitics (Rupel 2011, 52). After the First and the Second World War some areas mainly inhab- ited by Slovenians remained in Italy, Austria and Hungary, and are thus subject to international protection of national minority rights. In Slovenia, there are three constitutionally acknowledged national minorities (Constitution of Slovenia, Article 5): Italians and Hungarians, each with one guaranteed seat in the National Assembly (Article 64), and Roma (Article 65), whose representation is guaranteed at local gov- ernment level. There are also so-called ‘new ethnic minorities’ (Komac 2007) living in Slovenia, which ‘are not territorial communities, but do consist of individuals who are ethnically different from the majority ethnic community and tend to wish to preserve their special minor- ity identity or at least some of its special characteristics, most often the mother tongue’ (Roter 2014, forthcoming). They are Albanians, Bosniaks, Croats, Macedonians, Montenegrins and Serbs. The overall population size of Slovenia in April 2012 was a little above 2 million (Statistical Office of Slovenia 2012). In December 1990,4 the Assembly of the Socialist Republic of Slovenia adopted the ‘Plebiscite Law for Independence and Sovereignty of the Republic of Slovenia’ and a ‘Declaration to Respect the Fundamental Conventions of the European Council’ (Ministry of Defense of Slovenia 2001). The referendum was organized on 23 December 1990 and its results were officially proclaimed three days later: 88.5 per cent of all voters supported independence (voter turnout was 93.2 per cent). According to Prunk (2001), ‘this result testified [ ...] that Slovenian Ana Bojinovi´cFenkoandZlatkoŠabiˇc 49 independence was also supported by many non-Slovene inhabitants of the republic (mainly migrants from other Yugoslav republics) whom independent Slovenia then granted citizenship.’ The Socialist Republic of Slovenia proclaimed its independence on 26 June 1991. Slovenian independence was relatively smoothly achieved compared with other states which emerged from the breakup of the SFRY. Slovenia faced a ten-day war for independence (27 June–6 July 1991) because of the maneuvers of the Yugoslav army (Jugoslovenska Narodna Armija – JNA) on its soil. The JNA started to occupy the republic’s border cross- ings on the very night of Slovenia’s declaration of independence. The Slovenian leadership responded to the JNA’s acts by declaring that the JNA was an enemy force and mobilizing the local territorial defense force and the police, who started blocking and attacking JNA units. Resis- tance to the JNA was taken up spontaneously and in large numbers by ordinary Slovenians; and a national territorial defense force (Teritorialna obramba) was formed. In addition to individuals in the military forces who withdrew from the JNA’s command5 (Nanut 2001), the major- ity of Slovenian diplomats in Belgrade and in the Yugoslav diplomatic service supported the goals of the Slovenian political leadership for inde- pendence and actively engaged themselves into achieving Slovenia’s international recognition (Rahten 2011, 664–665). In order to prevent any exacerbation or extension of the war, a European Community Min- isterial Troika arrived in Zagreb on 29 June 1991 and attempted to broker a ceasefire, which was finally reached at the Brioni (Croatia) meeting on 7 July 1991 (Bucarˇ and Brinar 1994; Bucarˇ 1995; Rupel 1996, 192–193). The main foreign policy goal of the newly formed state was to acquire international recognition (Benko 1992, 3–4). This was achieved on 15 January 1992 by the signing of the Vienna Agreement on succes- sion issues. Slovenia – as one of the legally equal successor states of the disintegrated Yugoslavia – entered into international organizations and multilateral treaties whose signatory Yugoslavia used to be, and agreed with those entities about which of the SFRY treaties and agreements remained in force (Petricˇ 2013, 465). Slovenia became a member of the United Nations on 22 May 1992 (the same day as Croatia, and Bosnia and Herzegovina).

The institutional mechanisms in foreign policy decision-making and implementation and actors in foreign policy

Based on Hudson’s (2007) model of four levels in Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA), we could assess that the most relevant influences (structural 50 Early Departure – Early Arrival and agentive) on the Slovenian foreign policy process are derived from 1) domestic politics and opposition and 2) culture and national identity. However, the two levels of ‘theater stage’ (Hudson 2007, 143), that is national characteristics and the international system, also pose constraints and some opportunities for Slovenian foreign policy. Constraints are mainly Slovenia’s position in the international hier- archy as a small power and new state. However, opportunities for foreign policy stem from the nation’s historical experience of living in multicultural societies, and especially its experience of ‘inter-national’ cooperation with former Yugoslav republics and nations (Ramet 1992). In the context of the main postulates of a constructivist approach to FPA (Kubálková 2001), formulated as a research program of ‘critical for- eign policy’ (Smith, Hadfield and Dunne 2008b), foreign policy process will be analyzed as an open and inclusive societal and political process based on structural constraints or opportunities and agential change or continuity. Especially in the first process phase (formulation), foreign policy may be similar to domestic policy, but decision-making (more governmental powers) and implementation (foreign policy instruments) make foreign policy a different phenomenon from domestic policy (Bojinovic´ Fenko 2010, 71). The formulation of Slovenian foreign policy is mainly a task of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA). The MFA is empowered to pre- pare for the government, the National Assembly and the President of the Republic ‘expert grounding for accepting positions, evaluations and measures in the field of foreign affairs’ (Foreign Affairs Act, Article 2). Since Slovenia is a parliamentary democracy, it is not customary for the MFA to replace the main political advisory staff after the change of a party in power. Participation of societal actors in the foreign pol- icy formulation process is granted to enable a consensus on the main foreign policy goals (or national interest), as is customary in any open democratic system. A very active societal formulator of foreign policy is Slovenia’s Chamber of Commerce, pushing for changes in Slovenia’s commercial diplomacy, especially in the Balkan region (Udovicˇ 2011a). Public opinion is put under closer scrutiny in the next section. The ana- lytical core of the MFA is underdeveloped and not highly normatively positioned; the same could be said for relations between the MFA and academia (Bucarˇ 2001; Petricˇ 2013, 449). Each foreign minister (FM) has formed a Strategic Council on Foreign Affairs, constituted of all former FMs, academics and former diplomats. The experience of some of its members seems to suggest that the body has been working without Ana Bojinovi´cFenkoandZlatkoŠabiˇc 51 any clear organizational proceedings, with three or four ad hoc meet- ings a year and with extremely low internal transparency. In terms of its foreign policy formulation powers, the Council’s potential – given its diverse representation – has not been used to its full extent. More- over, it has led some members of the Council to conclude that it served more as a tool for the legitimization of current government foreign policy rather than as an actual working body.6 The goal and method of the Strategic Council on Foreign Policy were outlined as ‘for- mulation of concrete directions for further conduct of normative and trustworthy foreign policy’ which will be achieved through ‘discussion based on Chatham House rules’ (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Slovenia 2013a). The MFA as the central coordinative body of foreign policy-making is organized into the minister’s cabinet, a secretariat, diplomatic repre- sentations with consulates, four services (public diplomacy, analytical, internal revision, government-parliament cooperation) and five direc- torates with further sectors and smaller departments. The directorates are thematically assigned to: (1) European affairs and political bilateral relations; (2) global affairs and political multilateral relations; (3) eco- nomic diplomacy; (4) development cooperation and humanitarian aid; and (5) international law and protection of citizens (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Slovenia 2011). The MFA has been transforming its internal organizational structure since the EU accession process, mainly in terms of top-down Europeanization and structural adjustments; examples of this reorganization can be seen in the formation of a Governmental Office for European Affairs (Služba vlade za evropske zadeve – SVEZ) in December 1997,7 and the formation of a European correspondent and political director (Kajncˇ 2011, 194). According to Bucarˇ (2001), the decision-making process in Slovenia would best be described in terms of Allison’s second conceptual model, i.e. organizational output (‘you stand where you sit’). However, elements of the governmental politics model (‘you sit where you stand’) have become obvious in the last few years. According to Breuning’s conceptu- alization of insulated and embedded agencies (Breuning 2007, 118), the Slovenian MFA is clearly an insulated agency, that is an autonomous entity within a government bureaucracy with its own resources and organizational structure, with its own staff and its own developed cri- teria for advancement.8 One of the embedded agency features of the MFA, however, is the prerogative of the President of the Republic to give assent to each individual nomination for ambassadors (Constitu- tion of Slovenia 2006, Article 107), which are initially prepared by the 52 Early Departure – Early Arrival

Minister of Foreign Affairs and motioned by the government (Foreign Affairs Act 2003, Article 17). This procedure points to a so-called ‘trin- ity’ in Slovenian foreign affairs, by which we refer to overlapping or at least unclear boundaries of powers in foreign policy-making (For- eign Affairs Act 2003, Articles 2, 4, 5). It has up to now occurred at least once (from 2005 to the end of 2007) that the three state representatives, Janez Drnovšek (President of the Republic), Dimitrij Rupel (FM) and Janez Janša (PM), have formulated and implemented highly inconsistent foreign policy positions. In this regard, not only their formal roles but mainly their individual characters influenced the inconsistency in Slovenian foreign policy: the FM was inconsistent him- self, the PM pursued elements of Realpolitik and the President of the Republic leaned towards a so-called New Foreign Policy (Neack 2003), based on universal values, international responsibility of states, high morale of foreign policy leaders and ethical pursuit of the common good. Implementation of Slovenian foreign policy is mainly conducted through diplomatic foreign policy instruments and primarily through multilateral diplomacy. This is a consensual understanding of foreign policy-makers and society as a result of the internal and external constraints on Slovenia’s foreign policy environment – the state’s youth and small size (Brglez 1996; Petricˇ 2013, 443–471). Slovenia has 44 embassies, seven permanent representations with international orga- nizations, eight (general) consulates and a commercial office in Milan (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Slovenia 2011). Official development assistance (ODA) has been developed as a multilateral and bilateral for- eign policy instrument since 1998 for two purposes: first, to achieve the image of a donor state (and not aid recipient as other states of the Stability Pact for South-East Europe at the time of its formation) (Bojinovic´ 2005); and second, to secure Slovenia’s foreign economic policy goals related to trade and investment in the Western Balkan area – the latter is the recipient of 9.5 million out of 13.2 mil- lion (72 per cent) of Slovenian bilateral ODA (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Slovenia 2013b). The military instrument of foreign policy is developed exclusively multilaterally within NATO. Cultural diplomacy and culture in international relations are yet to be operationalized by the Slovenian state, since this foreign policy instrument is not well developed (no cultural attachés or centers exist), except for a cultural house in Vienna and a Slovenian-seated multi-actor coalition initia- tive called the Forum of Slavic Cultures (Požgan and BojinovicFenko´ 2012). Ana Bojinovi´cFenkoandZlatkoŠabiˇc 53

Analysis of the substance of Slovenian foreign policy

The development of Slovenian foreign policy since Independence The development of Slovenia’s foreign policy has gone through several stages. In the first stage, Slovenia was looking for pillars on which it could build its confidence to participate actively in international affairs. In this respect, despite a normative commitment to ‘best possible rela- tions with the states [ ...] of Yugoslavia because of economic and many other reasons’ (Slovenian Foreign Policy Strategy 1991),9 Slovenia’s first move was to disassociate itself from the former Yugoslavia – and the Balkans in general – which was then considered to be one of the most volatile areas in the world. At a time when Slovenia escaped the massive war in the former Yugoslavia and in an effort to establish its image as a ‘normal’ independent state, an approach ‘away from’ the (Western) Balkans seemed almost predictable. The second, albeit less distinct, effort was an attempt by Slovenia to find itself a place in Central Europe. However, it seemed very clear from the outset that Slovenia was not going to be considered as a part of the recently emerged Visegrád Group (Šabicˇ and Drulák 2012). Third, the state moved away from the tradi- tion of former Yugoslavia as a founder and an active member of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM). Also, because of the general hesitance of non-aligned countries to recognize Slovenia as an independent state at the time,10 Slovenia showed little interest in cooperating with Third World countries (and still does not have any formal relations with the NAM).11 Thus, Slovenia was left with literally only one goal to focus on: to join Euro-Atlantic institutions as soon as possible and generally focus its foreign policy activities on Europe. This became clear from the content of the six major foreign policy orientations spelled out in 1991, which were in the following order: (1) joining Euro-Atlantic political, security and economic cooperation (especially the EU and NATO); (2) partic- ipation in political and economic multilateral institutions (especially the United Nations, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), Central European Initiative, Central European Free Trade Agreement); (3) good bilateral relations, in particular with neigh- boring countries; (4) final exit from the Balkan area to aid adaptation to the new political role; (5) intensify efforts to enhance the image of Slovenia and to foster its interest in the international community; (6) maintain close relations with Slovenians abroad (Rupel, et al. 2000). The process of forming its own diplomatic-consular offices (completed in 1992) was demanding, as Slovenian diplomats accounted for less than 54 Early Departure – Early Arrival

5 per cent of the entire diplomatic corps in the former Yugoslavia. The consolidation of Slovenia’s position in the international community remained a priority until 1995. This period was followed by a con- certed effort to accomplish a goal which enjoyed unequivocal support by all the parties except for the Slovenian National Party: the already mentioned membership in the EU and in NATO. The second stage of Slovenia’s foreign policy was entirely devoted to gaining membership in these two Euro-Atlantic international organiza- tions. With regard to NATO, Slovenia had limited official contacts with the Alliance until 1994 because of the arms embargo which was intro- duced in 1991 against all former Yugoslav republics.12 Still, NATO fea- tured high in Slovenia’s domestic political discourse. The first formal document to announce Slovenia’s ambitions with regard to NATO mem- bership was adopted in 1993 by the Slovenian National Assembly in a Resolution on General Principles of National Security of the Republic of Slovenia (Government of the Republic of Slovenia 1998). The arms embargo was frustrating the Slovenian political leadership because it felt that it was seriously lagging behind other former socialist coun- tries which were just as eager to join NATO. When the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) was established in December 1991, coop- eration in this framework was offered to nine Central and East European countries from the former Warsaw Pact; Slovenia would only join the NACC in 1996. Although the Slovenian government had hoped that it might leapfrog most of the former socialist countries through an invitation from NATO member states to join the organization along- side Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary (in 1999), this did not happen (ŠabicandJelušiˇ cˇ 2003). Slovenia eventually received the invi- tation to join NATO at the November 2002 Prague Summit and became a NATO member state in 2004. Slovenia applied for EU membership in June 1996, which signifi- cantly affected Slovenia’s foreign policy in the sense that it became even more EU oriented. To pursue its primary goal, Slovenia had to deal with two neighboring EU member states which sought to extract cer- tain concessions from Slovenia ‘in exchange’ for EU membership: Italy and Austria (Šabicˇ 2002). Italy demanded a reopening of the question of the national border, despite the legal validity of the Treaty of Osimo (1975), which determined the border between the former Yugoslavia and Italy. Italy also demanded new arrangements on the status of the Italian minority in Slovenia. Austria’s bilateral conditionality to prove Slovenia’s ‘Europeanness’ was linked to the safety standards of the nuclear power plant in Krško and on the status of the German-speaking Ana Bojinovi´cFenkoandZlatkoŠabiˇc 55 population to be advanced to a national minority status. Both neigh- boring EU member states also demanded real-estate ownership status of their nationals who either left Istria or whose property was nationalized in SFRY after the Second World War. Austria’s government persuaded the European Commission that the denationalization issue should be treated as a non-discrimination principle within the EU market regula- tion, but Italy’s bilateral conditions especially were not accepted warmly among European allies. The issue of Italian citizens’ property acquisition rights had been dealt with through the Spanish presidency mediation in the so-called Spanish compromise. That, in turn, opened Slovenia’s road to the EU. Slovenia concluded the Europe Agreement on 10 June 1996 and at the same time applied officially for EU membership.13 Thus, five years into its independence, Slovenia has had some foreign policy ‘suc- cesses,’ yet it has still not formulated its own national document on foreign policy strategy. In lieu of the former, as pointed out by Bucar,ˇ this period has been marked by substantive inconsistency, oscillating between regionalism (focus on European institutions) and universalism (efforts in global institutions, such as a non-permanent seat in the United Nations Security Council, in the Human Security Network and in demining projects) (Bucarˇ 1992). The third still ongoing stage of Slovenia’s foreign policy develop- ment can be termed as a reflection on the future foreign policy strategy. In fact, this process started as early as 1999, when the Slovenian National Assembly adopted a Declaration on Foreign Policy of the Republic of Slovenia (Deklaracija o zunanji politiki Republike Slovenije). The Declara- tion, for its part, seems rather clear about the horizons of Slovenia’s foreign policy – as a matter of principle Slovenia should place its for- eign policy focus on Europe. According to the Declaration, there is no doubt that within the United Nations and other important international organizations, Slovenia is able to pursue its fundamental foreign policy goals and interests. However, in order to maximize limited resources and capabilities, Slovenia’s foreign policy focus will be on the EU, NATO, the Council of Europe, the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development and the OSCE (Declaration on Foreign Policy 1999). Such an approach was followed by other documents and communications. For example, the document called ‘An Appropriate Foreign Policy,’14 which was adopted by the Slovenian government in 2002, defined five ‘horizons’ of Slovenian foreign policy of which the EU was identified as the most important, followed by NATO, then neighboring countries together with South-East Europe, further Arab countries and Israel, and finally Asian, African and Latin American countries. 56 Early Departure – Early Arrival

After an initial flight away from the Balkans (as referred to above in the second stage), the biggest substantive and strategic change that the document produces is Slovenia’s reorientation ‘back to the Balkans’ (Bojinovic´ 2005). This change was not a consequence of the domestic normative environment but the result of pressure by external actors, namely the EU and NATO who, in 1998, strongly conditioned Slovenia’s (re)integration in South-East Europe to progress towards Euro-Atlantic integration. Slovenia thus identified itself in the 1999 Declaration on Foreign Policy of the Republic of Slovenia as a state with compar- ative advantages towards the region of South-East Europe: ‘on the basis of its geographical, political, economic and historical predisposi- tions Slovenia can offer good offices in solving complicated situations as in its neighbourhood as elsewhere.’ In the Declaration one sees a clear identity-based shift from central European to other Slovenian regional identities, in the following passage under the title Central Europe:

Nevertheless, Slovenia is not only a central European state, its iden- tity is also built on its Mediterranean tradition and connection to South Eastern Europe; therefore it could be a bridge between differ- ent European regions. This is also the perception of other (Central European) countries, therefore Slovenia has to profit from this posi- tion and within Central Europe (even as a future member of the EU) assume the role of the leading connoisseur and adviser on political, economic and other problems of South Eastern Europe.

Thus in terms of a changing foreign policy strategy, regional inte- gration into Euro-Atlantic organizations remained the main foreign policy priority, but it was seconded by developing Slovenia’s recognition and international visibility by bridge-building and mediation activities between Europe and South-East Europe, and even in the Mediterranean. However, several policy-makers as well as members of academia warn that a too regional-looking approach might limit Slovenia’s role in the world and, consequently, hurt Slovenia’s interests, especially because of the rapid changes caused by globalization, which brought new actors into the international arena, such as the BRICS (Brazil-Russia-India- China-South Africa). As one commentator has put it, ‘the world is more than just the EU’ (Bucarˇ 2004, 124). What the result of these debates will be is still unclear. A new foreign policy strategy is still being con- sidered, though at the time of writing, it was unclear when this will be completed. Ana Bojinovi´cFenkoandZlatkoŠabiˇc 57

Slovenian foreign policy and relations to the other Yugoslav successor states If future Slovenian foreign policy orientation is still under discussion, some topics are bound to be kept on the agenda. This is particularly true for the Western Balkans. Slovenia arguably counts among the European countries that are most active in the region. The state had made it clear during negotiations on accession to the EU that it would be most active on issues regarding the Western Balkans and even that it would offer good offices and mediation in solving complicated situations in its neighborhood (Kajncˇ 2011, 204).15 In terms of multilateral regional relations, Slovenia’s ties to coun- tries founded in the post-SFRY space are good, stable and progressively intensified. It is no wonder that during the 2008 EU presidency, which Slovenia held in the first part of the year, the situation in the Western Balkans topped its presidency agenda.16 Further, in July 2010 the National Assembly of Slovenia adopted a Declaration on the Western Balkans which outlined the measures of Slovenia’s support and assis- tance to the stabilization of the region (DeZB 2010). The Declaration was adopted in support of the ‘Guidelines for Slovenia’s Policy in the Western Balkans,’ which articulated various dimensions of Slovenia’s involvement in the region, in particular that of economic cooperation.17 In addition, Slovenia’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs has a special depart- ment focused on the region and regional initiatives, as well as a special office for assistance to the region.18 In line with the above-mentioned mediation efforts, Slovenia started the Brdo process in 2010.19 Also, as seen from the work of Slovenian Members of Parliament (MP) as rappor- teurs in the European Parliament (not as state representatives but in the context of good transnational relations), they positively reported on the visa-waiver regime for Western Balkan states. Bilaterally, Slovenia aims for good relations with all post-Yugoslav states, mainly for political, security, economic and cultural reasons. Slovenia holds diplomatic representations in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), Croatia, Kosovo, Macedonia, Montenegro and Serbia. Trade and investment flows with individual countries are of special importance (17 per cent of overall trade and 70–75 per cent of FDI). Thus, Slovenia has one economic attaché in Croatia, BiH, Serbia, Montenegro and Macedonia, whereby it also employs local staff for economic affairs in Serbia and in BiH.20 A parallel network of business diplomacy financed by the state has developed which functions in the form of so called business clubs in Belgrade, Skopje and Zagreb (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Slovenia 2008). A short overview of open issues in bilateral 58 Early Departure – Early Arrival relations is presented by a typology of succession-related issues and post-independence issues (Table 3.1).

Comparison between current Slovenian and former Yugoslav foreign policy

Comparing Slovenian and Yugoslav foreign policy would demand, first, assessing both states’ substance, in other words values, goals, strategy and instruments; and second, comparing the findings by looking for commonalities and differences. For this purpose, a foreign policy strate- gic document of comparable weight (e.g. parliamentary declaration) of both states should be analyzed and then compared. We have not man- aged to access such a Yugoslav document; thus our analysis (Table 3.2) rests on secondary sources. The foreign policy values of the SFRY and Slovenia are quite simi- lar, stemming from the respect of international law. Yugoslavia values the preservation of sovereignty and non-intervention in internal affairs; Slovenia supports general principles of international law which ‘pro- tect’ small states from big states’ arbitrary actions, especially human rights provisions. Values stemming from political systems are very dif- ferent, however, but Slovenia does continue to hold the high value of social welfare. Foreign policy goals are quite different; only gen- eral objectives might be understood as similar (economic prosperity, political stability). Geographically the SFRY’s outlook is global whereas Slovenia’s is regional, except in issue areas such as human security and environmental diplomacy.21 In terms of foreign policy instruments, the size and capability of the two states are the most prominent explanations of the difference in states’ availability of instruments. Nevertheless, in terms of their use, the two states may not be so different; both use(d) mainly diplomatic and economic instruments, Yugoslavia, however, in a slightly more hard power fashion (e.g. economic negative sanctions). Yugoslavia also strongly used culture and propaganda to promote its political system and societal values, whereby Slovenia does not have this instrument highly developed (it conducts only general public diplomacy – public information on MFA website) and does not have cultural centers abroad. Strategically, both states conduct(ed) active foreign policy multilaterally, but the SFRY had a global leadership ambition, whereas Slovenia only reaches for a strategy of regional mediation. An entirely new issue in Slovenian foreign policy is environmental diplomacy (cooperation in the Green Group).22 59 3 ˇ c (2011). ˇ candUdovi ˇ ci 2 closure because of Croatian unilateralproduction documentation – resolved in November 2009; EU accession treaty. enterprises; relatively high. Croatia the status of aproclamation candidate by country, the because Croatian of Parliament,2003, the on of 3 an October Ecological-Fishing ProtectionAdriatic. Zone Dispute in delayed the until thepartnership conclusion on of fisheries a agreement new betweenthe Croatia EU; and Slovenia recognized Kosovo on 5 March 2008. Post-independence issues Slovenia supports the use of the state name Macedonia. Slovenia set up an Internationaland Trust Mine Fund Victims for Assistance. Demining • Slovenian blockade of EU-negotiation chapters’ • 2013 dispute before Slovenian ratification of Croatian • Dispute over nationalization of assets of Slovenian • Slovenian recognition of Kosovo affects trade flows • Slovenia threatened to veto the EU decision to give never Ljubljanska banka ; ´ c regime with state 1 Ljubljanska banka ; ˇ c (2011b). Ljubljanska banka Ljubljanska banka in Udovi ´ c (2005). Ljubljanska banka ownership, waste management, profit fromproduction, electricity time-span of the plant; by international arbitration; an agreement signed on thethe issue succession to process be as treated aentry within condition in for March Croatian 2013. EU existed (unilaterally ‘solved’ by Miloševi / Succession-related issues Open question regarding the savers of BiH does not agree with territorial rule. successfully resolved. // confiscation of deposits). • Disagreements over nuclear plant in Krško regarding: • Open question on the border demarcation to be• solved Open question regarding the savers of Bilateral relations of Slovenia and individual post-Yugoslav states by two-fold typology More on the issue ofMore savings on of this in RoterMore and on Bojinovi the preventive diplomacy of Slovenia as the state presided over the Council of the EU in Zupan Kosovo Table 3.1 Bosnia and Herzegovina Macedonia Question regarding the savers of 1 2 3 Montenegro Serbia Question regarding the savers of Croatia 60 commercial diplomacy, official development assistance, environmental multilateral diplomacy; Croatia). rights; of the Western Balkans); Forum of Slavic cultures). Mediterranean); Republic of Slovenia • soft power: multilateral diplomacy, economic and • hard power: coercive diplomacy (e.g. in the EU towards • respect of international law; human rights, minority • democracy, social welfare, rule• of supranationality law; of the EU (and NATO). • ideological self-definition against• the Balkans; use of normative power and structural power (knowledge • multilateral issue-related alliance• (e.g. Green regional Group); cooperation in• central Europe mediation and between Balkans; the• EU and multicultural Western dialogue Balkans; (promotion of Slavic roots; e.g. • international recognition; • economic prosperity (membership• of the good EU, neighborly OECD); relations; • well-established state in the region (Central Europe, • membership in NATO. ∗ affairs, multi-ethnicity; (e.g. quotas, multiple currency policy,commercial economic diplomacy), and propaganda, culture; (e.g. bilaterally towards the Soviet Union). between the prevailing two blocs; self-management and of culture. developed and underdeveloped states); Community (1980s). Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia • respect of international law; non-intervention in internal • socialism, self-management; • peaceful and active• coexistence among independent nations; position outside block alliances. • soft power: multilateral diplomacy, economic instruments • hard power: strong national army, coercive diplomacy • ideological self-definition against• the USSR; use of normative• power (principles multilateral of alliance international – law); legitimate global co-leadership • regional Balkan cooperation; • promotion of political system, innovative socialist • political and economic• independence and new equality; economic order (reducing the gap between • leadership in NAM; • good relations with the USA, European Economic Comparison of Slovenian and Yugoslav foreign policy substance and strategy

Values Instruments Strategy Goals/Objectives

Strategy Content Some data on the foreign policy of Yugoslavia is analyzed on the basis of Kardelj (1956, 595–602) Table 3.2 ∗ Ana Bojinovi´cFenkoandZlatkoŠabiˇc 61

Conclusion – Historical continuity and change in Slovenia’s foreign policy

On the basis of the above analysis, the following conclusion can be reached: immediately after independence, Slovenian foreign policy intentionally displayed practically no continuation of former Yugoslav foreign policy. This has remained so ever since, displaying continuity in Slovenia’s foreign policy. On the other hand, Slovenian foreign pol- icy per se, especially in relation to the foreign policy objectives towards post-Yugoslav states, has been changing: after initial cooperative eco- nomic relations, Slovenia drifted away from the region, to come back to active integration through bridge-building and mediation. The reasons for both phenomena are summarized below. After the Yugoslav wars broke out in 1991, there appeared an identity collision between Slovenian statehood based on Western-type democ- racy and Balkan representation of armed conflict, non-democratic prac- tices of governance, disrespect for human rights and general instability. Slovenia thus did not have any political interest in continuing the substantive line of Yugoslav foreign policy, as that would keep her ideationally aligned to this at-the-time conflictual region and ham- per its desired democratization. Second, former close Yugoslav allies within the NAM were reluctant to recognize Slovenia’s independence, so the state had no means for establishing new relations and no interest in nurturing former relations, as the developing states acted distrust- fully toward the newly formed Slovenian state. Third, there were also very few Slovenian diplomatic staff (only 5 per cent) with a Yugoslav diplomatic background. This means that in terms of potential policy continuation there was none, because of the entire change of politi- cal personnel and administrative system. Thus it was no surprise that Slovenia after 1992 started from scratch: developing its foreign pol- icy administration, identity and international profile, and subsequently also foreign policy objectives and strategy. There is, however, one potential element of continuation identified between Slovenia’s imme- diate post-independent foreign policy compared to Yugoslav foreign policy. Accession to the EU as one of the two Slovenian priority post- independence goals might be interpreted as a rare element of general continuity of Yugoslavian pro-Western economic cooperation strategy (SFRY did have an economic agreement with the European Economic Community from 1982). In comparison to the SFRY, current Slovenian foreign policy differs through the constraints represented by its foreign policy environment. 62 Early Departure – Early Arrival

Slovenia is, by all standards, a small state, with a distinctive regional rather than global agenda. Yugoslavia, on the other hand, nurtured an image of immense strategic importance during the Cold War period, representing itself as a kind of buffer zone between the Soviet and the Western blocs, which was symbolized by a specific ‘self-management’ type of socialism. In addition, Yugoslavia successfully positioned itself on the map of global politics by becoming a founder and an active member, if not leader, of the NAM. To summarize, Slovenia is a small power with a regional identity and thus a regional outlook and strategy of action, whereas the SFRY was a medium power with a self-positioned identity against two global superpowers and thus with a global outlook reflected in a strategy of legitimate co-leadership of the NAM. However, a similarity could be found in the initial self-positioning of the two young states against their ideational ‘Others’; Yugoslavia in 1948 posi- tioned itself against the Soviet Union’s type of communism (and earlier against the Western democratic system) and Slovenia in 1992 based its self-definition against Balkan non-democratic practices of governance, favoring its Central European identity. This potential resemblance rests on the factors of both states being young and searching for international visibility by building their identity through foreign policy. In terms of Slovenia’s foreign policy continuity and change, we have shown elements of discontinuity. Slovenian objectives to assure international recognition and economic stability were initially pursued in cooperation with former Yugoslav republics but this has entirely changed upon the outbreak of the Yugoslav wars. A further need for identity-change has been explained above, linking Slovenia to Central rather than Balkan Europe. Slovenia’s ‘return’ to closer cooperation with the post-Yugoslav region was a result of external pressure, a condition made by Euro-Atlantic institutions for Slovenia to start its own accession process towards these organizations. As joining the latter was Slovenia’s main foreign policy goal, this was sufficient interest-based motivation for foreign policy change, but it was conditioned by an identity-element of representation as a donor (Western) state. Potential process-based sources of discontinuity owing to slippage have also been shown in Slovenian foreign policy (e.g. trinity in foreign policy, absence of inde- pendent MFA analytical core, malfunctioning of the Strategic Council), but the empirical analysis did not focus on their further elaboration. As a final conclusion, this analysis shows that interest-based elements of foreign policy might represent continuity between a former state and a newly established state, whereas the identity-based motives of foreign policy most often represent an element of change in newly established states. Ana Bojinovi´cFenkoandZlatkoŠabiˇc 63

Notes

1. The roots of the Slovenian nation and its self-rule can be traced back to the second half of the 7th century in what today is the Austrian part of Carinthia. 2. The short-lived State of Slovenians, Croats and Serbs in 1918 (just a few months); the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenians from 1918 and the latter’s renaming as Kingdom of Yugoslavia in 1929, which existed until the formation of SFRY in November 1945. For more on the historical aspects of various societal and political segments contributing to Slovenian nation-building, see Benderly and Craft (1996). For Slovenians’ engage- ment in diplomatic services of various pre-Slovenian states, see Rahten (2011). 3. Slovenian is a Western Slavic language most comparable to Croatian and Serbian, using the Latin alphabet. 4. In the second half of the 1980s, as interethnic, sociocultural relations and intra-federal and politico-economic visions in the SFRY began to diverge, resulting in a crisis of the communist regime, Slovenian intellectual move- ments gathered around a magazine (Nova Revija, New Magazine). It called for a new Slovenian national program, aiming for ‘an abandoning of the communist system and the introduction of a politically pluralist, democratic system, a free market economy with public welfare and an independent Slovene state’ (Prunk 2001). In the so-called ‘Slovenian Spring’ of 1989, the Slovenian communist leadership sided with the mood of the movement, which was generally taken over by the people. 5. These soldiers had to be granted certain legal rights and ensured security against possible revenge from the JNA. Information on these procedures and on general prisoners of war (POW)-related rules and procedures were dispatched by the Slovenian Secretariat for Internal Affairs to all police sta- tions on 29 June 1991, while provisions of the Geneva Conventions and the cooperation with the Slovenian Red Cross, who detached itself from the Yugoslavian Red Cross, were particularly taken into consideration. The total number of POWs was 3,700 (Prebilicˇ and Guštin 2010). 6. These insights are of Prof. Bojko Bucar,ˇ who was a member of the Strategic Council from the first Slovenian government until its present constitution, and of Prof. Zlatko Šabic,ˇ who was a member of the Strategic Council in the cabinet of two consecutive foreign ministers, Dr Dimitrij Rupel and Samuel Žbogar (2004–2011). 7. After EU accession, the SVEZ has been reformed into the government office for European Affairs and Development and in 2011 integrated into the MFA. 8. Petricˇ (2010, 456–460) is critical of Slovenian practices in the rotation of staff in MFA, especially the political nomination of diplomats and lack of (education for) career diplomats. 9. The second regionally related goal was a high priority to the issue of suc- cession (international treaties, economic agreements). For more details see Bojinovic´ (2005). 10. One of the authors of this paper still vividly remembers an encounter with a Nigerian diplomat in Thessaloniki in the fall of 1991, who accused Slovenia of destroying Yugoslavia and that ‘Nigeria will never recognize Slovenia.’ 64 Early Departure – Early Arrival

11. Currently, all former Yugoslav republics except Macedonia and Slovenia enjoy an observer status with the NAM. 12. The embargo was approved by UN Security Council Resolution 713 (25 September 1991). 13. More on this in Brinar and Svetliciˇ cˇ (1999). 14. Government of the Republic of Slovenia, The Appropriate Foreign Policy – the basic elements of the Slovenian foreign policy along its integration in the Euro-Atlantic alliances [Primerna zunanja politika – Temeljne prvine zunanje politike Republike Slovenije ob vkljuˇcevanju v evroatlantske povezave], adopted by the Government of the Republic of Slovenia on 10 October 2002. 15. For an analysis of Slovenian foreign policy towards the Western Balkans region as a strategic choice of Slovenian regional specialization see Bojinovic´ Fenko and Požgan (2014). For an analysis of Slovenia’s support of individual Western Balkans’ countries in the EU-enlargement process see Kajncˇ (2011, 204–206). 16. Slovenian Presidency Program Si.nergy for Europe. January–June 2008. Available at: http://www.eu2008.si/includes/Downloads/misc/program/ Programme_en.pdf (31 July 2013). 17. The Guidelines are available (in Slovenian) at http://www.mzz.gov .si/ fileadmin/pageuploads/Novinarsko_sredisce/Sporocila_za_javnost/1007/ Smernice_ZB.pdf. (30 July 2013). 18. See the website of the Centre for European Perspective (CEP), founded by the Government of the Republic of Slovenia, http://www.cep.si/. A description of the Western Balkans and regional initiatives department is available at http://www.mzz.gov.si/en/about_the_ministry/organisation/ directorate_for_european_affairs_and_bilateral_political_relations/ western_balkans_and_regional_initiatives_department/ (20 May 2013). 19. See more on the Brdo process on the MFA website (in English): http://www .mzz.gov.si/en/foreign_policy/foreign_policy/western_balkans/the _brdo_process/ (20 May 2013). 20. In Banja Luka, a consular office also conducts the promotion of economic cooperation. 21. See also the chapter on Yugoslavia by Katrin Boeckh in this volume. 22. The Green Group is an informal group of Cape Verde, Costa Rica, Slovenia, Iceland, Singapore and the United Arab Emirates; it aims to promote closer cooperation in environmental issues within foreign policies. It was estab- lished in 2009 at the initiative of the former Slovenian Foreign Minister Samuel Žbogar. It devotes particular attention to climate change, water and renewable energy sources (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Slovenia 2013c).

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Senada Šelo Šabi´c

Introduction

‘Congratulations Croatia. At midnight your country passed an important threshold. This is an event that will forever change the lives of this people. You have always been Europeans, now you are also mem- bers of the Union. On behalf of 27 member states, I wholeheartedly wish you a warm welcome!’ said Herman van Rompuy (van Rompuy 2013), the President of the European Council at the ceremony on the occa- sion of the Croatian entry into the EU on 1 July 2013. Martin Schulz (Dnevnik.hr 2013b), the President of the European Parliament, joined ranks of those who spoke about Croatia finishing a long journey and concluded: ‘Welcome to the European Union. Welcome home.’ Indeed, 1 July 2013 marks the end of a journey that may well be said to have started the moment Croatia began the process of disassocia- tion from the former Yugoslavia. Addressing the Croatian Parliament on 30 May 1990, just after the first democratic elections, Franjo Tuąman spoke about the immediate tasks of the new government, the first being a new constitution, the second the position of Croatia in Yugoslavia and the third the

integration into Europe and the Europeanization of Croatia. Simul- taneously with internal democratic transformation we should take all necessary steps to integrate Croatia into the ...European Commu- nity as soon as possible. For centuries Croatia has been an integral part of Western European (Mediterranean and Central European) cul- ture. Even when it did not enjoy full state subjectivity, Croatia was inextricably linked with Western civilization ...Through European

69 70 Early Departure – Early Arrival

integration Croatia must ensure its independence and faster development. (Sabor 2013)

President Ivo Josipovic´ (Danas.hr 2013) almost reiterated these words on 30 June 2013: ‘Europe was, is and will be an idea to which we belong. We were, are, and remain Europeans. Europe is the crucial part of our national identity. We belong to it, not only through geography, but also through values we share.’ Reflections of this kind do not mean, of course, that the journey was fast, smooth and straightforward. The transition from being a member of socialist Yugoslavia to being a member of the EU was demanding, slow and frequently frustrating. New laws were passed, new regula- tions and procedures adopted, new institutions created, existing ones reformed; and all this was to be made in the context of extensive change of values and norms. Initiating internal changes, sustaining debates, bringing in interests of different social groups, delineating ideological fault lines among key political parties – all these activities have a sig- nificant impact on a country’s foreign policy. Domestic structures and individual actors are agents of change in a country’s foreign policy (Evangelista 1989; Hudson and Vore 1995). This chapter thus analyzes the development of foreign policy in Croatia in the period from 1991 when it declared independence to 2013 when it entered the EU. In the course of 22 years, Croatia left the Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia, gained international inde- pendence, established full control of its territory, cooperated with the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia in the Hague (ICTY), joined NATO in 2009 and finally qualified for membership of the EU, becoming a member in 2013. These were goals of strategic national interest, and the consensus of all parliamentary parties was instrumental in carrying out this enormous task (Staniciˇ c´ 2005, 108; Caratan 2009; also see Jandrokovic´ 2008; Leko 2013). The integration into Euro-Atlantic structures rested on the premise ‘at any price.’ The foreign policy of Croatia developed along this trajectory of events backed by full consensus within the country on what constituted key national interests. Foreign policy in the future, however, may not be as straightforward as it was during these formative years. With around 56,000 km2 of territory and a population of around 4.4 million, Croatia is a relatively small country. If power relations are asymmetric (Thorhallsson and Wivel 2006), Croatia is small since it cannot exert any significant influence over global power structures Senada Šelo Šabi´c 71 or change the nature of international institutions. As a small state it can strive for regional relevance and seek to develop a few foreign policy strategies (Hill 2003) that fit a state of such a profile: pursue active multilateralism if ambitious (and if possible), resort to survival- oriented foreign policy if necessary and basically maintain a low-profile foreign policy except if focusing on specific thematic issues in which the country has expertise. The rest of this chapter will proceed in the following way: first I will outline the development of foreign policy since independence, includ- ing an overview of institutional mechanisms, main protagonists in the last two decades, objectives and outcomes, in line with Neack’s (2008) suggestion that foreign policy should be studied at both the institutional and the individual level. I then look into relations with other Yugoslav successor states and briefly discuss which foreign policy topics tend to arouse public interest. I conclude with an overview of the main foreign policy objectives and challenges of today.

Croatia’s move to independence

Croatia’s Day of Independence is celebrated on 8 October: on the same day in 1991 the Croatian Parliament severed all remaining ties with the former Yugoslavia, in which it was one republic in the fed- eration of six republics and two autonomous provinces, which had a population of 24 million. In 1990 the Parliament of the Socialist Republic of Croatia passed constitutional amendments, allowing for the first Yugoslav multi-party democratic elections to take place. The elec- tions brought to power the Croatian Democratic Union led by Franjo Tuąman, a historian and a former Yugoslav army general turned dissi- dent who had been arrested as a Croat nationalist in the 1970s. The Croatian Communist party, led by Ivica Racan,ˇ lost the elections and allowed a peaceful transfer of power. However, the transition from a republic in federal Yugoslavia to an independent country was not to be peaceful. The new Croatian Parliament (Sabor) decided to hold a referendum on independence on 19 May 1991. The voter turnout was 83.5 per cent, out of which 93 per cent were in favor of Croatian indepen- dence. Along with Slovenia, Croatia declared independence from the former Yugoslavia on 25 June 1991, but subsequently agreed to observe a three-month moratorium on this decision, which was requested by the European Community Ministerial Troika and the Conference on Secu- rity and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE, now OSCE). The moratorium 72 Early Departure – Early Arrival was to expire on 8 October 1991, giving the European states and the international community a limited time to mediate between Zagreb and Belgrade and seek a solution to the Yugoslav crisis. These were tense and frightening months, difficult for all sides – for disassociating Slovenia and Croatia, for hesitant Bosnia and Herzegovina and Macedonia, and for opposing Montenegro and Serbia. European diplomatic initiatives were insufficient – like a small fire crew trying to extinguish blazing bushfires. That summer saw a ten-day war in Slovenia and rising ten- sions in Croatia. By fall, the Hour of Europe, declared so infamously by Jacques Poos, went up in flames. On 7 October 1991, Banski dvori,the seat of the Croatian government, was bombed by the Yugoslav Army air force. The next day the moratorium expired and Croatia officially broke ties with Yugoslavia. By that time, over half a million people in Croatia were internally displaced (UNHCR 2011). Vukovar, a place of despicable civilian suffering and the centerpiece symbol of the war, was occupied on 18 November 1991. The war was in full swing and Croatia was fully out of Yugoslavia.

Elements of Croatian foreign policy development since independence

Croatian foreign policy can be separated into three phases (Jovic´ 2011):

1. Disassociating from Yugoslavia and acquiring international recogni- tion of the new state; 2. Recapturing occupied territories and reintegrating them into the mainland; 3. Seeking membership in Euro-Atlantic structures.

The first phase was rather short, a period in which Croatia held its refer- endum on independence, officially ceased membership of the Yugoslav federation, proclaimed independence and gained international recogni- tion. Croatia was recognized on 15 January 1992 by member states of the then European Community. Germany1 and the Vatican, instrumen- tal in this recognition, established diplomatic relations with Croatia on the same day. The United States recognized Croatia, along with Slovenia and Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), on 7 April 1992. Croatia became a member of the UN on 22 May 1992. These first few years of Croatian independent statehood were extremely challenging for its diplomacy and foreign policy, both politically and institutionally. Just as it was try- ing to establish and staff the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, embassies and Senada Šelo Šabi´c 73 consulates, Croatia had to participate in international meetings, receive foreign delegations and dignitaries, lobby in world capitals and consult permanently with its allies, in an attempt to explain its position and generate support for its actions. Croatia’s most reliable friends in Europe were the Vatican, Germany and Austria. A German diplomat (Libal 2004) subsequently analyzed cir- cumstances in the early 1990s, principles which guided German politics with respect to the break-up of Yugoslavia, and why in his opinion the ‘myth of early recognition’2 has been unfounded. Although Germany was the last country to ratify the Croatian EU accession agreement, and although German Chancellor Angela Merkel cancelled at the last minute her trip to Zagreb to attend the EU accession ceremony, the sense of strategic friendship sealed in the early 1990s and celebrated in a song3 has remained alive in Croatia until today. During the war, Croatia, just like Slovenia and BiH, was subject to the UN arms embargo. This put Croatia, and its neighbors, in an unfair and unbalanced position vis-à-vis the Yugoslav Army-supported Serb forces. Tuąman was disappointed by the lack of will of the European states to help Croatia defend itself. A number of domestic articles in those days analyzed and criticized European cynicism (Lerotic´ 1996, 135), the pres- sure from the international community to end a war in such a way that partial gains of the project of Greater Serbia would be recognized (Tomac 2004, 293) and the European slow, disunited and meek response to the war in Croatia (Canjuga 1996, 158). Diplomatic efforts focused on explaining the unfairness of the arms embargo. In foreign capitals, Croatian diplomats strove hard to gain approval for the final military operation that was being prepared. At home, the government focused on building up the army. The ceasefire in January 1992 suspended fighting for three years, after which the Croatian Army undertook three military operations against the rebel Serb forces – Operations Flash, Summer and Storm in the spring and summer of 1995, with which it recaptured the occupied territories, while territories in Eastern Slavonia were to be reintegrated peacefully. The Erdut Agreement on peaceful reintegration was signed on 12 November 1995, envisaging a two-year transition period to complete reintegration. On 15 January 1996 the UN estab- lished the United Nations Transitional Authority for Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sirmium (UNTAES) under the UN Security Council resolution 1037, and in the same year Croatia and the Federal Repub- lic of Yugoslavia (FRY), consisting of Serbia and Montenegro, signed the Agreement on normalization of relations. On 15 January 1998 the 74 Early Departure – Early Arrival

UNTAES mandate ended and Croatia regained full control of its territory (Pavic´ 1996). This date symbolically marks the end of the second phase of the development of foreign policy. Here, an explanation is due. The previously mentioned national consensus on Croatia’s steadfast course towards the joining of Euro- Atlantic structures was, after all, not exactly unchallenged. Tuąman was a Croatian nationalist and a conservative politician whose vision of Croatia rested on the premise that it would be a country for, primarily, Croats. Such a vision obviously saw the presence of minorities in any sig- nificant number as problematic, while the inclusion of Croats who lived outside Croatia would be welcomed.4 This is not the place to analyze Tuąman’s politics in detail, but with regard to the development of the country’s foreign policy, it is important to mention the choices and diffi- culties Croatia faced as a result of the president’s ambition. The decrease of the Croatian Serb minority as a result of military operations in 1995 and Croatia’s support of parallel structures of Bosnian Croats in BiH were met by international outrage, even from allies. Angered, Tuąman pon- dered the utility of Croatian historical sacrifice as being the Antemurale Christianitatis (bulwark of Christianity)5 forsuchanundeservingEurope. In particular, Croatian military operations in neighboring Bosnia compromised the argument that Croatia was waging a purely defen- sive war. The conflict between Croatia and BiH – by many expected to be natural would-be allies against Serbia – puzzled the international community, confirmed the perception of bloody and chaotic Balkan wars, significantly upset ethnic relations in Bosnia and remains a heavy burden politically for Croatia to this day.6 These actions tainted the Croatian position, whose main goal at the time was to evade sanctions,7 and made its foreign policy and diplomacy extremely difficult (Nobilo 2000; Granic´ 2005).8 In addition, nationalistic and anti-democratic rhetoric,9 treatment of minorities, suspicious privatization of state-owned enterprises, growing corruption and overall conservatism came to be associated with the rule of Franjo Tuąman in Croatia in the 1990s (Letica 1998). It was only after he died in December 1999 and a new leadership came to power that the international community shifted its position towards Croatia. With the parliamentary elections on 3 January 2000, which ended the decade-long rule of the Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ) and brought to power a motley six-party coalition led by the Social Democratic Party (SDP), the third phase began. In February of the same year Stjepan Mesic,´ who earlier split from Tuąman and the HDZ over Croatia’s politics towards BiH, was elected as the new president. International pressure on Senada Šelo Šabi´c 75

Croatia subsided as the new government, led by Ivica Racan,ˇ came with different values and a different rhetoric about what Croatia should do. The new government pledged to cooperate with the ICTY, to facilitate the return of Croatian Serbs to Croatia, and to mend relations with BiH. In 2000 Croatia joined the NATO Partnership for Peace and hosted the Zagreb Summit in November of the same year, at which the EU com- mitted to take in all the countries of the Western Balkans provided they carried out the necessary reforms, in other words adopt the acquis com- munautaire.10 Events in Croatia in 2000 coincided with the departure from power of Slobodan Miloševic´ in Serbia and the formation of a new, non-nationalistic government in BiH. All this gave a sense that new winds were beginning to blow in the region.

The institutional mechanisms and the main actors in foreign policy

Presidents Under the Croatian Constitution (Article 99), the President of the Republic and the government jointly shape and implement foreign policy. Constitutional changes in 2000 changed the Croatian political system from semi-presidentialism to parliamentary democracy by intro- ducing institutional mechanisms in order to circumscribe presidential powers and reduce the potential for any president to centralize or per- sonalize the system of government in the future; that is, not allowing the autocratic practice of President Franjo Tuąman to be repeated (Cularˇ 2000). While in power, Tuąman was the unquestioned authority on nearly all matters of state politics, including foreign policy. The longest serving foreign minister during the 1990s was HDZ’s Mate Granic,´ perceived as tolerant and calm. He was a good choice for a foreign minister in perplexing times. Mate Granic´ did not demonstrate strong politi- cal influence (hardly any official did in those times except for a few close associates of Franjo Tuąman), but he had open access to the pres- ident at any time and, by his own account, was frequently able to persuade Tuąman to modify, if not fully abandon, a decision which Granic´ (2005) judged would hurt Croatia’s foreign policy interests. Most of the time, however, the foreign minister had to resort to ‘damage control’ of Tuąman’s decisions. In policy-making, including foreign pol- icy, Franjo Tuąman relied on and consulted with the members of the Defense and National Security Council of the President of the Republic (VONS), operative from 1993 to 2000. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 76 Early Departure – Early Arrival those years was primarily a service to decisions taken on Pantovˇcak (the presidential seat). It was also widely perceived that the Ministry had a more pro-European foreign policy than the president. Stjepan Mesic,´ being also the last President of the Presidency of the Socialist Yugoslavia, served two terms as Croatian president, from 2000 to 2010. Mesic´ held that Serbian expansionist politics was to blame for the wars in the former Yugoslavia (Mesic´ 1994, 131; Magaš and Žanic´ 1999; Tomac 2004). Although building relations with all states of the former Yugoslavia during his mandate, Mesic´ stood aloof from (re)building relations with Serbia and was instrumental in Croatia’s immediate recognition of the independence of Kosovo. He won elec- tions by promising the de-Tuąmanization of Croatia, limitation of presidential powers and the repairing of Croatia’s international image. Instrumental in changing the image of Croatia was the severing of ties with Bosnian Croats and the withdrawal of Croatia’s support of their parallel institutions in BiH. He supported cooperation with the ICTY where, on a few occasions, he was a witness of the prosecution. President Ivo Josipovic´ took office in 2010, promising new justice at home and reconciliation in the neighborhood. The first year of Josipovic’s´ mandate saw substantial improvements in relations with Serbia. Along with the then Serbian president Boris Tadic,´ Josipoviccar-´ ried out a policy of regional reconciliation, well received in the region and the world. At home, emotions were mixed. There were strong oppo- nents to warming up relations with Serbia, as well as to the policy of reconciliation. However, over time the protests subsided and the presi- dent has consistently remained the most popular politician throughout his mandate.11 President Josipovic´ established the Economic Council and the Coun- cil on Foreign Affairs and International Relations to serve as discussion forums and advisory bodies.12 The councils have no decision-making power (unlike the former VONS), membership is invitation-based and pro bono. Along with a number of other advisors, the Office of the Pres- ident employs two foreign policy advisors and the chief analyst. Since Croatia became a member of the EU, the activities of the president, as well as that of the Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs, increased as a result of the broader thematic scope of the foreign policy field. Constitutional changes in 2000 circumscribed presidential powers. Being the chief commander of armed forces and the co-creator of for- eign policy have been the main prerogatives of power of a Croatian president since then. Foreign policy co-creation leads also to occasional conflicts. More than once did the former President Stjepan Mesic´ during Senada Šelo Šabi´c 77 his two mandates (2000–2010) clash with the Minister of Foreign Affairs on the nomination of ambassadors. More than once did he make state- ments that defied the position of the government.13 The same is true of President Josipovic´ and his cohabitation with two governments, the HDZ- and the SDP-led coalitions. Presidents in Croatia may not have wide executive powers, but in two fields where they co-create politics – defense and foreign affairs – they have been quite active.

Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs Approximately half of around 60 Croatian nationals who served in the Yugoslav Foreign Service joined the newly established Croatian Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the early 1990s. Along with around a dozen peo- ple working in the Committee on Information and the Committee for Foreign Relations, units of the government of the Socialist Republic of Croatia, they became the core from which the current Ministry grew.14 The Ministry is organized into the cabinet of the minister, the cabi- net of the deputy minister, the four directorates-general,15 the General Secretariat, the diplomatic academy, the diplomatic protocol, the polit- ical analysis and planning sector, the public relations and information department and the translation sector. In June 2013 Croatia amended the existing Law on Foreign Affairs, in effect since 1996, to adapt it to functioning within the EU. Among other things, the amendments allow for Croatian diplomatic and consular missions to give assistance to EU citizens if in need, as well as a possibility that Croatian citizens may seek assistance from any diplomatic office of an EU member state if Croatia has no representation office in a country. Croatia has diplomatic relations with 177 countries, 50 embassies, 24 consulates and 8 permanent diplomatic missions in which 575 diplo- mats work. The ministry employs 1,204 people, including those who work abroad.16 In 2005 the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of European Integration merged into the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and European Integration (MFAEI). The Ministry of European Integration existed from 2000 until 2005, while from 1998 until 2000 there was the Office for European Integration.17 In 2012 the MFAEI changed its name again into the current Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs (MFEA). The website of the MFEA lists 11 Croatian foreign ministers since 1990, five of whom served in the period from 1990 to 1992.18 The minister with the longest service remains Mate Granic´ (1993–2000), during whose mandates Croatia faced some of the most serious for- eign policy challenges. While Granic´ was preoccupied with peace talks, 78 Early Departure – Early Arrival international conferences and regional issues, the Ministry was basi- cally run by his deputy Ivo Sanader. When he became prime minister, Ivo Sanader concentrated more power in his hands, including foreign policy-making, yet this evolved gradually. His first foreign minister, Miomir Žužul (2003–2005), was a veteran diplomat from Tuąman’s time, serving in top positions that included ambassadorial posts in Geneva and Washington, and he was a good friend of Sanader. Žužul, with whom Sanader consulted, had to resign on charges of corruption, although the prime minister continued to defend him even after his dis- missal. The following two foreign ministers during two HDZ mandates (those of Ivo Sanader and Jadranka Kosor) from 2005 until 2011, were ambitious and moderate, with hardly any power base. Their position depended on demonstrating loyalty to the prime minister.19 The prime minister of the SDP-led coalition between 2000 and 2003, Ivica Racan,ˇ ruled with no strong fist, but the foreign minister of this period, Tonino Picula, served also in the shadow of his prime minister. The current for- eign minister, and the second woman in this position in Croatia, is a long-time opposition politician with strong convictions, outspoken and steadfast. She was the head of the Parliamentary Committee for Moni- toring Negotiations with the EU and has for years nurtured an ambition to become foreign minister. Once in office, she started energetically and ambitiously to place the Ministry in the driving seat of foreign policy- making. In the words of Foreign Minister Vesna Pusic´ (TPortal 2013a), Croatia now has foreign policy for the first time. She is a decision-maker, not just an implementer of decisions made on St Mark’s Square (gov- ernment seat) and Pantovˇcak. Zrinjevac (MFEA seat) has largely steered Croatia’s foreign policy since 2012. Yet, it is still too early to discuss results and effects of this strong drive in foreign policy-making.

Foreign policy and relations to the other Yugoslav successor states

Owing to the violent break-up of the former Yugoslavia and conflicts among former republics, establishing good neighborly relations has not been an easy task. Initially inclined to keep contacts with the former Yugoslav republics at a minimum, and to guard against regional cooper- ation for fear of renewing any kind of Yugoslav-like associations (Lerotic´ 1996, 144),20 Croatia only reluctantly accepted to take part in regional networks.21 However, the EU viewed regional cooperation as crucial for post-conflict stabilization, including the transfer of European norms (Bechev 2006, 21; Stubbs and Solioz 2012, 23), and insisted on building Senada Šelo Šabi´c 79 regional networks. Through trading and investing, the business sector also contributed to regional cooperation. The international community established the Stability Pact in 1999 to facilitate ‘peace, democracy, respect for human rights and economic prosperity’ (Stability Pact 2012). In 2008 the Regional Cooperation Council (RCC) succeeded the Stability Pact with the mission to further enhance regional cooperation and support Euro-Atlantic integration of the candidates and aspiring candidate countries (RCC 2012). The first Secretary General of the RCC was a Croatian diplomat,22 underscoring the Croatian policy shift. Croatia now participates in over 45 different initiatives and task forces within six areas of cooperation.23 Save for Slovenia and Croatia, all remaining Yugoslav successor states are current or potential candidates for EU membership. It is here where Croatia sees its most meaningful role in foreign policy – to transfer the know-how gained in its accession process to the countries in the region and to support their accession efforts. In 2010 former Prime Min- ister Jadranka Kosor handed over the Croatian translation of the acquis communitaire to the countries in the region, estimated to cost around 8 million. The Croatian president, the government and the parliament have pledged support to the goal of the whole Western Balkans being in the EU (and NATO). The parliament promised not to use bilateral issues to block progress of any country towards EU membership, this position being reiterated by the government in 2011. However, only time can tell if such promises will be kept. At the time of the break-up of Yugoslavia, Slovenia and Croatia were natural partners.24 Both held referendums on independence in May 1991 and both declared independence from Yugoslavia on the same day, 25 June 1991. They were also natural partners in the former Yugoslavia – both in the past were part of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, Catholic and the most developed republics. They adopted a similar political dis- course, pursued similar political objectives within the former federation, were the first to challenge communism and to aspire to political plural- ism and democracy. From partners they turned into bitter neighbors as independent nations, their relations strained over several bilateral issues. Slovenia, for example, blocked a couple of chapters of the acquis over Croatian proclamation of the protected ecological and fishing zone (ZERP) in the Adriatic sea,25 which was lifted only after Croatia backed down and agreed to an indefinite moratorium on the effectuation of this decision.26 Another conflicting issue for years has been the bor- der demarcation in Piran Bay in the Adriatic Sea. In November 2009 the two countries agreed to seek resolution at the Permanent Court 80 Early Departure – Early Arrival of Arbitration in The Hague. Both sides submitted written pleadings and the first hearing has been scheduled to take place in 2014 (Per- manent Court of Arbitration 2013). A decision on Krško nuclear plant, jointly owned and part of the succession package, has been pending. Yet another disagreement resulted from Croatia and Slovenia’s opposing views on how to solve the problem of pre-war deposits of Croatian citi- zens in Ljubljanska banka. Not to go into detail, it should be mentioned that Slovenia refused to ratify the Croatian accession agreement with the EU over this case. Needing this ratification, Croatia agreed to a com- promise solution which led to an express ratification in the Slovenian parliament in April 2013. On 5 July 2013 the two sides sent a joint letter to the Bank for International Settlements in Basel requesting its involvement in solving the dispute. Now that both countries are in the EU, the turbulent recent past seems to have been quickly forgotten. Both countries pledge to coop- erate closely in a number of fields – cross-border projects, joined efforts to secure contracts in third markets, enhanced regional cooperation and support for integration of the rest of the Western Balkans in the EU and NATO. The prime ministers promised to meet regularly, (Dnevnik.hr 2013a) and they co-chair the Bled Process, an initiative to facilitate regional cooperation and, in particular, encourage projects of common interest.27 This is also to show the EU that there is the political will and capability to solve local problems locally. With Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia probably has its most com- plex relationship. The two countries share the longest land border in the region (932 km) along with a long list of mutual interests and contested issues. The break-up of Yugoslavia and the Serbian aggression drew the two countries closer to each other, but the fighting between Bosnian Croats and Bosniaks in 1993 and 1994 has strained the relationship between the two countries ever since. Bosnian Croats are one of the three constituent peoples in BiH, while Croatia has made it a constitu- tional responsibility to protect Croats living abroad. Croatia is also one of the signatories of the Dayton Peace Agreement, which ended the war in BiH in 1995, and the co-signatory of the agreement which created the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1994. Croatia took a large part in catering for refugees from BiH in the 1990s,28 but has also been found responsible for supporting the Bosnian Croat leadership, which was con- victed for attempting to ethnically cleanse territories that would be put under Croat domination (International Criminal Law Bureau 2013). The late May 2013 judgment will be appealed, but the first ruling was already disgraceful for the Croatian government. Senada Šelo Šabi´c 81

Bosnia and Herzegovina has epitomized the clash of two visions of Croatia – one nationalistic, traditional and expansionistic; the other democratic, inclusive and modern. Being neighbors, the two countries are naturally drawn to cooperate. Although proximity increases friendli- ness, it also increases friction. Solving a long list of open issues requires responsible and reliable partners.29 Croatian officials use every oppor- tunity to underline that the stability and prosperity of BiH are in the Croatian national interest (Vrickoˇ 2013). Croatia has had strained relations with Montenegro because of the war, during which the Yugoslav Peoples Army, commanded from Belgrade but including reserve army forces from Montenegro, bombed the historic city of Dubrovnik, causing international outcry. The war- time major of Trebinje now claims he was only joking when he promised to ‘rebuild an older and more beautiful Dubrovnik’ (Index 2013). Bilat- eral relations, however, improved significantly in recent years. Croatia recognized Montenegro on 12 June 2006, on the same day as the EU. The only open issue between the two countries is the border demarca- tion at Prevlaka. However, pending the final solution and with a tem- porary border regime in effect, the two countries cooperate smoothly (SEEbiz 2013). As a country which is in the process of negotiating EU membership, Montenegro consults regularly with Croatia. Montenegro is also the only country in the region which has signed the Agreement on Euro-Atlantic Partnership with Croatia as a framework for the trans- fer of knowledge which Croatia gained during accession to Euro-Atlantic structures. Of all the countries that have emerged since the break-up of Yugoslavia, Croatia has had the most difficult relations with Serbia. This, of course, should come as no surprise taking into account their recent history. Only a step-by-step approach and commitment from both sides will allow trust and partnership to replace mistrust and hos- tility. Both countries have pending cases at the International Court of Justice, where they pressed charges against each other for genocide. Open issues range from the Croatian request that Serbia deliver data on persons reported missing since the war, prosecution of war crimes, return of refugees and collective rights of Serbs in Croatia, to trade and economic relations, border demarcation at the Danube river and the return of art objects from Serbia to Croatia. President Josipovicimproved´ relations by building a rapport with Serbian President Boris Tadic.´ Statements by Tadic’s´ successor Tomislav Nikolic´ regarding Vukovar (and Srebrenica) cooled off relations in 2012. Encouraged by the EU, Prime Minister Milanovic´ visited Belgrade in January 2013, symbolically 82 Early Departure – Early Arrival ending ‘the ice age’ (Palokaj 2012) with reciprocal meetings taking place thereafter. After days of speculation whether President Nikolic´ would be at the ceremony to mark Croatia’s entry into the EU, both the Serbian president and the prime minister attended, being probably the most protected dignitaries at the event. With Macedonia and Kosovo relations are stable and friendly, strengthened through bilateral and regional cooperation. Croatia rec- ognized Kosovo in March 2008, causing Serbia’s official protest, while relations were further exacerbated after Croatia testified in favor of Kosovo’s position regarding its independence at the International Court of Justice in 2009.

Foreign policy and public opinion

For nearly two decades, cooperation with the ICTY was one of the rare foreign policy issues certain to stir public interest. Security Council Res- olution 827 of 25 May 1993 established the ICTY as the first ever war crimes tribunal created by the UN and the first one after the Nuremberg and Tokyo tribunals, with the aim of dealing with war crimes commit- ted on the territory of the former Yugoslavia in the 1990s.30 Charges brought against Croatian generals infuriated Tuąman and his govern- ment. With the change of government in 2000, Croatia pledged full cooperation with the ICTY, but this remained a highly politicized and politically risky issue that permeated Croatian internal (and also exter- nal) relations for many years (Boduszýnski 2013, 48–50). In the early 2000s nationalist forces in the country accused the SDP-led coalition of jeopardizing the Croatian national interest by cooperating with the Tri- bunal. The rhetorical onslaught they were subjected to contributed to the SDP’s departure from power in 2003. It took a successor government led by the HDZ to explain to the people that full cooperation with the Tribunal was necessary if the country wanted to join the EU and NATO.31 Foreign policy issues, if discussed at all, are discussed only sporadi- cally, when an issue catches public sentiment; an example is the 2012 Palestinian bid for observer status in the UN General Assembly. Croatia abstained from voting, which was explained as a lack of unified stance by the EU, even if a majority of EU member states voted Yes. A Croatian historian explained the futility of this decision – befriending neither Israel nor the US who lobbied for a strong No, but at the same time endangering fragile relationships that Croatia has been trying to build with the Arab world (Jakovina 2012).32 The decision not to support Palestine aroused public sentiment because many could recall how two Senada Šelo Šabi´c 83 decades ago Croatia itself had been seeking international recognition, lobbying and eagerly awaiting to see how the world would react to its appeal. The basic conclusion was that Croatian abstention was not only a strategic miscalculation, but also a moral failure (Vukšic´ 2012). Foreign policy ‘full of moralistic rhetoric and empty of genuine moral principle’ (Manion 1987) may have become a rule rather than an excep- tion in today’s world. But small states, and especially ambitious small states, precisely because they have no large interests to cater for, have the potential to develop sensitivity for dialogue, morality and humanity on the international scene. Being small does not mean being powerless. An honest voice of conscience may not change power relations but can be heard if spoken. To start with, this may be enough. Another issue that caught public sentiment was the invasion of Iraq. President Mesic´ declined to be involved in the US-led ‘Coalition of the Willing,’ with broad public support. The government had already pledged Croatian support and was discomforted by the president’s open disagreement, which left it with no option but to accept the fait accompli. In January 2012 the referendum on Croatian entry into the EU drew just 43.5 per cent of voters to the ballot, with 66.5 per cent in favor. This was the second referendum in Croatian history, the first being the referendum on independence in 1991. A year later, in April 2013, Croats voted at the first elections for the European Parliament. Only 20.8 per cent voters went to the polls, making it the second lowest turnout in comparison with the last (2009) elections for the European Parliament, the lowest being Slovakia where the turnout was 19.6 per cent. The explanation was that the citizens were badly informed or, if they were informed, they were complacent, because these Members of the European Parliament would serve only one year as the next elec- tions are due to take place in 2014. Yet, these were the first elections for the European Parliament, and if citizens were enthusiastic about EU membership, it was expected that they would demonstrate more inter- est. Be this as it may, the government has a challenge ahead. While all parliamentary parties in the last decade or so have supported EU integra- tion, the future may bring to the political scene a party that is vigorously Eurosceptic.

The main issues in foreign policy today

Instead of the one-directional foreign policy that has governed Croatia’s outlook since independence, its membership of the EU will require 84 Early Departure – Early Arrival multi-directional foreign policy (Jovic´ 2011). With the EU’s ambition to become a global player, Croatia will need to develop competent and nuanced foreign policy positions on a number of different issues. This will be a challenge that will need skilled professionals and active policy- makers. In addition, maintaining good relations with the US has been a constant foreign policy objective of the Croatian government since the country’s independence, although these relations have not been without tensions and frictions (Cuˇ ciˇ c´ 1995). Being an active regional player and supporting EU and NATO acces- sion efforts of the countries in the Western Balkans is the strategic foreign policy objective of the current government. The transfer of knowledge gained in the process of Euro-Atlantic integration, as well as the experience of building a stable, peaceful and democratic state in a post-conflict environment, are key thematic niches. It is in this sphere too that Croatia could make more use of its still relatively good image in the region to promote its interests and objectives (Skoko 2010, 184). These goals are to be realized through a set of priorities as fol- lows: (1) successful positioning within the EU; (2) cooperation with NATO partners; (3) multilateral cooperation; (4) successful positioning within the region; (5) bilateral cooperation and economic diplomacy; and (6) special projects (Strategic plan of the Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs 2013). Foreign policy success in these areas will be determined by what Hill (1997) defines as the gap between capabilities and expectations: the smaller the gap, the larger the success. With limited internal resources, both in terms of skilled diplomats and financial means, Croatia will need to weight its priorities carefully. At the same time, the EU has global ambitions and Croatia as a member state, although small, will need to learn to act in light of these ambitions (Vukadinovic´ 1993, 1994; Caratan 1994; Jovic´ 2011).

Conclusion

Since Yugoslavia disintegrated and Croatia became independent, its foreign policy has been directed towards single goals, first gaining international recognition, second reintegrating the country and third, integrating into the EU and NATO (Jovic´ 2011). In 2013 these goals were achieved. How will Croatia’s foreign policy look from now on? This chapter analyzed the key phases of Croatia’s foreign policy development and described the institutional mechanisms which stand behind foreign policy design and implementation. The search for Senada Šelo Šabi´c 85

finding a proper balance of power between the president and the gov- ernment in conducting foreign policy has been an ongoing challenge. Different individuals behaved differently in the same institutions, while institutional structure changed with the country and the external envi- ronment. Judging from its proclaimed goals, Croatian foreign policy was successful because its main goals were achieved. However, this does not mean that there have been no missed opportunities, that some things could have been done differently or that there were no problems. Since 2011 the Ministry has issued successive strategies outlining main areas of activity and objectives to be achieved within given peri- ods.33 The latest (Strategic plan of the Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs 2013, 2) lists five key foreign policy objectives:

1. Advancing Croatian interests within the institutions of the EU and through bilateral relations with European countries; 2. Developing bilateral relations and enhancing regional cooperation; 3. Advancing interests and objectives and strengthening the position of Croatia in international organizations, and affirming Croatia as a donor country; 4. Fostering the norm of international law in Croatia’s foreign relations, harmonizing Croatian laws with EU laws and providing consular protection; and 5. Adjusting and improving the Foreign Service.

This list of strategic objectives shows that relations with European coun- tries and key allies remain the cornerstone of foreign policy. The US, although not discussed much in this chapter, is the ally Croatia sees as strategic. The US was instrumental in ending the wars in the former Yugoslavia and was the key architect of both the agreement on the Con- stitution of BiH and of the Dayton Peace Agreement, to which Croatia is a signatory. Relations between the US and Croatia may not have always been at the highest level, but from the Croatian perspective relations with the US as the world power will remain the strategic foreign policy orientation of the country. Relations with Russia have been kept at a low level for a number of years because of what was seen as Russian support to Serbia, and thus in opposition to Croatian interests. Yet, the energy issues, Russia as the member of the UN Security Council and Russian investments in energy and banking sectors are already changing the relationship. The same applies to Turkey, whose investments in tourism and other areas, as well 86 Early Departure – Early Arrival as active foreign policy in the region, have led to an intensification of bilateral relations. As the Strategy Plan of the MFEA shows, Croatia has an ambition to effectively contribute to the development cooperation agenda of the EU. For that goal, it has created the Advisory Committee for Transitional Pro- cesses and a Center of Excellence therein. The goal of the Center is to transfer the knowledge gained through accession to the EU and NATO to the potential new members of both organizations, mainly those in the region of the Western Balkans. But the ambition does not end there. Being a new EU donor country, Croatia has also demonstrated its inten- tion to transfer a knowledge of post-conflict state-building to countries in Northern Africa and the Southern Mediterranean. A re-energized approach to economic diplomacy is a key feature of recent foreign policy development, advocated for a long time (e.g. Skoko 2005, 235). In late 2013 the Ministry published a comprehen- sive, completely reconceptualized approach to economic diplomacy with the aim of supporting Croatian exports and investments both from and into Croatia. Among other things, the intention is to evaluate ambassadors on the criteria of their efficiency and efficacy in economic diplomacy, with direct effect on their salaries, extension of a mandate and employment contracts.34 Dynamic EU membership, strong relations with all European coun- tries, broad cooperation with neighbors, strategic links to the US, effective contribution to the economy, building a donor profile in the framework of development cooperation and an active role in NATO are current foreign policy objectives. Owing to the nature of the creation of the Croatian state and judging by the challenges that lay ahead over more than two decades, foreign policy was ‘one of the most critical activities’ (Hill 2003, 233) of successive Croatian governments. In all likelihood, it will remain so.

Notes

1. The German government decided on 23 December 1991 to recognize both Slovenia and Croatia, but the decision would not take effect until 15 January 1992, when all EC member states recognized the two new states. The Vatican officially recognized Croatia (and Slovenia) on 13 January 1992 in a strong signal to European states not to bring into question the agreed recognition that was to take place two days later. 2. The ‘myth of early recognition’ implies that Croatia and Slovenia were rec- ognized as independent states too early, thus breaking up Yugoslavia too fast and consequently contributing to the ensuing chaos. At times, different Senada Šelo Šabi´c 87

countries in Europe showed an inclination to share the assumption of early recognition, but it is mostly associated with politics of the UK and France at the beginning of the Yugoslav crisis, as well as the US. 3. A song ‘Danke Deutschland’ by Sanja Trumbic´ has been a most vivid expres- sion of gratitude expressed to the German people and in particular to the German Foreign Minister of the time, Hans Dietrich Genscher, for his support of Croatian independence. 4. Franjo Tuąman was keen on encouraging the return of Croatian emigrants to Croatia. The Croatian diaspora in the early years of Croatian indepen- dence and during the war was very active in raising donations and lobbying in world capitals on behalf of Croatia. Croatian governments in two peri- ods had ministries that would, among other things, encourage the return of Croats living abroad (Ministry for Expatriates, 1990–1992, and Ministry for Return and Immigration, 1995–1999), but their track record in actually bringing people back is meager. 5. In the address on the occasion of the first visit of Pope John Paul II to Croatia on 10 September 1994, Franjo Tuąman explained: ‘Croats are one of the oldest peoples in today’s Europe [ ...]. [T]he history of the Croatian people, because of their geopolitical position at the crossroads of different civilizations and imperial ambitions, until now, was a hard and painful fight for survival.’ He also quoted Pope Leo X, who sent a letter to Croats on 12 December 1519 through bishop of Trogir Tomo Niger: ‘My son, go and send my greetings to your Governor and the Croatian people! And tell to all: the head of church will not allow Croatia to fail, the strongest shield and the bulwark of Christianity.’ The integral address in Croatian can be found at: http://free-zg.t-com.hr/zdeslav-milas/FT/ft-11.htm. 6. For the international role in encouraging Tuąman to pursue the war in BiH, see, for example, Stjepan Mesic’s´ comments in a transcript of a discussion (130–133) in Magaš and Žanic´ (1999); also Tomac (2004). 7. Interview with a Croatian diplomat. Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs (MFEA), Zagreb, October 2012. 8. Asked what were the main failures of the Croatian foreign policy, Davorin Rudolf (2005, 244), a former minister of foreign affairs and an ambassador, replied: ‘We did not manage to prevent the Croatian-Muslim war in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Croatian-Muslim historical embarrassment.’ 9. In 1996 the Croatian government refused to extend the concession to the independent Radio Station 101 and ordered the crushing of protests against this decision. 120,000 citizens came out onto the streets of Zagreb in sup- port of the freedom of speech, while Franjo Tuąman, who had just returned from a medical treatment in the US, gave an often-cited speech in which he compared protesters to small livestock. 10. The Zagreb Summit remains the only Summit of the European Heads of States that took place outside Brussels. It was seen at the time as a sym- bolic threshold, after which relations between the EU and the region would be based on partnership infused with European norms and values. 11. Presidential elections in Croatia take place every five years; the next are scheduled to take place in late 2014. 12. Subsequently, the president also created two additional councils – the Council for Social Justice and the Council for War Veterans. 88 Early Departure – Early Arrival

13. For example, Stjepan Mesic´ openly criticized the war in Iraq and declined Croatian participation in the US-led coalition. He also advocated maintain- ing economic relations with Libya when the crisis in Libya started. 14. Interview with a Croatian diplomat. MFEA, Zagreb, October 2012. 15. Directorate-General for European Affairs, Directorate-General for Bilat- eral Affairs, Directorate-General for Multilateral Affairs and Global Issues and Directorate-General for EU Law, International Law and Consular Affairs. 16. These figures were given by the MFEA, signed by the General Secretary, in a reply to a request for information for this chapter, November 2012. 17. There was the head of the European Integration Office and three minis- ters for European Integration in the period 1998–2005 and these were, in chronological order, Ljerka Mintas-Hodak, Ivan Jakovciˇ c,´ Neven Mimica and Kolinda Grabar-Kitarovic.´ 18. In chronological order, the ministers were Zdravko Mršic,´ Frane Vinko Golem, Davorin Rudolf, Zvonimir Šeparovic´ and Zdenko Škrabalo. 19. Kolinda Grabar-Kitarovic,´ it should be noted, was the first female foreign minister, serving from 2005 to 2008, previously being the Minister for European Integration. She is currently the Assistant Secretary General for Public Affairs at NATO, the first female Assistant Secretary General. After the 2007 parliamentary elections, the minister became Goran Jandrokovic,´ whose loyalty to Ivo Sanader was his main recommendation for the job. After Sanader stepped down, Jandrokovic´ instantly pledged loyalty to Jadranka Kosor, Sanader’s successor, only to withdraw his support when HDZ lost par- liamentary elections in 2011 and Kosor lost party elections, to side with the new HDZ president Tomislav Karamarko. 20. Article 141 of the Croatian Constitution forbids any form of associations which would lead to the re-establishment of any kind of Balkan or Yugoslav community or union. 21. It is important to note here that reluctance to take part in regional coop- eration refers only to cooperation with countries of the Western Balkans. Relations with Central and Eastern European countries were desirable, espe- cially in the frameworks of Visegrád countries, Central European Initiative, Adriatic and Ionian Initiative, and Mediterranean Region. 22. Hidajet Bišcevi´ c´ has served two mandates since 1 January 2008. He was suc- ceeded by Goran Svilanovic,´ former Federal Republic of Yugoslavia’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, who took the post of RCC Secretary General on 1 January 2013. 23. Some of the initiatives are Regional Anticorruption Initiative (RAI), Migra- tion, Asylum and Refugee Regional Initiative (MARRI), Network of Associ- ations of Local Authorities of South-East Europe (NALAS), Women Police Officers Network (WPON), Disaster Preparedness and Prevention Initiative in South-East Europe (DPPI SEE), Centre for Security Cooperation (RACVIAC), Council of Ministers of Culture of South-East Europe (CoMoCo SEE), RCC Gender Task Force (GTF), Education Reform Initiative of South Eastern Europe (ERI SEE). 24. For the Slovenian-Croatian confederal proposal see Jovic´ (2007). 25. Slovenia was not alone in this regard, Italy was also against the Protected Zone. Senada Šelo Šabi´c 89

26. Interestingly, in summer 2013 the European Commission published a report that member states with access to the Mediterranean sea can ben- efit from establishing maritime protected areas (MPAs), http://ec.europa.eu/ maritimeaffairs/documentation/studies/study-maritime-zones-in-mediter ranean-sea_en.htm. See also (TPortal 2013b). 27. The Croatian president hosted the breakfast meeting for the leaders of the countries in the region on 1 July 2013 in Zagreb, the first day of Croatian membership in the EU. At the end of July 2013 the Slovenian president hosted a meeting of regional leaders to demonstrate and reiterate the shared commitment to regional cooperation, as well as the two countries and EU members’ will to support the region in EU accession. 28. In the period 1992–1995 the total number of refugees from Bosnia and Herzegovina in Croatia totaled 1.2 million, 700,000 of which are believed to have transited through Croatia, while approximately 170,000 were conferred refugee status in Croatia. With over half a million internally displaced citizens, catering for refugees from Bosnia and Herzegovina cre- ated heavy pressure on institutions. For more information see UNHCR (2011). 29. Some open issues stem from the time of the break-up of Yugoslavia, such as property rights, energy issues and social benefits, while new ones were created by the Croatian entry into the EU, such as the Neum corridor, access to port Ploce,ˇ suspension of CEFTA agreement and phyto-sanitary inspection points. For more details see VPI (2012). 30. For more about the ICTY, key figures, cases and types of crimes prosecuted, see www.icty.org. 31. Opening of the accession negotiations between Croatia and the EU in 2005 (from March until October) was postponed over the so-called Gotovina case. The ICTY insisted that Croatia hand over General Ante Gotovina while Croatia claimed he could not be located in the country. Only after the ICTY confirmed Croatian full cooperation could the negotiations with the EU begin. 32. It should be noted, however, that Croatia was not alone in the abstention block: 12 EU states abstained, 14 voted in favor and one voted No. It is also worth mentioning that out of all states of the former Yugoslavia, only Serbia voted Yes. 33. Strategic Plan of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and European Integration for the period 2011–2013; Strategic Plan of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and European Integration for the period 2012–2014; and the Strategic Plan of the Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs for the period 2013–2015 (in Croatian). 34. Information related to economic diplomacy is regularly updated on the Ministry’s website.

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Introduction

This chapter investigates the development of Macedonian foreign policy since the country’s independence in 1991. Looking at how the country’s foreign policy has evolved since the dissolution of the Yugoslav federa- tion and at the tools the political elites used to address challenges to it, the evolution of the foreign policy of a small, newly independent state in the post-Yugoslav space will be outlined. What makes Macedonian foreign policy an interesting case for scholarly analysis are the political and institutional transformations the country has been through over the past two and a half decades. In addition, the puzzle driving the discussion below is why and how the foreign policy consensus among Macedonian political elites has survived, despite fundamental changes in the country’s constitutional, party and political system since 1991. In a bid to better understand how the foreign policy consensus was forged and defended, this chapter looks at the past almost 25 years through a historical analytical lens. The focus lies on the institutional and policy tools used by political actors to design and implement the country’s foreign policy objectives. Moreover, it will look at how changes in the institutional framework affected the repertoire of avail- able policy instruments and political actors’ access to them. Based on the findings discussed below, it will be shown that Macedonian political elites have successfully responded to internal demands to expand the access to foreign policy decision-making. They have failed, though, to be sufficiently flexible to overcome external challenges to the country’s

97 98 Early Departure – Late Arrival? foreign policy goals. As a result, Macedonia struggles to achieve its twin objectives of NATO and EU membership. Macedonia declared independence from the Socialist Federal Repub- lic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) after a successful referendum on independence that took place on 8 September 1991. Although the referendum ques- tion was ambiguously framed1 and a large part of the ethnic Albanians in the country did not take part in the vote, the outcome was not dis- puted. According to official sources, more than 97 per cent of those who voted were in favor of independence from the SFRY. Macedonia was the third Yugoslav republic to declare independence after Slovenia and Croatia. The independence referendum as well as the subsequent independence from the SFRY was peaceful, following negotiations con- cerning the withdrawal of the Yugoslav army (JNA) from the territory of Macedonia between the newly elected Macedonian president Kiro Gligorov and the JNA leadership. The territory of the newly independent Republic of Macedonia corre- sponds to the territory of the Macedonian federal unit in the SFRY, com- prising 25,813 km2. Even before independence, Macedonia’s borders were largely international, including borders with Greece, Bulgaria and Albania. Only the administrative border to Serbia (including Kosovo) became an international border with independence (and was finally demarcated in 2009, upon Macedonia’s recognition of Kosovo). In 1991, the total population in the country was about 2 million, out of which 65 per cent were ethnically Macedonian, 21 per cent Albanian, Turks, Roma and others (Statistical Office of Macedonia 1991). Ethnic tensions between the Albanian community and the majority Macedonian pop- ulation have sporadically surfaced over the past two decades and in 2001 led to a short but violent conflict between Macedonian security forces and ethnic Albanian paramilitaries. A peaceful solution, outlined in the Ohrid Framework Agreement, was quickly negotiated with the assistance of EU and NATO representatives, allowing for constitutional reforms to enable greater access to political power for the members of the Albanian community.2 Macedonia has been an EU candidate state since 2005. However, ambitions to join NATO and the EU have been frustrated by an ongoing dispute with Greece over the name Macedonia (for historical and ter- ritorial reasons).3 Greece has vetoed Macedonian bids to join NATO in 2008 and since 2009 bids to open accession negotiations with the EU, while bilateral negotiations under UN facilitation have so far failed to produce a solution to the dispute. Although EU and NATO membership remain strategic priorities in Macedonian foreign policy, the struggles Cvete Koneska 99 to join these two organizations highlight the challenges the country is facing in pursuing its foreign policy objectives. The following sections offer a critical overview of the main develop- ments and features of Macedonian foreign policy since independence. By looking at the main decision-making mechanisms and implemen- tation tools of foreign policy objectives, as well as the logic informing foreign policy priorities, this chapter reflects on the trajectory the coun- try has followed in the international arena over the past two decades. The review highlights two features that have shaped Macedonian for- eign policy – the process of state-building and unresolved national identity issues. While these issues play an inevitable role in shaping the foreign policy of every newly independent state, the specific regional context and the constellation of bilateral relations and perceptions between Macedonia and its neighbors have led to the country’s late embracing of and slow progress towards EU and NATO integration on its political agenda.

Macedonian independence and foreign policy

Macedonia did not have an independent foreign policy until 1991. Although the SFRY was a highly decentralized federation, foreign pol- icy was among the few areas in the federal policy domain (Constitution of Yugoslavia 1974). Republics in the SFRY had numerous features of sovereign states, including the right to borrow from foreign banks, but the foreign policy of the country was negotiated, decided and imple- mented at the federal level (Bertsch 1977; Rusinow 2007). Although Macedonians were represented at all levels in federal structures, and many took part in the shaping and implementing of Yugoslav foreign policy, we can hardly talk about Macedonian foreign policy until the country gained independence. In 1991, along with establishing other features of an independent state, Macedonian leaders embarked upon setting their foreign policy objectives against the background of two events that shaped not only Macedonian foreign policy but also wider European politics and foreign policy priorities – the fall of communism across Eastern Europe and the wars following the dissolution of the Yugoslav federation. The fall of communism marked a fundamental shift in the strate- gic orientation of former communist countries in Eastern Europe towards membership in NATO and EU, virtually removing the divide in the European continent and ushering in an era of regional inte- gration (Keohane, Nye and Hoffman 1993; Verdery 1996). Like other 100 Early Departure – Late Arrival? former communist states, Macedonia turned towards Western European democracies immediately after independence and sought recognition and closer cooperation with the member states of the European Com- munity (since 1993 the EU). But unlike other former communist states, Macedonia was not successful in establishing closer relations with the Community. Problems with gaining international recognition delayed not only the country’s UN membership and diplomatic relations with the EU but also Macedonia’s progress towards EU and NATO mem- bership, setting it amongst the regional laggards in Euro-Atlantic integration. The wars in the former Yugoslavia led to a serious deterioration of the security situation in the region and created uncertainty regarding the borders of countries; legacies which still reverberate across the region and shape the foreign policies of former Yugoslav states. The security concerns in the neighborhood inevitably elevated peace and security to top foreign policy concerns for Macedonia in the first decade after independence, leading to the launch of the UN’s preventive mission in Macedonia – UNPREDEP (Sokalski 2003). These concerns were further amplified by the aforementioned problems Macedonia faced in gaining international recognition and a seat in the UN. Although strategic contextual factors played a very important role in designing foreign policy after independence, domestic government policies also constrained the shape and direction that it took. In par- ticular, the adoption of the 1991 Constitution and internal identity issues vis-à-vis domestic ethnic minorities and neighboring nations are the central domestic influencing factors (Fawn 2003). The adoption of democratic political institutions implied not only the introduction of pluralistic decision-making and implementation mechanisms for for- eign policy but also a set of values and norms associated with the behavior of democratic states in the international arena (Kubálková 2001). At times, matters relating to Macedonian national identity col- ored bilateral relations with neighboring states, as some neighbors such as Greece or Bulgaria were seen to dispute the Macedonian narrative of statehood and national identity. Domestic problems with the eth- nic Albanian minority further increased sensitivity to national identity issues in relation to other states and organizations. Rather than being a distinct policy field, foreign policy both shaped and was shaped by the national identity dynamics inside the country, linking external security concerns with internal group self-perception (Bloom 1993). Therefore, studying Macedonian foreign policy since independence requires a more complex approach, taking into account strategic, state Cvete Koneska 101 security-related concerns, as well as domestic government negotiations and identity issues. By mixing and complementing these approaches to examine foreign policy in Macedonia, a clearer understanding of the roots, drivers and mechanisms behind foreign policy can emerge.

Institutional mechanisms and actors of foreign policy

In the SFRY, foreign policy was an exclusive policy domain of federal institutions. Therefore, upon independence, building capacity in for- eign policy was one of the greatest challenges for Macedonia’s leaders. The lack of political and institutional foundation in foreign policy was further exacerbated by the overall change of political institutions and rules of political competition, which followed after the fall of com- munism and the transition towards democracy. However, despite the depth of ideological and institutional changes following Macedonia’s independence from the SFRY, the past two decades have witnessed both major changes and substantial continuities in the way foreign policy is conceptualized and implemented. With independence, Macedonia adopted a new set of strategic foreign policy priorities, while foreign policy remains the policy domain of the two executive branches of government. Since 2001, with the constitutional changes introduced by the Ohrid Framework Agreement, policy-making in many areas was made more inclusive of the interests of the Albanian ethnic commu- nity. Though foreign policy was not among the policy areas most affected by the introduction of ethnic power-sharing arrangements in Macedonian politics, the increased decision-making powers of ethnic Albanian politicians in the country have had an inevitable effect on the country’s foreign policy ever since (Daskalovski 2002; Atanasov 2011). The two main actors in Macedonia’s foreign policy are the president and the government (the foreign minister and the prime minister). The 1991 Constitution introduced a semi-presidential political system in which both the president and the government have foreign policy competencies (Constitution of Macedonia 1991; Spasenovski 2008). The directly elected president is the chief of the armed forces and heads the country’s National Security Council – an advisory and consultative body on issues concerning national security. The president also represents the country in certain international forums. The government is responsible for drafting and implementing foreign policy. The minister of foreign affairs and the prime minister also represent the country internation- ally and both, along with the rest of the cabinet, consult parliament 102 Early Departure – Late Arrival? and require parliament’s assent to pass legislation concerning various foreign policy issues. The divisions between foreign policy competencies of the presi- dent and the government are not entirely clear and in the past were determined by the personal charisma and leadership ambitions of the president, prime minister and foreign minister of the country.4 The first years after independence saw foreign policy dominated by the presi- dent. Whether by inertia, because it was the Yugoslav practice for several decades for the president to be the dominant foreign policy figure, or because of President Kiro Gligorov’s personal charisma and experience in international and regional politics, it was he rather than the foreign and prime ministers who was the main foreign policy actor during his two terms in office until 1999. Gligorov had a higher international pro- file than the then young and less experienced Prime Minister Branko Crvenkovski, and this together with Gligorov’s wider network of con- tacts across the region and internationally made him the main actor in the country’s foreign policy, negotiating the details and conditions of independence from the SFRY, securing international recognition and negotiating the settlement with Greece over the country’s name. Gligorov’s dominance over the country’s foreign policy had an inevitable impact on the contents of foreign policy and the world views that informed the country’s perception of its position and objectives in the international arena. Gligorov’s speeches suggest a traditional per- ception of international politics, informed by ideas about balance of power, the pursuit of security in international relations and the real- ization that small states need to rely on international institutions to protect their security and their interests (Gligorov 2000). Although the context in which he was acting was one that could have jus- tified these views as most appropriate, given the country’s disputed sovereignty and the security threats in the region, in his foreign pol- icy attitudes Gligorov rarely reflected on the importance of domestic factors, or dominant political and social norms and values for for- eign policy. He rarely advocated joining the EU and NATO because of the democratic norms and values that make Macedonia want to belong to these organizations, but rather as a means of ensuring peace and security in the country and the region (Gligorov 2006). His rhetoric differed significantly from the present foreign policy dis- course in Macedonia, emphasizing the fundamentally European nature of Macedonian national and political identity and embracing European norms and values through reforms and fulfillment of pre-accession conditions (Ružin 2010). Cvete Koneska 103

Over the first decade of statehood, Macedonia’s political system evolved from a semi-presidential system (such as France or Romania) towards a more reduced, ceremonial presidential position. The 2001 constitutional reforms strengthened the role of the government – partic- ularly ethnic-coalition governments – as the main decision-making and policy-making institution in Macedonian politics, reducing the impor- tance of the president in general and foreign policy in particular (Ohrid Framework Agreement 2001; Ilievski and Wolff 2011). This transition was facilitated by the election of Gligorov’s successor, Boris Trajkovski, in 1999: he did not have an established political career as Gligorov did, and did not seek to dominate foreign policy. Finally, progress towards EU integration in the years after 2001, which saw the country go through a process of legislative and policy harmonization with the EU, allowed a much greater role for the government and its various ministries, agen- cies and the civil service than for the president. The coordination of necessary regulatory and policy adjustments was done through the cab- inet and the newly established Secretariat for EU Affairs, allowing the government to take the lead in foreign policy issues. The transferring of foreign policy dominance from the president to the government opened foreign policy to inputs from a wider set of societal actors, including a greater influence of political parties and their ideologies on the context and strategic priorities in this area, as well as increased opportunities for social groups represented by politi- cal parties to influence foreign policy objectives. However, the impact on main foreign policy objectives has been limited. Virtually all main- stream parties in Macedonia embrace the same set of foreign policy priorities, which include integration into the EU and NATO, regional cooperation and increased cooperation with neighboring states, and peaceful resolution of conflicts, including the name dispute with Greece. These priorities have remained constant over the past ten to fifteen years, since Macedonia secured international recognition and estab- lished relations with the EU and NATO. Hence, regarding party politics, foreign policy is a non-contested issue. Only recently have political parties started to dilute the consensus on foreign policy objectives. The center-right VMRO-DPMNE (Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization – Democratic Party for Macedonian National Unity) is increasingly arguing against unconditional commitment to member- ship in these organizations, unwilling to accept compromise over the country’s name in order to start accession negotiations. On the cen- ter left, the opposition remains rhetorically committed to EU and NATO integration as top foreign policy priorities. 104 Early Departure – Late Arrival?

With the constitutional changes post-2001, the political party com- petition in Macedonia evolved into an ethnic version of a two-party system – with one party for the ethnic Macedonian community and another for the ethnic Albanian community. Nonetheless, Macedonian political parties can hardly be categorized as only ethnic parties, pro- moting the rights and interests of specific ethnic groups (Chandra 2011). Predominantly, they act as patronage networks, providing employment opportunities and access to economic or political resources for their supporters (Kitschelt 1995), while differences over ideology in foreign policy are minimal. Nevertheless, political parties’ increasing influence over the implementation of foreign policy has resulted in different views over the most appropriate set of means and policy tools for achiev- ing these objectives. Notably, since 2006 the government cabinets led by the center-right conservative VRMO-DPMNE party, in coalition with different Albanian parties, have seen a more pronounced national iden- tity component in all policies, including foreign policy. Projects aimed at revising the existing national history narratives, and reflecting on the ancient roots of the Macedonian nation, have had a spill-over effect on relations with neighboring states. Macedonia’s neighbors have reacted to these developments with a varying amount of concern and retaliation. The greatest impact has been on relations with Greece and Bulgaria, which saw Macedonia’s increasing focus on reasserting national identity as a threat and challenge to their national histories and identities and used it to justify vetoes in NATO and the EU. Domes- tically, relations between the Macedonian and Albanian communities are at times strained because of the insistence of Macedonian politi- cians on pursuing projects focusing on boosting ethnic Macedonian national identity, often at the expense of good inter-ethnic relations in the country. However, by and large, Albanian politicians have played a constructive role in foreign policy and in particular in the name dispute with Greece, supporting Macedonian efforts to keep the country’s con- stitutional name – Republic of Macedonia – unchanged. Thus, national identity dynamics, inevitable as they are in the state-building process of newly independent states, have come to obstruct rather than promote foreign policy objectives in the case of Macedonia. The dominance of political parties in Macedonian political life has prevented other social groups from gaining a say in the design and implementation of the country’s foreign policy. Religious organiza- tions, civil society groups and war veterans have had to channel their input through party agendas, rather than gaining an indepen- dent say on foreign policy issues. As a result, their influence has been Cvete Koneska 105 limited. Though religious issues sometimes surface in regional politics, for instance the unresolved dispute over the status of the Macedonian Orthodox Church with its Serbian counterpart, the church is not a sig- nificant player in Macedonian foreign policy. Similarly, war veterans from the 2001 conflict are hardly an important foreign policy player, and despite protests regarding the indictment of former Macedonian Interior Minister Ljube Boškovski and his associate Johan Tarculovskiˇ by the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), the official Macedonian attitude over cooperation with the Tribunal in The Hague has never been in question. Similarly, parliament’s role in for- eign policy, though guaranteed by the constitution, in practice has been more limited than what would be expected in a parliamentary democ- racy. The growing executive dominance in Macedonian politics, also over parliament, has resulted in the legislature acting more as a place where government decisions are rubber stamped rather than a venue for discussing decisions and policies. Parliament needs to ratify all inter- national agreements and treaties that the government signs, but over the past two decades there has been no occasion when the parliament has voted against a government’s decision in foreign policy. Finally, the administrative and organizational structures in foreign policy, responsible for implementing the policy decisions made at the political level, have seen their capacity grow and strengthen, but still remain relatively weak and can hardly act as an independent foreign policy actor (Art 1973). Given the lack of prior diplomatic and foreign policy institutional structures at the time Macedonia declared indepen- dence, the past two decades have witnessed the establishment of a foreign policy organizational structure, including the diplomatic service, which still remains under the shadow of the executive and struggles to develop an independent organizational identity. As a result, Macedonian foreign policy has evolved from being the sole domain of one political leader – the president – to an almost exclu- sive government policy domain. Although the increasing dominance of the executive in Macedonian politics has led to a stronger role for political parties in the foreign policy decision-making process, this has not resulted in the contestation of foreign policy priorities or in a more inclusive and open policy-making process.

Public opinion and foreign policy

Given the extensive decentralization of late Yugoslav communism, which allowed republics’ governments to run policies in many areas, 106 Early Departure – Late Arrival? foreign policy was one of the few tangible policy competencies that the Macedonian government gained with independence. As such, foreign policy was also perceived by the population as one of the most impor- tant symbols of sovereignty of the new state, which increased popular interest in foreign policy. The heightened public attention on foreign policy was further intensified with the name dispute with Greece, which thwarted the country’s efforts to gain international recognition, divert- ing public attention towards problems of foreign policy rather than to internal reform, as was the case elsewhere in former communist states. As a result, public opinion has been an important bottom-up factor shaping the country’s foreign policy (Page and Shapiro 1983; Eichenberg 1989). Since 1991, governments have rarely pursued a foreign policy course that has not been widely accepted by the population. Early compromise over the name dispute with Greece in 1992–1993 was not possible in the face of overwhelming public resistance. Consecutive governments have failed to resolve the issue, despite repeated mediation efforts by the UN, as none has had sufficient public support to compromise over the name of the state, even if that would mean unblocking EU and NATO inte- gration – the highest foreign policy priorities (Bozinovski 2007). As a result, the dispute remains more than 20 years after the first objections to Macedonia’s independence were raised by the Greek foreign minister in 1992. Nonetheless, on foreign policy issues perceived as less existential and more pragmatic than the country’s name, the government has some- times taken decisions against public opinion. One such occasion was the decision to allow NATO forces to use Macedonian airspace in the airstrikes against Yugoslavia in 1999. While the population opposed the attacks, the government decided to support NATO as part of its strategy to demonstrate that it can be a reliable partner to NATO and can support its values and missions. Later contributions to NATO mis- sions in Afghanistan and Iraq were authorized without much popular opposition, as the remoteness of these countries meant that there were no popular-level links and allegiances that were disturbed by the intervention, as was the case with Serbia (Yugoslavia) in 1999. On the regional level, regarding relations with the neighboring countries, the impact of public opinion is less consistent. Although the official policy stance has been to develop friendly relations with all neighboring states, at the popular level national stereotypes and prej- udices survive and shape public perceptions. Former Yugoslav states regularly score higher in public perception surveys that measure friendly Cvete Koneska 107 attitudes towards neighboring states than other countries such as Albania and Bulgaria (Gallup 2013). The more ambiguous attitudes towards Bulgaria and Albania (and Kosovo) can partly be attributed to the questions regarding the sizeable Albanian minority in the country and repeated arguments over the separate language and history with Bulgaria. Gestures such as the Greek, and most recently also Bulgarian (2012), vetoes for Macedonia regarding opening accession negotiations have a stronger impact on public opinion than merely political rhetoric, which has been coated in terms of developing mutual trust and good neighborly relations. Such gestures generate a public response, which can hardly be countered by friendly official statements, and they tend to have a longer lasting impact on public opinion than the adoption of declarations for bilateral cooperation.

Main foreign policy issues

Foreign policy objectives since 1991 Shaped by the contextual and domestic factors outlined above, Macedonian foreign policy since 1991 has focused on two sets of objec- tives – one relating to the country’s sovereignty and security, the other concerning its belonging to various international and regional orga- nizations, in particular NATO and the EU. Over the past 20 years, consecutive governments have adapted these goals despite the partic- ular domestic and external circumstances they faced, and while no government has overtly attempted an overhaul of foreign policy priori- ties, not all governments have been equally successful in pursuing these goals. Concerning the country’s sovereignty and security, the initial years after independence saw the country’s political elites focus their efforts on gaining international recognition for Macedonia as an independent state. Establishing sovereignty in today’s international system is largely procedural, involving application for UN membership and establishing diplomatic relations with other states. However, Macedonia’s road to international recognition was fraught with difficulties (Hillgruber 1998). First, Macedonia’s newly adopted democratic constitution was screened by an European Commission (EC) committee established to evaluate the preparedness of former Yugoslav republics to become independent states. In response to the EC’s comments Macedonia amended its consti- tution to include provisions stating that the country holds no claims to territories outside its borders and ensuring the protection of minorities within its borders (Rich 1993). 108 Early Departure – Late Arrival?

However, a far greater challenge was posed by the objection of Greece to recognizing the country under the name Republic of Macedonia. This dispute delayed Macedonia’s membership of the UN until 1993, and even then it joined under the temporary reference ‘the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia’ (UN 1993). The unresolved dispute further led to some countries recognizing Macedonia under its constitutional name, while others use the temporary reference. In addition, Greece imposed a trade embargo on Macedonia in 1994, virtually closing its border to any goods at a time when Macedonia’s northern border was also par- tially closed because of the international embargo against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. This severely affected the already contracting economy, forcing the Macedonian leadership to seek alternative trade routes, as well as a compromise solution with Greece (Sokalski 2003; Vankovska 2011). Nonetheless, the dispute did not escalate further, and the embargo remained the only coercive foreign policy tool employed by the Greek side. By the end of 1995, Macedonia and Greece had signed the Interim Accord, which obliged both countries to continue the negotiations process under UN facilitation and opened the way for Macedonia to gain membership in international and regional organiza- tions, allowing it to use the full benefits of its status as a sovereign state (UN 1995). As a result, it was only from 1996 onwards that membership in inter- national organizations and Euro-Atlantic integration climbed on the foreign policy agenda in Macedonia. By the end of the decade, when many of the former communist countries in Eastern Europe had already become NATO members and were well under way to completing the requirements for EU membership, Macedonia had only managed to establish diplomatic relations with the EU and joined the Partnership for Peace program in NATO. However, in this respect Macedonia was not the only laggard. All former Yugoslav states, with the exception of Slovenia, were stuck at the end of the queue for joining NATO and the EU by the end of the 1990s, having spent most of the first decade since the fall of communism in wars and ethnic conflicts that prevented them from pursuing other foreign policy goals. However, Macedonia is an exception among the former Yugoslav states for its constrained relations with Greece. No other former Yugoslav state had problems of this mag- nitude with a non-Yugoslav neighboring state, as Slovenia’s successful resolution of issues with Italy demonstrates. Since then, regional cooperation and EU and NATO integration have been the main priority on every government’s agenda in Macedonia, an ambition encouraged by NATO, and the EU signaling that former Cvete Koneska 109

Yugoslav states can join their ranks once they fulfill the membership cri- teria.5 Macedonia joined the Membership Action Plan of NATO in 1999 and the Stabilization and Association process of the EU in 2001, both pre-accession mechanisms aimed at preparing aspiring countries to take on the obligations of membership. However, sovereignty concerns had not fully disappeared by 2001. As the country plunged into ethnic con- flict between the Albanian minority and the country’s security forces, the prospect of external intervention raised questions about the capac- ity of the state to preserve its full sovereignty. The Macedonian political leadership at the time was negotiating a thin line between international intervention to prevent the conflict and external assistance for domestic negotiations between the leaders of the two ethnic communities. These events demonstrated the fragility of the country’s sovereignty and fur- ther strengthened the resolve of its leadership to pursue NATO and EU membership, since belonging to these organizations was seen to pro- vide an additional, external guarantee of the country’s sovereignty and territorial integrity (Ružin 2010). In the years following the 2001 ethnic conflict, Macedonia hosted several external missions on its territory, including a NATO disarma- ment mission and EU security and police missions. However, upon the expiry of their mandate and as the country further progressed towards EU and NATO integration, external missions on its territory were ter- minated, indicating the country’s growing capacity to maintain security and rule of law. The conflict between ethnic Albanian armed groups and Macedonian security forces did not lead to a significant shift in the country’s foreign policy. It underscored the undiminished impor- tance of security and sovereignty, but the country’s resolve to join NATO and EU remained unshaken. More than a decade after the eth- nic conflict, Macedonian foreign policy still includes the same strategic priorities, membership in NATO and the EU, and peaceful resolution of conflicts and outstanding issues with neighbors. Moreover, Macedonian leaders still face the same challenge their predecessors faced in 1991 – how to resolve the dispute about the country’s name with neighboring Greece, to remove the greatest obstacle to the country’s accession into NATO and the EU. Notwithstanding the above, indirectly the conflict and its aftermath changed the balance in Macedonia’s foreign policy. Albanian politi- cal leaders gained a greater say in foreign policy decisions, while the support for EU and NATO integration was rebalanced across the two ethnic communities in the country (Daskalovski 2002; Atanasov 2011). Macedonians grew more resentful of the role that international players 110 Early Departure – Late Arrival? were taking in the country, seeing the peace agreement as imposed from the outside. NATO’s assistance in stopping the violence and negotiating the peace agreement strengthened the alliance’s popularity among the Albanian community. Since 2001, Albanian politicians have been the most fervent supporters of Macedonia’s NATO integration. Despite these differences there was general consensus concerning the country’s for- eign policy priorities, which helped political elites focus on these shared goals, despite disagreements in many domestic policy areas. More than 20 years after independence, the security of the country’s borders, its territorial integrity and international recognition do not appear to be the most pressing foreign policy concerns for Macedonian politicians. Rather, becoming integrated into the Euro-Atlantic politi- cal and security structures has become the main foreign policy priority (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Macedonia 2013). In addition to status- related benefits from being a NATO and EU member state, which would see Macedonia recognized as a democratic, free-market, European state, the Euro-Atlantic ambitions are also seen to further consolidate the country’s security and territorial integrity. Other foreign policy issues are also connected to the goals of EU and NATO integration, such as good relations with neighboring states and the strengthening of regional cooperation, as these are among the foreign policy conditions for becoming a member. Finally, the most pressing foreign policy issue since the country’s independence – the unresolved name dispute with Greece – has also become closely intertwined with Macedonia’s bid for joining the EU and NATO, after Greece vetoed Macedonia’s membership in NATO in 2008 and since 2009 has repeatedly blocked the start of EU accession negotiations.

EU and NATO membership As mentioned above, Macedonia was late to establish diplomatic rela- tions with the EU and NATO as an independent state, having done so only after the signing of the Temporary Accords with Greece in late 1995. Before this, the European Community/EU and other international organizations, such as the ad hoc International Conference on the for- mer Yugoslavia, had been involved in negotiations about succession issues between the former Yugoslav republics and the specification of conditions for independent statehood, so Macedonian politicians have had opportunities to interact with and learn more about the modus operandi of the European Community and NATO. Nonetheless, offi- cially the country’s leadership did not express its desire to join the EU until almost a decade after independence. Therefore, although until Cvete Koneska 111

2001 Macedonia had not been involved in the wars in the former Yugoslavia, it was not included in the initial waves of the large Eastern Enlargement of the EU (2004 and 2007) and the first enlargement rounds of NATO (1999 and 2004). It was only with the end of the wars in Bosnia and Kosovo, and the establishment of several regional security and cooperation initiatives in the Balkans, such as the Stability Pact (later the Regional Coopera- tion Council), and the shifting rhetoric in NATO and the EU towards closer integration of states from the former Yugoslavia, that prospects for joining the EU and NATO improved. Indeed, since the mid-1990s Macedonia had joined NATO’s Partnership for Peace program and had allowed NATO to use its airspace during the 1999 air campaign against Yugoslavia in a bid to align its foreign policy to that of NATO member states. This decision, along with similar domestically unpopular moves, such as the hosting of more than 200,000 Kosovo refugees, testifies to the growing importance assigned to NATO and EU membership as the country’s strategic priorities, for which politicians are willing to sacrifice domestic support (Holsti and Rosenau 1988; Risse-Kappen 1991). With the turn of the decade and the launch of the Stabilization and Association process as a policy tool aimed at preparing the for- mer Yugoslav states for EU membership, accession efforts became a more institutionalized and procedural process, becoming more pre- dictable and therefore leaving less space for symbolic foreign policy gestures, such as those during the Kosovo war (Pridham 2007). Measur- ing commitment and progress in achieving foreign policy goals became increasingly more quantifiable, as the country progressed further along the road towards becoming an EU member state, through the annual progress reports published by the EC, which detailed the progress the country has achieved over the past year in more than 30 policy areas. European partnership documents detailed the tasks that needed to be completed every year in each of the 34 policy chapter areas, setting administrative and policy adjustments as the main tools for achieving EU membership (European Commission 2012). It was similar, though slightly less institutionalized, with NATO mem- bership, as Macedonia, along with Croatia and Albania, was included in the Membership Action Plan (MAP) of NATO that aimed to issue these three countries with membership invitations at the Bucharest summit in 2008. The MAP process was regularly monitored, through evalua- tions of the countries’ progress in defense and security reforms to ensure they fulfilled the criteria for NATO membership. Efforts to implement the necessary reforms were coupled with gestures aimed at signaling 112 Early Departure – Late Arrival? the country’s commitment to NATO goals and policies, such as send- ing troops to Afghanistan and Iraq. While many NATO members have withdrawn their troops from Iraq and Afghanistan, Macedonia still con- tributes troops to the International Security Assistance Force mission in Afghanistan, though in 2008 it terminated its participation in the international mission in Iraq. Nevertheless, despite being included in the EU’s enlargement policy and being awarded candidate status in late 2005, a step which was expected to further streamline the process of EU integration and set the country solidly on the road to achieving EU membership within a decade, its progress has stalled since then. NATO membership also did not materialize in 2008. Both were the result of Greek vetoes, owing to the unresolved name dispute between the two countries. Therefore, since 2008, the name dispute with Greece has become the single most important foreign policy issue in Macedonia, one that has shifted foreign policy back towards more symbolic and less predictable policy-making and behavior.

The name dispute with Greece The dispute with Greece over its objection to Macedonia’s name – the Republic of Macedonia – was a major obstacle to the country’s effort to obtain international recognition of its statehood in the early 1990s. However, after the signing of the Interim Accord in 1995, which introduced the provisional reference – the Former Yugoslav Repub- lic of Macedonia – by which Macedonia could seek membership in international organizations, including the UN, EU and NATO, relations between the two countries significantly improved. Greece was among the main supporters in the EU for the accession of the countries in the Western Balkans, and it promoted further EU enlargement to the Balkans, including Macedonia. However, the Interim Accord does not provide a full solution to the dispute, allowing for the recurrence of disagreements in the future (Zachariadis 1996). Mutual relations deteriorated after 2006, when the conservative center-right VMRO-DPMNE won the elections and replaced the center-left Social Democrats in government. The new gov- ernment embarked upon a wide-ranging campaign to stress the ancient roots of the Macedonian nation, including building monuments of ancient Macedonian historical figures, such as Alexander the Great and Philip of Macedon, and renaming infrastructure objects after them. This was perceived as a provocation by the Greek side, which first threat- ened to veto Macedonia’s membership to NATO and then in April 2008 Cvete Koneska 113 delivered on the threat at the NATO summit in Bucharest, when Croatia and Albania were invited to join the organization. Since then, Greece has repeatedly used its veto powers to prevent Macedonian membership of the EU and NATO, in order to put pres- sure on Macedonia in the name dispute. After the trade embargo, vetoes in NATO and the EU are the only other instance in which Macedonia has faced coercive means in foreign policy. However, unlike the embargo which resulted in a compromise, bilateral relations have not improved since 2008. Despite several UN-sponsored rounds of nego- tiations between the two countries, no meaningful progress has been achieved in resolving the dispute. It appears that the Greek vetoes and the strong rhetoric that accompanied them on both sides have disin- clined them further from compromise, making it unlikely that the issue will be resolved in the short term. In response to Greek vetoes, the Macedonian government relied on legal rather than coercive foreign policy tools. Earlier Macedonian lob- bying efforts led to the country’s recognition under its constitutional name by the US and Canada in 2005, and a few EU member states dur- ing the 1990s, but this had no impact on Greece’s stance in the dispute. The most important step made by the government after the Greek veto in 2008 was taking Greece to the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in 2011 for violating the Interim Accord from 1995 by vetoing Macedonia’s membership bid to NATO. The ICJ ruled in favor of Macedonia, find- ing Greece in breach of its commitments under the 1995 Accord, but this has had no tangible impact on the dispute, despite increased diplo- matic efforts and lobbying from the Macedonian side (ICJ 2011; Mircev 2012). The ICJ ruling had no enforceable provisions and, apart from the moral satisfaction of having won the case, the Macedonian side did not progress any further in resolving the dispute with Greece, which continued to block Macedonia’s EU accession negotiations. Given the persisting power asymmetry between Macedonia and Greece, stemming from the latter’s full membership of the EU and NATO, which grants it veto power over Macedonia’s membership aspirations, Macedonian gov- ernments have only used moral rhetoric and legal means to promote their case, refraining from using coercive or hostile foreign policy tools. Meanwhile, Macedonian ambitions for becoming a NATO and EU member remain, even though the government has not shown willing- ness to compromise over the name in order to unblock the road to EU and NATO membership, and the country’s leadership has failed to find an alternative way to successfully realize these objectives. There- fore, the name dispute remains the most pressing foreign policy issue 114 Early Departure – Late Arrival? in Macedonia, on whose successful resolution the achievement of the country’s main foreign policy priorities depends.

Regional cooperation

Although relations with Greece have been marred by the name dispute, over the past two decades Macedonian governments have invested sub- stantial efforts in maintaining good neighborly relations. Since 1991, regional cooperation and stability have been among the main foreign policy goals embraced by Macedonian politicians, not least because the conflicts in the region were perceived as potential threats to Macedonian security and statehood. Macedonia has joined most regional initiatives in the Balkans and it has aspired to maintain a reputation as a reliable partner of the countries in the region (Uvalic 2000; Bechev 2011). In par- ticular, relations with the former Yugoslav republics have been amiable, and despite the conflicts in the region Macedonia managed to maintain cooperation with all former Yugoslav republics. Slovenia and Croatia, both further advanced in the processes of EU and NATO integration, have been supportive of Macedonia’s efforts to join these organizations. Mutual relations and cooperation strengthened especially during the past several years, as Macedonia started the pro- cess of legislative and institutional adjustments to EU standards, with Slovenia and Croatia providing significant technical assistance, as well as many of the policy and institutional solutions that the two coun- tries had adopted in response to EU requirements. Travel and economic relations with these countries also strengthened during the last decade, as shared institutional legacies and familiarity with the administrative structure and pre-independence commercial relations made interactions both at popular and political level easier and more predictable. The only former Yugoslav republics that share a border with Macedonia are Serbia and Kosovo, the latter since 2008. The bor- der between Macedonia and Serbia has not been disputed since 1991. It follows the administrative border from Yugoslavia and both parties remained committed to it, a process that was replicated with Kosovo when the former Serbian province declared independence. Although the existence of ethnic minorities across republics’ borders led to conflicts in the 1990s elsewhere in the former Yugoslavia, the sizeable ethnic Albanian minority in Macedonia did not dispute the border between Macedonia and Kosovo. Macedonia’s recognition of Kosovo, which fol- lowed months after the country declared independence, caused the freezing of diplomatic relations with Serbia. Serbia temporarily broke Cvete Koneska 115 off diplomatic relations with Macedonia in October 2008, upon the country’s recognition of Kosovo’s independence, as it did with the other former Yugoslav republics which recognized Kosovo at the time. Nonetheless, diplomatic relations were soon restored in April 2009, and currently Macedonia maintains close relations with both Serbia and Kosovo. Relations with Bosnia and Herzegovina and Montenegro are also good, and there have been no outstanding problems between Macedonia and these two countries over the past two decades. Regular cooperation within the regional cooperation initiatives ensures relations remain friendly. The countries’ shared foreign policy goals of EU and NATO membership also provide common platforms for political cooper- ation and joint lobbying efforts at European level, as was demonstrated in 2009 with the visa liberalization in the EU, when all former Yugoslav republics (except Slovenia and Croatia) argued for lifting the Schengen visa regime and allowing their citizens to travel without a visa into the Schengen zone. Relations with non-Yugoslav neighbors have been relatively good and with few disputes. In particular, relations with Albania have remained non-conflictual throughout the post-independence period, despite Macedonia’s internal problems with the ethnic Albanian com- munity. Albania’s non-interference in the ethnic conflict in 2001 ensured that bilateral relations remained amicable. With Bulgaria rela- tions have been more volatile, ranging from very close support during the early 1990s, when Bulgaria was the first country to recognize Macedonia’s independence, to antagonistic by the end of 2012, when the Bulgarian government joined Greece in vetoing Macedonia in the EU Council. Since then relations have started to improve again, with both governments committing to cooperate more. By and large Macedonian foreign policy is aligned with that of other former Yugoslav states, as the whole region is gradually getting closer to joining the EU and NATO (Anastasakis and Bechev 2003). Although out- standing bilateral issues with Greece (and more recently Bulgaria) have blocked the country from proceeding further in EU and NATO integra- tion, there are no outstanding bilateral issues with the former Yugoslav states. Nonetheless, the unresolved status of Kosovo and ongoing nego- tiations between the governments in Belgrade and Pristina continue to stir anxiety among Macedonian politicians, who fear that any partition of Kosovo might spill over to Macedonia and fan secessionist senti- ments among the more radical Albanian political subjects. As a result, Macedonia often reiterates its firm support for territorial integrity in 116 Early Departure – Late Arrival? the region, as a means of preventing a new wave of ethnic hostilities. Macedonian Albanians maintain close relations with Kosovo Albanians, both at popular and political levels. Close ties from Yugoslav times were reinforced during the 1990s, especially through the paramilitary armies during the war in Kosovo in 1997–1999 and the conflict in Macedonia in 2001. Relations between Albanian political parties in Macedonia and parties in Kosovo are strong, and interactions at this level are much more frequent than through official state institutions. However, Kosovo’s commitment to building good relations with its neighbors, in a bid to establish its reputation as a peaceful, democratic player in the region, has led to no official support for some Albanian politicians’ rhetoric for secession or unification. With the signing of the agreement between Kosovo and Serbia in April 2013, the uncertainty over borders in the region has been reduced, as have fears for Macedonian territorial integrity.

Continuity and change

The end of communism and the dissolution of the Yugoslav federa- tion are seen as major ruptures in the recent history in the region, marking a major change in the political map as well as in foreign pol- icy relations. The embracing of democratic constitutions and rules of political competition also implies a major shift in foreign policy orienta- tion among the former communist and newly independent states (Skak 1992). In particular, for some among the former Yugoslav states, includ- ing Macedonia, it meant abandoning the doctrine of nonalignment in foreign policy and embracing EU and NATO membership as strategic priorities. This new set of foreign policy objectives and priorities is the most significant change in terms of foreign policy since Macedonian independence in 1991. Alignment with ‘the West’ has been almost unanimously accepted both at the political level, as well as among the population. Although the problems the state has encountered since the Greek vetoes for NATO and EU membership have led to a slight fall in approval rates for EU and NATO integration, no alterna- tive to these objectives has been articulated yet by political parties or leaders. In this respect Macedonia does not differ much from the foreign policy trajectory followed by other former Yugoslav states. Slovenia, Croatia and more recently Montenegro have also virtually unanimously embraced a foreign policy towards EU and NATO membership. Even in Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, the general agreement is to proceed Cvete Koneska 117 towards closer relations with NATO, if not outright membership, and joining the EU, despite objections among parts of the population and certain political groups. Although the pace of reform and progress in achieving these common objectives differs from country to country, they have faced some common challenges and jointly brought certain issues to the EU foreign policy agenda – such as visa liberalization in 2008–2009 – signaling the potential for more cooperation in this area by former Yugoslav states. However,thereisalsomuchcontinuityinmanyrespectswith the foreign policy of Yugoslavia. The institutional and diplomatic structure that underpins Macedonian foreign policy closely resem- bles that of Yugoslavia. After independence, Macedonia built its for- eign policy administration and diplomatic networks following the model used during Yugoslav times. For instance, the idea about professional, career diplomats is slow to take root in Macedonian diplomatic practice, despite repeated mentions of building a profes- sional civil service. Macedonian ambassadors abroad are often either retired party politicians or other socially distinguished individuals, such as writers or professors, but rarely professional diplomats. This is a practice that was widely applied in Yugoslavia and one which still remains, despite nominal acceptance of the principles of neu- trality and professionalism in public administration and diplomatic service. In other respects Macedonian foreign policy is much more con- strained and less global, despite the often-cited advance of globalization and the fall of the ideological divide across the world. By virtue of its small size, Macedonia does not have as much strategic importance in international relations as Yugoslavia did before 1989. As a result Macedonia’s relations with states beyond the region and the EU and NATO framework are limited. Both political and economic relations with countries on other continents and regions, though not antago- nistic, are also not developed to the extent to which they were before independence. While Yugoslavia had strong commercial and political relations with many states in Africa, Asia and the Middle East, thanks to the Non-Aligned Movement, Macedonia is only starting to rebuild these relations. With the recent economic downturn across Europe, Macedonia, like many other states in the region, has turned towards the more dynamic economies of Asia and the Middle East in order to attract much-needed foreign investments. Nonetheless, in terms of its geographic span, Macedonian foreign policy still lags behind the span of Yugoslav foreign policy. 118 Early Departure – Late Arrival?

Conclusion

This chapter offers a critical overview of the development of Macedonia’s foreign policy since independence from the SFRY in 1991. The above sections outline the changes and continuities in the country’s foreign policy priorities, institutional structures and decision-making mechanism over the past two decades. The findings suggest that since declaring independence the country’s foreign policy has experienced several important institutional changes. Foreign policy has evolved from being the domain of a single person – the president – to being more inclusive of multiple political actors, such as political parties and gov- ernment coalitions, and since 2001 of the ethnic Albanian community. Thus Macedonian political elites have proved responsive to internal challenges and demands to adapt foreign policy mechanisms, while at the same time preserving the consensus over main foreign policy goals – EU and NATO membership – both among political actors and the population. However, the findings also suggest that such flexibility is lacking in addressing external challenges to the country’s foreign policy aspira- tions. Although Macedonia has generally developed friendly relations with most of the countries in the region, political elites have failed to successfully resolve the country’s name dispute with neighbor- ing Greece. For more than 20 years this dispute has been thwarting Macedonian efforts to build closer relations with, and ultimately gain membership of NATO and the EU, but no government has marshaled sufficient public support and political consensus for a compromise with Greece. Instead, since 2006 the name dispute has escalated, leading to repeated Greek vetoes of Macedonia in the EU and NATO. The fail- ure to successfully resolve the dispute has rendered domestic political consensus over foreign policy virtually powerless, as without resolution Macedonian strategic foreign policy objectives remain unrealized.

Notes

1. The actual referendum question was: Are you in favor of a sovereign and inde- pendent Macedonia, with the right to enter into a future union of sovereign states of Yugoslavia? (author’s translation), suggesting both independence and eventual new union of Yugoslav states. The results from the voting for the referendum can be accessed at: Državna Izborna Komisija. Rezultati od izborite 1990–2000 [State Electoral Commission. Results from the elections 1990–2000]. Available at: http://www.sec.mk/Default.aspx?tabid=855. 2. The Ohrid Framework Agreement was signed by the leaders of the four largest political parties in Macedonia (two ethnic Macedonian, two ethnic Albanian) Cvete Koneska 119

on 13 August 2001. It contains provisions for constitutional changes in Macedonia’s political system – introducing power-sharing mechanisms in decision-making (double majority requirement and reconciliation committee in Parliament, inter-ethnic coalitions in government) and improved repre- sentation and access to political power for the Albanian ethnic community. The full text is available at: https://peaceaccords.nd.edu/site_media/media/ accords/Macedonia_framework_agreement.pdf (accessed on 25 January 2014). 3. The name ‘Republic of Macedonia’ is opposed by Greece for historical and territorial reasons. The ancient Kingdom of Macedonia was mainly on Greek territory. Furthermore, Greece’s Northern Province is also known as ‘Macedonia’ and many Greeks who live in this region identify themselves as Greek Macedonians without having any affiliation or loyalty towards the Republic of Macedonia. 4. Articles 79 and 84 of the Constitution of Republic of Macedonia state that the president represents the country and is responsible for appoint- ing Macedonian ambassadors abroad, competencies not clearly distinct from those of the government established by Article 91: proposing ambassadors, and establishing diplomatic relations with other countries (Constitution of Macedonia 1991). 5. The Thessaloniki EU Summit in 2003 put Western Balkans enlargement firmly on the EU agenda, and defined the Stabilization and Association process as pre-accession preparation mechanism for these countries.

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Introduction

Bosnia and Herzegovina (hereafter referred to as BiH or Bosnia) declared independence from the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) on 15 October 1991 in the middle of a deep and dramatic political cri- sis. The first country to officially recognize Bosnia and Herzegovina was Bulgaria on 17 January 1992, the European countries followed on 6 April and the United States (US) and Croatia on 7 April. The process of recognition of the former Yugoslav states was devised in a manner that was

requiring an application for recognition which is examined by an arbitrator and then decided upon according to a set timetable, is vir- tually unprecedented in recognition practice. The invitation by the [European Community] was thus extended to all six Republics of the SFRY but there was to be no uniformity in the responses or the results. (Rich 1993, 44)

The Badinter Committee’s1 opinion regarding Bosnia’s bid for inde- pendence was conditional upon organizing a referendum on the issue. Following the first democratic elections in Bosnia in 1991, three major ethno-nationalist parties achieved a landslide victory over reformed Communists and other smaller, centrist, civic and liberal parties. With 73.7 per cent of votes and the absolute majority of seats in the par- liament of the Socialist Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the ethno- nationalist triumvirate became the new political reality in BiH. However,

122 Adnan Huski´c 123 with their main opponent (Communists) out of the picture the frag- ile and superficial ethnic compromise was revealed for what it really was: a marriage of convenience for which the rationale had ceased to exist. The tri-ethnic set-up was soon put to its ultimate test with the rapid advance of the disintegration of Yugoslavia. Centrally positioned and truly multi-ethnic Bosnia had to choose its path; to follow in the footsteps of Slovenia and Croatia or to stay in what was left of the SFRY. Around this issue the major ethno-nationalist parties had diverg- ing opinions. The Party of Democratic Action (SDA) whose leader was Alija Izetbegovic´ as the main Bosniak (at the time Muslim) party and the Croat Democratic Union (HDZ) as a major Croat party along with a number of smaller parties supported the bid for independence by adopting on 17 October 1991 a memorandum and resolution. A week later Serb delegates from the Serb Democratic Party (SDS) and the Serb Renewal Movement (SPO) established the Serb People’s Assembly.2 On 24–25 January 1992 the Assembly of the Republic of BiH, now largely without Serb delegates, adopted a decision to organize a referendum on independence of the country. HDZ’s support for independence was seen as a tactical move towards ‘canonization’ of the country and as a consis- tent employment of the ethno-territorial principle clearly expressed in the so-called ‘Livno Formulation’ (Luciˇ c´ 2008). On 29 March and 1 April 1992, Bosnian authorities organized the referendum, which was boycotted by Serb parties. The turnout at the referendum was 67 per cent, with 99.7 per cent voting in favor of the country’s independence. Sporadic violence that had begun even before the referendum intensified, turned soon into a full-scale war with atrocities unseen in Europe since the Second World War. Even though the character of war in Bosnia remains disputed, the undisputed fact remains that it was fought mainly along ethnic lines. Ever since the elections in 1991, foreign policy in BiH has been conducted by a number of actors. In addition to foreign policy from Sarajevo, other groups conducted their own foreign policy activities mainly in support of their domestic agenda. Sarajevo’s policies after the breakdown of Yugoslavia focused mainly on issues that were instrumen- tal for the promotion and eventual survival of the state, while seeking to develop foreign policy capacities that are needed for a proper conduct of foreign affairs. The war lasted three years, and only two successive US-brokered peace deals (Washington and Dayton Agreement)3 brought an end to the con- flict, creating a power-sharing arrangement that has had a significant impact on the country’s decision-making capacity, processes and general 124 Early Departure – Late Arrival? conduct of foreign policy. Post-war structural limitations inherent in Dayton’s power-sharing structure have made Bosnian foreign policy slow in response, inactive and instrumental in the domestic political struggle. In a nutshell, Bosnian foreign policy is subject to historical legacy and political stalemate, which in turn leads to a situation where domestic policy paralyzes the foreign policy of the country. Conse- quently, the most appropriate way to analyze the Bosnian foreign policy is through the ‘governmental politics’ model by Allison and Zelikow. This seeks to explain the foreign policy of a state by looking at the political level of that state. The resulting foreign policy is seen as a conse- quence of the interplay and considerations of domestic politics (Allison and Zelikow 1999).

Development of Bosnian foreign policy since independence

The referendum on independence created an insurmountable obsta- cle for an unconsolidated Bosnian democracy. Fragile institutions and the lack of democratic culture could hardly accommodate the con- flict between Bosnia’s ethno-national elites, and this would eventually culminate in war. The earliest foreign policy activities by Bosnian authorities in Sarajevo were conducted through extensive lobbying aimed at the recognition of the country. It was generally assumed that widespread recognition of the newly independent Bosnian state would act as a deterrent for the opponents of Bosnian independence and that a conflict could thus be prevented. Therefore, securing recognition by major world powers became a primary task of Sarajevo-based Bosnian diplomacy, and the crowning achievement took place on 22 May 1992 when Bosnia and Herzegovina became a member of the United Nations (UN). A second, albeit related, objective was to try to gain the support of the wider inter- national public, which could influence international decision-makers’ actions with regard to Bosnia. Serb and Croat (1992–1994) authorities (Republika Srpska (RS) and the Croatian Community of Herzeg-Bosnia) did not engage in concrete foreign policy actions, as their political goals coincided with those of their kin-states at the time. The leader of the Bosnian Serbs Radovan Karadžic´ explained this position, saying that ‘if Yugoslavia is to be dis- solved, we [Bosnian Serbs] authorize Slobodan Miloševic´ to act on our behalf. [ ...] if Yugoslavia is to be preserved and built we authorize Alija Izetbegovic’´ (Anąelic´ 2003, 207). However, some form of individ- ual foreign policy activity by Bosnian Serbs could be seen following an Adnan Huski´c 125 apparent political split with their kin-state in 1993, which came as a result of the Bosnian Serbs’ refusal to ratify the Vance-Owen Peace Plan. It is because both Bosnian Serbs and Croats had their kin-states who acted on an international level on their behalf that the bulk of for- eign policy activity covered here represents the foreign policy of the Sarajevo-based government.

Wartime diplomacy – Recognition, perception and arms embargo

For the Sarajevo-based Bosnian government all diplomatic efforts dur- ing the war were instrumental in stopping the hostilities. In this sense, the internationalization of the Bosnian war was an aim pursued by a variety of actors, both formal and informal, and greatly facilitated by the emergence of the so-called CNN effect.4 Considerable effort was needed to win the support of the major European powers, some of whom were at that time considered ‘traditional’ allies of Serbs, such as France and Britain. Influencing British positions concerning the war in Bosnia could only be done by altering the perception of both officials and the media. According to Noel Malcolm, one rea- son for the apparent British inability to comprehend what is actually happening in Bosnia was thanks to British elections in April 1992, which meant that both media and politicians were too preoccupied with internal matters to pay much attention to events abroad. Once the elections were over, British politicians turned to the region only to find there ‘a number of equally fierce-looking combatants fighting one another for equally incomprehensible reason’ (2002, 239). Terms used, such as ‘warring parties,’ implied a neutral position on the part of British government and equality of all sides in the conflict. The British media were making a serious effort not to take sides even when it came to some very explicit actions, such as the hijacking of six UN trucks by Serb paramilitary forces in April 1992 (Malcolm 2002).5 The turning point in the international public’s perception of the war took place in August 1992, not as a result of Bosnian diplomacy but because of British press reports about the concentration camps around Prijedor.6 Images of starved men behind the barbed wire were reminis- cent of a period in history that everyone hoped would never be seen again. The US administration’s position started changing in 1993 when the conflict ‘was defined honestly as cross-border aggression that affected US interests and demanded a stronger response’ (Harris 1997). In a speech 126 Early Departure – Late Arrival? laying out the future direction of Bill Clinton’s foreign policy towards Bosnia, State Secretary Warren Christopher stated that the

continuing destruction of a new UN member state challenges the principle that internationally recognized borders should not be altered by force. [ ...] The world’s response to the violence in the for- mer Yugoslavia is an early and crucial test of how it will address the critical concerns of ethnic and religious minorities in the post-Cold War world. (US Department of State 1993)

The issues of recognition and raising awareness had an adjacent foreign policy objective of overturning an arms embargo that was imposed by the United Nation Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 713.7 This Resolution was adopted unanimously by the UNSC in September 1991. Sarajevo authorities were questioning the Resolution on two grounds, the matter of applicability to a country that did not exist at the time of the adoption, and possible consequences on the ground.

It is clear that in adopting the Resolution 713 the Security Council aimed to put an end to the conflict by staunching the flow of arms, but that, on the other hand, [ ...] created an imbalance to the detri- ment of Bosnia-Herzegovina which could lead to an aggravation of the ‘ethnic cleansing’ campaigns. (Bedjaoui 1995, 52)

However, the arms embargo remained in force, whereas the threat to unilaterally begin arming the Bosnian and Croat side (after the Washington Agreement in 1994) was only used to bring the Serbs to the negotiating table in Dayton in 1995. Notable effort was made in seeking support for the Bosnian case by a number of prominent intellectual figures, journalists and celebrities.8 The siege of Sarajevo, which is the longest siege of a capital city in mod- ern history (5 April 1992–29 February 1996), was instrumental in this sense, as it represented the most potent symbol of Bosnian defense and it attracted extraordinary media attention. Despite all problems inherent in its structure, Bosnia has managed to formulate its main foreign policy objectives. ‘The General direc- tions and priorities for implementation of foreign policy of Bosnia and Herzegovina’ outlines future priorities Adnan Huski´c 127

for the purpose of all-inclusive protection of human rights, poverty reduction, promotion of global partnership for development, strong commitment to integration and transition processes in the region of Southeast Europe in political, economic and security sense, well aware of the need of accelerating the European integration process of Bosnia and Herzegovina. (Presidency of BiH 2003)

The same document defines the following foreign policy priorities for BiH:

1. The preservation and protection of independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Bosnia and Herzegovina within its internation- ally recognized borders; 2. Full and consistent implementation of the Dayton Peace Agreement; 3. BIH’s inclusion into European integration processes; 4. Participation of Bosnia and Herzegovina in multilateral activities, in particular as part of the system of the UN, the Council of Europe, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC); and 5. Promotion of Bosnia and Herzegovina as a partner in interna- tional economic relations, and promotion of the activities aiming at the admission of Bosnia and Herzegovina into the World Trade Organization (WTO) (Presidency of BiH 2003).

Institutional mechanisms and main actors in post-war Bosnia

State actors in foreign policy Foreign policy today represents ‘an empirical subject matter straddling the boundary between the internal and the external spheres of a state’ (Smith, Hadfield and Dunne 2008a, 86). Bosnia’s post-conflict consti- tutional arrangement adds a completely new dimension of complexity to the study of the country’s foreign policy. From a comparative per- spective, Bosnia qualifies as a consociational democracy where up until 20069 the key aspect of governance ‘is the substantial role of inter- national actors, being able to override decisions of institutions and intervene in the decision-making processes themselves’ (Bieber 2004). This means that in addition to power-sharing and safeguards against infringement of rights of any ethnic groups, various international actors in BiH are also engaged in policy development and implementation. 128 Early Departure – Late Arrival?

Foreign policy in Bosnia is conducted by a plethora of actors, often with diverging objectives. To further add to this complexity, politics in Bosnia is still dominated by a struggle between the three ethnic groups whose positions concerning the future set-up of the country have remained virtually unchanged since the early 1990s. In accordance with the Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the domain of foreign policy is a responsibility of the institutions of BiH, in other words at state level. Given the peculiar power-sharing nature of the Dayton Constitution, sub-national units, that is, the entities Republika Srpska and the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (FBiH), are allowed to maintain ‘special relations’10 with neighboring Serbia and Croatia. While the Agreement on Special and Parallel Relations between the RS and Serbia was signed but not ratified by the Parlia- mentary Assembly of BiH, Croatia unilaterally gave up on the special and parallel relations with FBiH in favor of good relations with Bosnia as a whole, as part of the general change of the political course after president Tuąman’s death in 1999. The presidency of BiH is tasked with day-to-day foreign policy.11 Hav- ing in mind the set-up of the presidency (consisting of three members, one Bosniak and one Croat elected from the territory of the FBiH and one Serb elected from the territory of the RS), its rotating chairmanship and the need for broad consensus when it comes to decision-making procedures, the resulting foreign policy of BiH is limited mostly to non- contentious issues around which a consensus can be built. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of BiH is one of nine ministries on the state level. Given its importance, a particular attention is given to staffing accord- ing to ethnic and political principles. Power-sharing is strictly in place at ministerial and deputy ministerial level, while the rest of the employ- ees at the Foreign Ministry, even though they are civil servants, are as a matter of fact political appointees. This means that regardless of its hierarchical structure, Bosnia does not have a law on foreign affairs, which some senior diplomats consider a serious deficiency (Commis- sion for Foreign Affairs of the Parliamentary Assembly of BiH 2012, 2). Furthermore, communication between the Presidency, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Parliamentary Assembly is hardly satisfactory (Kapetanovic´ 2013).12

Sub-state actors in foreign policy Following the failure of constitutional reform talks in April 2006, the leadership of the Republika Srpska has become visibly more engaged in the foreign policy area, promoting the goals of RS that often stand Adnan Huski´c 129 in contradiction to the foreign policy priorities of BiH. These goals are defined by the ruling party Alliance of Independent Social Democrats (SNSD) and their leader Milorad Dodik, currently occupying the position of President of the RS. Together with two smaller partners they dominate the legislative assembly of the RS, which enables them to set the agenda freely. In addition to opening a total of eight government representative offices abroad,13 the RS government hired lobby firms14 intheUSto facilitate the access to US law- and decision-makers and to influence the US foreign policy position towards the RS and BiH as a whole. These firms render different services for the RS, from legal to PR to lobbying. In terms of current foreign policy objectives towards the US and Russia, the RS has recently added a Washington office to the list of RS representation offices abroad. Washington and Moscow are both consid- ered important for the RS, and the amount of money spent on lobbying in Washington proves this claim. The usefulness of this expenditure is hard to measure. While advocates for lobbying see a qualitative change in the US approach to the RS, the situation on the ground and the State Department’s distancing from Dodik largely disproves it. The head of the RS representative office in Washington, Obrad Kesic,´ praised, in an interview to a Banja Luka-based daily newspaper,15 the lobbying activi- ties, claiming that they managed to shift the foreign policy objectives of the US from wishing to abolish the RS to supporting it strongly (Vukic´ 2013). Ultimately, opening a representation office in Washington was presented to the public as a major lobbying victory, while omitting the fact that similar offices for the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) also exist in Washington, apparently to no avail. The RS’s foreign policy regarding Russia must be approached in the wider context of economic and geopolitical relations between Russia and the West. Russia supports and defends the RS position against what they consider an encroachment of rights given to the RS under the Gen- eral Framework Agreement for Peace (GFAP). Starting with 2007, Russia broke loose from the international coalition in the Peace Implementa- tion Council (PIC) by siding with the RS and Dodik in the face of yet another dispute between him and the Office of the High Representative (OHR) (PIC 2007). However, the firm Russian stance and the support for RS coincided with another event involving Russian interests in the RS. Earlier the same year, Dodik’s government sold the RS oil industry to the Russian oil company NefteGazInkor (subsidiary company of the Russian state-controlled Zarubezhneft) in a rather non-transparent fash- ion. Russia is seen by the RS as a vital ally and a close friend in achieving domestic and foreign policy objectives. An insight into foreign policy 130 Early Departure – Late Arrival? activities via lobby groups and representational offices paints a picture of foreign policy actions which serve to improve the image of the RS, advocate the closure of the Office of the High Representative in BiH or win support for a range of other goals. These goals vary from full adherence to the Dayton Agreement and the preservation of the state- within-state status to a return to the original Dayton provisions,16 and to the dissolution of the state and independence of the RS. In terms of the process of arriving at these objectives, foreign policy of the RS does not appear to be the result of broad deliberations but rather the result of Dodik’s personal preferences. This largely corresponds to the centralized character of the administrative set-up of government in the RS. The conduct of RS foreign policy can therefore be seen as instrumental for the domestic political struggle. Furthermore, if we subscribe to the notion that the ‘foreign policy (of a country) rests on the effectiveness of the state at home and abroad’ (Hill 2003, 31), then the RS’s activity in the domain of foreign policy could ultimately be seen as a sign of weakness on the part of BiH. Contrary to a very active, agile RS, the other entity of BiH, the Fed- eration of BiH, conducts virtually no activities in the foreign policy domain. There are neither representation offices (other than the office of the canton Sarajevo17 in Brussels) nor active lobbying abroad. This could be to some extent the result of a strong orientation towards the state of BiH on the part of the Bosniak political elite and an appar- ent lack of interest on the part of the Croat political elites. While the former believe that the interest of Bosniaks could best be served through the promotion of foreign policy activities through state level institutions, the Croat political elites rely both on their kin-state and their Christian-Democratic partners in the EU for advancement of their political agenda. Other important sub-state actors include religious organizations in Bosnia and Herzegovina. They are relevant for at least two reasons. First, they command the support of a significant portion of the population in BiH, and second, their structures permeate state borders of neighboring countries virtually uninhibited. This is the case with all three domi- nant religious organizations in BiH.18 Religious communities are using their structures to influence the policy-makers, and from time to time openly engage in foreign policy activities at an international level. One such example is the dispute between the Head of Islamic Community in BiH, an influential political figure Mustafa Ceric,´ and the then Serbian president Boris Tadic.´ Tadic´ was invited by Cerictoengageinacompre-´ hensive Bosniak-Serb dialogue. Tadic´ initially supported the idea, but a Adnan Huski´c 131 problem arose as a result of the power struggle to control the Islamic Community of Serbia. Ceric’s´ protégé Mufti Zukorlic´ from Sandžak, a region in Serbia and Montenegro mainly inhabited by Bosniaks, chal- lenged the authority of the Head of Islamic Community in Serbia, who was supported by the Serbian authorities and accepted the authority of Sarajevo. Ceric´ soon started to openly contest the Serbian authorities by visiting Kosovo, which was no longer under the effective authority of Belgrade, and meeting Kosovar officials. In trying to account for this behavior, one must look at religious communities’ structure in Bosnia. Control over the Islamic Community in Serbia was instrumental in increasing Ceric’s´ standing after the elections of the new Head of the Islamic Community of BiH in November 2012. Namely, Ceric´ lost the support of the Assembly of the Islamic Community in BiH and was prevented from running as Grand Mufti again by the Constitution of the Islamic Community. Therefore he lobbied strongly for a successor who will enable him to maintain control of the Islamic Community. At the same time, his activities should be seen as an attempt to counter- balance Serbia’s significant influence in BiH via Republika Srpska.Here it must be noted that Mustafa Ceric,´ who was the religious leader of Bosnian Muslims, seeks to assume political authority over Bosniaks and religious authority over all Muslims in the entire region (Croatia, Serbia, Montenegro and Macedonia). After elections in the Islamic Community in 2012, Ceric´ founded the World Bosniak Congress (Svjetski bošnjaˇcki kongres), a pan-Bosniak political organization. The influences of the other two dominant religious organizations, the Serb Orthodox Church and the Catholic Church, are visible in the facil- itation of relations between Serb and Croat politicians in BiH and their counterparts in the kin-states.

Foreign policy and relations to other post-Yugoslav states

Bosnian foreign policy is generally considered as middle of the road, a result of complex negotiations between three ethnic groups on matters of importance in the foreign policy domain. First, the separate inter- ests of all three groups are taken into account at presidency level, while implementation at the level of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and its diplomatic and consular network clearly follows the same logic. This is particularly important in terms of relations with neighboring states and countries such as Turkey and Russia, where a lack of reciprocal char- acter in foreign policy dealings places Bosnia in a very inconvenient situation. 132 Early Departure – Late Arrival?

Serbia Despite being recognized by Yugoslavia in December 1995 and hav- ing officially established diplomatic relations in December 2000, Bosnia and Serbia’s actual relations could be described as anything but typi- cal. There are several variables that need to be taken into account and these mainly, though not all, pertain to Bosnia’s internal administra- tive arrangement. Serbia is a guarantor of the GFAP and is the subject of the ‘special and parallel relations’ clause in the Dayton Constitution. As already mentioned, there are some informal attempts, unsupported by major political actors or the wider public, to offset these relations through the strengthening of a pan-Bosniak identity.19 Strained relations between Serbia and BiH existed until the end of Slobodan Miloševic’s´ rule in Serbia in 2000. The formation of a progres- sive government in Serbia under Prime Minister Zoran Ðinąicmarked´ the beginning of a period of rapprochement between the two coun- tries. Relations deteriorated again following the assassination of Zoran Ðinąic´ and the ensuing political struggle between major political actors in Serbia. Serbia officially supports Bosnian sovereignty and is generally against the impositions of solutions by external actors. Serbia further favors the political set-up created in Dayton but at the same time directly challenges Bosnian sovereignty,20 and through its actions worsens inter- ethnic relations in the country. Serbia’s claim over Kosovo coupled with the lack of effective control over it maintains a discourse where bor- ders and divisions play an important part. Drawing a parallel between Kosovo and the position of the RS in BiH as many Serbian politi- cians did hardly contributes to overall stability in BiH. Recently, Turkey, which tries to maintain very good relations with both countries, has managed to mend some broken relations via trilateral summits orga- nized by Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu. The government of Serbia, with President Nikolic´ and Prime Minister Daciˇ c,´ which took power in 2012, has been significantly more constructive in its approach to BiH compared to its predecessors. While the ‘special rela- tions’ with RS continue, relations at state level have improved in both frequency and quality. This is partly the result of a general change in course and the adoption of a strong pro-EU stance by the new government, but also the result of quite bad personal relations with Dodik. Dodik openly supported Tadic´ at elections and maintains cor- dial business and personal relations with Serbia’s controversial tycoon Miroslav Miškovic,´ currently under investigation by the new Serbian government. Adnan Huski´c 133

Croatia Croatia recognized Bosnia in April 1992 and established diplomatic rela- tions in July 1992. Even though the starting point for relations with Croatia, as envisaged by the Dayton Agreement, was identical to the one with Serbia, relations between the two countries are significantly better. The change of government in Croatia in 2000, and the departure of Tuąman, resulted in a serious shift in Croatian policy towards BiH.21 Croatia gave up on the special and parallel relations with the Federation of BiH in favor of closer ties with BiH as a state. The role of Zagreb ever since could be described, from the Bosnian perspective, as sovereignty reinforcing. Various disputes between the two countries still exist, espe- cially concerning disputed stretches of borders, the use of Bosnian lake water in Croatian power plants, the Pelješac bridge and the payment of compensations, but none of these represent an insurmountable prob- lem. Similar to Serbia, Zagreb is generally supportive of any solution for the country that all three ethnic groups support. There seems to be a positive correlation between Croatia’s EU acces- sion process and the improvement in relations with neighbors. Proxim- ity of the EU, which has come into effect with Croatia’s accession on 1 July 2013, will most certainly have a positive effect in BiH, simply by increasing the EU’s vested interest in Bosnian affairs given the length of shared borders.

Montenegro, Kosovo, Macedonia and Slovenia Following Montenegrin independence in 2006, relations between the two countries could be described as fairly smooth and frictionless. Bosnia sued Serbia and Montenegro at the International Court of Justice (ICJ) concerning the Application of the Convention on the Preven- tion and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (ICJ 2007). Since the verdict in 2007, there are no serious outstanding issues between the two countries. Similarly to Croatia, the advancement of the EU inte- gration process of Montenegro will probably have a positive effect for BiH. Relations with Kosovo are significantly more complex. Since 2008 and the Declaration of Independence, Bosnia has neither recognized nor established any formal dialogue with Kosovo. The state level is crippled by the strong opposition of RS parties with regard to Kosovo’s inde- pendence. Their position is aligned with the official Belgrade position. Bosniak parties are also holding certain reservations, being wary of any border realignment in the region and the destabilizing effect this might have on Bosnia. The dissonant attitude of EU member states with regard 134 Early Departure – Late Arrival? to Kosovo is also not contributing to the political consolidation of the region. Macedonia recognized Bosnia in April 1992 and they established diplomatic relations in May 1993. Bosnia recognizes Macedonia under its constitutional name. Both countries are pursuing Euro-Atlantic integration as strategic goals and a means to achieve internal stability. Slovenia was, until 1 July 2013, the only former Yugoslav state that is a member of the EU. Slovenia recognized Bosnia and established diplo- matic relations in April and November 1992, respectively. Slovenia has been very supportive of the Bosnian bid for membership in the EU and NATO. A significant element of BiH’s relations with former Yugoslav coun- tries is in the domain of trade. Over the years Bosnia maintained a gen- erally unfavorable export/import ratio. Bosnia’s largest trading partners are Croatia and Serbia, and with both countries Bosnia’s export/import ratio is 1:2. The only country that Bosnia has a trade surplus with is Montenegro (Agency for Statistics of BiH 2011). Bosnia’s failure to act to protect its own economic interest in cases of unfair trade prac- tices is a direct result of the complex governance structure and limited sovereignty.22

Main issues in foreign policy

In terms of basic directions and activities, within a bilateral framework, Bosnia works to establish good relations with neighboring countries, countries which are members of the Peace Implementation Coun- cil Steering Board, members of the UN Security Council (UNSC), EU member states, countries in the region, members of the Organiza- tion of Islamic States, and ‘other countries which significantly con- tribute to reconstruction and development of BiH’ (Presidency of BiH 2003). On the multilateral level, Bosnia seeks to join the EU and NATO, which represents an explicit recognition of the geostrategic constraints of the country. NATO and EU membership are considered a strate- gic goal, and the desired outcome is described as ‘improvement and institutionalization of mutual cooperation.’ While the EU remains the undisputed goal and the only common denominator of almost all Bosnian foreign policy actors, the issue of NATO membership is some- what problematic. While not openly opposing NATO membership, RS authorities now frequently mention a referendum on accession to NATO once it becomes a reality, though the rhetoric is mostly seen as a move Adnan Huski´c 135 to appease the RS public, who are generally skeptical towards NATO (Remikovic 2012). In December 2009 the UN General Assembly elected Bosnia along with Lebanon and three other states in an uncontested vote as a non- permanent member of the UNSC. The move was meant, among other things, to help strengthen the fragile institutions of these countries. In terms of performance, two years in the UNSC hardly produced a visi- ble improvement in Bosnia, for the mandate coincided with the deepest political crisis in Bosnia after the war, but the level of foreign policy consensus reached during that period is surprising and should in itself be considered a success. Bosnia voted in support of the UNSC Resolu- tion 1973, which provided a pretext for NATO’s military intervention in Libya that ultimately led to the removal of Gaddafi’s regime. During a discussion on the extension of sanctions for Iran in 2011, BiH’s Presidency once again surprised everyone by adopting a unani- mous decision to support the extension of sanctions. In the words of a Bosnian journalist this turn of events

should not have been so surprising [ ...] while Washington no longer maintains a high-profile in Bosnia, it remains a major power bro- ker behind the scenes. The reasoning went like this: Bosniaks would likely oppose the sanctions in deference to relations with Islamic countries and public pressure; Serbs would likely oppose the sanc- tions simply to irk the US, whose involvement in the 1992–1995 war in Bosnia is less than fondly remembered; Bosnian Croats were rather indifferent. (Alic´ 2011)

The reasoning behind Bosniak support for sanctions, which was reit- erated during the visit of the Iranian foreign minister to BiH, was their commitment to NATO and EU integration. Serb support for sanctions, on the other side, had probably more to do with maintaining good relations with Israel. On the issue of the Palestinian bid for statehood, the Presidency’s Bosniak member Bakir Izetbegovic´ and Croat member Željko Komšic´ supported the drive, while their Serb colleague Nebojša Radmanovic´ remains opposed. The position of Bosniak and Croat politicians reflects the general public’s significant level of sympathy for the Palestinian cause. However, the RS has in recent years intensified its relations with Israel and assumed a strong pro-Israeli stance. Pro-Israeli analysts and commentators began to figure prominently in Bosnian Serb media, with 136 Early Departure – Late Arrival? government insiders voicing their concern about BiH being a hotbed of Islamic radicalism. RS president Milorad Dodik visited Israel and promised to promote Israeli interests in Bosnia, while Israeli Foreign Minister Avigdor Lieberman visited the RS on a private trip with a group of businessmen. The reasons for intensification of relations between the RS and Israel are difficult to discern and appear to run along several lines. First, Dodik has developed a strong anti-Turkish stance as a response to what he calls ‘neo-Ottomanism’ or Turkey’s recent re-engagement in the Balkans. Aware of the practical limitations of Serbian politicians to openly contest the Balkan politics of the country with whom they have an asymmetric trade agreement, Dodik works to increase his standing among the nationalist oriented part of the population in both coun- tries by invoking an image of a mythical hero standing against Turkish expansion. Furthermore, in the last few years, Israel’s relations with Turkey have seriously deteriorated, so Dodik’s intensification of relations with Israel could be described as an attempt to create a mutually ben- eficial anti-Turkish alliance in the wider region. Second, Dodik expects strong Israeli support for his territorial claims that could culminate in an independence bid for the RS. Since Israel’s right-wing government is increasingly facing criticism for expanding settlement building in the occupied territories, Dodik is one of very few European voices of sup- port for Israel’s claim to ancestral lands. Third, this approach appears to be the most cost-effective way of gaining international visibility for Dodik, while building stronger ties with Israel and indirectly with the strong pro-Israeli lobby in the US at the same time. Fourth, support for Israel and against Palestinian claims is also directed inwards, in terms of provoking Bosniaks, which has contributed to further tensions (Alic´ 2011).

Foreign policy and public opinion

Bosnia’s public is hardly preoccupied with foreign policy issues. The apparent lack of interest could be partly explained by a general mistrust in the institutions of the state. The Bosnian public, regardless of their ethnic background, tends to mistrust politicians and structures (Berto 2009). If we add to this Bosnia’s limited sovereignty and capacity to conduct foreign policy, the lack of interest in foreign affairs becomes comprehensible. As mentioned earlier, one of the strategic goals for BiH is membership in the EU and the institutionalization of relations with NATO. As far as the EU is concerned, in a survey conducted by the Ipsos Public Affairs Adnan Huski´c 137 for the Directorate of European Integration from January 2013,23 82 per cent of citizens support BiH’s membership bid. The support is higher in the Federation of BiH (90 per cent) than in the District Brckoˇ (65 per cent) and the RS (67 per cent). However, the percentage of those who strongly oppose entry into the EU is stunningly low, with 13 per cent and 26 per cent for BiH and the RS respectively. However, when it comes to NATO, the situation is markedly different. Polling from November 2011 showed that the bid for NATO membership enjoys the support of 60 per cent of BiH citizens, while some 30 per cent are against it. When broken down across entities, the percentages indicate different positions that are the result of recent historical events. Support for NATO in FBiH is around 81 per cent, while just over one quarter (26 per cent) of the RS citizens support NATO membership.

Historical continuity and change

In the immediate post-independence period, there were very few trained diplomats and analysts at the disposal of Bosnian authorities. This situation resulted in a strong reliance on informal agents (diaspora, businessmen and celebrities) and on foreign relations by proxy, mainly major powers supportive of the Bosnian cause. Capacity-building in the field of foreign policy has fallen victim to the complexities of power- sharing arrangements. The Secretariat for Foreign Affairs of the former Yugoslavia (SIP) had a Department for Analysis and Planning that was considered a breeding ground for future diplomats and analysts, and a foreign policy generating body. The Department for Analysis and Plan- ning in the Bosnian Ministry of Foreign Affairs is understaffed and underused (it was at one point staffed by a single person). There seems to be a general lack of interest in staff training, resulting from diverging ideas among the political elites. The post-independence period is also marked by a fundamental change in foreign policy objectives. Contrary to the foreign policy of the former Yugoslavia, Bosnia along with most other successor states has chosen a path of Euro-Atlantic integration as a means of resolving its security and economic concerns. The demise of Yugoslavia and the end of the Cold War resulted in fundamental changes to the geopo- litical configuration of the world, and the region in particular. This approach has become common wisdom, and alternatives to this strate- gic foreign policy orientation are being considered only as a subject of academic interest. Yet, signs of an alternative approach of contain- ment24 (Korski 2010) are being discerned as a response to the country’s 138 Early Departure – Late Arrival? apparent lack of progress towards EU integration. Frustrated with stag- nation and regression, despite declarative support of both political elites and the general public for EU integration, the EU seems unable to devise a new approach. Furthermore, the lack of EU and US involvement in the country has opened the door to other aspiring international actors. Two countries are particularly important in this sense, Turkey and Russia.

Contemporary foreign policy issues

Turkey Turkey recognized Bosnia in February 1992 and supported Bosnian authorities strongly during the war. The post-war involvement of Turkey in BiH was managed mainly through multilateral bodies, such as the Peace Implementation Council25 and NATO. The gradual disengage- ment of international actors in Bosnia coincided with political changes in Turkey that resulted in the proactive Balkan politics of the former Turkish foreign minister, Ahmet Davutoglu. But despite the growing economic and political importance of Turkey in the region, it lacks the capacity to approach the Western Balkans in a systematic way. It is therefore mainly up to Minister Davotuglu to engage in the Balkans singlehandedly. He brokered a deal between Bosnia and Serbia concern- ing a problematic ambassadorial appointment and organized a number of high-level summits between Bosnia, Serbia and Croatia, with chang- ing configurations. Increasing Turkish influence is perceived in different ways in Bosnia: for some it invokes centuries of Turkish domination while for others it represents a welcome change in the power vacuum in the country.

Russia Russia recognized Bosnia on 27 April 1992 and established diplomatic relations on 26 December 1996. Since the beginning of the 1990s, Russian influence in the country was limited. However, during the tenure of High Representative Miroslav Lajcak,ˇ the consensus in the Peace Implementation Council fell apart and Russia positioned itself against the West and strongly backed Dodik’s position, thereby effec- tively crippling the PIC and ultimately the OHR. Starting in 2006, Russia’s role in the PIC meetings has become less constructive and more confrontational. Since then, the PIC’s conclusions are no longer unanimous, which ultimately discredited international efforts in Bosnia; Dodik is also openly challenging the authority of the High Repre- sentative with Russian support. Officially, Russia supports the Dayton Adnan Huski´c 139

Agreement and the sovereignty of BiH, but its actions speak a different language. Ever since 2000, Russia has been seeking to establish a stronger foothold in the Balkans as part of its re-emergence on the global politi- cal scene. After the NATO bombing campaign against Serbia in 1999 and the Asian crisis in 1998, Russia started to become more assertive in both a military and political sense. Its Balkan involvement could be inter- preted as a response to an apparent NATO intrusion into what Russia considers its own zone of interest in the Caucasus and an increasing NATO presence in the Gulf. Both Serbia and Republika Srpska see Russia as an ally and a bargaining asset in their dealings with the West. They compensated Russian support by selling it their oil-refining and distri- bution facilities, which is in line with the Russian energy policy in the region (e.g. the Nabucco versus South stream debate).

Conclusion

Bosnian foreign policy stretches over two periods. The first is the imme- diate post-independence period that soon morphed into an all-out war. The second period begins in 1995, with the establishment of Bosnia according to the Dayton Agreement. The post-independence phase is characterized by the struggle for recognition of the country, an effort to make the world aware of the character of the Bosnian war, which was instrumental in attempts to lift the arms embargo. After the end of the war, foreign policy reflected the internal divi- sion of the country. The thinness of Bosnian sovereignty blurs the line between internal and external policy, and various sub-state actors are actively engaged in foreign policy. A lack of agreement on state (not national) interests leads to a foreign policy that is slow in response, lack- ing in capacity and completely open to competing external influences. To a large extent this is a problem of internal asymmetry and asym- metric relations with Bosnia’s two largest neighbors. If Serbia followed in the footsteps of Croatia, and fundamentally changed its approach to Bosnia and the RS, it could significantly improve the situation and create a vested interest in the state via sub-state actors. Therefore, the crucial issue remains the status of special and parallel relations between Serbia as a state actor and the RS as a sub-state actor, and the question to what extent they act in a way that is detrimental to Bosnia as a state. Another, albeit related, variable is the correlation between progress towards the EU and NATO and the pacifying effect this has on the region. 140 Early Departure – Late Arrival?

Notes

1. The Arbitration Commission of the Conference on Yugoslavia, widely known as Bodinter Arbitration Committee (1991–1993). 2. The Serb Assembly founded the Serbian Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina in early 1992, which was renamed Republika Srpska (RS) in August of the same year. In November 1991, the HDZ had already established the Croatian Com- munity of Herzeg-Bosnia, which existed until the Washington Agreement in 1994. 3. The Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina, also known as the Dayton Agreement, represented the deal between all warring parties and was signed on 15 December 1995. It was preceded by the Washington Agreement brokered between Bosniak and Croat representatives on 1 March 1994. 4. For more on the CNN effect see Piers Robins (2002) ‘The CNN Effect – The myth of news, foreign policy and intervention’ and Babak Bahador (2007) ‘The CNN Effect in Action.’ 5. According to Noel Malcolm, the hijacking was reported by the BBC using rather neutral language and labeling it a ‘breakdown in law and order.’ 6. In August 1992 reports of Britain’s Independent Television News (ITN) jour- nalists Penny Marshall and Ian Williams covered the camps Omarska and Trnopolje. The ITN crew televised the iconic image of the Bosnian war: Fikret Alic´ and others imprisoned at Trnopolje in Bosnia. The image of an emaciated Muslim prisoner behind barbed wire bore a striking resem- blance to Second World War concentration camps, causing outrage among the Western public. 7. In Resolution 713 (1991) the UNSC decided ‘under Chapter 7 of the Charter of the United Nations, that all States shall, for the purposes of establishing peace and stability in Yugoslavia, immediately implement a general and complete embargo on all deliveries of weapons and military equipment to Yugoslavia until the Security Council decides otherwise fol- lowing consultation between the Secretary-General and the Government of Yugoslavia.’ 8. Among them were Annie Leibowitz, Susan Sontag, Bono, Brian Eno, Luciano Pavarotti, The Cranberries, Bernard-Henri Lévy and many others. 9. Indeed, this was an accurate description of Bosnia’s system until 2006 when, after a failed attempt at constitutional reform, the role of international actors gradually decreased in intensity to being nearly obsolete today. The nature of international presence has also changed, with a much stronger EU presence in terms of leadership and operating procedures. 10. ‘The Entities shall have the right to establish special parallel relation- ships with neighboring states consistent with the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Bosnia and Herzegovina.’ Article III. 2 of the Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina. 11. The Presidency shall have responsibility for:

a. Conducting the foreign policy of Bosnia and Herzegovina. b. Appointing ambassadors and other international representatives of Bosnia and Herzegovina, no more than two-thirds of whom may be selected from the territory of the Federation. Adnan Huski´c 141

c. Representing Bosnia and Herzegovina in international and European organizations and institutions and seeking membership in such orga- nizations and institutions of which Bosnia and Herzegovina is not a member. d. Negotiating, denouncing, and, with the consent of the Parliamentary Assembly, ratifying treaties of Bosnia and Herzegovina. (Presidency Arti- cle V.2).

12. See interview by Mr. Amer Kapetanovic,´ Assistant Minister for Bilateral Relations, given to FENA (Federal News Agency) on 6 January 2014. 13. All offices bear the official title ‘Representatives office.’ There are currently six such offices in Brussels, Jerusalem, Vienna, Moscow, Belgrade, Stuttgart, Thessaloniki and Washington. 14. Quinn Gillespie & Associates, Picard, Kentz and Rowe LLP and Dewey & LaBoeuf LLP. 15. Capital of Republika Srpska. 16. Since 1995, with several decisions of the Parliamentary Assembly of BiH and consent of the RS delegates, a number of authorities have been elevated to state level in order to make the country more functional. The current RS leadership is keen on reversing these decisions, despite lack of consensus among the other ethnic groups, or support from the international actors in Bosnia and Herzegovina. 17. The Federation of BiH is further divided into cantons, five of which are dominantly Bosniak, three dominantly Croat and two mixed. 18. Islamic Community, Serb Orthodox Church and Catholic Church. 19. These actions by non-state and informal actors are an affirmation of the authority of the Islamic Community of BiH over Muslims in Serbia and the establishment of a Bosniak Academy of Sciences (as opposed to Bosnian and Herzegovinian Academy) in the Sandžak region in Serbia. 20. Former Serbian President Tadic´ attended the elementary school ‘Serbia’s’ opening ceremony in Pale, less than 20 km from the Bosnian capital, and provided explicit support to Milorad Dodik during the 2010 BiH election campaign that was heavily nationalistic. Both the president and the Serbian foreign minister showed up at Dodik’s election rally. 21. See also the chapter on Croatia’s Foreign Policy in this volume. 22. As a member of CEFTA (Central European Free Trade Area) Bosnia was frequently subject to unfair practices by its neighbor states. Normally, retali- ation could level the playing field but the complexity and the consensual nature of Bosnia’s policy- and decision-making makes swift and concrete response impossible. Simplified, making a decision to protect Bosnia’s inter- ests over the interest of neighboring states is almost impossible given the fact that ministers frequently work to protect the interest of neighboring states. 23. Available online at http://www.dei.gov.ba/dei/media_servis/istrazivanje/?id= 11856, last accessed on 11 April 2014. 24. ‘This is a scenario few would want to accept. For if true, it would mean that it was time either to give up on Bosnia’s viability as a unitary state or the country’s EU integration. As the former is likely to be more unacceptable to most (but not all) EU governments, it would mean the EU would have to develop a strategy of containment for the country, not integration – one that 142 Early Departure – Late Arrival?

would see the EU engulf Bosnia, like South Africa engulfs Lesotho, as the rest of the region proceeds to integrate into the EU’ (Korski 2010). 25. Office of the High Representative’s website states that ‘Following the success- ful negotiation of the Dayton Peace Agreement in November 1995, a Peace Implementation Conference was held in London on December 8–9, 1995, to mobilize international support for the Agreement. The meeting resulted in the establishment of the Peace Implementation Council (PIC).’

References

Agency for Statistics of BiH. Foreign Trade 2010. Thematic Bulletin, Sarajevo: BiH Agency for Statistics, 2011. Alic,´ A. Bosnia: How to Wriggle Out of the Palestinian Statehood Vote. 22 August 2011. http://www.rferl.org/content/bosnia_wriggling_out_of_the_palestinian _statehood_vote/24304380.html (accessed 10 February 2012). Allison, G., and P. Zelikow. Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis. New York: Longman, 1999. Anąelic,´ N. Bosnia-Herzegovina – End of a Legacy. London: Frank Cass Publishers, 2003. Bahador, B. The CNN Effect in Action: How the News Media Pushed the West Toward War in Kosovo. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007. Bedjaoui, M. The New World Order and the Security Council: Testing the Legality of Its Acts. Berlin: Springer, 1995. Berto, S. Socijalno povjerenje u Bosni i Hercegovini [Social Trust in Bosnia and Herzegovina]. Sarajevo: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, 2009. Bieber, F. Institutionalizing Ethnicity in the Western Balkans: Managing Change in Deeply Divided Societies. ECMI Working Paper, Flensburg: European Center for Minority Issues, 2004. Commission for Foreign Affairs of the Parliamentary Assembly of BiH. Minutes of the Meeting of Foreign Affairs Commission of the House or Representatives of the Parliamentary Assembly of BiH with Newly Appointed BiH Ambassadors. Minutes of the Meeting, Sarajevo: Parliamentary Assembly of BiH, 2012. Harris, M. ‘Clinton’s “European” Bosnia Policies.’ In The Conceit of Innocence: Los- ing the Conscience of the West in the War Against Bosnia, by S. Mestrovic, 238–253. College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 1997. Hill, C. The Changing Politics of Foreign Policy. London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003. ICJ. ‘Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide.’ International Court of Justice. 26 February 2007. http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/91/13685.pdf (accessed 21 March 2014). Ipsos. ‘Istraživanje javnog mnijenja u BIH [Public Opinion in BiH].’ Ipsos Public Affairs. 28 February 2013. http://www.dei.gov.ba/dei/media_servis/ istrazivanje/?id=11856 (accessed 11 April 2014). Kapetanovic,´ A. Interview by Federal News Agency – FENA. 6 January 2013. Korski, D. ‘EU Council on Foreign Relations.’ Bosnia: The End of Inte- gration? 8 March 2010. http://ecfr.eu/content/entry/commentary _korskibosniathirdoption (accessed 25 May 2012). Luciˇ c,´ I. ‘Bosnia and Hercegovina from the First Multi-party Elections to the International Recognition.’ Journal of Contemporary History, 1, 2008: 107–140. Adnan Huski´c 143

Malcolm, Noel. Bosnia: A Short History. London: Pan Macmillan Ltd., 2002. PIC. Declaration by the Steering Board of the Peace Implementation Council. Declara- tion, PIC Steering Board, 2007. Presidency of BiH. ‘General Directions and Priorities for Implementation of Foreign Policy of Bosnia and Herzegovina.’ Sarajevo, 26 March 2003. Remikovic, D. ‘Possible RS Referendum on NATO Sparks Debate.’ SETimes. 22 March 2012. http://www.setimes.com/cocoon/setimes/xhtml/en_GB/features/ setimes/features/2012/03/22/feature-03 (accessed 24 May 2012). Rich, R. ‘Recognition of States: The Collapse of Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union.’ European Journal of International Law, 4, 1993: 36–65. Robins, P. The CNN Effect: The Myth of News, Foreign Policy and Intervention. London: Routledge, 2002. Smith, S., A. Hadfield, and T. Dunne. Forein Policy: Theories, Actors, Cases. New York: Oxford University Press, 2008. US Department of State. New Conference on Former Yugoslavia. Opening Statement by Secretary of State Warren Christopher, Washington D.C.: US Department of State – Office of the Spokesman, 1993. UN. ‘Security Council Resolution 713.’ United Nations. 25 September 1991. http://daccess-ods.un.org/TMP/2472029.9243927.html (accessed 26 March 2014). Vukic,´ U. ‘Obrad Kesic:´ US Is Against the Abolition of RS.’ Nezavisne Novine,09 September 2013. This page intentionally left blank Part IV Joint Departure – Different Arrivals This page intentionally left blank 7 An Orpheus Syndrome? Serbian Foreign Policy After the Dissolution of Yugoslavia Mladen Mladenov

Introduction

During almost the whole period of the East-West confrontation after the Second World War, Serbia, in many ways the dominant part of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY), enjoyed a respected and privileged status in the international community. This makes the devel- opment of its foreign relations, leading to the country being considered a ‘pariah state’ in the 1990s, the more puzzling. From today’s perspective the question arises how it could have come this far. Even more puzzling seems the fact that Serbia’s reputation has seen only modest improve- ments since its lowest points. The ends of several wars, the coming to power of different governments and the overturn of a regime have all presented opportunities for change. However, just as in the Orpheus myth, decision-makers have proved to be unable to stop looking back. The hiding of war criminals, the special relations with Republika Srpska (RS, the Serb-populated entity in Bosnia and Herzegovina) and the drag- ging on of a solution to the Kosovo issue have all represented the emulation of old policies, even though it must have been clear to the governments in charge that such behavior will hardly help to improve Serbia’s image. Therefore, this chapter will engage in an analysis of Serbian foreign policy over more than three decades in an attempt to provide explanations. First, the loss of reputation during the 1980s and 1990s will be analyzed, taking note of relevant institutions and mecha- nisms; then the same will be performed with regard to the years after 2000. Domestic structures and actors concerned with foreign policy decision-making and implementation will be discussed for both periods.

147 148 Joint Departure – Different Arrivals

Relations to the other post-Yugoslav states and public opinion in Serbia regarding foreign policy will be the subjects of the final two sections before the conclusion.

Serbia in the 1980s and 1990s – Becoming a pariah state

Serbia adrift (1981–1987) When Tito passed away in 1980 Yugoslavia soon found itself in a posi- tion where its future as a federal state was under threat. Paradoxically, this situation arose because of reasons attributable to Comrade Tito himself, as the country was struggling economically because of large amounts of foreign debt accumulated during the last years of his pres- idency and, perhaps more importantly, because he did not install a successor but opted for a rotating presidency instead, which proved to weaken the federal state. Although this cannot be blamed for the rise of nationalism, Serbia never settled into the new power-sharing regime governing Yugoslavia. Nationalists seized the opportunity to turn on it and to blame it for Serbia’s woes. Thus, in the mid-1980s they began to freely express nationalistic demands. In fact, ethnic tensions started well before the break-up of Yugoslavia, and the other republics played a part in it as well. Slovenia and Croatia were unhappy with the fact that, as economically strong regions, they were held back by and had to support financially the impoverished south of the feder- ation. Kosovo, while not a republic, also aired its dissatisfaction with its limited independence. This was crucially demonstrated by the stu- dent protests in March and April 1981 in the then autonomous Serbian province. Although the protests started on socioeconomic grounds, at their core emerged national aspirations, mainly for upgrading Kosovo’s status to a republic (Bass 2003, 44). This kick-started a national awak- ening process among the dominant ethnic Albanian population in the province and continued to be a relevant factor despite the crack-down on the protests. One powerful institution which was not directly controlled by the party had the potential to influence politics, and did this in that it laid the ideological foundations for the rise of nationalism. This was the intellectuals. Even though they were divided as well, those in sup- port of nationalism proved to be more vocal than those opposing it. Hence, the infamous draft memorandum by the Serbian Academy of Science and Arts (SANU) from 1985–1986 makes several claims with regard to the other republics and Serbia’s provinces which fundamen- tally altered Serbia’s perception of its relationship with them. First, it Mladen Mladenov 149 suggested that Serbia owed its economic backwardness to the fact that the two northern republics, Croatia and Slovenia, had made Yugoslavia to suit them first. Second, the memorandum heavily criticized the con- ditions in which the Serb minorities in Kosovo and Croatia were living, describing the former as genocide and the latter as the worst after the Second World War. Finally, the authors clearly positioned themselves behind a recentralization of Yugoslavia, thereby dismissing the possibil- ity of a confederation rather than a federation. While it is difficult to directly measure the impact of any written document on a society, it is worth emphasizing that the memorandum was created in the most pres- tigious Serbian national institution, and as such exceeds the importance of any other individual contribution (Milosavljevic´ 2000, 54).

Between a centralization of Yugoslavia and Greater Serbia (1987–1994) In 1991 Croatia, Slovenia and Macedonia declared independence, fol- lowed by Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) in 1992; the remaining republics of Serbia and Montenegro declared a new Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) in April 1992. Once events leading to the dissolution of the SFRY began to unfold, the Serbian leadership reacted by sponsoring violence imposed on the newly independent republics. It had the means to do this as the Yugoslav People’s Army (JNA) was heavily dominated by Serbs. Slovenia was the first republic to leave Yugoslavia, and conse- quently the first to sense the resolve of Serbia’s leadership to defend its initial foreign policy goal of holding Yugoslavia together at any price, including war. Very soon it became clear that preserving old Yugoslavia was no longer a viable option, and Slovenia was released after a ten-day war. Serbian foreign policy goals changed accordingly, with a Greater Serbia including all territories where Serbs lived as the new desired out- come. Thus, Serbia opted for union with Montenegro,1 the FRY, whose role as a protector of Serb minorities in the other successor states of socialist Yugoslavia emerged as the core element of its foreign policy (Pavlowitch 2002, 210). Consequently, the Miloševicregimecommit-´ ted much greater efforts to prevent the secession of Croatia and BiH, where Serbs lived in large numbers. The JNA, controlled by Belgrade, put its weight behind ethnic Serbs in those countries that fought to rejoin Serbia. In order to conceal that the aggression was sponsored by Serbia, the JNA was restructured so that ethnic Bosnian Serbs were deployed in Bosnia while ethnic Croatian Serbs were deployed in Croatia (Der Spiegel 1995). Even though Serbia’s leadership was pulling the strings, it 150 Joint Departure – Different Arrivals could now claim that military actions in general and war crimes in par- ticular were a matter of the other former republics but not of the new Yugoslavia. At the same time Serbian relations with the West and in partic- ular with the US had already started to deteriorate rapidly. In an ill-advised move, Miloševic´ decided not to meet US Ambassador War- ren Zimmermann for a whole year after his arrival in 1988.2 This proved to be a significant mistake by Miloševic´ – which he himself admitted at a later stage – as it meant that the US had no opportunity to become acquainted with Serbia’s positions regarding the issues that were fuelling the break-up of Yugoslavia, while the leaders of the other parties were able to exercise some influence on US foreign policy (Kesic 2010, 99). As a result of the war in Bosnia, where the Serb-dominated FRY was seen as failing to comply with the demand by UN Resolution 752 to end fighting and withdraw JNA’s units, rump Yugoslavia became the subject of UN sanctions (Weller 1992, 603). However, the international community has been criticized for not observing their implementation (Magaš 1993, xix). Sanctions included a strict trade embargo, a travel and transport ban and the freezing of bank accounts abroad, causing severe damage to the economy. Serbia’s foreign policy after 1987 is particularly closely linked to one person – Slobodan Miloševic.´ An opportunist with the goal of assum- ing power at any cost, he became the strong man in Serbia after a visit to Kosovo Polje in 1987 triggered his subsequent rise to prominence in the population and power in the League of Communists of Serbia in the same year. Consequently, Miloševic´ managed to create a cult of per- sonality for himself in Serbia which meant that he was in charge of all decision-making, regardless of which political post he actually occupied. Miloševic´ also managed to maintain the dominant role played by the Socialist Party, which was the successor of the League of Communists in socialist Yugoslavia. Inevitably, this led to decision-making without a recognizable long-term strategy, reflecting the nature of the institutional mechanisms behind it. Set up so as to exclude any opposition, the latter were tailored to Miloševic´ personally (Heeskens 2007, 15) and helped to design a foreign policy serving particular interests. Miloševic´ was crucially helped by parts of the secret service and thearmy,whilethemedia–hehadthemeanstoensurethathe controlled not only a few influential media bosses, but whole orga- nizations – was also biased in his favor. The media played a major role in advancing his agenda, including in relation to foreign policy. Miloševic´ started to demonize the West and make it responsible for Mladen Mladenov 151 the disintegration of Yugoslavia, and the daily Politika, which was con- trolled by Miloševic’s´ close ally Živorad Minovic,´ 3 made a significant contribution by repeatedly blaming ‘catholic Europe’ and the US for Serbia’s woes (Kurspahic´ 2003, 46). The army, on the other hand, was regarded as the only actor capable of preventing the break-up of the fed- eration. Ever since the death of Tito, there had been talk of a possible coup d’état. Indeed, the army was a powerful actor in Yugoslav politics and there were military staff who were trying to defend Yugoslavia. One such example is General Veljko Kadijevic,´ who was the Federal Secre- tary of Defense at that time, and as such is said to have threatened that the army would take control of the state should the presidency prove unable to prevent paramilitary organizations from committing violence (Der Spiegel 1995).4 Other officers, however, were less inclined to such actions and opted to support one of the parties. In Serbia, Miloševic´ found such support in Nikola Ljubiciˇ c,´ who had previously served as Secretary of Defense under Tito and had already praised Miloševic’s´ ascent in 1987 (Ðukic´ 1994, 36). Moreover, it is a well-known fact that the majority of the officers in the JNA were Serbs, who accounted for around 70 per cent of the high-ranking staff (Budding 1998, 50). Under these circumstances it comes as no surprise that Serbia could take the most advantage of the JNA, which virtually became the mil- itary extension of Miloševic’s´ power (Mandic´ 2007, 48). Thus, for all its significance, there remained one thing the army was not capable of doing. It could not, as long as socialist Yugoslavia existed, hold the state together by force (Jovic´ 2003). Even though the army had plans in place to make Slovenia and Croatia rejoin the federation, it did not prove strong and united enough to resist Miloševic’s´ will to pur- sue the establishment of Greater Serbia instead of keeping Yugoslavia together. The former cause was helped by the state security services, which were controlled by Miloševic´ and provided him with the most reliable and best-equipped forces to perform unorthodox operations on the ground during the wars in Croatia and Bosnia. According to Sorensen (2003, 67), the ultimate commander of these forces was the president himself, with the head of the security police, Jovica Stanišic,´ below him. Stanišic,´ in turn, was in charge of the Special Operations Unit (JSO or ‘Red Berets’), which at that time did not officially exist, via a mediator, Franko Simatovic,´ who was the founder of the unit in 1991. Again, intellectuals and the Serbian Orthodox Church (SPC) played into Miloševic’s´ hands during that period. Regular attacks from intellec- tuals on the other nations in Yugoslavia became frequent, and usually 152 Joint Departure – Different Arrivals accused the others of starting the feud in the first place, as did Dobrica Cosi´ c´ with his popular phrase that ‘the enemies of the Serbs made Serbs Serbs’ (Politika 1991). Despite the fact that Miloševic´ had condemned nationalist intellectuals in the mid-1980s (Pavkovic´ 1994, 445), he later endorsed their ideas and even introduced some of these intellectuals to politics, with Dobrica Cosi´ c´ becoming President of rump Yugoslavia in 1992 (Pavkovic´ 1993). Finally, the SPC also played some role in Serbian foreign policy from the very beginning of the dissolution of socialist Yugoslavia. This was, to a large extent, to the advantage of Miloševic.´ Overall, the clergy of the SPC are known for their hard-line national- ism (Ramet 2010, 20). Nevertheless, the SPC’s former patriarch Pavle, although a controversial figure himself, at times adopted a moderate tone regarding Serbia’s relations with its neighbors. He prominently met the cardinal archbishop of Zagreb during the Serbo-Croatian war and called for an end to the violence. However, Pavle also stated that Serbs could not remain in Croatia but had to join Serbia, in line with the position of most of the bishops, who in general made it clear that they only supported borders which would allow all Serbs to live in one state (Pavlowitch 2002, 210–211).

Polishing the surface – Dayton and its aftermath (1995–2000) Miloševic’s´ policies changed considerably by the summer of 1994 and this had an effect on both the wars in Bosnia and Croatia and his own relations with the West. At that time Miloševic´ had stopped supporting the Serbs in both former Yugoslav republics with the evident goal that their leaderships would concede defeat. This was finally sealed during the peace negotiations in Dayton in 1995, where Miloševic´ was called to represent the Serb side as the US were unwilling to speak to the Bosnian Serb leadership in Pale and preferred him instead (Holbrooke 1999, 106). The Albanian-dominated province of Kosovo, in turn, had demanded a restoration and extension of its autonomy of which it was deprived by the amendments made to the Yugoslav Constitution in 1989, but was left unheard in Dayton. The Serbian leadership took note, however, and started to meet its demands with increased brutality, including after 1996 with targeted actions of ethnic cleansing carried out by Serbian army and police forces. Since Serbia refused to with- draw its forces from Kosovo, on 23 March 1999 NATO planes, led by the US air force, began an extensive bombing campaign (Palmowski 2008). After massive attacks for 78 days and after Miloševic’sassumptionsthat´ NATO would split, Russia would intervene in favor of Serbia or new Mladen Mladenov 153 wars would begin in Macedonia and Bosnia, had been proved wrong, Miloševic´ conceded defeat (Judah 2002, 279). He was soon indicted for war crimes by the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and, in 2000, overthrown as President of Yugoslavia. In the aftermath of Dayton, Miloševic´ was presented as the tough negotiator Western powers expected him to be, but they also admit- ted that he made crucial compromises paving the way for peace. The most notable of these was giving up on those parts of Sarajevo which had been occupied by Serb forces. The motives behind this behavior and the change of goals in Serbian foreign policy will probably never be known with complete certainty. They have mostly been explained by the assumption that Miloševic,´ while willing to expand his influ- ence outside Serbia, was reluctant to build up his own stake in the power game and also wanted to eliminate the competition of the increasingly popular Bosnian Serb leadership at that time. From his personal view this move paid off, as he suddenly became a trusted peacemaker for the West and could strengthen his position in the FRY. Miloševic’s´ key demand at Dayton to lift the economic sanctions imposed by the UN against the FRY was satisfied on 22 November 1995, and in April 1996 rump Yugoslavia was recognized by the EU (Caplan 2005, 140). Following the agreement in Dayton, the media in Serbia were already prepared to present Miloševic´ as a wise statesman, praising his foresight. This ensured his almost undisputed reign in the years leading up to the Kosovo crisis (Silber 1996). During the latter, Miloševic´ was able to main- tain public support with the help of the media and a previously highly criticized Law on Public Information from 1998, which banned foreign programs and allowed authorities to arbitrarily decide which media were undermining the state (OSCE 1998). He also continued to make use of the state security apparatus and, in 1996, the Special Operations Unit (JSO) was officially formed and became part of the Serbian Police force (Bideleux and Jeffries 2006, 289). This unit was regarded at that time as ‘Miloševic’s´ praetorian guard’ (Gallagher 2005, 113). As in the first half of the 1990s, it continued to execute policies on the ground, including ethnic cleansing in Kosovo (Sorensen 2003, 67). Finally, the SPC was again at the forefront of foreign policy, defending the Kosovo myth in Serbia and advocating the strengthening of the Serb position in the for- mer province where three of its most ancient monasteries belonging to UNESCO’s world cultural heritage are situated – in Gracanica,ˇ Pecand´ Decani.ˇ 154 Joint Departure – Different Arrivals

Serbian foreign policy after Miloševic´ – Institutional setting, actors, priorities and public opinion

A new beginning (2000–2003) Even though Serbia has maintained a broadly pro-EU stance in this period, its foreign policy remained riddled with contradictions and inconsistencies (Seroka 2010, 438). From October 2000 to March 2003 a struggle for supremacy between Vojislav Koštunica, the Democratic Party of Serbia (DSS) leader and FRY’s president at that time, and Zoran Ðinąic,´ the Democratic Party (DS) leader and Serbian prime minister, left a significant mark on Serbian foreign policy. The latter crucially favored the arrest of war crime indictees and their extradition to The Hague, whereas such moves were met with fierce opposition by the former (Ramet 2011, 274). Both politicians and their parties participated in the Democratic Opposition of Serbia (DOS) coalition, which had brought together a total of 18 parties with the aim of ousting Miloševic´ in 2000. However, when Ðinąic´ got his way with the extradition of Miloševicto´ The Hague the DSS left the coalition. Koštunica relied on the assump- tion that the mere overturn of Miloševic´ would be enough for sanctions to be removed and Western capital to flow into the country. Meanwhile he did not accept any blame for Serbian involvement in the wars in Bosnia, Croatia and Kosovo (Bass 2003, 93) and was reluctant to allow extraditions to The Hague. Ðinąic,´ in turn, was ready to accept most of the demands of the West in order to spur EU integration. As long as the DOS coalition existed,5 even NATO membership was not out of the question. As minister of defense in 2003, Boris Tadic´ stressed the impor- tance of NATO integration for Serbia, calling on the organization to ‘not forget to clearly keep an open door for the membership of all Balkan states’ (Tadic´ 2003). Ðinąic´ had also publicly accepted war guilt, stated that Serbia would not stand in Montenegro’s way if it wished to become independent and was open to talks with Kosovo Albanian leaders over the future status of Kosovo (Ðinąic´ 2002). While he had cooperated with the JSO before the overthrow of Miloševic,´ in order to make sure it would not intervene in the mass protest on 5 October 2000, and had made use of the unit later when he made the decision to send MiloševictoThe´ Hague (Edmunds 2008, 35), he was ready to arrest some of its leading members following mounting pressure from Europe and the US to do so. However, this resulted in his assassination, which was organized and executed by the members of the unit. With regard to the institutions, in spite of some changes after October 2000 a complete overhaul of the system failed to materialize as Mladen Mladenov 155 resistance of officials from the old regime helped by Koštunica meant that they retained their positions. According to Goati (2009, 285), the newly empowered former democratic opposition was also responsible for this, as it lacked the willingness to push through substantial per- sonal changes, meaning that a significant degree of continuity with the old regime persisted and still persists, posing a threat to democratiza- tion. In the military, for example, Nebojša Pavkovic,´ who was indicted by the ICTY, stayed as Chief of General Staff until 2002 (Goati 2009, 285). Another example is the former head of State Security Adminis- tration (SDB), Rade Markovic,´ who remained in post until 27 January 2002. He could also count on the support of Koštunica. Markovic’s´ deputy, Mijatovic,´ later admitted that documentation of the secret ser- vice was destroyed during that time (B92 2004). This was helped by the fact that newly passed legislation allowed the SDB, which was renamed BIA (Security Information Agency/Bezbednosno informativna agencija), a great degree of freedom with no regulations existing by which it could be supervised (Ramet 2011, 274).

Preventing Kosovo’s independence and EU integration – A balancing act (2003–2012) Serbia remained the subject of various state transformations. First, in 2003 the FRY became the State Union of Serbia and Montenegro, a loose federation of the two republics. In June 2006, Montenegro became independent from the federation. Serbia subsequently gave notice that it was the successor state to the Union of Serbia and Montenegro. In February 2008, after nearly two years of inconclusive negotiations, the UN-administered province of Kosovo declared itself independent from Serbia – an action Serbia refuses to recognize. At Serbia’s request, the UN General Assembly in October 2008 sought an advisory opinion from the International Court of Justice (ICJ) on whether Kosovo’s unilat- eral declaration of independence was in accordance with international law. In its ruling of July 2010 the ICJ stated that international law did not prohibit declarations of independence (ICJ 2010b, 37). While cer- tainly a disappointment for Serbia, this did not deter its government from continuing to pursue its counter-secession policy (Ker-Lindsay 2012). Serbia finally engaged in talks with Kosovo over a normalization of their relations in 2011 and 2012, reaching some agreements. This proved to be enough for the country to receive the status of candida- ture for EU membership just before the presidential and parliamentary elections in May 2012. 156 Joint Departure – Different Arrivals

Serbia’s foreign relations in that period have been characterized by a nearly universal refusal of the political leadership to acknowledge and accept responsibility for the excesses and crimes of the Miloševic´ era. Vojslav Koštunica, who became Serbia’s prime minister in 2004 and lasted in this post until 2008, has been the main figure behind this policy, which meant that EU membership moved a long way off. The leader of the DSS, which advocates a traditionalist approach and has firmly established itself as one of the few relevant Eurosceptic par- ties, adopted an increasingly nationalist tone over the issues of the future status of Kosovo, relations with the West and cooperation with the ICTY. Koštunica has been a vocal critic of EU policies towards Serbia over Kosovo and disagreed with the prioritization of EU acces- sion (EIU 2012). Under the new government many of Miloševic’s´ old associates, including those on the EU’s visa ban list, were reappointed (O’Donnell 2011, 43). Despite joining NATO’s Partnership for Peace (PfP) program in December 2006, further integration was very unpopu- lar owing to NATO’s bombing campaign against Serbia in 1999. Serbian attitudes towards NATO, especially those voiced by nationalist parties, became more hostile as the determination of Kosovo’s future status seemingly entered its endgame, prompting Koštunica to prominently accuse NATO of trying to establish its own mini-state in Kosovo. He went on to rule out any possibility of Serbia joining the alliance in the future (Wood 2007). Since 2008, when the DS-led government with the participation of the Socialist Party of Serbia (SPS) took over, Koštunica and the DSS have been in opposition. The situation changed somewhat after the coming into power in July 2008 of a new government headed by the DS, whose leader in the period between 2004 and 2012 was Boris Tadic,´ the Serbian president at that time. This party crucially supports moving closer to the EU and appar- ently wanted to cooperate with the ICTY, but has been largely unwilling to accept all the war guilt and rejects the independence of Kosovo. Together with the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), which stands for EU accession, cooperation with the ICTY and acceptance of Kosovo’s recog- nition, it forms a more liberal, pro-European block in the Serbian party system. However, the LDP’s share of the vote has been between 5 per cent and 7 per cent and it has not been part of any government since its foundation in 2005. Instead, the DS forged a coalition with the SPS, Miloševic’s´ old party, which has abstained from engaging in any con- frontations concerning both Kosovo and European integration and has adopted a strictly pragmatic view. Tadic,´ who was narrowly re-elected as president in early 2008, became the most powerful political figure in Mladen Mladenov 157

Serbia during his second term, wielding considerable influence on the government headed by his party from July 2008 to May 2012, but lost in the run-off in May 2012 to Tomislav Nikolic.´ In his foreign policy he has been a strong supporter of European integration and reconciliation with Serbia’s neighbors on the one hand, and increasingly hesitant with regard to NATO membership on the other. Hence, this leadership began to be proactive in its foreign policy, signs of which were the swift submission of the Stabilization and Associa- tion Agreement (SAA) with the EU to the parliament and its ratification in September 2008, the arrest of Radovan Karadžic´ and apparent early efforts to detain the other two war crime indictees, Ratko Mladicand´ Goran Hadžic,´ as well as the signing of a protocol with the EU Rule of Law Mission (EULEX), which in practice acknowledged Kosovo’s borders as international borders – although formally the government still refuses to recognize Kosovo’s independence – and the reduction of financial support for radical Serbs in Kosovo (Ramet 2010, 17–18). Yet, despite the stronger focus on EU integration, Serbia did not abandon its close links with Russia, which have been particularly useful in its aim to pre- vent Kosovo’s recognition through the UN. Economic ties have also remained strong, with the sale of 51 per cent of the state’s oil com- pany NIS to Russia’s Gazprom in late 2008, while Foreign Minister Vuk Jeremic´ described Russia as Serbia’s closest friend (Ramet 2010, 18). Nev- ertheless, the captures of Mladic´ in May 2011 and Hadžic´ two months later, as well as probably most importantly the success of talks with the Albanian authorities in Kosovo, which led to concrete advances regard- ing the free movement of people, finally paved the way for Serbia to be awarded candidate member status by the EU in March 2012 (EIU 2012). Serbian foreign policy goals under this government used to be highly confusing. Tadic´ formulated four guiding principles, the United States, Russia, China and the EU, while former Foreign Minister Jeremic,´ insisted on adding two more, the nonaligned countries and Serbia’s neighborhood (The Economist 2009). Serbian leaders behaved accord- ingly, accentuating a different one of these core principles depending on the occasion. In September 2009 Tadic,´ speaking at Columbia Uni- versity in New York, stated that Serbia’s main priority was to join the EU (Tadic´ 2009b), while at other moments Serbia’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs put the focus of Serbia’s foreign policy on nonalignment and neutrality or on maintaining closer relations with Russia or China. This reflected a reluctance to ‘put all eggs into one basket’ (Ramet 2010, 18), with the political leadership trying instead to leave as many options as possible available. 158 Joint Departure – Different Arrivals

In terms of specific issues in foreign policy, Kosovo and EU rapproche- ment remained the most dominant. Quite inconveniently for Serbia, both are related in such a manner that persistence with one of them almost automatically means having to concede a setback with respect to the other. With regard to Kosovo, the political elites were reluctant to acknowledge the reality of its independence. Serbian foreign policy remained locked into the ‘unwavering principle that Kosovo is Serbia and will be eternally so’ (Seroka 2010). As Serbia’s president Tadic´ stated before the UN General Assembly in September 2009, ‘Serbia will never, under any circumstances, implicitly or explicitly, recognize the uni- lateral declaration of independence of the ethnic-Albanian authorities of our Southern province. We will continue to vigorously defend our integrity in a non-confrontational manner – using all peaceful means at our disposal’ (Tadic´ 2009a). With regard to institutional mechanisms in foreign policy decision- making, some changes during this period are worth noting. Until the break-up of the Union of Serbia and Montenegro, foreign policy and the Defense Department were incorporated at the federal level, which was dominated by Serbia. After the independence of Montenegro, Serbia rapidly adopted a new constitution in autumn 2006. Much was made dependent on the distribution of power in the state with the president, the prime minister and the minister of foreign affairs sharing respon- sibility for the foreign policy of the country. The constitution intends to provide a significant increase in authority for the parliament at the expense of the president, thereby making the role of the prime minister more important. While the president has the function of representing Serbia abroad, decision-making power lies mainly in the prime minis- ter’s hands (Constitution of Serbia 2006). However, with president and prime minister from the same party, the latter seemingly does not hold true, as demonstrated by the significant power of Tadic´ during his sec- ond presidential term which coincided with a government led by his party. Constitutional provisions seem less important, although it has to be noted that the constitution has put in place some obstacles with respect to the degree of freedom that decision-makers have to design foreign policy. Ramet (2010, 17) compares it to a ‘straightjacket,’ partic- ularly with respect to the Serbian position on Kosovo’s independence. In comparison, however, party politics and personalities have more weight in determining foreign policy. This observation is supported by the enormous power concentration in the hands of party leaders in Serbia, who have in many cases remained in office for a long time, often Mladen Mladenov 159 in spite of a series of defeats, and represent the most important factors in voters’ electoral decisions (Orlovic´ 2008, 208–209).

The ‘Nixon in China’ phenomenon or post-Dayton all over again (2012) After its election victory in 2012, the Serbian Progressive Party (SNS), which had favored European integration since its creation, but seemed reluctant to a much greater degree than the DS to accept concessions with regard to Kosovo, has established itself as the main player. Where in the previous parliament it failed to support legislation needed for EU integration or an historic resolution in 2010 that condemned the 1995 massacre of Bosniaks in Srebrenica (The Economist 2012), it has adopted a particularly pragmatic position with regard to Kosovo that has surprised many. The SPS, meanwhile, has exchanged its coalition partner, the DS, for the SNS, and has been part of the government with the latter since the 2012 elections. Its party chief and once Miloševic’s´ spokesperson Ivica Daciˇ c,´ who has managed since 2006 to re-establish his party as a political force, was appointed as prime minister. Kosovo-born Daciˇ chas´ been supportive of EU accession, but has consistently demanded that the EU offers concrete (financial) benefits. Recently, he has been praised by Catherine Ashton, the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of the EU, for his role and the ‘courage’ he displayed during negotiations on the Kosovo agreement (EEAS 2013). Yet his free- dom to act as prime minister has been limited with his deputy and, until August 2013, minister of defense from the SNS, Aleksandar Vuciˇ c.´ The latter has been widely regarded as the most influential politician in contemporary Serbia. A nationalist in the early 1990s, he shared the ambition of creating a Greater Serbia, but later became a strong sup- porter of European integration, and acknowledges that Serbia had ‘hit rock bottom’ in the past and has to ‘realize, accept and admit its own mistakes, while it pragmatically and realistically tries to repair the con- sequences of the damage’ (Business News Europe 2013). But 2012 also saw the victory of another former hard-line nationalist Tomislav Nikolic,´ who became the new president. Until recently the deputy leader of the Serbian Radical Party (SRS), Nikolic´ was Serbia’s leading nationalist opposition figure for many years. He narrowly lost to Tadicinthepres-´ idential election run-off in 2008 but, after founding his new party, the SNS, and adopting a strong pro-EU position, he managed to defeat Tadic´ four years later. The new president maintains that Serbia will remain on its path towards European integration and the early fears of the West 160 Joint Departure – Different Arrivals that this would not be the case, especially after he paid his first for- eign visit to the congress of Russia’s ruling United Russia Party in May 2012 (B92 2012b), have proved to be unfounded so far. Rather, follow- ing his stepping down from the post of SNS party leader and handing over to Vuciˇ c,´ he has left the latter together with Daciˇ c´ at the forefront of Serbia’s foreign policy. Overall, the new president and the new government have changed the rhetoric and concentrated much greater effort on EU integration and the strengthening of ties to Russia, while transatlantic cooperation or nonalignment has hardly been discussed. EU integration, the gov- ernment’s main priority in foreign policy, is still closely tied to Serbia’s handling of the Kosovo issue. In today’s Serbia, no significant political party or leader apart from the LDP has been willing to abandon or mod- ify the principle of non-accommodation over Kosovo’s status. However, the new Serbian government seems to realize better than its predecessor that a swift resolution is the only way for Serbia to achieve its other foreign policy goals. While a realistic Nikolic´ stated that ‘Serbia will never lose Kosovo, but I am not the president in Pristina [ ...]thisis what hurts and what, unfortunately, is already difficult to change’ (B92 2013c), Prime Minister Daciˇ c´ has gone even further. Claiming at home that he has ensured Serbia has got ‘the best deal possible’ (B92 2013a), Daciˇ c´ made significant concessions, crucially committing to disbanding parallel Serb institutions in Kosovo. The agreement was sealed in April 2013 and Serbia was rewarded accordingly by the EU with the promise of receiving a date to start accession negotiations. Concerning NATO, the new president Nikolic´ stressed immediately after his election that NATO membership is not something Serbia will pursue at any time (B92 2012). Vuciˇ c,´ however, has not completely ruled out the possibility of this happening, but underlined that Serbia’s participation in PfP pro- vides enough of a platform for cooperation at this point (B92 2013d). Serbian soldiers today are part of six UN peacekeeping missions (Congo, Liberia, Ivory Coast, the UN Truce Supervision Organization in the Mid- dle East, Lebanon and Cyprus) (SETimes 2012) and three multinational EU operations (Somalia, Uganda and Mali) while a long-term coopera- tion with the Ohio National Guard had already been established (Ohio National Guard 2008). Ivan Mrkic,´ the foreign minister until 2014, has further stated that ‘participation of the Serbian Armed Forces in activi- ties which are part of the EU security and defense policy is one of the priorities of the Defense Ministry’ (B92 2013b). Ljubiša Dikovic,´ Chief of General Staff, in turn claims to seek cooperation with the Russian army as well, and met his Russian counterpart in Moscow in May 2013. Mladen Mladenov 161

In the current setting, President Nikolic,´ the Socialist’s party chief, new Foreign Minister Daciˇ c´ and the SNS’s chief and Prime Minister Vuciˇ c´ have the final say with regard to foreign policy, which confirms the view that in reality the question of who is in charge of foreign policy depends on a large array of different factors, among them per- sonalities and coalitions. With Tomislav Nikolic´ becoming president, he fulfilled his promise to leave party politics in a bid to represent all Serbs which, in turn, paved the way for Vuciˇ c´ to become the party chief and to strengthen his overall position. This also applies to foreign policy, where he has played a key role, despite only being minister of defense until 2014, since coalitions also matter. In order to be able to participate in the government, the SNS offered the SPS the post of prime minister in 2012, despite the fact that its electoral result was significantly higher (24 per cent against 14.5 per cent). This did the trick and the SPS was lured into a coalition government, with Ivica Daciˇ c´ becoming prime minister until 2014. As such he has exerted a significant degree of influ- ence on foreign affairs, crucially leading the negotiations towards and ultimately signing the agreement with Kosovo in April 2013.

Serbia’s relations with the other Yugoslav successor states

Relations with the other Yugoslav successor states are typically charac- terized, although in each case to a different extent, by the burden of the circumstances in which the dissolution of Yugoslavia took place and the resulting territorial, ethical and minority issues. A boost for bilateral relations following the end of Miloševic’s´ regime was later neutralized by the recognition of Kosovo’s independence. With the exception of BiH, owing to the refusal of the Bosnian Serbs, all other post-Yugoslav states have recognized the independence of Kosovo. Serbian relations with the former autonomous province are naturally different. In spite of initial fears that the newly elected president and government in 2012 will be an obstacle in relations to the neighboring states, there has been no notable change so far.

Croatia Relations between Serbia and Croatia have been uneasy since the disintegration of Yugoslavia. The two countries were at war from 1991 to 1995 and diplomatic ties were finally established in September 1996, although relations have remained tense owing to the historical burden. Hostilities between both the political leaderships and the populations of the two countries were particularly evident during the rule of nationalist 162 Joint Departure – Different Arrivals leaders Miloševic´ in Serbia and Franjo TuąmaninCroatia.Sincethe death of Tuąman in 1999 and the overturn of Miloševic’s´ authoritar- ian regime in 2000, more democratic governments have been in place, making European integration a common major foreign policy goal, although the two states still behaved more as competitors than as part- ners (Stroh 2003, 355). Croatia’s approval of the Ahtisaari Plan, which was accompanied by the setting up of a Croatian liaison office in Pristina in February 2007 (B92 2007) and the consequent recognition of Kosovo’s independence, have strained the relations for a while. Nevertheless, the election of Ivo Josipovic,´ a moderate technocrat, as President of Croatia in 2010 and the reelection of Boris Tadic´ in Serbia two years earlier have resulted in an improvement in relations between the two countries, mainly through the proxy of European integration aspirations (Ralchev 2010, 1–2). However, a number of issues pertaining to the war still remain to be resolved. First, the problem of missing people is still high on the agenda of bilateral relations, as demonstrated at three meetings between Boris Tadic´ and Croatian president Ivo Josipovic´ in 2010 (TPortal 2010). Second, a border issue along the river Danube in Eastern Slavonia, par- ticularly about jurisdiction over two islands, Vukovar and Sarengrad, still persists, with both sides locked in negotiations. Third, the respon- sibility for war crimes committed during the 1991–1995 war between the two neighbors still represents an obstacle. Croatia filed a lawsuit against the FRY for war crimes perpetrated by the Yugoslav army at the ICJ in The Hague in 1999 to which Serbia, already as an independent state, responded by filing a countersuit in January 2010. Serbia’s claim encompasses crimes committed by the army of the Independent State of Croatia in the 1940s, in addition to those committed in the 1990s (ICJ 2010a). In 2012, Serbia suggested to Croatia that each country should drop its lawsuits against the other, but resolution of this issue has stalled since. Nevertheless, relations between Serbia and Croatia have remained stable despite some fears to the contrary following the election of a pre- sumably more nationalist government and president in Serbia. Tensions in society, on the other hand, have not disappeared almost two decades after the end of the war, as the rather inconvenient pairing of both coun- tries’ national football teams in the same qualifying group for the 2014 World Cup showed. For both games the state borders between Serbia and Croatia were closed so that Serbs could not attend the game in Croatia and vice versa, and in 2013 Alexander Vuciˇ c´ went on record saying that the game in Belgrade represented one of the biggest security challenges for Serbia (B92 2013d). Mladen Mladenov 163

Bosnia and Herzegovina Even more complex are Serbia’s relations with Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH). In fact, it proves difficult to speak of relations with one sin- gle state because Serbia has been dealing separately with the RS, one of the two entities within BiH, as it is where the Serbs in the country, one of the three constituent peoples alongside Croats and Muslims, live. It was the Dayton Agreement which granted the then FRY (and Croatia) special rights to establish separate relations with the two different entities of BiH. Even though this option was not officially used, the FRY still tried to maintain less transparent direct relations to the Bosnian Serbs (Stroh 2003, 361). Meanwhile, other than the mutual recognition of both states and a common declaration from October 1996 by Miloševic´ and Alija Izetbegovic,´ the then Bosniak member of the presidency of BiH, no formal relations between the FRY and BiH were established (Willenberg 2007, 9). The overturn of the Miloševic´ regime provided a fresh and promis- ing start to bilateral relations in the year 2000. Back then, a series of signs were hinting at a sustainable normalization of relations between the two states. Apart from the establishment of diplomatic missions, a special council was set up in order to provide further opportunities for bilateral cooperation, while inaugural visits of all three members of the presidency of BiH to the FRY took place and agreements set- tling most of the remaining controversial issues were signed (Willenberg 2007, 10). Svetozar Marovic´ in 2003 as well as Tadic´ in 2004, in their functions as presidents of Serbia, respectively apologized to the peo- ple of BiH for human atrocities committed during the war (Radio Free Europe 2004).6 However, the independence of Kosovo has led to a new twist, and proves to be a major obstacle in the develop- ment of relations with the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the other autonomous entity, and the federal state. Serbian leaders have made claims on numerous occasions that Kosovo’s indepen- dence means that RS should have the same right to secede from BiH (Willenberg 2008, 25). Added to this, there are still some territorial disputes concerning segments along the meandering Drina river (Guo 2006, 102–103), and although there was a final decision in 2007 by the ICJ on the Bosnian genocide case filed in 1996, the ruling still managed to reopen disputes. Despite finding that the genocidal acts that were the subject of the case were not attributable to Serbia, it upheld that Serbia was responsible for omitting to prevent genocide (Amerasinghe 2008, 411). 164 Joint Departure – Different Arrivals

Slovenia, Macedonia and Montenegro In comparison to relations with Croatia and BiH, Serbia’s relations with Slovenia, Macedonia and Montenegro are much less complicated, mainly because neither border issues persist nor significant violence has accompanied their independence from Yugoslavia. In the case of Slovenia, the short war in 1991 has been a minor burden, while the non- existence of a common border or ethnic Serbian or Slovenian minorities in the other country has contributed to a significant easing of tension between the two sides. As in the other cases, relations have improved at a very fast pace since 2000. Above all, the development of strong eco- nomic relations and Slovenia’s support for the European integration of Serbia have played an important part in this respect. However, the fast recognition of Kosovo’s independence by Slovenia has been regarded as a major disappointment in Serbia, leading to calls for a boycott of Slovenian products (Willenberg 2008, 20). With Macedonia there are also no important obstacles to the devel- opment of friendly relations, as ethnic minority issues and the burden of war are missing. Although Macedonia did recognize Kosovo, the political elite have, together with Montenegro’s, exercised considerably more patience than the other Yugoslav successor states before recog- nizing Kosovo in spite of strong pressure from the ethnic Albanian minority, which constitutes one quarter of Macedonia’s population. According to Willenberg (2008, 27), a definitive settlement concerning the Macedonian Orthodox Church’s autocephaly still represents a stum- bling block in relations between the two countries, while Macedonia also has some fears because of Serbian nationalist forces who see the country as part of a Greater Serbia. Recently, a trade dispute between the two countries has caused some damage to their relations, as Macedonia adopted a decree that limited imports of wheat and flour from Serbia. Montenegro, as the last post-Yugoslav republic to separate from Serbia, still has strong ties with its neighbor. In spite of some dis- trust and popular disappointment on the Serbian side after Montenegro proclaimed independence in 2006, the two countries established diplo- matic relations immediately, something which did not happen in any previous case of secession. The significant Serb minority, which amounts to approximately one third of Montenegro’s population, also serves as guarantor of strong efforts on both sides to maintain friendly relations. Nevertheless, the recognition of Kosovo’s independence by Montenegro still caused unrest in relations with Serbia. Montenegro’s ambassador was expelled, as happened with the other ambassadors from the countries that recognized Kosovo. Mladen Mladenov 165

Kosovo Finally, relations with Kosovo, as is to be expected, are the most contro- versial. International efforts to resolve the question of Kosovo’s status started in 2005 under the leadership of former Finnish president Martti Ahtisaari and ended with Kosovo’s declaration of independence in 2008, falling short of the desired comprehensive solution. The latter was, how- ever, highly improbable given the diametrically opposite views of the two sides regarding the question of Kosovo’s status. The de facto full separation from the Serbian state which resulted from the 1999 war meant that Pristina was not willing to accept anything but indepen- dence for Kosovo. Belgrade, in turn, was ready to settle for all sorts of outcomes as long as it was not independence. Consequently, since Kosovo declared independence unilaterally, Serbia has been resisting its integration into regional and international institutions (Lehne 2012, 4). Encouraged by the fact that international support for Kosovo’s inde- pendence has been only partial, Serbia continued to fight for its case. These efforts culminated in an attempt to challenge Kosovo’s indepen- dence at the ICJ but backfired when the court found in July 2010 that the declaration of independence did not constitute a violation of inter- national law. Notwithstanding this, Belgrade also continues to support ‘parallel structures’ in northern Kosovo, where Serbs are in the major- ity. In the summer and fall of 2011, tensions in the North flared up, threatening a wider crisis. Through the use of strong leverage on both sides, EU negotiators obtained agreements on customs stamps and on the integrated management of the border crossings that are aimed at normalizing the situation. A third agreement, concluded after difficult negotiations in February 2012, concerned the representation of Kosovo in regional cooperation. While it had nothing to do with the crisis at hand, it was nevertheless probably the most important result of the dia- logue so far as it opens the door to Kosovo’s participation in regional cooperation (Lehne 2012, 3). Further progress in normalizing relations has been reached by the government led by Ivica Daciˇ c,´ who together with Kosovo Prime Min- ister Hashim Thaçi has signed an agreement brokered by the EU in April 2013. It includes the establishment of an Association/Community of Serb Municipalities in Kosovo, which will have full competencies in the areas of economic development, education, health, urban and rural planning. In return, Serbia guarantees the abolishment of paral- lel security and judicial institutions which shall be fully incorporated into Kosovo’s authorities. Both sides have also agreed to abstain from blocking each other’s way to EU accession. 166 Joint Departure – Different Arrivals

Foreign policy and public opinion

The prolonged absence of a clear foreign policy strategy has been reflected in confused public opinions. A highly discussed topic refers to the process of coming to terms with the past. An example is public opinion in the aftermath of Radovan Karadžic’s´ capture: he was consid- ered a hero by 33 per cent and a criminal by 17 per cent, while 86 per cent thought that the ICTY was anti-Serbian (Bieber 2008, 328). Accord- ing to a more recent survey from 2009, 68 per cent of Serbs continue to oppose Karadžic’s´ extradition to The Hague (OSCE 2009, 13) and 45 per cent are against any cooperation with the ICTY, not even if it was in order to avoid international sanctions (OSCE 2009, 16). Similarly, the former Bosnian Serb commander Ratko Mladic´ was seen as a good Serb by 50 per cent in Serbia as recently as 2011, while only 20 per cent disagreed with this statement (Gallup 2011). The main controversy between the political leaders and public opin- ion lies, perhaps paradoxically, with questions related to European integration. While different governments – though at times only half- heartedly – have made it a top priority to reach a situation in which at least on paper no relevant political force opposes it, European integra- tion seemingly does not enjoy the same approval rates among Serbia’s citizens as demonstrated by a series of surveys. Results from the Balkan Monitor by Gallup (2012) show that only half of the Serbian population identifies moderately to extremely strongly with European values and only 30 per cent have at least moderate confidence in EU institutions. Two years earlier, responding to a more direct question about what they consider EU membership to be, only 44 per cent chose ‘a good thing’ (Gallup 2010). The same survey found out that merely 31.8 per cent of the population thinks of the EU as ‘friendly’ to Serbia. The scores for the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) and NATO are considerably worse, at 10.2 per cent and 8.6 per cent respectively (Gallup 2010). An older survey performed by the Centar za Slobodne Izbore i Demokratiju in May 2009 puts the support for EU accession at 39 per cent (Reljic 2009, 19). Experts’ opinions support these findings, with Stojanovic´ (2008, 390) claiming that only around half of the population favors Europeanization, while Ristic´ (2008, 336) describes the attitudes of the Serbs towards Europe as a ‘love-hate rela- tionship.’ Instead, the public seems to be more in favor of an alternative path in foreign relations, as demonstrated by the fact that 60 per cent of the population would like to welcome Vladimir Putin, who is by far the most popular foreign leader in Serbia (Biserko 2010, 560). In 2012, Mladen Mladenov 167 the Balkan Monitor (Gallup 2012) measured approval rates for foreign leadership in world politics. In Serbia, Russia and China came first, with approval standing at 51 per cent and 47 per cent respectively, while the West did much worse (Germany 35 per cent; UK 23 per cent; USA 20 per cent). The insights provided by these surveys serve to further prove the observation that Serbia’s motivation to join the EU could hardly be attributed to a willingness to truly embrace European values (Stahl 2013, 458).

Conclusion

The SFRY remained between the Western and the Eastern bloc during the Cold War and became used to this situation, as it was not just in its own interest but also for other reasons – including the wishes of the West (Miloševic´ 2007, 66). The Miloševic´ regime has clearly destroyed the privileged status of Serbia and has hampered its inter- national reputation, to the extent that it became a pariah state. The overthrow of Miloševic´ saw a lot of changes implemented and crucially opened the decision-making process for competing political actors in a more pluralistic system, even though the beginnings of democrati- zation were also marked by the fact that many servants of the old regime remained in their positions, thus leading to a certain extent to a lack of discontinuity. The murder of former Prime Minister Zoran Ðinąic´ is but one example of how powerful the old circles remained. With the Kosovo issue unresolved, Boris TadicandtheDSgovernment´ were unable to work out a viable foreign policy strategy that would receive the backing of the population, and decided to hide behind something that looked as though it was intended to imitate the suc- cessful foreign policy of the SFRY. Unsurprisingly, as the international order had also changed during that time, this did not happen. In this sense at least, the new governing coalition of Progressives and Social- ists has been more successful by prioritizing goals more clearly and working towards practical solutions. It would be very difficult to repli- cate the success of socialist Yugoslavia’s foreign policy, and the country should realize that it will have to overhaul its strategy. As in the myth about Orpheus, which is very popular in the Balkans, Serbia seems to know that looking back is fatal, but it does so nevertheless. The latest developments, in particular the recently signed Kosovo agree- ment, show that it is possible and beneficial to move on from past events. It shows also that Serbian foreign policy positions are not set in stone. 168 Joint Departure – Different Arrivals

Notes

1. In a referendum in 1992 the people of Montenegro voted with an overwhelm- ing majority in favor of staying within Yugoslavia. 2. This decision was probably provoked by the fact that Zimmermann along with other Western diplomats declined to assist the commemoration of the 600th anniversary of the Kosovo battle (Sell 2003, 143). 3. Minovic´ was also at the heart of Miloševic’s´ plan to seize control of Serbia’s League of Communists. 4. Veljko Kadijevic´ himself denies ever setting such an ultimatum and has been blaming the US for SFRY’s break-up (Kadijevic´ 1993, 13). 5. It fell apart in November 2003 after its candidate for the presidential elections in Serbia had suffered a heavy defeat at the hands of Tomislav Nikolic, the leader of the Serbian Radical Party (SRS). 6. Tadic´ added that these crimes were committed by individuals, not by the Serbian nation, and that Bosnian Serbs had suffered equally to other ethnic communities.

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Introduction

Following a plebiscite held on 21 May 2006, Montenegro declared inde- pendence from the State Union of Serbia and Montenegro on 3 June 2006. While in the period after the Yugoslav disintegration Montenegrin politics developed alongside the politics of Miloševic’s´ Federal Repub- lic of Yugoslavia (FRY), the decade preceding the independence of Montenegro was marked by internal discord over whether Montenegrins were distinct from Serbs or not, and the corresponding debate over whether the country should separate from Serbia or remain in a com- mon state with it. Montenegro’s independence drive and the departure from the common state with Serbia, which were mediated rather than supported by the EU, generated a divergence in the foreign policy of Montenegro from that of Serbia. Hence, this chapter seeks to solve the puzzle of how Montenegro’s foreign policy was gradually shaped from that of a republic in the FRY to that of an independent state. Given that the developments in Montenegro’s foreign policy were heav- ily marked by the relationship between Montenegro and Serbia, they can be divided into four periods: (1) foreign policy with Serbia within Yugoslavia before 1996; (2) foreign policy during the period when Montenegro opposed Miloševic´ (1997–2001); (3) foreign policy within the State Union of Serbia and Montenegro (2002–2006); and (4) foreign policy after independence (2006–present). Montenegro held its first referendum in March 1992, when Yugoslavia was on its deathbed. The population from the smallest of the former Yugoslav republics was asked whether they agreed ‘that Montenegro, as a sovereign republic, should continue to exist within the common state, Yugoslavia, totally equal in rights with other republics that might wish

173 174 Joint Departure – Different Arrivals the same?’ (Lukic´ 2005, 56). After 95.4 per cent of the turnout answered the question positively,1 Montenegro and Serbia established the FRY in April 1992. At that time, the ruling party of reformed Communists – the Democratic Party of Socialists (DPS) – sided with Miloševic,´ which implies that the republic’s foreign policy developed alongside those of the FRY and Serbia. This means that Montenegro participated in the wars of Yugoslav disintegration, as many Montenegrin soldiers and reservists waged war in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina (Bieber 2003). In addition to this, this foreign policy period was marked by international isolation of the FRY and an embargo by the international community, which had repercussions on domestic Montenegrin poli- tics. In the first half of the 1990s, as a republic in the FRY, Montenegro faced hyperinflation and the development of a shadow market, which has significantly delayed its political transition. The split in the ruling DPS in 1997 marked a significant change in the domestic political context, and an equally important shift in Montenegro’s foreign policy. The two parties that emerged from the split of the DPS quickly became major political forces in Montenegro. The faction of the DPS, which retained its name and remained in power, was headed by the then Prime Minister, Milo Ðukanovic.´ The other faction, which became the major opposition party, the Socialist Peo- ple’s Party (SNP), was led by the then president of Montenegro, Momir Bulatovic.´ Initially, the parties stood for either continuation of support for Slobodan Miloševic´ – endorsed by Momir Bulatovic’s´ SNP – or oppo- sition to the regime in Belgrade – advanced by Milo Ðukanovic’s´ DPS. In order to obtain external political and financial assistance for coun- tering the Belgrade regime, Ðukanovic’s´ wing of the DPS turned to the West, and predominantly to the US. As this faction of the DPS remained in power after the split, the government pushed a policy of ‘creeping independence’ (Roberts 2002, 6), which entailed Montenegro’s grad- ual estrangement from Yugoslav federal institutions. During this period, and as part of the ‘creeping independence,’ Montenegro conducted its foreign affairs differently from both Serbia and the FRY. That is, while the latter were largely isolationist and indistinct from one another, the former sought to reach out to democratic countries, thus overriding the federal foreign policy. After the demise of Miloševic´ in 2000, Montenegro’s foreign policy orientation was once again reshaped through domestic political divi- sions. This period was marked by amplified demands for independence on behalf of Ðukanovic’s´ government, and increased interaction of the SNP opposition with the new Serbian elites to preserve the union. Jelena Džanki´c 175

Political tensions within Montenegro and between the governments of Montenegro and Serbia required an external mediator. Following the failed attempts to redefine relations between the two FRY republics in 2001 and 2002, the brokering of a deal became the task of the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) representative Javier Solana. Negotiations were concluded on 14 March 2002, and the vague ‘Agreement on the Principles of the Relationship between Serbia and Montenegro’ – the Belgrade Agreement – was officially confirmed at the meeting of the European Council in Barcelona held on 15 and 16 March 2002. The Belgrade Agreement changed the nature of Montenegro’s foreign policy and induced a greater orientation towards the EU, as opposed to the US orientation that marked the previous period. According to van Meurs (2003, 70) ‘[i]n line with the choice on international legal per- sonality, foreign and defense policy are within the realm of the Union. In internal and international economic relations, the actual compe- tencies of the federation are less clear, as the republics are allowed to keep their separate economies, currencies and customs services.’ That is, while raising diplomatic relations to the level of the EU, international economic relations remained vaguely regulated, which prompted the separate paths of Serbia and Montenegro (‘twin-track’) for accession to the EU (Ðuric´ 2003). Yet, while transforming the common state of Serbia and Montenegro from a dysfunctional federation into a loose union of states with ambiguous common and shared competences, the Belgrade Agreement also envisaged an ‘exit option’ for the union’s members after three years. Using this provision, Montenegro organized a second popular vote as a mechanism to resolve the statehood debate. The 2006 referendum on independence occurred in a framework established by the interna- tional community, above all the EU. The EU’s final guidelines for this referendum envisaged a lower limit of 55 per cent of the population voting for the question (minimum turnout of 50 per cent) as a condi- tion for reaching independence (ICG 2005, 2). According to the official results of the Montenegrin plebiscite, 86.5 per cent of the total electorate went out to the polls, while the referendum question was answered posi- tively by 55.5 per cent of the voters (Center for Democratic Transition of Montenegro 2006). The voting threshold and the referendum results are a manifestation of the intensity of the internal Montenegrin discord. The fluidity of ethno-national categories in this post-Yugoslav state of less than 700,000 inhabitants has been central to this discord, and is mirrored in the population censuses of 1992, 2003 and 2011.2 176 Joint Departure – Different Arrivals

In the post-independence period, Montenegro’s foreign policy dis- plays several traits. First, the DPS-led government has placed an empha- sis on EU integration as its main foreign policy objective. Given the internal stability in the country, and the absence of any major regional challenge to it, Montenegro has quickly progressed in its accession aspirations. Following the accession of Croatia to the EU in mid-2013, Montenegro became the regional leader in the integra- tion process, having opened and provisionally closed two chapters of the EU acquis communautaire. Second, owing to the country’s small size and resources, particularly in the security sector, Montenegro has focused on NATO integration. Owing to the internal divisions in the country and NATO intervention in the FRY in 1999, accession to the North Atlantic Alliance is a publicly contested issue. Third, although the government’s orientation towards Russia as Montenegro’s cultural and economic partner has been generated in the wake of indepen- dence, these ties have persisted after 2006, although their intensity has decreased following the 2008 financial crisis. Finally, unlike other post-Yugoslav states, Montenegro has no major contentious issues with its neighbors, although the country’s relationship with Serbia is still strained after Montenegro’s recognition of Kosovo’s independence in October 2008. Against this background, the aim of this chapter is to examine the foreign policy of Montenegro over the past decade, taking into account the internal political debates, the multiple disintegrations of the states of which the country was a component, the country’s ethnic composition and its relations with other countries. Having in mind that Montenegro became an independent state only recently, the study adopts a pro- gressive approach to foreign policy analysis (Held and Mepham 2007). In this context, and contrary to the realist perspective on foreign pol- icy, the analysis acknowledges that external relations are no longer only a matter of interactions among independent states on grounds of interest. Rather, both value- and interest-based activities among polities (which may be supranational or subnational in character) are relevant in progressive foreign policy. In order to unveil the dynamics of Montenegro’s current foreign policy, this qualitative study first looks at policy development since Montenegro’s independence, which is followed by a discussion about the institutional mechanisms in foreign policy decision-making and implementation. The chapter then moves on to examine the external dimension of foreign affairs, Montenegro’s relations with other post- Yugoslav states, and the main issues covered by the country’s foreign Jelena Džanki´c 177 policy. The final parts of the chapter deal with the issue of external affairs and public opinion, and historical continuity and change, both of which are of particular relevance in the context of regional issues, EU and NATO integration.

Foreign policy development since Montenegro’s independence

Being a young country, Montenegro is still developing its foreign policy. According to the document of the Government of Montenegro enti- tled ‘Foreign Policy Priorities of Montenegro,’ ‘by changing its status, Montenegro has not changed its foreign policy’ (SPPCG 2007, 1). Yet, the most obvious change after the disintegration of the last common state of Serbia and Montenegro was that foreign policy became the full competence of the state, both in law and practice. During the existence of the FRY and its legal successor, Serbia and Montenegro, foreign policy was formally two-tiered. That is, the federal government was in charge of foreign policy, but the republics had their foreign ministries, whose main aim was to align sub-state external relations with the federation. Although legally speaking the foreign ministry of Montenegro did not have many competencies, in practice in the period after 1997 it gradu- ally acquired the role of the conductor of external affairs of the minor partner in Yugoslavia, which largely functioned as an independent state.3 The subsequent aspiration of Montenegro to become a member state of the EU has continued to top the foreign policy agenda of the government, and all political actors in Montenegro confirmed their pro-European course. On 12 June 2006, the EU Council recognized Montenegro as an independent sovereign state, which was followed by a negotiating mandate for a Stabilization and Association Agree- ment (SAA) with Montenegro late in July the same year. In addition, after the parliamentary elections in 2006, the SAA negotiations were launched, and the European Partnership for Montenegro followed in January 2007 (European Commission 2012a). The official signing of the SAA took place in Luxembourg on 15 October 2007, a mere four days before the adoption of the Constitution of Montenegro. Montenegro became an official candidate country for EU accession in December 2009. On 22 May 2012, the European Commission (2012a) recommended the start of accession negotiations, and by mid-2013 Montenegro had opened and provisionally closed two chapters of the acquis (Chapter 25 – Science and Research; Chapter 26 – Education 178 Joint Departure – Different Arrivals and Culture). EU accession has been highlighted as ‘the most impor- tant task of foreign and domestic policy’ (SPPCG 2007, 1). Importantly, the relations of Montenegro with the EU have a major effect domesti- cally, because of the conditions the country has to meet on its road to EU membership. Thus, the orientation towards the EU shows the ‘pro- gressive’ nature of Montenegro’s foreign policy, whereby interests are interwoven with values (as values, such as democracy, tolerance, respect of human rights, are deeply enshrined in the EU’s conditionality). This progressive nature of foreign policy in relation to the EU is largely down to the asymmetry of the partnership, and the zeal of Montenegro to join the ‘European’ club. In the case of NATO membership, which is another ‘strategic aim of Montenegro,’ a different type of interest prevails, based on mili- tary reform and a professional army. Shortly after the referendum on independence, Montenegro reorganized its military and abolished com- pulsory military service for adult males. In 2007, the Government of Montenegro established a mission at NATO Headquarters in Brussels, the aim of which was to outline ‘the full commitment to integrating [Montenegro] into wider processes, and the need for deepening the com- munications with the North-Atlantic Alliance [ ...], which has a pivotal role for the strengthening of Montenegrin and regional security’ (Min- istry of Foreign Affairs and European Integration 2012). Montenegro signed the Partnership for Peace program at the NATO Riga sum- mit in 2006, and joined the Adriatic Charter of NATO aspirants in 2008. Following these developments, the country contributed soldiers to NATO operations in Afghanistan, Liberia and Somalia. While the country’s NATO membership bid is supported by a number of coun- tries in the Alliance, the domestic public is divided on this foreign policy goal because of the 1999 NATO intervention in the FRY, as will be elaborated later in this chapter. Hence, the country’s external rela- tions are largely driven by the need to develop multilateral relations with international and supranational institutions. This approach to for- eign policy is underpinned by the small size of Montenegro, and thus its limited economic resources and political influence. In terms of bilat- eral relations, which appear to be secondary to the country’s multilateral focus, Montenegro continues to be supportive of the US. The orientation of the ruling elites towards the US during Miloševic’s´ rule was essen- tial for keeping the DPS in power in Montenegro. It has also resulted in a lower level of NATO intervention in Montenegro in 1999 than in other parts of the FRY, and US$430.9 million of unconditional aid from 1999 to 2001. This assistance was granted as ‘a tribute to the role Jelena Džanki´c 179 being played by Montenegro in the effort to build a free and democratic Yugoslavia’ (Albright 1999, 1). Although Montenegro’s relations with the US had been on a downward slope after the fall of Miloševic,´ because of Ðukanovic’s´ independence drive and the shift of the US’s foreign pol- icy towards the Middle East, this small state has considered the US as an ally since it became independent. The US recognized Montenegro on 12 June 2006, and established diplomatic relations with it shortly there- after. Among the political elites and the population of Montenegro, the split induced during the previous decade reflected attitudes towards the US. Only members and supporters of the governing coalition contin- ued to emphasize their close ties with the US. This is articulated in the foreign policy strategy of Montenegro, whereby

relations with the US are of special importance for Montenegro. Given that the US is the most significant ally in the North-Atlantic Alliance, and an inevitable partner of the EU and the region, as well as a state with an exceptionally important role in all the relevant international organizations, it is logical that Montenegro devotes a significant share of its foreign policy to developing and strengthening its relationship with the US. (SPPCG 2007, 1)

In addition to the US, following the referendum on independence, Russia as an external factor gained salience in Montenegro, largely because of the increased interaction of the Montenegrin government with that country’s economic magnates and the increase of Russian investment in Montenegro. The increased economic ties with Russian magnates sparked a lot of criticism of the government by civil society organizations, as the ‘[Russians] will be too powerful to be controlled by the government’ (Wood 2006). Yet, relations with Russia are not only based on economic interest. Rather, in the list of its foreign policy priorities, the government notes the importance of ‘cherishing tra- ditional friendly relations with Russia, due to historical and cultural reasons’ (SPPCG 2007, 6). In practical terms, such a foreign policy ori- entation resulted in the gift of a pedestrian bridge in 2007 and several monuments of the City of Moscow to Podgorica (Bichkov 2008, 287). Finally, the development of Montenegro’s foreign policy agenda after independence also saw the establishment of relations with other post- Yugoslav states; this will be discussed below. While based on common- alities of life in the former Yugoslavia, these bilateral relations are driven by a multilateral objective of joining the EU. In fact, at the Thessaloniki 180 Joint Departure – Different Arrivals

European Summit of 2003, the EU stipulated that regional cooperation is one of the conditions for accession (Council of the European Union 2003).

The politics of Montenegro’s foreign policy

In the short Preamble to its 2007 Constitution, Montenegro lists the goal of ‘adherence to equal cooperation with other peoples and states, and Euro-Atlantic integration.’ In addition to setting out foreign policy objectives in the constitution, which is an uncommon practice in the former Yugoslav states (Ðukanovic´ 2009, 35), Montenegro also constitu- tionally defined the mechanisms of cooperation with both other states and with international organizations. Article 15 of the Constitution, in this respect, poses an interesting approach to foreign policy, laying the pillars for the country’s EU and NATO accession as well as for developing bilateral relations. On the one hand, the international dimension is emphasized in Arti- cle 15 both by the observation of international legal standards and the capacity of the state to join international organizations and the EU. While the EU is clearly listed as a foreign policy priority in the con- stitution, NATO membership is not, owing to public contestation of this issue. However, in practice, NATO membership is listed as one of the country’s foreign policy ambitions. The constitutional grounds for the foreign policy objective of joining the Alliance are vested in Arti- cle 196, which stipulates that Montenegrin soldiers may take part in international military operations. On the other hand, the bilateral cooperation with other states is lim- ited to ‘friendly relations.’ Pursuant to Article 15 of the Constitution, Montenegro is constitutionally barred from entering an association with another state, whereby it would lose elements of its sovereignty. This provision stems from the history of Montenegro, the contested decision to join Serbia in 1918 (Roberts 2007) and the recently restored inde- pendence.4 Given the polarized political life of Montenegro and the difficulty to reach the consensus needed to change the state’s highest legal act, this provision is also intended as a constitutional barrier to a possible future reunification with Serbia, should the opposition parties, who opposed Montenegro’s independence, come to power.

Institutions Constitutionally, two institutions are in charge of Montenegro’s foreign policy: the president and the government. Given that Montenegro is Jelena Džanki´c 181 a parliamentary democracy, the president’s competencies in conducting the country’s external affairs are largely ceremonial. According to Article 95 of Montenegro’s 2007 Constitution, the president has four functions related to foreign affairs. Those are limited to: (1) representative role; (2) command of the army (following approval of the Military Coun- cil); (3) appointment and dismissal of ambassadors and other diplomatic representatives of Montenegro (following advice from the parliamentary Committee for International Affairs); and (4) receiving accreditation and dismissal letters for foreign representatives in Montenegro. Hence in practice, it is the government, that is the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and European Integration, that conducts the country’s exter- nal relations. After the first post-independence elections in September 2006, the Ministry’s competence regarding EU integration was ambigu- ous. While there existed a multilateral sector in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the 2006 government also established a separate Ministry of European Integration, headed by Gordana Ðurovic.´ The Ministry of European Integration was in charge of ‘managing the process of acces- sion of Montenegro to the European Union, in the sense of monitoring the implementation of the Stabilization and Association Agreement and the Interim Trade Agreement [ ...], as well as the coordination and mon- itoring of joint institutions established by this agreement [ ...]’ (Official Gazette of Montenegro 2009, Article 19). After the fallout of Ðurovic´ with high-ranking DPS officials, followed by the 2009 parliamentary elections, the Ministry of European Integration ceased to exist. Instead, its competencies were transferred to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which thus changed its name. In terms of organization, the Ministry is composed of several depart- ments, though the predominant focus is on multilateral cooperation because of the small size of the country and the need for it to act in concert in the international arena. So far, Montenegro has established diplomatic relations with 155 countries that have recognized it as an independent state. Yet, the number of embassies that the country has abroad is eight times as low (Ministry of Foreign Affairs and European Integration 2013). The country has also established missions to a num- ber of international organizations, including the UN, the EU, NATO, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), the Council of Europe and UNESCO. After Montenegro became a candidate state for EU accession, the Ministry reorganized, on the Croatian model, in order to meet the demands of the negotiation process. In January 2012, Andrija Pejovic,´ the former Head of Montenegro’s Mission to the EU, was named as chief negotiator. In fact, Montenegro’s membership 182 Joint Departure – Different Arrivals of international organizations did not lead to major objections by other countries, apart from in the case of the World Trade Organization (WTO). Although Montenegro submitted its application in 2004, whilst still in the common state with Serbia, it became a full member only in April 2012, as the Ukraine ‘vetoed Montenegro’s WTO accession by refusing to sign a bilateral agreement and requesting additional expla- nations of legislation in the fields of agriculture, industry, goods and services’ (Balkan Insight 2011).

Actors The politics of personality is often important in a country’s foreign policy. Yet, if Montenegro’s case is taken into account, the salience of personality in the conduct of external affairs has gradually diminished since 1997. The period when the politics of personality was most mani- fest in Montenegro’s foreign affairs was during the presidential mandate of the DPS leader Milo Ðukanovic´ (1998–2002). This trend continued, yet to a somewhat lower degree, during Ðukanovic’s´ terms as prime min- ister (2002–2006, and 2008–2010). The involvement of Ðukanovicin´ Montenegro’s foreign policy is based on his political power, rather than constitutional and legal competencies of the institutions he represented in Montenegro’s recent history. Compared with the current president – Filip Vujanovic´ – Ðukanovic´ was more involved in international rela- tions, including the negotiation of the Belgrade Agreement (van Meurs 2003). Contrary to this, the foreign ministers, although personally they could be taken as metaphors of the country’s foreign affairs, did not fea- ture as prominently in major international negotiations. For instance, Branko Lukovac (2000–2003) and Dragiša Burzan (2003–2004), both career diplomats, stood for Montenegro’s orientation towards Western countries and aimed to reach towards the diaspora at the time of the divide over statehood and identity. Their successor was Miodrag Vlahovic´ (2004–2006), a supporter of Montenegro’s independence since the early 1990s. The significance of the activities of the foreign ministers in the pre-referendum period has been acknowledged on the website of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and European Integration (2013). The current foreign minister – Milan Rocen´ – built his diplomatic career mostly in Russia, which reflects the recent foreign policy orientation of the country towards the East. Although never publicly acknowl- edged, the inflow of Russian investment in Montenegro has significantly increased following Rocen’s´ appointment as foreign minister. In contrast to some of the other post-Yugoslav states, religious per- sons have not in general played a significant role in the country’s Jelena Džanki´c 183 foreign policy. The only exception to this is the Metropolitan of the Serbian Orthodox Church (SPC) in Montenegro – Amfilohije – who promoted the common state with Serbia and whose role in the wars of Yugoslav disintegration has been very controversial (Santoro 1999; Ramet 2005). Amfilohije, who has been supported by a significant share of the population as a person in whom great confidence is placed (CEDEM 2004; 2009), publicly objected to Montenegro’s recognition of Kosovo and the country’s accession to NATO. Yet, after his appointment as the Archbishop of Kosovo, Amfilohije’s involvement in Montenegro’s foreign affairs has somewhat receded.5

Relations with the other post-Yugoslav states

Relations among the post-Yugoslav states have been marked by two dominant trends over the past two decades. On the one hand, the turbu- lent past of the wars of Yugoslav disintegration still somewhat thwarts the establishment of strong ties among the former upholders of the prin- ciple of ‘brotherhood and unity.’ On the other hand, the Thessaloniki Agenda, which makes ‘good neighborly relations’ a condition of entry into the EU, provides a strong incentive for cooperation among the post-Yugoslav countries. In this context, the ‘enhancement and mainte- nance of good neighborly relations and regional cooperation’ has been listed as one of the foreign policy priorities of Montenegro (SPPCG 2007, 3). In practice, the degree and the nature of external relations of Montenegro with other post-Yugoslav states varies, mostly in line with the country’s experience following the Yugoslav disintegration. External relations with Slovenia and Croatia were established as a part of the ‘creeping independence’ policy before Montenegro’s inde- pendence. The ban on imports of goods from Serbia, enforced by the Serbian police during 1998 and 1999, caused the Montenegrin government to establish economic links with Slovenia and Croatia, pro- gressively loosening its ties with federal structures (The Economist 1999). The establishment of trade links with Slovenia and Croatia implied the opening of a border crossing – Debeli Brijeg – in the Prevlaka area, which had been a matter of dispute between the FRY and Croatia since the war in the former Yugoslavia. This was followed by Ðukanovic’s´ offi- cial apology to the citizens of Croatia for Montenegro’s involvement in the attack on Dubrovnik in 1991 (ESI 1999, 6). After Montenegro became an independent state, it established diplomatic relations with both countries, which recognized its independent statehood shortly after the declaration of independence. In particular, in 2009 Croatia 184 Joint Departure – Different Arrivals and Montenegro agreed to refer the case of the disputed territory to the International Court of Justice (ICJ) (European Commission 2010, 7), which has been driven by both countries’ aspirations to consolidate their territories in the context of EU accession. In a similar fashion, Montenegro’s relations with Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) and Macedonia are driven by regional cooperation, particularly in economic affairs. With neighboring Bosnia, the emphasis has been on the reconstruction of roads and the improvement of trans- port and traffic infrastructure (Ministry of Foreign Affairs and European Integration 2013). One possible contentious issue remains dual citizen- ship between these two states, because of Montenegro’s restrictive cit- izenship legislation. Although transitory provisions were in force until 31 January 2012, allowing people from the former Yugoslav republics to obtain Montenegrin citizenship without renouncing their citizenship of origin, they were not applicable to a number of people. Hence, there still exist a number of people from BiH who fled to Montenegro during the Bosnian war and who are unable to obtain a Montenegrin pass- port because they unregistered their residence in Montenegro so as to obtain a passport of their country of origin (Džankic´ 2011). Contrary to this, Macedonia is the only country with which Montenegro has a dual citizenship agreement, which however covers only the period until the proclamation of independence. Unlike Croatia, Serbia and Bosnia, all of which are kin-states to minorities in Montenegro, the number of Macedonians in Montenegro is small, and thus dual citizenship does not disrupt the ethnic or electoral balances in Montenegro (Džankic´ 2010). An additional reason behind the eased relationship between Montenegro and Macedonia is the absence of conflict between these two post-Yugoslav states. Conversely, the relationship between Serbia and Montenegro is the most strained. This is mostly because of the legacies of the divide over statehood and identity in Montenegro, and Montenegro’s recognition of Kosovo as an independent state. Serbia recognized Montenegrin inde- pendence in mid-June 2006, after the US, the EU and most of the other post-Yugoslav states had done so. In recognizing Montenegro’s indepen- dence, the Serbian government noted, ‘[c]onditions have been met for the Serbian government [ ...] to recognize the Republic of Montenegro and to establish diplomatic ties, which contributes to the development of friendly and good neighborly relations’ (Vijesti 2006, 1). On the one hand, the timing of the recognition indicates a degree of reluctance in Serbia to recognize the independence of a state with which they share close cultural ties, and in which 28 per cent of the population declared Jelena Džanki´c 185 themselves to be ethnic Serbs. On the other hand, the recognition and the establishment of diplomatic ties between Serbia and Montenegro highlight the commitment of both countries to the EU’s Thessaloniki Agenda. Still, the initial advancement in relations between Serbia and Montenegro in the post-independence period has been tainted by the latter’s decision to recognize the independence of Kosovo in October 2008. A day after this recognition, the Serbian Foreign Ministry declared Montenegro’s Ambassador to Belgrade a persona non grata. Although rela- tions with Serbia have somewhat improved since, there are a number of outstanding issues, including dual citizenship, which has been a subject of multiannual negotiations between the two countries. The failure to reach an agreement is not only because of the two countries’ different approaches to citizenship but is also related to the preservation of ethnic and electoral balances in Montenegro (Džankic´ 2010). Montenegro recognized Kosovo six months after the country’s dec- laration of independence. According to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2013),

The Government of Montenegro made this decision bearing in mind the European and Euro-Atlantic prospects of Montenegro and the entire region, and in accordance with the strategic goal of Montenegro aimed towards fostering lasting regional stability and developing good neighborly relations. Such a position is in line with Montenegro’s belief that the future of all the countries in the region is grounded on their readiness to build relations on modern foundations, not impeded by historical prejudices and past legacies.

Nonetheless, the recognition of Kosovo appears to be a contentious issue within Montenegro itself, being contested by a number of political play- ers who support Serbia’s stance. This contestation has also induced an ambiguity within the ruling elite, which established diplomatic relations with Kosovo in January 2010 but is reluctant to open an embassy, cit- ing the return of Albanian refugees to Kosovo as a precondition (Portal Analitika 2010).

Main issues in foreign policy today

As outlined above, the top foreign policy priority of Montenegro is inte- gration in the EU and NATO. This focus on multilateral issues also brings about several interrelated issues, such as the dynamics of inter- nal politics in the context of EU integration, the contention of NATO 186 Joint Departure – Different Arrivals membership, regional cooperation – particular vis-à-vis Serbia – and the need to balance Western orientation with the salient influence of Russia in Montenegro’s foreign affairs. This fact indicates that, while appar- ently complementary, some of Montenegro’s foreign policy objectives may collide with one another or prove to be contentious domestically. While EU integration is the primary foreign policy priority of the Montenegrin government, and there is also a consensus among political actors of the need for accession, the domestic political context provides a challenge in the context of EU-related affairs. That is, given that the relationship with the EU is an asymmetrical one, Montenegro is bound to comply with a series of conditions before its accession. As many of these conditions require changes in domestic legal and institutional contexts, political actors see an opportunity to increase their leverage in negotiating and reaching their political goals. In Montenegro, this is par- ticularly manifest in the relationship between the government and the opposition on matters where a simple majority is insufficient to bring about legal change. The example of such a negotiation is the adoption of the 2011 Election Code, which was stipulated as one of the conditions for opening accession negotiations with the EU (European Commission 2010). As the amendment of the election legislation was dependent on a two-third majority in Parliament, this required the ruling coalition to give certain concessions to the opposition parties, particular in relation to minority votes, and citizenship for people from the former Yugoslav republics (Džankic´ 2011). A similar situation is also ongoing with regard to the requests of the parties that represent the interests of the Serb population of Montenegro, whose condition for reforms is based on changing the symbols of the state (Miloševic´ 2012). A different type of challenge emerges in relation to NATO acces- sion, but is likely to reach its peak at the time when membership in the Alliance is announced as a certainty. As will be further elaborated in the following section, the Montenegrin public is divided over the issue of NATO membership. Joining the Alliance is predominantly sup- ported by the ruling coalition, while the Montenegrin opposition and their followers are unwilling to see Montenegro become a NATO mem- ber, and thus seek a referendum on the issue. As the legal framework over the mechanisms of joining NATO is not as clear as in the case of EU accession (subject to parliamentary approval), making NATO acces- sion a foreign policy objective may prove to be a challenge for the Montenegrin government. A further issue for Montenegro’s foreign policy, also related to the country’s aspiration to join the EU, is regional cooperation and in particular its relationship to Serbia. As explained previously, after Jelena Džanki´c 187

Montenegro became independent and particularly after it recognized Kosovo’s independence, its relations with Serbia became rather strained. The significance of regional issues in this context is not only related to the maintenance of ‘good neighborly relations’ (European Council 2003) but also to Montenegro’s internal political dynamics in the con- text of political conditionality. Namely, as Serbs comprise almost a third of Montenegro’s population, their status and minority rights will be par- ticularly significant in fulfilling the accession requirements related to minority rights. As the latter have become a part of the EU’s acquis with which prospective members have to comply, it is likely that the foreign policy challenge regarding this issue will also come from within. Finally, in the context of its foreign policy goals, an important issue that Montenegrin policy-makers will have to deal with is the balance between increasing Russian investment (and thus potentially Russian influence) and the aspiration of the country to join NATO and the EU. In the wake of the 2012 NATO summit in Chicago, where the issue of Montenegro’s membership was discussed, the US Atlantic Council vice-president Damon Wilson stated that ‘Evidence of commitment to the combat against crime, corruption, nepotism must be provided [ ...]. There are issues of domination of some other states in Montenegro’s territory, primarily Russia. All this has to be solved before it gets an invi- tation for NATO membership’ (B92 2012a). Similar concerns have also been raised in the context of Montenegro’s EU accession, although not as explicitly as in relation to NATO.

Foreign policy and public opinion

Data about public attitudes towards Montenegro’s foreign policy are scarce. In the period from 2006 to 2010, the Gallup Balkan Monitor provides a useful source of information regarding various aspects of pub- lic opinion towards the country’s external affairs. However, the period after 2010 has not systematically been covered by any domestic or inter- national survey, which would yield comparative data. Yet, if trends in attitudes from 2006 to 2010 are observed, there is only slight fluctuation in public attitudes towards exogenous factors, which in some instances correspond and in others counter the foreign policy priorities of the Montenegrin government (SPPCG 2007). The greatest correspondence between public attitudes and the coun- try’s foreign policy priorities is related to the country’s EU acces- sion. As illustrated in Figure 8.1, the support for EU integration in Montenegro has been on the increase since the country became inde- pendent, and despite a slight drop in 2008, it stood at over 70 per cent 188 Joint Departure – Different Arrivals

80 70 60 50 40 30 20 10 0 2006 2008 2009 2010

Figure 8.1 Support for EU integration Source: Own construction based on data from Gallup Balkan Monitor (2012). in 2010. Although data for 2011 are unavailable, it is unlikely that pub- lic preferences on this matter have suffered a major shift, particularly owing to the country’s progress in the accession process. Unlike support of EU integration, public opinion regarding the mem- bership of NATO does not correspond to this foreign policy priority of the Montenegrin government. That is, while joining the Alliance peaks as the second foreign policy goal of Montenegro, the public is not as sup- portive of this integration as it is of joining the EU. The trends related to attitudes towards NATO are presented in Figure 8.2, in which it is seen that around 40 per cent of Montenegro’s population feels ‘friendly’ towards NATO and would thus be more likely to support the country’s accession. In terms of the bilateral priorities of Montenegro’s government (SPPCG 2007, 5), the public opinion data are rather interesting. The

45 40 35 30 25 20 15 10 5 0 2006 2008 2009 2010

Figure 8.2 Support for NATO Source: Own construction based on data from Gallup Balkan Monitor (2012). Jelena Džanki´c 189

60

50

40

30

20

10

0 2006 2009 2010 Germany The UK France Italy

Figure 8.3 Friendly towards EU member states Source: Own construction based on data from Gallup Balkan Monitor (2012).

document ‘Foreign Policy Priorities of Montenegro’ (SPPCG 2007, 5) lists as its key bilateral priority ‘the enhancement of relations and coop- eration with the influential EU Member states – Germany, the United Kingdom, France and Italy.’ The attitudes of Montenegro’s population towards these countries are presented in Figure 8.3. The data reveal that the steadiest degree of support (between 33 per cent and 35 per cent) is towards the UK, with which Montenegro does not have many visible foreign policy objectives. Support for France as the country’s for- eign policy partner decreased after the election of Nicolas Sarkozy as the country’s president, despite the submission of Montenegro’s candidacy for the EU during the 2008 French presidency. Similar to France, the support for Germany among the Montenegrin public has been on the decrease, whilst the approval of Italy has increased. These shifts in pub- lic attitudes towards EU member states are unlikely to be connected to the political shifts in these countries induced by elections, as the aver- age Montenegrin citizen is unaware (or only superficially aware) of the political trends in Western Europe. Rather, the support for or opposition to different member states of the EU is likely to be based on the poli- tics of personality (e.g. towards Sarkozy or Merkel) or cultural ties (e.g. towards Italy). Interestingly, in terms of support for Montenegro’s bilateral relations, the public appears closer to Russia than to the US, although the latter has precedence in official documents as the country’s foreign policy goal. The likely reason for such a trend is opposition to the US because of the NATO intervention, as the support for Montenegro’s NATO membership 190 Joint Departure – Different Arrivals

60

50

40

30

20

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0 2006 2009 2010 The US Russia

Figure 8.4 Support for the US and Russia Source: Own construction based on data from Gallup Balkan Monitor (2012). closely corresponds to attitudes towards the US. The greater support for Russia is likely to be because of increased cultural and economic ties with Russia in the post-independence period. The data related to support for these two states are schematically presented in Figure 8.4. Finally, in terms of regional cooperation, an interesting trend can be noticed, confirming the challenges to Montenegro’s foreign pol- icy presented in the previous section. As depicted in Figure 8.5, the

80 70 60 50 40 30 20 10 0 2006 2008 2009 2010 Slovenia Croatia BiH (Muslim) BiH (Croat) BiH (RS) Serbia Kosovo Macedonia

Figure 8.5 Montenegro and the post-Yugoslav space Source: Own construction based on data from Gallup Balkan Monitor (2012). Jelena Džanki´c 191

Montenegrin public feels most friendly towards Serbia, and the Republika Srpska entity of BiH, followed by Macedonia. These are the only coun- tries that the majority of the public feels ‘friendly’ towards. Interestingly, the data reveal that the attitudes of the Montenegrin public towards Bosnian Muslims and Croats in Croatia overlap to a great degree, while there is a somewhat greater degree of ‘friendliness’ towards Bosnian Croats and Slovenians. The likely explanation for this is the lower exposedness of the latter in the media during the wars of the Yugoslav disintegration. Finally, the Montenegrin public does not per- ceive Kosovo as ‘friendly,’ despite the fact that the government recog- nized Kosovo’s independence and established diplomatic relations with this post-Yugoslav state.

Continuity and change

As already mentioned, the official stance of Montenegro’s government is that the country’s independence has not induced any change to its foreign policy, which in turn exhibits elements of continuity (SPPCG 2007). A closer look at Montenegro’s external affairs, however, and comparison with some of the other post-Yugoslav states reveals that this continuity mostly refers to support for EU integration. Contrary to this, several elements of discontinuity can be recognized in rela- tion to Montenegro’s foreign policy, including NATO aspirations, the relationship with Russia and relations towards the other post-Yugoslav states. While some of these elements of discontinuity emerged in the post-independence period, a few of them actually started to manifest themselves with the political changes in Montenegro in 1997. Indeed, the continuity regarding accession to the EU is a trait of Montenegro’s foreign policy to a certain degree. That is, this continuity can be recognized with regard to the aspirations of Montenegro within the State Union of Serbia and Montenegro to become an EU member. Yet, the legal predecessor of Serbia and Montenegro – the FRY – did not exhibit such a tendency, so in a sense orientation towards the EU marks a clear discontinuity from FRY foreign policy. This discontinu- ity first manifested itself in the late 1990s, with the detachment of the Montenegrin leadership from Miloševic.´ With the democratic changes in Serbia in 2000, there was also a manifest shift in the foreign policy of the common state in the sense of prioritization of EU membership. Yet, most obviously perhaps, Montenegro’s foreign affairs show a discontinuity from the FRY foreign policy in terms of prioritizing NATO membership and the emphasis on a strong relationship with 192 Joint Departure – Different Arrivals the US. While the relationship with the US was established in 1997, and largely dominated the republic’s political life in the late 1990s, NATO membership peaked on the government’s agenda only after independence. Although vaguely discussed during the short-lived State Union of Serbia and Montenegro because of the experience of the 1999 NATO intervention (Džankic´ 2007), NATO membership was differently conceived in the two components of the common state after their inde- pendence. Montenegro, in a similar manner to Macedonia and BiH (Croatia and Slovenia are already NATO members), has declared its com- mitment to joining the Alliance (SPPCG 2007). Unlike these countries, Serbia’s foreign policy towards NATO is more ambiguous, even though this country signed the Partnership for Peace as the first step towards NATO membership at the Riga summit in 2006. Serbian politicians have commonly emphasized that Serbia’s goal is not NATO membership per se but ‘cooperation with neighbors and the alliance’ (B92 2009). Another element of discontinuity in Montenegro’s foreign policy is the current emphasis on foreign relations with Russia. While historically there existed strong cultural and financial links between Montenegro and Russia (Jovanovic´ 1995), Russia’s role in Montenegrin politics in the FRY and in Serbia and Montenegro has not been as pronounced. The likely reason for this is the orientation of Montenegrin elites towards the West in the late 1990s, and the subsequent caution that building strong ties with Russia (which was supportive of Serbia at the time) might have adverse effects on the inflow of foreign aid needed to sus- tain the political power of the ruling elite. Conversely, even though the global financial crisis has somewhat diluted the degree of financial deal- ings with this country, the post-independence period saw an increase in cultural and economic links with Russia. These links have been disputed in the context of the country’s NATO accession, as described above. The final element of discontinuity relates to Montenegro’s foreign policy towards the other post-Yugoslav states, as well as the neighbor- ing Albania. The FRY foreign policy towards the rest of the Yugoslav federation was based on an expansionist policy, which led to the Yugoslav conflicts and has been described in a number of academic analyses (Ramet 1996; Jovic´ 2008). While the contents of this policy changed with the democratic changes in Serbia in 2000, intensified regional cooperation was initiated only after the Thessaloniki Agenda of 2003. Yet, Montenegro changed its foreign policy towards Croatia and Slovenia in 1999, as part of the ‘creeping independence’ project described in the previous sections. As regards its relationship with Macedonia and Bosnia, there is reasonable continuity with the policy Jelena Džanki´c 193 implemented during the existence of the State Union. However, the major change in Montenegro’s foreign policy has been induced by the disintegration of the common state, when Serbia became a clear exoge- nous factor and the kin-state of a significant minority in Montenegro. While relations between the two components of Serbia and Montenegro were strained during the last decade of their coexistence in one state, they have further been severed by Montenegro’s recognition of Kosovo and the establishment of diplomatic links with this post-Yugoslav state. By the same token, unlike during the FRY times,6 Montenegro has good neighborly relations with Albania, which have been underpinned by the inclusion of the Albanian minority in government since 1998.

Conclusion

The aim of this chapter was to provide an insight into a multitude of issues surrounding Montenegro’s foreign policy, particularly in the post-independence period. It has showed that, owing to the focus on multilateral cooperation, and primarily EU accession, Montenegro has a progressive approach to external affairs. This, however, does not mean that the country’s foreign policy is progressive by nature. Rather, it is distant from the traditional state-based approach to foreign policy by default, because it adopts the values inherent in multilateral cooper- ation. In addition, being a small state, with insignificant bargaining leverage in international affairs, Montenegro has little potential for tra- ditional foreign policy based on state-to-state negotiations and interests. In terms of the relationship with the previous foreign policy approaches of Montenegro, the current one (SPPCG 2007) exhibits both continuity and change. The continuity with the country’s foreign policy while it was a member of the State Union of Serbia and Montenegro is most manifest over the issue of EU accession. Similar to all other post- Yugoslav countries, Montenegro aspires to become a member state of the EU in the future, which is also a significant driver of regional coop- eration, another foreign policy priority of the country. The discontinuity in Montenegro’s foreign policy is the country’s current approach to inte- gration into NATO, which has not been as explicit in the common state with Serbia owing to the 1999 intervention. Similarly, prioritizing exter- nal relations with the US since 1997 is another element of discontinuity with Yugoslav external affairs. The 1997 split in the ruling party also induced the discontinuity of a somewhat adverse foreign policy towards Croatia and Slovenia during Yugoslav disintegration and the establish- ment of foreign relations with these two post-Yugoslav states. More 194 Joint Departure – Different Arrivals recent elements of discontinuity include the strained relations with Serbia because of the recognition of Kosovo, as well as Montenegro’s establishment of close ties with Russia. Yet, a closer look at the country’s foreign policy and the analysis of public opinion of Montenegro’s foreign policy priorities reveals that one of the major challenges for the country will be to consolidate its internal political dynamics and its foreign policy goals. Prioritizing EU accession and the fulfillment of conditions for EU membership has induced sig- nificant political shifts in Montenegro’s political context. It has changed the dynamics of negotiations between the government and the opposi- tion, pushing the former to make concessions it was previously reluctant to make in order to forge a political consensus on sensitive issues such as citizenship and electoral legislation. Public opinion polls also reveal a major internal discrepancy relating to NATO membership, which is supported by only a third of the country’s population, despite being listed as the second foreign policy priority. With regard to Montenegro’s NATO membership a further tension may arise through US criticism of the mounting influence of Russia on the country’s politics. Given the virtual non-existence of academic studies dealing with Montenegro’s foreign policy, this analysis provides just the tip of the ice- berg of what could be examined in more detail. Further studies on this topic could potentially deal with questions of domestic political contest in the frame of EU accession; the public contestation of NATO mem- bership; strains between NATO aspirations and the salient influence of Russia; and regional cooperation.

Notes

1. Ethnic minorities and the independence-oriented Liberal Alliance of Montenegro (LSCG) boycotted the popular vote. 2. According to the 1991 census (Statistical Office of Serbia and Montenegro 1992), the largest ethno-national group were Montenegrins (61.9 per cent), followed by Serbs (9.3 per cent), Muslims (14.7 per cent), Albanians (6.7 per cent) and Croats (1 per cent). The results of the 2003 census were radi- cally different from 1991. In 2003 (Monstat 2003), the ethnic composite in Montenegro was: Montenegrins (43.2 per cent), followed by Serbs (32 per cent), Bosniaks (7.8 per cent), Albanians (5 per cent), Muslims (4 per cent), Croats (1.1 per cent) and Roma (0.4 per cent). The different results indicate the politicization of ethnicity in Montenegro during the debate over state- hood and identity, a politicization which has somewhat lessened after the independence referendum although ethno-national categories still show some fluidity. According to the 2011 census (Monstat 2011), the ethnic composite in Montenegro is: Montenegrins (45 per cent), Serbs (28.7 per cent), Bosniaks Jelena Džanki´c 195

(8.6 per cent), Albanians (4.9 per cent), Muslims (3.3 per cent), Croats (1 per cent) and Roma (0.3 per cent). 3. See the section ‘Continuity and Change’ for details. 4. Prior to the creation of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, Montenegro existed as a self-governing principality. Its independence in the international order of states was confirmed at the 1878 Berlin Congress. 5. There is, however, still the issue of the church at Mt Rumija and the crim- inal complaint against Amfilohije. This issue arose as a consequence of the SPC’s construction of a metal church on Mt Rumija in 2005. Although the SPC justified the construction by claiming that there existed an Orthodox church there until 1571, the erection of a Serbian Orthodox church on Mt Rumija caused much controversy, especially among the minority population in Montenegro. They claimed that Mt Rumija was a sacred place for all the religious communities in the country. In 2009, the Montenegrin Ministry for Spatial Planning issued a decree for the demolition of the church, which prompted a debate between Metropolitan Amfilohije and the Speaker of the Montenegrin Parliament – Ranko Krivokapic.´ Given that the Metropolitan Amfilohije issued an anathema against Krivokapic´ (who supported the demo- lition of the church), followed by a number of inciting public statements, he has since faced criminal charges for hate speech. 6. In the early 1990s, the relationship between the FRY and Albania was tense, as the Yugoslav leaders accused Albania of causing unrest in Kosovo and challenging the country’s territorial sovereignty.

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Ministry of Foreign Affairs and European Integration. ‘Odnosi Crne Gore i NATO [Relations Between Montenegro and NATO].’ Ministarstvo vanjskih poslova i evropskih integracija. 2012. http://www.mvpei.gov.me/rubrike/nato/ Odnosi-Crne-Gore-i-NATO (accessed 18 March 2014). ———. ‘Official Website.’ Ministarstvo vanjskih poslova i evropskih integracija. 2013. http://www.mip.gov.me (accessed 18 March 2014). Monstat. ‘2003 Population Census of Montenegro.’ Zavod za Statistiku Crne Gore [Statistical Office of Montenegro]. 2003. http://www.monstat.org/cg/page.php ?id=57&pageid=57 (accessed 18 March 2014). ———. ‘2011 Population Census of Montenegro.’ Zavod za Statistiku Crne Gore [Statistical Office of Montenegro]. 2011. http://www.monstat.org/cg/page.php ?id=322&pageid=322 (accessed 18 March 2014). Official Gazette of Montenegro. ‘Uredba o organizaciji i nacinuˇ rada državne uprave [Regulation on the Organization and Functioning of Public Adminis- tration].’ Službeni list Crne Gore, 59 (9), 2009: 62–85. Portal Analitika. ‘Vlasi: “Diplomatski odnosi Kosova i Crne Gore dobri za obje zemlje” [Vlasi: “DiplomaticRrelations Between Kosovo and Montenegro Are Good for Both Countries”].’ Portal Analitika. 2010. https://portalanalitika.me/ politika/vijesti/14671-vlasi-diplomatski-odnosi-kosova-i-crne-gore-dobri-za -obje-zemlje.html (accessed 22 June 2012). Ramet, S. Balkan Babel: The Disintegration of Yugoslavia from the Death of Tito to Civil War. Boulder: Westview Press, 1996. ———. ‘The Politics of the Serbian Orthodox Church.’ In Serbia Since 1989,by S. Ramet, 55–94. Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2005. Roberts, E. Serbia-Montenegro-A New Federation? Oxford: Conflict Studies Research Centre, 2002. ———. Realm of the Black Mountain: A History of Montenegro. Oxford: Blackwell, 2007. Santoro, L. ‘From Baptism to Politics, Montenegrins Fight for Identity.’ Christian Science Monitor, 91 (103), 1999: 7–9. SPPCG. Spoljnopolitiˇcki prioriteti Crne Gore [Foreign Policy Priorities of Montenegro]. 2007. http://www.mip.gov.me/index.php/Ministarstvo/spoljno- politiki-prioriteti-crne-gore.html (accessed 18 March 2014). Statistical Office of Serbia and Montenegro. Population Census 1981, 1991. Berlgrade: FZS, 1992. The Economist.‘Independence?’The Economist, 12 April 1999: 50–53. van Meurs, F. ‘The Belgrade Agreement: Robust Mediation between Serbia and Montenegro.’ In Montenegro in Transition: Problems of Identity and Statehood,by F. Bieber, 63–82. Baden Baden: Nomos, 2003. Vijesti. ‘Srbija priznaje Crnu Goru [Serbia Recognized Montenegro].’ Vijesti, 16 June 2006. Wood, N. ‘Tiny Montenegro Booms, and Eyes the Russian Hand That’s Feeding It.’ The New York Times. 24 December 2006. http://www.nytimes.com/2006/12/24/ world/europe/24montenegro.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0 (accessed 18 March 2014). 9 Foreign Policy as a Constitutive Element of Statehood and Statehood Prerogative: The Case of Kosovo Gëzim Krasniqi

Introduction

Of all the post-Yugoslav states, Kosovo is the last to develop and implement its independent foreign policy and service. Kosovo declared independence from Serbia on 17 February 2008 following the lack of a compromise with Serbia in the UN-led negotiations. Nonetheless, more than six years after its declaration of independence, Kosovo still does not possess all statehood attributes, including external and inter- nal sovereignty. This mainly stems from the issues related to Kosovo’s contested international subjectivity, and the refusal of Serbs from north- ern Kosovo to be integrated into the political system. As regards the international aspect, Serbia, Russia, Spain and other members of the international community have fiercely opposed Kosovo’s declaration of independence. What is more, the declaration without approval from either Serbia or the Security Council of the UN (UNSC) has resulted in a limited number of recognitions of Kosovo’s independence. Yet, as of October 2014 some 108 UN members have recognized Kosovo, and the new country has succeeded in becoming a member of the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, the European Bank for Reconstruc- tion and Development, the Council of Europe Development Bank, as well as some regional bodies, but UN (as well as Organization for Secu- rity and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) and Council of Europe (CoE)) membership is still not in sight.

198 Gëzim Krasniqi 199

The combination of this multifaceted set of factors makes the case of Kosovo rather complex in a wider post-Yugoslav context. Thus, it is this complexity that this chapter sets to analyze. The main argument is that in a situation of contested international subjectivity, Kosovo’s main foreign policy objective remains international recognition of its independence. As regards the relationship between foreign policy and statehood, foreign policy gains a dual capacity by serving both as a tool of state-building and as a statehood prerogative. On the other hand, with regard to foreign policy orientation and strategy, Kosovo’s foreign policy still remains under strong US influence, and as such could be classified as a ‘compliant foreign policy.’ This chapter will examine various legal, institutional, political and material constraints that have hindered Kosovo’s efforts to establish a fully fledged and independent foreign policy sector. Obviously, estab- lishing a functional foreign policy is a highly complex business for any contested state, for they ‘have a legal status that is uncertain, an interna- tional standing that is indefinite, a legal existence that is often relative, and a security situation that is at times precarious’ (Kurtulus quoted in Geldenhuys 2009, 24–25).

Small states, contested states, and foreign policy theories and approaches

According to Christopher Hill’s widely used definition, ‘[f]oreign policy is the sum of official external relations conducted by an independent actor (usually a state) in international relations’ (2003, 3). This defini- tion implies two things. First, it refers to external actions conducted by an ‘independent actor,’ meaning that only independent actors can engage in foreign policy activities. Second, by independent actor Hill means ‘usually a state.’ This implies that it is usually states that engage in external relations and foreign policy. Thus, this leaves unanswered the question whether semi-independent or independent-like actors can engage in foreign affairs. In terms of statehood, it is important to make a distinction between those states or political entities whose independence is universally accepted and recognized (confirmed states) and contested states. By con- tested states, political entities or states who are denied conventional international recognition and do not have collective recognition – typ- ically through the UN – are meant (Geldenhuys 2009, 7). Broadly speaking, Kosovo falls into this category. Nonetheless, in a spectrum of degrees of recognition – from full recognition to complete lack of 200 Joint Departure – Different Arrivals recognition – according to Owtram, Kosovo falls in the category of entities recognized by ‘key great powers’ (2011, 129). So, although Kosovo has yet to achieve membership in the UN, which in Joshua Keating’s (2008) opinion represents the ‘gold standard of international legitimacy,’ recognition by more than half of the UN member states, including the US, 23 out of 28 EU members and other regional powers, as well as membership in various international financial institutions, represents milestones in Kosovo’s path to becoming a full member of the international community. As far as the ‘actors versus structures’ debate is concerned – whether actors are shaped by structures or vice versa – this chapter subscribes to the constructivist view, which argues that agents/actors and structures should not be split apart nor should one be given priority over the other. By recognizing both the agency of actors and structural constraints, the constructivist approach emphasizes the social nature of international relations, as well as the dynamic and constantly changing nature of these relations (Kubálková 2001, 19–29).

The challenge of building a functional foreign policy in Kosovo

Earlier (unsuccessful) attempts to engage in foreign policy In the past, Kosovo made several attempts to engage in foreign pol- icy. During the socialist Yugoslavia, and especially between 1974 and 1989 when Kosovo’s institutional basis was set up (including various republican-type prerogatives), institutions of the Autonomous Socialist Province of Kosovo could conclude bilateral economic agreements with other external institutions through its Secretariat for Relations with the Outside World, after approval by the organs of the Socialist Republic of Serbia and the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY). Another attempt to engage in international policy was made in the 1990s, when in response to the crisis in the SFRY and the forcible abo- lition of its autonomy by Serbia, Kosovo declared its independence in 1991 (Weller 2009, 39–50). Although no other state apart from Albania recognized Kosovo’s independence at that time, the newly created insti- tutions of the Republic of Kosovo, known as the ‘parallel system,’ attempted to exercise foreign policy functions to mobilize international support for Kosovo. Thus, Kosovo opened a permanent political repre- sentation office in Tirana to serve the leaders of the Kosovar parallel system as the gateway to the world in their campaign to amass sup- port for the movement itself and for Kosovo’s independence. People Gëzim Krasniqi 201 such as Ibrahim Rugova1 and Bujar Bukoshi2 and their teams relent- lessly beat paths to the main political international organizations, political parties, NGOs, think-tanks, parliamentary committees, human rights groups and national governments worldwide (Hockenos 2003, 226). Nonetheless, despite numerous consecutive efforts and multiple visits and meetings, Kosovar leaders received little more than polite receptions and expressions of sympathies for their commitment to non- violence. In this way, ‘Kosovo was tasting the bitter fruits of collective non-recognition’ (Geldenhuys 2009, 113). In the period under international administration between 1999 and 2008, UN Resolution 1244 vested all legislative and executive powers, including the administration of the judiciary, in the hands of the Special Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG) and the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK). Irrespective of the fact that as of 2001 Kosovo had its own democratically elected institu- tions, foreign policy remained an exclusive competence of UNMIK and the SRSG, including the mandate to conclude agreements with states and international organizations. As pointed out by Knoll, ‘UNMIK thus follows established rules of agency in international law, namely, that the acts performed by the agent within the limits of its internationally conferred authority bind the entity as though they had been performed by the latter’ (2005, 644). Irrespective of efforts by Kosovar leaders to assume some foreign policy powers through the establishment of the Office of International Cooperation and Regional Dialogue, the latter never managed to become a credible structure to deal with foreign affairs (KIPRED 2007, 7). Kosovo’s institutional leaders could occasionally be part of the UNMIK delegation on foreign visits or UN Security Council discussions on Kosovo, but they had no right to speak or sign any- thing on behalf of Kosovo. Thus, in this period, a group of unelected officials (UNMIK officials) spoke and decided on behalf of the democrat- ically elected Kosovar leaders and institutions. Indeed, as Carne Ross put it, ‘Kosovo was not allowed any diplomatic representation or a foreign ministry, yet it was required to participate in a complex and highly-charged diplomatic process involving many diplomatic actors ...’ (2007, 192).

Foreign policy in post-independent Kosovo According to Hill, three central features of the state should be taken into account in foreign policy analysis: the set of institutions representing the res publica, constitutionalism and recognition by the international system (2003, 33–35). In the case of Kosovo, all these features are rather 202 Joint Departure – Different Arrivals complex and hinder Kosovo’s capacity to act independently in interna- tional relations. Despite the fact that Kosovo declared its independence in 2008, its assertion of sovereignty is challenged by the fact that its independence is supervised internationally, and this creates various sovereignty-related limitations. The Ahtisaari Plan, which laid the basis for Kosovo’s declaration of independence, foresaw a smooth transfer of power from the UN to the EU. This meant the termination of UNMIK’s mandate and an increased role for the EU Rule of Law mission (EULEX) and the International Civilian Office (ICO) to strengthen Kosovo’s insti- tutions, and to monitor their performance and the implementation of the Ahtisaari Plan. After declaring independence, Kosovo invited the EU to deploy a rule of law mission in Kosovo, but because of the lack of consensus in the UN and the EU (Spain, Greece, Cyprus, Romania and Slovakia refuse to recognize Kosovo’s independence), EULEX was deployed in Kosovo ‘under the general framework of United Nations Security Resolution 1244,’ which requires it to adopt a ‘status neutral’ approach. This slowed down the process of transition from the UN to the EU and created confusion amongst UN, EU and EULEX officials. The end result is that at least four different sets of institutions operate in Kosovo (Kosovo’s, UNMIK’s, EULEX’s and Serbia’s), creating a highly complex net of institutions, legal norms and jurisdictions that often overlap. Owing to the inability of the Security Council to terminate UNMIK’s mandate, the latter still retains foreign policy and external represen- tation competencies. UNMIK’s presence in Kosovo is a challenge for Kosovar institutions in two ways. First, according to the Ahtisaari Plan, Kosovar institutions inherit all the contractual obligations of UNMIK. Between 1999 and 2008, UNMIK has entered many international agree- ments with international bodies and other countries on behalf of Kosovo (KIPRED 2007, 6). Second, because of UNMIK’s presence in Kosovo, the former continued to represent Kosovo at the Security Coun- cil meetings on Kosovo as well as at other regional and international bodies where Kosovo became a member through UNMIK. This created a duality in the field of foreign policy and prevents the institutions of the Republic of Kosovo from becoming the sole representatives of the territory in international affairs. It is against this complex backdrop that Kosovo’s foreign policy is established.

Building effective foreign policy institutional mechanisms The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Diplomatic Service of Kosovo was established in March 2008, just weeks after the declaration of Gëzim Krasniqi 203 independence. This was followed by the adoption of the Law on For- eign Service of the Republic of Kosovo (Kosovo Assembly 2008a) as well as the Law on Consular Service of Diplomatic and Consular Missions of the Republic of Kosovo (Kosovo Assembly 2008b) in December of that year. Additional acts, such as the Regulation on Foreign Service and the Regulation on Consular Service, were adopted in spring 2009. This set the legal basis for the consolidation of the institutional struc- ture. In June 2008, just days after the entry into force of Kosovo’s new Constitution, the President of Kosovo decreed the opening of the first Kosovar embassies in the US, the UK, Germany, Italy, France, Austria, Switzerland, Belgium, Albania and Turkey. Months later, the first for- eign representatives (chargé d’affaires) were appointed to fill the posts in these embassies (SETimes 2008). Over the course of the next months and years Kosovo opened embassies in Slovenia, Croatia, Macedonia, the Netherlands, Sweden, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Bulgaria, Japan, Saudi Arabia and later on in Australia and Panama, thus taking the number of embassies to 22. On the other hand, by 2014, Kosovo has accredited 14 Consular Missions in the US, UK, Germany, Switzerland, France, Italy, Austria, Turkey, Sweden and Belgium. As of June 2009 they started to gradually offer consular services to Kosovar citizens living abroad (Bota Sot 2011). In another move to establish its separate interna- tional subjectivity, in July 2013 Kosovo started a visa regime for citizens of 87 countries, including China and Russia, the two UNSC members that oppose its independence (Agence France-Presse 2013). In this case, Kosovo clearly used these instruments to demonstrate that it possesses statehood prerogatives. The configuration and timing of Kosovo’s diplomatic missions reflect both the dynamic of recognitions from other countries as well as Kosovo’s foreign policy priorities. Thus, it is of no surprise that Kosovo opened its first embassies in the US and the main EU countries, which at the same time are the main sponsors and supporters of Kosovo’s inde- pendence. In terms of geography, the majority of Kosovo’s missions are concentrated in Europe, while two are located in Asia and one is situ- ated in each of North America, South America and Oceania. However, Kosovo is yet to open an embassy in Africa.

Foreign policy objectives Foreign policy figures as one of the main objectives of the first inde- pendent government of Kosovo – a coalition government between the Democratic Party of Kosovo (PDK) and the Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK). According to the program presented in the parliament in spring 204 Joint Departure – Different Arrivals

2008, the government of Kosovo pledges to engage in: (1) accelerat- ing the process of international recognition of Kosovo; (2) deepening special relations with the US, EU states, neighboring states and other countries; (3) building the Diplomatic and Consular Service of Kosovo; (4) achieving the country’s membership of the main political, economic and financial international organizations and institutions; (5) protecting the interests of citizens of Kosovo abroad; and (6) promoting the special identity of Kosovo (Government of the Republic of Kosovo 2008). The main priority is the completion of the structure and full functioning of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA); furthermore, the establishment of diplomatic and consular missions abroad, and membership in inter- national institutions. One of the main challenges identified is Kosovo’s membership of the UN. In line with this government program and priorities, the MFA has formulated similar goals and statements. Its main mission is ‘protect- ing and securing the country’s independence, defending state interests in the international arena, promoting Kosovo’s political and economic interests, and protecting and representing the rights and interests of its citizens’ (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Kosovo n.d.). Therefore, in order to accomplish its mission successfully, the MFA’s main priori- ties are: (1) recognition of Kosovo’s independence and establishment of diplomatic relations with these countries; (2) the cultivation of close and special relations with the US; (3) building a strategic partnership with the EU and NATO, including establishing contractual relations with these organizations on the path towards Euro-Atlantic integration; (4) Kosovo’s membership in international organizations; (5) developing good neighborly relations and regional cooperation based on shared interests, through bilateral and multilateral agreements; and (6) repre- senting and protecting the interests of Kosovo and its citizens abroad. While examining these strategic documents of Kosovo’s institutions, it becomes obvious that the top priority remains recognition of Kosovo as a way of increasing its international subjectivity and consolidation of statehood.

‘Kosovo calling’: The quest for external legitimacy and international subjectivity

The act of recognition of a state by another state has a long tradition in the history of international relations. However, as far as the effect of recognition is concerned, international law and international rela- tions scholars are divided between those who argue that an entity that Gëzim Krasniqi 205 possesses minimum characteristics of statehood (a territory, population, government and a capacity to maintain relations with other states) is automatically a state and an international subject – recognition can only mark the willingness of other states to have relations with it (the declara- tory theory), and others that argue that an entity is ‘constituted’ as a state and international subject through the actions of other members of the international community recognizing it as a state (the consti- tutive theory) (Geldenhuys 2009, 20). In any case, statehood criteria and criteria for recognition are not the same. From the point of view of international law, however, the Montevideo criteria set the following qualifications that a state should possess as a person of international law: (1) a permanent population; (2) a defined territory; (3) a gov- ernment; and (4) the capacity to enter into relations with the other states (Montevideo Convention 1933). As far as the last criterion is concerned, James Crawford treats the capacity to enter into relations with other states as a consequence rather than a criterion of state- hood (quoted in Geldenhuys 2009, 13). Likewise, according to Richard Caplan, ‘[r]ecognition would appear to be more of a discretionary political act today than it has been for decades’ (2005, 51). Nonetheless, owing to initial high expectations – days before the dec- laration of independence, Kosovo’s prime minister declared that 100 countries had confirmed they planned to recognize Kosovo when it declared its independence from Serbia (Balkan Insight 2008) – as well as the subsequent slow pace of international recognition and relative inter- national isolation, the issue of recognition has become a sine qua non for Kosovo in its quest for international subjectivity. By treating recognition as a major constitutive element of Kosovo’s statehood and international personality, Kosovo’s leaders thus subscribe to Oppenheim’s (a propo- nent of the constitutive approach with regard to recognition) argument that ‘a state is, and becomes, an International Person through recog- nition only and exclusively’ (quoted in Grant 1999, 2). Although the Kosovar government declared foreign policy and recognition of Kosovo a priority, Kosovo’s institutions fell short of developing a comprehensive foreign policy platform and lobbying strategy.

‘Wait and hope for the best’ approach By the time Kosovo declared its independence, its foreign policy was almost non-existent, both in the context of institutional mechanisms and foreign policy platform. Therefore, in the first weeks and months of 2008, Kosovo’s institutions were rather passive and disoriented in the realm of foreign policy. Irrespective of this, three months after the 206 Joint Departure – Different Arrivals declaration of independence, Kosovo’s independence was recognized by 42 states, including three Security Council permanent members, most of the EU countries and regional powers such as Turkey, Australia, Japan and South Korea. This wave of recognitions waned by the end of 2008. The main factors for this were Kosovo’s reactive approach in foreign pol- icy and Serbia’s diplomatic offensive to challenge the independence of Kosovo politically and legally. In the first months after the declaration of independence, Kosovar institutions relied solely on Kosovo’s sponsors and supporters to achieve international recognition. In the meantime, Kosovo’s main ruling par- ties, PDK and LDK, were engaged in an internal debate, first about the post of the minister of foreign affairs, and later on Kosovo’s first diplo- matic representatives. These power-sharing debates overshadowed the more pressing need for a foreign policy platform and a lobbying strat- egy. Thus, the first year of Kosovo’s foreign policy was characterized by a lack of a platform, a lack of wider political consensus on foreign policy, a lack of international relevance and lack of real objectives (KPJ 2008, 5). Owing to a limited number of recognitions, as well as criticism from the opposition parties and public opinion, the government approved the Strategy for the Achievement of Full International Recognition of the Republic of Kosovo in June 2011 (Indeksonline 2011). This strategy identifies obstacles and challenges encountered so far in the process of lobbying for international recognition of Kosovo and expresses the gen- eral strategic directions that should be followed by Kosovo institutions and other relevant actors involved in the process. The other major challenge for Kosovo was Serbia’s decision to chal- lenge the legality of Kosovo’s declaration of independence by taking the case to the International Court of Justice (ICJ). Serbia, which strongly opposes Kosovo’s independence, sponsored a draft-resolution at the General Assembly of the United Nations to request an advisory opinion from the ICJ on the legality of Kosovo’s declaration of independence. This initiative, which was aimed at halting Kosovo’s recognition pro- cess, triggered a process of intense coordination between Kosovo and its supporters, as well as mobilization of Kosovo’s institutions. Con- trary to general expectations, the ICJ’s opinion published in July 2010 was unequivocal, concluding that ‘the adoption of the DoI [Declara- tion of Independence] of 17 February 2008 did not violate general international law, Security Council Resolution 1244 (1999) or the Con- stitutional Framework. Consequently the declaration did not violate any applicable rule of international law’ (ICJ 2010). Gëzim Krasniqi 207

The ICJ’s opinion was considered a blow for Serbia (which had requested this opinion) and a major endorsement for Kosovo. Kosovo’s politicians interpreted this as a ratification of Kosovo’s independence and statehood. Prime Minister Hashim Thaçi (2010) stated that ‘the court reaffirmed Kosovo’s place in the international community.’ How- ever, contrary to predictions that an ICJ opinion in Kosovo’s favor would trigger a wave of additional recognitions for the new state, the pace of recognitions continues to be slow. Undoubtedly, this is an indica- tor both of the reluctance of states to recognize a seceding state and Kosovo’s inability to capitalize on the ICJ’s opinion. On the contrary, it was Serbia that reacted swiftly by submitting a draft resolution to the General Assembly of the UN that dismisses the ICJ’s opinion and calls for new negotiations on Kosovo’s status. How- ever, as a result of diplomatic pressure from the EU member states, at the last minute Serbia agreed to amend the draft resolution. The new draft calls for a dialogue between Belgrade and Pristina without ref- erence to the issue of Kosovo’s status (UN 2010). The content of this resolution in a way reflects Serbia’s agreement with the EU to move the Kosovo issue from UN fora to EU level. As required by this resolution, in March 2011 Kosovo and Serbia began an EU-facilitated ‘technical dia- logue,’ which in October 2012 was upgraded to a high-level dialogue with the participation of both Kosovo’s and Serbia’s prime ministers. This dialogue has produced a series of agreements on the return of civil registries and cadastre records, freedom of movement and persons, customs stamps, integrated management of the border crossings, repre- sentation of Kosovo in regional fora, exchange of liaison officers, energy and telecommunication, and most notably the landmark ‘First Agree- ment of Principles Governing the Normalization of Relations,’ signed on 19 April 2013 (KIPRED). This is a 15-point document that establishes the parameters for the dismemberment of the Serbian security struc- tures through their absorption into Kosovo equivalent structures and creation of new local institutions emerging from free and fair elections (organized in November 2013), while increasing the level of autonomy for the four Serb-dominated municipalities in northern Kosovo through the creation of the Association/Community of Serb Municipalities in Kosovo. As regards the agreement on Kosovo’s regional representation, it will allow for Kosovo to sign new regional agreements for itself and par- ticipate in various regional organizations and meetings, provided that the word ‘Kosovo’ is accompanied by an asterisk and the footnote: ‘This designation is without prejudice to status, and is in line with 208 Joint Departure – Different Arrivals

UNSC 1244 and the ICJ Opinion on the Kosovo Declaration of Indepen- dence.’ Although this would allow Kosovo to become member of various regional mechanisms independent of UNMIK, it reinforces Kosovo’s anomalous international status. As Stephan Lehne put it, ‘[b]y consent- ing to a rather peculiar nameplate, Pristina for its part acknowledged that it was not quite yet a normal state’ (2012, 3).

External representation and intra-institutional relationship Although states act as political and legal persons in international rela- tions, often it is not clear who represents the state. According to Hill, there are three models of relationships between head of government and foreign ministers: (1) equality; (2) subordinate foreign ministers; (3) established foreign ministers (2003, 60–61). In Kosovo, according to the Kosovo Constitution (2008), the President of the Republic of Kosovo leads the foreign policy, whereas the MFA has a fundamental role in its formulation and implementation, as well as in the realization of this priority. However, since 2008 there have been two different patterns of relationships between the minister of foreign affairs, the prime minister and president in Kosovo. In the first period, which corresponds with the PDK-LDK coalition government (2007– 2010), Kosovo had an established foreign minister. Skender Hyseni was at the helm of Kosovo’s foreign policy throughout his mandate until late 2010 when his party left the coalition government. He represented Kosovo abroad, lobbied at the UN during the General Assembly sessions (where he was occasionally joined by prime minister and president) and coordinated the process of defending Kosovo’s declaration of indepen- dence at the ICJ. However, he was often criticized by the opposition and civil society for lack of transparency and his exclusive attitude in the lobbying process. In particular, he was criticized by the New Kosovo Alliance (AKR) party and its leader Behxhet Pacolli. A successful busi- nessman and an ambitious politician, Pacolli embarked on a personal lobbying campaign for recognition. In addition to the lack of coopera- tion between the two, Pacolli and Hyseni often clashed in their attempts to claim exclusive credit for recognitions (Shkullaku 2010). Following the 2010 elections and the creation of a new government between PDK and AKR, a new pattern of foreign policy organization was established. In the new government, apart from the MFA (and his two deputies), there is a Minister for European Integration, and two deputy prime ministers who are engaged in foreign affairs. Deputy Prime Minister Behxhet Pacolli is charged with the special task of obtaining more recognition while Deputy Prime Minister Edita Tahiri, who leads Gëzim Krasniqi 209

Kosovo’s negotiating team in the technical dialogue with Serbia, also serves as Kosovo’s foreign policy envoy. The Ministry of European Inte- gration is also a stakeholder in foreign policy as it maintains the specific lines of communication with the EU. This model of proliferation of external representation has led to a situation where there is an overlap of competencies and where the MFA is in many ways subordinated.

Kosovo’s public diplomacy One of the key elements of foreign policy is diplomacy. As Hill put it, ‘[d]iplomacy is the human face of getting your own way in international politics’ (2003, 138). Therefore, in addition to political or traditional diplomacy – government-to-government contacts and relations – public diplomacy has become a means of influencing public opinion at home and abroad. Public diplomacy refers to cases where foreign policy insti- tutions target wider political audiences, including civil society. Having to struggle with incomplete international recognition as well as a dam- aged image, Kosovo made several efforts to improve its international position and reputation through the use of public diplomacy. A key element in Kosovo’s public diplomacy is a nation branding cam- paign, which was launched in October 2009. The 5.7 million campaign by advertising group Saatchi & Saatchi consists of several components: the best-known are the slogan and logo ‘The Young Europeans,’ a TV ad and a photo series (Wählisch and Xharra 2010, 10–18). In fact, this represents an example of ‘third party diplomacy.’ Besides the Kosovo government, civil society organizations and individuals have also been active in an attempt to use public diplomacy to promote Kosovo’s image abroad and increase the number of recognitions for the new coun- try. As regards the former, the Kosovo Foundation for Open Society (KFOS), Forum 2015, the Foreign Policy Club and other civil society organizations have been active in public diplomacy recently through debates with policy-makers in Kosovo and intellectuals, public figures and politicians from the countries that have not recognized Kosovo so far. In addition, there have been private initiatives, such as the one by Pacolli, who used his own initiative, resources and networks to lobby for recognition of Kosovo, or the one by James Berisha, a Kosovo-born American pilot who undertook a unique mission to fly a private plane through all the countries of Central and South America to persuade governments to recognize Kosovo (Wählisch and Xharra 2010, 39). Another multi-party initiative is the Communication with Europe through Diplomacy project between the Kosovo and British govern- ments, which will be implemented by the British Council to improve the 210 Joint Departure – Different Arrivals process of Kosovo’s recognition by other countries. This project primar- ily targets the five EU countries that have not recognized Kosovo so far (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Kosovo 2011). More recently, the MFA has initiated the creation of an ‘open source’ platform – www.digitalkosovo. com – as part of its National Strategy for the Digital Diplomacy, which aims at improving Kosovo’s inclusion in the global Internet infras- tructure, as well as using online communication channels to improve perceptions of Kosovo in support of the country’s economic, cultural and political developments. Use of these modern means of diplomacy testify the need for Kosovo diplomacy to use alternative contemporary ways of international engagement and lobbying to ‘thicken’ its inter- national presence, including on social networks, at a time when UN membership is still highly unlikely.

Kosovo’s relations with the neighbors, great powers and international organizations

Since the end of the war in 1999, Kosovo politicians and institutions have been engaged in forging closer ties and developing bilateral rela- tions with other countries and international organizations. These ties and relations were intensified at the time of negotiations about Kosovo’s status and reached their peak in the aftermath of the declaration of inde- pendence and the recognition of Kosovo by other countries. As regards the issue of strategic orientation, Kosovo’s foreign policy is based on three main pillars: the US, the EU and a regional alliance with Turkey and Albania.

Kosovo’s ‘eternal friendship’ with the US There is no doubt that Kosovo’s main supporter is the US. The latter has been actively engaged in the process of ending the Yugoslav wars, in the conflict in Kosovo and in Kosovo’s road to independence. In many respects, Kosovo remains a US protégé. Apart from being one of the first countries to recognize Kosovo, US administrations (both Republi- can and Democratic) have pledged continuous political, economic and diplomatic support to Kosovo and have been very active in lobbying for more recognitions and membership in international institutions. Some four months after the declaration of independence US president George W. Bush organized an official reception at the White House for Kosovo’s president and prime minister in a move that was aimed at boosting international support for Kosovo (White House 2008). According to the MFA, ‘cultivating close and special relations with the United States of Gëzim Krasniqi 211

America remains a particular priority for Kosovo’s foreign policy, as this relation continues to play a strategic role in maintaining the peace and stability in the country and region’ (2013a). Thus, it is of no surprise that the US remains a central point of reference in Kosovo, and that its politicians constantly refer to the ‘special friendship’ with the US. However, despite the fact that to a large extent Kosovo owes its independence to US political and military support, this ‘special friend- ship’ has another side; namely, Kosovo’s continuous dependence on US support. Apart from the influence that the US exercises in Kosovo’s internal affairs through its embassy in Pristina, US influence stretches into the domain of foreign policy as well. This has resulted in Kosovo’s nascent foreign policy being a ‘compliant foreign policy,’ which is typ- ical for a small state whose actions are in alignment with the desires of the more powerful country and whose decisions are undertaken only after the decision-makers of a more powerful state have exerted their influence (Breuning 2007, 152). Therefore, irrespective of the fact that it seeks to increase the number of countries recognizing its indepen- dence, Kosovo has adopted a very cautious approach towards states that are seen as problematic or anti-American, such as Iran, Syria, North Korea, Venezuela and Cuba. Another case in point is Kosovo’s attitude towards the ‘Arab Spring.’ During the Libyan crisis, Kosovo followed the US and other European governments and recognized the anti-Gaddafi National Transitional Council as the sole governing authority in Libya (The Sofia Echo 2011). Likewise, after intense contacts with the new Libyan and Egyptian administrations, Kosovo was recognized by both countries in 2013. By the same token, Kosovo followed other Western countries in establishing diplomatic contacts with representatives of the Syrian opposition, thus triggering reactions from Russia and Syria, which accused Kosovo of establishing training camps for Syrian rebels (Charbonneau 2012).

Complex relations with the EU, UN, OSCE, CoE and NATO Kosovo’s second pillar in foreign policy is the EU. However, despite the fact that Kosovo hosts the biggest ever EU mission abroad (EULEX), its relations with the EU are highly complicated. As a result of the formal end of Kosovo’s supervision in September 2012, the EU’s presence in Kosovo was reconfigured. Whereas the ICO was shut down and Inter- national Civilian Representative (ICR) responsibilities were transferred to local authorities, EULEX’s mandate was extended until mid-2014 (KIPRED 2013, 9). On the other hand, because only 23 out of 28 EU members recognize Kosovo’s independence, the EU has adopted a ‘status 212 Joint Departure – Different Arrivals neutral’ approach towards Kosovo. This has so far prevented Kosovo from establishing contractual relations with the EU that are akin to the other states in the Western Balkans. Although European integra- tion remains one of the main priorities of Kosovo, and irrespective of the fact that one of the main aims of the EU presence in Kosovo is to ‘support Kosovo’s European integration,’ Kosovo lags far behind other countries of the region in the process of integration. Only in March 2012 did the EU launch a feasibility study in Kosovo. Following the landmark agreement between Kosovo and Serbia in April 2013, the European Commission proposed to the Council the authorization of the opening of negotiations on a Stabilization and Association Agree- ment between the EU and Kosovo, a recommendation endorsed by the European Council (2013). Negotiations started in October 2013 and were concluded in May 2014. As regards the issue of visas, too, Kosovo moved closer to an eventual visa liberalization with the EU following, first, the launch of the Structured Dialogue on the Rule of Law with the EU on 30 May 2012 in Brussels and second, the handing over to the Kosovo government of the roadmap for visa liberalization by the European Commissioner for Home Affairs in June 2012 (European Commission 2012). Irrespective of the lack of contractual relations, EU integration remains a major goal and incentive for Kosovo and has strong popular support.3 Thus Kosovo has established extensive contacts and ties with various EU institutions. Kosovo has established diplomatic relations and managed to forge close ties with individual EU members. In addition, the MFA has taken various initiatives to increase communication with the five non-recognizing countries in the EU, in an attempt to gain recognition. As regards the UN, membership in this organization is also paramount, the existence of the UNSC Resolution 1244 and the UNMIK mission remaining an insurmountable barrier for Kosovo in its path towards full UN membership. In a similar vein, Kosovo’s relations with the OSCE and CoE have reached a low point following Kosovo’s decla- ration of independence in 2008. Nonetheless, the OSCE has retained its presence in Kosovo and has continued its monitoring work under the ‘status neutral’ formula. As regards the issue of membership, although 36 out of 56 OSCE member states have recognized Kosovo, the eventual use of veto by Serbia or Russia has discouraged Kosovo’s application. Likewise, since 2010 the Council of Europe has adopted a ‘status neutral’ approach in relation to Kosovo, allowing for direct working contacts with the Kosovo authorities, and more recently the two parties have Gëzim Krasniqi 213 created a joint working group, thus increasing the format of coopera- tion (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Kosovo 2013). Concerning eventual membership, CoE membership procedures require a two-thirds majority instead of a unanimous vote in the Parliamentary Assembly. As 34 out of 47 CoE members recognize Kosovo, its membership in the CoE is more feasible than in any other major international political organization. Last but not least, Kosovo’s membership in NATO remains one of the strategic foreign policy goals. Nevertheless, although NATO remains the main security guarantor of Kosovo, with some 5,000 troops on the ground, and it is engaged in the training of the new Kosovo Security Force, Kosovo membership in NATO will probably be postponed until all the member states recognize its independence.

Regional allies – Albania and Turkey Kosovo’s main partner states in the region are Albania (seen as the kin-state by many Kosovar Albanians) and Turkey. Albania has played a crucial role in Kosovo during the conflict (both in terms of provid- ing shelter for Kosovo refugees and providing political support for the Kosovo Albanian political and military movements), as well as after the war in Kosovo. Soon after the declaration of independence of Kosovo, Albania extended full diplomatic recognition to Kosovo and has been an important voice for Kosovo in international fora and organizations. Both countries have increased the level of cooperation in the fields of diplomacy, economy, culture and sports. In January 2012, the two coun- tries reached an agreement (the 75th agreement that Albania has signed with Kosovo since 2008), which allows for Albania to help Kosovo with diplomatic representation in those countries where the Kosovo diplo- macy is not yet present (Top Channel 2012). Common ethnic and cultural ties, as well as joint political interests, make Albania Kosovo’s natural ally. Similarly, the existence of multilevel ties – historic, political, religious and personal – between Kosovo Albanians and Turkey makes the lat- ter an important actor and ally. Turkey has increased its diplomatic and cultural presence in Kosovo since 1999 and was one of the first coun- tries in the world to recognize Kosovo’s independence. Turkey is giving a substantial contribution especially towards the consolidation of the state of Kosovo internationally, both through diplomacy and by offer- ing expertise and training to Kosovo’s new institutions. Statesmen from both states have exchanged innumerable visits in recent years and both countries have signed a number of bilateral agreements. Albanians see Turkey as their traditional ally and an ally of the West, above all of 214 Joint Departure – Different Arrivals the US, making Turkey a ‘trustworthy’ partner of Kosovo Albanians in their efforts to create a modern European state and identity (Krasniqi 2011, 200).

Kosovo’s relations with the former Yugoslav republics Kosovo’s relations with the other former Yugoslav republics are of par- ticular importance. Of the six former Yugoslav republics, Kosovo has established very good relations with three of them (Slovenia, Croatia and Macedonia), solid relations with one (Montenegro) and lacks for- mal relations with the remaining two countries (Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina), which refuse to recognize Kosovo’s independence. Slovenia and Croatia were the first former Yugoslav republics to rec- ognize Kosovo’s declaration of independence, on 5 and 19 March 2008 respectively. This paved the way for these two countries to establish diplomatic ties with Kosovo and deepen their bilateral relations. Being an EU member and having had the EU presidency in the first six months of 2008, Slovenia played an important role in the process of coordina- tion between various international actors at the time of the declaration of independence. In addition, both Slovenia and Croatia have supported Kosovo’s position at the ICJ. Despite the fact that Macedonia and Montenegro haveaconsid- erable number of Albanians in their territories who maintain close cultural and economic ties with Kosovo, it took a while – until Novem- ber 2008 – for them to decide on the issue of recognition. This was a particularly sensitive issue in Montenegro, which has a large Serb community and still had several unresolved issues with Serbia. Nev- ertheless, Kosovo’s relations with Macedonia reached a high point in October 2009, when both countries agreed to establish full diplomatic relations after solving a border disagreement over a territory of some 300 hectares (EurActiv 2009). The 500,000 ethnic Albanians in Macedonia and mutual economic interests and dependence impose closer ties and strategic partnership between Kosovo and Macedonia. Equally, as regards Montenegro-Kosovo relations, they have gradually intensified in many areas. However, both countries have yet to exchange ambas- sadors, an issue that seems to be dependent on the border demarcation, Kosovo refugees in Montenegro and the position of the Montenegrin minority in Kosovo. Bosnia and Herzegovina and Serbia remain the only ex-Yugoslav and regional countries that do not recognize Kosovo’s independence. While Bosnia’s refusal to recognize Kosovo is mostly conditioned by the Serb politicians in Republika Srpska, Kosovo’s relations with Serbia Gëzim Krasniqi 215 are very complex and often tense. To begin with, Serbia treats Kosovo as part of its territory and has made it clear that it does not intend to recognize Kosovo’s independence. Moreover, since 2008 it has chal- lenged Kosovo’s independence both internally and externally. At the external level, it has brought the issue of the legality of the decla- ration of independence of Kosovo before the ICJ. Internally, it has attempted to maintain and even enhance its control over the local Serbs in Kosovo, most notably in the northern part of Kosovo. Nonetheless, following the April 2013 Agreement with Kosovo, Serbia has agreed to shut down its political, security and judicial institutions in Kosovo to pave the way for the creation of new Serb-dominated institutions as part of the Kosovo system. A landmark development in the implemen- tation of this agreement is the November/December 2013 elections – the first to be organized throughout the territory of Kosovo – that resulted in the election of new Serb mayors and local councils on ten Serb-dominated municipalities in Kosovo, thus paving the way for the creation of the Association/Community of the Serb Municipalities in Kosovo (Peci 2013).

Public opinion and foreign policy

Public opinion plays an important role in foreign policy formation and activity. In the case of Kosovo, the public has mostly been informed about and interested in the issue of recognition. However, when it comes to Kosovo’s foreign policy orientation, religion has emerged as one of the most contentious issues in public opinion. Religion influ- ences Kosovo’s foreign policy orientation in a very unusual manner. Suffering from an unexplainable complex of inferiority and driven by the need to align their country with the ‘free and democratic world,’ Kosovar leaders have been wary of any tendency to bring Islam into the political space (Krasniqi 2011). Most striking is that Kosovar leaders uti- lize and politicize the religion of the minority, that is Catholicism, and undermine Islam, the religion of the majority, in order to demonstrate Kosovo’s ‘Western orientation.’ In line with this strategy, in the immediate aftermath of the declara- tion of independence, Kosovo’s leaders have shown signs of hesitation in establishing closer ties with predominantly Muslim states, especially those in the Gulf. Though being in desperate need of recognition by more states, Kosovo has been reluctant to approach member states of the Organization of the Islamic Conference and those of the Arab League. It would not be an exaggeration to say that this reluctance is 216 Joint Departure – Different Arrivals rooted in the fear of being labeled a ‘Muslim state.’ However, in an unusual move, the Kosovar government has decided to appoint the former Mufti of Kosovo, Rexhep Boja, as its chargé d’affaires and later ambassador in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. This might be an indication that the government is actually aware of the influence of Kosovo’s religious leaders in the ‘Muslim world,’ and tends to use this influence for imme- diate political gains. Nonetheless, despite dissenting voices, Kosovo’s population is one of the most pro-American and pro-EU in the whole region.

Conclusion

More than five years since the declaration of independence and the initiation of the process of building independent foreign policy insti- tutional mechanisms, various legal, institutional, political and material constraints have hindered Kosovo’s efforts to establish a fully fledged and independent foreign policy. The first major challenge is its obscure international legal status. The declaration of independence without approval from either Serbia or the UNSC has resulted in a limited num- ber of recognitions of Kosovo’s independence. This prevents Kosovo from joining major international political organizations. The second major challenge, closely related to the first, is that of external representation. Kosovo’s international legal obscurity has cre- ated confusion and duality in foreign policy representation. On the one hand there is the state of Serbia that claims exclusive competen- cies over the issue of international representation of Kosovo, and on the other hand is UNMIK that challenges Kosovo’s right to speak for itself internationally. Although the recent agreements on Kosovo’s regional representation allows Kosovo to be represented at various regional fora without UNMIK representatives, the latter still continues to represent Kosovo at UNSC meetings. Third, the lack of full internal sovereignty and dependence on exter- nal actors, above all the US and the EU, has various negative conse- quences on Kosovo’s functioning as a state and its foreign policy. On the one side, the persisting problem of the northern part of Kosovo and Kosovo’s lack of control over the entire territory ranks Kosovo in line with other frozen conflicts and disputed territories elsewhere. On the other hand, Kosovo’s dependence on the US and the EU, and its sub- sequent compliance in the field of foreign policy, risks the forging of a negative image – that of a ‘satellite’ or ‘client’ state – for Kosovo in international relations. Gëzim Krasniqi 217

In sum, being in a state of international legal obscurity and con- testation, Kosovo’s path to full international subjectivity is inherently linked to the issue of recognition and membership of international organizations. Therefore, in such cases, foreign policy gains a dual capacity, serving both as a tool of state-building and as a statehood pre- rogative. Nonetheless, as the case of Kosovo shows, regardless of the agency, in the case of contested polities, limited international subjectiv- ity means limited presence in international relations and limited access to international organizations.

Notes

1. Ibrahim Rugova was the main political leader of the Kosovar Albanians in the 1990s. He was president of the main Albanian political party – the Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK) – and also was elected President of the Republic of Kosovo in the internationally unrecognized elections in 1992 and 1998. 2. A member of LDK, Bukoshi led the Kosovar government in exile and held the position of minister of foreign affairs at the same time (Hockenos 2003, 188–189). 3. According to a survey from 2012, if there were a referendum on joining the EU tomorrow, 73 per cent of respondents would vote ‘yes,’ 10 per cent would vote ‘against,’ while 8 per cent would remain ‘neutral.’ Considering ethnic variations, whereas 90 per cent of Albanians would vote ‘yes,’ only 30 per cent of Serbs and 55 per cent of members of other communities would do the same (EU Perspective in Kosovo 2012).

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Constitution of the Republic of Kosovo, 15 June 2008. http://www.assembly -kosova.org/common/docs/Constitution1%20of%20the%20Republic%20of% 20Kosovo.pdf (accessed 16 October 2014). EU Perspective in Kosovo. ‘Survey of Awareness of the EU and European Inte- gration Among Kosovo Residents.’ European Union. 2012. http://eeas.europa .eu/delegations/kosovo/documents/press_corner/eupk_survey_report_2012. pdf (accessed 18 March 2014). EurActiv. ‘EU Hails Macedonia and Kosovo for Solving Border Quarrel.’ EurActiv. 19 October 2009. http://www.euractiv.com/europes-east/eu-hails-macedonia -kosovo-solving-border-quarrel-news-222860 (accessed 18 March 2014). European Commission. ‘Press Release: Commission Delivers Visa Roadmap to Kosovo Government.’ European Commission. 14 June 2012. http://europa.eu/ rapid/press-release_IP-12-605_en.htm (accessed 18 March 2014). European Council. ‘Conclusion.’ European Council. 28 June 2013. http:// register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/13/st00/st00104-re02.en13.pdf (accessed 18 March 2014). Geldenhuys, D. Contested States in World Politics. London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009. Government of the Republic of Kosovo. ‘Program of the Government of Republic of Kosovo 2008–2011.’ The Government of the Republic of Kosovo. April 2008. http://www.kryeministri-ks.net/repository/docs/951_PMO _Programi_Qeveritar-ENG.pdf (accessed 18 March 2014). Grant, T. The Recognition of States: Law and Practice in Debate and Evolution. Westport: Praeger, 1999. Hill, C. The Changing Politics of Foreign Policy. London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003. Hockenos, P. Homeland Calling. Exile Patriotism and the Balkan Wars. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2003. ICJ. Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence in Respect of Kosovo. Advisory Opinion of 22 July 2010, The Hague: International Court of Justice, 2010. Indeksonline. ‘Qeveria miraton strategjinë për njohje [Government Approves Strategy for Recognition].’ Indeksonline. 8 June 2011. http://www.indeksonline .net/?FaqeID=2&LajmID=3230 (accessed 18 March 2014). Keating, J. ‘How to Start Your Own Country in Four Easy Steps.’ Foreign Policy. 26 February 2008. http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2008/02/25/how_to _start_your_own_country_in_four_easy_steps (accessed 18 March 2014). KIPRED. Kosovo’s Foreign Policy: Strategic Factors, Objectives and Challenges. Pristina: Kosovar Institute for Policy Research and Development, 2007. ———. The Implementation of Agreements of Kosovo-Serbia Political Dialogue. Pol- icy Paper No. 4 (13), Pristina: Kosovar Institute for Policy Research and Development, 2013. Knoll, B. ‘From Benchmarking to Final Status? Kosovo and The Problem of an International Administration’s Open-Ended Mandate.’ The European Journal of International Law, 16 (4), 2005: 637–660. Kosovo Assembly. Law No. 03/L-122. Pristina: Kosovo Assembly, 2008a. ———. Law No. 03/L-125. Pristina: Kosovo Assembly, 2008b. KPJ. 1 Vit i Politikes se Jashtme te Kosoves. Raport Ekzekutiv [1 Year of Kosovo Foreign Policy]. Pristina: Klubi për Politikë të Jashtme [Club for Foreign Policy], 2008. Gëzim Krasniqi 219

Krasniqi, G. ‘The “Forbidden Fruit”: Islam and Politics of Identity in Kosovo and Macedonia.’ Southeast European and Black Sea Studies, 11 (2), 2011: 191–207. Kubálková, V. ‘Foreign Policy, International Politics, and Constructivism.’ In For- eign Policy in a Constructed World, by V. Kubálková, 15–37. Armonk: M.E. Sharpe, 2001. Lehne, S. ‘Kosovo and Serbia: Towards a Normal Relationship.’ Carnegie Endow- ment for International Peace. 2012. http://www.carnegieendowmant.org/files/ Kosovo_and_Serbia.pdf (accessed 18 March 2014). Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Kosovo. ‘Mission of Foreign Policy.’ Ministry of For- eign Affairs of the Republic of Kosovo. n.d. www.mfa-ks.net (accessed 18 March 2014). ———. ‘Public Diplomacy: A Three Party Project for Improving Kosovo’s Public Diplomacy.’ Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Kosovo. 24 June 2011. http://www.mfa-ks.net/?page=2,128 (accessed 18 March 2014). ———. ‘First Meeting of the Kosovo-Council of Europe Working Group.’ Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Kosovo. 18 November 2013. http://www.mfa -ks.net/?page=2,4,1952 (accessed 18 March 2014). Montevideo Convention. ‘Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States.’ Montevideo, 26 December 1933. Owtram, F. ‘The Foreign Policies of Unrecognized States.’ In Unrecognized States in the International System, by N. Caspersen and G. Stansfield, 128–143. London: Routledge, 2011. Peci, E. ‘Kosovo Run-Off Polls Produce Dramatic Changes.’ Balkan Insight. 2 December 2013. http://www.balkaninsight.com/ (accessed 18 March 2014). Ross, C. Independent Diplomat: Dispatches from an Unaccountable Elite. London: Hurst and Company, 2007. SETimes. ‘Kosovo Appoints First Diplomatic Envoys.’ SETimes. 3 September 2008. http://www.setimes.com/cocoon/setimes/xhtml/en_GB/features/setimes/ newsbriefs/2008/09/03/nb-05 (accessed March 2018, 2014). Shkullaku, A. ‘Hyseni – Pacolli, një garë pa fitues [Hyseni – Pacolli, a Race with no Winners].’ Gazeta Express. 15 April 2010. http://www.gazetaexpress.com/?cid =1,877,28770 (accessed 18 March 2014). Thaçi, H. ‘To Kosovans, Blair Is a True Hero.’ The Guardian. 2 September 2010. http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2010/sep/02/kosovans-blair -true-hero (accessed 18 March 2014). The Sofia Echo. ‘Kosovo Recognises National Transitional Council as Govern- ment of Libya.’ The Sofia Echo. 28 August 2011. http://sofiaecho.com/2011/08/ 28/1145968_kosovo-recognises-national-transitional-council-as-government -of-libya (accessed 18 March 2014). Top Channel. ‘Kosovo Albania Diplomatic Services Merge.’ Top Channel. 13 January 2012. http://www.top-channel.tv/english/artikull.php?id=4379 (accessed 18 March 2014). UN. ‘General Assembly Resolution 64/298.’ New York: United Nations General Assembly, 9 September 2010. Wählisch, M., and B. Xharra. Public Diplomacy of Kosovo: Status Quo, Challenges and Options. Pristina: Friedrich-Ebert Foundation, 2010. 220 Joint Departure – Different Arrivals

Weller, M. Contested Statehood: Kosovo’s Struggle for Independence. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009. White House. ‘President Bush Meets with President Sejdiu and Prime Minister Thaci of the Republic of Kosovo.’ The White House. 21 July 2008. http:// georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2008/07/20080721-3 .html (accessed 18 March 2014). Part V On Empirical Arrivals and Theoretical Departures This page intentionally left blank 10 Conclusion: Foreign Policy Analysis and the Post-Yugoslav States1 Amelia Hadfield

Introduction

History, it may be argued, has been unkind to some states and down- right vicious to others. Few regions – ancient or modern – are home to the combustible mix of divergent geographic, ethnic, religious and tribal allegiances as the Balkans. Fewer still have undergone the transi- tion from rabid internecine strife to nascent democratic legitimization, as have the post-Yugoslav states of the Balkan region. Equally, contemporary history has been unkind in producing some spectacularly bad examples of external assistance to halt or prevent Balkan warfare, by way of intervention, conflict prevention and recon- struction. No serious external assistance was offered to impede or redirect Montenegro, Bulgaria, Greece and Serbia from invading Albania and overthrowing the remnants of Ottoman rule in the First or Sec- ond Balkan Wars of 1912–1913. Fueled by local constructions of amity and enmity, catalyzed by the nationalist sentiments overrunning all of Europe and mobilized from ‘political act’ to ‘political instruments’ (von Clausewitz 1982), the Balkan Wars were inexorably drawn in, if indeed not a direct catalyst of, the First World War. Almost a century later, lit- tle was done when, in the 1990s, the region spiraled into national and then subnational internecine strife of an ethnic and religious nature. Nowhere was the stalemate of the Cold War replaced by ‘the return of history’ more potently than in the post-Yugoslav states, where ‘national memories and old hatreds resurfaced’ (Mazower 1998, 396). Attempts to stop the carnage were either lackluster and thus ineffective, or illegal, tardy and effective enough to require the wholesale reconstruction of an entire region.

223 224 On Empirical Arrivals and Theoretical Departures

And yet the region has survived. The post-Yugoslav states – indi- vidually and collectively – remain both a geopolitical challenge, and a foreign policy vade mecum: instructive in the lessons subsequently taught about religious conflict, internecine ethnic strife and attempts by external powers to restore a neutral order on the basis of acceptable, recognizable civic norms and the underlying value of tolerance. These are the same lessons that have yet to be properly learned – given some striking similarities in their profiles – in Syria, Libya, Iraq and the Sahel. As such, both the region and its seven republics present foreign pol- icy analysts with a series of conundrums. Four questions in this respect are of key interest in examining both the broad contours of interna- tional relations, and the foreign policy specificities of each state: (1) the instructive transitions between war and peace in the region; (2) the quality of the political, social, economic and cultural transformations effected in some states; (3) the catalysts driving these changes; and (4) the nature of resistance to any significant alterations. While the benchmark for regional transformation has itself moved from rudimen- tary societal security of the mid-1990s to full-blown EU membership as early as 2004, the region continues to exemplify a surprisingly wide range of different roles. In the most basic of foreign policy categories – broad state profiles – there are determined leaders and visible laggards. As suggested by Keil and Stahl in the Introduction, the foreign pol- icy of states does not always move in accordance with its post-crisis transformation. Kosovo, despite considerable problems, including atten- uated sovereignty, remains a formidably well-identified international actor, with a clear sense of its foreign policy priorities, as demonstrated by Krasniqi in Chapter 9.2 Serbia on the other hand, as illustrated by Mladenov (see Chapter 6), has hardly moved from its former pariah status, remaining mired in the past, witnessing only ‘modest improve- ments’ regarding its strategic depth, and consequently its international image. Equally, the states of the region share key common features: a legacy of war and reconstruction; the ethos and conditionality of the Stabilization and Association Agreements (and subsequent acces- sion packages) that have structured much of their post-1990s relations with the EU as their ‘primary regional patron,’ and divided attitudes over their shared ‘secondary regional patrons,’ Russia, the USA and, increasingly, China. This concluding chapter attempts to make both a general interdis- ciplinary point and a number of specific observations drawn from an interface of Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA) and International Relations (IR) theory. The broad point is that any decent foreign policy analysis Amelia Hadfield 225 suffers an embarras de richesses arising from the genealogical fruitfulness of FPA itself. FPA, with its long but chronically discontinuous her- itage, divided between American behavioral approaches, doggedly (even dogmatically) underwritten by a dedication to quantitative method- ologies and European historical and qualitative preferences, has long been entirely capable of rendering FPA that draws upon any dimen- sion or subfield of the social or political sciences. The sum total is a fascinating, if discontinuous, canon in which econometrics vies for explanatory power alongside geopolitics; where the ever-expanding sta- ble of IR theories attempts to thwart traditional historical enquiry; and where pre-theories are resuscitated whilst marginalized newcomers fall from grace.3 The chapters in this text are therefore broadly ‘European’ in their approach, and utilize a combination of de- and reconstruction of historical events, blending ‘old school’ FPA approaches of decision- making, psychological dimensions and comparative aspects with newer methodologies that discern actorness across macro, meso and micro levels of analysis. This chapter incorporates that same commitment to establishing a geopolitical basis, before moving on to suggest a variety of traditional FPA responses, in order to conclude with specific IR theory- based interpretations of the tortuous process by which the Balkan region has epitomized both the very worst, and the very best, of European diplomacy.

History and geopolitics: A region divided

Geography has contributed significantly to the region’s multifarious identities. As a land corridor joining Mediterranean, Dalmatian, Aegean and Black Sea cultures, the Balkans is both a crossroad of cultures and a crucible of the intersecting geopolitical influences. Imperial annexations explain the make-up of the region and its difficulties in achieving a sin- gular political perspective more precisely. From Roman times onward, the area has operated as a juncture of Latin and Greek civilizations, Orthodox and Catholic Christianity, and Islam and pagan beliefs. Impe- rial conquest therefore, whether Roman, religious or Soviet, has had the same effect of providing a temporary method of gathering the region into an uneasy generic Balkan category. However, while empire after empire has left its stamp upon the region, the host of separate, desper- ately incommensurate cultures left behind, alongside an iterative legacy of irrepressible political ambitions has turned both the risk of instabil- ity, and the threat of war, into a virtual guarantee of both, on countless occasions (Glenny 2012). 226 On Empirical Arrivals and Theoretical Departures

The area – in foreign policy terms – is a tranche, or slice, connected to, or perhaps the conduit to, other key heartlands. Embracing Greece and Turkey as well as the peninsula, the Romans colonized a broad area of South-East Europe, governed via Latin but with a decidedly Greek influence. The next batch of arrivals – Bulgars and Slavs – was assimilated into the split personality of Romanized Hellenic culture. The emergent Bulgarian Empire, of which the Balkans was a strategic spur, played host to its own series of east-west wars between the flagging Byzantine Roman Empire and the ‘local’ Serbian Empire. This deferred to the most powerful and long-standing imperial force of the region, the Ottoman Empire, which became the primary ‘other’ to the assorted types of Balkan ‘selves,’ with local military and political heroes gain- ing iconic status for their resistance to the Ottomans along the lines of contemporary national compositions. European great powers vied with the Ottomans in various theatres, including the Balkans; the ebb and flow and ultimate erosion of Ottoman power during the 17th and 18th centuries and of the Austro-Hungarian Empire in the 19th century grad- ually left the region both politically and economically isolated (Mazower 2002). Geographically removed, culturally dissimilar from the heart of imperial power bases, and persistently at arm’s length from European foreign policy attention, the majority of Balkan states transformed from imperial outposts to emerge as autonomous units by the early 20th century. Two trends are visible from this brief history. First, the dominance of imperial structures determining both the internal composition and the region’s external attitude, which has underwritten the inevitable series of regional conflagrations. Second, the peak and trough pattern of internal turbulence that inevitably follows as a response to, or in the wake of, imperial collapse. The First Balkan War of 1912–1913 thus united Serbia, Bulgaria, Montenegro and Greece, and sounded the first death knell for the Ottoman Empire (creating Albania in the process); it then swiftly triggered local animosity between Bulgaria, Greece and Serbia, viewed by great European powers as an available neighborhood. Serbian-Bosnian antagonism was consequently a primary cause of the First World War, with Serbia squaring off against Bulgaria and the Cen- tral Powers. As Tharoor points out, the foreign policy dynamics are both fascinating and horrifying, as ‘newly independent states in Bulgaria, Greece and Serbia – at times, egged on, at others, reined in by imperial powers like Russia, Austria-Hungary, Germany and the U.K., who were all jockeying for supremacy – were now possessed by their own fan- tasies of creating a Greater Serbia or Greater Bulgaria’ (Tharoor 2012). Internal centripetal strengths vied against regional centrifugal forces, Amelia Hadfield 227 newly national agendas competed against the territorial entitlements assumed by early 20th-century Great Powers: a formula that repeated itself during the Second World War. After a variety of interregional clashes – including a coup within the Royal Yugoslav family – saw the initially neutral Yugoslav government shift to the Allied side, the Greek invasion of Albania prompted Germany to invade Yugoslavia. Although Nazi Germany initially operated as an attractive external imperial ban- ner by which to promote temporary regional cohesion, such attempts swiftly unraveled, resulting in separate Serbian and Croatian factions. Internal stability was again achieved under the aegis of Communism, enforced by the Cold War and manned in robust foreign policy terms by Marshal Josip Tito. Via skillful deployment of nonalignment policy, Tito managed to effect both a pragmatic extraction of Yugoslavia from the fundamentalist doctrines of Communist Russia, and link the area more robustly than ever before to the West, constructing in the process a ‘multivectoral foreign policy,’ as described by Boeckh in Chapter 2. Canny negotiating saw Tito play off the USSR against the US, rais- ing both Soviet loans and Western credit and trade agreements to rebuild the region and consolidate his own brand of socialism. Nat- urally, Britain and the US regarded Tito’s growing independence as well suited to their own foreign policy of undermining the Soviet bloc from within, promoting a possible breakaway of other Eastern European states. The after-effects of Communism’s dissolution were swift in nature, and comprehensive in scope. Mazower’s tripartite explanation for the structural shifts that transformed the region from a self-contained col- lective with a multivectoral foreign policy, to a radically undone series of warring republics with no effective foreign presence, is particularly instructive:

The fall of communism underlined nationalism’s disruptive potential for several reasons. First, liberation from communism was often seen in the context of demands for national independence [ ...] Second, the old mechanisms for smoothing minorities disputes inside the Warsaw Pact, already badly worn out, no longer operated after 1989. Third, the greater ease of access to Eastern Europe for Westerners meant a harsher light now shone on xenophobia and racism in the region. [ ...] It was, of course, the bloody disintegration of Yugoslavia which set nationalism centre stage – the one case where the failure of communism had devastating consequences (and showed what Russia had escaped). (1998, 396–398) 228 On Empirical Arrivals and Theoretical Departures

The removal of the Communist meta-governance structure swiftly prompted hostilities driven by majoritarian national allegiances and Serb minorities. Thus, Slovenia – lacking any sizeable Serb minority – broke away in 1991 with little strife; while Croatia and Bosnia struggled to secede from the Yugoslav federation as a result of fierce Serb minor- ity opposition. Far more single-minded than Tito in instrumentalizing national sentiments for political solidarity, Miloševic´ drew deliberately upon the galvanizing sentiments of sectarian ethnic identity to ensure that ‘nationalism, self-obsession and the regime’s lock on the media minimized Serbian opposition to the war itself’ (Mazower 1998, 398). The result was ethnic warfare mostly pitched between Serbia and Bosnia, which produced protracted and bitter fighting that first required UN intervention, and subsequently (in 1995 and 1999), NATO ground and air action against Serb forces in Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina. Vir- tually no area was left untouched, with death tolls numbering in the tens of thousands. The implicit Serbian foreign policy, initially based on garnering support, non-interference and even reliable degrees of apathy from European and American audiences, gradually eroded when initial mil- itary superiority gave way by 1995, and Serb defeat saw the balance of power shift towards the Bosnians and Croats. This in turn confirmed the paradox of a liberal state composition emerging from a war with geopolitical tipping points and fought largely in realist terms. Although not fully understood at the time, the defeat was twofold. The concept of European political apartheid was finally damned. Yet all future for- eign policy would be afflicted by the first post-Cold War example in which the newly reconstituted West ‘which failed to meet the first seri- ous challenge to liberal values after the Cold War [ ...] chose realpolitik over the protection of rights and the prevention of genocide’; and – prophetic of subsequent interventions in Iraq and North Africa – ren- dered ‘worse {when] even its realpolitik was a failure’ (Mazower 1998, 399). In a region in desperate need of a credible template, NATO’s 1999 bombing, under US leadership had set a singularly poor example. Acting in the absence of the UN Security Council’s explicit authorization, the moral weight of ‘a group of states [who] had explicitly justified war in the name of protecting a minority within another state’ ironically con- tributed to a war that ‘was significantly undermined by its illegality,’ in eyes both local and international. The gap between ‘legality and legit- imacy’ has consequently remained a problematic trademark of many post-Yugoslav public and foreign policies (Cunliffe 2007, 42). The key positive that Kosovo continues to represent is of course the philosophy Amelia Hadfield 229 of R2P, or Responsibility to Protect: a foreign policy in the form of col- lective effort by a given portion of the international community, who substitute the ambiguity of legitimacy for the demands of responsibil- ity in the face of a state that patently fails to do so (UN 2005, para. 138–140). While nascent in some respects, R2P-invoked responses to Kosovo were ultimately strong enough to overleap the UN (procedurally deadlocked despite the laudability of its substance) (Chandler 2004, 72). They were also strong enough to recalibrate the regional foreign policy of the EU from one of ignorance and apathy to wholesale dedication to regional transformation. After NATO involvement in 1995, and again in 1999, political upheaval replaced rabid violence, reaching its zenith in 2008 when – under UN administration – Kosovo peaceably declared independence from Serbia. For foreign policy analysts, the question is one of spotting durable, even axiomatic dynamics, , distinguished against a backdrop of fast-paced transformation. The 1995 defeat of Serbia demonstrated in practical terms that the EU, for example, while emblematic of con- tinental transformation, had not itself come of age as a security actor; that key EU member states such as Britain and France would continue to operate bilaterally in determining their national interest, whether with the EU, or the UN and NATO, and the EU would for at least another generation regard the Balkans as an irksome ‘backyard.’4 The EU has come of age as a formidable integrationist actor; whose foreign policy of enlargement has proved strong enough a catalyst to engender gen- uine and institutionalized post-crisis transformation across the region. Less irksome, but still unpredictable, the region is now regarded as agree- ably more ‘European’ than during its Communist or nationalist seasons, but still arguably a southeastern annex than a formidable new southern flank. The irony is that the states that generally support the Balkans in terms of political association with the EU tend also to be the least willing to work in a viably multilateral way with their EU counterparts. Other changes are visible. International governance, for instance, has left its mark: from the peace-keeping and regional administration of the UN, to the role of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) declar- ing legal Kosovan independence; from the role of the International Criminal Tribunal’s prosecution of Serbian president Slobodan Miloše- vic,´ to NATO missions, and ‘handover’ mechanics to EU ESDP ops, and the EU’s own Stability and Association Agreements and pre-accession structures of the EU. EU membership has proved a considerable attrac- tion, pulling in five states of the greater Balkan region: Greece (1981), Slovenia (2004), Romania and Bulgaria (2007) and Croatia (2013), and 230 On Empirical Arrivals and Theoretical Departures gradually replacing the regional power vacuum with the supranational promise of EU accession for most if not all of the seven post-Yugoslav republics. Whether this is the final imperial bookend to the cycle of stability and strife, or whether ongoing animosity between Serbia and Bosnia (over the Drina river), between Croatia and Bosnia (regarding maritime access), between Slovenia and Croatia (over Pirin Bay and aspects of the Adriatic Sea), or more likely, between Kosovo and Serbia (inter alia) will flare up remains to be seen. In broad terms, the area represents a series of identities, from the backyard of Europe, to a proxy province for ideological battles with socioeconomic consequences, to a laboratory for crisis management or even a showcase for the transformational effects of soft power. In an area already torn between primordial attachments intermittently drawn upon in the cause of war, and then subsequently neutralized in the cause of peace, one must enquire as to the approaches and benefits of the ‘for- eign policy revisionism’ practiced by the UN, NATO and now the EU. The area progresses towards peace, to be sure, but never convincingly institutes its progress or socializes its post-conflict peace. More often than not, the area seems to suffer from a paradoxical mix of being a site of pilgrimage – in which key sites and identities are still held in deep reverence – and a site of profound political isolation, deliberately held at arm’s length from all key power centers, owing to its sheer tendency to instability. The region thus continues to suffer from a plethora of polit- ical identities: post-Yugoslav but pre-EU, South-East Europe in terms of cooperation and stability but with an extended Black Sea identity.5 A decent grasp of political history brings us a good way in ascertaining the maelstrom of war and periods of peace that have marked the region. Why therefore invoke political science, and indeed the use of given the- ories, to tighten our grasp on the foreign policy of the region? Simply put, because an understanding of the Balkans as somehow irredeemably associated with the cycle of internal war and externally mandated peace is simply not good enough. Quite apart from the disservice done to the terrain itself, such attitudes perpetuate a range of unchallenged assumptions inherent in much Cold War sociopolitical theorizing, the most famous being Carl Pletsch’s ‘Three Worlds’ analysis. Here, based on a tradition-modernity spectrum, political science was best disposed to analyze developed, industrialized first worlds via rationalism; area studies could tackle the distorted market and political structures of Communist provinces; whilst anthropologists alone could tackle the ramshackle Balkan wilds so persistently overrun by ethnic, religious and tribal sentiments (Pletsch 1981). Amelia Hadfield 231

Mazower pithily deconstructs the alleged primordial and homoge- neous qualities of ethnic, religious and tribal identities and their causal role in strife, debunking in the process the intellectual arrogance of approaches that fail to deploy the whole explanatory arsenal available to political and social science (1997). The problem now indeed is choos- ing the appropriate approach; chiefly because ‘the sheer range of ideas, issues and theoretical approaches that have battered down the walls of a previously isolated and self-contained discipline is truly dizzying’ (Bickerton, Cunliffe and Gourevitch 2007, 3).

Theory and foreign policy

Astutely combining theory, history and policy-making, the previous chapters have thrown light on the motivations and methods that have produced such a wide range of foreign policies amongst the post- Yugoslav states. Its approach is particularly instructive in terms of exploring the symbiosis between theory and policy. As John Vincent first argued, in getting to the heart of any decent analysis, theory and policy should be understood as:

[ ...] two sides of the same coin in that they both represent a priori outlines which can then be tested empirically, in the first case against something called ‘truth’ and in the second against political practice. Some academics and policy-makers have a joint interest in broad out- lines, while others form an alliance over their concern for detail. The central distinction becomes that between theory (policy) and practice (experience), a distinction akin to that between values and facts. (1994, 29)

The case study/practice distinction is a perfectly workable structure by which to deconstruct the motivating inputs and behavioral outputs of the foreign policies of the post-Yugoslav states. This is particularly help- ful when sketching out the four overarching questions posed at the outset: 1) the tipping points of war and peace in which entire states and national communities alternate between amity and enmity, for exam- ple, are best mapped out against a geopolitical background, with the assistance of historical approaches, and a rudimentary use of pre-theory to get a grasp upon the major actors and dynamics. Even before IR theory itself can be used to identify the behavior of key groups and particular attitudes, working categories using top- down or bottom-up approaches are immensely useful in simply figuring 232 On Empirical Arrivals and Theoretical Departures out whether (2) given political, economic or sociocultural patterns are broadly recurrent in a given group across a particular period, or whether they are arguably specific. Hence the suggestion below of deductive and inductive tools can then complement the introduction of specific real- ist or liberal, constructivist or neo-institutional perspectives in getting to grips with (3) the causes, catalysts and consequences of foreign pol- icy attitudes on a state-by-state basis and (4) the motivations behind resistant attitudes. As charted in this section and the next, scholars have to move from the widest possible palette of geopolitical shifts to a refined focus upon the specific actions of a given group attitude (in this case foreign pol- icy) and its particularistic inputs and outputs. With a geopolitical and historical foundation in place (as above), and before committing to (for example) IR theory-informed FPA, a number of other approaches should be considered.

• James Rosenau’s ‘pre-theory’ of foreign policy (Starr 1988) in which the analysis of foreign policy outputs needs to define and explain the interrelations between five cardinal sources (or levels of analysis). The ‘Orpheus syndrome’ plaguing Serbian foreign pol- icy, as described by Mladenov, is broken down into the individual level (attributes and attitudes of Miloševic);´ role (characterizations derived from his foreign policy-making responsibilities: individual or collective); governmental (the conditions faced by the Serbian nationalist administration between 1991 and 1995, and the impact this had on constraining or enabling foreign policy choices); societal (socioeconomic and/or cultural conditions of the state at the time, particularly dominant Serbian value orientations); systemic (vari- ables derived from the international environment, including the role of the EU, NATO and the US itself that impacted Serbian foreign decision-making); • Top-down (deductive) versus bottom-up (inductive) approaches traditionally utilized across social and political sciences. When com- bined with investigating a given aspect of foreign policy this is respec- tively augmented by incorporating nomothetic (general, recurrent) patterns, for example the broadly recurrent features of identity- driven differentiation seen in the foreign policy of all post-Yugoslav states, set against the ideographic (particular, case study-specific) examples in which the specific tri-ethnic set-up of Bosnian identity, as described by Huskic´ in Chapter 6, is deconstructed for what dis- tinguishes it against other forms of regional self-reference. As argued Amelia Hadfield 233

above, and elsewhere,6 this is particularly helpful in decoupling the maddening series of generic-genetic dyads that plague the foreign policy compositions of post-Yugoslav states during and after their period of strife; • FPA Decision-Making: within FPA, the nomothetic-ideographic dyad is realized through actor-general versus actor-specific approaches (qua George and Bennett 2005). As illustrated below, the explana- tory variables of realism and liberalism (as well as geopolitics) are well suited to capture the systemic, macro-based conditions that produce specific foreign policy behaviors. Actor-specific approaches, however, are ideographically distinguished with their commitment to the decision-makers themselves, seen for example in Huskic’s´ investigation of state and sub-state actors in Bosnian foreign pol- icy (e.g. the Presidency of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Milorad Dodik, leader of the Alliance of Independent Social Democrats and presi- dent of the Republika Srpska). Setting aside philosophical questions of distinguishing questions of agent from agency, FPA decision- making permits enquiry into much that remains causally and con- stitutively unexplored in post-Yugoslav foreign policy: personality studies, group dynamics, bureaucratic structures, institutional pol- itics, because – as noted by Snyder, Bruck and Sapin (1954) – all are intrinsically connected to decision-makers as the most proximate cause of foreign policy.

The conclusions to be reached from this broad overview – and indeed from any economic or cultural equivalent that we attempt to map – are interesting, but fairly ungovernable, both empirically and conceptu- ally, in the absence of IR theory (whatever its US or UK/EU genealogy). In other words, we can get as far as inputs and outputs (still as basic a dyad as any decent foreign policy analysis), or distinguishing direct from indirect, or causal from constitutive effects upon foreign policy, but not much further. Consequently, we need a transmission belt that links a series of axiomatic understandings about key principles of indi- vidual and collective behavior to the generic and genetic inputs7 of each state and its discernible outputs in terms of foreign policy, to be able to identify both patterns, and differences; both commonalities and particularities; both recurring and atypical behavior, both habit- ual attitudes and examples of change; both customary foreign policy practices and the diplomacy of the unexpected. In short, we require IR theory. 234 On Empirical Arrivals and Theoretical Departures

International Relations Theory and Foreign Policy Analysis

Without the grouping mechanics afforded by IR theory in terms of vertical, categorical organization and available horizontal nexuses, we can tackle only a very few of the above-mentioned (and entirely non- exhaustive) foreign policy themes, and struggle, ‘through a glass darkly,’ to gain either empirical purchase or conceptual illumination. The ques- tion therefore is how best to bring IR theory to bear upon FPA in terms of inputs and outputs investigated in the previous chapters? There are a number of ways in which theory can offer an explanation. At its most substantive, theories offer a set of conceptual perspectives and tools by which to understand a given policy problem; providing a world view, or ontology of sorts. Making sense of the moving parts of the system sees theory operate as a vade mecum to policy-making, whether addressed to a broad ‘demos,’ a foreign ministry or a sin- gular statesperson. Conceptually and empirically, IR theory also puts additional data at our disposal in terms of distinguishing between the actor-specific versus actor-general approaches that have typified non-IR FPA, dividing its investigations into rational-actor, deductive approaches that are reconcilable with realism and much of liberalism and structural conventional constructivism, versus psychological-sociological-cultural approaches that typify most of the ideational turn at the heart of post-structuralist IR. IR theory therefore underwrites our knowledge of foreign policy by providing a series of workable categories, and successively lending analytical depth and empirical rigor to them. In each category (and its sub- or related categories), we find the inputs and outputs of pre- and post-Yugoslav foreign policy generally better ordered than the rudimen- tary actor-general versus actor-specific dyad habitually offered by IR-free FPA. Equally, as illustrated below, we find a range of foreign policy prob- lématiques, some uniquely typical of the situation in the contemporary Balkan region. Following Smith, Hadfield and Dunne (2012), the simple ‘triad plus one’ approach of realism, liberalism, constructivism and stable of post- structuralist critical approaches gives an appreciably workable spectrum from which to derive a series of identifiably different foreign pol- icy behaviors, and serves as a method to then work deductively to assemble the empirical case studies that provide a good fit for each of these categories. The Balkan region, in both its Yugoslav and post- Yugoslav incarnations, provides a particularly fertile range of foreign policy behaviors in this regard. Amelia Hadfield 235

Wohlforth, for example, has suggested that there are identifiably realist foreign policies, stemming from a range of key working parts (Wohlforth 2012). Power-seeking, individual and collective, plugs into autocratic governing styles of key leaders as well as the thirst of key communities to enjoy power in the form of political, and especially cultural, autonomy. Pragmatic interpretations move realism to power sharing (as with the recent agreement between Serbia and Kosovo). Realism works well to explain the form of the state and some of its contents, including its territory, borders, the army and the types of autonomy demanded by societies to keep power (in all its forms) over it. The nationalistic demands and the xenophobia that arise from these power-seeking behaviors drive ethnic, even genocidal, warfare, and have profound consequences on the foreign policy attitudes of a state: first with regard to its immediate neighbors; second vis-à-vis the surround- ing region; third in relation to the broader neighborhood (in this case the EU); and fourth as it impacts on the traditional lineup of allies and enemies that typify the external environment of a given state. Serbia’s foreign policy for instance (both local and more broadly) in the early 1990s was state-sponsored violence in an attempt to keep the Yugoslav state together. When this strategy failed, the policy reflected the shift to the idea of a Greater Serbia, which eventually permitted a union with Montenegro; the two states together producing yet another image for the external world to come to terms with. This links to state institu- tions – ministries and the army, for instance – that realism is familiar with, and treats on the basis of a unified, centralized actor (as with the state itself). Liberal foreign policy would by contrast flow from a range of val- ues with a strong moral undercurrent, chiefly democracy and the rule of law for the collective health of the body politic, and human rights for the proper treatment of its people. With a focus on domestic struc- tures, liberalism allows a comparison between different governmental types, administrative styles and the interpolation of these morals, when brought to bear under the aegis of progress. International organiza- tions operate in this philosophy as acceptable and necessary non-state actors; their raison d’être of begetting compromise and ensuring coop- eration coming firmly to the fore with examples such as the 1995 Dayton peace negotiations, the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), which indicted Miloševic,´ or the ICJ (which ruled in 2010 on the effective legality of the Kosovan declaration of independence). 236 On Empirical Arrivals and Theoretical Departures

The thorn in the side of liberal agreements is that they substantiate realist dynamics as effectively as they promise permanent assistance: thus Kosovan negotiations ‘demanded a restoration and extension of its autonomy’ (Chapter 6), which prompted targeted Serbian ethnic cleans- ing. Liberalism perforce relies on soft power, on the growing moral and political compatibility to bring two communities closer together. When things go astray, economic sanctions (as imposed by the UN, for instance) are used to impose influence rather than power outright. The question is when diplomacy – ensuring the rudiments of peace – requires legitimacy, collectively (i.e. democratic mechanisms) and judi- cially and societally (i.e. through the strengthening of law, overhauling the separation of powers, prosecuting criminals). Integration is the mechanic by which to affect the institutionalized cooperation of polit- ical communities; liberalism (and its neo-variants of internationalism and institutionalism) is well placed to investigate the soft-power pull of the EU and the hard-power guarantees of NATO. Constructivism permits both systemic understandings of the social- izing behaviors of states, and discursive understandings of the par- ticularistic identities that constitute the composition of states, their national communities and the forms of self-reference that drive them. Majoritarian identification and minoritarian demands for protection are good raw material from this conceptual perspective; shedding light, for instance, on the various motivations given by the Serbian leader- ship to make war in defense of a range of different Serbian identities: political, cultural, ethnic, minority, etc. The role of culture and iden- tity cannot be under-estimated in this region: it lies – as a form of self-reference – at the heart of virtually every form of regional antago- nism. National narratives, symbols and myths are a key part of national identity, itself a prime driver of the foreign policy. Memories, real or imagined, secular or sacred, drive national myths and fortify foreign policy positions. This partly explains why, for example, UNESCO plays a key role in the Serb-Kosovan tensions, in the ability of the former to identify and work to preserve the ancient monasteries of Gracanica,ˇ Pec´ and Decani.ˇ Additionally, as Koneska demonstrates in Chapter 5, with- out a detailed discussion of identity, history and nation-building, we would be unable to understand the current dynamics in Macedonian foreign policy, particularly vis-à-vis Greece. Further, constructivism allows investigations into the broad socializa- tion of states on the basis of commonality, and the specific methods by which they defiantly, and usually permanently, ensure differences between them. The regional identity, and subsequently the foreign Amelia Hadfield 237 policies, of the post-Yugoslav states are helpfully deconstructed by con- structivism in one further way; while they reflect the past and contem- porary convulsions, they struggle to emerge as policies distinguishable from each of their neighbors – and to cultivate a sort of ‘genetic’ differ- ence rendering their state unique. As memories of the Cold War fade, we should not be tempted to dismiss the enormous impact provoked by 1989 in terms of the ‘upsurge in the tendencies towards fragmentation,’ witnessed in the ‘rediscovery of state identities’ which in Yugoslavia ‘had the effect of reigniting various long-standing border disputes in addi- tion to provoking the radical ethnocentric fragmentation’ that swept through the region (Telò 2006, 115). All the states of the region thus inevitably share common qualities in terms of their regional heritage, whether it be the socialism of Tito, the ethnic-religious dyad that has sparked so much bloodshed, the same post-conflict trauma. The point is that this similar input curates across the region a ‘generic’ similarity, rendering each state alike in more ways than their foreign policy would perhaps countenance. The post-Cold War meta-narrative of economic globalization, ‘of global harmony guar- anteed by the almost universal acceptance of the market economy and democratic principles,’ was roundly rejected in the wake of national crises; and the appearance of a ‘variegated scenario made up of both cooperation and armed conflict’ (Telò 2006, 115). All states participated in some measure of bloodletting and required swift and sustained crisis resolution and management. Subsequently, all required external political support, financial assistance, normative encouragement and methods to facilitate local and regional integration. That they all require this supporting structure in different measures, but for the same reason, has produced both individual foreign policies with some key differences, but also a regional stance towards the exter- nal environment that reflects what they all require collectively. Of late, the region as a whole appears to have a loose ‘post-crisis’ identity that has encouraged external commentators to acknowledge the ‘remark- able capacity’ of the Balkan states ‘to break with the darker aspects of their past,’ moving from ‘legacies of hatred, corruption, and crony- ism’ to the pull of EU integration, and the commitment this demands ‘toward a democratic future’ (Likmeta 2013).8 In systemic terms, we need to be aware of the socializing proclivities of states, and the cen- tripetal dynamics of adhering to an emergent set of rules, a deeper level of values, and eventually incorporating common generic identi- ties in key facets of their institutionalized behavior. Wendt’s suggestion that ‘interaction, if properly theorized, offers the tantalizing promise 238 On Empirical Arrivals and Theoretical Departures of ameliorating the depredations of international anarchy’ is particu- larly instructive for peaceful post-Yugoslav reconstitution, reminding us that both interaction, and the root cause of agency, help explain post-sovereign developments such as integration (Cunliffe 2007, 24). IR theory, however, particularly in its radical constructivist and post- structural approaches, is equally capable of providing an agent-specific approach to explaining foreign policy behavior. There is an explana- tory ‘surface area’ provided for both human agency and the nature of their utterances (as artifact, discursive, etc.). The watchword here is post-Yugoslav political culture: the constructs and values that it now comprises, the method by which such values have been wakened and instilled, and the variable forms of local, regional and EU and interna- tional governance that allow the region to transcend traditional areas of sovereignty (e.g. from the current status of Kosovo to the postmodern caretaker identity adopted by the EU). Copenhagen School approaches (emerging from the work of Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde, for example) could equally promote insights, with area-specific scholars examining – inter alia – the powerful role played by the external agendas of ‘great powers,’ the intrinsically social nature of security policies and the habit- ually discursive nature of policy played out in the region, from the Ottomans to NATO, from Russia to the EU, and the contested agency of that policy. Equally, post-structural viewpoints derived from Der Derian, Walker and Hansen could be drawn upon to deepen the myriad (and fre- quently embattled) sources of political and cultural representation; to deconstruct the symbiotic but deeply asymmetrical forms of normative abstraction operative in EU accession process with states such as Serbia, the multiple forms of representation that the region has traversed in the past century (especially prescient given the current centenary of the out- break of the First World War). The agenda here is particularly urgent: both supposedly immutable Yugoslav identities, and constructed post- Yugoslav political concepts, demand to be deconstructed, allowing today’s IR analysts to eschew uncontested assumptions about territory and borders, communities and national cultures – many may prove inadvertently arbitrary at best and dangerously inaccurate at worst. As Džankic´ points out in Chapter 8, the interaction of Montenegro’s inter- nal policies and its external environment help to explain its foreign policy since 1997, and therefore demonstrate why the deconstruction of territorial and national issues remains of key importance for FPA. Post-structural approaches thus offer a wealth of explanatory original- ity, simply by beginning from the starting point that major facets of Amelia Hadfield 239 the post-Yugoslav state, its governmental apparatus and its sociocultural composition are neither immutable nor fixed; rather they are ‘social artifacts, open to change’ (Cunliffe 2007, 24).

Foreign policy problématiques Equal in fascination to mainstream interfaces between IR theory supply- ing conceptual inputs and foreign policy-oriented outputs are the range of concepts and qualities of actorness that simply defy a good fit in con- ventional categories. Geopolitics, historical enquiry and IR theory work complementarily for the most part in guiding scholars through key pre- cepts: from territory to identity, from state to policy, from market to community, and from war to peace. This broad canon thus satisfactorily addresses the overarching four questions posed at the outset regarding war and peace tipping points, the range of sociopolitical, economic and cultural patterns or exemplars on offer in each national community, as well as their various origins, outcomes and forms of opposition. Post-mainstream approaches, however, may transcend such avenues of enquiry, preferring to think more critically about broad issues of actorness, or alternatively profess a more forensic approach in dis- cerning the composition of statecraft, or the socializing mechanics of post-crises communities within key institutions. In either case, the agents, and the levels of analysis on which they operate, are neither as plain nor as predictable in terms of their foreign policy as they appear in mainstream understandings. This makes for a richer, but possibly less conclusive, appreciation of who acts, on whose behalf, why and with what result. In an attempt to provide the reader with plausible endgames of the foreign policy future of the post-Yugoslav states, the section below briefly reviews the contested nature of statehood that has taken place in some of the region’s key players, against the backdrop of the sec- ond major dynamic: that of increased (though not unproblematic) EU actorness.

Contesting statehood The region as a whole is something of a laboratory for the major themes of war and peace in late 20th-century Europe, and a microcosm of the transformational, soft-power potential of political integration. As suggested by Keil and Stahl in the Introduction, post-Yugoslav states have in the past either been treated passively, as subjects or recipi- ents of the broader foreign policy ambitions of others, or collectively as something of a ‘playground’ in which to test different approaches 240 On Empirical Arrivals and Theoretical Departures to state-building, economic reconstruction, normative reform and even good old-fashioned self-determination. Each state in the region is at a different stage in terms of its develop- ment, and consequently operates with varying degrees of capability in terms of exercising its sovereign autonomy in forming its foreign policy: a status not unlike many other emerging states in various areas. What is especially notable in the Balkans is that very great difference in foreign policy preferences vis-à-vis their selected allies and named foes; the range of their post-conflict governing capabilities; and the variegated conse- quences of these two dynamics upon each states’ ability to be active architects of their own foreign policy, or as yet passive recipients of the broader transformations percolating through the region. Contested viewpoints, however, of which critical approaches are but one example, highlight a key problématique with the above conclusions. The majority of the above approaches, and indeed most understandings within FPA, operate on the assumption that states are unitary, coher- ent, sovereign entities, their internal contents insoluble, and generally unimportant in comparison to the outward behavior they undertake. The Balkan states, however, show us a series of states in very different, very real stages of development. In absolute terms, all are sovereign, save Kosovo; possessing territory, population and governments. All are autonomous political entities, operating with foreign policy-making capacity. However, in relative terms, there is clearly a world of differ- ence between Slovenia’s ability to mature into an EU member state as early as 2004, and Kosovo’s contested status; between Croatia’s 2013 EU accession and Macedonia’s political stasis. This presents us with a mot- ley range of types of states and statecraft; with a spectrum of ‘actorness’ in which the wellsprings of national identity operate as either manage- able or uneasy wellsprings for the national interest; a variegated series of political actors whose independence is established, alongside those whose dependence is still visible; ultimately, a list of states who operate with varying degrees of capability to construct and implement a distinct foreign policy. Stateness and the consolidation of statehood are also central when attempting to explain the key puzzle opened by Keil and Stahl in the Introduction. While the post-Yugoslav states share the common her- itage of the relatively successful Yugoslav foreign policy, they have since diverged into different foreign policy paths. Some have quickly oriented towards the EU, particularly by ‘moving away from the Balkans’ as Bojinovic´ Fenko and Zlatko Šabicargueinthecaseofˇ Slovenia (Chapter 3); while others have not yet come to terms with Amelia Hadfield 241 their historical legacy and their new status in the post-Cold War and post-Yugoslav order. This is true for Serbia, but also for Macedonia and Montenegro, and applies particularly to the states of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo, which remain internally and externally con- tested. Consolidated statehood and an internal consensus on EU inte- gration as the main (and only) foreign policy objective can therefore explain this divergence in foreign policy. Furthermore, foreign policy capacity, historical legacies and relations with the wider region are also factors that can be listed from the discussion in previous chapters. Yet, more research is needed in order to understand foreign policy diver- gence, and the link between foreign policy and state-building in the post-Yugoslav space. Does this challenge the state-centrism of IR and of FPA? Not in the sense that the key players remain states and governments. Yes, in the sense that it forces an admission of different qualities of stateness and different capabilities of statecraft. The unit of the state is not in question, but its characteristic of autonomy is certainly rendered contestable by the sheer range of foreign policy-carrying capacity of the post-Yugoslav states. Again, visible state-centrism remains a key anchor by which developing states transition from passive policy recipients to active pol- icy architects; yet their very ability to exemplify this transition illustrates the fluid nature of actorness, of statecraft, of the socializing mechanics that underwrite foreign policy, and which have had to be unlearned and then relearned. Further, intergovernmental dynamics have oper- ated alongside undeniably robust institutional actorness in the form of the collective security of NATO and the integrationist apparatus of the EU.

EU actorness and Foreign Policy Analysis Lastly, the EU, both in terms of its form and its content, represents – in its dealings with the post-Yugoslav states – perhaps the ultimate challenge to traditional IR-supported FPA. The EU is an entity like no other, and its own foreign policy, directed for more than two decades now (despite periodic lapses in attention) at the Balkans, both represent a new institutional ontology for FPA; its transnational policy systems have provided us with a new epistemological framework, and its foreign policy outputs forced the emergence of new methodologies to capture this singularly collective unit. As Brian White observed in this regard, ‘European policy processes as a whole are also characterized by other types of process in operation [ ...] which require explanations of policy that go beyond a realist account of what is going on’ (2001, 170). 242 On Empirical Arrivals and Theoretical Departures

As the EU currently represents the main foreign policy actor for five of the states in the region, FPA requires a wholly different focus in dealing with the supranational and intergovernmental structure that comprises the EU on one side and the range of individuated/genetic and regional/generic foreign policy outputs emanating from the post- Yugoslav states. In a sense, both the EU and the Balkan region as a whole each represent a ‘non-unitary actor’ (White 2001, 170). When one considers the fiercely national content that continues to render EU foreign policy-making a series of uneven but usually historically pre- dictable bilateral accords between its larger states acting as traditional ‘patrons’ to key Balkan states, the situation grows even more confus- ing. In one scenario, the EU is the structure and the Balkan states the actors, with the foreign policy of either side emerging from a series of top-down and bottom-up feedback loops on the basis of ever-deepening Europeanization. In other scenarios, the Balkan region itself sets up its own post-conflict structure in which the EU is merely the most robust actor, inputting its own regional foreign policy, along with the stabiliza- tion mechanics of the US and the governmental and financial assistance provided by Russia. If operating on the former, we can perceive the EU as a formidable structure and each of the post-Yugoslav states an actor in its own right. A key part of the EU structure has been the defense of human rights and democracy norms and the rebuilding of a regional community via crisis management. Doing so however invites our (and the actors’ own) scrutiny upon the goodness of fit of this enterprise. As Telò argues, ‘as the international community,’ and principally the EU, clarifies its role

in defending human rights and crisis management ...and becomes more intrusive in national societies, it will be increasingly neces- sary to strengthen its legitimacy and accountability. Accountability requires credibility and control mechanisms, both of which must be developed on various levels: national, regional and global. (2006, 78)

Given that the EU’s overall foreign policy is to absorb the majority of the post-Yugoslav states over the decade, it has been progressively focused upon exporting democratic legitimization into the heart of its accession requirement, in an effort to instill governmental instincts that can help overcome pragmatic interregional attitudes and occasional flare- ups rooted in national and ethnic tensions. The states themselves, to move from recipient to ‘responsible,’ have generally had to indicate that humanitarian missions either are no longer needed or indicate a stable Amelia Hadfield 243 society; that the attribute of broad democratic legitimization is suffi- ciently visible as to reinforce internal security and contribute to regional stability. The EU too needs to demonstrate precisely this principle, to illustrate not only that it can absorb effectively this most troubled of regions, but can move forward as a new entity. Given the EU’s reputation in the region as being incapable of acting in its own backyard, which led to many unseized opportunities, clear international failures and both domestic and international humiliation, which have served to diminish the internal legitimacy of the process of European integration, it is vital that with each post-Yugoslav state and the region as a whole, the EU ensures both legitimacy coming from within the EU and external might via the cardinal norm or democratic legitimacy and through structures of multi-level governance. Failure to do so risks returning the post-Yugoslav states, and the region as a whole, to its vicious cycle of war and peace. The Balkans, it should be remembered, have had periods of peace as fragile but integrated republics. The prospect of war, loss and defeat, however, can swiftly promote first defensive, then offensive animosity on the basis of resur- gent realism, foreshortened liberalism or unstructured identity politics. As Mazower elegantly argues, the perceived effect of war, therefore, as much as the identities invoked in its cause, are co-equal in provok- ing strife as a form of local and foreign policy: ‘it has been war – first as a specter then as a reality – which affected people’s sense of eth- nic identity’ (Mazower 1997).9 Against this high-stakes backdrop, IR theory-grounded FPA provides a helpful remedy against the tempta- tion of snap answers and unreflective advice; assisting to deconstruct the constitutive terrors of the region and illustrate political avenues forward.

Conclusion

Cynics suggest that FPA has only ever existed as a ‘spin-off’ from IR, languishing in deserved obscurity owing to the unwieldy set of axioms and empirics, and riven by starkly different methodological approaches between its American and European cousins. Supporters, however, of whom there are an increasing number, have been careful to point to the vital symbiosis between IR theory and high-quality FPA, whether the approach be quantitative or qualitative, policy-based or historical, theory based or cultural, deductive or inductive. The Balkans – as Churchill first opined – was a region that long pro- duced more history than it could consume.10 Equally, FPA, buoyed by IR 244 On Empirical Arrivals and Theoretical Departures theory, is both a macrocosm of this embarras de richesses in attempting to locate solely the broad, visible actions of international actors, and a microcosm in (sometimes unwittingly) unveiling the maddening series of dependent and independent variables that make up endogenous, exogenous and intermediate forces that contribute, causally and con- stitutively, to international activity in all its forms. From a mainstream perspective, IR arguably grounds our ability to analyze the foreign poli- cies of the post-Yugoslav states; bequeathing both solid and varied perspectives that capture and explain the majority of official external behavior of the region, whatever the era, its composition and its state of peace or war.

Notes

1. Grateful thanks are due to Michal Gloznek, Canterbury Christ Church Politics/IR 2014 graduate, for both his research and insightful editorial assistance. 2. A brief glance at any of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the seven post- Yugoslav republics indicates the broad contours of their contemporary stance, including that of Kosovo: http://www.mfa-ks.net/?page=2,1. 3. Nailing down the contemporary elaborations inherent in the body of for- eign policy analysis is a wearisome but fascinating task. Valerie Hudson and I understand FPA to refer predominantly to the North American school of thought, operating since the 1950s as a subset of IR theory, fueled by strands of decision-making, public policy analysis, sociology and psychology, with bridge-building afforded by mid-range theorizing. Understood unofficially as ‘Analysis of Foreign Policy’ or AFP, rival variants have a largely European legacy, and generally operate on the basis of a commitment to historical, social and ideational approaches, deployed via a range of qualitative meth- ods. Making greater use of IR theory and methodology, and drawing less extensively on FPA precepts and tools, AFP avenues have proved particu- larly fruitful in producing country-specific investigations of European states, which of late have focused on European foreign policies existing within and without the collective foreign policy-making machinery of the EU. Sidestep- ping some of the excessively quantitative approaches favored in FPA, AFP has now ironically captured the richness of the original FPA founders, by focusing upon the original triad of decision-making dynamics, psychological dimensions and comparative aspects capable of rendering both generalizable and case-specific observations. See Hadfield and Hudson 2015. 4. There is a paucity of decent EU foreign affairs textbooks that make more than scant reference to the Balkans; the EU intervention in the Balkans is inevitably described as a fiasco that occurred ‘in its own backyard.’ There is virtual silence on the foreign policy dynamics of the region at the time, the subsequent interrelations between post-Yugoslav crisis resolution and EU enlargement policy, or the lessons learned for the evolving European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP), or EU-NATO interoperability. Amelia Hadfield 245

5. The region has overlaid it with a variety of organizations in this respect: The Southeast European Cooperation Process, the Stability Pact for Southeast Europe, the Southeast European Cooperative Initiative, and the Black Sea Economic Cooperation group. 6. In reference to the use of this approach (derived from historical enquiry) within IR theory, see Williams, Hadfield and Rofe 2012, Chapter 1. 7. A dyad first conceptualized by Cambridge academic, Philip Allott, helpful in capturing the recurrent and particularistic aspects of working categories such as the national identity, the national interest or indeed foreign policy itself. 8. Slovenia joined in 2004, Croatia in 2013; in mid-2013 Serbia – after success- fully putting in place an agreement with Kosovo – was given a start date by the EU for accession talks; Kosovo itself is now engaged in its own Stabi- lization and Association Agreement, as the first building block towards EU membership. 9. Serge Schmemann makes much the same point, arguing that ‘a history of perceived humiliation, after all, lurks behind many acts of terror. And com- peting narratives of victimhood and insults sustain conflicts in the Balkans, the Caucasus, the Middle East and many other regions’ (2010). 10. W. Churchill: ‘The Balkans produce more history than they can consume’; cited by Ishaan Tharoor, ‘The Balkan Wars: 100 Years Later, a History of Violence,’ Time, 8 October 2012, ibid.

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actor, 3, 4, 8, 9, 10, 11, 52, 56, 70, 75, Albanian 101, 102, 123, 125, 127, 128, 147, authority, 157, 158 151, 154, 182, 199, 200, 201, 206, community, 98, 101, 104, 110, 213, 229, 231, 233, 234, 242 115, 118 external, 56, 132, 216 ethnic, 98, 101, 109, 114, 115, 118, foreign policy, 35, 49, 101, 102, 105, 119, 148, 158, 164, 214 134, 242 Ambassador, 34, 51, 77, 78, 86, 117, international, 10, 127, 138, 214, 138, 140, 150, 164, 181, 185, 224, 244 214, 216 non-state, 235 analysis, 47, 58, 61, 62, 77, 97, 137, political, 97, 118, 132, 167, 177, 194, 230, 231 186, 240 empirical, 15, 47, 62 societal, 50, 103 foreign policy, 49, 53, 147, 176, 201, state, 127, 139 223, 224, 232, 233, 234, 241 sub-state, 9, 128, 130, 139, 233 levels of, 225, 232, 239 Arbitration Commission of the actorness, 225, 239, 240, 241 Conference on Yugoslavia, see agency, 103, 134, 155, 200, 201, 217, Badinter Arbitration Committee 233, 238 army, 22, 60, 73, 81, 150, 151, 152, embedded, 51 160, 162, 178, 181, 235 insulated, 51 Association/Community of Serb agreement, 14, 20, 26, 27, 29, 30, 49, municipalities in Kosovo, 59, 81, 85, 116, 128, 139, 155, 165, 207 160, 163, 165, 184, 185, 201, 207, Autonomous Socialist Province of 212, 213, 236 Kosovo, see Republic of Kosovo bilateral, 182, 200, 204, 213 economic, 61, 63, 200 Badinter Arbitration Committee, 140 international, 105, 202 Balkan Pact, 20, 28, 30 Kosovo, 159, 161, 167, 215, Balkan(s), 13, 19, 20, 21, 22, 47, 53, 216, 245 56, 60, 61, 111, 112, 114, 138, multilateral, 204 139, 167, 223, 225, 226, 229, 230, trade, 23, 136, 227 240, 241, 243, 244, 245 Agreement on the Principles of the federation, 21, 25, 26, 30 Relationship between Serbia and region, 223, 229, 234, 242 Montenegro, see Belgrade states, 25, 26, 154, 237, Agreement 240, 242 Agreement on Special and Parallel Western, 50, 52, 57, 64, 75, 79, 80, Relations, see Dayton Peace 84, 86, 88, 112, 119, Agreement 138, 212 Ahtisaari Plan, 162, 202 Belgrade, 20, 25, 26, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, Albania, 19, 21, 25, 98, 107, 111, 113, 35, 36, 37, 49, 57, 72, 81, 115, 115, 192, 193, 200, 203, 210, 213, 131, 133, 141, 149, 162, 165, 174, 223, 226, 227 185, 207

247 248 Index

Belgrade Agreement, 6, 175, 182 change, 4, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 19, 21, Bled Process, 80 50, 56, 61, 64, 70, 97, 101, 116, bloc, 15, 19, 60 118, 128, 129, 132, 137, 138, 147, Eastern, 19, 33, 167 153, 158, 161, 167, 177, 191, 193, Soviet, 29, 30, 62, 227 195, 224, 229, 239 Western, 29, 33, 62, 167 democratic, 5, 191, 192 border, 30, 35, 36, 49, 54, 80, 81, 98, foreign policy, 11, 13, 28, 47, 61, 62, 100, 107, 108, 114, 116, 125, 126, 137, 177, 191, 233 127, 130, 131, 133, 152, 157, 162, of government, 13, 82, 133 164, 165, 183, 207, 214, institutional, 97, 101, 118 235, 238 legal, 186 aggression, 125 political, 15, 138, 174, 191 demarcation, 59, 79, 81, 214 civil society, 104, 179, dispute, 12, 24, 237 208, 209 international, 98, 157 CNN Effect, 125, 140 Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), 3, 4, 5, coalition, 10, 74, 77, 78, 82, 83, 88, 6, 7, 9, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 20, 49, 104, 129, 154, 156, 159, 161, 186 57, 59, 72, 74, 80, 81, 87, 89, 111, ethnic, 103, 119 115, 116, 122, 123, 124, 125, 126, governing/government, 103, 118, 127, 128, 131, 132, 133, 134, 135, 119, 161, 167, 179, 203, 208 136, 138, 139, 140, 141, 142, 149, Cold War, 8, 15, 19, 26, 33, 62, 137, 150, 151, 152, 153, 154, 163, 174, 167, 223, 227, 228, 230, 237 184, 192, 214, 228, 230, post–, 126, 228, 237, 241 233, 241 Comecon, 27 Bosnian Cominform, 24, 25, 26, 27, authority, 123, 124, 137, 138 28, 31 Croats, 74, 76, 80, 125, 135, 191, Comintern, 21, 22, 24 228, 232 foreign policy, 122, 123, 124, 125, Common Foreign and Security Policy, 126, 127, 131, 134, 139, 12, 175 140, 233 communism, 18, 31, 62, 79, 227 Pan-Bosniak identity, 131, 132 fall of, 99, 101, 108, 116, 227 Serbs, 124, 125, 135, 149, 152, 153, former, 99, 100, 106, 108, 116 161, 163 communist state, 21, 26, 28, 32, 34, war, 125, 139, 140, 184 36, 99, 100, 106, 108 Brdo Process, 57, 64 Conference on Security and Bulatovic,´ Momir, 174 Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), see Bulgaria, 20, 21, 25, 26, 27, 30, 98, Organization for Security and 100, 104, 107, 115, 122, 203, 223, Co-operation in Europe 226, 229 conflict, 5, 26, 27, 28, 38, 61, 74, 76, Burzan, Dragiša, 182 78, 79, 98, 105, 109, 114, 116, 123, 124, 125, 126, 184, 192, 210, capabilities, 3, 32, 55, 58, 80, 84, 213, 216, 224, 237, 245 240, 241 ethnic, 108, 109, 115 Central European Free Trade ethno-national, 124 Agreement (CEFTA), 53, 89, 141 post–, 78, 84, 86, 127, 230, 237, Central European Initiative, 53, 88 240, 242 Centre for European Perspective prevention, 109, 223 (CEP), 64 resolution, 103, 109 Index 249 constitution(al), 23, 33, 35, 48, 51, 69, democracy, 37, 60, 79, 100, 101, 178 75, 88, 99, 100, 101, 104, 105, consociational, 127 107, 119, 131, 152, 158, 177, 180, democratization, 3, 12, 61, 155, 167 181, 203, 208 parliamentary, 50, 75, 105, 181 change, 75, 101, 104, 119 democratic Dayton, 128, 132 elections, 69, 71, 122, 201 name, 105, 108, 113, 134 legitimacy, 223, 242, 243 reform, 98, 103, 128, 140 transformation, 69 constraint, 50, 52, 61, 134, 199, 216 Diaspora, 87, 137, 182 structural, 50, 200 Ðinąic,´ Zoran, 132, 154, 167 constructivism, 10, 234, 236, 237 diplomacy, 20, 37, 72, 210, 213, constructivist approach, 69, 233, 236 200, 238 coercive, 60 continuity, 11, 61, 62, 116, 133, 155, digital, 210 191, 192, 193, 195 economic, 51, 84, 86, 89 discontinuity, 62, 167, 191, 192, multilateral, 52, 60 193, 194 preventive, 59 foreign policy, 61, 62, 117 public, 51, 58, 209 historical, 47, 50, 137, 177 divergence, 7, 15 Convergence, 7, 15 foreign policy, 12, 14, 173, 241 foreign policy, 12, 13, 14 Dodik, Milorad, 129, 130, 132, 136, Corruption, 34, 74, 78, 187, 237 138, 141, 233 Regional Anticorruption Initiative domestic policy, 7, 19, 50, 110, (RAI), 88 124, 178 Council of Europe (CoE), 55, 127, 181, Ðukanovic,´ Milo, 14, 174, 179, 198, 211, 212, 213 182, 183 crisis, 12, 63, 88 financial, 139, 176, 192 Kosovo, 5, 153, 165 Eastern Europe, 23, 25, 26, 29, 35, 54, management, 230, 237, 242 88, 99, 108, 227 political, 122, 135 Ecological-Fishing Protection Zone post–, 224, 229, 237 (ZERP), 59, 79 Yugoslav, 72, 87, 200 Economic Croatia, see Republic of Croatia agreement, 61, 63, 200 Croatian Community of aid, 29 Herzeg-Bosnia, 124, 140 cooperation, 30, 53, 57, 61, 64, 245 Cult of personality, 18, 21, 33, 150 crisis, 19, 37 culture, 10, 35, 36, 48, 50, 52, 57, 58, development, 165, 210 60, 69, 124, 153, 176, 178, 179, interest, 134, 179, 204, 214 184, 189, 190, 192, 210, 213, 214, recovery, 30 224, 225, 226, 233, 234, 235, 236, reform, 3, 37 238, 239, 243 relation, 61, 81, 88, 114, 117, 127, sociocultural, 232, 239 129, 164, 175 sanction, 59, 153, 236 Daciˇ c,´ Ivica, 159, 161, 165 ties, 157, 179, 190, 214 Dayton Peace Agreement, 80, 85, 123, transformation, 23, 224 124, 127, 128, 130, 132, 133, 138, economy, 27, 36, 86, 108, 150, 213 139, 140, 142, 152, 153, 159, market, 63, 237 163, 235 Yugoslav, 23, 69 250 Index elite, 4, 14, 23, 34, 174, 192 186, 187, 191, 202, 204, 207, 209, ethno-national, 124 210, 211, 212, 216, 217, 229, 230, political, 4, 10, 14, 97, 107, 110, 232, 233, 235, 236, 238, 239, 240, 118, 130, 137, 138, 158, 164, 241, 242, 243, 244 174, 179 accession, 12, 13, 51, 57, 59, 61, 63, ruling, 178, 185, 192 73, 84, 86, 89, 98, 109, 110, embassy, 185, 203, 211 112, 113, 133, 156, 159, 165, Erdut Agreement, 73 166, 175, 176, 177, 178, 180, ethnic, 48, 63, 98, 101, 103, 104, 116, 181, 184, 186, 187, 191, 194, 118, 119, 123, 132, 136, 149, 185, 230, 238, 240, 245 194, 213, 217, 223, 224, 232, 237 acquis communautaire, 75, 79, 176, cleansing, 5, 80, 126, 152, 153, 236 177, 187 community, 48, 101, 104, 109, 115, candidate, 5, 12, 79, 98, 155, 118, 119, 168 157, 189 composition, 176 conditionality, 4, 178 group, 104, 127, 128, 131, 133, 141 enlargement, 3, 5, 15, 111, 112, 119, identity, 104, 228, 231, 243 229, 244 multi–, 48, 60, 123 Europeanization, 51, 69, 166, 242 relations, 74, 104, 132 Eurosceptic, 83, 156 tension, 98, 148, 242 foreign policy, 117, 229, 242, 244 warfare, 228, 235 Hour of Europe, 5, 72 Euro-Atlantic, 53, 54, 56, 62, 64, integration, 3, 4, 6, 7, 12, 13, 14, 83, 110, 185 89, 103, 106, 108, 109, 110, cooperation, 53 111, 112, 114, 115, 116, 133, integration, 56, 79, 84, 100, 108, 135, 138, 141, 142, 154, 155, 134, 137, 180, 204 157, 159, 160, 176, 177, 181, partnership, 81 185, 186, 188, 191, 212, 237, structure, 70, 72, 74, 81, 110 241 European Bank for Reconstruction member, 5, 6, 7, 11, 13, 14, 54, 55, and Development (EBRD), 198 56, 60, 70, 76, 77, 79, 81, 82, European Commission (EC), 55, 86, 83, 86, 89, 98, 99, 100, 108, 89, 107, 111, 177, 212 109, 110, 111, 112, 113, 115, European Community, 5, 69, 72, 100, 116, 118, 133, 134, 136, 156, 110, 122 166, 177, 178, 191, 193, 194, European Community Ministerial 200, 211, 212, 214, 224, 229, Troika, 49, 71 240, 245 European Council, 48, 69, 175, 212 presidency, 57, 214 European Political Cooperation (EPC), pro–, 132, 154, 159, 216 see Common Foreign and Security Rule of Law Mission (EULEX), 157, Policy 202, 211 European Union (EU), 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 11, Thessaloniki Agenda/Summit, 5, 63, 12, 13, 15, 53, 54, 55, 56, 60, 69, 119, 179, 183, 185, 192 75, 77, 78, 79, 80, 81, 82, 83, 84, 85, 86, 87, 89, 98, 100, 102, 103, 104, 107, 108, 109, 110, 111, 113, Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY), 114, 115, 117, 130, 132, 133, 134, 73, 88, 108, 149, 150, 153, 154, 138, 139, 140, 141, 142, 153, 154, 155, 162, 163, 173, 174, 175, 176, 156, 157, 159, 160, 165, 166, 167, 177, 178, 183, 191, 192, 193, 195 173, 175, 178, 179, 180, 181, 184, Foreign policy, 191, 192 Index 251

Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina post-Yugoslav, 15, 58, 137, 232, (FBiH), 80, 128, 163 233, 234 First World War, 20, 21, 223, 226, 238 priority, 10, 56, 99, 101, 103, 105, Foreign Minister, 19, 24, 36, 50, 52, 106, 107, 110, 114, 127, 129, 63, 64, 75, 77, 78, 87, 88, 101, 160, 180, 183, 186, 187, 188, 102, 106, 132, 135, 136, 138, 141, 189, 193, 194, 203, 224 157, 158, 160, 182, 206, 208, 217 strategy, 13, 55, 56, 58, 61, 71, 166, Foreign Policy (FP), 3, 4, 7, 8, 9, 10, 167, 179 11, 12, 14, 15, 18, 19, 20, 27, 37, success, 12, 55, 84, 167 47, 50, 51, 52, 61, 62, 69, 70, 71, Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA), 8, 9, 11, 72, 74, 75, 76, 78, 79, 82, 86, 97, 14, 15, 49, 50, 176, 201, 223, 224, 99, 100, 101, 102, 103, 104, 105, 225, 232, 233, 234, 238, 240, 241, 106, 107, 110, 111, 112, 113, 116, 242, 243, 244 118, 124, 126, 127, 130, 131, 134, Former Yugoslav Republic of 136, 137, 139, 140, 150, 153, 157, Macedonia (FYROM), see 158, 161, 166, 176, 177, 178, 179, Macedonia 180, 185, 187, 191, 193, 199, 200, Forum of Slavic Cultures, 52, 60 201, 202, 205, 208, 211, 215, 216, Framework Agreement for Peace in 217, 224, 226, 227, 228, 229, 230, Bosnia and Herzegovina, see 231, 232, 233, 234, 236, 237, 238, Dayton Peace Agreement 239, 240, 241, 243, 244, 245 activity, 53, 123, 124, 125, 129, 130 genocide, 5, 81, 133, 149, 163, 228 agenda, 108, 117, 179 geopolitical, 12, 30, 48, 87, 129, 137, challenge, 71, 77, 187 224, 225, 228, 231, 232, 233, 239 consensus, 13, 97, 135 Gligorov, Kiro, 98, 102, 103 globalization, 56, 117, 237 decision, 3, 14, 105, 109 global player, 19, 84 development, 55, 70, 71, 72, 74, Granic,´ Mate, 75, 77 86, 177 Greece, 4, 5, 6, 12, 14, 20, 21, 25, 29, environment, 47, 48, 52, 61 30, 98, 100, 102, 103, 104, 106, goal, 11, 49, 50, 55, 58, 62, 97, 108, 108, 109, 110, 112, 113, 114, 115, 111, 114, 115, 118, 149, 160, 118, 119, 202, 223, 226, 229, 236 162, 178, 187, 188, 189, 194, 213 human rights, 58, 60, 61, 79, 127, implementation, 47, 49, 50, 52, 84, 178, 201, 235, 242 99, 100, 104, 126, 147, 176 Hyseni, Skender, 208 independent, 99, 198, 216 instrument, 11, 13, 50, 52, 58, 99, identity, 4, 56, 61, 62, 100, 101, 105, 108, 113 182, 184, 194, 204, 214, 228, 230, -making, 8, 9, 10, 47, 49, 51, 52, 78, 232, 236, 237, 238, 239, 243 97, 105, 147, 176, 232, 240, 242 foreign policy, 7, 14, 15, 62 multivectoral, 18, 84, 227 national, 50, 70, 99, 100, 102, 104, objective, 7, 14, 61, 71, 84, 85, 86, 236, 240, 245 87, 97, 99, 103, 104, 107, 116, regional, 62, 236 118, 126, 129, 137, 176, 179, independence, 5, 9, 12, 13, 19, 22, 30, 180, 186, 189, 199, 203, 241 31, 33, 47, 48, 49, 53, 55, 60, 61, orientation, 10, 33, 53, 57, 85, 116, 70, 71, 72, 76, 82, 83, 84, 87, 97, 137, 179, 182, 199, 215 98, 99, 100, 101, 102, 106, 107, position, 52, 84, 129, 236 110, 117, 118, 123, 124, 127, 130, 252 Index independence – continued International Monetary Fund 133, 136, 148, 158, 164, 165, 174, (IMF), 198 175, 176, 177, 179, 180, 182, 184, International Organization, 14, 49, 52, 192, 195, 199, 200, 202, 203, 204, 54, 55, 85, 108, 110, 112, 179, 205, 213, 214, 227, 240 180, 181, 182, 201, 204, 210, Constitutive Theory, 205 217, 235 creeping, 174, 183, 192 International Relations (IR), 7, 8, 9, declaration of independence, 49, 70, 15, 52, 76, 102, 117, 182, 199, 71, 79, 98, 105, 114, 118, 122, 200, 202, 204, 208, 216, 217, 138, 149, 155, 158, 165, 173, 224, 234 183, 185, 198, 202, 205, 206, International System, 3, 10, 50, 208, 210, 212, 213, 214, 215, 107, 201 216, 229, 235 International Trust Fund for Demining Declaratory Theory, 205 and Mine Victims Assistance, 59 post–, 115, 137, 139, 176, 181, 185, Intervention, 5, 31, 58, 60, 106, 109, 190, 191, 192 135, 140, 176, 178, 189, 192, 193, referendum, 71, 72, 79, 83, 98, 123, 223, 228, 244 175, 178, 179 inflation, 37, 174 Josipovic,´ Ivo, 70, 76, 77, 81, 162 Interim Accord, 108, 110, 112, 113 International Civilian Office (ICO), Khrushchev, Nikita, 30, 31 202, 211 Kosor, Jadranka, 78, 79, 88 Kosovo, see Republic of Kosovo International Civilian Representative Kosovo Foundation for Open Society (ICR), 211 (KFOS), 209 International Community, 3, 14, 53, Koštunica, Vojislav, 154, 155, 156 54, 72, 73, 74, 79, 147, 150, 174, 175, 198, 200, 205, 207, 229, 242 legitimacy, 38, 200, 204, 228, 229, International Conference on the 236, 242, 243 former Yugoslavia, 110 Little Entente, 20 International Court of Justice (ICJ), Livno Formulation, 123 81, 82, 113, 133, 155, 162, 163, lobby, 4, 73, 83, 87, 113, 115, 124, 165, 184, 206, 207, 208, 214, 215, 129, 130, 136, 205, 206, 208, 229, 235 209, 210 International Criminal Tribunal for Lukovac, Branko, 182 the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), 70, 75, 76, 82, 89, 105, 153, 154, 155, Macedonia, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 13, 15, 25, 57, 156, 166, 235 59, 64, 72, 82, 98, 99, 100, 101, Boškovski, Ljube, 105 102, 103, 104, 107, 108, 110, 111, Gotovina, Ante, 89 112, 113, 114, 115, 116, 117, 119, Hadžic,´ Goran, 157 131, 133, 134, 153, 164, 184, 190, Karadžic,´ Radovan, 124, 157, 166 191, 192, 203, 214, 236, 240, 241 Mladic,´ Ratko, 157, 166 Macedonian Tarculovski,ˇ Johan, 105 foreign policy, 97, 98, 99, 100, 101, International Development 102, 105, 107, 109, 112, 115, Association (IDA), 32 117, 118 International isolation, 174, 205 independence, 99, 101, 105, 106, International law, 51, 58, 60, 85, 88, 115, 116, 149 155, 165, 201, 204, 205, 206 Marovic,´ Svetozar, 163 Index 253

Marshall Plan, 29 Montenegro, 3, 4, 5, 7, 10, 14, 20, 48, media, 125, 126, 135, 142, 150, 153, 57, 59, 72, 73, 81, 115, 116, 131, 191, 228 133, 134, 149, 154, 164, 168, 173, mediation, 34, 55, 56, 57, 58, 60, 174, 175, 176, 177, 178, 179, 180, 61, 106 181, 182, 183, 184, 185, 186, 187, Mesic,´ Stjepan, 74, 76, 83, 87, 88 188, 189, 190, 191, 192, 193, 194, Milanovic,´ Zoran, 81 214, 223, 226, 235, military, 20, 23, 26, 28, 30, 38, 49, 52, 238, 241 139, 140, 150, 151, 155, 178, 181, foreign policy, 14, 173, 174, 176, 213, 226, 228 177, 178, 179, 180, 182, 186, coup, 21 187, 190, 191, 192, 193, 194 help, 20, 25 independence, 5, 7, 133, 155, 158, maneuver, 27, 32 164, 173, 176, 177, 180, 182, militarization, 18 184, 187 mission, 23 multilateral, 49, 51, 52, 53, 57, 60, 84, operation, 73, 74, 180 88, 127, 134, 138, 178, 179, 181, 185, 193, 204, 229 paramilitary, 98, 116, 125, 151 reform, 178 nationalism, 14, 19, 36, 38, 71, 74, 81, support, 5, 22, 27, 29, 31, 211 82, 136, 141, 148, 152, 159, 161, Miloševic,´ Slobodan, 5, 13, 59, 75, 162, 164, 223, 227, 228, 229, 232, 124, 132, 149, 150, 151, 152, 153, 235 154, 156, 159, 161, 162, 163, 167, NATO, 4, 5, 12, 14, 33, 52, 53, 54, 55, 168, 173, 174, 178, 179, 186, 191, 56, 60, 70, 79, 80, 82, 86, 88, 98, 228, 229, 232, 235 99, 100, 102, 103, 104, 106, 107, Minister of Foreign Affairs, see Foreign 108, 109, 110, 111, 113, 115, 116, Minister 117, 118, 134, 136, 137, 139, 152, Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), 35, 154, 156, 157, 160, 178, 180, 185, 50, 51, 57, 58, 62, 63, 64, 72, 75, 186, 187, 188, 189, 191, 192, 194, 77, 89, 128, 131, 137, 157, 181, 204, 211, 213, 228, 229, 230, 232, 182, 185, 202, 204, 208, 209, 210, 236, 238, 244 212, 244 accession, 84, 86, 109, 180, 183, minority, 7, 48, 54, 55, 74, 107, 126, 186, 192 149, 161, 164, 184, 186, 193, 195, Adriatic Charter, 178 214, 215, 227, 236 integration, 13, 84, 99, 103, 106, Albanian minority, 100, 107, 109, 108, 109, 110, 114, 115, 116, 114, 164, 193 135, 154, 176, 177, 185, 193 Bosnian Croats, 74, 76, 80, 125, Membership Action Plan (MAP), 135, 191, 228, 232 109, 111 Bosnian muslims, 131, 191 mission, 106, 109, 178, 229 Bosnian Serbs, 124, 125, 135, 149, North Atlantic Alliance, 176, 152, 153, 161, 163 178, 179 Croatian Serbs, 75, 149 partner, 30, 84, 106 ethnic, 48, 100, 114, 126, 164, Partnership for Peace, 75, 108, 111, 194, 236 156, 178, 192 Kosovo Albanian, 116, 154, 213, 214 NATO Summits minority right, 48, 60, 187 2000 Zagreb Summit, 75, 87 pan-Bosniak, 131, 132 2002 Prague Summit, 54 Serb, 74, 164, 228 2006 Riga Summit, 178, 192 254 Index

NATO Summits – continued Communist Party of the Soviet 2008 Chicago Summit, 187 Union (CPSU), 25, 26, 28 2012 Bucharest Summit, 111, 113 Communist Party of Yugoslavia Nikolic,´ Tomislav, 81, 82, 132, 157, (CPY), 18, 19, 21, 22, 24, 25, 26, 159, 160, 161, 168 27, 28, 31, 34 non-aligned Croat Democratic Union (HDZ), 74, countries, 33, 34, 53, 157 75, 77, 78, 82, 88, 123, 140 policy, 33, 34, 35, 38 Democratic League of Kosovo Non-Aligned Movement, 12, 15, 18, (LDK), 203, 206, 208, 217 19, 32, 33, 34, 53, 116, 117, Democratic Opposition of Serbia 160, 227 (DOS), 154 Nonalignment, see Non-Aligned Democratic Party (DS), 14, 74, 103, Movement 123, 154, 156, 159, 167, Non-intervention, 58, 60 174, 203 North Atlantic Cooperation Council Democratic Party of Kosovo (PDK), (NACC), 54 203, 206, 208 Democratic Party of Serbia (DSS), Office of International Cooperation 154, 156 and Regional Dialogue, 201 Democratic Party of Socialists (DPS), Official Development Assistance 14, 174, 176, 178, 181, 182 (ODA), 51, 60 Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Ohrid Framework Agreement, 98, 101, Organization – Democratic 103, 118 Party for Macedonian National opportunity, 35, 81, 148, 150, 186 Unity (VMRO-DPMNE), opposition, 5, 23, 50, 78, 85, 103, 106, 103, 112 133, 150, 154, 155, 156, 159, 174, Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), 180, 186, 189, 194, 206, 208, 211, 156, 160 228, 239 New Kosovo Alliance (AKR), 208 Organization of Islamic Conference Party of Democratic Action (OIC), 127 (SDA), 123 Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), Serbian Progressive Party (SNS), 159, 53, 55, 71, 127, 166, 181, 198, 160, 161 211, 212 Serb Renewal Movement (SPO), 123 Social Democratic Party (SDP), 74, Pacolli, Behxhet, 208, 209 77, 78, 82 Pariah state, 147, 148, 167 Socialist Party of Serbia (SPS), 156, parliament, 4, 35, 51, 57, 59, 69, 71, 159, 161 79, 80, 83, 101, 102, 105, 119, Socialist People’s Party (SNP), 129, 122, 157, 158, 159, 186, 195, 203 134, 138, 142 Party, 5, 6, 10, 22, 25, 26, 28, 31, 33, peace, 5, 14, 25, 34, 77, 79, 100, 102, 34, 50, 54, 70, 71, 74, 83, 88, 97, 108, 110, 123, 140, 152, 153, 166, 103, 104, 105, 114, 116, 117, 118, 211, 224, 229, 230, 231, 236, 239, 122, 123, 125, 133, 148, 150, 151, 243, 244 154, 156, 157, 158, 159, 160, 161, Peace Implementation Council, 129, 174, 180, 186, 193, 201, 206, 208, 134, 138, 142 209, 212, 217 People’s Commissariat of Internal Alliance of Independent Social Affairs (NKVD), 23 Democrats (SNSD), 129, 233 Permanent Court of Arbitration, 80 Index 255 political system, 19, 21, 36, 58, 60, 75, public opinion, 11, 50, 82, 105, 106, 97, 101, 103, 119, 198 107, 119, 136, 142, 148, 154, 166, power, 5, 10, 14, 19, 22, 50, 51, 52, 54, 177, 187, 188, 194, 195, 206, 62, 70, 71, 74, 75, 76, 77, 78, 82, 209, 215 83, 85, 100, 119, 123, 124, 127, 128, 131, 132, 133, 135, 137, 147, Racan,ˇ Ivica, 71, 75, 78, 159, 161, 165 148, 150, 151, 153, 156, 158, 167, rapprochement, 132, 158 174, 178, 180, 182, 201, 202, 210, realpolitik, 52, 228 225, 226, 230, 235, 236 recognition, 31, 47, 53, 56, 59, 61, 63, asymmetry, 70, 113 72, 86, 100, 108, 122, 124, 126, balance of, 85, 228 133, 134, 138, 139, 179, 184, 185, European, 125, 226, 227 199, 200, 201, 203, 204, 205, 206, hard, 58, 60, 236 207, 208, 209, 211, 214, 215, 217 normative, 60 international, 48, 49, 60, 62, 72, 83, political, 98, 102, 119, 192 84, 100, 102, 103, 106, 107, 110, 112, 126, 199, 204, 205, regional, 200, 206, 230 206, 210, 217 small, 50, 62 of Kosovo, 3, 6, 14, 59, 76, 82, 98, soft, 60, 230, 236, 239 115, 123, 156, 157, 161, 162, structural, 60 164, 176, 183, 184, 185, 187, vacuum, 138, 230 191, 193, 194, 198, 200, 202, veto, 113 204, 205, 206, 209, 210, 212, prejudice, 106, 185, 207 214, 215, 216 president, 18, 33, 34, 35, 37, 50, 51, of Macedonia, 108, 110, 113, 114, 52, 69, 70, 74, 75, 76, 77, 79, 81, 115, 134 82, 83, 85, 87, 88, 89, 98, 101, myth of early, 73, 87 102, 103, 105, 118, 119, 128, 129, reconciliation, 14, 30, 31, 76, 119, 157 130, 132, 136, 141, 151, 152, 153, refugee, 80, 81, 88, 89, 111, 185, 154, 156, 158, 159, 160, 161, 162, 213, 214 163, 165, 168, 174, 180, 181, 182, regional, 3, 4, 10, 56, 57, 58, 62, 71, 187, 189, 203, 208, 210, 217, 76, 84, 89, 99, 100, 106, 176, 198, 229, 233 200, 202, 206, 207, 208, 210, 213, Prime Minister, 18, 33, 78, 79, 80, 81, 216, 224, 226, 227, 232, 237, 82, 101, 102, 132, 154, 156, 158, 238, 242 159, 160, 161, 165, 167, 174, 182, cooperation, 60, 78, 79, 80, 82, 85, 205, 207, 208, 210 88, 89, 103, 108, 110, 111, 114, Pristina, 115, 160, 162, 165, 207, 115, 165, 180, 183, 184, 186, 208, 211 190, 192, 193, 194, 204 process, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 12, 13, 28, 30, 33, forum, 3, 207, 216 47, 50, 51, 53, 55, 57, 59, 62, 64, initiative, 57, 64, 114 69, 79, 80, 81, 84, 86, 99, 103, integration, 56, 99, 237 104, 105, 108, 109, 111, 112, 114, issue, 76, 177, 187 119, 122, 123, 127, 130, 133, 148, network, 78, 79 166, 167, 176, 178, 181, 188, 201, organization, 30, 107, 108, 165, 207 202, 204, 206, 208, 210, 212, 214, politics, 102, 165 216, 225, 226, 227, 231, 238, 241, regionalism, 55 243, 245 security, 30, 111, 178 propaganda, 23, 33, 36, 58, 60 stability, 185, 243 prosecution, 18, 37, 76, 81, 229 transformation, 224, 225 256 Index

Regional Cooperation Council (RCC), religious leader, 131, 216 52, 79, 88, 111, 245 Amfilohije, 183, 195 relation, 10, 13, 14, 23, 26, 30, 31, 38, Ceric,´ Mustafa, 130, 131 47, 50, 53, 57, 60, 61, 71, 74, 75, Pavle, 152 76, 77, 78, 79, 81, 82, 84, 85, 87, Pope Paul VI, 34 88, 100, 103, 104, 106, 108, 110, Repression, 18, 21, 34 112, 114, 115, 116, 117, 118, 129, Republic of Croatia, 3, 4, 5, 7, 10, 11, 131, 132, 133, 134, 135, 136, 139, 12, 13, 20, 35, 49, 57, 59, 60, 69, 148, 150, 152, 156, 157, 161, 162, 70, 71, 72, 73, 74, 75, 76, 77, 78, 163, 164, 165, 175, 178, 179, 183, 79, 80, 81, 82, 83, 84, 85, 86, 87, 185, 187, 189, 193, 205, 210, 211, 89, 98, 111, 113, 114, 115, 116, 212, 214, 224, 241 122, 123, 128, 131, 133, 134, 138, bilateral, 51, 53, 57, 58, 59, 81, 85, 139, 141, 148, 149, 151, 152, 154, 86, 99, 100, 113, 115, 141, 161, 161, 162, 163, 164, 174, 176, 183, 162, 163, 178, 179, 180, 189, 184, 190, 191, 192, 193, 203, 214, 210, 214 228, 229, 230, 240, 245 diplomatic, 21, 38, 72, 77, 100, 107, foreign policy, 13, 70, 72, 75, 78, 84, 108, 110, 114, 115, 119, 132, 85, 87 133, 134, 138, 164, 175, 179, Republic of Kosovo, 3, 4, 6, 7, 11, 12, 181, 183, 185, 191, 204, 14, 25, 57, 59, 82, 98, 107, 111, 212, 214 114, 115, 116, 131, 132, 133, 134, foreign, 9, 35, 77, 85, 137, 147, 156, 147, 148, 149, 150, 152, 153, 154, 166, 176, 177, 178, 181, 192, 155, 156, 157, 158, 159, 160, 161, 193, 199 165, 185, 191, 195, 198, 199, 200, friendly, 106, 164, 179, 180 201, 202, 203, 204, 205, 206, 207, good neighborly, 14, 60, 78, 107, 208, 209, 210, 211, 212, 213, 214, 114, 183, 184, 185, 187, 215, 216, 217, 224, 228, 229, 230, 193, 204 235, 240, 241, 244, 245 multilateral, 51, 178 crisis, 5, 153 foreign policy, 14, 199, 203, 206, normalization of, 73, 155, 163, 209, 210, 211 165, 207 independence, 5, 14, 115, 133, 155, Soviet-Yugoslav, 22, 30, 31, 32 156, 157, 161, 162, 163, 164, special, 128, 132, 147, 204, 210 165, 176, 185, 187, 191, 198, special and parallel, 128, 132, 199, 200, 202, 203, 204, 206, 133, 139 207, 210, 211, 213, 214, 215, religion, 34, 215 216, 229 religious community, 130, 131, 195 status, 154, 156, 160, 165, 198, 208, Catholic Church, 34, 79, 131, 141, 210, 238, 240 215, 225 Republic of Macedonia, see Macedonia Christian, 74, 87, 225 name dispute, 4, 5, 14, 77, 98, 102, Islamic Community, 130, 131, 141 103, 104, 106, 108, 109, 110, Macedonian Orthodox Church, 112, 113, 114, 118, 119, 134 105, 164 Republic of Serbia, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 9, 10, Muslim, 131, 140, 141, 163, 190, 12, 14, 20, 25, 57, 72, 73, 74, 75, 191, 194, 195, 215, 216 76, 81, 82, 85, 89, 98, 106, 114, Serb Orthodox Church (SPC), 131, 115, 116, 128, 131, 132, 133, 134, 141, 151, 152, 153, 183, 195 138, 139, 141, 147, 148, 149, 150, Vatican, 34, 38, 72, 73, 86 151, 152, 153, 154, 155, 156, 157, Index 257

158, 159, 160, 161, 162, 163, 164, Slovenia, see Republic of Slovenia 165, 166, 167, 168, 173, 174, 175, socialism, 18, 19, 27, 28, 31, 32, 34, 176, 177, 180, 182, 183, 184, 185, 35, 38, 60, 62, 227, 237 186, 187, 190, 191, 192, 193, 194, Socialist Federal Republic of 198, 200, 202, 205, 206, 207, 209, Yugoslavia (SFRY), 7, 11, 13, 15, 212, 214, 215, 216, 223, 224, 226, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 228, 229, 230, 235, 238, 241, 245 27, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, foreign policy, 14, 147, 148, 149, 37, 38, 47, 49, 53, 55, 57, 58, 60, 150, 153, 154, 157, 158, 160, 61, 62, 63, 70, 72, 76, 79, 84, 98, 167, 192, 228 99, 101, 104, 106, 114, 117, 118, Republic of Slovenia, 3, 4, 5, 7, 11, 12, 122, 123, 124, 132, 140, 147, 148, 13, 20, 35, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 149, 150, 151, 167, 168, 173, 177, 53, 54, 55, 56, 57, 58, 59, 60, 61, 200, 210, 227, 237 62, 63, 64, 71, 72, 73, 79, 80, 86, break-up, 3, 5, 73, 79, 80, 81, 85, 86, 88, 98, 108, 114, 115, 116, 123, 89, 123, 148, 150 133, 134, 148, 149, 151, 164, 183, disintegration of, 49, 123, 151, 190, 192, 193, 203, 214, 228, 229, 161, 227 230, 240, 245 foreign policy, 8, 13, 18, 60, 117 foreign policy, 13, 47, 50, 52, 53, 54, former, 5, 53, 54, 69, 70, 71, 76, 78, 55, 56, 57, 58, 61, 62 82, 89, 100, 105, 111, 114, 126, Republika Srpska (RS), 9, 124, 128, 137, 153, 161, 179, 183 129, 130, 131, 133, 134, 135, 136, society, 7, 9, 18, 27, 33, 48, 50, 52, 137, 139, 140, 141, 147, 163, 190, 104, 142, 149, 162, 179, 208, 209, 191, 214, 233 235, 242, 243, 245 foreign policy, 129, 130 Southeast Europe, 20, 21, 22, 52, 55, reputation, 25, 114, 116, 147, 167, 56, 88, 127, 226, 230, 245 209, 243 sovereignty, 3, 26, 31, 48, 58, 102, responsibility, 37, 52, 80, 128, 140, 106, 107, 109, 127, 132, 133, 134, 156, 158, 162, 211, 229, 232, 245 136, 139, 140, 180, 195, 198, 202, Rocen,´ Milan, 182 216, 224, 238 rule of law, 60, 109, 157, 202, 212, 235 Soviet Union (USSR), 8, 19, 21, 22, 23, Russia, 4, 11, 21, 56, 85, 129, 131, 138, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 31, 34, 38, 139, 152, 157, 160, 167, 176, 179, 60, 62 182, 186, 187, 189, 190, 191, 192, 194, 198, 203, 211, 212, 224, 226, Stability Pact, see Regional 227, 238, 242 Cooperation Council Stabilization and Association Sanader, Ivo, 78, 88 Agreement (SAA), 5, 6, 109, 111, Sarajevo, 123, 124, 125, 126, 131, 119, 157, 177, 181, 212, 224, 245 142, 153 Stalin, Josip, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, Schengen, 115 28, 30, 37 secession, 12, 115, 116, 149, 155, 163, State-building, 3, 15, 86, 99, 104, 199, 164, 207, 228 217, 240, 241 Second World War, 18, 19, 21, 22, 25, statehood, 61, 72, 100, 103, 110, 112, 29, 48, 55, 123, 140, 147, 149, 227 114, 135, 175, 182, 183, 184, 194, self-determination, 3, 240 198, 199, 204, 205, 207, 239 Serbian Academy of Science and Arts consolidation of, 204, 240, 241 (SANU), 148 prerogative, 199, 203, 217 Serbia, see Republic of Serbia State-within-state, 130 258 Index

State Union of Serbia and General Assembly, 82, 135, 155, Montenegro, see Federal Republic 158, 206, 207, 208 of Yugoslavia (FRY) Interim Administration Mission in structure, 13, 34, 35, 51, 70, 72, 74, Kosovo (UNMIK), 201, 202, 81, 85, 99, 105, 110, 114, 117, 208, 212, 216 118, 124, 126, 128, 130, 131, 134, resolution, 64, 73, 82, 126, 135, 140, 136, 147, 165, 183, 200, 201, 203, 150, 201, 202, 206, 207, 212 204, 207, 226, 228, 229, 230, 231, sanction, 58, 74, 135, 150, 153, 154, 233, 235, 237, 242, 243 166, 236 student protest, 148 Security Council, 55, 64, 73, 82, 85, subjectivity, 69, 198, 199, 203, 204, 126, 134, 140, 198, 201, 202, 205, 217 206, 228 succession, 49, 58, 59, 63, 80, 110 UNESCO, 153, 181, 236 successor state, 49, 57, 71, 78, 79, 137, UNPREDEP, 100 149, 155, 161, 164 UNTAES, 73, 74 United States (US), 4, 5, 7, 8, 9, 11, 12, Tadic,´ Boris, 76, 81, 130, 132, 141, 13, 14, 20, 22, 24, 27, 29, 31, 32, 154, 156, 157, 158, 159, 162, 163, 34, 36, 37, 38, 60, 72, 82, 83, 84, 167, 168 85, 86, 87, 88, 113, 122, 123, 125, Tahiri, Edita, 208 126, 129, 135, 136, 138, 150, 151, Temporary Accord, see Interim Accord 152, 154, 157, 167, 168, 174, 175, territorial integrity, 109, 110, 115, 178, 179, 184, 187, 189, 190, 192, 116, 127, 140 193, 194, 195, 199, 200, 203, 204, Thaçi, Hashim, 165, 207 210, 211, 214, 216, 217, 224, 227, Tito, Josip Broz, 13, 18, 22, 30, 31, 228, 230, 232, 233, 238, 240, 241, 151, 237 242, 245 tourism, 36, 85 Atlantic Council, 187 Trajkovski, Boris, 103 transformation, 3, 23, 69, 97, 155, Vance-Owen Peace Plan, 125 224, 229, 240 veto, 5, 59, 98, 104, 107, 110, 112, transition, 4, 11, 70, 71, 73, 101, 103, 113, 115, 116, 118, 182, 212 127, 174, 202, 223, 224, 241 Vienna Agreement on Succession transparency, 51, 208 Issues, 49 treaty, 20, 21, 23, 25, 49, 63, 105, 141 Visa, 15, 36, 115, 156, 212 Tuąman, Franjo, 5, 10, 69, 71, 73, 74, liberalization, 115, 117, 212 75, 76, 82, 87, 128, 133, 162 regime, 57, 115, 203 Turkey, 11, 14, 20, 30, 85, 131, 132, Visegrád Group, 53 136, 138, 203, 206, 210, 213, 214, 226 Vuciˇ c,´ Aleksandar, 159 Vujanovic,´ Filip, 182 United Nations (UN), 14, 34, 49, 53, 55, 64, 72, 73, 82, 98, 100, 106, war, 12, 13, 20, 22, 24, 25, 32, 38, 49, 107, 108, 112, 113, 124, 125, 126, 53, 72, 73, 80, 81, 87, 99, 100, 127, 134, 140, 150, 153, 155, 157, 104, 108, 123, 124, 125, 138, 139, 160, 181, 198, 199, 200, 201, 202, 147, 149, 161, 162, 163, 164, 210, 204, 206, 207, 208, 210, 211, 212, 224, 225, 226, 228, 230, 231, 228, 229, 230, 236 239, 244 arms embargo, 54, 73, 125, 126, 139 Balkan, 74, 223, 226, 245 Index 259

in Bosnia, 80, 87, 111, 123, 125, Yugoslav 135, 139, 140, 150, 151, 152, citizen, 15, 19, 33, 35, 36, 37 154, 184 foreign policy, 8, 13, 18, 28, 30, 38, crime, 5, 24, 81, 82, 147, 150, 154, 47, 58, 59, 60, 61, 99, 117, 157, 162 167, 240 defensive, 74, 236 former- -republic, 50, 54, 62, 64, 78, of disintegration, 174, 183, 191 107, 110, 114, 115, 152, 173, in Kosovo, 111, 116, 154, 213 184, 186, 214 prisoner of, 21, 63 People’s Army (JNA), 32, 49, 71, 72, Serbo-Croatian, 111, 151, 152, 73, 81, 98, 149, 162 154, 174 post--states,3,4,5,6,7,9,10,11, ten day, 49, 72, 149 12, 13, 14, 15, 47, 57, 59, 61, veteran, 87, 104, 105 131, 148, 161, 164, 175, 176, Yugoslav/in former Yugoslavia, 11, 179, 182, 183, 184, 191, 192, 61, 64, 76, 85, 111, 183 193, 198, 223, 224, 231, 232, Warsaw Pact, 19, 31, 33, 54, 227 233, 237, 239, 240, 241, 242, Washington Agreement, see Dayton 243, 244 Peace Agreement Yugoslavia, see Socialist Federal World Bank, 32, 198 Republic of Yugoslavia World Bosniak Congress, 131 World Trade Organization (WTO), zone of interest, 139 127, 182, 195 Žužul, Miomir, 78