Israel and the Middle East News Update

Thursday, March 2

Headlines:  Ministers to Debate Bill to Apply Sovereignty to Ma’ale Adumim  Poll: Public Feels Netanyahu Failed on the Tunnels But Most Fit to Lead  Gantz: ‘My Troops Are the Ones Who Grade Me’  Trump Suggests Wave of Anti-Semitism False Flag by Jews  Senior Intel Official: Syria Tops 's Security Agenda  IDF Intelligence Director: Gaza on Verge of Explosion  Gaza Rocket Attacks Sparked by Hamas Crackdown on Pro-IS Groups

Commentary:  Al-Monitor: “How ’s Gaza War Report Became a Political Battlefield”  By Mazal Mualem, Israel Pule Columnist, Al-Monitor  TOI: “Israel Stuck in Tunnels of Yesteryear, But Hamas Is Digging Right Now”  By Avi Issacharoff, Middle East Analyst, Times of Israel

S. Daniel Abraham Center for Middle East Peace 633 Pennsylvania Ave. NW, 5th Floor, Washington, DC 20004 www.centerpeace.org ● Yoni Komorov, Editor ● David Abreu, Associate Editor

News Excerpts March 2, 2017

Ma’ariv Ministers to Debate Bill to Apply Sovereignty to Ma’ale Adumim On Sunday, The Ministerial Committee for Legislation is scheduled to discuss the bill to apply Israeli sovereignty to Maale Adumim, which will put to the test the new relationship between the Trump administration and the Israeli government. The bill was introduced by MKs Yoav Kisch () and (Jewish Home). The explanation to the bill says that Ma’ale Adumim has always and forever been an inseparable part of the historic Land of Israel and that there is a broad consensus in Israel and in the world that it should come under Israeli sovereignty. See also, “Ma'ale Adumim Pushes for a Sunday Ministerial Vote on Annexation” (Jerusalem Post)

NRG Poll: Netanyahu Failed on the Tunnels But Most Fit to Lead Channel One reported a poll it commissioned that found a majority of the Israeli public believes Prime Minister Netanyahu is the figure who is most responsible for the tunnel fiasco in Operation Protective Edge. Conducted against the backdrop of the release of the state comptroller’s report on Gaza and despite the public holding Netanyahu responsible, it also considers him the figure most fit for the job of prime minister. Chairman is the leading figure after Netanyahu. See also, “Amos Yadlin: State Comptroller Adopted a Childish Approach” (Arutz Sheva)

Ynet News Gantz: ‘My Troops Are the Ones Who Grade Me’ The day after State Comptroller Yosef Shapira’s report about the mistakes of Operation Protective Edge was released, , who was chief of staff at the time, responded to the criticism that was leveled at him. In a relaxed and restrained interview with Channel Two News, he rejected the criticism and termed it “hindsight.” He said he was at peace with what he had done and directed implied criticism at the members of the security cabinet in the course of the operation.

Ha’aretz Trump Suggests Wave of Anti-Semitism False Flag by Jews US President Donald Trump on Tuesday indicated for the second time he believes it is possible the current wave of anti-Semitism could be “false flags” – perpetrated by the left or Jews themselves to make his administration look bad. Trump spoke to a gathering of state attorney generals including Pennsylvania Attorney General Josh Shapiro. Shapiro told reporters in a conference call after the meeting that Trump suggested the attacks could reflect something other than anti-Semitism, saying “the reverse can be true…someone’s doing it to make others look bad,” according to Philly.com. See also, “Trump Is Flirting with the Idea that Anti-Semitic Incidents Are False Flag – Yet Again” (Washington Post) See also, “Trump Surrogate Walks Back 'False Flag' Tweet on JCC Threat” (Forward)

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Times of Israel Senior Intel Official: Syria Tops Jerusalem's Security Agenda Despite ongoing concerns over Iran’s nuclear ambitions, dealing with threats emanating from the Syrian war theater currently tops the agenda of Israel’s security apparatus, according to a top intelligence official. “The most important strategic issue we’re currently facing is the strengthening of the Shiite axis led by Iran in Syria, especially after the fall of Aleppo,” Chagai Tzuriel, the director- general of the Intelligence Ministry, said Wednesday. In mid-December, pro-government forces captured the war-torn city from the hands of rebels fighters. “Syria is the key arena, because it’s a microcosm of everything: world powers, such as Russia and the US; regional actors such as Iran and Turkey; and rival groups within the country, such the Assad regime, the opposition, the Kurds and the Islamic State,” Tzuriel told The Times of Israel during a recent briefing in his Jerusalem office. “Whatever happens in Syria today will greatly impact the region, and beyond, for years to come.”

Yedioth Ahronoth IDF Intelligence Director: Gaza on Verge of Explosion Director of Military Intelligence Maj. Gen. Hertzi Halevy yesterday gave an intelligence review to the members of the Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee that contained both a calming message and an urgent warning. One day after the state comptroller’s report was released that criticized the government for ignoring the dire economic situation in Gaza on the eve of Operation Protective Edge—which could have prevented the outbreak of the fighting—Halevy described a situation not much different: participants at the meeting said that Halevy said that there was a terrible humanitarian crisis in the Gaza Strip that was liable to lead to an explosion. That said, he contended that Hamas did not want a clash at this stage. In the territories, in contrast, his diagnosis was more troubling: Halevy said that if the PA residents did not immediately see anything on the peace horizon—a clash in the West Bank was likely.

Times of Israel Gaza Rockets Sparked by Hamas Crackdown on Pro-IS Groups The spate of recent rocket attacks against Israel from Gaza are reportedly the result of increased tension between Hamas and extremist Salafist groups in the Strip. According to a report Thursday in the pan-Arab daily Asharq al-Awsat, Hamas has arrested hundreds of Salafis in recent months, including noncombatants. In order to put pressure on Hamas to release the prisoners, Salafi militants who identify with the Islamic State terror group and seek to turn Gaza into a caliphate have been firing rockets at Israel, which they know result in costly Israeli retaliations against Hamas property and sometimes its members. See also, “Rocket Fired into Israel from Gaza Second Time this Week” (BICOM) See also, “UN Envoy Slams Rocket Attack from Gaza” (Times of Israel)

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Al-Monitor – February 28, 2017 How Israel’s Gaza War Report Became a Political Battlefield By Mazal Mualem  Education Minister and HaBayit HaYehudi Chair was in high spirits as he wandered the halls of the on Feb. 27. In fact, the members of his party noted that he seemed unusually pleased with himself. Just one day before the release of the state comptroller's report on the performance of the Security Cabinet and the military leadership during the 2014 Operation Protective Edge in Gaza (with much of the report’s content leaked to the press), Bennett could claim an enormous victory. Indeed, the report describes him as the only minister who demanded that Israel take action against the threat posed by Hamas’ terror tunnels.  An old rabbinic adage says, "He who works hard before the Sabbath will have what to eat on the Sabbath." It could easily refer to Bennett, who was a member of the Security Cabinet during the operation. Even as the fighting was underway, he made a point of branding himself as the campaign's political victor. He was the young minister who challenged the prime minister, the defense minister and the chief of staff, all of whom failed in their management of the fighting in Gaza.  Bennett showed an unprecedented level of sophistication by shifting the public discourse about the operation to the threat posed by the Hamas attack tunnels. As the report shows, not only did he convince the public, he even managed to convince the state comptroller himself that the most important way to assess Operation Protective Edge should be through that prism. Bennett operated like a well-oiled PR machine in the month preceding the report's release. Military and political pundits and senior media figures alike all received personal briefings from him. This prepared Bennett for the inevitable political fighting both preceding and following the report's Feb. 28 release.  Prime Minister , Moshe Ya'alon, who was defense minister at the time of the fighting, and then-Chief of Staff Benny Gantz waged a media campaign of their own in an effort to undermine the state comptroller's findings, which were very critical of them. Meanwhile, Bennett made some last-minute adjustments to his own efforts. In the days before the report’s release, he briefed the members of his faction about its findings and recruited them to continue with his political and media campaign — a campaign designed to intensify as the report would be published. In closed-door party meetings, Bennett could finally show his Knesset colleagues that he was "providing them with the goods," as the head of a party with eyes on the prime minister's office. On the night before the report was published, Bennett shared his version of events again, this time at a meeting with party activists.  Bennett's new status as the political beneficiary of the criticism surrounding Operation Protective Edge bolsters his standing within his party and among the right at large. When confronting Netanyahu and Ya'alon, his two main rivals for the leadership of the right, he can now present himself as a security hawk who has a better understanding of the threats posed by the campaign in Gaza. Along the way, he is also firing off a warning shot at an emerging political threat by challenging the professionalism of Gantz, someone frequently mentioned as a candidate for Labor Party leadership. 4

 The one person who tried, without much success, to shift the discussion about Operation Protective Edge away from the threat posed by the tunnels was former Justice Minister , who was also a member of the Cabinet at the time of the operation. As a former foreign minister, too, Livni is one of the most experienced politicians when it comes to serving as a Cabinet member during a military campaign. She was there for the Second Lebanon War in 2006 and for Operation Cast Lead in Gaza, 2008-2009. In a conversation with Al-Monitor on Feb. 27, Livni said that the most important conclusion to be derived from the way the Cabinet functioned during Operation Protective Edge is that Israel has no real policy regarding the Gaza Strip. That, she continued, should be the focus of discussion.  In a stinging rebuff of Bennett, she noted that "during Operation Protective Edge, the Cabinet was busy dealing with tactics, rather than with strategy." Livni said she tried spearheading an initiative that would successfully end the fighting and offer Israel achievements vis-a-vis Hamas. Her proposal called for the demilitarization of Gaza in exchange for its reconstruction and rehabilitation. The UN Security Council was prepared to accept her proposal, which would have given Israel license to take action against the tunnels and Hamas' rocket fire against Israel. Nevertheless, she claimed, the prime minister blocked it. Another politician who served during the operation as a senior Cabinet minister also told Al-Monitor that Livni sought to divert the internal wars in the Cabinet to the diplomatic field.  On Feb. 27 at the Knesset, Netanyahu received an especially warm reception from his faction’s members. He came out swinging at the state comptroller in what can only be described as a preemptive strike in the media before the report’s publication. In the report, the comptroller points a finger at Netanyahu for ignoring the tunnel threat and for failing to even hold a Cabinet discussion about it until the fighting commenced. "The truly important lessons” are not in the comptroller's report, Netanyahu noted. “We've delivered Hamas the hardest blow it has ever suffered. … We acted with force and responsibility and in full coordination between the political and military ranks."  Having resigned from his post as minister and Knesset member last year, Ya'alon has been waging for a while now his own battle from outside the Knesset's walls. He is fighting to preserve his good reputation, despite the report’s findings and Bennett's own version of events. According to Bennett, Ya'alon failed to instruct the Israel Defense Forces to come up with an operational plan to handle the tunnel threat, and he misestimated how ready Hamas really was to embark on a protracted campaign. Ya'alon responded with a disparaging attack on Bennett, claiming that Bennett tried to score political points during the operation, and that he continues to do so today. He even called Bennett the "Minister of Leaks."  By focusing on tactical issues, the report succeeded in turning a public discussion about the hostilities into a political battle. That is unfortunate.  The public received and continues to receive vast amounts of information, including conflicting versions of events and accounts of infighting in the media. What the report failed to provide is a focused discussion about serious issues, which is, in itself, a huge disservice to the families of the 73 soldiers and civilians who died during the operation. That is also why discussions surrounding the report are only accessible and meaningful to a very limited group of interested parties, those being the very people who pull the strings.

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 The political impact of the report is much more limited in scope than Bennett would like to believe. It contains no operative conclusions regarding Netanyahu, Ya'alon or Gantz. Furthermore, those three principals actually find themselves on the same side, rather than squabbling with each other, while Livni isn't attacking any of them from the opposition benches. In other words, the report will not have a corrosive effect, whether on the right or the left. In that sense, it is a sharp contrast to the Winograd Commission Report after the Second Lebanon War. Mazal Mualem is a columnist for Al-Monitor's Israel Pulse and formerly the senior political correspondent for Ma’ariv and Ha’aretz. She also presents a weekly TV show covering social issues on the Knesset channel.

Summary: Bennett showed an unprecedented level of sophistication by shifting the public discourse about the operation to the threat posed by the Hamas attack tunnels. As the report shows, not only did he convince the public, he even managed to convince the state comptroller himself that the most important way to assess Operation Protective Edge should be through that prism. Bennett operated like a well-oiled PR machine in the month preceding the report's release. Military and political pundits and senior media figures alike all received personal briefings from him. This prepared Bennett for the inevitable political fighting both preceding and following the report's Feb. 28 release.

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Times of Israel – February 28, 2017 Israel Stuck in Tunnels of Yesteryear, Hamas Digging Right Now By Avi Issacharoff, Middle East Analyst for Times of Israel  Hamas is still tunneling. With or without the state comptroller’s report, it tunnels almost without respite, and without paying much heed to the incessant Israeli chatter regarding the war that ended two and half years ago.  More and more ink is spilled in Israel, pages upon pages in an orgy of analysis, opinions and declarations, culminating in a report, Tuesday, that set out conclusions everybody already knew. Pages upon pages that do nothing to change the result of that war. And that will probably not impact the next war, either.  The State of Israel continues to look for scapegoats, and to highlight failures, even when many of the people responsible are long gone — including 2014’s IDF chief of staff Benny Gantz and defense minister Moshe Ya’alon.  Israel plainly doesn’t really know how to prepare for the next war; only for the previous one. That was the case, too, with the Second Lebanon War in 2006.  Hamas is still tunneling, 24/7, in shifts.  Hamas’s tunnel unit has become one of the most prestigious in the Gaza terror-government’s military wing, and the men who enlist in it are accorded superhero status in the Strip, receiving particularly fat salaries.  But Israel is still living in the past, in the tunnels of yesteryear.  It’s hard to believe amid the crescendo of 2014 recrimination generated by Tuesday’s comptroller report, but the fact is that Hamas has already got at least 15 tunnels under the border with Israel. Right now.  Meanwhile inside Gaza, a subterranean network thrives — criss-crossing over tens of miles — transferring supplies, enabling gunmen to move around at will.  Residents of , who are living amid years of construction for a city subway project, can only be jealous of the dizzying pace at which the diggers move beneath Gaza and at the border.  The IDF has upped its preparedness and training to try to confront the tunnel threat. There has been much talk of the barrier Israel is constructing to block the cross-border tunnels. But nobody expects such a barrier to be completed within the next couple of years. Despite the comptroller’s report, with its repetition of the familiar litany of failures, therefore, Israel still lacks an effective defense against the Hamas tunnels. Israel also still lacks an effective response to Hamas’s ongoing rearmament.  This is where the ongoing failure lies.

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 The politicians, and the media, obsess about the last war. But nobody is talking about initiating an operation, or taking any other effective action, to counter the current threat deepening, literally, under our feet.  Nobody wants to start another war by taking preemptive action. And therefore, it is clear that in the event of another round of conflict with Hamas, Israel will again be vulnerable to attack via cross-border tunnels. And if that next round of conflict develops into a full-scale war, the IDF will not encounter too many Hamas fighters above ground. There’ll all be in the internal Gaza tunnels.  For decades, the IDF has trained for warfare via columns of tanks, taking control of enemy areas. Has it trained for battle in the arena Hamas has now prepared for it inside Gaza? Given the insistence on looking backward rather than ahead, as exemplified by Tuesday’s report and the clamor it has attracted, one doubts it.  On Monday evening, the Hamas military wing issued a statement in which it indicated that if Israel again responds to a rocket attack in the way that the IDF did on Monday, by targeting several Hamas positions across Gaza, it will escalate its response. That may prove to be an empty threat, but experience suggests it would not be wise to take it lightly. Hamas cannot afford to appear weak, but that is the impression that has been created in recent days. The sense has been created that it is afraid of another major confrontation with Israel.  If there is one useful conclusion to be drawn from the comptroller’s report, much more useful than his comments about the tunnels, it is his assertion that IDF military intelligence failed to accurately gauge Hamas’s appetite for war. At the very beginning of 2014’s Operation Protective Edge, the assessment of IDF military intelligence was that Hamas was eager to end the fighting. At a series of briefings in the early days of the war, military intelligence declared that Hamas was weak, had been dealt punishing blows, and wanted to cry uncle. Those assessments, for some reason, overlooked what Hamas considered to be its achievements, as well as its conviction that it was scoring many points in Gazan and wider Arab public opinion. Those assessments, for some reason, failed to internalize Hamas’s desire to continue fighting, and its belief that it was poised at a historic turning point. Military intelligence missed its mark.  Hamas was wrong to believe that the war would enable it to dramatically change the Gaza reality, by pressuring Israel into lifting the security blockade and/or consenting to the construction of sea or air ports. It was wrong, but its confidence meant it was not looking for a swift end to the fighting.  Ahead of the next conflict, Israel should realize that gauging the true intentions of Hamas — and of Hezbollah, in southern Lebanon, for that matter — is far from simple. It’s not only in Israel that politicians’ actions are affected by concerns about public opinion. It’s not only in Israel that there are those who believe the nonsense spouted in conventional and social media. And it’s not only in Israel that decision makers put their own political interests ahead of those of their people.

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Summary: But Israel is still living in the past, in the tunnels of yesteryear. It’s hard to believe amid the crescendo of 2014 recrimination generated by Tuesday’s comptroller report, but the fact is that Hamas has already got at least 15 tunnels under the border with Israel. Right now. Meanwhile inside Gaza, a subterranean network thrives — criss-crossing over tens of miles — transferring supplies, enabling gunmen to move around at will.

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