Issue 86, 3rd Quarter 2017 JOINT FORCE QUARTERLY

On Strategy Itself An Interview with Kurt W. Tidd Where Rumsfeld Got It Right ISSUE EIGHTY-SIX, 3 RD QUARTER 2017 Joint Force Quarterly Founded in 1993 • Vol. 86, 3rd Quarter 2017 http://ndupress.ndu.edu

Gen Joseph F. Dunford, Jr., USMC, Publisher MajGen Frederick M. Padilla, USMC, President, NDU

Editor in Chief Col William T. Eliason, USAF (Ret.), Ph.D.

Executive Editor Jeffrey D. Smotherman, Ph.D.

Production Editor John J. Church, D.M.A.

Internet Publications Editor Joanna E. Seich

Book Review Editor Frank G. Hoffman, Ph.D.

Associate Editor Patricia Strait, Ph.D.

Art Director Marco Marchegiani, U.S. Government Printing Office

Intern Aidan M. Low

Advisory Committee COL Michael S. Bell, USA (Ret.), Ph.D./College of International Security Affairs; Brig Gen Christopher A. Coffelt, USAF/Air War College; Col David J. Eskelund, USMC/Marine Corps War College; BG Paul H. Fredenburgh III, USA/Dwight D. Eisenhower School for National Security and Resource Strategy; RADM Janice M. Hamby, USN (Ret.)/College of Information and Cyberspace; RADM Jeffrey A. Harley, USN/U.S. Naval War College; Brig Gen Darren E. Hartford, USAF/National War College; Brig Gen (Sel) Brian E. Hastings, USAF/Air Command and Staff College; LTG Michael D. Lundy, USA/U.S. Army Command and General Staff College; LTG William C. Mayville, Jr., USA/The Joint Staff; Col William McCollough, USMC/Marine Corps Command and Staff College; MG William E. Rapp, USA/U.S. Army War College; RDML Jeffrey Ruth/Joint Forces Staff College; VADM Kevin D. Scott, USN/The Joint Staff

Editorial Board Richard K. Betts/Columbia University; Stephen D. Chiabotti/ School of Advanced Air and Space Studies; Eliot A. Cohen/ The Johns Hopkins University; COL Joseph J. Collins, USA (Ret.)/ Center for Complex Operations; Richard L. DiNardo/Marine Corps Command and Staff College; Aaron L. Friedberg/Princeton University; Bryon Greenwald/Joint Forces Staff College; Douglas N. Hime/Naval War College; Col Jerome M. Lynes, USMC (Ret.)/ The Joint Staff; Kathleen Mahoney-Norris/Air Command and Staff College; Thomas L. McNaugher/Georgetown University; Col Mark Pizzo, USMC (Ret.)/National War College; LtGen Bernard E. Trainor, USMC (Ret.); Bert B. Tussing/U.S. Army War College

Printed in St. Louis, Missouri, by

Cover 2 images (top to bottom): Logistics Specialist 1st Class Amber Wilson reacts to being selected as 2016 CNO Shore Sailor of the Year after Vice Chief of Naval Operations makes announcement, April 20, 2017 (U.S. Navy/Taylor N. Stinson); Lithuanian girl holds rocket launcher at static display in Visaginas, as militaries from several countries taking part in Exercise Iron Sword 16, including the United States, interacted with and demonstrated their gear to locals and visitors, November 26, 2016 (U.S. Marine Corps/Kirstin Merrimarahajara); Soldiers celebrate third-period goal during 3rd annual Army vs. Air Force hockey game, which Army won in overtime, January 9, 2017 (U.S. Army/John Pennell) About the Cover In this Issue Airman secures outside of hardened facility after neutralizing opposing force during Battlefield Leaders Dialogue Assaulter Course, Integrated 2 From the Chairman Combat Essentials, on Ramstein Air Base, Germany, May 30, 2015 (U.S. Air Force/Ryan Crane) Forum 4 Executive Summary 6 An Interview with Kurt W. Tidd 11 U.S. Southern Command: Evolving to Meet 21st- Century Challenges By Kurt W. Tidd and Tyler W. Morton Features 20 Strategic Competition: 122 Joint Publication 3-0, Beyond Peace and War 86 Autonomous Weapons Joint Operations Systems Safety By Daniel Burkhart and Alison Woody By Rick Rowlett By Brian K. Hall 28 Black Is the New Red: 124 Joint Doctrine Update Containing Jihad 94 The Trouble with Mission Command: Flexive By Scott Englund Command and the Future Joint Force Quarterly is published by the National 35 Respecting Strategic Agency: of Command and Control Defense University Press for the Chairman of the On the Categorization By Andrew Hill and Heath Niemi Joint Chiefs of Staff. JFQ is the Chairman’s flagship joint military and security studies journal designed to of War in Strategy inform members of the U.S. Armed Forces, allies, and 101 Learning to Fish in Murky By Lukas Milevski other partners on joint and integrated operations; Waters: The Missing Link national security policy and strategy; efforts to combat terrorism; homeland security; and developments in in Capacity-Building training and joint professional military education to JPME Today By Stephen E. Webber and transform America’s military and security apparatus Donald E. Vandergriff to meet tomorrow’s challenges better while protecting 41 Professional Military Education freedom today. All published articles have been vetted and Broadening Assignments: through a peer-review process and cleared by the A Model for the Future Defense Office of Prepublication and Security Review. Recall NDU Press is the National Defense University’s By Douglas Orsi 109 Building a Stay-Behind cross-component, professional military and academic publishing house. 49 Civil-Military Relations in Resistance Organization: The The opinions, conclusions, and recommendations Transitions: Behavior of Case of Cold War Switzerland expressed or implied within are those of the Against the Soviet Union contributors and do not necessarily reflect the views Senior Military Officers of the Department of Defense or any other agency of By Charles D. Allen By Kevin D. Stringer the Federal Government. Copyright Notice 60 A Strategic Leader’s Guide This is the official U.S. Department of Defense edition Book Reviews of Joint Force Quarterly. Any copyrighted portions to Transforming Culture of this journal may not be reproduced or extracted in Large Organizations 115 Hubris without permission of the copyright proprietors. JFQ Reviewed by Ryan A. Sanford should be acknowledged whenever material is quoted By Mark Schmidt and Ryan Slaughter from or based on its content. Submissions and Communications 116 The Grand Strategy of JFQ welcomes submission of scholarly, independent Commentary Classical Sparta research from members of the Armed Forces, Reviewed by Williamson Murray security policymakers and shapers, defense analysts, 66 Where Rumsfeld Got It academic specialists, and civilians from the United Right: Making a Case for States and abroad. Submit articles for consideration 118 The Grand Strategy That In-Progress Reviews to ScholarOne, available at https://mc04. Won the Cold War manuscriptcentral.com/ndupress, or write to: By Anthony Dunkin Reviewed by John Culclasure Editor, Joint Force Quarterly NDU Press 73 Military Retirement Reform: 260 Fifth Avenue (Building 64, Room 2504) A Case Study in Successful Fort Lesley J. McNair Joint Doctrine Washington, DC 20319 Public Sector Change 120 Adaptive Doctrine: Infusing Telephone: (202) 685-4220/DSN 325 By Laura J. Junor, Samantha Email: [email protected] Clark, and Mark Ramsay the Changing Character of JFQ online: www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jfq/jfq.htm Warfare into Doctrine 3rd Quarter, July 2017 81 Trauma Care in Support of By Gregory E. Browder ISSN 1070-0692 Global Military Operations and Marcus J. Lewis By Kyle N. Remick and Eric A. Elster General Dunford and Senior Enlisted Advisor to the Chairman, Sergeant Major John W. Troxell, meet with crew of Boeing B-52H to observe Air Force Nuclear Triad operations and talk to Airmen, Minot Air Force Base, North Dakota, November 2, 2016, (DOD/Dominique A. Pineiro)

Maintaining a Boxer’s Stance

ny coach will tell you that the acts globally, the United States does not partners, deter adversaries, compete on first step in training a fighter is have the luxury of choosing between a a day-to-day basis, and, when necessary, A developing a “boxer’s stance,” force that can fight nonstate actors, such respond across the spectrum of conflict. the foundational posture from which as the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria The first element of an effective all offensive and defensive movements (ISIS) and al Qaeda, and one that can boxer’s stance requires us to develop and flow. A good boxer’s stance conserves deter and defeat adversaries possessing maintain a balanced inventory of joint energy while keeping the fighter bal- a full array of military capabilities. We capabilities and capacities. As a result of anced, protected, and ready to throw also cannot afford to choose between sustained high operational tempo and quick, powerful punches. Between meeting today’s operational requirements an unpredictable fiscal environment fights or between rounds, any assess- and making the investments necessary over the last several years, we now face ment of a fighter’s performance must for tomorrow. Because we do not know readiness shortfalls and a bow wave of begin with the stance. when, where, or under what conditions modernization requirements across the While the Joint Force remains the the next fight will occur, the U.S. military Services. This challenge is particularly most capable military in the world today, must maintain a boxer’s stance—with the acute within the nuclear enterprise, which adversary investments, a decade and a half strength, agility, and resilience required is why we are actively recapitalizing plat- of continuous combat operations, and to fight and win against any potential forms in each leg of the nuclear triad to years of budgetary instability have eroded adversary. Maintaining this stance requires ensure that our deterrent remains safe, our competitive advantage and reduced us to develop and advance the capabilities, secure, reliable, and effective. Continued our ability to project power where and posture, operating concepts, and human investments in space and cyberspace when needed. As a nation that thinks and capital necessary to assure our allies and capabilities allow us to deny adversary

2 Dialogue / From the Chairman JFQ 86, 3rd Quarter 2017 objectives, impose costs on those who conduct attacks, and ensure resiliency across all domains. We are also investing in power projection capabilities that allow us to deliver the right force at the right time. These capabilities are essential to overcoming an increasingly lethal array of integrated air defense systems, ballistic and cruise missiles, unmanned aerial and subsurface vehicles, and advanced aircraft, all of which are enabled by adversary electronic warfare capabilities. Other shortfalls and modernization requirements can be found across the Joint Force and getting the right balance of capabilities remains one of our most pressing non-operational challenges. Second, an agile and resilient stance requires us to prioritize and allocate Airmen assigned to 22nd Special Tactics Squadron participate in U.S. Special Operations Command Exercise Emerald Warrior 17, during which joint special operations forces train to respond to various resources geographically to effectively threats across spectrum of conflict, Eglin Range, Florida, March 4, 2017 (U.S. Air Force/Nicholas Dutton) manage the risks posed by our five pri- ority strategic challenges: Russia, China, and reorienting the joint exercise pro- when short-term tactical and operational Iran, North Korea, and violent extrem- gram to develop a shared understanding gains may be at odds with long-term ism, which includes organizations such about the array of threats we face, collec- strategic imperatives. Accordingly, we are as ISIS and al Qaeda. Setting the globe tively assess our preparedness to respond refocusing on how to best select, train, correctly not only balances risk, but it to contingencies, and uncover vulnerabili- and educate the Servicemembers who also assures our allies and partners, opti- ties in our operational plans and concepts. will lead tomorrow’s Joint Force. mizes our ability to respond to crisis, and We are complementing and reinforcing By the time this article goes to improves our resilience across domains this effort through joint experimentation. print, many of you will have seen the and warfighting functions. Experimentation done in concert with Service chiefs, combatant commanders, The third element underpinning exercises, wargames, or simulations can and me offer our annual testimony our boxer’s stance is the family of joint yield significant military capabilities, as before Congress. While senior leaders concepts that propose new approaches demonstrated by the U.S. Navy’s exper- help guide the force, it is up to every to address compelling operational chal- imentation with aircraft carriers in the Soldier, Marine, Sailor, Airman, and lenges. Informed by national strategy, 1920s and U.S. Army air-mobile exercises Coastguardsman to think through the joint concepts articulate a vision for leading up to Vietnam. This kind of in- challenges of tomorrow. The Joint deploying, employing, and sustaining the novation—in both our concepts and our Force’s true competitive advantage comes force in the years ahead—in short, they material capabilities—is what will allow from the quality of men and women we guide how we will fight on tomorrow’s us to identify and leverage fundamentally have in the force today. Maintaining our battlefields. By offering educated judg- new ways to counter tomorrow’s threats. advantage and ensuring that we never ments about future military challenges, Finally, we understand that human send Americans into a fair fight is our joint concepts play a significant role in capital is the ultimate hedge against shared obligation. Consequently, your defining future requirements and ad- future uncertainty and that the men and ideas matter, and I am counting on you dressing gaps in our existing approaches women of the Joint Force are the foun- to contribute to this dialogue. JFQ and capabilities. As such, they guide our dation upon which our boxer’s stance is priorities for capability development and built. While war will always be chaotic General Joseph F. Dunford, Jr. innovation. and violent, its character is changing Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Two interdependent activities, rapidly. Consequently, we must invest in exercises and experimentation, help to adaptive, innovative, and critically think- bring joint concepts to life. Throughout ing leaders who can thrive at the speed history, military exercises have served of war in the 21st century; it is no longer to reduce uncertainty, increase readi- enough for leaders to simply be experts ness, and refine and test new concepts. in a particular functional area. Given the Recognizing the complexity of today’s complexities of today’s fights, leaders strategic landscape, we are reenergizing must also be wise enough to recognize

JFQ 86, 3rd Quarter 2017 Dunford 3 Why should the United States risk our “blood and treasure” in this war? What instruments of national power should be used and to what measure? What will the end of the war look like? How will we know our side is winning? Who will fight with us? How are we to fight and when should we expect to be done? Issues of strategy, operational art, tactics, and forces of the military instrument of national power come into view along with the diplomatic, infor- mational, and economic instruments. The civilian-military relationship that is at the heart of our national security structure ultimately shapes the outcome in victory, stalemate, or defeat. But what are we to think of war in the 21st century? While we have learned that history does not repeat, it often rhymes, but in ways we cannot fully predict or anticipate. The Italian airpower theorist Giulio Douhet, an Italian artillery officer, is quoted as stating, “Victory smiles upon those who anticipate the change in the character of war, not upon those who wait to adapt themselves after the changes occur.” So, in 2017, how is that working out for the joint force and our coalition partners around the world? Are we anticipating the changes in the character of war, or are we just trying to get back to where we knew we were suc- cessful? Is military power sufficient? No, but having the best military is certainly useful in a crisis as is having capable and reliable partners. What can we learn from the conflicts of the past, especially those of the past 15 years? What do you think Airman listens as cadres critique results we should do to complete the business of humanitarian training mission, November 10, 2010, at Camp Bullis, at hand while preparing for war in the Texas (U.S. Air Force/Jonathan Snyder) future? The future will be here before you think it will. Both your troops and your leadership want to know what you think war will look like and how to deal with it. When you have a lock on that view, write it down and send it to us here at your Executive Summary Joint Force Quarterly. JFQ last featured the U.S. Southern Command over a decade ago. Much ne of the most important ques- war “thinkers” like Thucydides or Carl has changed in that region and the tions we ask students of national von Clausewitz. An equally import- world since then as you will learn O and international security is ant set of questions flows from these from my interview, in Forum, with “What is war?” Many will provide a responses. When should a country like USSOUTHCOM Commander solid response citing one of the great the United States become involved? Admiral Kurt W. Tidd. What I was most

4 Forum / Executive Summary JFQ 86, 3rd Quarter 2017 impressed about his candid answers is how all the combatant commanders are united in their view of the requirement to share assets as they view their security concerns as globally connected vice an older paradigm of each making a regional case. The threats today are global in connectivity and so should be our joint force. In an accompanying article, one of a series we anticipate from that region over the next few issues, Admiral Tidd and Tyler W. Morton discuss how the command is adapting to better integrate with the other combatant commands while addressing regional and global is- sues. Strategic competition is at the heart of many challenges for the United States and our partners as Daniel Burkhart and Marines with Bravo Battery, 1st Battalion, 10th Marine Regiment, 2nd Marine Division provide security during CH-53 day-battle drill in support of Weapons and Tactics Instructors course 2-17 at Fire Base Alison Woody offer their perspective Burt, California, April 8, 2017 (U.S. Marine Corps/Clare J. Shaffer) of working in the space between peace and war. One of the enduring aspects of war planning as instituted by Secretary while maintaining effective command strategic competition vexing many coun- Donald Rumsfeld over 15 years ago. and control. Preventing war or working tries today, as Scott Englund contends, Anthony Dunkin thinks that the In- to restore security in a conflict zone have is how to contain individuals and groups Progress Reviews that became standard placed capacity-building center stage, engaging in jihad of one kind or another. for the Secretary to gauge planning but Stephen E. Webber and Donald E. In another important contribution on as- efforts are still worth the effort. Laura Vandergriff have identified a gap in these sessing war and strategy, returning author J. Junor, Samantha Clark, and Mark efforts that they believe must be closed to Lukas Milevski helps us understand the Ramsay provide an insider’s view of re- achieve success. concept of strategic agency. cent efforts to reform military retirement, We return to the Cold War in Recall Our JPME Today section features one of the largest portions of DOD’s this issue with an interesting article by three important articles related to leading bill that must be paid. Extending our Kevin D. Stringer that discusses how at the top levels of the military. One of conversation on how we can get to a Switzerland prepared to resist a Soviet the long-debated but seemingly intrac- better prewar environment in troubled attack. After three excellent book re- table problems of staffing our staff and areas of the world, Kyle N. Remick and views, our Joint Doctrine section has two war colleges with military instructors of Eric A. Elster suggest sharing methods of interesting pieces to consider. Gregory E. the highest caliber (read promotion to performing trauma care will enable more Browder and Marcus J. Lewis offer us a general/flag rank is still very possible) is successful health support, which in turn look at “adaptive doctrine” as a concept addressed by Douglas Orsi in a way that lessens strife around the world. Finding to adjust for the ever-changing character would meet the former Chairman’s intent ways to slow the growth of the U.S. de- of war. Rick Rowlett then brings us his for these critical positions. Next, from the fense budget in the future has long been summary of the recently revised Joint Army War College faculty and one of our an elusive quarry for our government. Publication 3-0, Joint Operations. And, JFQ alumni authors, Charles D. Allen dis- A great set of unfinished problems of course, we leave you with important cusses how senior officers in the military appears in Features. Brian K. Hall asks publication information in our Joint should relate to civilian leadership, a sub- us to understand the complexity behind Doctrine Update. ject that seems obvious but is not always. autonomous weapons as they become an We hope these articles have given you Mark Schmidt and Ryan Slaughter offer increasing part of our tactical means to some good ideas both to think and to an interesting take on how to change the carry out missions in support of strategy. write about, especially concerning war in culture of an organization while in the It is not just a fire-and-forget world the 21st century and how the joint force leadership chair. anymore, it seems. As General Goldfein, will respond. The best ideas for how that Commentary features three topics the Air Force Chief of Staff, discussed will be done have a home here at Joint that tackle big issues from defense in my interview with him in our last Force Quarterly. A global audience is planning and retirement reform in the issue, command and control is evolving waiting to hear from you. JFQ Defense Department to global health rapidly. Andrew Hill and Heath Niemi engagement. Many will remember the have identified important concerns in William T. Eliason significant change to how DOD does its execution of mission command principles Editor in Chief

JFQ 86, 3rd Quarter 2017 Eliason 5 Dunford began to develop this strategy, particularly General Dunford. The National Military Strategy focuses on multidomain security challenges that are now global security challenges. It provides a useful intellectual organizing construct by going to a regional geographic com- mand and thinking through the role of a geographic combatant command as a member of an enterprise. That gave us a useful way at USSOUTHCOM to move away from stovepiping regionally and instead consid- ering what is going on around the world in relation to the region. As we thought about it, it became apparent that if Russia is worth paying attention to, we must not just pay attention to their actions in the Middle East, Europe, and Ukraine; we should pay attention to them glob- ally. The reality is that Russia is active all across the USSOUTHCOM region, as is China, as is Iran . . . and evidently so are the violent extremist organizations, so the plus one. I don’t want to try to overstretch the intellectual model, and so I think that periodically we do see some weapons proliferators on some North Korean–flagged merchant vessels, but they are not a big player in this theater. So, we’ve got three-plus-one instead of the four-plus-one scenario. Admiral Kurt W. Tidd is the Commander of U.S. When you think about Southern Command (DOD) USSOUTHCOM, you immediately think drugs. Nobody doubts that illicit drug-trafficking coming largely from this region is a scourge on American society. But when you try to think from a military perspective, and then from a An Interview with national security perspective, you realize there are multitudes of illicit commodities trafficked. The one that we pay attention Kurt W. Tidd to right now in the United States hap- pens to be cocaine because of the sheer volume and dollar amounts involved, thus the ability for criminals to generate significant finances. But when we look JFQ: We last featured U.S. Southern Admiral Kurt W. Tidd: The new at the security situation in Latin America Command [USSOUTHCOM] in 2006, National Military Strategy exists as a re- and the Caribbean, for instance, it’s not and it seems that a number of issues sult of some fundamental changes in the the commodity that is responsible for the remain the same, although others have geopolitical landscape. Leaving the Joint insecurity. Instead, it’s a manifestation of emerged. How does USSOUTHCOM fit Staff and going to USSOUTHCOM, I the insecurity, it’s a source, it’s a generator into the new National Military Strategy? had the benefit of spending several years of income, but it is by no means the only listening as both General [Martin E.] one. Then we simply follow that logic: Dempsey and then General [Joseph F.] If we could wave our hand and cocaine

6 Forum / An Interview with Kurt W. Tidd JFQ 86, 3rd Quarter 2017 disappeared overnight, we would still law enforcement, partner-nation military efficient endstate in order to conduct the have security challenges in this part of the supporting partner-nation law enforce- disruption piece. Now we’ve got the sort world. Why is that? It’s because of threat ment, or U.S. Federal law enforcement of logical underpinnings that make for a networks—transnational transregional officials who have the appropriate author- more cohesive network that we can then threat networks—that are the real under- ities. In the past, we have gotten ourselves place on top of these threat networks lying security challenge in these areas. cross-threaded because we focused on and work together. We are still in the We then begin to look at the spec- the counter-drug mission, so there was theoretical development of that construct trum of threat networks and note that a lot of friction on the military side. Is and then in the communication of that they run from purely economically the counter-drug business a legitimate construct in a way that does not breed motivated criminal networks to purely military mission? Moreover, on the law mistrust because that is a big challenge, ideologically motivated terrorist net- enforcement side, there was a little bit of but I think that DOD wants to be viewed works. And the more we study them, the mistrust—for instance, law enforcement as a partner, as a trusted and supporting more we realize that there is this inter- felt that their mission space was being partner in this enterprise, and that should mingling and interweaving of the two, encroached on, and so rather than work- lead to even greater success. and so they are not pristine; that is, nei- ing together cohesively, I think that the ther exclusively criminal nor exclusively military and law enforcement worked at terrorist. We’ve got plenty of examples. cross purposes. JFQ: What was the catalyst in under- Hizballah is the classic case-in-point of a When we start talking counter–threat taking a sea change in your reframing of terrorist network that routinely engages networks, we find our U.S. partners—law USSOUTHCOM’s operational require- in criminal activity to raise funds for its enforcement partners—rapidly recognize ment and your approach to it? Some might terrorist activities in another part of the that there is a real trust, particularly cite the reasons of relative stability, lack world. We are well aware of instances when we focus on those areas where of state conflict, growing middle class, de- where we’ve had criminal networks that we have expertise and capacity in sup- mographic trends as indicators of progress. may be wittingly or unwittingly support- port of law enforcement entities. We Was there the perception that the old way of ing terrorist networks either to move or focus on the detection and illumination doing business was inadequate? to generate income or to do other sorts piece and develop that picture. Then of things. So, we find that like all net- the people who have the authorities to Admiral Tidd: Having worked this works, if we take a network-view of these conduct the disruption piece are able to challenge from the perspective of, first, problem, we find lots of overlaps, lots of work together. With some painstaking the vice J3 on the Joint Staff and then, intermingling, lots of nodes where they trust-building, we find that there may subsequently, as the J3 on the Joint Staff, occupy the same space, and it runs the be opportunities for us to knit together I found that one of the responsibilities spectrum of corrupt government officials; a more cohesive team. Not under DOD is the management of the global force it may be money-launderers or traffickers [Department of Defense] leadership, we allocation process. Not making the ulti- in forged documents. From a strategic are just a supporting element within this mate decision—that’s for the Secretary of perspective of a theater commander, if overarching construct. Similarly, working Defense—but I did try to match up stated we take a look at it through this network with our partner-nation military contacts, policy priorities with available military lens, I think that provides a much clearer we find that they absolutely understand resources. For years, USSOUTHCOM view of what they’re doing and how they a counter–threat network approach, and has been chronically under-resourced, and threaten security. We find, too often, that they view that as a valid military mission, so going to the command, I asked myself before we thought these networks were and so again, we do not find ourselves why is it that no one doubts the scourge a product of the insecurity, but in reality, working at cross-purposes. on society that drugs produce, but it has they are responsible for much of the It also gives the logical underpinnings been almost impossible to make the case insecurity in the way that they both prey for other activities that we traditionally that resources are desperately needed. on society, undermine and suborn gover- conducted, such as building partner It kind of led to this intellectual jour- nance, and corrupt officials. capacity. The troubling question was ney—trying to find a way to reframe this The proper role of our national secu- that we needed to build partner capac- strategic challenge in a way that might, rity enterprise should be to focus on these ity, but in order to do what? When we at least, make a more compelling case. At threat networks. As we look at the lexicon look at this particular construct in the the same time that we are trying to better of networks that we developed in our counter–threat network approach, it understand if there is a better way to go counterterrorism campaigns, it included becomes clear: We build the capacity after the security challenges that we face, “find-fix-finish.” We also spoke in terms of partner-nation law enforcement and the counter-threat model provides of “detect, illuminate, and disrupt.” In the working hand-in-hand with U.S. State a much more useful and compelling USSOUTHCOM area of operations, that Department programs and we build argument. disruption piece, that endstate piece, is partner capacity with our partner-na- The new National Military Strategy almost always going to be partner-nation tion’s military to conduct an effective, was also being developed. Recognizing

JFQ 86, 3rd Quarter 2017 Tidd 7 Dominican Republic air force A-29 Super Tucano participates in initiative between U.S., Colombian, and Dominican Republic air forces on procedures to detect, track, and intercept illegal drugs (U.S. Air Force/Justin Brockhoff) that we’ve got this crossroads of activi- The sea change also created oppor- Will they cause you to reexamine how and ties by three of the four global security tunities for a richer series of connections where you are investing and engaging with challenges, it became critical that head- and thus a great understanding across the regional partners? quarters, instead of being inwardly joint force of exactly what the security focused, be outwardly focused. It also concerns are in this part of the world. Admiral Tidd: It gives us a more stra- became critical to find the means, con- But I think it also created a new under- tegic focus for communications, so—as nections, and linkages to plug in with our standing of opportunities. For instance, opposed to coming in and talking about [U.S. Pacific Command, U.S. European in our South American partners, we have a counter-drug mission, which almost Command, and U.S. Africa Command] some tremendously capable, professional always tends to be a tactical-level dis- partners. We always had a longstanding, partners that have aspirations of their cussion—it allows us to come in and solid relationship with our U.S. Northern own, that view themselves not exclusively talk much more broadly, on a theater Command partners, but again, this as South American or Latin American; security perspective, and to take a strate- provided the underpinning rationale they have global interests and global gic approach to that and to understand to be able to do it much more than the aspirations. It allows us to work closely how linkages of activities occurring in narrow commodities-based perspective with Pacific-facing nations—Colombia, the Middle East can directly affect these of the counter-drug mission, and I think Peru, and Chile—who have interest in partners at home. The phenomenon of that opened the optic to look at human-, working with U.S. Pacific Command in rapid radicalization that occurs via the weapons-, and gold-trafficking as well as the broader U.S. Pacific security arena. Internet has led to concerns among our these rivers of people that head from south regional partners. In the past, there was to north, and to understand how that pro- a tendency to believe that we are isolated vides a potential threat vector of people JFQ: How will these adaptations in from it; that it is part of the Middle who have a nefarious intent to use that as your strategy and approach affect East, and we don’t have a terrorism an avenue to enter the United States. USSOUTHCOM’s downstream activities? problem in our country. That was a

8 Forum / An Interview with Kurt W. Tidd JFQ 86, 3rd Quarter 2017 widespread and strongly held belief not Because as a geographic combatant com- by insecurity in the individual countries, only in the United States but also on mand, we have a regional perspective and so we work together with our inter- the part of many of our partners in the an opportunity, so we can now work with agency partners, largely led by the State USSOUTHCOM area of operations. each of our partners within the individual Department and [the U.S. Agency for But when we saw self-radicalized in- country teams to stitch together these International Development], to try to dividuals in Europe as well as the United various effects. Much of it is by building address the local level, and expanding States, I think that led to a change in the best possible picture, sharing that pic- beyond the local level, these areas of thinking. Countries that previously ture within each individual country team, insecurity. We support the efforts of the believed they did not have a terrorism and then achieving “unity of command.” Department of Justice to help countries problem began to realize that there were But obviously, there is no such thing develop a judicial system capable of small pockets of individuals within their as unity of command in this instance effectively administering justice so that a countries that were susceptible to radical- because these partners are individual na- conviction can be achieved. Then there’s ization. We needed to do a much better tion-states, sovereign territories, and our got to be effective governance that job sharing information, exchanging representation is rightfully our chief of produces an incarceration system so that ideas, as well as understanding the routes mission within each of those states. an individual who has been convicted of self-radicalization and steps that might How can we stitch together each of doesn’t find a safer, more secure place be taken to head it off before it takes firm these effects? In our military lexicon, we to conduct his illicit business inside of a root. We needed to share best practices always hope for unity of command, but prison. It’s the full ecosystem, if you will, across all of our regional partners, and I that doesn’t happen in the interagency of the justice circle. The military has to think that gave us a compelling reason to community, ever. Unity of purpose we work its piece of the larger picture and talk to each other as opposed to some- sometimes are able to achieve, but really help our fellow partners come together times almost telling them how to do their what we are hoping to achieve in this to address the entire circle; otherwise, we security business in the counter-drug case is unity of effects. Self-supporting, are trying to empty a sinking boat with a mission. Too often, partners would self-synchronizing effects occur because thimble, and we’re never going to make a rightfully turn to us and state, “Hold we are all orienting on a common oper- whole lot of progress. on a second. The only reason that I am ating picture, and we do the best job we having these security problems is because can of building that picture, receiving of the insatiable American demand for information from as many partners as we JFQ: Can you discuss your military imper- drugs.” That is absolutely true. That is a can, kind of putting all of those individual atives and why they are important? How piece of the equation that we always had tiles together into a mosaic and then shar- do you gain traction with concepts that a difficult time addressing in the military ing it with our interagency partners. may not resonate with the culture and be- sphere. Now when we talk about threat liefs of foreign societies governed by security networks, it gives us a much more equal forces? basis to sit at the table as equal partners JFQ: What role does domestic and inter- and to share ideas on how we can solve national demand for narcotics and other Admiral Tidd: That’s the challenge, some of the problems. illicitly trafficked goods play in fueling the isn’t it? Ultimately, because we have profits reaching these threat networks? You longstanding, positive military-to-military mentioned a little bit of this before. How relationships with many of the countries JFQ: You have been talking about expand- does USSOUTHCOM engage outside of its throughout the Caribbean and Latin ing USSOUTHCOM’s aperture to focus area of responsibility to address that end of America, we work together well, and on transregional and transnational threat the system? one of the questions that I think we all networks and not simply the commodities are interested in is how can we not only they traffic. How can a geographic com- Admiral Tidd: One of the challenges is effectively become better military orga- batant command markedly affect these that we don’t have a military mission in nizations, but also ultimately contribute networks? the demand-reduction piece of it. To the to the security of our nations and work extent that we are able to apply broad together. For a number of years, we’ve Admiral Tidd: Much of it comes from pressure across the length and breadth had a number of different programs that building our own friendly network, of these networks, it will challenge the addressed individual issues, and it seemed and understanding all the partners and ability of the networks to be able to that what was needed was an overarch- players who are in that friendly network. move that commodity. There is the other ing organizing construct to pull these Many times, those activities are confined piece of the problem; we look at illicit together to explain why is it that we do within U.S. country teams within U.S. flows in the case of human-trafficking these things. In the end, if it’s about be- Embassies within individual sovereign and movement of people. We also look coming a modern, effective 21st-century states. How can we develop the means at what are the push factors that cause military, what are some of the attributes to link together these various activities? people to leave. It is primarily generated of those militaries? I try to pull together

JFQ 86, 3rd Quarter 2017 Tidd 9 these threads into a tapestry—each one is a more effective military, we’ve got to prepare himself. Similarly, a young girl at important in its own right, but ultimately find the right way to incorporate fully that same age, if she sees the commander all the threads are interdependent, so qualified women into all the branches of of a geographic combatant command to advance them requires them to work the Armed Forces. Again, it’s not because who happens to be a woman, who is also together. it is social engineering or some sort of supremely qualified, if she sees a woman Probably the most obvious and social experiment; it’s because we learned who has successfully completed the longstanding example is the work that by being pragmatic. Consider our special ranger program, if she sees women who USSOUTHCOM has done in advancing operations forces in Afghanistan and are fighter pilots and captains of ships is that respect for human rights has to then Iraq. They were unable to approach leading Marines and she recognizes that be a foundational attribute of a modern half of the human terrain because they those individuals are valued for who they military. We’ve had difficulty in the past could not speak with any of the women, are, she will also develop the skills she because often we were viewed as preach- and yet women are enormous sources of needs to successfully compete and achieve ing and beating up some of our partners information and understanding of what’s to get to that point. So that’s the third over this topic of human rights. We’ve going on. If we are going to be success- imperative. got to find a way of understanding why ful, we need to understand that. So, they The fourth one is this concept of it is important to have a foundational successfully incorporated women into jointness, which Joint Force Quarterly respect for human rights. It’s not because their forces. helps support. We’ve been on this path it’s a superficial or nice-to-do thing. It’s The challenge we’ve got to overcome toward jointness for well over 30 years. what allows the security forces to derive are cultural ones. I need people who look We are still struggling, but the one piece their legitimacy. It’s what underpins their at problems from different perspectives, that I would take from having our joint purpose for being, where the military, have different ways to get to a solution, force engage in combat operations as full police, or security forces is viewed by the and, no great surprise, it turns out that joint force partners, now for a decade and population at large—not just the elites, women solve problems differently than a half, is that there is nobody in today’s not just the government—as protectors men. Why would we not want to incor- leadership who questions the value of and not as predators. USSOUTHCOM porate that creativity into the deck of jointness and the understand-ing that we is getting ready to celebrate the 20th an- cards that we’ve got available to us as we will never fight as separate Services. We niversary of its human rights office, and are solving problems? We’ve got to find can help our regional part-ners gain that that is something we are exceptionally a way to adjust to that. Unfortunately, in understanding. They are at various stages proud of. some circles, we have reduced whether along this same journey because, Another example is a longstand- people can be effective team members to ultimately, none of them has the ing program that has been going on, how many push-ups they can do, how resources, none of us has the resources to largely centered within the office of many sit-ups, how fast can they run a be able to solve problems individually. I USSOUTHCOM’s command ser- mile-and-a-half, two miles, three miles. would say that the time is now to extend geant-major. We have long recognized That is a simplistic way of looking at that further. It is not just military. If you in the U.S. military that its backbone this problem. Yes, those are important were going to be an effective joint officer, is a capable, professional senior NCO abilities, and don’t get me wrong, I don’t you’ve got to understand the role that [noncommissioned officer] corps. We mean for one second to undervalue that you play as part of a security team that have told people that’s the secret sauce one has be a fit individual to succeed on includes the military, Intelligence that makes the military as effective as it the modern battlefield. But that’s not the Community, law enforcement, diplomatic is. Officers may dictate what the standard only attribute that we need. As we have community, NGO [nongovernmental is, but it’s the NCO corps that enforces it discovered, we need to measure for te- organization] community, as well as and and makes sure that it pervades the entire nacity, willingness to execute the mission understand the roles and contri-butions organization. It is the living, breathing regardless of how difficult or challenging that they can make. You can’t just state, ethos of the organization. Whatever the it is, and creativity—coming at problems “I’m only going to do NCO NCO corps accepts, that is the main- from different perspectives—so that I development and jointness.” It is an tained standard. Let’s think about that. If can have a competitive advantage against interdependent mix. I think that working it’s important, if respect for human rights my adversary. How do we measure those jointly has made us stronger. We’re not is important, you have to make sure that things? We still are struggling with pro- there yet, it’s a path, it’s a journey that we your NCO corps understands that, be- viding a holistic look at what attributes are on with mixed results. Ultimately, it’s lieves it, espouses it, and lives it. The two we value most. cultural change, and I think that we can are interdependent. But this won’t happen overnight, just help our regional officers. JFQ The next one we took a look at is as a 6-, or 8-, or 10-year-old boy imag- recognizing how we can take advantage ines himself as a Soldier, Marine, Sailor, of the human capital to solve critically Airman, Coastguardsman, as he imagines different problems. If we want to be himself serving and taking the steps to

10 Forum / An Interview with Kurt W. Tidd JFQ 86, 3rd Quarter 2017 Members of U.S. Southern Command–directed team Joint Task Force–Matthew provide humanitarian and disaster relief assistance to victims of Hurricane Matthew, Jeremie, Haiti, October 8, 2016 (U.S. Marine Corps, South/Adwin Esters)

U.S. Southern Command Evolving to Meet 21st-Century Challenges

By Kurt W. Tidd and Tyler W. Morton

atin America and the Carib- in U.S. foreign policy and national United States. Previously, U.S. South- bean is the region most closely security strategy. Given our shared ern Command (USSOUTHCOM) L connected to our own stability, values, culture, geography, heritage, efforts were heavily devoted to one of security, and economic prosperity. and history, security challenges in these challenges: narcotics smuggling This is important despite the fact other Latin America and the Caribbean often into the United States. While USSOU- regions often figure more prominently become security challenges for the THCOM—along with our interagency and regional partners—continues to be invested in the counterdrug mission, the threats in our region continue Admiral Kurt W. Tidd, USN, is the Commander of U.S. Southern Command. Lieutenant Colonel Tyler to evolve and so must we. Today’s W. Morton, USAF, Ph.D., is the U.S. Air Force Special Assistant to the Combatant Commander. Many of the themes in this article were first posited in Admiral Tidd’s 2017 Posture Statement before the challenges are much more likely to U.S. Senate Armed Services Committee. be transregional, multidomain, and

JFQ 86, 3rd Quarter 2017 Tidd and Morton 11 Navy and Coast Guard personnel assigned to guided-missile frigate USS Elrod signal toward narcotics bales, April 21, 2012, during recovery operations in Caribbean Sea (U.S. Army/Andy Barrera) multifunctional. This new era calls for the efficacy of law enforcement agencies. underlying challenges such as poverty and increased cooperation across the U.S. Through endemic corruption and, at weak governance—amplify the impact Government and, more importantly for times, the outright co-opting of gov- of disasters, extend human suffering, USSOUTHCOM, increased coopera- ernmental services and agencies, T3Ns and exacerbate existing developmental tion with U.S. allies and partners. have the ability to destabilize societies, challenges. Additionally, while overall the In the USSOUTHCOM area of exacerbating the lawlessness that often region is politically stable, the aforemen- focus, transregional and transnational creates the conditions that prompt mass tioned gap between public expectations threat networks (T3Ns) increasingly migration.1 This destabilizing effect and governmental performance fre- challenge the sovereignty of states across represents a direct threat to the U.S. quently manifests itself in social protest. the region. Through the exploitation homeland and a national security risk. Though generally peaceful, the potential of the permissive environments they The USSOUTHCOM region also faces exists for violent demonstrations; a down- deliberately seek to create, these illicit a threat from violent extremist organiza- ward turn in the most at-risk countries networks carve out geographical areas tions. While not a major area of extremist has the potential to compel a regional re- of impunity in which they can operate activity, the same permissive environ- sponse and requests for U.S. engagement without fear of law enforcement interfer- ment, created and taken advantage of by or support. ence. Characterized by fragile rule of law, the T3Ns, allows these organizations to While threat networks and potential porous borders, and weak governance, operate with relative impunity. crises pose the nearest and most pressing these open zones are riddled with illicit In addition to the threat posed by danger, the United States also faces pathways that T3Ns use to move any- T3Ns and extremist organizations, direct competition in the region from thing and anyone across borders for great Latin America and the Caribbean are several external state actors (ESAs). Latin profit. Driven by the insatiable demand extremely vulnerable to natural disasters America and the Caribbean present for their products, this lucrative business and infectious disease outbreaks. Uneven strategic opportunities for Russia, China, provides T3Ns with vast resources that prevention, management, and response and Iran to achieve their respective long- they subsequently use to further erode capabilities in the region—coupled with term objectives and advance their global

12 Forum / Evolving to Meet 21st-Century Challenges JFQ 86, 3rd Quarter 2017 interests, which are often incompatible Countering Transnational and them vulnerable. The CENTAM COI with ours and those of our partners Transregional Threat Networks continues to grow and recently expanded in the region. The influence of these To keep pace with the challenges posed to include representatives from U.S. external actors presents a transregional by T3Ns, we must do more than simply Northern Command. This collaboration problem set that connects our region to target the illicit commodities they between the two commands charged with the rest of the world. To counteract this move.3 Though we are not walking away defending the U.S. homeland has already evolved global challenge requires close from our statutorily mandated support yielded results and strengthened the synchronization of effort across the af- to the counterdrug mission, to truly seams along the commands’ boundaries. fected geographic combatant commands degrade the T3Ns requires a shift away Building on the CENTAM COI (GCCs). As such, USSOUTHCOM is from isolated efforts aimed at stopping success, we have also established a diligently working with many of the other the commodities they traffic and a counter-T3N cross-directorate team at commands to ensure unity of effort. refocus on dismantling the networks the command’s headquarters in Doral, Additionally, the expanding presence— themselves. This shift in thinking has Florida. This team is a group of dedi- and influence—of ESAs in the region is been the biggest change at USSOU- cated analysts and operators who work concerning, particularly in the sphere of THCOM. By employing a networked directly with our interagency partners to human rights and the promotion of re- approach that integrates the command’s improve the fusion of intelligence anal- gional peace and stability. Keep in mind, capabilities with those of U.S. allies and ysis and operations. Through network none of these ESAs have the Leahy Law,2 partners across the region, we hope to mapping and enhanced collaboration, restrictions on security assistance, or any stop the threats—whatever they may this team will lead the command’s independent domestic media to scruti- be—as far away from the U.S. homeland C-T3N efforts. Though the initial focus nize their external activities. Their arms as possible. To that end, we are working of the team will be to stem the flow of sales are not tied to international proto- ever more closely with our interagency special interest aliens (SIAs) and foreign cols, and they are not subject to human and regional partners to affect the net- terrorist fighters (FTFs), we expect rights vetting. Additionally, the loans they works that control the pathways in the their roles to expand as the team’s ca- provide often do not come with require- region. While we have always cooper- pability matures.4 Additionally, we have ments to follow anti-corruption standards ated with teams from across the region, partnered with the greater Intelligence or even clear repayment terms and con- what has changed is how we are now Community to pursue innovative ap- ditions. These occasionally unscrupulous working as a team to maximize effects. proaches to integrate unclassified open business practices and disregard for trans- Building a Joint, Interagency Team. source, social media, and publically parent rule of law facilitate corruption To better enable efforts to disrupt, de- available information into our shared and pose challenges to the shared norms grade, dismantle, and, ultimately, defeat knowledge base. By doing so, we will and values that have brought prosperity the T3Ns, we have created multiple better characterize the regional security and security to millions of people across communities of interest (COIs) that environment and facilitate increased the hemisphere. bring together various U.S. Government information and intelligence exchanges As outlined above, the threats stakeholders. The members of these with regional and interagency partners. to the region are complex and often COIs meet weekly to share information To complement these efforts and fill go overlooked given the increasingly and intelligence; expand understanding a requirement identified in the National crowded national security agenda. To and awareness about the networks and Strategy to Combat Terrorist Travel Act better confront them, USSOUTHCOM our activities to counter them; and of 2016, we have greatly expanded our is currently undergoing a sea change guide our efforts to ensure maximum support to the Department of Homeland in the way we think about, analyze, disruption of T3N activities. In 2016, Security effort to counter the migration and address these national security information-sharing and support to tac- of SIAs.5 In 2016, in a combined effort concerns. Beginning in summer 2016, tical operations generated by our Central with U.S. Northern Command and U.S. the command established a series of America COI (CENTAM COI), which Special Operations Command, we dedi- cross-functional teams to dissect the is hosted by our Joint Task Force–Bravo cated analysts and resources to Homeland problems we face and forge new ways to (JTF-Bravo) and includes over 700 par- Security Investigation’s Operation confront and overcome the challenges. ticipants from various U.S. Government Citadel—a multiyear, multiagency These teams were focused on three areas agencies, helped dismantle several T3N effort to dismantle human-smuggling that comprise the bulk of our main ef- nodes and subnetworks. By sharing networks and identify migrants who may forts: countering T3Ns (C-T3Ns), rapid information in the CENTAM COI, in- present security threats. In fiscal year response, and building relationships. teragency participants are better prepared 2017, our increased planning support, After extensive work, the teams produced to apply pressure at points that force the intelligence capabilities, and airlift will a series of actions that will drive the tasks, T3Ns to modify their operations and significantly enhance Homeland Security initiatives, and strategic planning as we change their tactics; this shift exposes, Investigation’s ability to prevent persons move forward. or illuminates, the network and makes of interest from transiting the region,

JFQ 86, 3rd Quarter 2017 Tidd and Morton 13 reaching the U.S. border, and potentially we work bilaterally and multilaterally region, USSOUTHCOM is integrating gaining entry into the United States. with partners such as the Caribbean the efforts and expertise of the private Further C-T3N efforts include broad- Community’s Implementing Agency for sector, nongovernmental organiza- ening the detection and monitoring Crime and Security and the Regional tions, and civil society to mitigate the mission of the USSOUTHCOM- Intelligence Fusion Center to facilitate conditions that contribute to the social subordinate Joint Interagency Task greater information-sharing and to close service vacuum. The command routinely Force–South (JIATF-S) in Key West, our capability gaps in addressing illicit conducts community support activities Florida. Often recognized as the model flows of drugs, SIAs, and FTFs. We also in Central America, South America, and for interagency cooperation, JIATF-S support the Caribbean Community as the Caribbean where we work alongside was countering threat networks long be- it develops a regional counterterrorism our partners in civil society to expand fore the term became vogue.6 While its strategy and work with key partners such the skills necessary to demonstrate state core detection and monitoring mission as Trinidad and Tobago to illuminate and presence and reduce the malign influence will continue to support interagency law degrade extremist networks with global of T3Ns. enforcement efforts to stem the ever-in- ties to the so-called Islamic State and Enabling Rapid Response. While creasing flow of drugs, JIATF-S is also other dangerous groups.10 countering threat networks receives broadening its scope by targeting global Working with our allies and partners, the preponderance of our effort, money laundering, bulk cash smuggling, USSOUTHCOM counternarcotic USSOUTHCOM faces other challenges. and other facilitator-based illicit activities programs (including train and equip, in- Given the inevitability of natural disasters that enable narcotics trafficking. frastructure, and building partner-nation in the Caribbean and Latin America, we Teaming with Partner Nations. We capacity and capability) play an important continually work with our allies and part- have also worked diligently with our allies role in stabilizing the region from the ef- ners to improve the region’s collective and partners to increase the entire re- fects of T3Ns. Central American partners preparedness and response capabilities. gion’s ability to counter threat networks. are increasingly capable, playing a role Within the USSOUTHCOM enterprise, Though the Colombian government and in nearly 50 percent of JIATF-South’s we are focused on institutionalizing our the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias maritime interdiction operations and own capabilities to provide agile and de Colombia (FARC) recently signed a conducting operations on their own, effective support to our interagency and peace agreement ending over 50 years and with each other. USSOUTHCOM regional partners. In the region, we are of armed conflict, our cooperation with has also helped enhance land interdic- strengthening our linkages to the very Colombia remains vital as powerful, ille- tion capabilities across the region by network of militaries, civilian agencies, gally armed groups will undoubtedly seek providing training, infrastructure, and and experts with whom we will cooperate to fill the power vacuum created by the communication equipment. As a result, during a crisis. FARC’s agreement to abandon the drug there has been significant improvement Strengthening Interagency trade.7 With coca cultivation and pro- across Central American security and Partnerships. Cooperation starts duction in the Andean region increasing military forces. Guatemala’s Interagency with trust; it is the linchpin of almost 40 percent in 2016 alone, these Task Forces combine the best of military USSOUTHCOM’s ability to rapidly re- networks could complicate Colombia’s and law enforcement authorities and spond and work seamlessly with our allies post-FARC transitional period.8 To pre- capabilities; these organizations unite and partners. We build this trust during empt this, USSOUTHCOM is leveraging at the task forces to reduce the flow of routine exercises and deepen it during our unique relationship with Colombia to drugs, people, and other illicit goods. crisis response operations. This was synchronize the delivery of counter-T3N Honduras has also made a concerted most apparent during our response to capability-building efforts with our effort to dismantle threat networks, Hurricane Matthew in October 2016. By continued training and equipping of key expedite suspected drug traffickers to leveraging forward-deployed forces, Joint units across the Colombian armed forces the United States, and eliminate corrup- Task Force–Matthew (JTF-Matthew) and law enforcement.9 We believe these tion.11 Panamanian efforts to counter a provided a tailored rapid response that efforts will continue to help Colombia as wide spectrum of threats showcase them was critical during the early stages of it transitions into the post-FARC era. as an increasingly capable partner that is relief operations. Utilizing our presence Elsewhere, USSOUTHCOM joined positioned at a critical geographic choke- at Soto Cano Air Base in Honduras and other Defense Department and U.S. point.12 In 2017, USSOUTHCOM will the U.S. Naval Station–Guantánamo Government agencies to team with expand its support to Panama and Costa Bay, the command moved elements from Brazil during the 2016 Rio Olympics. Rica to help dissuade T3Ns from moving JTF-Bravo and a Special Purpose Marine This successful partnership provided into the southern portion of Central Air-Ground Task Force (SPMAGTF) new opportunities to work with Brazil in America’s isthmus. to Haiti within 24 hours of notification the areas of C-T3Ns, counter–weapons Building Public-Private from the lead Federal agency, in this of mass destruction, cyber, space, and Collaboration. Finally, as T3Ns exploit case, the U.S. Agency for International information-sharing. In the Caribbean, socioeconomic vulnerabilities in the Development. JTF-Bravo and the

14 Forum / Evolving to Meet 21st-Century Challenges JFQ 86, 3rd Quarter 2017 Servicemember from Barbados participates in Exercise Tradewinds 2016, at Twickenham Park Gallery Range, Jamaica, June 24, 2016 (U.S. Marine Corps/ Justin T. Updegraff)

SPMAGTF team—which had previously Fuerzas Aliadas Humanitarias test mul- humanitarian aid mission that will bring been conducting security cooperation tinational responses to diverse scenarios medical, dental, and veterinary assistance activities in Central America—provided such as the trafficking of weapons of mass to Guatemala, Honduras, and Colombia. unique U.S. military capabilities that destruction, terrorist acts, and natural During CP-17, U.S. personnel work significantly aided the delivery of humani- disasters. Multinational exercises are the hand-in-hand with their host-nation tarian supplies and alleviated the suffering most important way we train with our counterparts, local government officials, of tens of thousands of Haitians. partner nations’ military forces, law en- health professionals, nongovernmental Additionally, the rapid deployment of forcement agencies, and civil society aid organizations, and private volunteer elements from the U.S. Transportation organizations. These exercises improve organizations to respond to the med- Command’s Joint Enabling Capabilities our interoperability, institutionalize pre- ical needs of the local populations. Command was critical to the success paredness and response measures, and Additionally, at the early stages of the of JTF-Matthew. U.S. forces deployed build confidence in the United States as Zika outbreak, the U.S. Naval Medical aboard the USS Mesa Verde and USS a reliable partner. The trust built during Research Unit 6 based in Lima, Peru, Iwo Jima provided robust relief from the these exercises helps reduce the scope and established research sites in partnership sea as they moved hundreds of tons of duration of a crisis and increases the like- with Colombia, Guatemala, Honduras, supplies to the hardest hit areas. During lihood our partners can respond to crises Paraguay, Bolivia, Venezuela, and Peru to the relief mission, we also coordinated on their own if necessary. actively support partner-nation response with our U.S. Coast Guard partners to Regionally, the command’s health efforts. This quick reaction was critical to deter potential migration in the after- and medical readiness engagements slowing the spread of Zika in Central and math of the hurricane and supported build partner-nation capacity and capa- South America. the Department of State’s outreach to bility to prevent, detect, and respond Many of these building partner-nation regional partners seeking to contribute to to disease outbreaks. USSOUTHCOM capacity and capability efforts would not the response effort. does this through a series of in-country be possible without the dedication of our Working with Allies and Partner engagements. Taking the spotlight this Total Force partners from the National Nations. Exercises like Panamax, year is Continuing Promise 2017 (CP- Guard and Reserves. The National Integrated Advance, Tradewinds, and 17), a USSOUTHCOM-sponsored Guard’s State Partnership Program has

JFQ 86, 3rd Quarter 2017 Tidd and Morton 15 been especially valuable to building to treat tens of thousands of the region’s human rights. Chile is a regular partici- trust and cooperation in the region as citizens. We are also building basic infra- pant in USPACOM’s annual Rim of the illustrated by the following examples. structure like schools, medical clinics, and Pacific exercise and will assume a greater In 2016, the relationship between the emergency operations centers and ware- exercise leadership role in the future. Florida National Guard and Barbados houses for relief supplies. These activities Colombia is leading an effort to integrate strengthened the Barbadian govern- provide training opportunities for our a block of Pacific alliance nations into ment’s ability to respond to national own personnel, while also improving the the Western Pacific Naval Symposium disasters with a focus on critical infra- ability of our partners to provide essential and is expanding defense cooperation structure and interagency collaboration.13 services to their citizens and meet their with South Korea, Japan, and potentially Additionally, the Massachusetts National humanitarian needs during a disaster or Vietnam. Brazil is deepening its maritime Guard’s partnership with Paraguay has emergency response. security cooperation with West Africa allowed for the training of over 2,000 and focusing on countering illicit trade Paraguayan military personnel as peace- Building Relationships to between the South American and African keepers and observers. Now, Paraguay Meet Global Challenges continents. These nations join many supports United Nations missions in Whether we are remaining vigilant other regional leaders in supporting Africa, Haiti, Cyprus, and Colombia.14 against the activities of ESAs, fostering United Nations peacekeeping operations This commitment further highlights the greater regional and multinational around the world, including the mission desire of many of the region’s nations to cooperation against shared challenges, in Haiti. contribute globally to the common good. or reinforcing the rules-based interna- Military Imperatives. The insti- Collaborating with Civil Society. In tional order, security partnerships are tutionalization of jointness, respect addition to collaborating with our inter- the foundation of everything we do. for human rights, development of agency and regional partners, we seek These relationships—based on shared professional noncommissioned offi- to build a culture of crisis management values, mutual respect, and principled cer (NCO) corps, and integration of and trust across our network of nongov- U.S. and regional leadership—ensure gender perspectives are interconnected ernmental partners. During the lead-up our Hemisphere remains a beacon of and interdependent characteristics of to the Rio Olympics, we teamed with peace and prosperity. capable, modern defense forces.15 These international cruise lines and law enforce- Solidifying Interagency Partnerships. characteristics are military imperatives ment agencies to share information about Over the past year, we have expanded for national defense forces that seek to potential threats and ensure security our collaboration with the interagency maintain legitimacy and gain the trust of protocols were in place. We are begin- community, our allies and partners, those they exist to serve. Militaries that ning work with the College of William and fellow GCCs to address the global fail to advance in these areas risk finding & Mary’s Violent International Political challenges posed by ESAs. We work with themselves at a distinct competitive disad- Conflict and Terrorism laboratory to the Intelligence Community to build a vantage in the modern security arena. help predict violence in partner nations, better shared understanding of ESA in- Integrating Gender Perspectives. At assess deterrence option effectiveness, tentions and how their activities in Latin USSOUTHCOM, we recognize that, as and forecast tactical successes. We also America and the Caribbean advance their an inter-American defense community, regularly join chaplains in our partner-na- respective global strategies. We routinely we can attain a competitive, and even tion militaries to engage religious leaders share information with U.S. European asymmetric, advantage by unlocking the in the region about their role in disaster Command, U.S. Pacific Command full potential of our security and defense recovery and potential opportunities to (USPACOM), U.S. Central Command, workforce. To be the most effective work together when crisis hits. and U.S. Special Operations Command team we can be, we simply cannot afford Led by U.S. Army South and U.S. on issues of mutual interest and con- to cut ourselves off from 50 percent of Air Forces Southern, the Beyond the cern. In 2017, USSOUTHCOM and our population, 50 percent of our tal- Horizon and New Horizons human- USPACOM will cohost a meeting with ent, and 50 percent of our capabilities. itarian and civic assistance exercises our allies and partners in Southeast Asia Gender integration is much more than incorporated more than 2,000 U.S., and South America to share information simply numbers, however. The quest for partner-nation, and public/private partic- on Asia-Pacific security and T3Ns. gender integration is about finding the ipants from seven nations. This network Increasing Partner Capacity and right teammates; those people—both treated nearly 30,000 patients, conducted Capability. While our capacity- and men and women—with the irresistible 242 surgeries, and constructed schools capability-building efforts help partner drive to contribute to mission success, and clinics in remote areas. Similarly, our nations address immediate threats, over who have the right team ethos, and training missions such as JTF-Bravo’s time we seek to encourage a network who possess a diverse way of looking at medical engagements and CP-17 bring of willing partners who contribute to problems. Effective gender integration is together U.S. military personnel, part- international security and advance shared really part of a larger question: how do ner-nation forces, and civilian volunteers principles like good governance and we attract, develop, and retain the best

16 Forum / Evolving to Meet 21st-Century Challenges JFQ 86, 3rd Quarter 2017 Colombian naval infantrymen explain their water purification and jungle survival techniques to U.S. Marines during Amphibious-Southern Partnership Station near Turbo, Colombia, October 10, 2011 (U.S. Army/Juancarlos Paz)

people, with the right skill sets, to meet USSOUTHCOM has also hired a full- includes learning about and leveraging the ever-accelerating demands of military time Gender Advisor, a U.S. Navy master complementary service-specific capa- operations in the 21st century? Gender chief petty officer with combat experience bilities and subsequently exchanging integration needs to evolve from beyond in Iraq, to work with and advise our part- lessons learned with our various partners a simple argument of whether women ners. These initiatives have already yielded across the region. We truly embrace the can meet standards to a full acceptance results: from exchanging best practices joint, interagency, intergovernmental, that female military professionals want with Paraguay regarding women in and multinational (JIIM) principles in to be judged on the basis of their grit, peacekeeping operations to hosting a visit our approach as we integrate the capa- their determination, and their tenacity. by Argentinean leaders to discuss ways to bilities of allies and partners from across Women want the opportunity to com- integrate women into operational military the region.16 This was evidenced in our pete, just like their male counterparts. At units, the region’s militaries are steadily response to Hurricane Matthew as forces USSOUTHCOM, we are committed to capitalizing on diversity and moving for- from the United Kingdom, France, the instilling this way of thinking throughout ward as one integrated team. Netherlands, Colombia, Argentina, our partner-nation military forces and law Institutionalizing and Achieving Brazil, and Jamaica all contributed aid. enforcement organizations. To ensure Enhanced Jointness. Operating jointly Their contributions were critical to suc- maximum integration of gender perspec- is fundamental to our ability to confront cess in Haiti and were a direct reflection tives, we have included several objectives challenges in today’s complex world. of the jointness, or JIIM, mindset. in our strategic planning documents and Conflict now happens in a transre- Human Rights. One of country-specific strategies that commit gional, multidomain, multifunctional USSOUTHCOM’s highest priorities our staff to assisting our partners in incor- environment that is evolving daily. is the promotion of respect for human porating fully qualified women into their For militaries to keep pace, they must rights, a mission it has integrated into defense sectors, countering trafficking incorporate the unique capabilities that its activities and engagements since the in persons, and protecting vulnerable each service brings to the fight. The 1990s. The Latin American region has populations during military operations. USSOUTHCOM approach to jointness made great strides in democracy and

JFQ 86, 3rd Quarter 2017 Tidd and Morton 17 human rights in recent decades, and partner nations through NCO exchanges, our nation’s priorities oriented to more today our hemisphere is interconnected exercises, and hands-on training. NCOs prominent global challenges, maximiz- by shared democratic principles. Respect from the U.S. Marine Corps, Navy, Air ing the limited resources we have and for human rights is a critical military Force, and from across the National working hand-in-hand with our allies imperative in order for defense and Guard work directly with NCOs from and partners are absolutely essential security operations to be successful. the partner nations to train, execute, to our success. We do this through a Without it, we lose our legitimacy, the and build the capability of their NCO networked approach that focuses on trust and confidence of the people we corps. This investment in partner-nation optimizing what each contributor can aim to protect, and the effectiveness of enlisted leadership yields improved readi- supply to the overall task. This was most the security missions entrusted to us. To ness and field forces capable of exporting recently apparent in the response to date, USSOUTHCOM remains the only security in support of regional and Hurricane Matthew, where many of our combatant command with a dedicated global security operations. To date, the interagency, allied, and partner nations Human Rights Office, which has both an NCODP has interacted with 16 hemi- contributed everything from food and internal and external focus. This means spheric partners and has been involved in building supplies to medical care. The that we ensure our own personnel are more than 50 events. Highlighting the result was a joint, interagency, intergov- properly trained and educated on this impact of the program, during the last 24 ernmental, multinational solution that military imperative while supporting months, USSOUTHCOM NCOs have provided care and services across the our partners’ efforts to build strong been directly involved in the creation affected parts of Haiti. Moving forward, human rights programs within the armed and/or support of an NCO Corps and we expect the response to Hurricane forces. The USSOUTHCOM-sponsored Senior NCO Course in the Dominican Matthew to become the norm, regard- Human Rights Initiative (HRI) is a fun- Republic; the first designated Sergeant less of the nature of the challenge. damental tool that drives this imperative. Major of the Army for Brazil and Chile; Whether we are confronting the threat HRI brings together representatives of and the first Joint Senior Enlisted posed by T3Ns or reacting to another military, security forces, civilian gov- meetings in Brazil, Chile, Paraguay, El natural disaster, our first response will ernment, and civil society to develop a Salvador, Honduras, Argentina, and the always be to rally a coalition of contrib- model human rights program for military Dominican Republic. uting partners. forces focused in four areas: doctrine, These four imperatives are hallmarks Fortunately, USSOUTHCOM has education and training, internal control of modern professional militaries. While created a legacy of trust. Our way for- systems, and cooperation with civilian each has a separate meaning, we must ward is to use that trust to enhance the authorities. Currently, USSOUTHCOM remember that they are interdependent relationships we have and to help us build supports the efforts of 11 nations in the and interconnected—without any one new ones. Together we will move past USSOUTHCOM area of operations and of the four, a military’s competence is simple synchronization and coordination 1 regional organization that have formally incomplete. All four must function simul- to a truly integrated, collaborative effort. committed to implementing HRI within taneously as each supports, facilitates, and We have been charged with defending their militaries. HRI also creates a net- ensures the success of the other three. As our nation’s southern approaches; only work of partner nation militaries formally we train, exercise, and conduct operations by working together will we be able to committed to respecting human rights. with our partners, USSOUTHCOM unite our efforts to produce a faster, Development of Professional NCO seeks to inculcate the imperatives into flatter, and more agile network of dip- Corps. Long referred to as the “backbone the culture of each partner military. lomatic, law enforcement, Intelligence of the Army,” the NCO remains exactly Sometimes quite challenging, we believe Community, and military teammates. that and much more.17 Today’s NCOs embracing the imperatives is critical for Here at USSOUTHCOM, we are doing play critical roles in the institutional ad- each nation’s legitimacy and ultimate just that. JFQ vancement and operational effectiveness success. of our Armed Forces. Understanding this, USSOUTHCOM has partnered Conclusion Notes with regional defense institutions to From interconnected, ruthless threat 1 improve NCO development and ed- networks to the malign influence of Kenneth Rapoza, “Immigrants Fleeing Increasingly Violent Latin America, Study ucation across the Hemisphere. Our ESAs, the national security threats we Suggests,” Forbes Magazine, January 28, 2016, Noncommissioned Officer Development face in the Western Hemisphere are available at . 2 The Leahy Law is a U.S. human rights itaries. The NCODP integrates unique lenges that requires USSOUTHCOM, law that prohibits the Department of State capabilities and perspectives from across our allies, and our partners to be ready and Department of Defense from providing the U.S. joint force and delivers those to to react at a moment’s notice. With military assistance to foreign military units that

18 Forum / Evolving to Meet 21st-Century Challenges JFQ 86, 3rd Quarter 2017 violate human rights. For further information 10 Former U.S. Ambassador to Trinidad and on the Leahy Law, see the “Leahy Fact Sheet,” Tobago John Estrada estimates that 100 to 130 available at . so-called Islamic State; that number represents 3 Joint Publication 3-25, Countering Threat the highest number per capita of all Western NDU Press Networks (Washington, DC: The Joint Staff, Hemisphere nations. Frances Robles, “Trying for the Center for the Study of December 21, 2016), GL-4, definescountering to Stanch Trinidad’s Flow of Young Recruits to Chinese Military Affairs threat networks as “the aggregation of activities ISIS,” New York Times, February 21, 2017. across the Department of Defense and United 11 As testament to Honduras’s commitment Strategic Forum 299 States Government departments and agencies to C-T3Ns, they will reportedly extradite At- China’s Future SSBN Command and that identifies and neutralizes, degrades, dis- lantic Cartel head Wilter Blanco to the United Control Structure rupts, or defeats designated threat networks.” States to face trial on drug trafficking and rack- by David C. Logan 4 The Department of Homeland Security eteering charges. See Mike LaSusa, “Alleged China is de- definesspecial interest aliens (SIAs) as “aliens Honduras Kingpin Wanted by U.S. Captured veloping its from specially designated Countries that have in Costa Rica,” Insight Crime, November 23, shown a tendency to promote, produce, or 2016, available at . nuclear forces. 12 Office of Inspector General, “Supervision of As law enforcement has increasingly This emer- Aliens Commensurate with Risk,” December clamped down on traditional south-north gent nuclear 23, 2011, 5, available at . The become a pathway of choice for the majority of ballistic mis- United Nations (UN) definesforeign terrorist the SIAs traveling north from South America. sile submarine fighters as “terrorist fighters, namely individuals See Sara Schaefer Muñoz, “Global Migrants (SSBN) force will pose unique chal- who travel to a State other than their States of Brave Panama’s Vipers, Bats, Bandits to Reach lenges to a country that has favored residence or nationality for the purpose of the U.S.,” Wall Street Journal, May 29, 2015. tightly centralized control over perpetration, planning, or preparation of, or 13 For further information, see The State participation in, terrorist acts or the providing Partnership Program: FY 2015 Annual Report its nuclear deterrent. The choices or receiving of terrorist training, including in to Congress (Washington, DC: Department China makes about SSBN command connection with armed conflict.” See UN Se- of Defense, December 26, 2016), available at and control will have important curity Council Resolution 2178, September 24, . nershipProgram/FY15%20SPP%20Annual%20 5 The National Strategy to Combat Terror- Report.pdf>. mand and control will be mediated ist Travel Act of 2016 directs U.S. Government 14 Marta Escurra, “The United States by operational, bureaucratic, and agencies to identify and address security vul- Ratifies Military Cooperation with Paraguay,” political considerations. A hybrid nerabilities in the U.S. defense against terrorist Diálogo Digital Military Magazine, July 19, approach to command and control, travel. See House Resolution 4408, National 2016, available at . navy and the Rocket Force, would available at . age our partners to embrace joint, interagency, strategic stability. 6 For background information on JI- intergovernmental, and multinational (JIIM) ATF-South’s long history of excellence, see mindsets. Evan Munsing and Christopher J. Lamb, Joint 16 For further information on the JIIM Interagency Task Force–South: The Best Known, principles, see Matthew Wade Markel et al., Least Understood Interagency Success, INSS Stra- Developing U.S. Army Officers’ Capabilities tegic Perspectives 5 (Washington, DC: NDU for Joint, Interagency, Intergovernmental, and Press, June 2011). Multinational Environments, RAND Research 7 Rogerio Jelmayer, Kejal Vyas, and Saman- Brief (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, December tha Pearson, “Brazilian Gang Enlists FARC 6, 2011), available at . articles/brazilian-gang-enlists-farc-rebels-for- 17 The English poet Rudyard Kipling made drug-trade-1485858609>. the first reference to the noncommissioned 8 UN Office on Drugs and Crime, “Colom- officer (NCO) being the backbone of the army bia: Monitoreo de Territorios Afectados por in his famous poem “The ’eathen,” which was Cultivos Ilícitos 2015,” July 2016, 11. his ode to British NCOs, available at . Security Cooperation, see “Joint Press Release on the United States–Colombia Action Plan on Regional Security Cooperation,” media note, Washington, DC, April 15, 2012, available at Visit the NDU Press Web site for . at ndupress.ndu.edu

JFQ 86, 3rd Quarter 2017 Tidd and Morton 19 CV-22 Osprey from 8th Special Operations Squadron flies members of deployed aircraft ground response element over Hurlburt Field, Florida, during Emerald Warrior, DOD’s only irregular warfare exercise, May 2, 2014 (U.S. Air Force/Jasmonet Jackson)

he struggle Morgenthau describes results in an evolv- Strategic T ing international distribution of power. After World War II, the majority of global power was divided Competition between two poles until the fall of the Soviet Union gave rise to a uni- polar system. The transformation Beyond Peace and War of the international order continues today as rising powers join established By Daniel Burkhart and Alison Woody powers, such as the United States, Japan, and the European Union, on the international stage.1 Although a more balanced distribution of power The struggle for power is universal in time and space may have economic and humanitarian and is an undeniable fact of experience. . . . International benefits, political and military tensions frequently accompany major transitions politics, like all politics, is a struggle for power. in the international order.2 Beyond the —Hans Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace strains inherent as rising powers clash with those more established, the lack of globally dominant hegemons in a system of distributed power creates opportunities for revisionist state and Major Daniel Burkhart, USA, is a Strategist (FA-59) with operational experience in Iraq and Afghanistan. Alison Woody was an intern with the Army Capabilities Integration Center at the U.S. nonstate actors to pursue their own, Army Training and Doctrine Command. sometimes perilous, ambitions.3

20 Forum / Strategic Competition: Beyond Peace and War JFQ 86, 3rd Quarter 2017 As the global balance of power challenge of contested norms, the joint between actors of strategic importance. shifts, the United States will face several force would benefit from a more compre- Additionally, it assumes rational actors, complex challenges requiring innovative hensive approach. This article introduces defined as states having situational responses, and indeed, is already facing a way to view the operating environment awareness of their external environment rivals that it cannot optimally engage. using a model comprised of three con- and behaving logically to achieve their Referred to by the Chairman of the Joint ditions: cooperation, competition below own goals.8 While a historical examina- Chiefs of Staff General Joseph F. Dunford armed conflict, and armed conflict. These tion of state relations on a case-by-case as the “four-plus-one challenges” (Russia, conditions account for both war and basis would generate fewer exceptions China, Iran, North Korea, and the so- peace as well as the gray zone in between. than model-based understanding, called Islamic State), these rival actors are In addition to delineating competition models have great use for delineating evading U.S. strength by competing at as the gap between peace and war, the overarching frameworks. Moreover, this a level below the threshold of a coercive “conditions-based model” identifies model is limited in scope to those actors U.S. or allied military response.4 These an active role for the joint force within in the operating environment viewed by revisionist state and nonstate actors are cooperation and details a unique under- the implementer of the model as strate- working to contest the rules and norms standing of armed conflict. The model gically important, whether they be state established in the post–World War II also provides organization and context or nonstate actors. order to create a system more sympa- to enable decisionmakers to consider and In the conditions-based model, the thetic to their interests. offer guidance for the role of the military term condition describes the way in which Although strategic competition is instrument of power in all conditions. two strategic actors are associated in the not a new phenomenon, planning and This article begins by charting a international system. The three condi- resource processes and current U.S. framework for the conditions-based tions used to categorize relationships are military doctrine are tailored to a para- model, clarifying the mechanisms of cooperation, competition below armed digm in which the United States views this model, and presenting a theoretical conflict, and armed conflict. The model its relations with other strategic actors as rationale for its adoption. The following pertains to the state or nonstate actor as a binary, within a context of either peace or sections describe the three conditions by whole and concerns all its instruments of war. In this view, military power is most providing definitions, outline typical ac- strategic power: diplomacy, information, applicable during hostilities, and certain tivities and a historical example reflecting military, and economics (DIME). The actions are only permissible during a time each condition, and briefly illuminate three possible conditions result from the of war.5 This restricted view leaves space ways in which the joint force could oper- interaction of interests, the importance for rivals to achieve their strategic objec- ate in the context of this model. of those interests, and the capabilities tives in conditions that do not constitute available to advance them. Since rational armed conflict. By operating in ways Conditions-Based Model actors behave according to their interests, that do not evoke a military response, The international system is a vastly the activities they employ are indicative of they are able to exploit U.S. processes.6 complex and densely populated network the condition at hand. For each strategic Consequently, the current modus ope- comprised of actors with interests and relationship, the actor using the model randi does not fully account for the utility relationships that are overlapping to must identify the current condition and of the U.S. military in conditions outside various degrees and, at times, con- the desired condition, the latter being of armed conflict. flicting. To understand the dynamics that which the actor hopes to bring about Recently, some security professionals within this intricate system, one must based on internal interests and ambitions. have referred to these in-between activi- necessarily simplify or generalize aspects The way in which the user of the model ties as taking place in the gray zone. This of it. A model provides a framework for perceives the intersection of both actors’ term refers to an approach characterized organizing ideas wherein some aspects interests and intentions results in a cate- by activities such as irregular warfare, of reality are abstracted to produce gorization of the current condition. To low-intensity conflict, and gradual opera- insight regarding something of special provide clarity of explanation, this section tions. As the term suggests, the gray zone importance. While simplification is refers to Red and Blue, two imaginary is a form of competition accompanied necessary in a model, it must also be strategic actors in the international by ambiguity concerning the actors nuanced enough to resemble reality. system. involved, the nature of the conflict, and The conditions-based model attempts Although a single actor may engage the relevant policy and legal frameworks.7 to reflect dynamics that already exist in various activities reflecting different Revisionist actors are engaging in gray in the operating environment while intentions, classifications of conditions are zone activities to increase their relative providing a framework for thinking mutually exclusive. For instance, while power in the global system. about and organizing relationships Red and Blue may cooperate economi- While the idea of a gray zone in the international system. Rather cally and compete militarily, all activities in contributes to our understanding of than being predictive, this model is a their relationship are component elements the operating environment given the guide to understanding interactions of the underlying condition.9 Additionally,

JFQ 86, 3rd Quarter 2017 Burkhart and Woody 21 At Brookings Institution, February 23, 2017, General Dunford assessed risk posed by Russia, China, North Korea, Iran, and violent extremism (DOD/D. Myles Cullen) while the model does not imply that disagree with Blue’s environmental this enterprise is likely to result in the the three conditions follow a linear pro- policy. Blue’s policy inflicts some cost on annihilation of Red as an actor on the in- gression, there is an implied hierarchy of Red, but this cost does not significantly ternational stage. A more prudent option coercive measures employed. The lowest impinge on Red’s high priority interests. for Red would be to undermine Blue’s level condition is cooperation, since actors Should Red choose to take military violence through other means or make primarily use cooperative activities to action to counter this policy, Red would concessions. facilitate mutually beneficial relationships. be inciting a war over a relatively low-pri- Instead of attempting to make Coercion is more central to the condition ority interest. Instead, Red would more predictions about state behavior, this of competition below armed conflict, likely seek to counter this policy through model provides insight and context for while armed conflict involves the highest sanctions or negotiations. decisionmaking. Policymakers may more intensity of coercive force. Since a rational In addition to the relative importance accurately understand and respond to actor will not engage in activities that of an interest, available capabilities are a actions of other actors, while military reflect a higher level of coercive intensity limiting factor in an actor’s determination professionals are enabled to provide best than their interests dictate, the highest to pursue an interest. Perhaps the Blue military advice and convey intent. Taking level activity is indicative of the current government is kidnapping and killing a simplistic view of this model, an interest condition between two actors. Red citizens, and the Red government is will be either high or low priority and the Actors will always have multiple unable to resolve the situation through actor will have either high or low capabil- interests, which will vary in importance, any means short of war. However, in this ity for acting on that interest. Of course, priority, and feasibility. An actor em- case, Red is a nonstate actor with limited this is an intentionally reductionist view ploying the conditions-based model power and scope, negligible military and, in reality, interests will fall on a scale will conduct a cost-benefit analysis to might, and meager financial resources. of greater complexity and nuance. determine the level of priority of a given Red may indeed attempt to take military Actors’ intentions and interests interest. For instance, Red may strongly action despite its relative weakness, but determine conditions, but perception

22 Forum / Strategic Competition: Beyond Peace and War JFQ 86, 3rd Quarter 2017 is also important in this model for two of piecemeal responses to each individual on rebuilding its economy while the reasons. The first is the problem of im- action, provides a greater context for United States was able to maintain a for- perfect information: one actor cannot decisionmakers to set policy aims. In ward presence in East Asia and extend its know another’s intentions with certainty addition, the model enables policymakers nuclear umbrella. This forward strategy (for example, Red may think that Blue is to maintain continuity of perspective and allowed the United States to observe cooperating, when Blue is actually com- articulate condition-based guidance for Soviet maritime movement in the re- peting). Second, there is an alignment interacting with any given actor. It offers gion.13 Today, both countries are invested problem: two actors’ intentions regarding a useful way of organizing perceptions, in maintaining the status quo power each other may differ (for example, Red interests, and intentions in order to think balance in the Far East. Over time, the may compete with Blue, while Blue is co- more clearly and plan effectively. The United States and Japan have negotiated operating with Red).10 Therefore, some following sections describe the three con- the terms of the alliance and adjusted amount of interpretation and speculation ditions in more depth, provide examples them to meet the changing needs of is necessary to categorize relationships. reflecting each condition, and briefly both actors. Security cooperation has Reality and perception may not always illustrate the role of the joint force in the been enhanced by an increase in mili- align, but any actor seeking to classify a context of this model. tary-to-military engagement, benefiting relationship according to this model must force and intelligence interoperability.14 work diligently to limit the gap between Cooperation Cooperation is strategically important truth and its interpretation. The peace/war paradigm lends a passive for the United States. It underpins the Returning now to our fictional connotation to actors not in conflict, current international order, enhances col- actors, Red chooses to employ the even though various instruments of lective security, helps to ensure access to conditions-based model and begins by national power are required to actively global commons, enables burden-sharing, examining several factors about the actor maintain and strengthen peace. Mutu- and deters conflict.15 Military power sup- in question, including Blue’s behavior, ally beneficial relationships between ports and enables cooperation in many capabilities, ideology, experience, and actors with similar or compatible ways. Joint force participation in military statements. This examination informs high-priority interests are the basis for engagement builds trust and enables Red’s perception of Blue’s interests and the condition of cooperation. In the information-sharing with U.S. partners.16 intentions. In addition, Red must ac- global context, cooperation occurs in Joint actions such as nation assistance count for the reality of its own interests a variety of forms and across a range of and foreign humanitarian assistance regarding Blue, and consider Blue’s per- issues, including, for example, security, bolster friendly relations and cooperation ception of Red’s interests and intentions. nuclear nonproliferation, environmen- efforts.17 Show of force and enforcement After Red cultivates an understanding of tal issues, and economics. Actors may of sanction missions augment deterrence these elements, Red decisionmakers can cooperate over the long term or they and assure partners of U.S. resolve. make a determination regarding relations can cooperate on a specific issue in an Assurance is also vital for enabling nations with Blue according to one of the three isolated instance. Activities within a to maintain military forces at levels un- conditions: cooperation, competition condition use various instruments of likely to trigger arms races. below armed conflict, or armed conflict. power. Cooperative activities across Once Red identifies the current condi- DIME instruments could include Competition Below tion it is in vis-à-vis Blue, it must decide friendly diplomatic actions, training Armed Conflict whether it is advantageous to remain in exercises to increase interoperability, The condition of competition below this condition or to try to change the security cooperation, and economic armed conflict exists when two actors nature of relations to reflect the desired partnerships. in the international system have condition. One example of bilateral coopera- incompatible high-priority interests Thinking about strategic relation- tion is the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty. and one or both actors engage in or ships in terms of these three conditions According to this agreement, Japan acts intend to engage in behavior that will provides several advantages. Compared as a host nation to U.S. forces, and the be detrimental to the other’s interests. to a limited peace/war model, the United States is committed to defend- The incompatible interest is either too conditions-based model is more descrip- ing Japan and essentially responsible low a priority or too difficult to attain tive in its portrayal of reality through for Japanese security.11 Since 1960, the given actor capabilities to rise to the its accounting of activities below the United States and Japan have perpetuated level of open armed conflict. To be an threshold of armed conflict. It addresses a symbiotic security relationship, and the act of competition, the behavior must perception biases, identifies conditions longevity of this alliance is evidence that negatively affect another actor’s vital resulting from interests, and outlines the two countries’ interests are more interests or suggest that future activities possibilities for influencing conditions. compatible than incompatible.12 In the are likely to do so. Competitive inten- This all-encompassing approach to cat- context of the Cold War, the alliance tions may become apparent over time, egorizing relations with an actor, in lieu allowed Japan to concentrate its efforts as in the case of coercive gradualism,

JFQ 86, 3rd Quarter 2017 Burkhart and Woody 23 HH-60 Pave Hawks from 33rd Rescue Squadron, 943rd Rescue Group, and Japan Air Self-Defense Force fly in formation behind MC-130J from 17th Special Operations Squadron during exercise Keen Sword 17, November 7, 2016, near Okinawa, Japan (U.S. Air Force/Stephen G. Eigel) where an aggregate of seemingly benign government perceived Russia’s annex- Crimea.22 Repeated denials of Russian actions could over time change the ation of Crimea and the ensuing disorder involvement from the Kremlin also con- environment in a manner contrary to in 2014 as armed conflict, but from the tributed to widespread confusion about the interests of another actor.18 point of view of the United States, it re- the actors involved in the crisis. The Regarding the instruments of flected a condition of competition below international community did not take power, diplomatic acts of competition armed conflict. Russia’s behavior was military action in the conflict, most likely could include espionage and sabotage. consistent with the Kremlin’s interest in because analysis revealed the cost of in- Information operations range from de- geostrategic expansion to former Soviet tervention would outweigh any resultant ception and disinformation techniques to territories.19 By preparing the “battle- benefits. As the risk of a North Atlantic propaganda. The military aspect of power field,” President Vladimir Putin was able Treaty Organization military backlash can be employed through proxy warfare, to create an opportunity to accomplish subsided, Russian forces gradually transi- guerrilla tactics, covert operations, or his goals without engaging the West in tioned to more overt uses of force.23 a mix of covert and overt operations. armed conflict. Preparations included a Proxy warfare is another manifesta- Economic activities in competition can robust information operations offensive, tion of competition below armed conflict take the form of sanctions, trade barriers, consisting of a heavy barrage of propa- when considered from the perspective of or tariffs. Competitive behavior is often ganda targeting Russian-speaking viewers actors employing the proxies, since the asymmetric and can include criminal of state-run media in the near abroad.20 parties in question are not using their action employed for political gain, terror- As the expansion unfolded, Russian tac- own forces for overt coercive military ac- ism, and annexation of foreign territory. tics included espionage and both covert tion. Consider, for example, the Houthi Competitive behavior is normally covert, and overt military action.21 Even though insurgency currently unfolding in Yemen. ambiguous, gradual, indirect, or some Putin engaged the military instrument of Analyzing this situation from multiple mixture thereof. power, he did not consider the behavior points of view demonstrates how the Conditions are perspective-de- as constituting war, and he neither de- conditions-based model, using binary pendent. For instance, the Ukrainian clared war nor stated an intention to seize interactions as a building block, can be

24 Forum / Strategic Competition: Beyond Peace and War JFQ 86, 3rd Quarter 2017 applied to complicated situations involv- Figure. Yemen’s Frontlines ing multiple state and nonstate actors. Yemen is composed of a diverse population with a fractured political system plagued by sectarian fighting 24 and economic crises. Alliances there Oman shift frequently; actors must constantly Saudi Arabia evaluate their relations with others to de- termine the current condition. In 2011, ada the previous centrality of power dissolved Red Sea Yemen au when President Ali Abdullah Saleh rea tred ut ad aaa resigned following youth-led uprisings ed Fre rea tred and was replaced by then–Vice President udada aar uaa tut Fre 25 Abdrabbuh Mansur Hadi. The gov- Eritrea a rea ueed ernment remained weak, thus allowing Qaeda

various groups such as the Harak south- de ern separatists, al Qaeda in the Arabian Gulf of Aden Peninsula, and the Houthi rebels to con- Djibouti trol most of the country.26 After a gradual consolidation of power and transforma- Sources: etra teee e aar au, ee r, u Fre tion into a militia, the Houthis fought eat, r 1, 2016, aaae at rrarudereer ar their way to the capital and, in January area, eret u e, reate ere 2015, removed Hadi from power.27 At the local level, these events re- include security force assistance, building armed conflict or use other means in an flect a power struggle between various partner capacity to improve collective attempt to depart from armed conflict.34 tribal and sectarian alliances, domestic deterrence, show of force, counterterror- Whether the activity triggers a military political parties, and the military. From a ism, and foreign internal defense.31 response depends on a variety of factors, regional perspective, the crisis in Yemen including the value of the object in has become indicative of the geopolitical Armed Conflict view, the scale of the attack, the actor’s competition for influence between Saudi When one or both actors have available capabilities, and the desired Arabia and Iran. The former perceives extremely incompatible high-priority condition from the point of view of the Yemen as a border-state vulnerable to interests and sufficient capabilities to target actor. Iranian influence that requires its careful pursue these interests, they are likely Activities reflecting the condition of attention, as illustrated by Saudi financial to enter into a condition of armed armed conflict involve coercive use of contributions to Yemeni domestic politi- conflict.32 The value of the interest is DIME instruments of power. One role of cal actors.28 Saudi Arabia has opposed the such that the actor is unable to continue diplomacy in this condition is to commu- Houthis through both direct military and operating according to the status quo nicate the conditions of war termination economic action, reflecting a condition of and becomes willing to risk crossing directly or through the cessation of diplo- armed conflict between Saudi Arabia and the threshold into open armed conflict. matic interaction. Information operations the Houthis.29 Iran is cooperating with Armed conflict is not ubiquitous, and can include cyber attacks to impede the Houthi rebels by providing financial the intensity ranges from limited warfare or destroy the opponent’s capabilities. and material support.30 Saudi Arabia and to traditional great power warfare and Military action in the condition of armed Iran are engaged in a broad competition, even to total war with nuclear weapons. conflict can aim to either contain, defeat, not armed conflict, since Iranian forces Activities reflecting the condition of or destroy an enemy. Economic activities are not openly fighting Saudi Arabian armed conflict are hostile in nature reflecting the condition of armed conflict forces. and employ the overt use of coercive can include embargo, sanctions more U.S. activities in the condition of military power against another actor severe than those used in competition, competition below armed conflict can in the international system.33 This use and the use of naval, air, and/or ground aim at either directly accomplishing U.S. of force can target civilian or military forces to cut the adversary off from goals or countering the advancement of citizens, infrastructure, or resources, resources. adversaries. U.S. military activities are and may result in adversary retaliation. The Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor a critical component of achieving and Once one actor escalates the condition and the ensuing conflict between Japan maintaining national security interests to armed conflict, the other must decide and the United States is an example of within the condition of competition. whether to engage the opponent’s mil- two great powers crossing the thresh- Joint actions to counter rival actors itary forces and continue to operate in old of armed conflict and engaging in

JFQ 86, 3rd Quarter 2017 Burkhart and Woody 25 Soldiers begin loading supplies on UH-60 A+ Black Hawk, February 22, 2012, as part of task force to provide humanitarian assistance at request of government of Montenegro after heavy snowfall (U.S. Army/Edwin Bridges) traditional warfare. Given the magnitude and miscalculation and led the Japanese purposes and for defending against the of U.S. power at the time, many have government to conclude that it had no threat of external coercion. Thus, the contemplated and studied Japan’s rea- acceptable alternative. primary purpose of the U.S. military is to sons for what appeared to be “national Although the destructive nature of fight and win the Nation’s wars.39 suicide.”35 While it is beyond the scope war makes it an undesirable option, stra- of this article to dissect the substantial tegic actors may view armed conflict as The uncertainties of the future and literature surrounding causes of war, the best available means to achieve their the realities of the present require a this model asserts that armed conflict political ends. The high level of coercion paradigm shift in the way the joint force occurs when high-priority interests implicit in armed conflict aims to affect views the operating environment. Even are not reconcilable through measures another actor’s cost-benefit analysis so as the joint force must be prepared to short of coercive force.36 Analyses of the that the other believes the costs to his prevail in war, it has significant utility for attack on Pearl Harbor present varying own entity will outweigh the benefits of conditions outside of armed conflict. The arguments about the direct causes of pursuing whatever interest is in question. conditions-based model is a comprehen- war, but it is evident that Japan and the As Clausewitz stated, “War is thus an act sive approach to understanding strategic United States had directly incompati- of force to compel our enemy to do our relationships in an increasingly complex ble interests at the time: Japan sought will.”38 The military is the instrument of world. Categorizing relationships in expansion into Southeast Asia and U.S. power most capable of incurring costs terms of cooperation, competition below interests prioritized the prevention of on the adversary. The joint force must be armed conflict, and armed conflict equips this expansion.37 Although neither gov- prepared to prevail in open armed con- joint leaders with an improved lexicon ernment desired war with the other, a flict. The military instrument of power for providing best military advice and series of events resulted in misperception has utility both for offensive coercive conveying intent. Furthermore, the

26 Forum / Strategic Competition: Beyond Peace and War JFQ 86, 3rd Quarter 2017 23 model has utility beyond the joint force, ary History 18, no. 4 (Spring 1988), 675–700. Ibid. 11 Yukio Okamoto, “Japan and the United 24 Laura Kasinof, “How the Houthis Did offering a basis for all instruments of States: The Essential Alliance,” The Washington It,” Foreign Policy, January 23, 2015. national power to achieve policy aims Quarterly 25, no. 2 (2002), 59–72. 25 Eric Schmitt and Robert F. Worth, “With with a consistent view of U.S. strategic 12 George R. Packard, “The United States– Arms for Yemen Rebels, Iran Seeks Wider Mid- relationships. JFQ Japan Security Treaty at 50: Still a Grand Bar- east Role,” New York Times, March 15, 2012; gain?” Foreign Affairs 89, no. 2 (March–April Silvana Toska, “Shifting Balances of Power in 2010), 92–103. Yemen’s Crisis,” Washington Post, September 13 Ibid. 26, 2014. Notes 14 Ibid. 26 Schmitt and Worth. 15 Patrick M. Cronin, Mira Rapp-Hooper, 27 Kasinof. 1 Examples of rising powers include Brazil, and Harry Krejsa, Dynamic Balance: An Alli- 28 Frederic Wehrey, “The Authoritarian Russia, India, China, and South Africa. ance Requirements Roadmap for the Asia-Pacific Resurgence: Saudi Arabia’s Anxious Autocrats,” 2 Henry Kissinger, World Order (New York: Region (Washington, DC: Center for a New Journal of Democracy 26, no. 2 (April 2015), Penguin Books, 2015), 212–233. American Security, 2016), available at . Institute of International Affairs, 2015). “Power asymmetries among the great powers 16 Joint Publication (JP) 1-0, Doctrine for 29 Wehrey, 71–85; Mona El-Naggar, “Shift- are more commonplace in multipolarity than the United States Armed Forces (Washington, ing Alliances Play Out Behind Closed Doors in bipolarity, and the strong become hard to deter DC: The Joint Staff, 2013). Yemen,” New York Times, January 25, 2015. when power is unbalanced, because they have 17 JP 3-0, Joint Operations (Washington, 30 Salisbury, 1–13; Wehrey, 71–85; Schmitt increased capability to win wars.” See also John DC: The Joint Staff, 2011). and Worth; Kasinof. J. Mearsheimer, “Why We Will Soon Miss the 18 For example, China has expanded grad- 31 JP 3-0, Joint Operations. Cold War,” in Conflict After the Cold War: ually into the South China Sea by constructing 32 This model assumes that actors are Arguments on Causes of War and Peace, ed. artificial islands, thereby expanding its territorial rational. th Richard K. Betts, 4 ed. (New York: Pearson, control and regional influence. Combined with 33 The conditions-based model is designed 2012), 18–34; Thomas H. Henriksen, “The other individual actions, such as its naval de- for actors in the international system. Overt use Coming Great Powers Competition,” World fense investment and issuance of an Air Defense of coercive force internal to one actor is beyond Affairs 158, no. 2 (Fall 1995), 63–69. Identification Zone, China’s behavior could the scope of this model (including civil wars 4 See Colin Clark, “CJCS Dunford Calls eventually culminate in a permanent change where none of the participants constitute a sig- for Strategic Shifts: ‘At Peace or at War is in territorial holdings and dominance over the nificant distinct nonstate actor or military force Insufficient,’”Breaking Defense, September 21, South China Sea. used against a country’s own citizens). 2016, available at . and Putin-Led,” Journal of Slavic Military others. 5 In this instance, “war” can be either de- Studies 28 (2015), 445–461. 35 Scott D. Sagan, “The Origins of the clared or part of an active contingency plan. 20 “Russian Propaganda: 1984 in 2014,” Pacific War,”The Journal of Interdisciplinary 6 Christopher Paul, “Confessions of a The Economist, March 29, 2014, 52, avail- History 18, no. 4 (1988), 893–922. Hybrid Warfare Skeptic,” Small Wars Jour- able at ; “Putin’s short of war. sions-of-a-hybrid-warfare-skeptic>. Gambit: Russia and the Ukraine,” The Econ- 37 Sagan, 895. 7 U.S. Special Operations Command, The omist, May 10, 2014, 49, available at ; 39 “Coercion generates effects through the John J. Mearsheimer, “Reckless States and Re- Andrei Aliaksandrau, “Brave New War: The application of force (to include the threat of alism,” International Relations 23, no. 2 (June Information War Between Russia and Ukraine,” force) to compel an adversary or prevent our 2009), 241–256. Index on Censorship 43, no. 4 (December 1, being compelled.” See JP 1-0, I-13. 9 Competition in this model reflected by 2014), 54. economic activities is distinct from economic 21 Philip Shishkin, “How Russian Spy competition. In the field of economics broadly, Games Are Sabotaging Ukraine’s Intelligence competition is understood to be a necessary Agency,” Wall Street Journal, March 11, 2015, and beneficial characteristic of open economies. available at ; Kristin Ven when one actor intends to strategically compete Bruusgaard, “Crimea and Russia’s Strategic for its vital interests. These activities are coer- Overhaul,” Parameters 44, no. 3 (Autumn cive and would likely include embargoes, tariffs, 2014), 81–90, available at ; Dan can be determined only by war; states’ inten- Peleschuk, “Russia Today vs. Ukraine Tomor- tions may be impossible to determine, even row,” Maclean’s, March 16, 2015, available after the fact and with all the relevant records at . and Misperception,” Journal of Interdisciplin- 22 Ven Bruusgaard, 81–90.

JFQ 86, 3rd Quarter 2017 Burkhart and Woody 27 Army M109A6 Paladin conducts fire mission at Qayyarah West, Iraq, in support of Iraqi security forces’ push toward Mosul, October 17, 2016, to defeat so-called Islamic State (U.S. Army/Christopher Brecht)

Black Is the New Red Containing Jihad

By Scott Englund

diverse battlefront runs from politicians, academics, and journalists phenomenon of Salafi jihadism, the nightclubs in Florida and Paris, frequently remind whoever may be ideology that motivates terrorist orga- A along the Mediterranean coast listening that the United States and its nizations such as the so-called Islamic of France, through the Bosphorus allies face an enemy that is rigidly com- State, al Qaeda, and associated groups. Strait and among the shadowy dis- mitted to a radical ideology in which Examining the West’s understanding courses of online propagandists. It con- the old political orders of liberalism, and response to the ideology of com- tinues in the sieges of Iraqi and Syrian democracy, and a system of sovereign munism and the Soviet Union and towns, through the ruins of Afghan- states will be torn down and replaced.1 comparing them to the threat posed istan, and deep in the jungles of the This description, however, could by Salafi Jihadism provides a lens that Philippines. While this varied topogra- apply equally to the Soviet Union at can help shape a practical and credible phy presents a challenge, similar threats the beginning of the Cold War 70 response to current threats. This article have been confronted before. Pundits, years ago and to the present global applies the strategy of containment at the beginning of the Cold War to the current threat of Salafi jihadism. Dr. Scott Englund is a Post-Doctoral Research Fellow at the Orfalea Center for Global International Just as containment was successfully Studies at the University of California, Santa Barbara. deployed against the threat of Soviet-style

28 Forum / Black Is the New Red: Containing Jihad JFQ 86, 3rd Quarter 2017 communism in the Cold War, it may serve Kennan drew parallels between the outward ‘toughness.’”6 He suggested as an effective strategy against the present Kremlin under Joseph Stalin and a reli- that the United States create in the world ideological struggle against jihadist terror gious order, operating in a world where an image of consistency, harmony, and organizations. Published anonymously the forces of good (the Soviets) would, peaceful prosperity: as “X” in a 1947 Foreign Affairs article, through the inevitable progress of history, George Kennan described a strategy overcome the forces of evil (the global It is rather a question of the degree to for the ideological battle of his day that capitalist order): which the United States can create among later came to be known as containment.2 the peoples of the world generally the im- Applying Kennan’s prescription to Salafi The leadership of the Communist Party is pression of a country which knows what it jihadism means persistent, patient pressure therefore always right. . . . On the principle wants, which is coping successfully with the and unified resolve to counter perceived of infallibility there rests the iron discipline problems of its internal life and with the re- Salafist expansionism. In containing an of the Communist Party. . . . Like the sponsibilities of a World Power, and which idea, what Kennan called “superfluous Church, it is dealing in ideological concepts has a spiritual vitality capable of holding gestures” and “outward histrionics” are which are of long-term validity, and it can its own among the major ideological cur- counterproductive. Such political restraint, afford to be patient.4 rents of the time.7 however, proved difficult to come by in a super-charged U.S. Presidential campaign. In confronting an uncompromising He cautioned that disunity is a balm Promises by some candidates to quickly ideological opponent, one should ex- to one’s opponents in an ideological eradicate groups like the Islamic State pect that challenges to their motivating battle: “by the same token, exhibition through large-scale military action may ideology would be either disregarded or of indecision, disunity and internal dis- make headlines, but these promises are subsumed into the narrative of a decay- integration within this country have an disingenuous, misleading, and perhaps ing, corrupt governing political order. exhilarating effect.”8 reveal a misunderstanding of the threat Kennan observed: Kennan’s prescription for patiently posed by groups like the Islamic State. squeezing the Soviets was sometimes crit- Even after their inevitable military defeat, Now it lies in the nature of the mental icized as being not aggressive enough. It jihadi terror groups will still pose a threat world of the Soviet leaders, as well as in the was, after all, a strategy for containing and to security in the Middle East and else- character of their ideology, that no oppo- eventually strangling the Soviet Union, where. This article first reviews Kennan’s sition to them can be officially recognized not abruptly destroying it. Applying con- containment strategy, then turns to com- as having any merit or justification what- tainment to the present struggle against pare Salafi jihadism to the Soviet system soever. Such opposition can flow, in theory, jihadism may be similarly criticized as not that inspired Kennan’s 1947 analysis, only from the hostile and incorrigible forces doing enough, but of critical importance noting some critical differences, and then of dying capitalism.5 are persistence, patience, and consistency applies containment to the jihadist threat. along multiple vectors of action (some of According to Kennan, Soviet leaders which are clandestine), and coordinated Kennan’s Containment believed themselves to be absolutely efforts with allied states. In a political Though jihadi groups represent a powerful at home and infallible in their contest, opponents attempt to create challenge to the peace and security of interpretation and application of their differing visions of a political reality and the Middle East and threaten terrorist ideology; they could rest assured of then try to convince people that the vi- violence abroad, one cannot conclude their inevitable victory, and could not sion they create is preferable. The United that this is either wholly unique and be criticized from without. The Soviets States and its allies were arguably better unprecedented or that the challenge were a formidable ideological opponent; than their Soviet opponents at this kind they present is insurmountable. Their the political-ideological dimension of the of competition during the Cold War. In absolutist ideology and unwavering challenge the Soviet Union posed im- its present conflict with jihadist terror hostility to liberal political institutions mediately after World War II was greater organizations, the United States has been is also nothing new. In 1947, George than the threat they posed to the physical notably less successful. Kennan wrote of the Soviet Union: security of people beyond its immediate Since 1947, Kennan’s blueprint for influence. containment has evolved as successive subjectively these men [Soviet leaders] Kennan’s prescription for foreign administrations were confronted by the probably did not seek absolutism for its policy under such circumstances is now Soviet challenge. For example, Fareed own sake. They doubtlessly believed—and well known: “a long-term, patient but Zakaria argued in 1990 that Ronald found it easy to believe—that they alone firm and vigilant containment of Russian Reagan’s administration thought of itself knew what was good for society and that expansive tendencies.” He cautioned as implementing containment, “but one they would accomplish that good once their that “such a policy has nothing to do quite different from any previous version power was secure and unchallengeable.3 with outward histrionics: with threats of containment.” He concluded that in or blustering or superfluous gestures of spite of its high-risk tendencies, Reagan’s

JFQ 86, 3rd Quarter 2017 Englund 29 version of containment was successful.9 they operate.13 Writing in the last years of terrorist organizations that assert its In a Cold War postmortem, Daniel of the 1980s, Kennan suggested, “what religious superiority. In spite of some Deudney and John Ikenberry argued most needs to be contained, as I see it, differences in application, a core belief that over 50 years, with small changes is not so much the Soviet Union as the system that inalterably divides the world occasionally, “the basic thrust of Western weapons race itself.”14 Furthermore, “the into two oppositional camps remains. policy toward the [Soviet Union] re- first thing we Americans need to learn Other important differences should mained remarkably consistent.”10 They to contain is, in some ways, ourselves; be noted: no jihadist terror organization concluded that though containment our own environmental destructiveness, possesses the massive industrial complex must have played an important role in our tendency to live beyond our means and economy the Soviets did; though the ultimate demise of the Soviet system, and to borrow ourselves into disaster.”15 the Islamic State has successfully seized it cannot be the sole cause. Writing Of course, war is sometimes necessary— modern military equipment, nothing in 1989, Paul Kreisberg laid out how Kennan was no pacifist. What Thomas they have compares to the massive Soviet changes in Soviet economic and military Schelling called the “diplomacy of vio- Red Army. Secondly, though eventually behavior in the late 1980s meant that lence” is a legitimate means of achieving the Soviet nuclear force actually posed an containment was on its “last gasp” and a political outcome in some cases.16 existential threat to the United States and innovation in U.S. foreign policy was Properly accomplished, containment its allies, presently no terror group poses overdue.11 The sudden and unpredicted keeps the widest array of policy options such a threat—in spite of claims made collapse of the Soviet Union cannot be open to ultimately defeat jihadism. by some political leaders. Thirdly, the attributed to a single cause. However, Soviets had a rigid, centralized structure as a pillar of U.S. foreign policy for six Black Is the New Red for interpreting Marxism-Leninism and successive administrations, containment No analogy is perfect, but this does not possessed the power to demand loyalty served to provide a stabilizing force limit the utility of comparison. In this to that interpretation—not that schisms that contributed to the implosion of the section, Salafi jihadism is compared to did not exist, notably the break between Soviet system. the Soviet ideology Kennan confronted Soviet and Maoist systems. Presently, Kennan later regretted the extent in 1946. First, and perhaps most obvi- no single jihadist group can legitimately to which his prescription for containing ously, communism is a distinct political claim to dictate its interpretation of the Soviet threat became dominated by ideology borne of an economic theory, orthodoxy to others, though many rivals military means at the expense of other while Salafi jihadism is a religious inter- have attempted to do so. In fact, the avenues. Writing in Foreign Affairs in pretation of sacred texts. This important declaration of a caliphate by the Islamic 1987, Kennan sought to contextualize distinction does not render comparison State was denounced by al Qaeda leader- his containment prescription and apply it useless, however. In both cases, a core ship and organizations affiliated with al to the political realities of the late 1980s. belief system drives and constrains Qaeda.17 When the article was first written as a behavior. Importantly, both the com- However, similarities between Salafi memo for the new Secretary of Defense munists of the past and the jihadists of jihadist organizations and the Soviets in December of 1946, Kennan admitted, the present wage a battle they believe deserve some attention and can help “there was no way that Russia could will shape the future of the world. Both policymaking. Just as Marxism-Leninism appear to me as a military threat.” What belief systems assure their adherents of sought the establishment of global social- he did see was an “ideological-political inevitable success. For the communists, ism and the ascendance of the proletariat threat.”12 The populations of Europe and their victory would be a result of the through revolution, Salafi jihadism Asia had been traumatized by World War forces of history, and for Salafi jihadists, expects to spread its authority through II and the infrastructure of their societies their victory is divine destiny. violence in order to replace a corrupt, had been devastated; this made them In both cases, local political consid- decadent order.18 Like the Soviets 70 vulnerable to the political vision of Soviet erations shaped the manner in which years ago, jihadist terrorist organizations propagandists. Military conquest was not their beliefs were adopted and adapted. capitalize on upended political orders, the necessary where people willingly accepted Vladimir Lenin’s Russia was different chaos that accompanies and follows open communist promises of a near-to-hand from Mao Zedong’s China, which warfare, and public anxiety: “[Whole utopia, as was almost the case in Greece was different from Abimael Guzmán’s nations] had just been seriously destabi- and Turkey in 1946. Shining Path in Peru; each had distinct lized, socially, spiritually and politically, by Kennan’s views on what motivated features that differed across place and the experiences of the recent war. Their Soviet aggression changed some over the time, each had unique political and populations were dazed, shell-shocked, years. In the final decade of the Soviet social forces that drove different appli- uncertain of themselves, fearful of the system, Kennan was suggesting that cations of Marxism-Leninism-Maoism. future, highly vulnerable.”19 Written by an essential element in confronting the Similarly, local sociopolitical conditions Kennan to describe Europe and Asia Soviets was to seek to understand their shape how the dominant Salafi ideology after World War II, it could just as easily perspective and the environment in which is manifested through the constellation describe much of the Middle East and

30 Forum / Black Is the New Red: Containing Jihad JFQ 86, 3rd Quarter 2017 Onboard warship during Crimean conferences at Yalta, Russia, February 4 to 11, 1945, Prime Minister Winston S. Churchill is closely observed by Marshal Joseph Stalin (U.S Navy/U.S. National Archives and Records Administration/Released March 22, 2016)

North Africa now, as well as Afghanistan, al Qaeda is more than an organization, and they engage in the practice of tak- the Horn of Africa, and the southern but is representative of a myth and an fir, or declaring other Muslims to be reaches of the Arabian Peninsula. ideology, which is being immortalized as unbelievers.23 As was argued by Robert Hutchings Nazism and Marxism-Leninism was in A schism has developed between al in Foreign Policy 12 years ago, the the 20th century.21 Qaeda and the Islamic State, although phenomena of al Qaeda and Soviet Salafi jihadism claims to represent an they both agree on the central principles communism were born of political ideological purification and correction, of Salafi jihadism; their differences center circumstance and sustained by a com- and repentance from prior errors; ulti- on long-term strategy and local tactics. Al mitment to a particular ideology.20 For mate victory over the present decadent Qaeda takes a long view of restoring the Salafi jihadists and the communists in and decaying order is only a matter of caliphate; the Islamic State is committed the Kremlin, the correct application of time and piety. Salafism is a relatively to its tactics of hyper-violence, even ideology is key to correcting political modern interpretation, being traced to against fellow Muslims, and sees bene- imbalance and restoring political Islam the 19th-century Iranian scholar Jamal al fits to its high-risk, incendiary style. Al and Russia, respectively, to their rightful din al Afghani. It is revivalist, seeking to Qaeda sought to attack and disrupt what place of leadership in the global order. interpret contemporary events through it viewed as the “far enemy,” the West, The ideological dimension of jihadi original Islamic principles. Afghani and to chase it from Muslim lands. The groups is often discussed, but too often sought to understand how Islam, which Islamic State chose to attack the “near considered separately from the more had been dominant for so long and pro- enemy” in order to quickly establish its tangible dimensions of the threat of vio- duced so much wealth, could have fallen caliphate.24 lence they pose, the mayhem they cause behind and was now subject to Western Political, temporal victory is integral in the territories where they operate, or imperial projects.22 Both the Islamic State to spiritual revival and ascendancy. An funding and supply-chain logistical issues. and al Qaeda embrace Wahhabi-Salafism, Islamic State spokesperson made its polit- Properly understood, ideology is central which focuses on the elimination of ical objectives clear: to the existence of any of the jihadist ter- idolatry (shirk) and affirming the oneness ror groups, justifying and explaining both (tawhid) of God. Its adherents view We inform the Muslims that, with the an- means and end. It has been argued that themselves to be the only “true” Muslims nouncement of the caliphate, it has become

JFQ 86, 3rd Quarter 2017 Englund 31 obligatory for all Muslims to give bay’a example, negative consequences for bad appropriately tasked technical assets, and and support to Caliph Ibrahim. Void is behavior, and above all, unified action disciplined, rigorous analysis. Today’s the legitimacy of all emirates, groups, ad- and harmony, were advised. Political Intelligence Community was designed ministrations, and organizations to which competition is natural in liberal demo- and built to contain the Soviet threat. his [Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi’s] authority cratic societies, but the current level of During the Cold War, intelligence activ- extends and his army comes.25 discord in the United States and Europe ities flourished in a classic head-to-head must comfort jihadi ideologues in Syria, contest with the Soviet Union. Assets Violence is inherent to their ideology, Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere. were recruited over cocktails, microfilm as interpreted by al-Baghdadi who, in Just as it took 44 years from when was left in dead-drops, spy planes flew May of 2015, declared: Kennan’s “X” article was published overhead, covert operations changed before the Soviet Union ceased to exist, the political map abroad, while back O Muslims, Islam was never for a day the the Islamic State, al Qaeda, and their ilk home there was little oversight, and the religion of peace. Islam is the religion of will likely present challenges for many American people knew almost nothing of war. Your Prophet (peace be upon him) years. The important question is how what was happening. An instructor with was dispatched with the sword as a mercy to well the threat they pose can be managed the Office of Strategic Services, the World the creation. . . . He fought both the Arabs and reduced in the interim. Its fight War II predecessor to today’s Central and non-Arabs in all their various colors. against radical terrorist groups has forced Intelligence Agency, is famously supposed He himself left to fight and took part in U.S. military planners to rethink what to have said that their ideal candidate was dozens of battles. He never for a day grew “winning” looks like as it confronts the a “Ph.D. who can win a bar fight,” and tired of war.26 challenges posed by terror groups spread the same is true today. In today’s fight, across the globe, and notably active in recruits will likely need to have spent con- Salafi jihadism, therefore, combines the Syria and Iraq.28 siderable time living and working abroad puritanical strains of the Wahhabi tradi- To differing degrees, the Islamic State in dangerous places; they might not have tion with a commitment to violence in and al Qaeda play a three-level game: a spotless record or have the smoothest pursuit of political ascendency. Violence first, a clandestine transnational effort path to security clearance adjudication. is necessary to create utopia; in some to infiltrate Western states and commit The difficult, disciplined, and quiet work cases, as with the leaders of the Islamic terrorist acts; second, a propaganda pro- of intelligence is just as important now State, religious warfare provides the gram designed to win support in areas as it was in the Cold War, and requires opening notes of the apocalypse.27 where they assert some level of influence; patient investment and cultivation. and finally, a military campaign to take Presently, intelligence is a very public Applying Containment and hold territory. During the Cold War, topic, and the people (and Congress) Kennan’s 70-year-old advice can be the Soviets (and arguably, the United want results. Much of intelligence still fruitfully applied to the present ideolog- States) followed a similar multilevel effort needs to be done quietly, however, and ical conflict. The intervening years have to undermine opposition governments “serving in silence” remains the ideal. suggested that Kennan’s read of Soviet with acceptable levels of deniability, win In today’s fight against jihadism, the conduct exaggerated their expansionist hearts and minds openly where it could, same principles will apply, though the strategy, but given the Kremlin’s inscru- and engage in military action only where settings may look different. Clandestine tability and open hostility at the time he necessary, through proxies if available. service officers need to be recruited and wrote, his urgency may be forgiven. It Containing Salafi jihadism requires a trained, human assets need months of may not be possible to deter an orga- similar strategy: first, intelligence-driven development, analysts with rigorous nization like the jihadi terror groups efforts to detect, disrupt, and destroy methodological skills must be employed. the same way that the Soviet Union jihadi terror operations; second, laying Gone are the days of Embassy parties; and Stalin—a realist with an instinct for bare jihadi groups’ own hypocrisy, today’s intelligence needs to be done institutional survival—were deterred. contradictions, and immorality both to in tents, on horseback, with dangerous However, Kennan’s principal stricture undermine their ideological authority and people. Analysts, formerly confined to was patient resolve in containing and to drive a wedge between it and potential cubicles in a headquarters building, need squeezing the perceived threat from supporters; and finally, fighting it in the to be deployed to the field. Intelligence international communism. Swagger, open only where absolutely necessary, collection at home is perhaps just as grand gestures, fruitless engagements killing jihadi leaders and destroying ter- important as collecting abroad, as recent were contraindicated. Kennan under- rorist financial and material infrastructure. “homegrown” jihadist attacks have stood that in open warfare the Soviet First, detect and disrupt clandes- proved. Surveillance in aid of detecting Union could not be defeated without tine plots to carry out terrorist attacks the potential radicalization of individuals great cost, and skirmishes would outside “hot” battlefields through an will push the legal limits of a liberal dem- likewise harden their resolve. Instead, intelligence-driven effort, relying on ocratic society. persistent containment through positive well-placed human intelligence assets,

32 Forum / Black Is the New Red: Containing Jihad JFQ 86, 3rd Quarter 2017 Sailors direct F/A-18C Hornet assigned to “Rampagers” of Strike Fighter Squadron 83, on flight deck of aircraft carrier USS Harry S. Truman, deployed in support of Operation Inherent Resolve, Arabian Gulf, February 2, 2016 (U.S. Navy/Lindsay A. Preston)

Secondly, deploy an effective count- person to use his own resources to wreak inflicts harm and raises the profile of the er-propaganda operation and lay bare havoc at home. Even if defeated militarily, group that inspired the violence is a dou- jihadi contradictions, exaggerations, the online presence of jihadist groups may ble-win for the terrorist organization. An and hypocrisy. The varied sociopolitical persist; eliminating or neutralizing the effective domestic communication plan, geography of Salafi jihadism will require radicalizing effects of these groups may therefore, includes elements directed a finely tuned approach. Any message prove to be the most challenging. toward preventing people from choosing originating in the United States will be Part of this effort will be to avoid to commit acts of violence while resist- immediately discredited. Therefore, overt giving too much credit to jihadist groups ing the urge to over-hype the combat U.S. Government projects should not be that will inspire attacks against civilian effectiveness of an organization that may considered. Covert counter-information targets in the United States and allied inspire violence. operations will need to be given priority.29 countries. Because terrorism at its core Finally, fight openly only when abso- This effort will lean heavily on intelligence relies on an emotional response on the lutely necessary, limiting exposure, and gathered in the field. The people who part of the witnesses to violence, the relying on proxies wherever possible. produce such messages need to know the best counterterrorism policies necessarily Using drones to kill jihadi leadership and local language, the local idioms and slang, require two distinguishable, but related technical experts (especially those respon- the jokes, the history, and the taboos. The tasks: first, actually reducing the risk of an sible for media operations) are important right message, delivered in the right way, attack, and secondly, making people feel tactical victories, but they do not, on their to the right people requires much effort— more secure. Underlining and reinforcing own, constitute a counterterrorism strat- and mistakes will be made. Attention radical linkages between an individual egy. In containing the Soviets, only twice needs to be turned home, as well as who acts in the name of a Salafi jihadist (on the Korean Peninsula and in Vietnam) abroad. The most cost-effective means of organization does little but unrealistically was a corps-size force deployed to combat, carrying out a terror attack in the United amplify that organization’s operational and never in direct contact with the Red States is to convince a disaffected young effectiveness. An act of violence that both Army. Much smaller, detached units of

JFQ 86, 3rd Quarter 2017 Englund 33 15 advisors or special operations forces units public’s eye. Open warfare in Iraq and Ibid. 16 Thomas Schelling, Arms and Influence were sparingly deployed. Routine naval Syria may achieve one goal: the disinte- (New Haven: Yale University Press 1966), and air patrols were far more likely to gration of the Islamic State’s leadership chapter 1. make contact with their Soviet counter- and its ability to wage an insurgency, 17 Thomas F. Lynch III, The Impact of parts, but were never required to engage. but it will not contain the transnational ISIS on Global Salafism and South Asian Jihad Nuclear deterrence, and an approach to threat remnant jihadi groups may pose. (Washington, DC: Hudson Institute, August 2015), available at . meant military engagement was restrained, analysis of threats, assessments of 18 Cole Bunzel, From Paper State to Caliph- indirect, and respectfully cautious. countermeasure effectiveness, then the ate: The Ideology of the Islamic State (Washing- In the 15 years since the attacks of application of the appropriate tools to a ton, DC: The Brookings Institution, March 2015), available at . two different theaters of operation and leaders of Salafist jihadist groups around 19 Kennan, “Containment Then and Now,” has maintained deployments in Iraq the globe believe themselves to be locked 886. and Afghanistan up to the present day. in a world-altering battle in which they 20 Robert L. Hutchings, “X + 9/11,” For- eign Policy 143 (2004), 70–72. According to a RAND study, as of 2011, will inevitably be victorious. As Kennan 21 John Turner, “From Cottage Industry to support Operations Iraqi Freedom advised, the longer the rest of the world to International Organization: The Evolution (and follow-on operations) and Enduring can deny them any semblance of victory of Salafi-Jihadism and the Emergency of the Al Freedom, the U.S. Army alone supplied and lay bare their own hypocrisy and Qaeda Ideology,” Terrorism and Political Vio- over 1.5 million Soldier-years (that is, one contradictions, then the end of this par- lence 22, no. 4 (September 2010), 541–558. 22 Ibid., 543. Soldier deployed for 1 year, or 2 Soldiers ticular challenge is achievable through 23 Bunzel. deployed for 6 months, each). The total patient, thoughtful opposition and 24 Lynch. Soldier-years of all Services exceed 2.3 mil- defense. “Surely, there was never a fairer 25 Ibid., 31. lion. The same RAND report assessed that test of national quality than this,” con- 26 “Islamic State Releases ‘al-Baghdadi only 4 percent (or 20,000) of the Active cluded Kennan.32 JFQ Message,’” BBC Online, May 14, 2015, avail- able at . 30 ployed and are available to do so. As of 27 William McCants, The ISIS Apocalypse: September 2016, in support of Operation Notes The History, Strategy, and Doomsday Vision of Inherent Resolve, over 6,000 U.S. mili- the Islamic State (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1 tary personnel are deployed to Iraq, and Daniel Byman, Al Qaeda, The Islamic 2015). State, and the Global Jihadist Movement (Ox- 28 Anna Mulrine, “In Syria, a Test of according to the Defense Department, it ford: Oxford University Press, 2015). Obama’s ‘Good Enough’ Military Doctrine,” spends on average $12.3 million every day 2 George Kennan [as X], “The Sources of Christian Science Monitor Online, May 13, on the combined joint task force.31 This Soviet Conduct,” Foreign Affairs 25, no. 4 2016, available at . 4 Ibid., 572–573. 29 Scott Englund, “Killing Anwar: Tar- tlefield in Syria is a prime example of how 5 Ibid., 570. geting Jihadi Propagandists Only Part of the U.S. forces can be dragged into settling 6 Ibid., 575. Solution,” War on the Rocks, January 14, scores among long-feuding local factions. 7 Ibid., 575. 2016, available at . deploy conventional forces only when (Autumn 1990), 374. 30 Dave Baiocchi, Measuring Army Deploy- absolutely necessary, and respect the long- 10 Daniel Deudney and G. John Ikenberry, ments to Iraq and Afghanistan (Santa Monica, term commitment of military action when “Who Won the Cold War?” Foreign Policy 87 CA: RAND, 2013), available at . 11 Paul H. Kreisberg, “Containment’s Last 31 “Operation Inherent Resolve: Targeted Gasp,” Foreign Policy 75 (Summer 1989), Operations Against ISIL Terrorists,” Depart- Conclusion 146–163. ment of Defense, available at ; Helene Cooper, “U.S. to Send precisely when and where the United 885–890. 600 More Troops to Iraq to Help Retake 13 States absolutely must fight, or what is Paul Hollander, “The Two Faces of Mosul from ISIS,” New York Times, Septem- George Kennan: From Containment to Un- ber 28, 2016, available at . of counterterrorism is often quiet, 14 Kennan, “Containment Then and Now,” 32 Kennan, “The Sources of Soviet Con- behind-the-scenes, and away from the 889. duct,” 582.

34 Forum / Black Is the New Red: Containing Jihad JFQ 86, 3rd Quarter 2017 B-52G Stratofortress aircraft take off in formation as part of operational readiness inspection by Strategic Air Command Inspector General team, December 1, 1986 (DOD/Phil Schmitten)

Respecting Strategic Agency On the Categorization of War in Strategy

By Lukas Milevski

any—perhaps most—strategists iting conditions, and its own peculiar war and warfare: conventional or regular, prefer to think about past, preconceptions. Each period, therefore, unconventional or irregular, Martin van present, and future war in would have held to its own theory of Creveld’s trinitarian and non-trinitarian, M 1 terms of categories. Whether in retro- war.” Due to this tendency of thinking symmetric, asymmetric, insurgency, hy- spect, in contemporary experience, or in categories, strategic studies is often brid, gray zone, Mary Kaldor’s new wars, in anticipation, they define war by its washed by recurring tides of jargon. and so forth. Some categories naturally generalized character. These strategists The current fad in terminology is gray fit into dichotomies, such as conventional arguably include Carl von Clausewitz zone wars. Often, these faddish terms versus unconventional and symmetric himself, who suggested that “every age actually serve to label and relabel the versus asymmetric. Others do not, such as had its own kind of war, its own lim- same observed phenomenon. hybrid warfare or gray zone wars, which Simply put, categories are ways of merely allow observers to distinguish dividing up any particular set of phenom- between like and unlike. ena into distinguishable groups based Categories of war such as these are Lukas Milevski is a Baltic Sea Fellow at the Foreign Policy Research Institute and lecturer at on some consistent commonality of cognitive shortcuts for describing in Leiden University. attributes. There are many categories of relatively simple and bite-sized ways the

JFQ 86, 3rd Quarter 2017 Milevski 35 complex interactions between wartime thinking in categories of war is a flawed who the future enemy may be—they adversaries. This practice has repeatedly exercise. All categories must necessarily may be inclined to construct a threat for proved to be a double-edged sword. The derive from the more fluid actual practice policy, political, and planning purposes. reduction of complexity in description and interaction of adversarial strategies; In the absence of a politically deter- often results in the reduction of applica- therefore, it is usually more rewarding mined adversary during the interwar bility of analysis, as the complexity behind to focus on the strategies themselves and period, for instance, the U.S. military simplified categories is lost and they their potential mutual interactions.5 As planned for war against a range of foes consequently become less fit for purpose. the Soviet strategic theorist Aleksandr from Cuba and Mexico to Japan, the According to Antulio Echevarria: Svechin similarly argued: United Kingdom, and Germany. The current proliferation of catego- While the original aim of such labeling [A] particular strategic policy must be ries of war inundating strategic studies or relabeling may have been to draw the devised for every war, each war is a special stems from the end of the Cold War attention of busy policymakers to emerging case, which requires its own particular and the collapse of the Soviet threat. security issues, it has evolved into something logic rather than any kind of stereotype or During the Cold War itself, the one of a culture of replication in which the pattern, no matter how splendid it might great threat was identified early on and labels are repeated more out of habit than be. . . . A narrow doctrine would probably remained central to all considerations of reflection. As a result, we have an increase confuse us more than guide us. And we strategy for 40 years. It was obvious what in claims about what contemporary wars must not forget that only maneuvers are kind of war might break out; therefore, are (or are not), but little in the way of one-sided, while wars are always two-sided. which category seemed best to describe strategic analysis to support those claims.2 We must be able to get a grasp of war as it the anticipated war was not important is perceived by the opposing side and clarify compared to the particular tactics and Due to its persistence, the pursuit the other side’s desires and goals.6 strategies required to actually conduct of categorization may have become it in extremis. Although some analysts an indelible part of American strategic Emphasizing the uniqueness of every sought to apply categories to the antic- culture. Echevarria states that “in all, war may serve in commentary, and it may ipated central war between the North the penchant for theorizing about war be reasonably applicable in the immedi- Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and warfare is relatively consistent in ate context of war, where the feedback and the Warsaw Pact, such as Henry American military history. The number derived from strategic performance is Kissinger did when he tried to imagine of sound theories may, however, be a relatively direct. However, in peacetime waging a limited nuclear war in Europe, minority compared to those which are a focus on specific strategies and their these categories rarely survived long. not.”3 This stems at least to the birth of mutual adversarial interaction is far more Beyond the European theater, al- modern strategic studies as an academic difficult to achieve. This article considers ternative categories of war were rarely and practical discipline in the wake of the the utility and pitfalls of categories of war popular and often required politically use of atomic weapons by the United in the differing contexts of war and peace. powerful advocates even to be con- States against Japan. With this change sidered. The U.S. Air Force preferred in strategic affairs, there were suddenly On Categorization in focusing on its Strategic Air Command clearly two types of wars: nuclear and Peace and War and its mission of massive nuclear attack nonnuclear. The distinctions have only Categories are usually a product of against the Soviet Union, to the detri- grown finer, although arguably the nu- peace that are typically, but not always, ment of its performance in other missions merical climax of categorization did not formed in the absence of a concrete in the lesser conflicts that actually charac- occur, as one might think, in recent years, enemy. The lack of such an enemy terized much of the Cold War. Although with the parade of asymmetry, new, or introduces various types of uncertainty discussion of limited war became non-trinitarian wars, but rather in 1965. into defense planning, including threat widespread among academic strategists This was when Herman Kahn posited his and operational unknowns. The former after the Korean War, the Army only notion of the ladder of escalation, a con- “reflects a lack of necessary knowledge considered counterinsurgency seriously cept of progress in strategic interaction about both the goals and capabilities under presidential pressure, particularly involving 44 rungs in 7 broad categories of potential adversaries, and about the after President John F. Kennedy endorsed ranging from “subcrisis maneuvering” all time when threats will arise,” whereas such a focus. This latter emphasis did the way to “civilian central wars.”4 Even the latter “describes a lack of necessary not long endure. The singular traumatic the categories were being categorized. knowledge about the type of conflict instance of the Vietnam War sufficed Unfortunately, reliance on categories to prepare for.”7 If strategists cannot subsequently to redirect much of the may take on a life of its own, gaining gain the necessary knowledge about U.S. military back to its comfort zone inertia from habit and lack of reflec- the enemy’s goals and capabilities and in central Europe and to engender the tion. Some have suggested that due to how he may use the latter to achieve the doctrine espoused by Caspar Weinberger the potential dangers and weaknesses, former—if strategists do not even know (and later by Weinberger and Colin

36 Forum / Respecting Strategic Agency JFQ 86, 3rd Quarter 2017 Sailor briefs group of distinguished international strategists about various watch stations on navigation bridge aboard Navy’s forward-deployed aircraft carrier USS George Washington, Yokosuka, Japan, February 5, 2013 (U.S. Navy/Justin E. Yarborough)

Powell), which explicitly sought to limit steady access to them, simply due to new effects. Tactics as such are not a necessar- U.S. military involvement in messy lim- geopolitical circumstances. ily inappropriate aspect to consider, given ited wars. With the end of the Cold War, Categories of war therefore became their salience to the successful future the condition of certainty, presented by popular among strategic analysts and aca- practice of strategy. Yet to categorize the need to fend off the Soviet threat in demics. Categories act as cognitive guides on the basis of tactics is to generalize Europe, crumbled. or standard templates to mimic and about potential operating environments, Habits of strategic thinking had to replace as many of the missing details as tactical and operational challenges, and shift to accommodate the new uncer- possible to minimize the uncertainty with some chains of tactical and strategic cause tainty. It was more difficult to focus on which planning must cope. Categories and effect—even if many political and strategies because uncertainty about both emphasize and generalize tactical some strategic effects are truly beyond the potential threat or its operational and operational details, which are not anticipation. The prominence of these conditions precluded knowledge of the only among the most relevant details for considerations is appropriate because they necessary details to anticipate potential strategic analysts but are also the least constitute, ultimately, strategy itself. strategic interaction, given its contingent certain prior to war itself. After all, strat- Nevertheless, this approach of gen- and reciprocal nature. The practice of egy is carried out with, and as, tactics—if eralizing about tactics from historically strategy in war depends on vital details the tactics do not work, then the strategy diverse wars does have its dangers. As of and in the theater of operations, in- itself may fail as a consequence. M.L.R. Smith has argued, “All wars are cluding terrain and weather; the enemy’s Strategists tend to ground these tac- unique to their time and place. They all forces, plans, and objectives; and myriad tical and operational categories in history have distinctive origins and directions. other factors that cannot be precisely to identify precedents and to establish Because they are multifarious they defy anticipated in a world bereft of concrete potential causal relationships between categorization and cannot be reduced foes. Strategists needed these details to tactical and operational categories and and subsumed under general labels like perform effectively but no longer had consequential strategic and political guerrilla war or low intensity conflict.”8

JFQ 86, 3rd Quarter 2017 Milevski 37 MV-22B Osprey assigned to Ridge Runners of Marine Medium Tiltrotor Squadron 163 operates in Indo-Asia-Pacific region to enhance amphibious capability with regional partners and serves as ready-response force for any type of contingency, South China Sea, April 4, 2017 (U.S. Navy/Devin M. Langer)

An emphasis on tactical categories may some belligerents to buckle and others to the Donbas. Strategists and politicians obscure political variability of both the buckle down. Victory may induce either in the West were taken by surprise by would-be insurgent and the counterin- hubris or caution. One may learn the both the content of Russian policy and surgent. Politics and resultant policies are wrong lessons about strategy in war from the form of its strategy, and a new—or contingent upon cultural, economic, and battle and so foreclose upon a successful renewed—category was immediately other types of beliefs of the day and on strategy or persist with a failing strategy. codified. Usually labeled hybrid warfare the specific responsible decisionmakers. According to Colin Gray, “The trouble is in the West, it is sometimes also called For example, the relatively successful that there is a radical difference in nature, full-spectrum conflict or new generation ancient Roman or modern Russian ways in kind, between violence and political warfare. Regardless of the label, a new of counterinsurgency do not appeal to the consequence . . . [and] this dilemma category appeared for the blindsided liberal West, despite their arguably greater of currency conversion is central to the politicians and strategists to explain what success when compared to the West’s difficulty of strategy.”9 When war is Russia was doing and how it was doing it. unenviable record of the past few decades. categorized, this adversarial interaction Anticipation is hard, as one is trying The liberal West is politically unwilling to with nonlinear cause and effect, which is to predict a historically unique event. generate strategic and political effect out always historically unique, is generalized Anticipation is especially difficult once of the counterinsurgent tactics prevalent among multiple cases such that the non- one is forced to leave the confines of at other times or in other places, even if linearity is lost. one’s own cultural context. According the cost of this reluctance may be policy Another vital issue concerning cate- to Ken Booth, “Strategists as a body are failure, as has frequently been the case. gories is that of anticipation. Anticipation remarkably incurious about the character Cultural and political distance, stemming is the reverse aspect of the question of of their enemies and allies. Ethnocentrism from physical geography as from changes historical uniqueness. Western countries is one way in which individuals and wrought over time, implies variations in have often played catch-up, identifying groups consciously and subconsciously cause and effect, the very subject in whose new categories only after they apparently evade reality.”10 A litany of Western cul- anticipation strategists employ categories. emerge in reality and have already done tural and political blunders indicates the Strategy is often nonlinear. The damage to Western interests. This ques- lack of interest in the politics, policies, independence, intelligence, and activity tion of catch-up most recently surfaced and perspectives of potential adversaries, of the enemy mean that tactical cause in March 2014, when suddenly hybrid and consequent lack of insight about does not necessarily lead to the desired warfare became popular as a category to how they might seek—through the use strategic or political effect. Defeat causes describe Russian strategy in Crimea and of force if necessary—to achieve their

38 Forum / Respecting Strategic Agency JFQ 86, 3rd Quarter 2017 political goals, especially if these goals been characterized as an insurgency, it Yet the United States did not con- are counter to the West’s own aggregate would have invalidated all the neoconser- front a particular category of war in interests. vative political assumptions and rhetoric Vietnam, but rather a fluid and effective Ethnomorphism further hampers about postwar Iraq that underpinned the North Vietnamese and Vietcong strategy, the assessment of others’ policies and U.S. invasion in 2003. In such circum- which sought relative advantage through potential strategies. Ethnomorphism “is stances, strategy is beholden to a political either guerrilla or overt, large-scale tactics the conceptualization of the charac- debate about labels and is prevented from as necessary. Through a generally supe- teristics of another group in terms of serving the desired policy. Use of a label rior strategy, the North Vietnamese held one’s own. . . . the mistake of assuming becomes of greater concern than pursuit greater and more effective control over that the development of [one’s] own of success in the war. the war relative to the United States and particular group was a prototype for the In Iraq, the political refusal to ac- its South Vietnamese ally. Superior North development of all groups.”11 The West cept a category sent strategy awry and Vietnamese strategy has led to the ap- has difficulty accepting that the rest of negatively impacted U.S. strategic perfor- pearance of the Vietnam War having been the world is not necessarily interested in mance for years because it forbade candid merely presented to U.S. decisionmakers its model of political development or its appreciation of the emerging threat. Not as a particular category, rather than as an political cultures, ideas, and ideologies. only was the category “insurgency” more interaction in which the United States Therefore, it has difficulty believing that apt than whatever description Rumsfeld was an independent and occasionally others would want to change the status preferred at the time, but also the refusal effective strategic actor. quo in the world to the detriment of the to consider insurgency prevented the In considering categories of war, strat- West and fails to anticipate the strategies United States from objectively analyz- egists too often forget to respect strategic potential adversaries employ to change ing actual relevant details in theater. agency—not only that of the enemy, but the status quo through force; Russia’s Categories in war thus inhibit strate- their own as well. On the former, just adventure in Crimea came as a surprise, gy-making because their use may prevent because one categorizes the enemy or the and the idea that Russia may still seek to accurate assessment of engagements in war in a particular way does not oblige challenge NATO is often met with skep- theater and because their misuse or disuse the enemy to act or react in accordance ticism because ethnomorphism makes it can similarly prevent accurate evaluations. with the categorical rules one sets out. hard to imagine what Russia would gain In either case, strategy suffers because On the latter, the West often forgets that from such a policy. Because the strategic strategists are forbidden from either it too influences the character of any war imagination or empathy required to an- properly examining the conflict or pro- in which it participates. The character ticipate others’ strategies or the policies viding apt direction to defeat the enemy. of any particular war is controlled more those strategies serve is lacking, a new Categories, as cognitive shortcuts, by the belligerent with a good (enough) strategy comes as a surprise, is then im- may also obscure important tactical and strategy and less by the one with a mediately codified as a new category of strategic details during war because those strategy that is not working. As one com- war, and so continues the ossification of details do not fit the favored category. mentator observed in the wake of World strategic analysis. This extends also to the retrospective War II, albeit employing the term grand The flaws of categories in peace be- analysis of war. Vietnam is an excellent strategy rather than character of war: come the flaws of categories in war. Yet case in point, the historiography of categorization also has dangers particular which remains divisive to this day. The in all the great wars of modern times the to war. Because categories are cognitive primary historiographic schism relates to aggressor dictated grand strategy in the pur- shortcuts, they can have an easily under- the particular character of the war. One suit of political objectives as long as he had stood sound-bite quality that begins to side believes it to have been primarily an liberty of decision and action. Once he lost carry weight in domestic politics. Thus, insurgency, with particular unflattering liberty of decision and action the aggressor the possibility that a war may fall under a conclusions about U.S. tactical and was thrown back on the defensive, and his particular category and not another be- strategic conduct as Military Assistance ability to determine grand strategy passed to comes politically charged and reflects on Command, Vietnam, simply did not un- adversaries. From that time on the original the higher political and strategic direction derstand the war it faced. The other side aggressor could only counter the strategy of of the war—specifically because categories believes it to have been primarily a con- opponents who frequently were satisfied to are ultimately shorthand descriptions of ventional war against another country, merely thwart his political designs.12 adversarial strategic interactions. Among with particular unflattering conclusions the most recent major examples of the about U.S. political leadership and the political weight of categories occurred in domestic political scene, as the home Is Categorization a Lost Cause? 2003–2005 when Secretary of Defense front and politicians did not recognize Categorization is unavoidable; it is one Donald Rumsfeld forbade the term insur- the character of the war and prevented of the prime purposes of theory.13 War gency to describe ongoing events in Iraq. the military from winning the war as it itself is a category concerning a certain If the violence that wracked Iraq had should have done. section of human interactions, just

JFQ 86, 3rd Quarter 2017 Milevski 39 as peace is a category encompassing each of these words is a set of assump- about mutually adversarial interactions. another section of human interaction. tions about the value of military force One must first think about strategy and War exists as a category because, as applied in the appropriate manner com- possible mutually interacting strategies Michael Howard has rightly noted, bined with a theory of victory, a theory before one may think productively about “after all allowances have been made for of why this particular set of means and the interactivity of war. JFQ historical differences, wars still resemble measures would be sufficient to break the each other more than they resemble any strategic and political will of the enemy. other human activity.”14 Among all wars It is more productive because it gets to Notes there is sufficient mutual commonality the core perceptions of cause and effect 1 for war to be a meaningful category. with which strategists enter into conflict. Carl von Clausewitz, On War, ed. and trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Prince- We must think in categories; otherwise, As Antulio Echevarria writes of gray zone ton: Princeton University Press, 1984), 593. we cannot distinguish among various wars, “One way to approach the problem 2 Antulio J. Echevarria II, “How Should phenomena. Where does that leave the of gray-zone wars is to reduce the hostile We Think about ‘Gray-Zone’ Wars?” Infinity utility of categories regarding the two actions undertaken in Ukraine and the Journal 5, no. 1 (Fall 2015), 16. 3 major challenges mentioned—of deriv- South China Sea to their core dynamic— Antulio J. Echevarria II, “American Strategic Culture: Problems and Prospects,” ing conceptual generality from historical which is a combination of coercion and in The Changing Character of War, ed. Hew 17 specificity and of anticipating future deterrence.” That is, one should reduce Strachan and Sibylle Scheipers (Oxford: Oxford historical specificities through the appli- the category of gray zone war to the University Press, 2011), 439. cation of conceptual generalities? strategies chosen by the primary aggres- 4 Herman Kahn, On Escalation: Metaphors First, we must understand what it is sive actors, Russia in Ukraine and China and Scenarios (New York: Praeger, 1965), 40. 5 Lukas Milevski, “The Nature of Strategy that we should actually be categorizing. in the South China Sea. Versus the Character of War,” Comparative Should we categorize war and warfare, To think of strategy and strategies Strategy 35, no. 5 (December 2016), 438–446. or should we categorize strategy and rather than thinking in terms of the 6 Aleksandr A. Svechin, Strategy, ed. Kent strategies? To categorize the former is to whole interaction of competing strategies D. Lee (Minneapolis: East View Information compress the interaction of two oppos- alleviates the challenges to categorizing Services, 1991), 62. 7 Emily O. Goldman, “Thinking About ing sets of strategic intent, actions, and wars at the cost of being more difficult. Strategy Absent the Enemy,” Security Studies 4, performances into a single generalized Rather than requiring a sufficient level no. 1 (1994), 42–43. label. Conventional war, for instance, of historical continuity in patterns of his- 8 M.L.R. Smith, “Guerrillas in the Mist: implies that both sides are operating with torically unique cases of interactive cause Reassessing Strategy and Low Intensity War- regular armies on large operations and so and effect (wars), it would only require fare,” Review of International Studies 29, no. 1 (2003), 37. forth. Unconventional war implies that continuity in patterns of perceived and 9 Colin S. Gray, The Strategy Bridge: Theory one side—and probably not our side—is anticipated cause and effect among indi- for Practice (Oxford: Oxford University Press, acting in a strategically unconventional vidual actors (strategies). Furthermore, as 2010), 136. manner. Yet there is always an implicit long as we are specifically thinking about 10 Ken Booth, Strategy and Ethnocentrism sense of special pleading in these catego- other strategic actors, due to this deeper (London: Croom Helm, 1979), 17. 11 David Hackett Fischer, Historians’ ries. First, it “assumes there is only one level of study and understanding, we Fallacies: Toward a Logic of Historical Thought truth and model for warfare, and that stand a better chance of anticipating their (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1970), we alone have it.”15 Second, there is also future strategies. 224–226. a sense of unfair play. As British general If strategists need to boil down 12 Paul M. Robinett, “Grand Strategy and Rupert Smith wrote of asymmetric war- categories of war to the actual strategies the American People,” Military Affairs 16, no. 1 (Spring 1952), 30. fare, “[l]abelling wars as asymmetric is to in action to understand how the enemy 13 Harold R. Winton, “An Imperfect Jewel: me something of a euphemism to avoid is attempting to achieve effect anyway, Military Theory and the Military Profession,” acknowledging that my opponent is not they should simply skip the categories of Journal of Strategic Studies 34, no. 6 (Decem- playing to my strengths and I am not war to think just about strategy. To think ber 2011), 855. 14 winning.”16 Categorizing war itself is heir about strategy is to think about strategic Michael Howard, “The Use and Abuse of Military History,” Parameters 11, no. 1 (March to all the challenges already mentioned. agency—our own, and that of our enemy. 1981), 13. To categorize strategy and strategies, To think about war is to think about how 15 Stephen J. Blank, Rethinking Asymmetric however, is to seek to understand an these two independent sets of strategic Threats (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, individual belligerent’s strategic intent. agency interact in an adversarial manner 2003), 15–16. 16 Many of these categories have been famil- as each side seeks to achieve its political Rupert Smith, The Utility of Force: The Art of War in the Modern World (London: iar terms for a long time—for example, goals and deny its enemy strategic fulfill- Penguin Books, 2006), 4. annihilation, exhaustion, and attrition. ment. The former enables a historically 17 Echevarria, “How Should We Think In terms of nuclear strategy, one might unique reaction to a similarly unique about ‘Gray-Zone’ Wars?” 17. identify countervalue, counterforce, and adversary’s strategy, whereas the latter countervailing, among others. Behind already posits a conceptual straitjacket

40 Forum / Respecting Strategic Agency JFQ 86, 3rd Quarter 2017 French army instructor teaches squad movements to U.S. Soldiers attending French Jungle Warfare School as part of annual, combined, joint military exercise Central Accord 2016 (U.S. Army/Henrique Luiz de Holleben)

n today’s Army culture, professional Professional military education (PME) is a critical factor for promotions and advance- I 1 ment. For future Chief of Staff of the Army (CSA) General J. Lawton Collins, Military Education attending the Army Industrial College and Army War College, and subse- quently instructing at the latter, broad- and Broadening ened his horizons and prepared him for future assignments and responsibilities.2 The Army is at a point in its history Assignments where it is inconceivable for an officer to attain high rank without attending formal PME, as was the exceptional A Model for the Future case with former CSA General William Westmoreland.3 By design, the Army By Douglas Orsi selects its top performers to attend resident intermediate and senior PME. Currently, selection rates are 52 percent I was fortunate in serving three years at the Army War College, 1937–1940, one year as a student and two as an instructor. Colonel Douglas Orsi, USA, is a Faculty Instructor —J. Lawton Collins, in the Department of Command, Leadership, and Lightning Joe: An Autobiography Management at the U.S. Army War College.

JFQ 86, 3rd Quarter 2017 Orsi 41 Marines and Sailors with Alpha Battery, 1st Battalion, and 12th Marines attached to Alpha Battery, 3D Battalion, make final preparations before heading to field in Hijudai Maneuver Area, Japan, February 24, 2017 (U.S. Marine Corps/Christian J. Robertson) for intermediate and 40 percent for development within the current officer during their career. These begin with senior-level education. ranks. Accordingly, changing the cur- precommissioning before transition- Yet a faculty assignment in those rent PME and broadening assignment ing to Primary (for lieutenant through same PME institutions is seen as sidelin- paradigm face significant difficulties. To captain). Majors learn at the intermedi- ing an officer’s career or, even worse, prepare for future challenges, the Army ate level, also known as intermediate putting him or her at risk for nonselec- must change its culture and prioritize level education (ILE). The Army tion for command or identification for commonsense guidelines to train and conducts this primarily at Fort Leaven- Selective Early Retirement.4 This trend educate versatile leaders for tomorrow’s worth’s Command and General Staff has gradually developed since the end of force. College (CGSC) or other Service-equiv- World War II thanks to a generation of alent schools. Senior PME is for lieuten- leaders who deployed to war as junior PME and the Value of Teaching ant colonels and colonels and taught officers, came home senior in rank, and According to Department of the Army largely by the senior Service colleges neither attended nor saw the need for Pamphlet (DA PAM) 600-3, Commis- (SSCs).7 The Army War College con- PME.5 However, having top-tier officers sioned Officer Professional Development ducts this course along with other mili- attending PME institutions and instruct- and Career Management, PME expands tary Service colleges and the National ing other officers benefits the military knowledge, skills, and attributes Defense University for joint PME.8 The profession as a whole. This article argues required of a leader to accomplish final PME is for general/flag officer that instructing at intermediate and current and future military missions. level and has recently been restructured senior PME institutions improves officer PME is “progressive and sequential” under the Army War College–led Army development and the ability to operate across an officer’s career and, linked Strategic Education Program. at the strategic level of leadership. By with civilian education, develops the Retired Lieutenant General Richard examining how the Army addressed PME leader attributes of “character, presence, Trefry noted that a part of being a between the world wars, this article offers and intellect.”6 Officers can progress professional, or a “great soldier,” is a framework that improves leadership through five levels of military education being a “great teacher.”9 Defining the

42 JPME Today / PME and Broadening Assignments JFQ 86, 3rd Quarter 2017 difference between training and educa- tion is essential: according to Trefry, oseph Lawton Collins, a New graduation, Collins sought an opera- teaching how is “training”; teaching why JOrleans native, entered the U.S. tional assignment.3 is “education.”10 Likewise, when the Military Academy at West Point in Collins departed for the Army rebuilt itself after the Vietnam War, 1913 after spending 1 year at Loui- Philippines in 1933, serving as the 23rd General William DePuy, commander of siana State University. He graduated Infantry Brigade’s executive officer the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine and commissioned in the infantry in and as the General Staff’s G2/G3.4 In Command, focused on “teaching the 1917. Assigned to the 22nd Infantry 1936, Major Clarence Huebner, infan- Army how to fight” while simultaneously, Regiment in New York, Collins com- try personnel officer, assigned Collins his subordinate at CGSC, Major General manded a company and battalion to Washington, DC, to attend the John Cushman, directed “teaching Army but did not deploy prior to war’s Army Industrial College. The follow- officers how to think about fighting.”11 end. Collins reported to France ing year, Collins attended the Army The Army trains Soldiers entering the in 1919 as a temporary major and War College and was asked to return military, then educates them to progress replacement officer. On occupation as an instructor from 1938 through in rank and responsibility. In the period duty, Collins commanded the First 1940.5 Collins’s professional military between the world wars, the Army saw Infantry Division’s 3rd Battalion, 28th education and operational assignments PME and broadening assignments, such Infantry Regiment, and finally served in the interwar years developed and as instructor duty at Service schools, as an as Assistant G3, American Forces in successfully prepared him to com- important means to develop leaders. As Germany.1 mand the 25th Infantry Division in the a result, those officers who rose to high Between the wars, Captain Collins Pacific and VII Corps in Europe dur- command during World War II not only (having reverted to his permanent ing World War II. He retired in 1956, attended PME but also served as instruc- rank) served as a West Point chemistry having served as Army Chief of Staff, tors or faculty. instructor from 1921 to 1925. He U.S. Representative to the North then attended the Infantry School in Atlantic Treaty Organization, and The Interwar Army PME 1926, followed by the Artillery School Special Representative of the United and Instructor Paradigm in 1927. Upon completion, Collins States in Vietnam with Ambassadorial Reviewing the PME and assignments of transferred to the Infantry School rank.6 JFQ future general officers before World War as an instructor from 1927 to 1931, II reveals leaders serving in a fiscally where he worked under the Assistant 1 Joseph Lawton Collins, Lightning Joe: constrained period, strikingly similar Commandant, Colonel George C. An Autobiography (Baton Rouge: Louisiana to the present day. On November 11, Marshall.2 Collins then attended the State University Press, 1979), 1–21, 25–34. 1918, at the end of fighting in Europe, Command and General Staff College’s 2 Ibid., 42, 44, 46–47. 3 the Army contained almost 5 million 2-year course in 1931 and gradu- Ibid., 42, 44, 46–47, 55–57. 4 Ibid., 62–63. Soldiers. Within a year, Active-duty ated in 1933; during this period, he 5 Ibid., 86, 88. strength numbered 224,000. The was promoted to major. Although 6 Ibid., 376–383, 412. National Defense Act of 1920 further asked to remain as an instructor upon reduced the Army to 135,000 by 1925, leading General George C. Marshall to remark, “The cuts, and cuts and Europe, eerily similar to today. Only Command and General Staff School,17 cuts came.”12 The Crash of 1929 and the onset of a global war in Europe and 14 (41 percent) later served on the ensuing Great Depression led to further finally resulted in more funding to the faculty. Twenty-nine also graduated from slashing of the military budget, thus Army and increased preparedness by the Army War College; one, Collins, guaranteeing the Army would not the late 1930s.15 Despite this resource- served on the faculty.18 Berlin’s research purchase new equipment and weapons constrained environment, the Army found that within this cohort, all those but instead would have to rely on its sustained its PME to ensure the profes- in the Regular Army “served as instruc- vast stores of World War I surplus.13 sional development of its officers. tors somewhere in the army educational Between 1932 and 1933, the Army Officers such as Marshall, Collins, system” prior to World War II, including hit its low point in force structure, and Dwight D. Eisenhower not only 11 officers at the U.S. Military Academy readiness, and preparedness. Accord- attended PME but also served assign- at West Point and 15 in Reserve Officer ing to the Army’s official history, the ments as faculty at those institutions.16 Training Corps (ROTC) programs.19 Service was “unbalanced, insufficiently Dr. Robert Berlin studied the careers of During this period, low manning equipped, and insufficiently trained.”14 34 officers who commanded Army corps levels of operational regiments led large The Nation faced military expansion during World War II. The study shows numbers of officers to serve as PME in the South China Sea concurrent that all but one officer attended the faculty. Additionally, units were dispersed with conflict and instability in Eastern

JFQ 86, 3rd Quarter 2017 Orsi 43 Senior Enlisted Advisor for U.S. Naval War College performs service dress white uniform inspection of enlisted personnel in Newport, Rhode Island, April 19, 2016 (U.S. Navy/James E. Foehl) to small posts and camps (typically at the of these officers later commanded at the ening assignments. While the previous battalion or company level), resulting in corps level; as PME instructors, they edu- group of corps commanders, 44 percent a lack of available operational command cated a generation of officers who led the of whom taught at CGSC and SSC, and staff positions. Thus, Service schools Army to victory in World War II. were all experienced instructors in the developed officers while serving in staff Army’s educational system, in the and faculty positions.20 For the officers The Current PME and post-2001 group only 16 officers (44 who attained corps command during the Instructor Paradigm percent) served as PME instructors, war, PME and assignments as instruc- As mentioned earlier, the trend for with the majority (9, or 26 percent) tors and faculty were a common thread rising officers’ careers to include tours teaching cadets at either West Point or in their overall leader development. as PME instructors declined after World ROTC. While the majority served as Instructor duty served as a means to open War II. A recent review conducted by instructors of cadets, only a few served their minds to new ideas, questioning the this author evaluated the PME and at interme-diate and senior PME levels. status quo, and working in an environ- broadening assignments of 36 officers Just one officer served as a seminar ment (such as the Infantry School at Fort who served as corps commanders since leader at the School for Advanced Benning under Marshall) that encour- 2001, a period of continuous war for Military Studies, U.S. Army CGSC, one aged “open and free discussion” for the Army. While the World War II as a doctrine author at CGSC, and one instructors and students alike.21 To main- cohort had 97 percent CGSC and 85 as a professor of joint military tain PME, the Army should follow this percent SSC graduates, the current operations at the Naval War College.24 effective and relatively inexpensive model group was 100 percent for intermediate The differences are stark. Whereas used between the world wars. During and senior level PME.23 These officers, 15 of the previous officers had served that extended period of fiscal constraint, whose careers span the end of the as faculty at CGSC and the Army War the Army developed its leaders through Vietnam War to the present, reveal a College, the current group has 1. Seven PME and sent its best performers back different picture than their World War of the officers served as instructors and to instruct in those same schools.22 Many II predecessors when it comes to broad- faculty as captains and majors at West

44 JPME Today / PME and Broadening Assignments JFQ 86, 3rd Quarter 2017 Point prior to attending CGSC, and four had some instructor duty as captains at larence Ralph Huebner, a Regiment from 1939 to 1940.5 As a branch or specialty school.25 Only two CKansas native, enlisted in the an assignments officer, Huebner was taught in Army ROTC programs, one as Army in 1910 and subsequently instrumental in J. Lawton Collins’s a professor of military science.26 Based on received a commission in the infantry assignment to the Army Industrial this current information, it may be easily in 1916. After attending the Infantry College and Army War College.6 deduced that assignments as instructors Service School at Fort Leavenworth, Huebner’s broadening assignments in intermediate- and senior-level PME Huebner went off to World War I in and professional military education in institutions were not common in the 1917 as a captain, where he served the interwar years professionally devel- career paths of Army corps commanders with distinction in the First Infantry oped and successfully prepared him to and, subsequently, the senior leadership Division’s 28th Infantry Regiment. As command the First Infantry Division of the Army. What has changed, and why a company, battalion, and regimental and V Corps in Europe during World is attendance at PME sacrosanct while commander, Huebner earned two War II. Lieutenant General Huebner assignments instructing at CGSC and the Distinguished Service Crosses, Dis- retired in 1950 as Commander in Army War College are not? If it is so ben- tinguished Service Medal, and mul- Chief, U.S. Army Europe.7 JFQ eficial to have officers attend PME during tiple Purple Hearts for his combat 1 a resource-constrained environment, leadership in France. 1 Martin Blumenson and James L. how does the Army make assignments Between the wars, Captain Stokesbury, Masters of the Art of Command as instructors and faculty at these same Huebner served as an instructor at (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, institutions career-enhancing? How does the U.S. Army Infantry School from 1975), 165–167; R.J. Rogers, A Study of the Army implement this now? 1920 to 1922. He then attended the the Leadership in the First Infantry Divi- sion During World War II: Terry De La Infantry School from 1922 to 1923 Mesa Allen and Clarence Ralph Huebner, PME Instructor Talent and the Command and General Staff Master’s thesis, U.S. Army Command and Management versus College (CGSC) in 1924, graduating General Staff College, 1965, 54–55; Steven Army Culture sixth out of a class of 258 in 1925.2 Flaig, Clarence R. Huebner: An American Mixing diverse assignments and sending His follow-on assignment from 1925 Military Story of Achievement (Denton: University of North Texas, May 2016), 13. officers with the potential to become to 1928 was as an instructor at the 2 Robert H. Berlin, U.S. Army World senior leaders as faculty in PME institu- Infantry School (where, beginning in War II Corps Commanders: A Composite tions will improve leader development 1927, the new assistant commandant Biography (Fort Leavenworth, KS: U.S. of the officer corps. Experienced officers was Colonel George C. Marshall, the Army Command and General Staff College, 1989), 11. will serve as role models for the next Chief of Staff of the Army during 3 3 Mark A. Stoler, George C. Marshall: generation of leaders and shape the World War II). Huebner, promoted Soldier-Statesman of the American Century generals of tomorrow. Anecdotally, to major in 1927, attended the Army (Detroit: Twayne Publishers, 1989), 55. officers who serve as PME instructors War College in 1928 and upon gradu- 4 Berlin, 11; “Clarence Ralph Hueb- or small group leaders attest to learn- ation served on the faculty of CGSC ner,” Arlington National Cemetery Web ing and growing as much as students until 1933.4 site, available at . do during the teaching, coaching, and Huebner also served within the 5 Blumenson and Stokesbury, 170–171. mentoring process. In The Generals, Army Staff and on operational assign- 6 Joseph Lawton Collins, Lightning Joe: Thomas Ricks describes the need for ments, most notably with the Office An Autobiography (Baton Rouge: Louisiana senior military officers to improve criti- of the Chief of Infantry from 1934 State University Press, 1979), 86, 88. 7 cal thinking and writing skills.27 Senior to 1938 and with the 19th Infantry Blumenson and Stokesbury, 171–172; “Clarence Ralph Huebner”; Berlin, 12. officers also recognize that instructing in the PME environment makes better leaders. General Robert B. Brown, former commandant of the Command difficult would it be to implement this leadership must address is the deep-seated and General Staff College, listed the cultural change to the Army’s talent culture that regards faculty assignments benefits of serving on PME faculty: management system? Extremely. in PME schools as a career inhibitor or a “Improved communication, critical Since the announcement of budget path to nonselection for command and/ thinking, and research skills.”28 Brown’s cuts in 2011, the Army has shown a or promotion. To change the Army’s assignments included serving as an Edu- commitment to sustain PME across the culture, the institution must implement cational Technologist and later Assistant force.29 As demonstrated by the Army sustainable and realistic change into the Director for Performance Enhancement in the interwar years of the 20th cen- Service, ensuring irreversible momentum Program at West Point. These are the tury, PME should be the last line item behind all initiatives so that changes do same skills needed by senior leaders to cut when resources become tight. The not languish.30 operate at the strategic level. So how next order of business that the Army’s

JFQ 86, 3rd Quarter 2017 Orsi 45 At head of table, General John E. Hyten, commander, U.S. Strategic Command, listens to students of Air University’s Air War College, Blue Horizons, and School of Advanced Air and Space Studies, May 5, 2017, at Maxwell Air Force Base (U.S. Air Force/Melanie Rodgers Cox)

As in all institutions and bureaucra- preclude some talented people from serv- DA PAM 600-3 states that those officers cies, Army culture is strong and tends ing on faculties, but it does not reward will be “assigned to positions designated to be extremely resilient and resistant to them.”32 Again, cultural resistance to as requiring the skills of former battalion change. It will take years to modify the change persists. commanders.”35 Additionally the CSA mindset of midgrade and senior leaders. In June 2006, the Army’s Review of designates those positions for former According to John Kotter, implementing Education, Training, and Assignments brigade level commanders.36 Who bet- change for a company takes from “three for Leaders Task Force addressed this ter to teach, coach, and mentor junior to ten years.”31 It could take a generation aspect of Army culture and assignments. field grade officers who aspire one day to before the Army changes certain aspects The task force report found that “officers command a battalion or brigade than a of its culture. Senior leaders frequently aspire to the highest positions of respon- former commander? fall into the trap of believing there is sibility by selecting narrow career paths at Including faculty instructors at ILE nothing wrong with the current assign- the expense of development in the skills institutions and SSCs as post-CSL posi- ment path of successful officers who needed in the non-kinetic spectrum.”33 tions will begin this process and “seed” attain high rank. If the current promotion This lack of broadening assignments in those institutions with former com- system selected them due to their career the career path of senior officers, to in- manders and key leaders. This is similar path and performance, it must be good clude CSAs, and lack of strategic thought to a proposal made by Richard Kohn for everyone else. How can a system be and vision have come under criticism by recommending that instructing at a PME flawed that selected them for such high numerous authors.34 If the Army wants institution be required for promotion rank and position? This post–World War high-quality officers with the potential for to flag rank. He believes that “teaching II tendency to discount PME instructor- promotion to serve as PME instructors, a subject or discipline to college and broadening assignments is not new. In this mindset must change. graduate-level officers provides time for a 1998 article in Joint Force Quarterly, The Army must also change the reflection, sharpens critical thinking and Leonard Holder and Williamson Murray paradigm of post–Central Selection List rigorous, precise writing,” which are stated, “The low priority attached to (CSL) command positions. Presently, skills critical at the flag rank.37 Likewise, teaching and the tendency of promotion the Army assigns officers who complete retired Major General Robert Scales, and command selection boards to ignore CSL billets, such as battalion- or brigade- former commandant of the U.S. Army or even penalize teaching experience level command or key staff officers, to War College, suggests that “no officer mean that few officers seek such [PME] specific positions after completing their can be selected for flag rank without first assignments. This indifference does not 2- or 3-year tour. Current guidance in serving a two-year tour as an instructor at

46 JPME Today / PME and Broadening Assignments JFQ 86, 3rd Quarter 2017 a service school.”38 This forcing function competition for command, key billet or to serve as faculty at Service PME institu- is an initial step that raises the importance senior executive-level positions.”41 This tions.43 Making these officers serve as of PME and has those selected for flag guidance will only bear fruit if promotion instructors is necessary, but also having and general officer educate the future rates for officers who serve in these posi- officers who volunteered with a clear path leaders of their Services. tions are consistent with those serving in to success will entice them to serve in Some may argue that the current other, more traditional post-command these crucial positions. Army promotion schedule will not allow broadening assignments. When the U.S. Air Force approached for this “insertion” of time to serve as Supporting this second point is para- the problem of talent management of instructors and faculty at ILE schools and mount, but it requires the Secretary of PME instructors in the mid-1990s, it fol- SSCs. If the Army now has time to place the Army to give guidance to promotion lowed an approach similar to that taken officers in high-visibility positions after and CSL boards. Faculty instructor or by the Army in the interwar period. The command while awaiting the next pro- small group leader positions must be on Air Force offered officers on track to at- motion board, why not place them where par with more traditional post-command tend SSCs to serve as faculty members they can influence the next generation assignments. These include lieutenant at the Air Command and Staff College of senior officers? By simply sending of- colonels assigned as deputy brigade prior to attending the Air War College. ficers selected to attend intermediate- and commanders, division G-3, or key staff Promotion rates rose for faculty at ILE senior-level PME earlier in their careers, positions. The same must hold true for institutions, and instructor quality in- the Army would allow them to serve as post-CSL colonels serving as chiefs of creased as word spread. This approach faculty and still have the opportunity to staff or G-3s for a major command or benefited not only the PME institution command at the battalion and brigade corps. This recommendation must syn- but also the officer corps.44 The Army level without affecting career timelines. chronize with any proposed changes to also has a program for enticing recent This also addresses a cultural issue within the Goldwater-Nichols Act concerning SSC graduates to attend doctoral pro- the officer corps: “improving tactically” post-CSL personnel filling joint duty grams and return to serve that institution rather than “improving strategically,” and assignments. Additionally, this guidance as permanent faculty.45 Additionally, the serving in a PME environment where must go out to the Human Resource Army War College manages a Faculty reading and writing for professional Command and Senior Leader Division Tenure Program to keep qualified and journals are encouraged.39 The PME offices that manage the Army’s majors, talented military faculty on staff.46 environment provides time to think and lieutenant colonels, and colonels. collaboratively address issues dealing with Board guidance from the Secretary Conclusion national security policy, strategic leader- of the Army and CSA and an update of Reduced and uncertain defense budgets ship, joint and combined operations, and DA PAM 600-3 to show these PME have influenced the Army over the last 5 larger defense enterprise. broadening positions as billets for former years, and while the election of Donald As these changes take root, multiply- battalion and brigade commanders will Trump may alter the fiscal defense land- ing opportunities for post-CSL tours to also be necessary. Similarly, proportional scape in the near term, the Army must sister ILE schools and SSCs would fur- promotion rates and selection for higher stay the course and aggressively promote ther enrich the professional development command at the same rates as their peers PME for its officers. Standards must be of future senior leaders and reinforce who took the former traditional positions set and expectations must include foster- the importance of faculty membership will serve as cues for junior officers. The ing an environment that brings former at these institutions. The Army is mak- Army must reinforce the idea that serving battalion- and brigade-level command- ing headway in changing the culture of as an instructor or faculty at PME institu- ers and key leaders back into the PME instructor and small group leader duty. tions is part of the roadmap to promotion system to instruct and develop future Currently, DA PAM 600-3 states that and advancement. The Army must leaders. One of the simple and inexpen- “PME instructor positions are critically monitor promotion levels and selection sive ways to improve leader develop- important as developmental experiences for higher command for those officers ment is to make service within the PME that shape individual career success, and who fill these intermediate and senior system valued and career-enhancing, effectively disseminate shared operational PME faculty positions. Additionally, the improving the overall professionalism experience.”40 Who better to impart Army must continue to assign Active- across the force. By bringing former operational experience than former com- duty officers to serve as faculty at PME CSL commanders and key leaders back manders and key leaders from operational institutions. The reason is twofold: first into its PME institutions, the Army will units? The pamphlet professes, “Positions providing officers who have relevant enhance the education of future leaders. as platform instructors, small group knowledge in operational warfare,42 then The Nation will expand or contract leaders, doctrine writers or other posi- providing successful senior leaders to its military due to a world crisis or an tions in the institutional Army are critical teach, coach, and mentor future Army economic downturn, but the Army must broadening opportunities for our officers leaders. Major General Scales also recom- have leaders who are trained and edu- that will enhance an officer’s standing in mends that Active-duty officers continue cated, ever waiting for the call to serve.

JFQ 86, 3rd Quarter 2017 Orsi 47 12 Finally, the most important aspect of Edward M. Coffman, The War to End Money,” Armed Forces Journal International, All Wars: The American Military Experience in October 2000, 46. bringing back former commanders and World War I (Lexington: The University Press 31 John Kotter, Leading Change (Cam- key leaders to serve as faculty at CGSC of Kentucky, 1968), 357–361. bridge: Harvard Business Review Press, 1996), and the Army War College is mentorship. 13 During the 1920s and 1930s, defense 13. Senior leaders must encourage and guide spending was between 1 and 3 percent of 32 Holder and Murray, 89. those officers who will be the future bat- gross domestic product (GDP) and is currently 33 The United States Army Review of Educa- 4.5 percent of GDP; see . Also Task Force Officer Team Report, June 16, 2006, and key leaders to seek out instructor see Charles E. Kirkpatrick, “Orthodox Soldiers: 7. positions at intermediate- and senior-level U.S. Army Formal Schools and Junior Officers 34 Ricks, 236; Warren, 36; Andrew J. Bacev- PME institutions. At the critical juncture between the Wars,” in Forging the Sword: ich, America’s War for the Greater Middle East: in an officer’s career, senior mentors Selecting, Educating, and Training Cadets and A Military History (New York: Random House, Junior Officers, ed. Elliot V. Converse III (Chi- 2016), 196–197; Senate Committee on Armed must tell these up-and-coming officers to cago: Imprint Publications, 1998), 99. Services, “Global Challenges, U.S. National “do as I say and not as I did.” If not, the 14 Mark Skinner Watson, United States Security Strategy, and Defense Organization,” Army will continue to struggle with nar- Army in World War II, Chief of Staff: Prewar 113th Cong., October 22, 2015. row career paths to general officer, which Plans and Preparations (Washington, DC: 35 DA PAM 600-3, 17. do not include instructing and educating Historical Division, United States Army, 1950), 36 Ibid., 8. 3–5, 15–17, 24. 37 Richard H. Kohn, “Beyond Sequester: our future leaders. JFQ 15 Ibid., 4; Charles F. Romanus and Riley Improving National Defense in an Age of Aus- Sunderland, U.S. Army in World War II, terity,” Joint Force Quarterly 70 (3rd Quarter China-Burma-India Theater: Stilwell’s Mission 2013), 52–53. Notes to China (Washington, DC: Historical Division, 38 Robert H. Scales, “Too Busy to Learn,” United States Army 1953), 4–6. U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings 123, no. 2 1 Department of the Army Pamphlet (DA 16 Robert H. Berlin, U.S. Army World War (February 2010), 1284. PAM) 600-3, Commissioned Officer Professional II Corps Commanders: A Composite Biography 39 Ricks, 450, 458. Development and Career Management (Wash- (Fort Leavenworth, KS: U.S. Army Command 40 DA PAM 600-3, 14. ington, DC: Headquarters Department of the and General Staff College, 1989), 12; Jason 41 Ibid. Army, December 3, 2014), 37. Warren, “The Centurion Mindset,” Parameters 42 Joan Johnson-Freese, “The Reform of 2 Joseph Lawton Collins, Lightning Joe: 45, no. 3 (Autumn 2015), 36. Military Education: Twenty-Five Years Later,” An Autobiography (Baton Rouge: Louisiana 17 Known as the Command and General Orbis (Winter 2012), 151. State University Press, 1979), 86–87. The Staff School, this course has changed names 43 Scales, 1284. Army Industrial College is now the Dwight D. over the years to include Command and 44 James W. Forsyth, Jr., and Richard Eisenhower School for National Security and General Staff Officer Course and now back R. Muller, “We Were Deans Once . . . and Resource Strategy. as the Command and General Staff School as Young,” Air & Space Power Journal (Fall 3 Thomas Ricks, The Generals: American part of the overall Command and General Staff 2011), 93. The Air Command and Staff Col- Military Command from World War II to Today College. lege and Air War College are collocated in (New York: Penguin, 2012), 235. Westmore- 18 Collins, 90–91. Montgomery, AL. land never attended Command and General 19 Berlin, 12. 45 U.S. Army War College Regulation No. Staff College or the Senior Service College. 20 Kirkpatrick, 99, 106. 621-1, “Professor, U.S. Army War College 4 Thomas A. Kearney, “The War Colleges 21 Forrest C. Pogue, George C. Marshall: (PUSAWC) Program,” October 20, 2014. and Joint Education,” in The United States in Education of a General (New York: Viking, 46 Carlisle Barracks Memorandum 351-6, Military Education: Past, Present, and Future, 1963), 256. August 16, 2004, “U.S. Army War College ed. Gregory C. Kennedy and Keith Neilson 22 Coffman, 361; Berlin, 9–12. Military Faculty Tenure Program.” (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2002), 151. 23 Berlin, 10–12. 5 Leonard D. Holder and Williamson Mur- 24 The author reviewed the military biog- ray, “Prospects for Military Education,” Joint raphies of the 34 officers who commanded or Force Quarterly (Spring 1998), 83. The U.S. served as acting commanders of I, III, V, and Army War College closed in 1940 due to per- XVIII corps from 2001 to 2016 via “Resumes,” sonnel shortages in the war effort and reopened U.S. Army General Officer Management Of- in 1950. fice, available at . 7 Ibid., 7, 22. 25 Ibid. This included Ranger, Recondo, 8 The other Service war colleges are the Air and the Infantry School. War College, Naval War College, Marine Corps 26 Ibid. War College, and National Defense University, 27 Ricks, 458. which comprises the National War College and 28 Robert B. Brown, “The Army Univer- Dwight D. Eisenhower School for National sity: Educating Leaders to Win in a Complex Security and Resource Strategy. World,” Military Review (July–August 2015), 9 Richard G. Trefry, “Soldiers and Warriors; 25. Warriors and Soldiers,” in American Warrior, 29 Andrew Feickert, Army Drawdown and ed. Chris Morris and Janet Morris (New York: Restructuring: Background and Issues for Con- Curtis Brown Ltd., 1992), 50–51. gress, R42493 (Washington, DC: Congressional 10 Ibid., 51. Research Service, January 3, 2013), 1–3. 11 Ricks, 337–343. 30 Jason Sherman, “Momentum, Mo’

48 JPME Today / PME and Broadening Assignments JFQ 86, 3rd Quarter 2017 On May 19, 2009, President Barack Obama met with new U.S. Commander for Afghanistan Lieutenant General Stanley A. McChrystal in Oval Office (White House/Pete Souza)

Civil-Military Relations in Transitions Behavior of Senior Military Officers

By Charles D. Allen

n Inauguration Day 2017, Presi- Defense (DOD). Over the previous 2 and legislative branches of the U.S. dent Donald Trump inherited years, President Obama had selected an Government in the exercise of civil- O from President Barack Obama’s impressive group of military officers. military relations (CMR). At times, administration the current cohort of This process included the emplacement the relationship was contentious as the uniformed military leaders at the most of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of President formulated policies and strat- senior levels across the Department of Staff (CJCS) and of the Vice Chairman egies for military operations in Iraq and by the end of fiscal year 2015, and of Afghanistan. Likewise, military leaders each of the Service chiefs by October advocated for relief from sequestration 2016.1 Over the course of President measures based on the Budget Control Colonel Charles D. Allen, USA (Ret.), is Associate 2 Professor of Leadership and Cultural Studies at Obama’s second term, these senior Act of 2011. the U.S. Army War College. officers engaged with both executive

JFQ 86, 3rd Quarter 2017 Allen 49 There have been continuing challenges fledgling U.S. Army, General George advice to civilian leaders,6 Marshall clearly to two aspects of CMR—providing best Washington addressed his officers in understood and respected their consti- military advice and presenting dissenting Newburgh, New York, to quell the tutional authority.7 As historian Mark opinions—in the 21st century. Such chal- Newburgh Conspiracy.4 When the Con- Stoler’s book title asserts, Marshall was lenges support historian Richard Kohn’s gress of the Confederation considered the “Soldier-Statesman for the American list of myths regarding CMR: rescinding its commitment for back Century,” having continued his postwar pay and pensions, officers threatened service to the Nation as Secretary of State “Everything is fine in the •• to disobey orders to disband the stand- and then Secretary of Defense. Even with relationship.” ing Continental Army. Some proposed his formidable reputation, Marshall’s “Civil-military control is safe, •• a mutinous march on the capital to professional advice was overruled by U.S. sound, and inviolate—No coup, no demand their due. Washington’s March Presidents on at least three important problem.” 1783 speech at the New Windsor Can- issues: advocating for a cross-Channel in- “There exists a clear bright line •• tonment reminded these disgruntled vasion of Europe in 1942–1943, shifting between military and civilian officers of their professional obligation the U.S. war effort to the Pacific rather responsibilities.” to the civilian leaders of the Nation. than “Germany first,” and, as Secretary “The military is non-partisan and •• Seven months later, in his final speech of State, opposing the recognition of the apolitical”; “The military is political as the military commander in chief, state of Israel in favor of establishing a and politicized.” Washington reinforced the principle United Nations trusteeship. “There is a covenant between the •• of the military’s subordination to the If Marshall is the exemplar, then military and the American people.” new government and its Congress. He General Douglas MacArthur, also a “Civilian control is understood by •• modeled this principled behavior by former Army Chief of Staff, provides both sides in the relationship and the resigning his military commission in the counter-example of inappropriate American people.”3 December 1783.5 civil-military behavior. As a national hero Current civil-military relations are At the onset of the American Civil and savior of the Pacific theater in World challenged by the strategic uncertainty War, President Abraham Lincoln wrestled War II, MacArthur was called upon to and fiscal austerity that affect the national with two problems. First, he needed a reverse the 1950 North Korean invasion military strategy and complicate its ex- strategy to defeat the Southern seces- of South Korea as the Commander-in- ecution in such areas as readiness, force sionists (he refused to acknowledge “the Chief, United Nations Command, and structure, and modernization of the joint Confederacy”) in order to preserve the Supreme Commander for the Allied force. The current cohort of senior of- Union. Second, he needed to find the Powers. Feeling constrained by President ficers must now continue to ensure the general who would execute such strategy Truman on his strategy and opera- Nation’s security in a time of divisive do- and defeat the secessionist forces. For a tions, MacArthur chided “temporary mestic politics and dutifully serve a new time, that officer was General George occupants of the White House,”8 who, administration. B. McClellan, who had served as the he claimed, ignored his military savvy. This article examines the behavior General-in-Chief for the Union Army MacArthur violated direct guidance of our most senior military officers and and then commanded the Army of the from the President by speaking out reviews their impacts on CMR as they Potomac. After President Lincoln had de- to the press and threatening offensive transitioned out of their senior leadership vised a strategy, McClellan did not agree operations against Chinese forces. In his positions. It examines this behavior in a with it and failed to aggressively engage diary, Truman wrote, “This looks like historical perspective. It describes how the enemy. Upon his relief from com- the last straw. Rank insubordination,” formerly privileged and private conversa- mand, McClellan actively challenged the culminating the series of confronta- tions may have become stridently public. President while in uniform. He then be- tions over the 5-year relationship with It then considers how this more public came Lincoln’s Democratic political rival MacArthur.9 After his relief from com- role may affect CMR. This analysis is in the election campaign of 1864, pledg- mand and forced retirement, MacArthur based on congressional testimony, press ing to end the war through negotiations addressed a rare joint session of conferences, and media engagements, with the Confederate States of America. Congress to deliver his farewell address as well as news reports and journal- Arguably, General George C. Marshall in which he set forth the risks of political ist accounts of senior military leaders’ serves as the exemplar of proper military indecision and Presidential restraints in statements. behavior in CMR. As Chief of Staff of the Korean campaign, which he claimed the Army at the start of War World II prevented decisive military operations.10 U.S. History of Civil- until its conclusion, he established a Like McClellan in the prior century, Military Tensions relationship built on confidence and trust MacArthur was insubordinate toward From the inception of this nation, our with Presidents Franklin D. Roosevelt his commander in chief and entertained military has struggled to find the proper and Harry S. Truman—as well as with presidential aspirations. He certainly did balance of CMR. As commander of the Congress. While candidly blunt in his not intend to “just fade away.”11

50 JPME Today / Civil-Military Relations in Transitions JFQ 86, 3rd Quarter 2017 Supreme Allied Commander General Douglas MacArthur signs Instrument of Surrender on board USS Missouri, Tokyo Bay, September 2, 1945 (U.S. Army Signal Corps)

Evolution of Theory “principle of objective civilian control,” become political agents who exert their For military officers, the detailed analy- civilian leaders rarely simply assign mis- outsize influence on the national policy sis of military campaigns and the perfor- sions, provide resources to the military, formulation and strategic decisionmak- mance of the generals and admirals who and then defer planning and execution ing. He boldly asserts that military leaders lead them is part of their professional to military professionals. Implicit in this “must make the management of an studies. The cases of the four generals— principle is loyalty to the commander in effective military force compatible with Washington, McClellan, Marshall, and chief and Secretary of Defense, exempli- participation in political and administra- MacArthur—are familiar to Army offi- fied by military leaders who “stay on tive schemes.”15 cers. Perhaps more important for their message.” Contemporary political scientists have education in the profession of arms Huntington, however, asks a ques- tended to challenge the precepts of the is the study of civil-military relations. tion that continues to complicate CMR: earlier predominant theories. Eliot Cohen World War II and the Korean War have “What is the proper course of profes- argues that, in practice for democracies, provided the context for theories and sional behavior when called before a there is subjective control of the military prescriptive models of civil-military rela- congressional committee and invited aligned with the principle of civilian con- tions proffered by Samuel Huntington12 to criticize the President’s recom- trol—what he calls “an unequal dialogue” and Morris Janowitz.13 While military mendations?”14 Equally challenging is between the head of state and the most leaders seem to embrace Huntington’s Janowitz’s call for military leaders to senior uniformed military leader.16 Peter

JFQ 86, 3rd Quarter 2017 Allen 51 Feaver reframes CMR as a principal-agent Roles and Functions experience. Through three decades of relationship in which principal civilian The President, of course, is the com- uniformed service, they have commanded leaders have limited knowledge and mander in chief of the U.S. military. successfully at every level in both opera- expertise on the employment of military Accordingly, the military leaders are the tional and institutional settings. Many power and thus must engage with and chiefs of the Armed Services, including have served as commanders of either manage their uniformed military agents.17 the Commandant of the Marine Corps, combatant or subunified commands dur- This management requires monitoring Chief of Staff of the Army, Chief of ing the war on terror. They have served as and taking action to ensure the behaviors Staff of the Air Force, Vice Chairman of leaders of key organizations within their of military leaders support goals of civilian the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and Chairman, Services and in powerful staff positions in political leaders rather than pursue their who serves as the principal military the Pentagon. Their past performances parochial military interests. In the 21st cen- advisor to the President and Secretary are scrutinized for Presidential appoint- tury, the theories of Cohen and Feaver are of Defense. Another powerful group of ment and congressional confirmation more pragmatic for U.S. CMR. Indeed, civilian elites is comprised of Members before they become members of the Joint the actions of civilian leaders performing of Congress, especially those from com- Staff. An explicit consideration in their as principals have recently led to the forced mittees that provide oversight—the vetting is assurance that they will not only retirements and firing of several senior Senate Armed Services Committee and provide best military advice to the chief military officers.18 Two of the most promi- House Armed Services Committee executive but also convey their candid nent cases were General David McKiernan (SASC and HASC, respectively)—along assessments to Congress, even when not and General Stanley McChrystal, who with those Members who are respon- in accord with the other Joint Chiefs and, both served as commanding generals of sible for resourcing decisions through importantly, when their counsel is differ- U.S. forces in Afghanistan for an opera- their respective congressional defense ent from the President’s inclination. tional theater of war.19 appropriations committees. Patricia Shields recently approached The Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) U.S. Civil-Military Tensions CMR theory from a public administra- have substantially different roles from Considerable evidence currently sup- tion perspective. She focuses on three warfighting commanders.21 Combatant ports Kohn’s challenges to CMR areas that are informative for military pro- commanders are charged with developing myths, especially “Everything is fine in fessionals, political scientists, and military and executing military strategies to sup- the relationship.” In February 2003, sociologists. Specifically, Shields examines port national policy and security strategy Army Chief of Staff General Eric “(1) the relationship between civilian in their assigned regions and functions. Shinseki, under direct questioning elites and military leaders; (2) military Accordingly, they develop short-term by Senator Carl Levin (D-MI) of the leaders and their profession; [and] (3) plans to address defense issues; they also SASC, responded that “several hundred military institution and society.”20 In this design theater campaign plans to support thousand soldiers” would be needed to analysis, civilian elites are those execu- national security interests. They, however, provide security following major combat tive branch leaders who are the civilian have no direct roles in developing military operations in Iraq.22 This statement sug- Service secretaries and the Presidents’ budgets. In contrast, Service chiefs as- gested flaws in the strategy endorsed by Secretaries of Defense. sist Service secretaries in fulfilling their Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld. DOD civil-military relations are en- responsibilities for the Title 10 U.S. Code Though Shinseki completed his full abled by dialogue, debate, and eventual functions of the Armed Forces. Among term as Army chief, he was effectively consensus that conveys the best military other responsibilities, they must man, marginalized by Secretary Rumsfeld advice of its senior leaders—the Secretary train, and equip forces provided to the as punishment for being off message. of Defense and CJCS—to the Nation’s combatant commanders. In effect, they At the end of his tenure, Shinseki commander in chief and chief executive, are responsible for the long-term health provided the Secretary a “Personal the President of the United States. The and well-being of their respective Services. For” memorandum that explained the interactions among executive branch While the JCS support the short-term intent behind his response to Senator leaders and uniformed senior officers needs of combatant commanders, they Levin and the SASC.23 The Secretary are only two legs of the CMR trinity. must remain focused on mid- and long- was noticeably absent from Shinseki’s Embedded in our constitutional form of term capabilities of U.S. military forces. retirement ceremony. Had Rumsfeld a democratic government is the tension The four roles specified in Title 10 require attended, he would have heard Shin- between the commander in chief’s charge the Chairman, as the senior member of seki’s farewell caution to “beware the to lead the Armed Forces and the con- the Joint Staff, to assess, advise, direct, 12-division strategy for a 10-division gressional responsibility to provide funds and execute national defense policies and force Army,”24 which pointed out the to resource our military. Additionally, plans. Service chiefs have parallel roles for Secretary’s strategy-resource mismatch. Congress has the constitutional respon- their military organizations. Service chiefs provide manned, sibility to provide legislative oversight of The military leaders of the JCS equipped, and trained forces to the the military. have a formidable depth and breadth of combatant commanders. Accordingly,

52 JPME Today / Civil-Military Relations in Transitions JFQ 86, 3rd Quarter 2017 From left, former Service chiefs General Raymond T. Odierno, USA, Admiral Jonathan Greenert, USN, General Mark A. Welsh III, USAF, and General Joseph F. Dunford, Jr. (USMC), testified before Senate Armed Services Committee on effect of Budget Control Act of 2011 and sequestration on national security, January 28, 2015 (U.S. Navy/Julianne F. Metzger)

Shinseki was responsible for supporting invasion of Iraq, then as the commanding “I’m a soldier and I live in a democracy multiple theaters during his tenure, espe- general of United States Army Europe. and I work for political leaders. And when cially for that of General Tommy Franks. From that position, he was selected to my political leaders tell me it’s time to go, For the major combat operations of the lead the U.S. and North Atlantic Treaty I must go.”28 21st century, General Franks headed U.S. Organization effort as the Commander, As military leaders seek to provide Central Command for the 2001 invasion International Security Assistance Forces, the capability and capacity to perform of Afghanistan and the 2003 invasion and U.S. Forces in Afghanistan. When explicitly assigned missions, a strategy- of Iraq. As a combatant commander the U.S. war strategy in Afghanistan to-resource mismatch has persisted. leading the main warfighting headquar- changed under the Obama administra- Accordingly, defense officials have sought ters, Franks became frustrated with his tion, McKiernan disagreed with its to gain sufficient resources to conduct Pentagon-based colleagues and derided implementation. When challenged and the spectrum of assigned missions or to the Service chiefs as “Title 10 Rear asked to retire quietly, McKiernan report- be relieved of specific missions in order Echelon M**F**s.”25 Regarded as a hero edly replied, “You’re going to have to fire to have sufficient resources to fulfill their following the speedy takedown of the me.”27 So he became the first U.S. general responsibilities. Presently, defense lead- Taliban and the Saddam Hussein regime, officer fired from an active theater of war ers are persistently struggling to satisfy Franks retired in July 2003. During the since MacArthur in Korea. In his retire- the requirements of the Budget Control 2004 Presidential campaign, he actively ment ceremony, McKiernan’s message Act of 2011, which threatens cuts to endorsed President George W. Bush at to his military profession claimed that defense spending by enforcing budget the Republican National Convention.26 “What counts the most are reputation caps if national debt reduction measures Although not a Service chief, General and . . . decisions based on missions and are not taken.29 Faced with the very real David McKiernan was well respected as taking care of troops and their families.” prospects of budgetary sequestrations an Army leader. He had served as the land His farewell speech clearly acknowledged in 2013, the Joint Chiefs of Staff sent a component commander for the 2003 Huntington’s principle of civilian control: memorandum to Congress urging it to

JFQ 86, 3rd Quarter 2017 Allen 53 Table. Previous Joint Chiefs of Staff Positions and Assignments Officer Position Key Assignments General Martin E. Dempsey, USA Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Army Chief of Staff (October 2011–September 2015) U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command Admiral James A. Winnefeld, Jr., USN Vice Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff U.S. Northern Command (August 2011–July 2015) Director, Strategic Plans and Policy (Joint Staff) General Raymond T. Odierno, USA Chief of Staff, Army U.S. Joint Forces Command (September 2011–August 2015) U.S. Forces–Iraq Assistant to Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Joseph F. Dunford, Jr., USMC Commandant, U.S. Marine Corps Commander, International Security Assistance Forces (October 2014–October 2015) U.S. Forces–Afghanistan Assistant Commandant, U.S. Marine Corps Admiral Jonathan W. Greenert, USN Chief of Naval Operations Vice Chief of Naval Operations (September 2011–September 2015) U.S. Fleet Forces Command U.S. Pacific Command General Mark A. Welsh III, USAF Chief of Staff, Air Force U.S. Air Forces Europe (August 2012–June 2016) Associate Director, Central Intelligence Agency General Frank J. Grass, USA Chief of National Guard Bureau Deputy Commander, U.S. Northern Command (September 2012–August 2016) Deputy Director, National Guard Bureau pass a budget rather than emplace tempo- the national security debate and policy or oversight hearings. These routine, rary spending measures through another development. legally mandated senior military leader continuing resolution.30 When sequestra- Other important forums are the testimonies generally reflect the military’s tion was enacted for a period in 2013, Service-related professional meetings compliance with Presidential priorities as Congress subsequently passed Bipartisan and symposiums used by senior officers presented in the defense portion of the Budget Acts in 2013 and 2015 to delay to advocate on the behalf of the military. Federal budget request. Similar to the defense cuts in 2-year increments. JCS Service secretaries and chiefs of the budgetary hearings are readiness hearings members advised congressional leaders to Armed Forces provide keynote speeches from the force providers and updates on allow military professionals to determine at such gatherings to connect with and current activities from the combatant how defense cuts would be applied, garner support from myriad stakehold- commanders. Oversight hearings address rather than applying them by arbitrary ers who wield great influence with U.S. functional concerns (that is, acquisition and indiscriminate legislation. Government representatives on defense programs) or items of special interest to issues and with the American people.32 Congress (such as the effectiveness of op- Forums to Observe Behavior Graduation speeches at Service academies erational strategies in a regional theater). As Joint Chiefs transition out of their and senior-level colleges also provide op- While each forum is available and positions, CMR can be influenced not portunities for senior military leaders to used frequently, of special interest and only by these leaders’ accomplishments set expectations of newly commissioned potential controversy are the farewell but also by their conduct immedi- officers, to affirm institutional values with addresses of senior military leaders as ately upon retirement. Several forums members of the profession of arms, and they transition out of their prominent provide an opportunity to observe to announce policy initiatives.33 positions into retirement. The purpose CMR during senior military officer Likewise, DOD communicates of such statements may be to reinforce and Presidential transitions. Pentagon with selected audiences through of- current policies, strategies, and priorities; press briefings and issued statements are ficial publications such as Joint Force to inform and heighten awareness and routine communications; they are now Quarterly (under the auspices of CJCS compel action on an unresolved issue; used with greater frequency to inform and the National Defense University) to provide a glide path to the successor; the U.S. public about military activities. and Service-related magazines such as or to “clear the deck” of contentious They also provide real-time updates on ARMY. Other publications include influ- issues for the next Service chief or existing crises or emerging concerns ential scholarly journals such as Orbis and Chairman. The aforementioned historical of political or international interest Foreign Policy. Similarly, newspapers such farewell addresses by Generals George involving the U.S. military. DOD offi- as the Wall Street Journal and the New Washington, Douglas MacArthur, Eric cials also engage with think tanks on York Times garner immediate attention Shinseki, and David McKiernan provide policies and strategies still under devel- from a diverse and informed readership. such examples. opment.31 These sessions are used to The more formal and official The following discussion of the inform civilian elites who are outside of civil-military venue is congressional tes- behavior of transitioning senior lead- government and active contributors to timony, whether for the annual budget ers is based on materials available

54 JPME Today / Civil-Military Relations in Transitions JFQ 86, 3rd Quarter 2017 approximately 1 year prior to the lead- of the promising Arab Spring and the executive and legislative branches and ers’ nominal release from Active-duty resulting lack of effective governance Army Chief of Staff General Raymond service at the end of the fiscal year in and security in the Middle East region. Odierno. In August 2015, his declara- September. It traces a sequence of key The complexity of the strategic environ- tion that “this is no time to cut the events and reflects a consistent battle ment challenges the Nation’s ability U.S. Army” appeared in the Wall Street rhythm. In August, JCS members submit to counter threats effectively and to Journal.40 Consistent with his previous their Service budget requests for 1 year develop strategies with identified risks. statements, Odierno identified global later. In October, Service chiefs begin the The current venue of choice for missions that require Army capabilities new fiscal year in engagements with their transitioning senior military leaders to go and the resourcing challenges that “have Service associations’ annual meetings. “on the record” appears to be published brought the nation to an important For the following months, Services and articles and interviews. General Martin inflection point.”41 An adamant advocate the Joint Staff work the defense planning, Dempsey chose Joint Force Quarterly to for Army force structure and sufficient programming, and budgeting processes convey his parting message.37 In a final force manning levels to accomplish mis- within the executive branch, which then interview, he sought to educate and in- sions of the national military strategy, becomes part of the President’s budget form members of the profession of arms Odierno contended that “[d]ecisions submission to Congress in early February. about the inevitability of friction within made in Washington . . . must be based From March through June, senior de- civil-military relations—friction that com- on the world as it is, and not the world fense officials and military officers appear plicates national security decisionmaking as we wish it to be.”42 Those Washington in hearings before congressional commit- for strategic-level issues.38 Dempsey em- decisions on policy and military strategies tees. Senior military leader transitions are braced his role to provide the President are made within the executive branch, completed with changes of responsibility with information and best advice on and decisions on resourcing and oversight and retirement ceremonies in the summer issues that may extend beyond the rules reside within the legislative branch. months, which may include graduation military domain. As the senior military Odierno had frequent interactions with speeches, final press and media inter- advisor, he sought to make a compelling both. After Odierno’s retirement, Army views, and publication of senior military case for senior military leaders’ role in Secretary John McHugh was more direct leaders’ essays. the assessment of threats. He advised in criticizing Congress at the October military leaders to work effectively with 2015 convention of the Association of Contemporary Issues for other elements of the executive branch the U.S. Army. He addressed the Army’s Civil-Military Relations in employing the instruments of national need to get “beyond budget caps, con- Throughout the second Obama power—diplomatic, informational, tinuing resolutions, and the uncertainty administration, several defense issues military, and economic—to protect U.S. they foster.”43 persisted and remained subject to the national security interests. In doing so, In the last month of his tenure as advice of the senior military leaders he would recommend prioritization and Air Force Chief of Staff, Defense News of JCS. The table lists the last cohort, specify resourcing requirements for de- interviewed General Mark Welsh.44 Like their positions, and key assignments fense capabilities. Admiral Greenert, he expressed concern that serve as the foundation for their In an August 2015 interview with about the dim prospects of a timely de- expertise. Among the enduring defense Defense News prior to his September fense budget and the ensuing impact of requirements are developing an effec- retirement, Admiral Greenert focused on the Budget Control Act on moderniza- tive National Defense Strategy sup- two main points.39 First, he noted that tion programs that would provide future ported by National Military Strategy congressional difficulties with passing capabilities to the Air Force. While pes- to protect and advance U.S. national budgets and the resulting use of continu- simistic about the stability of the Federal security interests.34 Development of ing resolutions are having an adverse budget process, Welsh stated that the such strategic documents has influenced impact on naval readiness. Accordingly, majority of Air Force interactions with the conduct of ongoing conflicts in the uncertainty of funding for training Congress were “very positive” and that Iraq and Afghanistan, especially after and maintenance as well as investments for “we don’t have to agree.”45 Moreover, the declared end of combat operations modernization would affect not only cur- like General Dempsey, he noted that “our in those theaters. The resurgence of rent capacities but also future capabilities. job is to provide the best military advice the Taliban and al Qaeda as well as the Second, while acknowledging the security we can give. . . . I have no issue with emergence of the so-called Islamic State challenges of potential acts of terrorism debate and disagreement with Congress. (IS)35 have complicated the U.S. desire by ISIL and al Qaeda, Greenert expressed That is part of the system.”46 to rebalance its military forces to the concern about the potential threats of The most nuanced transitional Pacific as outlined in the 2012 Defense Russia and China that would require remarks came from Marine Corps Strategic Guidance.36 Likewise, these strong U.S. naval capabilities to counter. Commandant General Joseph F. policy documents have influenced the Perhaps the most contentious recent Dunford. He had been nominated to U.S. response to the messy aftermath civil-military issue arose among the succeed General Dempsey as Chairman

JFQ 86, 3rd Quarter 2017 Allen 55 President Abraham Lincoln and General George B. McClellan at Antietam, Maryland, October 3, 1862 (LOC/Alexander Gardner) of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Perhaps accepted his new responsibility: “As the Understandably, points of friction are in- the most striking test of civil-military senior military advisor and the senior uni- herent in civil-military relations. Friction relations occurs when civilian policy formed member, it’s my job now to assist is evident in formal statements and unof- decisions appear to challenge a military the secretary with full implementation ficial leaks across agencies of the executive Service’s core identity and directly affect to make sure that we do it in a way that branch. Friction may arise when senior the Service’s mission readiness. Such was maintains our combat effectiveness, main- military leaders’ assessments of threats the assessment of General Dunford in tains the health and welfare of our troops and risks are different from those of civil- his report to Secretary of the Navy Ray and takes advantage of the talent of all the ian leaders. It may be the case that the Mabus in the Marine leader’s recom- men and women that we have in uniform. “best military advice” is considered but mendation to exclude women from some So we are getting after that now.”48 As he not accepted by their civilian leaders. In combat positions within the Marine transitioned to the role of CJCS, Dunford such cases, military leaders may speak out Corps.47 Dunford’s best military advice embraced Carter’s decision after render- to provide pushback on current policies was presented with full knowledge that ing professional advice to the contrary and strategies. They may seek to influence Mabus would not seek an exemption In these senior leaders’ transitional and potentially shape the discourse on for the Marine Corps and that Secretary statements, four themes have emerged: emerging policies and strategies. Or, in of Defense Ash Carter had made public requirements for military preparedness, the absence of clear policy guidance, they his support for full gender integration capabilities to execute contingency may press for decisions. In any event, of the military. When Secretary Carter operations, the covenant to sustain the they must advocate for resources com- announced the decision in December all-volunteer force, and obligation for mensurate with missions and established 2015, freshly appointed CJCS Dunford stewardship of the military profession. priorities of their civilian leaders.

56 JPME Today / Civil-Military Relations in Transitions JFQ 86, 3rd Quarter 2017 Public and scholarly discourse com- century as documented in the works of your view on the strategic issue that has monly cite the tensions in civil-military journalist Bob Woodward and of former national security implications.’”51 relations, which often involve issues Defense Secretaries such as Rumsfeld, The greatest area of contention in of authority, autonomy, and account- Robert Gates, and Leon Panetta.49 civil-military relations may be the interac- ability. Authority is established in legal The current JCS membership is tion between Congress in its resourcing documents such as the Constitution the second complete cohort of senior and oversight roles and the Pentagon of the United States; Title 10, U.S. uniformed officers in the 8 years of as it seeks autonomy to act within the Code; and policy directives within the the Obama administration. They have expertise and jurisdictions allotted to executive branch. As leaders in the pro- observed the successes and challenges the military profession.52 While military fession of arms in accordance with the of CMR over periods of stress and tur- leaders have protected communications Huntingtonian constructs of expertise, moil with deliberations on the surge in with their commander in chief, exchanges responsibility, and corporateness, senior Afghanistan, the declared end of combat with Congress are generally public and military leaders expect autonomy in their operations in two theaters of war, and the “on the record.” These are inherently conduct of military operations. However, shifting of strategic priorities. Arguably, political—and potentially partisan. So senior military leaders’ authority and au- JCS leaders have taken those lessons to direct evidence of military dissent with tonomy must come with accountability to heart. An assessment of CMR expecta- Presidential decisions and policies in the American people and their elected of- tions from the Ronald Reagan era still congressional engagements is not readily ficials. Accordingly, trust and confidence seems applicable, even 30 years since available. are essential elements for developing ef- passage of the Goldwater-Nichols Act: Congressional hearings may in some fective and healthy CMR. “In keeping with their military culture, cases challenge Presidential policies rather the Joint Chiefs preferred clearly defined than assess the effectiveness of military Implications for U.S. Civil- organizational roles and lines of author- operations. This kind of partisanship Military Relations ity. What they often got . . . were vague has also led to delays in considering This article traces the evolution of directives, lax assignments of authority, Presidential appointees, impacting civilian civil-military relations through selected and contradictory behavior from the appointees more than military ones. For cases in U.S. history that have served as President and his subordinates.”50 example, former Under Secretary of the the foundation of several theories and Through it all, these officers gained Army Brad Carson withdrew from con- frameworks (for example, Huntington, the credibility and trust of President sideration as Undersecretary of Defense Janowitz, Cohen, and Feaver). It has Obama based on their past performances for Personnel and Readiness after waiting examined transitional behavior of the and established effective working re- a year for Senate approval. Additionally, cohort of senior military leaders in the lationships with civilian leaders. While the approval of Secretary of the Army final term of the Obama administra- anecdotal reports of strained relations Eric Fanning took 6 months, as the tion. This review has illustrated aspects between the White House and the Senate delayed to consider presidential of civil-military relations and provided Pentagon surfaced, the behavior of this remarks on an unrelated subject.53 themes for consideration. In view of cohort of senior military officials was Military leaders continue to call for current tensions and the consequences appropriate. Vigorous discussions and congressional action to pass a timely of inappropriate behavior of some exchanges enabled them to provide the Federal budget in order to avoid the senior uniformed leaders, continuing best military advice to civilian leaders Budget Control Act of 2011 seques- education is essential to ensure senior as they determined policy objectives tration cuts and preclude reliance on military leaders do not unduly compli- and approved plans as well as evaluated temporary spending measures of a cate and impair U.S. CMR. specific courses of action to address stra- continuing resolution. They also seek The JCS members noted here have tegic issues. President Obama selected authorization and appropriations for progressed through careers shaped greatly and nominated each of these officers, defense programs for weapons system by the Goldwater-Nichols Department and their appointments were confirmed acquisitions; they likewise rely on the of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986. by the Senate. As such, their prior per- Base Realignment and Closure process Accordingly, they have served in diverse formance and reputation established a to deal with excess infrastructure and joint assignments, have spent time in baseline of trust and confidence with to use Federal funding more effectively. the Pentagon observing the interaction the civilian masters in the executive and Although some scholars express con- between senior civilian and uniformed legislative branches of our governments. cern about apparent conflicts between defense leaders, and have participated An example of such Presidential trust was Congress and Pentagon leaders, General in professional development programs offered by General Dempsey: “As it came Dempsey offers a valuable perspec- that include analysis of civil-military rela- around to me, I would say, ‘I am here as tive: “Our entire system is built on the tions. Perhaps most important, they have your military advisor, and that is not a premise that we require friction to move witnessed contentious and problematic military issue.’ And the President would [forward]. . . . I would advise future civil-military relations behavior in the 21st say, ‘Yes. But you are here and I want leaders that friction and disagreement in

JFQ 86, 3rd Quarter 2017 Allen 57 decisionmaking is not a negative. . . . In equally important for civilian officials to Military Relations,” posted September 16, 2013, available at . most persuasive arguments tends to pre- policies, craft laws, and ultimately make 4 Richard H. Kohn, “The Inside History vail in those environments.”54 decisions involving the use of military of the Newburgh Conspiracy: America and the Historian Steven Rearden asserts that force. Accordingly, CMR education Coup d’Etat,” William and Mary Quarterly 27, the most important task of the CJCS should be provided to Presidential ap- no. 2 (April 1970), 187–220. 5 The officers of the Continental Army sent is to manage CMR through the transi- pointees, the National Security Council a letter to Congress March 20, 1783, detailing 55 tion of civilian leadership. Transitions Staff, and to members of selected con- their concerns. See “Washington’s Resignation almost always include appointments of gressional committees. By their very Speech (Final Draft),” December 23, 1873, new Secretaries of Defense, Secretaries nature, CMR are necessarily dynamic Annapolis, MD, available at . leadership within Congress. Following monitored. 6 Mark A. Stoler, George C. Marshall: congressional elections, majority leader- The legacy of the last cohort of Soldier-Statesman for the American Century ship for the SASC and HASC often shifts. JCS members has provided a founda- (Woodbridge, CT: Twayne, 1989). Notably, Presidential appointees to senior tion for their successors. The current 7 See the Constitution of the United States defense positions and those elected to cohort, in turn, will, according to their of America, Article I, Section 8: “The Congress shall have Power . . . To declare War, To raise Congress (currently fewer than one in own predilections, shape the future of and support Armies . . . To provide and main- five) have limited military experience and CMR through engagements with the tain a Navy.” Article II, Section 1: “The execu- thereby rely on the assessments provided new Presidential administration. Over tive Power shall be vested in a President of the by their military advisors. Arguably, trust the coming years, President Trump will United States of America.” Article II, Section and confidence may be extended initially select his own senior military officers for 2: “The President shall be the Commander in Chief of the Army and the Navy of the United to senior military leaders, but they are the Joint Staff. They may espouse the States, and of the Militia of the several States continually tested throughout the CMR. unequal dialogue with civilians who are when called into actual service of the United On Election Day 2016, Lieutenant unchallenged in their authority and con- States.” General Dave Barno, USA (Ret.), and trol of America’s military. Senior military 8 This line was offered by the main charac- Dr. Nora Bensahel offered sage advice leaders must demonstrate the experience, ter in the filmMacArthur , Universal Pictures, 1977. to military leaders for the then-pending expertise, and judgment that should be 9 “Diary Entry of President Harry S. transition period of a new Presidential provided with candor to inform the deci- Truman, April 6, 1951,” Truman Papers— administration: “Don’t assume the new sions of our national policymakers. An President’s Secretary’s Files, Harry S. Tru- team will continue the processes, policies, exchange relationship is inherent in such man Library and Museum, available at . See also H.W. Brands, The Donald Trump is critical and essential as be based on trust and confidence. Trust is General vs. the President: MacArthur and Tru- they transition into positions of solemn necessary to “ensure the responsible use man at the Brink of Nuclear War (New York: responsibility for our national security. of force in the public interest . . . to pre- Doubleday, 2016). 10 “General Douglas MacArthur Farewell This is a period when civil-military gaps vent arbitrariness, ensure accountability, Address to Congress delivered 19 April 1951,” may be greatest. Former defense and and safeguard human rights and the rule American Rhetoric Top 100 Speeches, available state department official Rosa Brooks as- of law.”58 In our democracy, the exchange at . 11 between elite civilian political leaders and tive, Members of Congress, and military Ibid. 12 Samuel Huntington, The Soldier and the elite military leaders: a gap of knowledge, leaders who serve the Nation. Despite the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military 57 and a gap of trust.” inevitable tension, balance that facilitates Relations (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Civil-military relations are nominally proper CMR is possible. JFQ Press, 1957). included in the joint and Service profes- 13 Morris Janowitz, The Professional Soldier: sional military education programs. For A Social and Political Portrait (New York: The Free Press, 1960). the Army, civil-military relations are an Notes 14 Huntington, 416. important part the curriculum at the U.S. 15 Janowitz, 418. 1 David Barno and Nora Bensahel, “The Army War College. Under the direc- 16 Eliot A. Cohen, Supreme Command: New Chiefs in Town,” War on the Rocks, June Soldiers, Statesmen, and Leadership in Wartime tion of Generals Dempsey and Odierno 30, 2015, available at . 17 Peter Feaver, Armed Servants: Agency, Chief of Staff, CMR sessions were led 2 Budget Control Act (BCA) of 2011, Oversight, and Civil-Military Relations (Princ- Pub.L. 112-25, S. 365, 125 Stat. 240, enacted by scholars such as Feaver, Cohen, and eton: Princeton University Press, 2003). August 2, 2011. Kohn in the Senior Leader Seminar and 18 Donald Drechsler and Charles D. Al- 3 See video, “Richard Kohn on Civil- Army Strategic Education Program. It is len, “Why Senior Military Leaders Fail: And

58 JPME Today / Civil-Military Relations in Transitions JFQ 86, 3rd Quarter 2017 What Can We Learn from Their Mistakes,” are part of the National Defense University). work-to-fully-integrate-women>. Armed Forces Journal, July 1, 2009, available at 34 Most recent documents are the National 49 See Bob Woodward, Bush at War (New ; Charles D. Allen, “Les- House, February 6, 2015), Sustaining U.S. War (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2011); sons Not Learned: Civil-Military Disconnect in Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Donald Rumsfeld, Known and Unknown: A Afghanistan,” Armed Forces Journal, September Defense (Washington, DC: Department of Memoir (New York: Penguin, 2011); Robert 1, 2011, available at . Military Strategy of the United States of America (New York: Penguin, 2011); and Leon Panetta, 19 Allen, “Lessons Not Learned”; Marybeth (Washington, DC: The Joint Staff, June 2015). Worthy Fights: A Memoir of Leadership in War P. Ulrich, “The General Stanley McChrystal Af- See also Quadrennial Defense Review (Washing- and Peace (New York: Penguin, 2014). fair: A Case Study in Civil-Military Relations,” ton, DC: Department of Defense, 2014). 50 Steve Rearden, Council of War: A History Parameters (Spring 2011), 86–100. 35 Also known as the Islamic State of Iraq of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 1942–1991 (Washing- 20 Patricia Shields, “Civilian-Military Rela- and the Levant, Islamic State of Iraq and Syria, ton, DC: NDU Press, 2013). tions,” in Encyclopedia of Public Administration or Daesh. 51 “An Interview with Martin E. (forthcoming). 36 Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership, Janu- Dempsey,” 9. 21 This section is from Charles D. Allen, ary 2012. 52 Colton C. Campbell and David R. Auer- “The Pit and the Pendulum: Civil-Military Re- 37 “From the Chairman: An Interview with stadt, eds., Congress and Civil-Military Rela- lations in an Age of Uncertainty,” Armed Forces Martin E. Dempsey,” Joint Force Quarterly 78 tions (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Journal, May 1, 2013, available at . 39 Vago Muradian, “Interview: U.S. Navy’s for Blocking Army Secretary Confirmation,” 22 “Army Chief: Force to Occupy Iraq Mas- Adm. Jon Greenert,” Defense News, August Military Times, April 28, 2016, available at sive,” USA Today, February 25, 2003, available 31, 2015, available at . interviews/2015/08/31/interview-adm-jon- gressman-blocking-army-secretary-confirma- 23 Eric Shinseki, “Memorandum for Secre- greenert-cno-usnavy/71453982/>. tion/83661806/>. tary of Defense, Subject: End of Tour Memo- 40 Raymond T. Odierno, “This Is No Time 54 “An Interview with Martin E. randum,” U.S. Army, June 10, 2003. to Cut the U.S. Army,” Wall Street Journal, Dempsey,” 5. 24 Eric Shinseki, Farewell Address, June 11, August 13, 2015, available at . Oversight Gap: The Role of the Military General,” The New Left Review 29 (Septem- 41 Ibid. in a Civilian Transition,” War on the Rocks, ber/October 2004), 123–124. 42 Ibid. November 8, 2016, available at . washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/ . us-armys-biggest-concern-right-now-con- War and the Military Became Everything: Tales 27 Rajiv Chandrasekaran, “Pentagon Wor- gress/122730/>. from the Pentagon (New York: Simon & Schus- ries Led to Command Change,” Washington 44 Valerie Insinna, “U.S. Air Force Gen. ter, 2016), 305–306. Post, August 17, 2009, available at . available at . tion in defense spending of $487 billion over 45 See video interview with Aaron Mehta, 10 years and an additional reduction of $495 “Defense News TV: Gen. Mark A. Welsh billion as motivation to address the national USA,” June 26, 2016, available at . think tanks are the Center for a New American 46 Ibid. Security, Center for Strategic and International 47 Lolita C. Baldor, “Officials: Marine Studies, and Brookings Institution. Commandant Recommends Women Be 32 Each component has its annual meetings Banned from Some Combat Jobs,” Ma- and convention hosted by the Association of rine Times, September 19, 2015, available the United States Army, Marine Corps League, at . 33 Senior-level colleges are the Army War 48 Jim Garamone, “Dunford Says All in College, Naval War College, Air War College, Military Will Work to Fully Integrate Women,” Marine Corps War College, National War DOD News, December 5, 2015, available at College, and Eisenhower School for National

JFQ 86, 3rd Quarter 2017 Allen 59 Vice Admiral Thomas Rowden, commander, Naval Surface Forces, U.S. Pacific Fleet, speaks to Sailors assigned to Arleigh Burke–class guided-missile destroyer USS Shoup during his visit to Naval Station Everett, November 1, 2016 (U.S. Navy/Joseph Montemarano)

s the Department of Defense A Strategic (DOD) transitions to a new A administration, it will be accompanied by numerous editorials advocating for equipment moderniza- Leader’s Guide tion and changing our theater-specific postures. Many of these discussions will call for altering DOD’s current to Transforming strategy. In essence, they will reiterate a dogmatic logic among the depart- ment’s leadership: the best way to solve Culture in Large a problem is to develop a new strategy. To succeed, we must realize that focus- ing mainly on strategy will cause us Organizations to overlook our greatest advantage— organizational culture. Patrick Lencioni relates the impor- By Mark Schmidt and Ryan Slaughter tance of organizational health (culture) this way: “The single greatest advantage any company can achieve is organization health. Yet it is ignored by most leaders Lieutenant Colonel Mark Schmidt, USAF, is a student at the National War College. Major Ryan Slaughter, USAF, is the Director of Operations at the 44th Reconnaissance Squadron, Creech Air Force even though it is simple, free, and avail- Base, Nevada. able to anyone who wants it.”1 Prior to

60 JPME Today / Transforming Culture in Large Organizations JFQ 86, 3rd Quarter 2017 overhauls of our current strategy, the new and personal interactions.5 Because of culture in their book, First, Break All administration should ask DOD strate- the size of DOD, strategic leaders rely the Rules: What the World’s Greatest gic leaders—the Secretary of Defense, mostly on embedding mechanisms, Managers Do Differently. Gallup has Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, which serve as more formal and pro- studied and measured human behavior Service chiefs, and combatant and compo- cedural mechanisms that support and and organizational culture for over nent commanders—to focus on creating reinforce the primary messages.6 It is 80 years. After decades of employee or fostering a healthy culture. These important for leaders to understand surveys that included 100 to 200 ques- top-tier military leaders are uniquely re- which embedding mechanisms are in tions, broad audiences, and little effect, sponsible and positioned to forge a culture place that foster or impede positive they identified five tenets necessary for that will increase engagement, innovation, culture change. When embedding an effective survey instrument. When and empowerment, yielding a military mechanisms misalign with a leader’s measuring the strength of an organiza- that promotes and retains its best practices vision, culture suffers because subor- tion’s culture, surveys must be focused, and warfighters. This article presents a dinates are confused by what the boss measure what’s important, be compa- brief overview of organizational culture values. We focus on 3 of Schein’s 12 rable, reinforce local accountability, and followed by a three-part construct that embedding mechanisms, 2 primary emphasize the process rather than specific enables strategic leaders to assess, bench- and 1 secondary, to show where poten- events. From Gallup’s study emerged the mark, and positively transform DOD tial exists to transform culture in the Q12 survey of employee engagement. The culture. As part of the leadership transi- Defense Department. The three-step Q12 has been administered to millions tion, incoming strategic leaders should process is as follows: of employees representing thousands first assess the culture of the entire orga- of organizations and demonstrates how assess and benchmark organizational nization and benchmark the assessment •• measuring engagement is a key factor in culture across the DOD and against private sec- high performing teams. The survey asks embrace feedback tors. Once DOD culture is benchmarked, •• employees to assess their workplace expe- transform the culture. an informed plan based on the findings •• rience by scoring their level of agreement should be implemented to promote and with 12 statements (see table), typically retain the most talented workers. Assess and Benchmark on a five-point Likert scale ranging from Organizational Culture “strongly disagree” to “strongly agree.”8 Organizational Culture Embedding Mechanism 1: What leaders The responses are scored individually and Three decades ago, Edgar Schein pay attention to, measure, and control on as an aggregate. introduced us to embedding mecha- a regular basis.7 If you ask a combatant DOD should consider the Gallup nisms, which serve as the conscious commander or Service chief the location Q12 as an ideal commercial off-the-shelf and subconscious ways of forming of organizational assets and their readi- program and coordinate its administra- organizational culture. Schein defines ness, the leader could quickly generate tion to all Services and civilian sectors organizational culture as “a pattern of plenty of readiness statistics, asset facts, in DOD. The Q12 contains the core shared basic assumptions that the group and preparedness measurements. This elements needed to attract, focus, and learned as it solved its problems of collection of highly valuable metrics is keep the most talented employees.9 This external adaption and internal integra- critical in making informed decisions, cost-effective, proven, and brief metric tion, which has worked well enough and no strategic leader would commit will avoid survey fatigue experienced to be considered valid and, therefore, to action without them. However, it is by today’s warfighter, while offering a to be taught to new members as the our assessment that if we ask the same unique glimpse into organizational cul- correct way to perceive, think, and feel leaders, “How’s your culture?” you will ture. This new perspective will highlight in relation to those problems.”2 He likely get less precise responses. Interest- where successes and failures can be ex- identifies six primary and six secondary ingly, readiness and some of the biggest pected and turn the key to lasting cultural embedding mechanisms as a way leaders challenges in DOD are culture-based improvement. Once implemented, the measure success, react to crises, teach (for example, sexual assault, suicide, Secretary of Defense could ask a Service their values, reward performance, and and retention). It is likely that strategic chief or combatant commander, “How’s preserve talent within their organiza- leaders are less prepared to assess organi- the culture in your organization?” and tion.3 These mechanisms are used by zational culture because it is considered expect a clear and standardized indicator strategic leaders to instill their convic- not essential for organizational effective- of that organization’s level of employee tions and form a shared belief system by ness or too hard to measure. engagement and readiness. Also, bench- substituting continuous organizational Currently, DOD has no standardized marking the results against other agencies oversight with guidance on how to metric that benchmarks all the Service and companies allows the strategic leader perceive, think, feel, and behave.4 At cultures. While working at Gallup, to assess how engaged, innovative, and the tactical level, a leader can develop Marcus Buckingham and Curt Coffman empowered its culture is by comparing and manage culture through charisma introduced a short survey that measures both public and private sectors.

JFQ 86, 3rd Quarter 2017 Schmidt and Slaughter 61 because they do not have tactical control Table. Gallup Q12: Items That Drive Performance of units within the organization. If a I know what is expected of me at work. measurement reveals the values of an I have the materials and equipment I need to do my work right. organization are not in alignment with At work, I have the opportunity to do what I do best every day. its culture, it is likely that embedding In the last 7 days, I have received recognition or praise for doing good work. mechanisms in the strategic leader’s My supervisor, or someone at work, seems to care about me as a person. organization are partially, if not solely, responsible for the unhealthy culture. There is someone at work who encourages my development. If strategic leaders find cultures within At work, my opinions seem to count. their organization that negatively affect The mission or purpose of my company (organization) makes me feel my job is important. engagement, innovation, and empower- My associates or fellow employees are committed to doing quality work. ment, they should first evaluate which I have a best friend at work. embedding mechanisms are in place that In the last 6 months, someone at work has talked to me about my progress. are enabling toxic cultures. By treating feedback as a call to ac- This last year, I have had opportunities at work to learn and grow. tion to change embedding mechanisms, Source: Marcus Buckingham and Curt Coffman, First, Break All the Rules: What the World’s Greatest strategic leaders create an environment Managers Do Differently (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1999), 28. of trust and learning. Nothing affects the learning culture of an organization more than the skill with which its execu- It is likely that strategic leaders will zational crises.11 Once the culture is tive team receives feedback.13 A strategic be tempted to create a different or tai- measured, the challenge for the strategic leader who models how to receive and lored survey measuring culture. Schein leader is how to process and orchestrate process feedback creates an environ- emphasizes the ultimate challenge of change that creates a positive outcome. ment that models how to react to critical the strategic leader “is the ability to A survey of this size and scope will incidents. The trust built by the strategic step outside the culture that created the help identify critical characteristics that leader who demonstrates ownership of leader and to start evolutionary change have the potential to lead to an orga- feedback without retribution fosters or- processes that are more adaptive. This nizational crisis. The potential crisis ganizational value alignment and invites ability to perceive the limitations of one’s would serve as an impetus to initiate positive change. own culture and to develop the culture necessary cultural changes within DOD. adaptively is the essence and ultimate For DOD to transform its culture, its Transform the Culture challenge of leadership.”10 Cognitive bias strategic leaders should emphasize and Embedding Mechanism 3: Changing and blind spots, which are inherent in all demonstrate an organizational ability organizational systems and proce- organizations, will likely create a survey to receive, process, and respond to dures.14 Although using embedding that measures what “the boss” wants to feedback. mechanisms that focus on a process measure. Also, leaders need to be aware Strategic leaders have the responsi- are important in transforming organi- of survey fatigue caused by overloading bility of modeling a feedback-receptive zational culture, the goal is to create warfighters with surveys. Using the Q12 culture. Rather than contemplating ways an environment conducive to behavior survey will allow our strategic leaders to to reword a message for unreceptive change. Behavior change happens step outside of the culture that created audiences, our strategic leaders should in highly successful situations when them and build an accurate picture of the evaluate what embedding mechanisms leaders speak to people’s feelings.15 As culture within the organization. are in place that create a culture that is the workforce continues to diversify, By using a standard measurement adversely affecting their organizational ef- greater mental agility is required when in assessing organizational culture that fectiveness. If strategic leaders personally seeking to relate to people, change is short and consistent, strategic leaders demonstrate the acceptance of feedback behavior, and transform culture. will create an embedding mechanism and implement change by altering em- The following model depicts how that will help generate a more engaged, bedding mechanisms that are negatively strategic leaders can harness the power of innovative, and empowered culture. The affecting culture, they will create a culture feedback and deliberately create engaged, feedback from the assessment is a call to that is more receptive to feedback. The innovative, and empowered organiza- action for strategic leaders and the orga- feedback-receptive leader will be the tions. Ultimately, the model seeks to nizations they lead. catalyst for creating a more engaged, in- foster healthy relationships necessary for novative, and empowered culture.12 a feedback-receptive culture. There are Embrace Feedback It is essential for strategic leaders four steps to ensure a feedback receptive Embedding Mechanism 2: Leader reac- to influence and shape organizational culture is created and sustained: tions to critical incidents and organi- culture through embedding mechanisms

62 JPME Today / Transforming Culture in Large Organizations JFQ 86, 3rd Quarter 2017 Retired Soldier and member of Statewide Prevent Suicide Hawaii Taskforce speaks to Seaman after suicide prevention seminar on Joint Base Pearl Harbor–Hickam, September 24, 2013 (U.S. Navy/Diana Quinlan) •• Leadership buy-in to subordinates us can recognize a coach, instructor, or the sake of “having a good job.”18 For •• Subordinate gives permission to be leader who believes in our ability and sees the bought-in leader, generational or taught unrealized potential because “human cultural differences are not treated as hin- •• Leader and subordinates become beings have hard-wired systems exqui- drances, but welcomed as characteristics vulnerable (creating the ability to sitely designed to let us know where we of a thriving workplace environment. In identify strengths and weaknesses) stand with others.”16 Strategic leaders a culture created by the bought-in leader, •• Proper administration of feedback. with buy-in use verbs such as “need,” subordinates understand that their place “believe,” “trust,” “proud,” and, dare within the organization is meaningful Step 1: Leadership buy-in to subor- we say, “love,” to communicate how to and relevant and refuse to accept lowered dinates. First, strategic leaders must accomplish the mission. Working in orga- expectations. demonstrate to subordinates that they nizations where leaders regularly display Step 2: Subordinate gives permission have bought into their potential for buy-in, subordinates understand the high to be taught. Once the strategic leader growth and development. All of us have expectations levied upon them. communicates buy-in to the warfighter, experienced the feeling when a teacher, The bought-in leader defends against workers within the organization will start coach, or leader has recognized our inferior expectations for individuals opening up and eventually give permis- unseen potential. A bought-in leader within the organization. For example, sion to be led. Permission to be directed sees unrecognized potential and abilities some managers believe today’s mil- and taught means the warfighter trusts of the people in the organization. The lennials have an unreasonable sense of the leader. After establishing trust in the bought-in strategic leader understands entitlement that renders them unable relationship, the leader has the precious and communicates how important to perform at high levels.17 This claim opportunity to identify the subordinate’s each warfighter is to mission success. lacks merit for the bought-in leader; the weaknesses and strengths in a meaningful She expects to release the potential of bought-in leader views the Millennial and longstanding way. individuals within the organization, and workforce as less willing to tolerate stag- Permission to lead and teach subor- her subordinates are aware of it. All of nant development or poor leadership for dinates cannot be assumed or taken for

JFQ 86, 3rd Quarter 2017 Schmidt and Slaughter 63 Marines and Sailors aboard amphibious assault ship USS Makin Island run Sexual Assault Awareness and Prevention Month 5K on flight deck, April 21, 2017 (U.S. Navy/Clark Lane) granted by leaders. If the leader fails to Step 4: Proper administration of of feedback for improvement. Therefore, garner permission, they are inevitably feedback. Finally, the strategic leader who leaders need to separate coaching and frustrated when well-intended feedback demonstrates buy-in, earning permission evaluation when giving feedback.22 An goes unheeded. Conversely, with permis- to coach and lead, and who then cor- example of how leadership incorrectly sion granted, the leader and subordinate rectly handles vulnerability will create an uses feedback is in quarterly and annual find even the slightest observation an environment where subordinates are open awards. At the tactical and operational actionable priority to improve individual to feedback. In Doug Stone and Sheila levels, some leaders believe quarterly performance and better the organization. Heen’s book Thanks for the Feedback, and annual awards show appreciation Step 3: Leader and subordinates become they point out that handling feedback is for performance, but subordinates view vulnerable. The opportunity to identify difficult because it puts two fundamental awards as a form of evaluation. We are not weaknesses and correct behavior means human desires against each other. The arguing against awards, but leaders need people become vulnerable to feedback. first desire is being accepted and respected to understand that subordinates perceive Great leaders create an environment in the current state and the second awards as evaluation among peers and allowing openness and vulnerability be- desire is wanting to learn and grow.20 not appreciation. This is just one example cause workers know their vulnerability is Understanding the conflicting nature of of where leaders mix evaluation with handled with care and good intentions. A feedback demonstrates that feedback must coaching and appreciation leading to failure to do so will cause warfighters to be formulated properly, but not softened. evaluation drowning out the other forms withdraw and build barriers to produc- Stone and Heen compartmentalize feed- of feedback. Commanders will improve tive feedback. Conversely, the welcoming back into three categories: appreciation, the culture if they understand the differ- of vulnerability in the leader-follower coaching, and evaluation.21 ences between appreciation, coaching, relationship opens the communication We believe military leaders get and evaluating, and make every effort to channels for feedback, which will improve feedback wrong because they mix the teach and coach while being selective of the individual and benefit the organiza- different types of feedback. Stone and the moments to rank or score (evaluate) tion. A leader’s willingness to engage with Heen point out that because evaluation performance. Leadership that understands vulnerability “determines the depth of our is the most emotionally loud, it drowns the three types of feedback and how to courage and the clarity of our purpose.”19 out coaching, the most productive form employ them will create an embedding

64 JPME Today / Transforming Culture in Large Organizations JFQ 86, 3rd Quarter 2017 3 mechanism of organizational systems and vative, and empowered culture. After all, Edgar H. Schein, Organizational Culture and Leadership, 4th ed. (San Francisco: Jossey- procedures that properly handles feed- if “culture eats strategy for breakfast,” Bass, 2010), 236. The expanded list of Schein’s back. The result will be an organizational measuring and transforming the culture six primary embedding mechanisms is: What culture that understands feedback by real- of DOD has the greatest potential in leaders pay attention to, measure, and control izing the good intentions and merits of creating an organization that promotes on a regular basis; Leader reactions to critical both the message and the messenger. engagement and innovation through an incidents and organizational crises; How leaders allocate resources; Deliberate role modeling, Promoting individual growth and empowered workforce.24 teaching, and coaching by leaders; How leaders development through feedback is criti- Without delay, DOD’s strategic lead- allocate rewards and status; and How leaders cal for organizational advancement. The ers should employ a simple, thorough, recruit, select, promote, and excommunicate. challenge for strategic leaders is harness- and brief Q12 survey to measure its orga- 4 Schein, Organizational Culture and Lead- th ing the power of feedback to create an nizational culture. The survey’s findings ership, 4 ed., 236. 5 Ibid., 235; Warren Bennis and Burt Na- environment that encourages engage- will serve as an indicator of employee nus, Leaders: Strategies for Taking Charge (New ment and transforms culture. Perhaps the engagement and organizational culture. York: Harper & Row, 1985), xiii. worst indictment of any feedback process The culture assessment and benchmark- 6 Schein, Organizational Culture and Lead- is a perception that nothing is going to ing will create insight and reveal the ership, 4th ed., 236. change within the organization. appropriate reorientation needed to 7 Ibid. 8 Marcus Buckingham and Curt Coffman, Embedding mechanisms of orga- generate the force of the future. Changes First, Break All the Rules: What the World’s nizational systems and procedures that must be embraced and modeled at the Greatest Managers Do Differently (New York: enhance feedback have the ability to reach highest levels of leadership, offering Simon & Schuster, 1999), 28. every worker in DOD. Because feedback subordinate leaders a clear and actionable 9 Ibid., 30–36. affects everyone, understanding and im- method to affect change within their or- 10 Schein, Organizational Culture and Leadership, 4th ed., 236. proving the way leaders receive and send ganizations that will not be undercut by 11 Ibid. feedback is an organizational procedure misaligned embedding mechanisms. The 12 Douglas Stone and Sheila Heen, Thanks that has great potential in transform- result will be mission and values align- for the Feedback: The Science and Art of Receiv- ing DOD culture. As Stone and Heen ment for the current force as it transitions ing Feedback Well (New York: Viking, 2014), point out, it is important to standardize to the force of the future. 1–11. 13 Ibid., 5–10. data collection, “but you can’t ‘metric’ In the 21st century, the Department 14 Schein, Organizational Culture and your way around the fact that feedback of Defense finds itself in increasing Leadership, 4th ed., 236. is a relationship-based, judgment-based competition with industry to recruit and 15 John Kotter and Dan Cohen, The Heart process.”23 A leader who understands how retain the best warfighters. Continued of Change (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Business to communicate buy-in to subordinates reliance on recruiting and reten- School Press, 2002), x. 16 Judith E. Glaser, Conversational Intel- and then grow and develop the team with tion methods that focus on changing ligence: How Great Leaders Build Trust and Get sound feedback loops between sender and a strategy will not be as effective as Extraordinary Results (New York: Bibliomo- receiver will create a more engaged, inno- transforming organizational culture. tion, Inc., 2014), 4. vative, and empowered organization. Transforming organizational culture in 17 Bruce N. Pfau, “What Do Millennials Re- the military by changing embedding ally Want at Work? The Same Things the Rest of Us Do,” Harvard Business Review, April 7, mechanisms will create long-term positive Summary 2016. Some would argue that DOD and its results that will empower young leaders 18 Jeanne C. Meister and Karie Willyerd, all-volunteer force do not need another to create new and innovative strategies. “Mentoring Millenials,” Harvard Business survey and feedback model to improve DOD methodology should start with Review, May 2010; Brandon Rigoni and Amy organizational performance by trans- transforming culture, which will create Adkins, “What Millennials Want from a New Job,” Harvard Business Review, May 11, 2016. forming culture. Or trying to measure better strategists. DOD should assess and 19 Brene Brown, Daring Greatly: How the and transform culture will waste time benchmark culture across the entire or- Courage to Be Vulnerable Transforms the Way and money in an organization that is ganization, take ownership of the results, We Live, Love, Parent, and Lead (New York: busy accomplishing the mission. If the and transform the aspects which are mis- Penguin Random House, 2012), 3. 20 survey and model are implemented, it aligned with the organization’s vision. JFQ Stone and Heen, 6–8. 21 Ibid., 30–33. will be an imperfect plan executed by 22 Ibid., 43–44. imperfect people leading to sometimes- 23 Ibid., 294. less-than stellar results. But strategic Notes 24 Torben Rick, “Organizational Culture leaders need to understand that a major- Eats Strategy for Breakfast, Lunch and Dinner,” 1 ity of DOD employees are not frustrated Patrick Lencioni, The Advantage: Why Or- Corporate Culture, June 11, 2014, available at ganizational Health Trumps Everything Else in . stems from cultures that do not promote and Leadership, 2nd ed. (San Francisco: Jossey- the values that create an engaged, inno- Bass, 1992), 12.

JFQ 86, 3rd Quarter 2017 Schmidt and Slaughter 65 Soldiers assigned to Task Force 1-35 Armor, 2nd Brigade Combat Team, 1st Armored Division, make their way down road as canal burns in Tahwilla, Iraq, July 30, 2008 (U.S. Army/David J. Marshall)

Where Rumsfeld Got It Right Making a Case for In-Progress Reviews

By Anthony Dunkin

ombatant commanders (CCDRs) exercise combatant command (CCMD) ity to craft plans that meet the policy are responsible for the develop- authority, which provides the full endstates of the Nation. Accordingly, C ment of campaign and contin- legal authority to perform functions CCDRs and their staffs must build gency plans as directed by the Guidance of command over all assigned forces. plans through a structured and predict- for the Employment of the Force (GEF) Inherent in CCMD is the authority to able process that remains flexible and and the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan designate objectives and direction over responsive while also integrating inter- (JSCP). Together, these documents all aspects of military operations.1 Fur- agency and multinational capabilities. translate national strategic direction thermore, Joint Publication (JP) 5-0, The Adaptive Planning and Execution and guidance from the President to Joint Operation Planning, states, “[the] (APEX) process is the current mandated CCDRs via the Secretary of Defense supported CCDR has primary respon- framework that CCDRs use to translate (SecDef) and the Chairman of the Joint sibility for all aspects of a task assigned strategic guidance into operational plans.3 Chiefs of Staff, respectively. CCDRs by the GEF, the JSCP, or other joint Secretary Donald Rumsfeld created APEX operation planning directives.”2 These in 2005 as a response to a poorly crafted legal and doctrinal mandates place Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) invasion Anthony Dunkin is a student at the Naval War the CCDR within an extraordinary plan labeled Operation Plan (OPLAN) College. position of authority and responsibil- 1003. The plan was the product of a

66 Commentary / Making a Case for In-Progress Reviews JFQ 86, 3rd Quarter 2017 flawed system, hereafter referred to as a regression in the U.S. military’s ability by 263 percent.12 These statistics closed-circuit planning. The closed-circuit to plan, shape, and respond to events show an insatiable demand for civil- model earned a reputation for generating around the world. The contemporary ian leadership to have more options in stale, inflexible, and ineffective plans with global operating environment is showing greater detail. Then, the 2015 JSCP inadequately linked tactical actions and no sign of becoming less complex. The altogether removed the section that strategic ends. Furthermore, closed-cir- increasing capabilities of our adversaries, directed CCDRs toward specific plans cuit planning consistently lacked sufficient the current transnational threats, and that required an IPR. The document integration of interagency and coalition the rising occurrences of cyber attacks gave no indication that there would partners. Consequently, in his Adaptive suggest that collaborative planning is be a decrease in total IPRs but inex- Planning Roadmap, Secretary Rumsfeld more essential than ever.8 The need to plicably removed the mechanism for deemed In-Progress Reviews (IPRs) as produce more relevant and adaptive directing which ones should be briefed critical to the efficacy of the APEX.4 IPRs plans to respond to the growing number to whom and to what level of detail. provided the collaborative environment of campaign activities and their related The omission invited ambiguity into Rumsfeld envisioned to create relevant contingencies has never been more criti- an already embattled process. Planners and executable plans that ensured stra- cal. The SecDef is in the unique position were left to wonder which of their plans tegic alignment. IPRs were intended to to inform and shape operational plan- was the priority. The situation became afford CCDRs deliberate interaction with ning with strategic guidance. Thus, the increasingly untenable, and as of 2016, the SecDef throughout the formulation Secretary should personally reinvigorate CCDRs had received further guidance of a plan.5 the IPR process, specifically mandating to continue planning without a single However, an inspection of strategic an IPR for all top priority plans. Through IPR. The JSCP data, taken together planning documents from 2008 to 2015 this reinvigoration, the SecDef will ensure with the updated guidance, quite revealed that this vision has gone unreal- military plans are appropriate for the naturally uncover a process that ignores ized. Specifically, the documents exposed contemporary environment, are strategi- current doctrine and policy, a condition a trend of increasing numbers of directed cally aligned, and incorporate interagency problematic in itself. More importantly, plans requiring an IPR and correspond- capabilities. one struggles to identify the opportuni- ing growing levels of detail in those plans. ties for adaptation and collaboration by Concurrently, strategic guidance suc- Current Global Environment eliminating the IPRs from the process. cessively reduced the amount of SecDef APEX was created to reduce planning A synthesis of the data and statements participation in those same reviews. In timelines and produce better plans. from current and former staff members other words, the overall numbers of re- Nevertheless, former and present mili- revealed that the growing number of quired IPRs were increasing, and the level tary planners note “available time” as directed plans (and the IPRs that accom- of detail for plans requiring an IPR was the primary limiting factor to producing panied them) overwhelmed not only their increasing. Simultaneously, the SecDef a broad range of plans with branches capabilities but also those of the SecDef chaired fewer and fewer of the collabora- and sequels under both the closed- and other senior leaders in the Office of tive sessions.6 IPRs grew more numerous circuit and APEX processes.9 In fact, by the Secretary of Defense (OSD). CCDRs than in previous years, yet their utility 2015, personnel in the system noted and the Joint Planning and Execution was decreasing in parallel with the level that they were more overwhelmed Community found themselves without a of supervision therein. The unsettling than ever. They pointed to the IPRs clear solution to maximizing their avail- trend was completely reversed in January as a primary consumer of their time. able time.13 Decisionmakers elected a 2016, when CCDRs were directed to Careful analysis of classified U.S. stra- misguided approach of eliminating IPRs continue planning without a single IPR.7 tegic planning documents reinforces to balance time constraints. Yet without IPRs had grown so numerous and had so anecdotal staff officer concerns. For IPRs, plans are essentially being built little real value that they were eliminated example, since 2011, GEF-directed under the old closed-circuit model, one altogether. campaign objectives have increased that has repeatedly been shown to be Presently, CCDRs face the overreac- by 81 percent.10 Likewise, between similarly time-consuming and ineffective. tion to these described trends: a return 2008 and 2015, the JSCPs reflect an When IPRs became too time-consuming, to the antiquated, closed-circuit system. increasing number and level of detail of the response was to eliminate them In this system, CCMD staffs are produc- SecDef-directed IPRs. During a 3-year entirely, an approach that is too dras- ing end-to-end plans without input or period, the number of level 4 plans to tic and fails to adequately address the comment from the SecDef, preventing be briefed in a SecDef IPR increased problem. The increases reflected in the them from aligning their actions with by 50 percent, and the number of GEF and JSCP indeed suggest that IPRs strategic guidance. Moreover, interagency 3T plans increased by 267 percent.11 had become too frequent and were, in collaboration is perceived as a burden to Furthermore, the lower priority plans fact, slowing down the overall process. staffs and is on a glide path to being ig- that require an IPR to the Undersec- However, IPRs were once seen as a great nored altogether. These trends represent retary of Defense for Policy increased success of adaptive planning. As Douglas

JFQ 86, 3rd Quarter 2017 Dunkin 67 Paratroopers with 6th Engineer Battalion, 2nd Engineer Brigade, pull security after exiting UH-60 Black Hawk during exercise Arctic Pegasus near Deadhorse, Alaska, May 2, 2014 (DOD/Edward Eagerton)

Clark found through an adaptive plan- and determine risk levels and their mitigat- assumptions and unresponsive to changes ning (AP) survey conducted in 2008, ing factors. This dialogue is the linchpin in the strategic environment or shifting one respondent noted, “[the] biggest to successful planning. Without this input policy goals. The plan lacked sufficient improvement to planning provided by from strategic decisionmakers, plans are time- or risk-based options and included AP is that combatant commands are fol- incomplete and irrelevant. outdated intelligence and assumptions. lowing a tighter orchestration of IPRs, Additionally, a rewrite of the contingency which gets plans in front of the SecDef Strategic Alignment plan would have taken months; hence, quicker and within shorter intervals.”14 Those who argue for a return to closed- the invasion was executed despite using a Throughout its evolution, members of circuit planning hold that the United highly flawed plan.16 Clearly, the dialogue the joint planning community supported States was somehow more dominant in between senior civilian leadership and the use of IPRs. In fact, those in the Joint the previous era due to this approach operational military commanders was Planning and Execution Community to military planning. All the variables to insufficient during the development of currently see IPRs as value added to the why the United States was perhaps more 1003. In this case, as with other closed- APEX process. or less dominant in any given era are circuit plans, the design was too static and At the 2015 Joint Faculty Education beyond the scope of this article; however, lacked any attempt to update assumptions Conference, presenters reiterated that it will address the erroneous perception or strategic guidance upon initiation. The IPRs for contingency plans “improved in- that closed-circuit planning somehow exact breakdown of the closed-circuit tegrated planning, increased civil-military adds an advantage in the contemporary model lies with the process itself. Closed- dialogue, and accomplished resource-in- environment as well as provide evidence circuit models such as JOPES lacked any formed planning and assessment.”15 These that it was similarly unsuited for the con- mandatory function to force preliminary assessments showed that IPRs not only tingencies of the past. and recurring discussion between senior improved upon the closed-circuit model A glaring example is the case of civilian and military leadership during but also lie at the heart of APEX successes. OPLAN 1003, the invasion plan for OIF plan development.17 Oddly, current practices have removed the in 2003, and the inspiration for APEX. APEX addressed the problem heart; the process cannot be expected to OPLAN 1003 was developed through through the use of IPRs, specifically, one survive. The solution lies not in elimina- the process predating APEX, the Joint scheduled for the completion of mission tion, but in a modification of the original Operational Planning and Execution analysis and before course of action de- IPR structure. IPRs should endure as a System (JOPES). JOPES, as a closed-cir- velopment. At this point in the process, means to assess the strategic environment, cuit system, failed to address the common CCDRs took their operational vision and address guidance issues, confirm assump- problems inherent in contingency initial assessments of the GEF-directed tions, discuss the range of options to be planning that have existed throughout problem sets into a discussion with the explored, address policy or resource issues, history. Most notably, the closed-circuit SecDef for approval. The initial IPR address matters that require interagency system produced time-consuming con- represented a critical step early in the coordination, discuss executable timelines, tingency plans, bound by their original process, before the staff began concept

68 Commentary / Making a Case for In-Progress Reviews JFQ 86, 3rd Quarter 2017 and plan development in earnest. Gaining their staffs can produce precise, execut- the resolution of conflicts. Further, IPRs feedback during the initial IPR provided able plans once the SecDef validates the facilitate planning by ensuring that the the flexibility and adaptability envisioned CCDR’s balance of risk and objective. plan addresses the most current strategic by Secretary Rumsfeld and was the So, too, CCDRs can preserve staff hours assessments and needs.19 clear distinction from its predecessors. by not having to rework a plan based on Additionally, it provided the civilian misaligned interpretations of acceptable Assuredly, CCDRs who internalize leaders a forum to discuss the multiple risk. Moreover, engaging in subsequent this doctrinal tenet are more successful options available to them. IPRs can rapidly modify the plan as the in environments with shifting strategic Contrast this model with closed- national level of acceptable risk changes conditions and potentially fluid national circuit precursors, where civilian over time in a given theater or in response strategic objectives. IPRs provided the leadership did not enter the process until to an emerging problem set. mechanism to ensure internalization was completion of the plan. APEX formal- Then–Chairman of the Joint Chiefs occurring and to the appropriate degree. ized and mandated civilian influence of Staff General Martin Dempsey’s 2013 Conversely, interagency involvement was resulting in a more aligned plan. Plans letter on Syria to the Senate Armed largely ignored or treated as an after- developed under closed-circuit models Services Committee is an applicable thought in the closed-circuit model and often bound civilian leaders to a single example. In his letter, General Dempsey thus often failed to craft an adaptive plan option and limited their time to negoti- addressed tactical and strategic risk, inclusive of all elements of national power. ate or apply other elements of national resource constraints, and interagency The necessity to integrate planners power, as evident during the planning coordination. He also provided military across all agencies and departments is for OIF. Conversely, IPRs facilitated the options to a given problem set.18 General again made clear by the OIF example. collaboration necessary to produce cam- Dempsey’s comments represent a model When the United States invaded Iraq paign and contingency plans with valid for similar IPR discussions between a on March 19, 2003, the strategic objec- political/policy assumptions and explore CCDR and the SecDef. In no uncertain tives were to “disarm Iraq’s Weapons the range of options sought by civilian terms, General Dempsey was pointing of Mass Destruction (WMD), end leadership. Removing the IPR(s) takes out strategic misalignment; IPRs offer Saddam Hussein’s support of terrorism, the “adaptive” out of APEX and is simply the chance for CCDRs to do the same. and free the Iraqi people.”20 A mere 2 closed-circuit planning by another name. Without the IPR, CCDRs and their staffs months later, President George W. Bush Perhaps most importantly, the IPR are left to create plans that cannot achieve announced major combat operations provided a forum for CCDRs to push strategic endstates or, worse, cannot be were over, signifying a new phase of the back on directed objectives. Specifically, executed at all. operation. Hence, the strategic objec- the IPR presented a CCDR with a direct tives shifted to “maintain stability, search line to the SecDef to share the resource The Interagency Community for WMDs, find Saddam, rebuild the shortcomings and risk of a given plan. The early integration of interagency government . . . and de-Baathifiy/dis- The SecDef uses the GEF to assign planners is equally critical to the devel- solve the Iraqi Army.”21 Over the course campaign objectives and contingencies opment of a strategically aligned plan. of the following year, facing a growing to CCDRs based on an initial set of as- Prudent CCDRs formulate their cam- insurgency and rising U.S. casualties, sumptions and directed resources. By paign plans, accounting for all the instru- General George Casey took command removing the IPR, there is no formal ments of national power. Correspond- of Multi-National Force–Iraq. He issued conversation where the CCDR can ingly, sound operational design pursues a new campaign plan seeking to support provide candid feedback about potential accomplishment of intermediate military the Iraqi government by conducting disconnects in the acceptable levels of risk objectives while creating an environment “full spectrum counter-insurgency opera- or resourcing for the accomplishment conducive to conflict resolution and is tions to isolate and neutralize former of a stated objective. The IPR offers the likewise oriented on the desired endstate. regime extremists and foreign terrorists, CCDR the ability to confront strategic IPRs confirm that planners are track- and organize, train and equip [the] misalignment and potentially unrealistic ing this intent by gaining interagency Iraqi security forces.”22 In 2005, the parameters set by civilian leadership. guidance from top-level leadership, a U.S. National Strategy for Victory again CCDRs who identify that they cannot principle made clear in JP 5-0: sought to update the strategic endstates accomplish their directed objective, by offering the following: “An Iraq that given the currently acceptable level of [IPRs enable] clarification of the problem, is peaceful, united, stable, democratic, risk, should state it clearly no later than strategic and military end states, military and secure, where Iraqis have the institu- their initial IPR. Additionally, the level objectives . . . identification and removal tions and resources they need to govern of acceptable risk to forces, the ability to of planning obstacles, required support- themselves justly and provide security for respond to simultaneous contingencies, ing and supported activities, guidance their country.”23 and other global responsibilities directly on coordination with the interagency This dizzying account clearly il- impact the range of options. CCDRs and and multinational communities, and luminates how, within a given theater

JFQ 86, 3rd Quarter 2017 Dunkin 69 of operations, strategic endstates can incapable of simplifying the strategic and CCMD staffs responsible for the change significantly in a relatively short planning process to meet the rapid, planning effort. Condemnations go time. Furthermore, the diversity of the flexible demands of the environment.26 further by indicating that the few IPRs endstates demanded a requirement to Price was right to point out the inflex- conducted miss the mark as intended leverage interagency arms to achieve suc- ibility of APEX, as it existed from 2008 by Secretary Rumsfeld.29 IPRs have ex- cess. The strategic objectives remained to 2012, as a potential reason for an panded from streamlined discussions to fluid, going through no less than four inability to produce better plans more presentations of ever-increasing numbers major revisions in a mere 2 years—a quickly. However, that reality was more of slides. Staffs who prepare these IPR point more salient when considering it a result of institutional bloat than of a briefs are overburdened and lose time took 24 months to craft plans in the old flawed model. In fact, APEX retained from actual plan development.30 Similarly, closed-circuit system.24 The CCDR is flexibility in its original form and with formal IPRs have invited a growing responsible for the execution of military appropriately tailored IPRs. He cham- number of predecisional boards, review- objectives in support of desired endstates pioned strategic thinking as being able ers, and panels that all have input before and thus has an obligation to involve to “generate insight into the present the discussion with the SecDef. A once- those agency planners. A process for and foresight regarding the future,” formal discussion between the CCDR rapidly procuring feedback from all agen- a condition, he posits, as unattainable and SecDef now requires a series of cies and departments is a prerequisite due to APEX’s reliance on a process.27 “socialization” meetings, IPR prebriefs, for success to ensure stated objectives However, APEX IPRs were intended to and Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) Tanks. are achievable at the outset and to react capture that very spirit of creative and Additionally, the requisite read-ahead for as objectives change in a time-restricted collaborative thought and have proved those engagements further prolongs and environment. to result in more viable plans. Price complicates the process.31 There are also CCDRs can begin to address natural himself acknowledges that “in-progress those in favor of off-the-shelf plans. They frictions between military and interagency reviews between combatant command- argue for a formal return to closed-circuit planners during their initial IPR with ers and the secretary of defense has [sic] planning and for abandoning APEX the SecDef. The CCDR should detail enhanced the flow and frequency of altogether.32 Admittedly, criticisms of his desired level of interagency input and plan reviews.”28 APEX and IPRs are not entirely without allow potential conflicts to be resolved While strategic thinking may result in merit; in fact, the very reality that IPRs by agency principals. The likely result is a deeper understanding of problem sets, are currently not executed in accordance collaborative process between interagency it is insufficient for delivering feedback with the joint doctrine and policy is in planners and CCMD staffs that provide to civilian decisionmakers. The strategic itself evidence that there is a fault in the a shared understanding of the strategic thinking approach can aid planning staffs method.33 However, abandoning IPRs endstates at the start of a plan and cul- in creatively identifying potential avenues altogether would be an error of great tivates a lasting relationship capable of to achieving intermediate military objec- consequence. IPRs remain a critical tool surviving plan execution. tives, yet it falls short of providing civilian for CCDRs to produce relevant, adaptive leadership with the range of options they plans capable of achieving the Nation’s Counterargument and Rebuttal desire. Ultimately, strategic thoughts desired political endstates. At the far end of the spectrum are those must eventually translate into executable who argue for a tectonic shift in how plans; there is no shortcut to a detailed Recommendations the military thinks about strategic plan- plan with options. Of course, the world The SecDef could address many of ning. Proponents such as Lieutenant does not stop while planning occurs but APEX’s limitations by tailoring IPRs Colonel John Price, USAF, argue for at some point, the staff must enter into in frequency, scope, and audience. strategic thought superseding strategic a deliberate approach to producing a Every top priority plan should have planning as the U.S. military’s “primary detailed plan. Incorporating IPRs is the a single IPR (IPR A). IPR A should discipline.”25 In his 2012 article, Price forcing function that keeps those plans be conducted at the conclusion of condemned APEX as a failure to relevant. Proponents of the strategic strategic assessment/guidance before revolutionize military planning. He thinking approach add value to the concept development, as presented noted APEX’s primary shortfall as the discussion by increasing the creative and in JP 5-0.34 Reducing the number of assumption that improvement depended critical thought throughout the develop- IPRs per plan from four to one would on slight changes in the process rather ment of a plan; however, such thought is likewise decrease the overall number than a wholesale adoption of strategic most valuable at the beginning stages of of IPRs by 75 percent. Such reduction thought. He proposed elevating stra- a plan and is updated accordingly when a would facilitate adequate dialogue and tegic thinking above strategic planning significant change occurs. maintain the vision and intent of APEX as the military’s primary discipline. Similarly, APEX has a wider range while keeping schedules manageable for Critical to his argument is the premise of critics. Detractors note that APEX CCDRs, staffs, and the SecDef. that APEX itself is inflexible and thus IPRs are too time-consuming for SecDef

70 Commentary / Making a Case for In-Progress Reviews JFQ 86, 3rd Quarter 2017 General Ray Odierno, commanding general, Multi-National Forces–Iraq, and Lieutenant Colonel Joseph McGee, commander of 2-327 Infantry Battalion, 1st Brigade Combat Team, 101st Airborne Division, walk through streets of Samarra on October 29, 2008 (U.S. Army/Kani Ronningen)

In addition to the frequency of IPRs, actual plan development and, likewise, the CCDR. Overreliance on socializations, the IPR format should be addressed. provides the SecDef more time to attend prebriefs, and JCS Tanks risks the clarity IPR A should be stripped down to its his countless obligations. and fidelity of guidance transmitted from initial purpose with a focus on ensuring IPR A should be formalized between the SecDef to the CCDR. If the CCDR correct interpretation of strategic direc- the CCDR and SecDef with all other par- requires assistance gaining the full coor- tion, validating assumptions, addressing ticipants to include the Under Secretary dination of the Services or across other interagency coordination, and allocating of Defense for Policy, Deputy Assistant commands, he could request a JCS Tank. intelligence and resources for a given Secretaries of Defense, Chairman of the In the event the CCDR wishes to further range of military options. The process Joint Chiefs of Staff, Vice Chairman, develop common perspective, review con- should avoid expansive, prepared briefs and any other Joint Staff members or cepts, or incorporate recommendations, a to the SecDef. The format should be OSD-designated representatives who socialization or prebrief is appropriate. roughly 10 minutes of brief/update to would participate in a strictly “moni- the SecDef, followed by 30 minutes of tor” capacity. Their presence, whether Conclusion discussion. The CCMD staffs would pro- in person or virtual, would be to ensure APEX without IPRs reverses the vision vide minimal products (7–10 slides) to SecDef’s guidance to the CCDR is heard proposed in 2005 and represents a aid in the visualization of the issues to be and applied to their plans and offices. The pendulum swing back toward closed- discussed. The SecDef needs to reinforce conversation should center exclusively on circuit planning. Closed-circuit planning this vision so as not to allow ambitious the CCDR and SecDef. Furthermore, largely failed to adequately produce staffs to bloat the process. All necessary while IPRs should be prioritized, they plans for recent operations and likewise follow-ups for issues or guidance should should not be delegated. With the re- cannot produce plans tailored to the be conducted informally between the duction in overall IPRs per plan, direct contemporary environment. APEX, in CCDR and SecDef. The intent is fewer SecDef influence into those plans should its original form, sought to meet today’s overall IPRs that have to be scheduled be mandatory. Subsequently, the GEF planning challenges through extensive and synced with the plan development and JSCP should reflect the need for collaboration and senior leader influ- calendar and thus a reduced amount of SecDef influence on those IPRs. ence. Perhaps in practice, the complete read-ahead material and products. This Finally, the need for predecisional vision of APEX was unsustainable and model gives time back to the staffs for briefs should be left at the discretion of unable to meet the specific planning

JFQ 86, 3rd Quarter 2017 Dunkin 71 9 18 needs of today’s civilian and military McGauvran, 12. Martin E. Dempsey, letter to Senator Carl 10 Guidance for the Employment of the Force Levin on the U.S. Military and the Syrian Con- leaders. However, the joint planning (Washington, DC: Office of the Secretary flict, July 19, 2013, available at . model. The essence of APEX lies with a 5-year period. The number of campaign ob- 19 JP 5-0, I-3–I-4. the IPR. The frank, two-way conver- jectives assigned to geographic combatant com- 20 Clark, 2. manders has increased. Likewise, the number of 21 Ibid., 2. sation between CCDRs and SecDef posture planning priorities has increased. The 22 Donald Wright and Timothy Reese, On provides the necessary collaboration campaign objective statistic is a primary driver Point II: Transition to the New Campaign (Fort and guidance required for adaptive for developing campaign plans and contingency Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute plans. Strategic planning is the com- plans; however, posture guidance priorities also Press, June 2008), 177. mander’s business and, as such, should add to the planning effort and are a consider- 23 George W. Bush, “National Strategy for ation when balancing the factor of time. Victory in Iraq,” November 2005, available at remain between senior and subordinate. 11 Plans are categorized by levels of detail . and appropriate scope. IPRs allow for nexes; 3T is the same but includes Time Phased 24 At the time, the Joint Operation Planning strategic alignment and interagency col- Force Deployment Data (TPFDD). Level 4 is and Execution System was the planning process a complete plan with all annexes and a detailed of record and advertised a 24-month timeline laboration—qualities not found in the TPFDD. These increases are substantial and to produce plans. century-old closed-circuit system—in noteworthy because level 3T and above are far 25 John F. Price, Jr., “The Downfall of the rapidly developing contemporary more time consuming to produce. Further- Adaptive Planning: Finding a New Approach environment. The SecDef has the power more, TPFDDs have a short shelf life and after a Failed Revolution,” Air & Space to reinvigorate the IPR process and require constant updating. Power Journal 26, no. 2 (March–April 2012), 12 JSCP. 118–131, available at . recommendations contained herein. munity consists of the Office of the Secretary 26 Ibid., 118–131. Consequently, the U.S. military will of Defense, combatant commands (CCMDs), 27 Ibid., 125. regain the spirit of APEX, address the Services, National Guard Bureau, all Joint 28 Ibid., 123–124. concerns of the planning community, Staff directorates, and DOD Combat Support 29 Bob Woodward, State of Denial: Bush at Agencies. War, Part III (New York: Simon & Schuster, and retain the ability to be the world 14 Douglas K. Clark, “The Path to Finally 2006), 36. This passage is key in understand- leader in strategic planning. JFQ Realizing the Adaptive Planning Vision of De- ing Donald Rumsfeld’s demand for short and fense Secretaries Rumsfeld and Gates,” Master’s pointed discussion with his commanders, a thesis, Joint Advanced Warfighting School, likely driver of the IPR concept. Notes 2009, 30, available at . officer, April 22, 2016. 15 31 1 Joint Publication (JP) 1, Doctrine for the Carl A. Young, “Update to Adaptive JSCP, 2015. The following is extracted Armed Forces of the United States (Washington, Planning, JP 5-0, and an Update on the Plans from unclassified portions of the JSCP: “Social- DC: The Joint Staff, 2013), V-2. Review Process,” lecture, Joint Faculty Educa- izations are formal meetings with the Joint Staff 2 JP 5-0, Joint Operation Planning (Wash- tion Conference, Washington, DC, July 1, and OSD providing CCMDs the opportunity ington, DC: The Joint Staff, 2011), II-12. 2015, slide 5. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of to socialize plans and develop common perspec- 3 Michael McGauvran, A Primer for: The Staff (CJCS) Instruction 1800.01D, “Of- tive regarding the review process. JCS Tanks JSPS, GEF, JSCP, APEX, and GFM (Newport, ficer Professional Military Education Policy are held by the CJCS in advance of scheduled RI: Naval War College, 2015), 11. (OPMEP),” requires the Joint Staff J7 Joint SecDef IPRs. The intent of a JCS Tank is to 4 Adaptive Planning Roadmap 2005 (Wash- Education Branch to host a Joint Faculty ensure full coordination across the CCMDs and ington, DC: Department of Defense, 2005). Education Conference (JFEC) every year. The Services and enable the Chairman’s compliance 5 Michael A. Santacroce, Joint Strategic and conference’s purpose is to “present emerging with Title X requirements; they are supple- Operational Planning: Planning for Planners concepts and other material relevant to main- mented by Operations Deputies (OpsDeps) (Lakeland, FL: The Lightning Press, 2014). taining curricula currency to the faculties of Tanks and, ‘Paper Tanks.’ CCDRs conduct 6 Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP) the [professional military education] and [joint pre-briefs with the Services, Joint Staff, and (Washington, DC: The Joint Staff, 2008, professional military education] colleges and OSD planners IOT review concepts, discuss 2011, 2015). Close analysis of the JSCPs from schools.” The JFEC convenes each summer; ideas, and incorporate recommendations. For 2008 to 2015 reveals clear trends in numbers the Joint Staff J7 invites representatives of the plans requiring SecDef IPR, socializations and of plans requiring In-Progress Reviews (IPRs) professional military education community. De- pre-briefs must take place one month before across all functional and geographic combatant fense Department representatives’ presentations the IPR.” 32 commands. The trends apply across all levels not only focus on the evolving professional Interview with former Joint Staff Plans of detail; however, the author chooses to focus body of knowledge but also provide insight officer, April 22, 2016. 33 only on the higher level detailed plans as they into the strategic environment. There is a range of doctrinal and policy 16 are the most significant and time consuming. Robert M. Klein, “Adaptive Planning: documents that direct the use of APEX in the 7 McGauvran, 15. Not Your Great-Grandfather’s Schlieffen Plan,” joint operational planning process, including JP nd 8 “Administration Cybersecurity Efforts Joint Force Quarterly 45 (2 Quarter 2007), 5-0 and CJCS Memoranda 3130.03, 3130.01, 2015,” White House Fact Sheet (Washington, 85, available at . JP 5-0, II-14. 17 Ibid., 85.

72 Commentary / Making a Case for In-Progress Reviews JFQ 86, 3rd Quarter 2017 Chief Builder Keith Genereux, assigned to Naval Mobile Construction Battalion 5, renders final salute while passing through sideboys at his retirement ceremony, Port Hueneme, California, May 4, 2012 (U.S. Navy/Ace Rheaume)

particularly well because major reforms Military Retirement based on the integration of diverse skills and perspectives, as well as the alignment of competing interests, are more likely to succeed. The success- Reform ful reform of the military’s retirement benefit from the longstanding pension- A Case Study in Successful based system to a blended system cer- tainly fits that argument.1 Simply put, this reform would not have been pos- Public Sector Change sible without the (mostly) complemen- tary efforts and driving forces of Con- By Laura J. Junor, Samantha Clark, and Mark Ramsay gress, the Military Compensation and Retirement Modernization Commis- sion, and the Department of Defense n old proverb states that success (DOD). We believe it provides a useful Dr. Laura J. Junor is the Director of Research has many fathers, but failure is and rare case study for achieving sig- and Support and Director, Institute for National an orphan. That idea immedi- nificant, consequential change in the Strategic Studies, at the National Defense A University. Samantha Clark is Deputy General ately resonates with most of us because public sector. This article documents a Counsel on the United States Senate Armed we have seen that taking credit for process where government at a variety Services Committee. Lieutenant General Mark success is much easier than taking of levels worked well and acknowledges Ramsay, USAF (Ret.), is the former Director of Force Structure, Resources, and Assessment responsibility for failure. However, in lessons that should be passed along for (J8), Joint Staff. the public sector, this proverb resonates those reforms yet to come.

JFQ 86, 3rd Quarter 2017 Junor, Clark, and Ramsay 73 Figure 1. Percentage of All PrivateSector Workers Enrolled because they perceived the risks vastly in Defined Benefit and Defined Contribution Plans, 19792013 outweighed the rewards. That percep- tion persisted until a confluence of events 35 occurred that included military end-

30 strength reductions after over a decade of sustained conflict, successive years 25 of trillion-dollar Federal deficits, and major cuts to defense spending under the 20 Budget Control Act. All the while, the labor market was adapting to the chang- 15 ing preferences of a constantly evolving labor force. 10 Under the current military retire-

5 ment system, only about 17 percent of Servicemembers serve the full 20 years

0 required to receive the retirement annu- 1979 1981 1983 1985 1987 1989 1991 1993 1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007 2009 2011 2013 ity. Under the defined annuity benefit, Defined Benefit Only Defined Contribution Only Defined Contribution Both which has been in effect for decades, members serving fewer than 20 years Source: U.S. Department of Labor Form 5500 Summaries 1979–1998, Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation receive no government-funded retire- ment benefit regardless of how well they performed.4 By 2011, it became clear A Brief History of In the face of such an overwhelming that thousands of members who served Military Retirement trend, the question of whether the mili- admirably supporting operations in Iraq The basic elements of the current mili- tary retirement system should somehow and Afghanistan, as well as other contin- tary pension-based retirement system follow suit was logical. In particular, both gencies and operations, would be forced were first signed into law between the 10th and 11th Quadrennial Review to leave military service well before they 1945 and 1947. Since then, there have of Military Compensation (QRMC) in met the 20-year requirement to receive been changes in the defined benefit 2008 and 2012 recommended major a pension. In addition, real concerns that include changes in the basis for changes to the DOD retirement system.3 about the Federal deficit were driving the annuity payment and the 1986 The mobility-enhancing aspect of a successively lower defense budgets and establishment of the REDUX option defined-contribution benefit was part of subsequent reductions in the size of the allowing members to essentially trade the reason the military never seriously force. During this same period, DOD a near-term lump-sum payment for a contemplated a blended plan. The vast was also grappling with how to fit es- long-term reduction to their annuity. majority of military skills and expertise sential investments in defense technology Since the 1980s, the vast majority of cannot be hired from the civilian labor and readiness recovery into a declining private-sector employers shifted from market; they must be grown from within defense budget that was increasingly a defined benefit annuity to a defined the Services through education and dominated by discussions on compensa- contribution 401(k)-type plan (see experience. This means that DOD must tion costs.5 figure 1). The basis of this shift was maintain a powerful incentive for enough In response to these circumstances, likely the result of several factors. The of the best of its workforce to remain the Defense Business Board (DBB) first was employer-borne cost; defined despite the seemingly more lucrative proposed eliminating the defined benefit contribution plans are a less expensive experiences of their friends and relatives annuity and shifting military retirement benefit for employers. The second was in the private sector. A retirement benefit completely to a defined contribution a booming economy over significant that requires a 20-year commitment pro- system.6 By September of 2011, the portions of this period; many invest- vides such a powerful retention incentive, Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) ment funds performed well, especially while a portable retirement benefit does convened a Retirement Reform Review throughout the 1990s and early 2000s. not. As the economy entered a major working group that considered the DBB The third factor was the changing recession in 2008, the traditional DOD proposal as part of a broader pay and dynamic of the labor force that favored retirement annuity seemed even more compensation efficiencies review.7 While career mobility. Throughout this period, important as it was largely immune from this review recommended a blended employees were increasingly less likely economic downturn. retirement benefit that was conceptually to work for the same employer for During this recession, the military similar to the benefit ultimately passed decades, making a portable defined con- beneficiaries, DOD, and Congress did into law in 2015, beneficiaries, advocacy tribution plan a critical benefit.2 not aggressively pursue reform, probably groups, and congressional members were

74 Commentary / Military Retirement Reform JFQ 86, 3rd Quarter 2017 concerned that the internally led DOD House defense authorization commit- column in the table details the elements task force did not adequately consider a tees and personnel subcommittees.11 of the blended retirement plan. Once comprehensive review of pay and com- These Members, some of whom have the final report was delivered officially pensation and its impact on the viability established military careers themselves, on January 29, 2015, President Barack of our all-volunteer force. That meant clearly understood the imperative of Obama was given 60 days to review the the probability of widespread opposition responsible compensation reform and set plan and convey his recommendations was high. To avoid this outcome and that expectation for the MCRMC. While to Congress.13 President Obama asked increase the chances of success, an outside fiscal concerns presented unforgiving the Secretary of Defense to consider the review comprised of leading subject mat- pressure on compensation issues, writings MCRMC’s reforms for implementation. ter experts was necessary to validate and and testimonies of congressional leaders improve concepts for military retirement clearly conveyed their concern about Breaking the Status Quo Bias reform.8 maintaining a ready, healthy all-volunteer Based on the recent experience of Con- force that was capable of competing for gress with reducing the COLA annuity The Path to Reform the country’s best and brightest person- adjustment for working-age retirees, the The Military Compensation and Retire- nel. They were looking for a retirement high likelihood of congressional advo- ment Modernization Commission solution that was affordable, attracted cacy would not be enough to guarantee (MCRMC) was assembled by an act of new enlistees looking for military experi- a reformed retirement plan. For that, Congress as sections 671–680 of the ence (rather than a 20-year career), and current Servicemembers, retirees, and fiscal year (FY) 2013 National Defense provided the means for these individu- their advocacy groups would have to Authorization Act (NDAA).9 Congress als to begin establishing a portable and support reform, or at least not mount established the MCRMC to ensure the secure retirement future. Armed Services a strong opposition. That meant that long-term viability of the all-volunteer Committee leadership set up regular these groups would need the time to force, enable a high quality of life for hearings and informational meetings fully review the details of the changes military families, and modernize and between the committee Members and and their expected consequences. achieve fiscal sustainability of the com- their staffs and the commissioners in The time allotted for this review pensation and retirement systems.10 The order to ensure that MCRMC members was extremely challenging, but it did commission was comprised of experts understood their tasking and had the force immediate and focused attention on military retirement and compensa- support they needed to produce useful on retirement reform. The Secretary of tion systems, including former Senators, recommendations. Defense had to send his recommenda- Representatives, executive appointees, The most critical aspect of Congress’s tions to the President by March 13, and congressional defense commit- active involvement may have been the 2015, in order for Mr. Obama to meet tee staff. Together, these experts held signal that it sent outside of the MCRMC the legislated timeline; that allowed only numerous town halls at military bases (for example, to DOD, beneficiaries, about 6 weeks for DOD to review all 15 and communities far and wide to gather and advocacy groups) that Congress was MCRMC recommendations.14 At that input from Servicemembers, their serious about implementing responsible time, Secretary Carter indicated that families, retirees, and advocacy groups. military retirement reform. The reduc- DOD leadership was prepared to accept With this research, the MCRMC built a tion in the cost of living adjustment three recommendations immediately and sound case for retirement system reform (COLA) for Servicemembers’ annuity anticipated that following further work that was backed by thorough research benefits passed in the Bipartisan Budget with the commission, they could support and analysis. Act in 2013 already signaled that they another seven recommendations by the Typically, these “blue ribbon com- were willing to make big changes in this end of April 2015. While DOD indicated missions” result in recommendations space during times of heightened fis- that it agreed with the commission’s that present reform as either prohibitively cal austerity.12 In the case of the COLA objectives regarding the remaining rec- complex or involving insurmount- reduction, however, reform was the prod- ommendations, it might disagree on how able political risk. An issue as complex, uct of closed-door budget negotiations best to achieve those objectives.15 In any consequential, and politically risky as a rather than of comprehensive analyses, event, DOD indicated that it would need fundamental change to military retire- and ultimately most elements were largely more time to assess the remaining recom- ment on the heels of the longest conflicts rolled back in subsequent legislation. mendations but promised to complete in the Nation’s history could have easily Since Congress designed the MCRMC to this work in time for the preparation of resulted in such an outcome. The prod- avoid that shortcoming, the likelihood of the FY 2017 budget. uct of this commission was different, meaningful legislation this time was very While many within DOD had advo- largely because congressional leadership credible. cated for a blended retirement system for directly and consistently oversaw the The MCRMC indeed fulfilled its years, there were many others who were MCRMC’s work. By 2015, there was mandate and provided a well-considered, concerned that the risk to the recruit- new leadership in both the Senate and viable retirement plan. The second ing, retention, and management of an

JFQ 86, 3rd Quarter 2017 Junor, Clark, and Ramsay 75 Table. Retirement Plans Attribute Current MCRMC DOD Final (2016 NDAA) Defined Benefit (DB) Vesting 20 Years of Service (YOS) 20 YOS 20 YOS 20 YOS DB Multiplier 2.50% 2.00% 2.00% 2.00% DB Working-Age Annuity Full annuity Full annuity; with lump- Full annuity; no lump-sum Full annuity with lump-sum option sum option option DB Retirement Age NA Active Component NA AC; 60 RC NA AC; 60 RC NA AC; 60 RC (AC); 60 Reserve Component (RC) DB COLA COLA-1%* Full (COLA-1% repeal) Full (COLA-1% repeal) DB Disability Retirement Pay Disability rating (Min Disability rating remove Disability rating (Min 30%) Disability rating (Min 30%) capped 30%) capped at 75%, or 75% cap, or 2.0% multiplier capped at 75%, or 2.5% at 75%, or 2.0% multiplier 2.5% multiplier multiplier Defined Contribution (DC) NA 1% automatic; plus up to 1% automatic; plus up to 1% automatic; plus up to 4% DOD Contribution Rate 5% matching (Max = 6%) 5% matching (Max = 6%) matching (Max = 5%) DC DOD Contribution Years NA 1% at entry until 20 1% at entry until end of 1% at entry until 20 YOS; of Service YOS; Matching: After service; Matching: After Matching: After completion of 2 completion of 2 YOS until completion of 4 YOS until YOS until 20 YOS 20 YOS end of service DC Enrollment NA Automatic at entry, Automatic at entry, no Automatic at entry, automatic automatic reenrollment automatic reenrollment** reenrollment

DC Default Contribution Rate NA 3% automatic enrollment 3% automatic enrollment 3% automatic enrollment at entry at entry at entry*** DC Vesting of DOD NA Start of 3 YOS Start of 3 YOS Start of 3 YOS Contributions Continuation Pay (CP) NA Min 2.5 for AC. 0.5 RC; Varies at Service Min 2.5 for AC. 0.5 RC; max varies Multiplier max varies discretion CP YOS / Additional NA For everyone at 12 Services determine whom For everyone at 12 YOS, minimum Obligation YOS, minimum 4-year to target between 8 to 16 4-year obligation. Basic CP: AC 2.5 obligation. Basic CP: AC YOS at Service discretion; times basic pay, RC 0.5 2.5 times basic pay, RC 0.5 min 1-year obligation Effective Date NA 1-Jan-18 1-Jan-18 % of Force Receiving Benefit 19 85 85 85

* FY 15 NDAA moved the effective date for COLA-1% to January 1, 2016, for new entrants ** Can opt-out after financial literacy training at 1st permanent duty station; no auto-reenrollment ***Default investment is ROTH L-fund all-volunteer force was not worth the Defense Analyses, and Center for Naval Secretary and included individuals with benefit of proposed reforms. In April Analyses). In addition, DOD included requisite policy and analytic skill-sets 2015, Secretary Ashton Carter pledged experts from the Labor, Agriculture, from the Joint Staff, OSD Comptroller, to the President that he would continue Commerce, Education, and Veterans and OSD Cost Assessment and Program to review the MCRMC’s retirement Affairs Departments, as well as the Office Evaluation (CAPE) office. Sub-teams proposals.16 In fact, civilian and military of Management and Budget and Office conducted the analysis and response that analysts within DOD had been meeting of Personnel Management, throughout informed the Secretary’s recommenda- with the MCRMC members, outside this 6-week effort to ensure a holistic tions to the President. DOD leaders experts, and representatives from the review. Finally, the review included two understood that Congress was determined White House, Department of Veterans sessions with leaders from the military to evolve these benefits and that the White Affairs, and Office of Management and and veterans’ organizations. Senior lead- House was similarly disposed. While Budget constantly since January 2015. ers at every level of DOD reviewed the there was never a mandate to accept these More specifically, DOD’s review was work on a weekly basis and provided criti- recommendations, DOD leaders knew conducted by more than 150 internal cal input. that they had to genuinely consider each subject matter experts and supported by The internal DOD MCRMC re- of the MCRMC recommendations if they three Federally funded research and de- sponse team was led by OSD Personnel hoped to have a positive influence on velopment centers (RAND, Institute for and Readiness (P&R) on behalf of the the final outcome. Therefore, the DOD

76 Commentary / Military Retirement Reform JFQ 86, 3rd Quarter 2017 Figure 2. DOD Retirement Simulation of Annual ifetime Income under arying Scenarios

Enlisted SM, 20yr Career Scenario for this illustration Enlisted Servicemember 300,000 20-year career Current Compensation Deferred Compensation Total Retirement Benefit Total Active Duty Pay DOD Funded Retirement Benefit Blended System 1,534,157 Defined contribution TSP 250,000 Current System 754,214 Current System 1,219,791 At entry Auto-enrolled in TSP at 3 of basic pay Delta 314,366 Blended System 765,554 Blended System 1,278,815 25.77 1 automatic DOD contributions until End of Service (EOS) 200,000 Delta 11,339 Delta 59,024 From 3 years of service until EOS, member contributes 4 to TSP (Cont. Pay) 4.84 and DOD matches 4 TSP has 7.3 nominal annual returns 150,000 Career ears Working Retirement Full Retirement Member draws benefit at age of 67 SM TSP 50,000 Annual in F15 Defined benefit Multiplier of 2.0 Member TSP Continuation pay 3.37x monthly basic pay Begin TSP withdrawals at 67 Contributions 1,534,157 Assumptions 50,000 Income is adusted for inflation (constant F15 ) Resulting Member SM retires after 20 years of service as an E7 and lives until age 85 TSP Income 314,366 Continuation pay (3.37x monthly basic pay) added to Active-duty blended pay - but not counted in retirement benefit 18 22 26 30 34 38 42 46 50 54 58 62 66 70 74 78 82 • At entry SM autoenrolled in TSP at 3 of basic pay DOD automatically contributes 1 through EoS Age • Starting ear of Service OS 3 EOS SM contributes 4 to TSP • Starting OS 3 EOS DOD matches 4 contribution Current Pay Blended Pay Member TSP Contributions Member TSP Income • TSP account annuitied at age 67 Current Retirement Continuation Pay Blended DB Retirement DOD TSP Income TSP has 7.3 nominal annual returns (L2040/L2050 fund class) recommendations to the Secretary, and ul- a comprehensive discussion and evalua- House and Senate versions contained timately the President, had to be based in tion of each MCRMC recommendation. detailed sections on military retirement reproducible logic and could not blindly Based on this approach, DOD generally modernization that were placed in the reject the commission’s recommendations found that MCRMC’s objectives were Chairman’s marks by the subcommit- in favor of the status quo. Given the time- consistent with its own, and any differ- tees on personnel and passed on the line and a strong status quo bias, failure ences that existed largely concerned the floors of both bodies of Congress.17 here was possible. best means of achieving those objectives. Both versions reformed the currently To combat that likelihood, and before Simply put, DOD agreed in whole or in defined benefit retirement system into the sub-team leads were chosen, the part with the majority of the MCRMC’s a modernized hybrid contributory and response team created an approach that recommendations based on defendable defined benefit system that contained forced a broader consideration of each criteria and thorough analysis. many common elements.18 The main of the 15 recommendations. Each sub- The process outlined above iden- policy dispute was whether to include team had to deliver a structured narrative tified three objectives of a military an element in the Senate version, known response for each recommendation that retirement plan: as a lump-sum payment, for those elect- began with an explanation of the purpose ing to take a portion of their retirement do no harm to the all-volunteer force of the benefit linked to that recommen- •• benefit early and defer collection on in terms of recruiting, retention, and dation irrespective of either the status the rest until they reach Social Security workforce management quo policy or the MCRMC’s recom- retirement age.19 As the basic structural provide the opportunity to yield a mended change. In other words, it had to •• reform was contained in both versions benefit that is equivalent to the tradi- address and answer such questions as why of the FY 2016 NDAA, a version of this tional defined annuity benefit DOD provides this benefit and what were reform was all but certain to remain in provide a transportable retirement the benefit’s intended goals. That led to •• the final conferenced version of the bill. benefit to a larger percentage of the a description of specific policy attributes This triggered efforts within DOD to force. that would meet this goal—or, phrased begin building consensus and recom- differently, what “right” looks like when It also set up the empirics to explore mendations for modifying the legisla- it comes to a policy shaped to meet the the attributes of a retirement plan that tion contained in the House and Senate goals of the benefit. The next step was met those objectives, including analysis of versions of the FY 2016 NDAA. to discuss the MCRMC’s recommenda- recruiting and retention consequences of Support Within the Department of tion in the context of whether it met the various defined benefit, defined contribu- Defense. Two factors made retirement stated objectives of the benefit. Only tion, and continuation pay options. reform more difficult than most others. then would sub-team analysts extend this First, military retirement is an intensely logic to draft a final recommendation. Building Support critical and personal issue for military While the status quo could be raised as a Congress included legislation for a leaders. In part, it is an issue of keeping better alternative to the MCRMC recom- modernized military retirement system faith with fellow Servicemembers who mendation, it only survived as such after in the FY 2016 NDAA. Both the are willing to sacrifice enormously for

JFQ 86, 3rd Quarter 2017 Junor, Clark, and Ramsay 77 their country. There is also a real concern (TSP), likely individual TSP contribution plan attributes on individual members. that any change could irrevocably harm rates, likely age at fund withdrawal, and At the very least, it seemed to allay some the success of the current professional average fund performance over the life of of their fears. While many of these sup- all-volunteer force. Finally, retirement a Servicemember. It also allowed them to port organizations remained concerned benefits are notoriously difficult to un- understand the scenarios that were most about the idea of having any portion of derstand.20 It was clear to the working likely to yield a retirement benefit at least the retirement benefit in the uncertain team that efforts to fairly weigh the pros as good as the current defined annuity hands of Servicemembers who might and cons of a blended retirement benefit benefit. When combined with the years not be financially savvy or at the mercy would have to provide the means to sim- of research on recruiting and retention of volatile financial markets, they did ply, and without bias, let decisionmakers that had already been assembled, the Joint appreciate the real value of providing see and compare the different aspects of a Chiefs and SELs had the information they many more young Servicemembers with blended retirement system. needed to make informed choices that a portable retirement benefit. In the end, In response to the first issue, the met the three principles outlined above. they did not aggressively oppose the rec- OSD-led response team overwhelmingly The Joint Chiefs and SELs designed ommended plan. agreed that the Joint Chiefs of Staff and their optimal blended retirement plan Congressional Action. Once Senior Enlisted Advisors (SELs) were the after multiple meetings where they DOD’s preferred proposal cleared the most appropriate group to help design worked through the history and at- White House, the process of reforming and propose a reformed retirement plan tributes of the current plan and many retirement was back where it started for Servicemembers. OSD leaders under- variants of a blended plan illustrated over a year earlier: Congress. While stood that sometimes the best leadership through the simulation tool shown in the President’s plan (as recommended decision is to know when to step aside; figure 2. The Chairman sent the recom- by DOD) was fairly well received by this was one of those times. For past mendation of the Joint Chiefs and SELs Members and professional staff, the and present military personnel to accept to the Secretary of Defense on May two institutions differed in some of the a radically different retirement benefit, 19, 2015. After consulting with the specific attributes of a blended plan. they had to see that it was designed from deputy secretary and Service secretaries, These differences were about when TSP within their military community. OSD Secretary Carter accepted the Chairman’s matching contributions would begin, P&R, Comptroller, and CAPE had recommendation and, in turn, recom- how long matching would last, whether already done a great deal of work evaluat- mended it to President Obama on June a lump-sum option would be allowed, ing alternative plan attributes during the 8, 2015. Finally, the President accepted and the total amount of matching. These working group process. They continued Secretary Carter’s recommendation. (The differences highlighted one failure of the this work by actively supporting the Joint attributes of the blended plan are listed in internal DOD process: for all the efforts Staff–led subgroup both in preparing column 3 of the table.) to be transparent and inclusive across the material and analyses and in attending Support from Military Advocacy executive branch, DOD failed to include decisionmaking forums. The process Groups. A motivated Congress and some key staff members in its delibera- remained transparent and inclusive, just a united DOD position would not tive process. Whether that would have with a different lead. be enough to ensure a successfully changed the outcome is unclear, but it In response to the second issue, the reformed retirement benefit. Both would have better informed the delibera- Joint Staff developed a simple com- Congress and DOD knew they needed tions between Congress and DOD earlier pound interest simulation to illustrate to get some level of support from the in the overall process. the consequence of different blended various veterans’ and Servicemembers’ That said, the collaboration was plan attributes on the out-of-pocket support organizations, which were not extremely effective on the issue of the expense and forecasted retirement benefit predisposed to favoring major changes in COLA minus 1 percent (COLA–1) an- of an individual Servicemember (see long-term benefits. While Congress held nuity reduction. DOD demonstrated that figure 2). The model was designed for hearings and hosted meetings with the maintaining the COLA–1 adjustment Active and Reserve, enlisted and officer Armed Services Committee Members would jeopardize the ability of a blended Servicemembers. This simulation tool and staff, Secretary Carter hosted a retirement plan to provide for a viable re- enabled open and frank senior leader roundtable of nearly 30 representatives tirement benefit since it would essentially discussions based on sound facts that from the larger support organizations. add to the reduction in working-age re- clearly showed the range of possible This allowed the OSD and Joint Staff tirement income.21 Since the revisions in blended retirement system outcomes for team to brief the DOD findings on each the law largely reduced the savings associ- individual members. More specifically, of the MCRMC recommendations and ated with the COLA–1 reduction, DOD it allowed the Joint Chiefs and the SELs walk through the implications of the argued that the objectively low savings to view what happens when they varied retirement plan in detail. Once again, the were not worth invoking likely opposi- values associated with the DOD match- simple simulation tool was instrumental tion to any version of a blended plan. The ing percentage to the Thrift Savings Plan in illustrating the most likely effects of savings from a blended plan were also

78 Commentary / Military Retirement Reform JFQ 86, 3rd Quarter 2017 Former CNO Admiral Jonathan Greenert speaks with Servicemembers, civilians, and their families about U.S. rebalance to Pacific, shorter deployments, and potential upcoming changes to military compensation and retirement benefits, Pearl Harbor, February 6, 2015 (U.S. Navy/Brennan D. Knaresboro) likely higher and more immediate than implementation date for the blended individuals for decades—far longer those associated with COLA–1. Congress retirement system for January 1, 2018, to than the typical applicant ever plans supported the DOD analysis and allowed ensure that a robust financial education on spending in any job. As the labor full COLA adjustments as part of the process is in place for a smooth transition. market becomes more competitive and proposed blended retirement plan. The FY 2017 NDAA contains further the technical skills required of military Ultimately, Congress passed the technical and clarifying amendments on members grow, this challenge becomes blended retirement reform as part of the the modernized retirement system as a even more acute. For these reasons, FY 2016 NDAA, which was signed into result of this ongoing process.22 DOD must continue to evolve how law on November 25, 2015. military personnel are recruited, com- The attributes of the modernized Final Thoughts pensated, promoted, and managed to military retirement plan contained in Retirement reform, in the context of make sure that the Services are able to the FY 2016 NDAA legislation are listed the larger compensation efforts of the maintain a professional workforce now in the right column of the table. Note MCRMC, was a first major step in and well into the future. The reform of that the final outcome written into law evolving how DOD manages the all- the retirement benefit was a sound step. by Congress does not entirely match volunteer force. The challenge in main- As we look at other broad and key the solution submitted to it. However, taining this force is that DOD must personnel issues, reform of the military there are obvious similarities across all grow the majority of its own labor force healthcare system is also necessary in three versions created by Congress, the from within because military skills, espe- order to decrease growing costs and MCRMC, and DOD. In the year follow- cially at the middle and senior grades, better ensure high-quality, safe, and ing the passage of the FY 2016 NDAA, cannot be hired from the civilian labor accessible health care. In addition, the Congress and DOD have continued to market. That means that DOD must civilian national security workforce work closely on technical and conform- not only attract qualified applicants, but requires changes in how it approaches ing changes to the law. Congress set the also train and retain the best of these identifying, training, and retaining highly

JFQ 86, 3rd Quarter 2017 Junor, Clark, and Ramsay 79 skilled personnel. Each of these reforms Matthew Goldberg, Costs of Military Pay and members’ support, commissary and exchange Benefits in the Defense Budget (Washington, consolidation, the health benefit program, and is at least as controversial and complex DC: Congressional Budget Office, November the blended retirement system. as retirement reform and, if they are to 14, 2012), available at . Ashton Carter to President Barack Obama on parent analyses and coordination within 6 Defense Business Board, Modernizing the the Department of Defense Review of the Mili- and among the executive and legislative Military Retirement System Task Group (Wash- tary Compensation and Retirement Moderniza- ington, DC: Office of the Secretary of Defense, tion Commission Recommendations, April 27, branches, military and veteran advocacy July 21, 2011). 2015. organizations, and think tanks. 7 Concepts for Modernizing Military Retire- 17 S.1376, FY 2016 NDAA, introduced Retirement reform deservedly and ment (Washington, DC: The Joint Staff, March by Senator McCain (May 19, 2015); H.R. necessarily had many mothers and fathers. 2014) was sent to the Military Compensation 1735, National Defense Authorization Act for It is an example of government col- and Retirement Modernization Commission Fiscal Year 2016, introduced by Representative by Acting Deputy Undersecretary of Defense Thornberry (April 13, 2015). laboration at its best. This was a highly Christine Fox, March 2014. 18 Ibid. orchestrated process of analytic-based 8 Note that the Office of the Secretary of 19 S.1376, FY 2016 NDAA, § 633. consensus-building that was never one in- Defense also supported and even advocated for 20 Two economists point out that even the dividual or even one institution’s reform. an outside review for the same reasons. most lauded economists at the University of It is unlikely that it would have ever suc- 9 FY 2013 NDAA. Chicago almost never make any changes to 10 Conference Report Accompanying the their retirement account and, among those that ceeded as such. As new reforms begin to National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal started their 401k while single, still listed their take shape, those charged with designing Year 2013 (House Rept. 112–705). mothers as their beneficiary. See Richard H. and implementing them should consider 11 In 2015, Senator John McCain (R-AZ) Thaler and Cass R. Sunstein, Nudge: Improving the lessons this case study offers. JFQ became chairman of the Senate Armed Services Decisions about Health, Wealth, and Happiness Committee and Representative Mac Thorn- (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2008). berry (R-TX) became chairman of the House 21 All versions of the blended retirement Armed Services Committee. At the same time, reform reduced the value of the annuity from Notes the personnel subcommittee chairmen in both a multiple of 2.5 times basic pay to a multiple chambers changed to Senator Lindsey Graham of 2.0. Since retirees cannot draw on the TSP 1 National Defense Authorization Act (R-SC) in the Senate and Representative Joe income until they reach 59½ years old (in most (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2013 (Public Law 112- Heck (R-NV) in the House. Both Senator cases), the annuity is their only retirement 239; 126 Stat. 1632), § 675. Graham and Representative Heck were serving income during the years between their military 2 Defined benefit plans from private-sector members of the Air Force and Army Reserves, retirement and allowable TSP withdrawal ages. employers also carried an element of risk in that respectively (Mr. Graham as a judge advocate If COLA–1 had remained in law, it would have the annuity was contingent on the solvency of and Dr. Heck as a medical commander). further reduced the value of this annuity over the employer. If the employer suffered critical 12 Section 403 of the Bi-Partisan Budget the working age period of a Servicemember’s losses or folded completely, retirement annui- Act of 2013 changed the cost of living (COLA) life. ties could be severely compromised. formula for military retired pay during a Ser- 22 Sections 631–634 of S. 2943, FY 2017 3 Kristy N. Kamarck, Military Retire- vicemember’s “working age” years (under the NDAA, contain provisions with conforming ment: Background and Recent Developments, age of 62) from full COLA to COLA minus and technical changes to the modernized retire- RL34751 (Washington, DC: Congressional 1 percent (COLA–1). At age 62, retired pay ment system that were coordinated with DOD Research Service, September 12, 2016), 14. would be recalculated as if full COLA had been as part of the implementation process. th The 10 Quadrennial Review of Military Com- in effect during the working age period, and in- pensation (QRMC) was published in 2008, and creased by full COLA each year thereafter. This th the 11 was published in 2012. change applied to all military retirees. Within a 4 If Servicemembers volunteered to invest in month of enactment, and after vocal concerns the Federal Thrift Savings Plan (TSP), they can from Servicemembers, retirees, and groups that maintain those assets regardless of how long advocate for them, Congress passed legisla- they serve. Under the defined benefit program, tion to water down the effects of COLA–1 by the TSP investments are not really a retirement exempting disability retirees and their survivors benefit in the sense that there are no govern- and survivors of members who die on Active ment/employer contributions. Servicemembers duty. Eventually they also grandfathered all cur- invest their own money into these funds. rent retirees and members who entered military 5 Phillip Carter and Katherine Kid- service prior to January 1, 2014, and delayed der, Military Compensation and Retirement implementation by 1 year. Modernization: A Primer (Washington, DC: 13 FY 2013 NDAA. Note that the Center for a New American Security, January MCRMC’s final report listed 15 recommenda- 2015), available at ; Mackenzie 14 The MCRMC shared highlights of their Eaglen, Trends in Military Compensation: A recommendations with the Department of Chartbook (Washington, DC: American Enter- Defense (DOD) on January 15, 2015, 2 weeks prise Institute, July 2014), available at ; serve component statuses, exceptional family

80 Commentary / Military Retirement Reform JFQ 86, 3rd Quarter 2017 Senior Airman provides dental care as member of 59th Dental Support Squadron, providing high-performance health system dedicated to excellence in global dental care and education, Base San Antonio–Lackland, Texas, January 26, 2016 (U.S. Air Force/Keith James)

Trauma Care in Support of Global Military Operations

By Kyle N. Remick and Eric A. Elster

he Department of Defense by 15 to 20 percent.1 In 2006, senior of knowledge and material products, (DOD) Joint Trauma System military and civilian medical leaders clinical guidelines for optimal care, T (JTS) revolutionized combat partnered to translate this civilian and direct guidance to commanders casualty care by creating a trauma model to the battlefield. The deployed as a key components of a continuously system for the battlefield. Over the past components of the JTS provided learning trauma system in two theaters 30 years, U.S. civilian trauma systems real-time data collection and analysis, of operation, directly saving lives on have decreased mortality from trauma research to guide rapid implementation the battlefield.2 The JTS must now adapt to similarly support new challenges posed by dis- persed and globally remote operations Colonel Kyle N. Remick, USA, MD, is the Military Deputy of the Combat Casualty Care Research Program outside of formal combat zones and at the U.S. Army Medical Research and Material Command, Fort Detrick, Maryland. Captain Eric A. Elster, USN, MD, is Professor and Chairman of the Department of Surgery at the Uniformed Services University with fewer dedicated medical resources. of the Health Sciences and the Walter Reed National Military Medical Center. In this context, developing regionally

JFQ 86, 3rd Quarter 2017 Remick and Elster 81 Figure. Country Income Groups to reach Entebbe, Uganda. The injured World Bank Classification U.S. personnel were then transferred to a C17 and transported to a hospital in Nairobi, Kenya.3 After receiving care in Nairobi, the Servicemembers were then evacuated through Landstuhl Regional Medical Center in Germany to the United States. South Sudan is a low-income coun- try, and its medical infrastructure, to include trauma care, is far below what we would accept for our Servicemembers. Thus, neither the civilian nor the military hospitals in South Sudan would have been an acceptable option for care.4 The Servicemembers were taken to a hospital World Bank country income groups (2008) Gross National Income per capita 2007 (current USD) in Nairobi, which is approximately 745 miles away. This took around 3 hours High income 11,500 or more Middle, upper 3,700–11,500 Middle, lower 900–3,700 Low income 900 or less including the transfer of the wounded in Uganda from the Osprey to the C17. relevant trauma care system strategies has the ability to dedicate our own or PN The pre-hospital time was far longer the potential to decrease mortality from military trauma resources to support all than the now commonly accepted and injury for this new global operational operations. expected “golden hour” guideline to environment. The creation of this global Thus, DOD will need to leverage reach initial surgical care. Furthermore, trauma care system strategy requires the the trauma capabilities of geographically the Servicemembers were injured on the synergy of four trauma-oriented pillars relevant PNs. This strategy presents sev- same aircraft that served as the evacua- of effort. These are global trauma care, eral challenges. First, these operational tion platform, so they did not have to medical interoperability, medical stability environments are likely to be in low- and wait for a separate medical evacuation, operations, and health diplomacy. Their middle-income countries (LMICs). which would have added significantly to importance and unique contribution to Second, these military operations in need the pre-hospital time. The conclusion is an overall global strategy of trauma care of trauma support are likely to be in re- the distance to acceptable trauma care is described. mote locations. Lastly, the civilian trauma was prohibitive. Remote sites with pro- centers and trauma systems in these longed evacuation times are a challenge Global Trauma Care countries, if they exist, may not deliver for contingency planning, thus support- From a trauma systems and medical care to an acceptable standard for use by ing the need to develop regionalized PN operational perspective, the term global Servicemembers. Using the medical care trauma centers. trauma care implies the scenario distinct in LMICs as part of our global strategy The next politically charged ques- from combat operations in a mature for trauma care without prior planning tion is whether the quality of trauma theater of war in which all roles of care would be disastrous and would poten- care in Nairobi is acceptable for our and extensive military resources are tially increase morbidity and mortality. Servicemembers and, more broadly, not necessarily available. With numer- There is already tangible proof for whether the quality of trauma care ous, small scale, and globally dispersed the need to develop PN trauma capabili- provided in any LMIC is acceptable. In operations currently ongoing and over ties. In December 2013, South Sudan, general, the answer is no. Thus, multiple the horizon, a plan of action to provide the world’s newest nation, experienced options to provide optimal injury care trauma care for serious injuries is of a rekindling of internal strife in the form include placing U.S. trauma resources paramount importance. of armed conflict between the military within 1 hour of every military operation, DOD seeks to support all missions of the legitimate president and rebels in forward-staging air evacuation assets with U.S. military trauma resources as support of the former vice president. On to cover all military operations within close to a 1-hour window as possible as December 21, four Servicemembers were 1 hour, or identifying regional PNs survival from trauma is time sensitive. injured during an attempt to evacuate and develop their trauma care to a level Where this is not possible, an alterna- American citizens from the town of Bor acceptable for our use. Each of these op- tive is to leverage trusted or previously in the state of Jonglei, approximately 125 tions has a role in short-term planning validated partner-nation (PN) military miles from the nation’s capital of Juba. to close this gap in trauma care, but the trauma resources. Unfortunately, the Ospreys were damaged in the attempt, most feasible long-term solution is the reality is that we will not always have but fortunately the aircraft were still able third option.

82 Commentary / Trauma Care in Support of Global Military Operations JFQ 86, 3rd Quarter 2017 Lieutenant Commander Justin Dye, right, and Dr. Minh Hoaug Vo operate on patient’s spine during Pacific Partnership 2017 in Da Nang, Vietnam, May 2017 (U.S. Navy/Madailein Abbott)

The harsh reality is that we operate Medical Interoperability Example 1: UK Role 3 Hospital at in many remote areas of the globe con- The U.S. military may more often Camp Bastion. Probably the best ex- sidered to be LMICs (see figure), but partner with North Atlantic Treaty Orga- ample of interoperability within NATO with a dedicated, long-term commitment nization (NATO) nations and others in was the United Kingdom (UK) Role 3 to these LMIC PNs, the care provided support of future combat and noncom- Hospital in Camp Bastion, Afghanistan, could be improved to an acceptable level bat operations. In the context of provid- in support of the British Operation for our Servicemembers to mitigate risk ing trauma care, it is essential to enable Herrick. Beginning in June 2009, the of death and disability from injury. resource interoperability between nations U.S. Navy was asked to contribute per- Again, this will be a large effort to ensure a baseline. Interoperability sonnel to this facility. This transitioned to requiring a long-term commitment, leverages trauma care as a force multiplier the U.S. Army in 2012 prior to closure but we anticipate this as a major gap in for future limited-resource operational of Camp Bastion in September 2014. trauma care that will take a combined environments. This will be a military-to- The UK Role 3 Hospital at the camp effort between DOD, Department of military partnership with other nations was rightfully the shining star of the UK State, and other U.S. agencies to resolve that will require DOD and Military Medical Corps and a model for success in over the next several decades. With the Health System support for success. medical interoperability. assistance of the medical leadership from The U.S. military has already begun Early on, the UK established a the U.S. regional military commands, to build relationships with the medical thorough predeployment training and a joint and unified geographic trauma corps of other nations, and there are validation model. This model fully system plan could be developed for several examples regarding the benefits incorporated U.S. medical personnel each area of responsibility. Strategically of interoperability from recent conflicts deploying with British medical personnel located PN civilian or military trauma from Afghanistan. These examples high- in support of the Role 3 Hospital. As centers could be identified for light that successful collaboration relies with any multinational military endeavor, development. heavily on predeployment preparation. there are always differences in tactics,

JFQ 86, 3rd Quarter 2017 Remick and Elster 83 Tactical critical care evacuation team nurse (forefront) assigned to Army’s 3rd Platoon, C Company, 2-149 General Support Aviation Battalion Medical Evacuation, prepares for patient transfer mission, May 13, 2013, at Forward Operating Base Orgun East, Afghanistan (U.S. Air Force/Marleah Miller) techniques, and procedures (TTP). In operating room, intensive care unit, and surgical teams in this Spanish facility this case, there were distinct differences patient ward; management of multi- serves as another example of the need for in medical TTPs within the hospital casualty and mass casualty scenarios; interoperability. command and control procedures and in patient evacuation procedures; and Example 3: Italian Role 1 in the practice of trauma care between the detained personnel procedures. After a Conjunction with Surgical Team United States and UK. In the vast major- thorough testing period, the UK military Support of Special Operations. In 2008, ity of cases, these differences were not hospital team was validated for Operation a U.S. military surgical team was tasked better or worse—just different. These dif- Herrick. This predeployment medical to support a special operations mission at ferences in roles and responsibilities and field exercise also served as predeploy- an Italian base in Afghanistan. The Italian in clinical medical practice were clarified ment interoperability training between military had an existing Role 1 facility in advance of deployment to ensure trust, the UK and the United States. This suc- with a primary care physician and medics cooperation, and smooth interoperability cessful example is a model that we should to provide initial trauma care. The mis- among international colleagues. replicate for future operations. sion of the U.S. Role 2 surgical team was The UK military medical field exercise Example 2: Spanish Role 2 to augment the Italian team’s capability Hospex served to facilitate interoperabil- Hospital in Herat. Spain and Italy sup- for a short time period while American ity. The exercise was as the culmination ported combat operations in western forces were in the area conducting op- of a successful predeployment training Afghanistan for a decade. Spanish Role erations. The U.S. Role 2 successfully and validation model. Inside a warehouse 2 was the largest trauma facility in supported this brief special operations on a small UK base in the quiet town Regional Command–West. Beginning in mission, but prior combined training of Strensall, near York, England, stood January 2010, the U.S. military placed with the Italians would have yielded a an exact replica of the Bastion Role 3 surgeons at this facility. Although not as stronger unity of effort. Hospital. A fully experienced and trained deliberately planned, this partnership was With the potential for numerous, dis- staff hosted a week-long validation a good example of a NATO partner as- persed operations throughout the world, exercise covering all aspects of Role 3 suming primary responsibility for trauma placement of U.S. military trauma assets command and control procedures, pa- care in a specific region of a combat in all locations simultaneously may not tient care in the emergency department, zone. The presence of American military always be possible. Our goal should be to

84 Commentary / Trauma Care in Support of Global Military Operations JFQ 86, 3rd Quarter 2017 collaborate and develop interoperability Health Diplomacy encourage this strategy to provide an op- with all of our NATO Allies in order to Health diplomacy can represent a timal system for casualty care in support share the responsibility of providing care. variety of activities from formal treaties of a globally responsive and regionally In addition, we should seek out oppor- to multiple stakeholder agreements to relevant joint force. JFQ tunities to collaborate with medical units informal collaborations.6 Thus, health from less-developed partner nations. diplomacy conducted on an informal level by individual DOD organizations Notes Medical Stability Operations must first serve U.S. national interests. 1 Partnering to improve host-nation Regarding strategic efforts for global Ellen J. MacKenzie et al., “A National Evaluation of the Effect of Trauma-Center trauma care in support of its security trauma system development as part of Care on Mortality,” The New England forces is a component of medical stabil- health diplomacy, it is expected that Journal of Medicine, vol. 354 (January 26, ity operations. For success, this effort regional commands would guide these 2006), 366–378; Avery B. Nathens et al., “A involves military-to-military, military-to- efforts to locations of the military and Resource-Based Assessment of Trauma Care in civilian, and civilian-to-civilian partner- national security interests. Concurrently, the United States,” Journal of Trauma: Injury Infection, and Critical Care 56, no. 1 (January ships involving DOD, Military Health DOD investment in global trauma 2004), 173–178; N. Clay Mann et al., “System- System, civilian university and hospital system development, as a component atic Review of Published Evidence Regarding institutions, and Department of State. of GHE, has the potential to provide Trauma System Effectiveness,” Journal of Trau- In support of stability and security a measureable benefit to an overall ma: Injury Infection, and Critical Care 47, no. operations and counterinsurgency opera- strategy. 3 (September 1999 supp.), S25–S33; Gregory J. Jurkovich and Charles Mock, “Systematic tions, DOD often supports infrastructure As the United States moves forward Review of Trauma System Effectiveness Based development in key PNs. As an important in GHE, we must be sure that we can on Registry Comparisons,” Journal of Trauma: component of this greater strategy, our measure the effects of our actions. Health Injury Infection, and Critical Care 47, no. 3 military trauma system leadership should diplomacy must not only serve national (September 1999 supp.), S46–S55. 2 collaborate with PN medical leader- interests but also provide a measure- Brian J. Eastridge et al., “Trauma System Development in a Theater of War: Experiences ship in order to develop their trauma able benefit to the target of GHE. from Operation Iraqi Freedom and Opera- system infrastructure. The purpose of Furthermore, trauma system develop- tion Enduring Freedom,” Journal of Trauma: this collaboration and development is ment is not mutually exclusive of the Injury Infection, and Critical Care 61, no. not specifically for the purpose of caring other important pillars already discussed. 6 (December 2006), 1,366–1,373; Brian J. for injured U.S. Servicemembers but This pillar builds on the previous two Eastridge et al., “Utilizing a Trauma Systems Approach to Benchmark and Improve Combat for improving host-nation trauma care involving the JTS role in trauma system Casualty Care,” Journal of Trauma: Injury In- in support of its security forces. JTS, advisory and development in LMICs of fection, and Critical Care 69, no. 1 (July 2010 as the DOD enterprise responsible for importance to national security interests. supp.), S5–S9. military trauma care, can achieve this 3 Craig Whitlock and Sudarsan Raghavan, through leadership, guidance, and direct Conclusion “Four U.S. Troops Injured During Evacuation Mission in Strife-Torn South Sudan,” Washing- development of the host-nation’s trauma We stand ready for a changing world ton Post, December 21, 2013. infrastructure and capability. This ef- that will require revolutionary change in 4 Kyle N. Remick et al., “Development of a fort has the potential to bolster the host how we wield combat power and how Novel Global Trauma System Evaluation Tool nation’s will to fight and convey a signifi- we measure military success. Military and Initial Results of Implementation in the cant psychological advantage to security success may be measured as much by its Republic of South Sudan,” Injury 45, no. 11 (November 2014), 1,731–1,735. and counterinsurgency forces in direct finesse as a tool for national security as 5 Ramey L. Wilson, “Building Partner support of the overall National Security by its strength. To succeed in this new Capacity and Strengthening Security Through Strategy.5 operational environment, our military Medical Security Force Assistance” (Ph.D. diss., This pillar truly overlaps with national medical support must be adaptive, Naval Postgraduate School, 2013). 6 global health engagement (GHE) efforts. innovative, and exploit the initiative to Rebecca Katz et al., “Defining Health Diplomacy: Changing Demands in the Era of This uniquely leverages JTS for GHE in leverage our recent trauma experience Globalization,” The Milbank Quarterly 89, no. operations other than war. A coherent and expertise to enhance direct support 3 (September 2011), 503–523. plan for trauma system development for to warfighters and augment diplomacy. the host-nation security forces should Regional combatant commanders be integrated into the overall plan when will drive the need for a global strategy conducting operations. The application for trauma care. Their theater security of JTS to GHE for medical stability op- plans will be essential to identify part- erations leverages U.S. military trauma ner nations with the greatest potential expertise to augment the other means of to institute sustainable trauma system U.S. power (that is, diplomatic, informa- development. We recommend that the tional, and economic). Joint Staff and Services support and

JFQ 86, 3rd Quarter 2017 Remick and Elster 85 Phalanx close-in weapons system aboard Ticonderoga-class guided-missile cruiser USS Cowpens fires at missile decoy, September 10, 2012 (U.S. Navy/Paul Kelly)

ooking to the future to identify strategic trends, continuities, and Autonomous L projected policy, as well as plan- ning and force development strengths and deficiencies, the joint force must Weapons Systems contend with the rapid diffusion of advanced technology economically and commercially available to non- Safety superpower militaries and the profusion of nonstate actors. To contend with this problem set, we must reassert our By Brian K. Hall national lead in safely developing mili- tary capabilities to withstand a future security environment that is likely to If we continue to develop our technology without wisdom or be more unpredictable, complex, and potentially dangerous than today. prudence, our servant may prove to be our executioner. One way to deal with such an op- —General Omar Bradley erational challenge is to design and field force options comprising a mix of capabilities that proportionately includes greater integration of autonomous systems. What will influence our ability Colonel Brian K. Hall, USAF (Ret.), is the Autonomy Program Analyst for the Force Application Division, to direct such a strategic shift is policy Joint Staff J8 (Force Structure, Resources, and Assessment).

86 Features / Autonomous Weapons Systems Safety JFQ 86, 3rd Quarter 2017 guidance and oversight for the develop- State of Autonomy is acceptable, autonomous systems will ment and employment of autonomous Autonomy is often misunderstood as benefit from being more tightly coupled systems—particularly weapons systems— providing independent thought and with humans. Often, tightly coupled systems with lethal capability. action. For weapons systems, it most will feed information directly to humans, Available technology and unforeseen often suggests self-awareness and such as automatically cueing a warfighter world events will make it increasingly dif- self-governance. to a threat or analyzing large amounts ficult to apply the law of armed conflict Autonomy is better understood as of electronic emissions and presenting and international law relating to the use a technologically advanced capability exploitation options to human analysts and of force via autonomous weapons systems or capabilities that enables the larger planners. For missions where humans are in a consistent manner that adheres to human-machine system to accomplish less effective or which are too dangerous U.S. policy. a given mission by the performance of and remote control is not feasible, more Many nations, including the United key actions—with or without human loosely coupled systems will operate with less States, will place limits on the use of lethal intervention. input from human operators. These more autonomous weapons systems (LAWS) to In this instance, autonomy is not closely fit the traditional conception of au- avoid the risk of collateral damage and to exclusively about the intelligence of the tonomous systems—those that operate while comply with international humanitarian machine but rather its human interface. out of touch with humans, such as a strike law. However, potential adversaries might The degree of autonomy in a single platform in a communications-degraded not be bound by these constraints. The human-machine or machine-machine or denied environment. joint force may confront adversaries who system may vary over time as it goes in are willing to deploy fully autonomous and out of contact with operators. The Some of the greatest advantages of weapons systems to deliver lethal force dynamic relationship between technical autonomy will come from augmenting and more completely automate their needs and capability benefits demon- human decisionmaking, not replacing it. kill chains to achieve an advantage. The strates that the level of autonomy of In this way, the role of humans will ag- potential exists that in such a situation the a system is not a goal in and of itself. gregate at the higher cognitive processes United States and like-minded nations Rather, autonomy is a capability driver such as operational planning and analysis. will be more willing to enter conflict or that DOD can design into military As such, human-machine interaction use lethal force given the lower potential systems in conjunction with human is a key technology area supporting of loss of their own combatants through roles to produce a more effective and autonomy. the use of either autonomous or semi- affordable force. Autonomous systems Increased automation or autonomy autonomous weapons systems. will reliably perform highly survivable, can have many advantages, including Ultimately, commanders and op- self-organizing, adaptive mission capabili- increased safety and reliability, improved erators will exercise appropriate human ties that cannot be easily defeated either reaction time and performance, reduced judgment over the suitable use of this by killing individual platforms and sensors personnel burden with associated cost force. or providing capabilities to do things savings, and the ability to continue opera- This article furthers the technical that would be otherwise unaffordable or tions in communications-degraded or issue discussions supporting the emerg- result in impractical manning. -denied environments. ing U.S. position to the United Nations The 2015 Office of Technical This article recommends a sound U.S. Convention on Certain Conventional Intelligence report, Technical Assessment: weapons review practice that will, with Weapons on LAWS. It also addresses Autonomy, illustrates control diversifica- minor modification following autono- the current U.S. military joint weapons tion between man and machine from an mous technology sector growth, enable review practices that lead to weapons engineering coupling approach: balanced autonomous system capabilities safety assurance and endorsement for any to be advantageously included in future weapons system—manned, autonomous, Viewing the capabilities of autonomous operations. This discussion does not at- or semi-autonomous. The article em- systems within the context of human- tempt to directly address future policy or phasizes safety and trust by determining machine systems recognizes a critical role legal changes that may be required to en- operational necessity, averting risk, and for humans coupling the advantages of sure inclusion of an advanced unmanned applying engineering design reliability. both allowing for operational application capability into force development, pos- This practice is consistent with current previously non-existent. In order to better ture, and employment. Doing so would U.S. defense policy cited in Department capitalize upon the relative strengths of hu- be premature; how the confluence of of Defense (DOD) Directive 3000.09, mans and machines, autonomous systems autonomous weapons system policy with “Autonomy in Weapons Systems.” will operate on a spectrum from tightly legal and technical factors will impact Readers should better understand the coupled to loosely coupled. Where human the conduct of future warfare is not yet precautions taken to prevent unintended performance provides benefits relative to known. What could be done is help machine action and function of a lethal machine perception, cognition, or action shape what it could be. The international nature. and where safety and risk to warfighters community is watching how the United

JFQ 86, 3rd Quarter 2017 Hall 87 Researchers with U.S. Army Natick Soldier Research, Development, and Engineering Center are testing Prox Dynamics PD-100 Black Hornet Personal Reconnaissance System to provide squad-size units with organic aerial ISR capability in challenging ground environments (Courtesy UK Ministry of Defence)

States contends with these emergent upon rational human judgment when technologies during the Cold War–era to technologies and integrates them into delegating mission capability to autono- define the emerging nuclear-space age. force design, development, and employ- mous systems. For example, in a determined move to ment. Doing so has far-reaching global diversify its defense business base in the strategic security implications. Diversification and 1950s, General Motors scaled tank and Advances in science and technol- Operational Risk gun production favoring new markets ogy—such as artificial and collective DOD has diversified and invested in in military electronics.3 Others followed intelligence, miniaturized sensors, multi- considerable numbers of unmanned a similar strategy to include Lockheed, vehicle control systems, and particularly vehicles over the last several decades. Northrop, Martin, and Douglas Aviation. human-machine interaction—are laying Today, the inventory stands at well over This diversification spread through the the foundation for giving autonomous 20,000 unmanned vehicles spanning all defense sector, spawning advances in the weapons the ability to perform at levels domains, at a fiscal year 2017 budgeted missile and electronics fields that became currently difficult to predict. Weapons funding level of $4.5 billion.1 Projec- the technological keystone of the DOD review, appropriately applied, ensures tions estimate that by 2018, annual First Offset Strategy. The United States safety of such capability across the range global spending on military robotics will and its mission partners find themselves of operations, both civil and military. exceed $7.5 billion.2 These vehicles are in a similar revolution in military technol- Autonomous systems will become part integrated elements of varying degree of ogy brought on by innumerable robotic of the social landscape, and as autonomy larger robotic and autonomous systems and autonomous technologies that are and computational intelligence grow, used for a variety of missions, includ- shaping the character of future warfare. these systems will continually raise dif- ing persistent surveillance, firefighting, Innovative concepts of operations and ficult questions about the role of safety time-critical strike, force protection, wargaming are just now revealing the and effective integration with humans. counter–improvised explosive devices, previously unrealized human-machine As weapons systems, particularly those route clearance, and close air support. teaming potential of these robotic and with greater autonomous capability, are Conceivable tasks for future autono- autonomous systems. studied and understood, society will face mous systems of all domains span the The technologies that enable autono- challenging policy and regulatory issues full range of military operations. mous systems are evolving rapidly. As surrounding how much autonomy these The diversification is not unprec- computer processing power and sensors systems should be granted based upon edented, and such endeavors should be improve, autonomous systems will be acceptable levels of risk. Ultimately, the undertaken with cautious optimism. capable of increasingly complex deci- path of these technologies is dependent The United States explored various sions and actions. The ability to operate

88 Features / Autonomous Weapons Systems Safety JFQ 86, 3rd Quarter 2017 in fast-paced, contested, nonpermissive, successful cyber attack could conceivably leading to systems with the potential for force-on-force engagements, particularly allow an enemy to disable mission-critical unintended engagements, or both. under conditions of degraded communi- operation or, in a worst-case scenario, cations, will drive the need for increased usurp control of an autonomous weapon. Operational Trust autonomy. The United States already has Today, autonomous systems, to varying A prominent issue—potentially the autonomous force protection systems degree, are vulnerable to spoofing, hack- greatest at home and abroad—with that defend bases and ships against air ing, and intrusive deception measures military employment of fully autono- and missile attack (for example, Counter in ways that humans are not because mous capabilities is one of trust that Rocket, Artillery, and Mortar; and artificial mechanical systems lack self- an autonomous weapons system will Phalanx). Which decisions are appropri- awareness, common sense, and a general do what it is supposed to do when it is ate for delegation to autonomous systems frame of reference against which to mea- supposed to do it. If it does not, then and which must be retained under human sure faulty data. Safeguards and fail-safes forces in the field relying on shared task control will be important considerations are needed to minimize the probability performance to assure mission success for defense policymakers. The fact that and impact of compromise or failures that will not use the system due to lack of the U.S. military has had defensive could lead to unintended consequences trust, with safety compromised. There systems that autonomously use lethal resulting in damage to persons or things is more likely to be trust in robotic and force for decades complicates the issue that were not deliberately targeted. autonomous systems supporting these on the use of force. The track record of DOD currently depends on policy sorts of missions if they are most of the these systems suggests that safeguards are guidance in autonomy, human control, time at least partially controlled by a required in order to minimize the prob- and the use of force that informs military human or have demonstrated assured, ability of civilian casualties, premature tactics, techniques, and procedures; fully autonomous mission capability application of force, fratricide, or unin- doctrine; minimizing collateral damage; during force development and training. tentional escalation. rules of engagement; or future system Part of the trust issue is that autono- Autonomous systems are vulnerable design to ensure that adequate safeguards mous weapons systems may suffer from to an array of potential failures, including are in place. Next-generation unmanned cyber vulnerabilities where information situations common to any software- vehicles (for example, carrier-based aerial systems, system security procedures, or dependent system, as well as additional refueling systems) and autonomous internal controls are exploited. At issue failures due to their scalable complexity. munitions (such as long-range antiship is whether an autonomous weapons As the complexity of a system increases, missiles) currently in development have system is either not functioning as it so does inherent operational risk. the potential for autonomous charac- is supposed to because its algorithms Verification (the ability to meet system re- teristics, function, and even behavior. have been compromised by cyber at- quirements) and validation (the ability to Current guidance is derived from many tack or system programming has been operate as intended) of software to ensure sources, as autonomy has both national taken over to the point where it is acting trustworthy, reliable operation become defense and civil implications. Direction against its own forces. imperative. Currently, it is increasingly comes predominantly from DOD A related and far-reaching issue is the difficult for operators to predict with a Directive 3000.09 and the department’s concern of autonomous systems properly high degree of probability how a system unmanned system roadmaps and stra- following the orders of manned systems. might actually perform against an adap- tegic plans. Other organizations within There are multiple ways for issues to arise, tive adversary, potentially eroding trust DOD and across mission partners are including preplanned program malfunc- in the system while asserting operational addressing challenges with respect to au- tion and adversary jamming of sub-system risk. To avert risk and instill trust, it tonomous sense and avoid technologies, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnais- becomes increasingly important to invest loss of communications procedures, static sance sensors and associated command, in autonomous weapons system model- and onboard defense of manned instal- control, and communications links. The ing, simulation, and experimentation to lations and platforms, and other issues. issue becomes whether there will be explore the fast-paced, complex, unstruc- DOD and the Department of State have enough sensor precision and assured data tured environments that autonomous a unified effort to assess current policy exchange in contested and unstructured systems may face in future scenarios. guidance on autonomous force applica- environments to allow autonomous Also requisite to achieving assured au- tion—current policy remains relevant and systems to sense what they need to either tonomy are rigorous test and evaluation authoritative. But without determined take action on their own or report the to develop a deep learning database of guidance review to accommodate game- information to their human operators. successful actions and problem-solving changing technologies forecast to reach These are important points to consider computation and recall. advanced readiness levels over the next now as we shape strategy, force design, It is widely recognized that systems 5 years, the Nation risks obsolescence and operational planning for the future. relying on software are vulnerable to that could cede advantage to potential Autonomy is not the sole solution cyber attack from many vectors. A adversaries, permit inadequate safeguards to any requirement. The utility of any

JFQ 86, 3rd Quarter 2017 Hall 89 Figure. Capability Reuirement and Acuisition Integrated In particular, compulsory assessments Periodic Weapon System Safety Review and reviews are captured in Capability Development Document (CDD) as

Identify Need, part of overall weapons safety assurance Concept Development, Detailed Design Test and valuation Production and Operations Reuire Analysis required for continued acquisition deci- 9 A C sion and entry into EMD phase. For example, the CDD addresses system safety Technology Material Technology ngineering and Production and Operations Opportunities Solution Maturation Manufacturing Deployment and Support in accordance with current DOD guid- and Resources Analysis and Risk Development 10 Reduction ance, confirming the establishment of a ser Needs system safety program for the life cycle of ICD CDD CPD the weapons system in accordance with Pre-Systems Acquisition Systems Acquisition Sustainment the Defense Acquisition System.11 This program conforms and complies with Scoping Activity Sponsor Activity JCIDS Dpcument Acquisition Decision Weapons Review treaties, international agreements, Federal regulations, and laws. Additionally, DOD instruction provides further risk acceptance autonomous capability is a function of pursuit of such capability presents an criteria.12 This cascades into operational the mission design requirements, opera- unacceptable level of risk and hazard as planning and employment decisions to in- tional environment of employment, and compared to qualified benefit. At this clude autonomous weapons system aspects operational context describing how the point, the weapons system concept of in rules of engagement development and capability will be used.4 The prevalence of employment is assessed against policy ultimately the commander’s assignment of autonomy in game-changing technologies and both national and international law. tactical mission tasks. presents opportunities to expand mis- Initial weapons systems safety as- Furthermore, acquisition and pro- sion capability. The emergence of these surance should be complete before the curement of DOD weapons systems technologies challenges both capability acquisition, engineering, and manufac- shall be consistent and compliant with all and material developers and users by turing development (EMD) phase. But applicable arms control agreements, cus- introducing distinct differences in action it begins as early as entry-level material tomary domestic and international law, and function between automated (robot- solution analysis (see figure) of the acqui- and the law of armed conflict.13 DOD- like) and autonomous (cognitive-capable) sition process—the nexus of JCIDS and authorized counsel shall conduct the systems.5 More than likely, development the Defense Acquisition System. legal review of the intended acquisition of of new autonomous systems will be de- In compliance with Joint weapons or weapons systems.14 liberate and incremental; so too will be Requirements Oversight Council Autonomous weapons system re- development of norms about acceptable Memorandum 102-05, “Safe Weapons views, particularly of a lethal nature, system design, acquisition, and use. in Joint Warfighting Environments,” all are consistent with established United munitions or associated systems capable Nations Convention on Certain Current Practice— of being used by any U.S. military Service Conventional Weapons associated arms Safety Assurance in joint operations are considered joint control protocols. It is premature to The approach and procedures effectively weapons and require a joint weapons classify LAWS as inhuman or otherwise institutionalized in the DOD Joint safety review in accordance with JCIDS as the large-scale operational implica- Capabilities Integration and Develop- and under Joint Service Weapon and tions of employing such technology are ment System (JCIDS) provide initial Laser System Safety Review processes.7 just now being studied and analyzed system safety oversight and guidance Mission capability system attributes and across many defense sectors. to minimize the probability and conse- performance parameters must be ad- quences of catastrophic failure or critical dressed as the basis for the Weapon Safety Rethinking Joint Function mishap that could lead to unintended Endorsement.8 This includes identifica- and Performance autonomous weapons system engage- tion of everything necessary to provide Conventional ways to classify capabili- ment.6 Before any new capability can for safe weapon storage, handling, ties and their associated characteristics enter the development process related transportation, or use by joint forces to accommodate the unique key system to reviewing and validating its require- throughout the weapon life cycle, to attributes of autonomy may be inad- ment, the originating sponsor organiza- include performance and descriptive qual- equate and require adjustment. The tion must first identify autonomous or itative and quantitative attributes. This purpose and method behind doing semi-autonomous weapons system capa- is important, as baseline performance so come from the realization that bility requirements related to its func- measurement and system safety attributes traditional means of command as a tions, roles, mission integration, and will be integral to systems engineering— solely human endeavor, mechanisms operations. Then, it must determine if particularly test and evaluation. for control, communications in denied

90 Features / Autonomous Weapons Systems Safety JFQ 86, 3rd Quarter 2017 MQ-8B Fire Scout unmanned aircraft system from “Magicians” of Helicopter Maritime Strike Squadron 35 prepares for flight operations aboard littoral combat ship USS Fort Worth (U.S. Navy/Antonio P. Turretto Ramos) environments, and data computa- should maintain flexibility and take into testable, and verifiable in a practical and tion and dissemination will be insuf- consideration reliability, safety, and trust. timely manner to support follow-on ficient to satisfy future truly symbiotic Notional examples of KSAs include decisionmaking. For this discussion, the human-machine system integration persistence, protection, survivability, threshold value for an attribute is the requirements. interoperability, endurance, security, sus- maximum acceptable value considered Advances in machine cognition tech- tainability, and cognition. achievable within the available technol- nology as well as greater understanding While KSAs are more qualitative by ogy at low to medium risk. Performance of human intelligence require rethinking design, Key Performance Parameters below the threshold value is not opera- current joint functions, particularly com- (KPPs) are quantifiable (see the table tionally effective or suitable and may not mand and control (C2). This comes with for notional examples of autonomous provide an improvement over current the acceptance that machine cognition weapons system KSAs and associated capabilities. will remain rudimentary in the foresee- performance measurement). KPPs are The following KPPs should be able future with respect to traditional considered critical to the development considered mandatory in assuring warfighter-identified C2 attributes such of an effective autonomous or semi- autonomous weapons system safety. as understanding, timeliness, relevance, autonomous capability. The number and Organizations assessing joint weapons robustness, and simplicity. The level of au- character of performance parameters system safety conformance will provide tonomy should enable the flexibility and should allow for program flexibility and, the lead joint multidisciplinary functional assuredness of the commander to exert in the case of autonomous capabilities, as- capabilities boards with an endorsement control. Autonomous control system sure human safety. Failure of a system to of the KPP in order to receive the weap- interoperability is still nascent, particularly meet a validated KPP safety threshold will ons system safety endorsement. in the area of standardized data interfaces impact overall development viability by The force protection KPP is applicable and information exchange models. either rescinding the validation or bring- to all manned semi-autonomous or au- The fundamental method to un- ing the military utility of the associated tonomous systems designed to enhance derstand and distinguish between joint system into question. This may result in a personnel survivability. Force protection functions is the way capability Key System reevaluation of the program or the associ- attributes are those that contribute to the Attributes (KSAs), or characteristics ated system, leading to modification of protection of personnel by preventing or of a system—manned, robotic, or au- production increments.15 mitigating hostile actions against friendly tonomous—are considered essential to Safety performance metrics are personnel, military and civilian. This achieving a balanced capability require- codified in KPPs derived from KSAs. KPP emphasis is on protecting system ment solution. The number of KSAs, Both are cited in the acquisition pro- occupants or other personnel rather than as identified by a capability sponsor, gram baseline. They are measurable, protecting the system itself.

JFQ 86, 3rd Quarter 2017 Hall 91 Table. Notional Performance Measurement System Attribute: Persistence Key Performance Parameter Threshold Objective Sensor Tracking Mission: Tracking and locating (finding, fixing, finishing) subject of interest (SOI) Measure: Timely actionable dissemination 2 minutes Near real time of acquisition data for SOI Conditions: Decision quality data to the Area denial of SOI activities SOI tracked, disabled tracking entity System Attribute: Interoperability Key Performance Parameter Threshold Objective Data Dissemination and Relay Information Element: Target data Between Dissimilar Systems Measure: Dissemination of SOI biographic 10 seconds 5 seconds and physical data Measure: Receipt of SOI data Line of sight (LOS) Beyond LOS Measure: Latency of data 5 seconds 2 seconds Conditions: Tactical/geographical Permissive environment Nonpermissive environment

The system survivability KPP is ap- Conclusion operations have been developmentally plicable to manned systems and may be The preceding discussion illuminates more challenging since they operate in applicable to robotic and autonomous the depth of autonomous weapons a far less structured environment. As a systems. The intent of the KPP includes system safety mechanisms currently in result, more research, development, test, reducing a system’s likelihood of being place while giving consideration to the and evaluation are needed to assess the engaged by kinetic or nonkinetic fires. future. The current review processes, impact of advanced human-machine team- Survivability attributes include speed, already laudable for inherent safety ing design and operation.18 This may have maneuverability, situational awareness, checks and balances, will continue to broad implications for planning, doctrine, and countermeasures; reducing the serve as models as both manned and and policy, particularly in autonomous system’s hardening and redundancy of autonomous systems evolve. The stra- weapons system legal and safety reviews critical components; and allowing the tegic and programmatic implications of supporting current and future policy for system to survive an operation in a pre- these game-changing technologies are the appropriate role of autonomy and dictable, safe manner.16 the emerging cornerstones of the DOD human control in the use of force. The net-ready KPP is applicable to all Third Offset Strategy, particularly the The ultimate purpose is to ensure information systems used in the control, shift from manned to human-machine military utility, avert risk, preserve life, exchange, and display of DOD data or symbiosis. Other noteworthy technol- and instill safety assurance that employ- information. The intent of the KPP is to ogy informed strategy and operational ment of such capability will remain clearly ensure a new system’s information design planning factors are the transitions from in the hands of human control using fits into the existing military architectures remote to onboard cognitive control the judgment of military commanders, and infrastructure to the maximum ex- capabilities and from program-enabled consistent with defense and national tent practicable. It is applicable to many to cognitive-enabled systems. policy and relevant international conven- potential autonomous weapons system Implications to military Service invest- tion. Even though automation will be a KSAs, particularly interoperability, modu- ment portfolios are significant in light of general feature across operating environ- larity, and assured autonomy. institutionalizing human-machine team- ments and weapons systems, genuine The team to secure autonomous ing and the complexity of autonomous autonomy in weapons will remain rare for weapons system safety comprises capabil- system development. In recent years, un- the foreseeable future and be driven by ity and materiel developers, testers, and manned aircraft systems were considered special factors such as mission capability operators throughout the full system life more complex and thus more expensive requirements and the tempo of particular cycle to assure technical performance and platforms than unmanned ground ve- kinds of operations. operational value. Autonomous weapons hicles.17 Today, and for the near future, Current lethal autonomous weapons system safety requirements not only in the opposite might be true. For example, systems present few new legal or policy is- the EMD phase but also throughout the U.S. Army unmanned ground systems sues. Many of the most frequently voiced life cycle for any system enable the identi- projected to operate with a high degree criticisms of these systems are actually fication and management of hazards and of autonomy are seen to be more com- criticisms of the policy decisions and legal associated risks during system develop- plex than their unmanned aircraft system questions relating to projected use. The ment, testing, and sustaining engineering counterparts. Furthermore, advanced future strategic advantage of autono- activities. unmanned ground vehicles for combat mous weapons systems is still conjecture.

92 Features / Autonomous Weapons Systems Safety JFQ 86, 3rd Quarter 2017 iRobot 510 PackBot searches for explosive devices under vehicle in Djibouti (U.S. Air Force/Maria Bowman)

Although technological progress can re- 6 These safeguards are explained in detail 10 DOD Instruction 5000.69, “DOD duce costs, increase efficiency, and create in JCIDS, Manual for the Operation of the Joint Services Weapon and Laser System Safety Joint Capabilities Integration and Development Review Processes,” November 9, 2011, 8, new capabilities, we should not become Systems, February 14, 2015, D-58. available at . or overconfident in the ability of new cil is the statutory council to the Chairman of 11 DOD Directive 5000.01, “The Defense technologies to solve complex problems. the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) in his respon- Acquisition System,” November 20, 2007, Most important, we must ensure that sibility to advise the Secretary of Defense on available at ; and Military Standard future requirements-informed policy and the combatant commanders, and the extent to (MIL-STD) 882E, “Department of Defense strategy drive technological development which the program recommendations and bud- Standard Practice: System Safety,” May 11, and that alluring new technologies do not get proposals of the military Services, combat- 2012, 9, available at . conform to the priorities established in strategic 12 MIL-STD 882E. plans and with the combatant command priori- 13 DOD Directive 2060.1, “Implementa- ties. CJCS Instruction 5123.01G, “Charter of tion of, and Compliance with, Arms Control Notes the Joint Requirements Oversight Council,” Agreements,” January 9, 2001, 2, available February 12, 2015, 5. at . Year 2017 President’s Budget Proposal,” press 9 The Capability Development Document 14 DOD Directive 5000.01, 7. release, February 9, 2016. (CDD) proposes the development of a specific 15 JCIDS, Manual for the Operation of the 2 Michael C. Horowitz, “The Loom- materiel capability solution intended to wholly Joint Capabilities Integration and Development ing Robotics Gap,” ForeignPolicy.com, May or partially satisfy validated capability require- Systems, D-A-5–11. 5, 2014, available at . Performance Parameters, Key System Attributes, Army Systems with Foreign Counterparts (Santa 3 Philip Shiman, Forging the Sword: Defense and additional performance attributes to guide Monica, CA: RAND, 2015), 102, available Production during the Cold War (Champaign, the development of one or more increments of at . 53–54, 64–66. a CDD must provide a safe, operationally effec- 18 Ibid. 4 Defense Science Board, 21. tive, suitable, and useful capability solution in 5 Joint Concept for Robotic and Autonomous the intended environment. See JCIDS, Manual Systems (Washington, DC: The Joint Staff, for the Operation of the Joint Capabilities Integra- October 19, 2016), 2. tion and Development Systems.

JFQ 86, 3rd Quarter 2017 Hall 93 F/A-18E Super Hornet assigned to Gunslingers of Strike Fighter Squadron 105 prepares to make arrested landing on flight deck of aircraft carrier USS Dwight D. Eisenhower, April 9, 2017 (U.S. Navy/Anderson W. Branch)

Mission command begins with a bias to decentralized decisionmaking, and The Trouble with then fails to equip officers with tools for understanding how to determine where control should reside. Mission Mission Command command is presented as a premise of effective command—“Given that I am decentralizing control as Flexive Command and the much as possible (that is, exercising mission command), how should I Future of Command and command?”—when it is in fact just one of many possible answers to the question of control, and not always Control the right one. This conceptual failure exposes the military to significant By Andrew Hill and Heath Niemi risk as the context of war undergoes one of history’s great revolutions with the entry of lethal, fully autonomous he U.S. military is having the systems. We need a command philoso- wrong conversation about phy that acknowledges the historical T command. The current empha- constraints of warfare but also leaves sis on “mission command” as an end room to exploit the emerging capabili- in itself misses a crucial point about ties of modern technology. The right Andrew Hill is a Professor in the Department of the nature of command—namely, question to ask is: “Given the tactical, Command, Leadership, and Management at the U.S. Army War College. Colonel Heath Niemi, that situational understanding is the operational, and strategic context, how USA, is a graduate of the U.S. Army War College. rarest of all command characteristics. should I command?”

94 Features / The Trouble with Mission Command JFQ 86, 3rd Quarter 2017 In this essay, we present flexive com- mission orders.”1 In this context, it is a command philosophy, encompassing the mand as a more appropriate way to think subordinate element of broader discus- art and science of C2, whereas the other about command and control. Flexive sions of command and control (C2), Services abide by the joint definition.5 command prompts us to identify where and an appropriate way of command The mixture of the two views of mission the greatest situational understanding in a communications-denied environ- command creates confusion about what it resides at a given decision point and ment, where subordinate units are cut really means. Worse still, however, is that encourages us to devise ways to con- off from higher oversight. In this sense, the interpretation of MC-as-philosophy- nect that understanding to the decision then-Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of of-command forecloses a needed itself. Under flexive command, mission Staff General Martin Dempsey’s 2012 discussion of enduring principles of C2 to command (as delegation of increased “Mission Command White Paper” was the potential detriment of the force. decision authority) becomes one of many a directive to train the force in mission Mission command is a legacy type command approaches to a problem, command so that when subordinate com- of command derived from the Prussian and therefore is an element (a “way”) of manders find themselves isolated from Auftragstaktik, when communications command. superiors, they are prepared to adapt and were limited by the technology of the time Command is a military principle that act without direct guidance in achieving and explicit orders throughout a battle exists to use military forces effectively mission success.2 were unrealistic.6 In the current and future in achieving tactical, operational, or In joint doctrine, the term mission multispectrum warfare, the Services must strategic objectives. The ends of com- command (MC) clearly refers to a way be prepared to fight in a denied environ- mand are simple: military operations that of command—the “conduct of military ment, but to always command through support the political objectives of war, at operations through decentralized execu- delegation is impractical. This view of MC the lowest cost to future organizational tion based upon mission-type orders”; is faulty both as historical analysis (induc- effectiveness. these orders convey “commander’s tion) and as deductive logic. Of the means of command, there are intent” and focus on “the purpose of the The inductive argument for MC four resources necessary to effectiveness: operation rather than on the details of asserts that military organizations with authority, communication, situational how to perform assigned tasks.”3 Thus, decentralized decisionmaking outperform awareness, and situational understanding. MC is one of many ways of command. those with centralized control. Army Authority is the power to compel subor- It requires a clear communication of Doctrine Reference Publication 6-0, dinate elements to act. Communication overall purpose and delegates as much Mission Command, states that “the nature is the ability to convey information to subsequent decisionmaking as possible of operations and the patterns of military and receive information from subordinate to subordinates. This view is reflected in history point to the advantages of mis- elements. Situational awareness (SA) is a the early doctrinal work of the Marine sion command.”7 This is a misleading knowledge of the current facts of a situ- Corps, the U.S. military organization simplification. Although technological ation. It answers the question, “What is that pioneered formal thinking about change has rewarded decentralized con- happening?” Situational understanding mission command. While reflecting a bias trol in recent military history, a longer (SU) is a higher level of insight that to decentralization of control, the 1996 view shows that the relationship between describes the ability to link the current Marine Corps publication Command and technology and the optimal control facts to the past, present, and future of Control acknowledges that commanders level is more complicated. The historical the operational environment. It answers must choose the appropriate level of con- performance of different approaches to the questions, “Why is it happening, and trol based on circumstances: levels of control has rested not only on what should we do about it?” their tendencies to centralize or delegate The ways of command, too numer- No commander will rely entirely on either authority, but also on the technological ous to list here, refer to the various uses purely detailed or purely mission methods. and operational context, and (crucially) and combinations of the means of com- Exactly what type of command and con- on the decisions of adversaries. The two mand. How specific are orders? How trol we use in a particular situation will greatest empires of the classical world frequent is communication? How does depend on a variety of factors, such as the were built on innovations in military the commander delegate authority, risk, nature of the action or task, the nature and organization that pulled significant con- and responsibility? How are SA and SU capabilities of the enemy, and, perhaps most trol up in the organizational hierarchy. shared? The list goes on. of all, the qualities of our people.4 Neither the Macedonian phalanx nor the There is confusion surrounding Roman maniple could function effectively the term mission command due to two However, recent explanations of mis- if independent decisions were made distinct ways that it is used. In Joint sion command have advanced a second, within these units because formational Publication 3-0, Joint Operations, mis- more problematic use of the concept, integrity was essential to their perfor- sion command means a way to command portraying it as the preeminent way of mance. They did not and could not work by delegating authority and empower- command. This is an error. The Army, with sub-commands within those ranks. ing subordinates to “carry out last for example, describes it as an entire Similarly, the powerful innovations in

JFQ 86, 3rd Quarter 2017 Hill and Niemi 95 The Distributed Common Ground System–Army provides timely, relevant, and accurate targetable data to warfighters and will be fully interoperable with Army’s Unified Mission Command System, providing access to information and intelligence to support battlefield visualization and ISR management (U.S. Army) training and organization of Maurice of Paper states, “the key to victory . . . [is] •• Mission command is therefore Orange and Gustavus Adolphus created the ability to create situations wherein necessary to focus and delegate com- greater uniformity of action to exploit one can make appropriate decisions more mander thinking and guidance. massed musket fire and brought tacti- quickly than one’s opponent.”9 Third, Therefore, controlling for the speed cal formations under higher levels of war is complex and its conditions and of decisions, the SA reduction through operational control during battle, often circumstances are “wrapped in a fog of each level of a hierarchy diminishes the with decisive success. The best we can greater or lesser certainty,”10 and “no C2 quality of adaptations decided by higher say about the tension between central technology has ever successfully over- echelons (since their information is more and dispersed control is that history has come the fog of war.”11 From these three incomplete than that of lower echelons). shown that both can work, and that their premises, advocates of MC derive the fol- Controlling for the quality of decisions, effectiveness depends on the technologi- lowing conclusions: the SA reduction reduces the timeliness cal and operational context. Technology Complexity and competition make of adaptations decided by higher ech- may reward greater decentralization. But •• all war plans provisional, and effec- elons, since higher levels must expend it also may reward greater control and tive adaptation is therefore required. precious time replicating the situational organization. The decision-speed requirements awareness held by lower levels. What about the deductive argument •• of modern warfare make both the The deductive argument for MC, for MC? It rests on three major premises. quality and the speed of decisions like the historical (inductive) argument, First, war involves competitive actors crucial to successful adaptation. contains some truth but makes unjustifi- whose behavior is adaptive and therefore SA is inevitably (and often drasti- able conclusions based on that truth. unpredictable.8 Second, decision speed •• cally) reduced from the tactical to The logic that war is competitive and in warfare is itself an axis of competition. the strategic level, and prevents suf- therefore requires adaptation is valid and Drawing on the work of Colonel John ficient local understanding at higher sound. The other three conclusions are Boyd, the Mission Command White levels. more problematic.

96 Features / The Trouble with Mission Command JFQ 86, 3rd Quarter 2017 The argument that decision speed is For a tactical decisionmaker to intervene significant limits to shared understanding, a crucial basis of competition is incom- effectively at that level and prompt an we should either increase central control plete and simplistic, fetishizing rapid effective adjustment, he would need to to achieve coordinated action, or decrease decisionmaking and grossly undervalu- process information more rapidly than central control to achieve greater diversity ing situational understanding. General the system and deliver the information of action. Our preference will depend on George Patton said, “A good plan, to the system without disrupting its the conditions of the conflict. violently executed now, is better than a coordination. This is highly unlikely. Just Let us now turn to the equally prob- perfect plan next week.” We may focus so as early innovations in musketry favored lematic “fog of war” argument for mission much on the “violently executed now” massed effects with limited opportunities command. This view sets aside at a stroke part of that maxim that we overlook for lower level improvisation, systemic centuries of technological innovation that the “good plan” requirement. General automation of tactical units will drive have changed the informational context of George Custer exercised mission com- meaningful control up in echelons. war and can be used to foreclose necessary mand at the Greasy Grass. Speedy MC supporters go so far as to say that exploration of the amazing potential of decisionmaking is good only when it is mission command “enables decentralized new technologies that will transform the accompanied by good choices. An even and distributed formations to perform as way that war is fought. greater problem with the emphasis on if they were centrally coordinated.” This The fog of war is real. It affects situ- decision speed is that it ignores the ability is an odd argument that draws on the ational awareness at all levels. Historically, of actors in war to affect the tempo of concept of “emergence,” or spontaneous the limited means of gathering and operations, getting inside the loop (to organization. Given a simple set of rules, transmitting information meant that the use Boyd’s term) of an adversary not by large groups of otherwise stupid actors farther someone was from the context increasing the speed of their own choices, (think of a hive of bees or a flock of birds) of battle, the less complete and accurate but by slowing the speed at which can achieve highly coordinated and ro- the information and the greater the delay adversaries are making decisions, or by bust organizational behavior. Bees swarm in communication. SA was valuable, and making those choices irrelevant to the against a threat to the hive. Starlings fly (usually) only local commanders pos- outcome. In recent years, for example, in massive, undulating formations that sessed enough of it to derive sufficient special operations teams have learned the protect individuals from predators. But SU to make good choices. What happens value of seizing control of tempo during the keys to such coordination are the when technology changes that equation? raids in which targets can be isolated. simplicity of the decision rules and the History is not destiny. Quintus Fabius Maximus (nicknamed common capability in following those Recall the “Mission Command White “Cunctator,” or “Lingerer”) saved rules. The rules for decisionmaking in Paper” assertion that “No C2 technology Rome from Hannibal’s invasion because warfare are not simple, and the capabil- has ever successfully overcome the fog he protracted the campaign, avoiding ity of human beings to decide how to of war.” Missing from this statement is decisive engagements with Hannibal’s behave according to those rules var- the word “yet.” That word makes a big army. America’s adversaries in Vietnam ies. Emergence is more likely to occur difference because it alerts us to the pos- and Afghanistan pursued similar “Fabian” when decision rules are simple, factual sibility that what we have not observed strategies. Not everything has to be done interpretation is constrained, and the may still be out there to discover—the quickly to be done well. options are limited. Examples include “black swan” of command and control. What about modern, high-intensity stock market bubbles and crashes and The path of technological innovation conflict, on a battlefield teeming with battlefield panics. This is clear evidence has been one of constant progress in autonomous systems, where high tacti- of shared understanding, a crucial term in increasing the fidelity and completeness cal and operational speed is essential? mission command. When a war produces of information, and in transmitting that Curiously, even here the delegation of these conditions, mission command sup- information faster. authority to lower levels may slow down ports emergent coordination in human Situational awareness is becoming in- operations and degrade decision quality, systems. However, amid significant creasingly commoditized—that is, widely depending on the technological context. ambiguity and situational complexity, we available and therefore less decisive in its At what echelons will we likely see the should expect that shared understanding effects. We speak of the sensing environ- first fully automated systems? Various will be much more difficult to achieve. ment in warfare as if it were affected by factors point to the tactical levels. Given Higher levels of decentralization will metaphysical forces. We even have a word the expected ability of advanced artificial therefore undermine systemic coordina- for it: Fingerspitzengefühl. In reality, intelligence to distribute itself across tion, leading to divergence in behaviors however, humans have just five senses, multiple, dispersed robots, the most ef- and greater diversity of action. Sometimes and technology is becoming increasingly fective tactical autonomous platforms are that is very useful, such as when existing adept not only at projecting those senses likely to be those used in systems. These approaches are unsuited to the objectives with great accuracy and over immense systems would act and decide at machine of war and the system needs to learn distances, but also at augmenting those speed, in a highly coordinated manner. and change. In summary, when facing senses with additional dimensions of

JFQ 86, 3rd Quarter 2017 Hill and Niemi 97 Two E-2C Hawkeyes from “Black Eagles” of Carrier Airborne Early Warning Squadron 113 fly by aircraft carrier USS Carl Vinson during change-of-command ceremony, Pacific Ocean, February 9, 2017 (U.S. Navy/Zackary Alan Landers) understanding. A Roman commander technology has consistently extended and commanders such as Hannibal, Julius at a battle could see, hear, smell, and projected presence, awareness, and strike, Caesar, Napoleon, Wellington, and feel the conflict. A modern commander and we should expect that it will con- Rommel? It is because such genius is rare. far removed from battle can see it and tinue to do so. The trend is therefore an Furthermore, military brilliance exists not hear it but cannot (yet) feel it or smell it. increasing perception of “O3” on the part as an absolute, but only in its relative su- However, he can also see electromagnetic of senior commanders, based on actual periority. That is, it does not matter that signatures and information flows. Cyber improvements in all three areas. a commander is brilliant; it only matters and information operations are of increas- With the commoditization of SA, that he or she is more brilliant than an ing relevance to warfare. Given domains situational understanding should be the adversary. The ancient historian Polybius of warfare that cannot be perceived by decisive factor in guiding a military’s ap- observed: unaided human senses, SA at the tactical proach to command and control. What level may in many cases be inferior to that is the ideal approach to command and Now as to the battles which the Romans of higher echelons. This trend is toward control? It is one in which the person fought with Hannibal and the defeats what we (with tongue slightly in cheek) with the best situational understanding which they sustained in them. . . . It was call “O3”: omnipresence, omniscience, is matched to a decision opportunity and not owing to their arms or their tactics, but and omnipotence.12 Omnipresence is given authorities such that a good choice to the skill and genius of Hannibal that the result of advanced communications is made and communicated in time to they met with those defeats . . . for as soon as capabilities. Omniscience is the result of achieve success. That superior situational the Romans got a general of ability com- advanced information-gathering capabili- understanding may be found in a battalion parable with that of Hannibal, victory was ties (situational awareness). Omnipotence commander at the front, but it may also not long in following their banners.13 is the result of advanced precision-strike be found in a staff officer far from battle. capabilities. This is hyperbole, but such We now get to an uncomfortable We may wish to believe that if we exaggerations have their uses. Indeed, fact. Why do we remember brilliant just empower lower-level commanders,

98 Features / The Trouble with Mission Command JFQ 86, 3rd Quarter 2017 C-17 Globemaster IIIs deploy flares December 6, 2014, while flying over Nevada Test and Training Range during U.S. Air Force Weapons School’s Joint Forcible Entry Exercise 14B (U.S. Air Force/Thomas Spangler) communicating intent and creating companies were achieving astounding not captured in existing communications shared understanding, subordinate com- returns, Warren Buffett pithily observed, means), communications constraints, manders will act exactly as their superiors “The Internet does not change the way and large numbers of current operations. would if they had the same informa- we chew gum.” In the same spirit, we Flexive command seeks to build a com- tion and great things will happen. This can observe that technology does not mand culture and structure that is better belies the competitive reality of military make situational understanding more able to solve the matching problem of brilliance. It is rare. Most officers are abundant. It does, however, open the command. Decisions should be made by neither remarkably good nor bad in their possibility of projecting brilliance when the person who can make the best choice strategic intelligence. Some officers are it is found. An unthinking commitment in time for it to affect the outcome. More brilliant. Some are fools. Most muddle to mission command stands in the way of simply, command decisions are made at through. Recent American experiences this projection. the level that balances opposing tensions in war bear this out. Given this variance Flexive command is an alternative and reduces risk. in cognitive ability and competence, framework for thinking about the factors Flexive command focuses on four we should expect that MC-empowered that lead commanders to pull control questions: commanders at the tactical level will vary up or push it down along a continuum What is the nature of the decision in their understanding, and therefore of control. In broad terms, factors that •• cycle? diverge in their behaviors. Sometimes pull control up include strategic risk, How complex are the problems? such variance is exactly what we want (for problem complexity, high learning costs, •• How costly are communications? example, in developing solutions for an and small numbers of total operations. •• What are the strategic and political unexpected and difficult-to-comprehend Pushing control down are adaptation •• implications of failure? obstacle). We return to this below. requirements, decision speed, situational When asked why he invested complexity (that is, the large quantity All four questions pertain to military in Wrigley at a time when dot-com and high relevance of information that is risk, which increases with the speed of

JFQ 86, 3rd Quarter 2017 Hill and Niemi 99 decisions, the complexity of problems, available to those units, and the ability of focuses on how to command, as if the the costliness of communications, and supporting elements to interact with and choice regarding delegation of authority, the implications of failure. solve a problem. a way of command, were its own end. Decision cycles in military opera- Communications costs vary. Fidelity Yet command is not made for officers. tions vary. Some are more controllable of communications refers to the accuracy Officers are made for command. It is es- than others, meaning that we can affect with which a given fact is represented to sential that we build a command culture their speed and character. Some cycles the receiver of a message. A message that in which officers seek out the counsel of are by nature fast, while others are slow. says “yes” when the sender said “no” has others who provide superior situational Decisions cycles may be discrete, involv- low fidelity. Granularity of communica- understanding. JFQ ing decision “moves” (for example, tions refers to the amount of relevant and American football, with play resetting necessary detail captured in a message. after a whistle) or continuous (for ex- A radio broadcast of a baseball game has Notes ample, soccer). Cycles are also affected by less granularity than a television broad- 1 competing demands for decisionmakers’ cast. Timeliness of communications refers Joint Publication 3-0, Joint Operations (Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, August attention and resources. For example, de- to their composition and delivery within 11, 2011), II-2. centralization of control is more valuable a timeframe that affects the outcome. 2 Martin E. Dempsey, “Mission Com- when cycles are not controllable, rapid, The costliness of the communications en- mand White Paper,” April 3, 2012, continuous, and in the context of high vironment clearly affects the optimal level available at . Problem complexity varies. Tactical Finally, military operations have vary- 3 Joint Publication 1-0, Doctrine for the units are less likely to possess the re- ing strategic implications. It is naive and Armed Forces of the United States (Washington, sources to solve problems that are difficult unreasonable for local commanders to ex- DC: The Joint Staff, March 25, 2013), V-15. and novel. That is, the probability that the pect a laissez-faire approach from higher 4 Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication 6-0, expertise of someone in the unit matches echelons when, for example, nuclear war Command and Control (Washington, DC: Headquarters U.S. Marine Corps, Department the problem is low. More to the point, may result from a bad decision (think of the Navy, October 4, 1996), 80. it is more likely that the problem can be of the naval blockade during the Cuban 5 James W. Harvard, “Airmen and Mission addressed by the combined intelligence missile crisis). Compounding this dif- Command,” Air & Space Power Journal 28, of decisionmakers supporting operations. ficulty is the way in which social media no. 2 (March–April 2013), 138. 6 During the National Aeronautics and appears to be increasing the strategic Eitan Shamir, “The Long and Winding Road: The U.S. Army Managerial Approach to Space Administration’s failed Apollo 13 relevance of tactical decisions. Strategic Command and the Adoption of Mission Com- moon mission, the astronauts had to implications will inevitably draw higher mand (Auftragstaktik),” Journal of Strategic create a carbon filter that would allow echelons into decisionmaking. The trick Studies 33, no. 5 (October 2010), 647. them to oxygenate air in the lunar landing is to develop officers who understand 7 Army Doctrine Reference Publication module. They could not do this them- how to engage in those discussions in a 6-0, Mission Command (Washington, DC: Headquarters Department of the Army, March selves and called on engineers at mission mature and productive way. 12, 2014). control for support. This is an example of Flexive command is a nascent concept 8 Ibid. “Linus’s Law,” coined by the technologist and, as such, it makes few simple pre- 9 Dempsey. Eric Raymond: “Given enough eyeballs, scriptions. We suggest it not because it 10 Carl von Clausewitz, On War, ed. and all bugs are shallow.”14 If you want to provides the right answers but because it trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princ- eton: Princeton University Press, 1989), book solve a sticky problem, get a lot of people asks the right questions. We stand at the 1, chapter 3. to interact with it and give them the free- beginning of the robotics revolution in 11 Dempsey. dom to depart from standard procedures. warfare. For the U.S. military to continue 12 Heath J. Niemi, Did the Radio Kill The modification of Sherman tanks with to innovate in how it organizes and fights Auftragstaktik? Strategy Research Project “rhino” nose-plates to burst through the amid this technological disruption, it (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, April 1, 2015). hedgerows of Normandy is a poignant ex- must recognize the essential character of 13 Polybius, Histories, trans. Evelyn S. ample of the power of variant approaches outstanding strategic insight and create Shuckburgh (New York: Macmillan, 1889, to adaptation. One Soldier had the idea; mechanisms for extending that insight as reprint Bloomington, 1962), book 18, available his local commander agreed to let him try widely as possible. at . found out about it. The modification a final argument used in favor of mis- 14 Eric S. Raymond, The Cathedral and the soon became standard. Linus’s Law is in sion command: that it is good for the Bazaar: Musings on Linux and Open Source by fact a powerful argument both for and morale of officers who otherwise resent an Accidental Revolutionary (Sebastopol, CA: against mission command. It depends micromanagement from higher echelons. O’Reilly Media, Inc., 1999), available at . (number of units engaged), the resources even worse for morale. Mission command

100 Features / The Trouble with Mission Command JFQ 86, 3rd Quarter 2017 Security force team member for PRT Farah, whose mission is to train, advise, and assist Afghan government leaders at municipal, district, and provincial levels in Farah Province, Afghanistan, maintains security during key leader meeting at provincial governor’s residence in Farah City (U.S. Navy/Josh Ives)

Learning to Fish in Murky Waters The Missing Link in Capacity-Building

By Stephen E. Webber and Donald E. Vandergriff

uilding partner capacity has been to its centrality to ongoing operations this broad mission set: the building recently recognized as a key in Afghanistan and Iraq. The recent of institutional capacity in host-nation B mission set of the U.S. Armed political and strategic direction has ministries. Then we offer a scientifically Forces. It has received a great deal emphasized military, diplomatic, and and historically sound methodology for of verbal and written attention from civil coordination with other nations military advisors working at the minis- military leaders and policymakers due worldwide.1 A full explanation of U.S. terial level. By improving how we plan diplomatic, development, and military and execute our train, advise, and assist approaches to capacity-building, and missions, and rethinking the role of the the evolution of the military’s current military advisor, we can more effectively Lieutenant Stephen E. Webber, USNR, is assigned to Maritime and Air Operations role and conceptualization of these enable our partners around the world. Headquarters, U.S. Fleet Forces Command, Naval operations, would undoubtedly be The missing link in capacity-building and Amphibious Liaison Element Cell. Major relevant and useful, but remains beyond is education. It is not the education of our Donald E. Vandergriff, USA (Ret.), is a Mission Command Consultant with the North Atlantic the scope of this article. Instead, we personnel or counterparts exclusively; it Treaty Organization. examine one critical component of is the role of mutual learning in advisory

JFQ 86, 3rd Quarter 2017 Webber and Vandergriff 101 Combat medic (right) with Charlie Company, 225th Brigade Support Battalion, 2nd Advise and Assist Brigade, 25th Infantry Division, teaches Iraqi soldiers how to splint broken leg at Forward Operating Base Warhorse, Diyala Province, Iraq, October 5, 2010 (DOD/Brandon D. Bolick) engagements and an understanding of Unfortunately, this falls short. of work on how we advise.2 The joint the importance of the education disci- Except for the small talk and pleasantries force has scratched the surface by produc- pline to the capacity-building mission. required in many cultures, meetings ing guidance on the basics of advising: In Afghanistan and Iraq, the United remain highly structured and rigid. An helping troops build the communication, States and the North Atlantic Treaty American (or NATO) officer often sits interpersonal, and cultural skills to inter- Organization (NATO) use the term across from his counterpart and proceeds act with their counterparts. This may be train, advise, and assist (TAA) as a catchall through a script of “to-dos” and a review doing more harm than good because we that encompasses virtually all our interac- of manufactured milestones. As advisory risk creating checklists and artificial scripts tions with host-nation forces. Rarely do assistance is almost always linked to finan- that oversimplify the task at hand. we stop to consider the fact that this is a cial and materiel support, the host-nation Now we must consider the advisor three-word phrase, and not a single verb counterpart offers little pushback to the mission in context and understand how (for example, “We’re going to TAA our advisor’s assertions. Both parties leave the interaction between advisors and Afghan partners in institutional reform the engagement at best satisfied with the host-nation counterparts could be used today”). But what form should this train- status quo and at worst disillusioned with to achieve our broader goals. To use ing take? Toward what end do we advise one another and the possibility of prog- familiar terms, what advising tactics do we our partners, and what sort of assistance ress. The advisor’s chain of command employ, and how do we structure train, should we be offering them? All too and higher headquarters remain unsure advise, and assist operations to achieve often, our advisors focus on conducting of how to quantify progress. They focus our strategic outcome of building capacity “engagements,” sitting down for lengthy reflexively on shallow metrics such as the in host-nation institutions? In response to meetings with host-nation counterparts. number of engagements conducted per these vital questions, we offer an approach Meetings with key leaders are necessary to week or the submission of boilerplate re- to capacity-building based on human in- develop a common operating picture and ports. Despite sending men and women teraction and learning. First, we consider to establish goals, just as time with coun- from across the joint force to advise the importance of institutional capacity terparts can start to build the trusting foreign forces on complex issues, the U.S. from the standpoint of a system of human relationships upon which all else hinges. military has yet to produce a strong body interaction. Second, we explain how

102 Features / The Missing Link in Capacity-Building JFQ 86, 3rd Quarter 2017 our view of the strategic goal affects the resources. Recent years have illustrated want our partners to manage their own planning and execution of advisory opera- the fact that paying for a nation’s military military forces, which requires everything tions, and lastly, we provide a real-world or teaching valuable skills to its troops is from rule of law, to fiscal responsibility, example of innovative advising tactics not nearly enough to enable a partner na- to administrative effectiveness.9 How do recently employed in Kabul, Afghanistan. tion’s military. Advising within a country’s we even begin to consider these broad governmental organizations is critical to concepts? By thinking of them in terms The Strategic Goal: Developing any man, train, and equip effort. of systems with an outward focus, not Institutional Capacity The United States and NATO are on processes with an inward focus (get- Only recently has the U.S. military currently placing military, government, ting bogged down in shallow metrics, placed a proper emphasis on institu- and contracted advisors among the cultural constraints, control, disregard of tional capacity. In the initial approaches upper echelons of host-nation forces and the intangibles). We are trying to shape to stability operations in Iraq and within government departments. Prior patterns of interaction between people so Afghanistan, NATO called for the rapid to the deployment of advisors, we as a that they create the outcome we want.10 creation of military and police forces force must first consider the political This is far from simple, but the impor- to protect the populace and fight the and strategic outcomes for these institu- tance of learning and educational theory enemy. The mixed bag of successes and tions and how to measure success. If it is plain to see. It must be mentioned that failures achieved by the international is decided that advisory missions are an this learning cannot occur in a vacuum— community in raising the Afghan and effective way of achieving our desired the small part of capacity-building we Iraqi security forces is well documented endstate, we must first consider how we address in this article is only of value if it and discussed at length by many schol- intend to shape conditions. Ideally, this is part of a comprehensive policy and stra- ars.3 U.S. military doctrine reflects discussion would occur prior to the deci- tegic approach. Our broader diplomatic, learning on the part of the military sion to deploy advisors. As we are already military, and development efforts toward to embrace stability operations and employing advisor efforts, we must take a a certain problem-set must complement enabling civil authority (Phases IV and step back and reconsider how they fit into and reinforce one another in achieving V of a joint campaign) as critical to stra- the bigger picture, while changing the the desired endstate if a train, advise, and tegic success.4 way we conduct them. assist effort is going to be successful. It Afghanistan in particular provides Our train, advise, and assist efforts is critical, however, to devise our train, a good example. To put things simply, at the ministerial level should shape sys- advise, and assist operations based on an no matter how many Afghans stepped tems that will accomplish our near-term understanding of the mission that ad- forward to defend their country, how goals of enabling host-nation partners dresses the importance of learning. well international forces trained them, or against dynamic threats while becoming how much money and material poured self-perpetuating in order to continue to Train, Advise, and into the country, the nation is unable strengthen institutions with time, ideally Assist Operations to manage the resources at its disposal.5 well after the detachment of advisors from How do you create a system? Systems While Afghanistan, with its historic lack of their counterparts. Institutional capacity are shaped by people and how they governance and central authority, is a glar- is a system, and systems emerge through do things. To put it simply, people ing case, the importance of developing repeated human interaction. Theories of + processes = systems. As stated, we the capacity to lead and manage applies education, management, and especially cannot create a system as we wish and to every case of security assistance or joint international relations tell us that human implement it; it must emerge over time military training. The United States is interaction causes learning, which in turn through repeated interaction. The currently working with police and military shapes the nature of repeated interac- two parts of the equation that we can forces around the world to counter the tion.7 The way people and organizations influence are people and processes. A threat of global terrorism.6 Even in the interact with one another over time cre- train, advise, and assist effort must look absence of kinetic action, if U.S. advisors ates institutions, or the rules that govern to achieve an effect on people and an conduct combined tactical training in a interaction.8 We all understand this effect of processes that will without a foreign country, the relationships built seemingly complex concept intuitively; in doubt influence the systems at play. We and the skills communicated will not be the United States, we refer to the “demo- do not, nor will we ever, have complete maintained and carried on if the host na- cratic institutions of our government.” As control of how a system develops or tion lacks the institutions to retain them. military professionals, we talk a lot about all of the outcomes of our actions to If the United States grants a large sum of “command climate and Service culture” influence others.11 What we can control money to another nation to man, train, that we can influence by the policies we is our approach to the people we work and equip its armed forces, these funds enact, how we lead, and how we interact with and the processes we devise with will not provide optimal capability if the with our people. them to manage their organizations. country lacks a bureaucracy to manage Consider our goals for ministerial People must come first in everything a large budget, logistics, and human development within partner nations. We that we do. Carl von Clausewitz reminds

JFQ 86, 3rd Quarter 2017 Webber and Vandergriff 103 us never to underestimate the “human tactical concept, such as marksmanship or counterpart as an individual, his organiza- factor” in war,12 and if we trace our stra- patrolling, is best understood if students tion, and the systems currently at work tegic goals back to our national purpose, practice on their own, being allowed to within the host nation. Education with we realize that the ultimate purpose of make mistakes and adapt their technique. right teaching methodology, whether our military efforts is the preservation of The same is true for administrative pro- field exercises at the tactical level or joint human life and human freedom. Joint cedures or operational concepts. Anyone working groups at the operational/stra- special operations doctrine defines ir- can learn to recite a definition, but there tegic level, presents an opportunity for regular conflict (within which many of is no way to effectively convey how to mutual learning. Here, advisors should our advisor missions fall) as a “struggle manage a defense budget or plan a mili- not only know the key points that they among state and non-state actors for tary campaign. People always learn best intend to communicate, but also be legitimacy and influence over relevant when they understand things in their careful to listen to their counterparts, al- populations.”13 We cannot coerce or own way, describe them in their own lowing all participants to learn from one bribe capacity into a host nation. Moral terms, and interact with others to inform another. It is important to view oneself and ethical considerations aside, what their understanding. as a facilitator of learning. Frankly, an we fund or force on a group of people In our approach to train, advise, and advisor is present in each country because will only be as effective as they are. Also, assist, the advisor is as much a student of local nationals do not know something there is no exit strategy with this line of his counterpart as the counterpart is of that the advisor needs them to know. thought. The only way to influence an the advisor. To achieve success, advisors At the same time, local nationals know individual or group in the long term is must proceed with abject humility know- and understand things that their advisors through education. ing that they enter a host nation knowing could never hope to, and often intuitively Education is a vital part of an advi- little of how things work. An advisor may know and understand the information sor’s mission, and any train, advise, and or may not have a strong background in that an advisor is trying to convey, but in assist operation should consider how we his subject matter from previous service, their own way.15 will educate our host-nation partners. but there is no better way to learn than The conclusion that advising tech- Education is too often thought of as to teach. Also, the way one person un- niques must change is grounded in the conveying of knowledge from a derstands something will always differ in learning theory and modern educational teacher (who knows something) to a some way from how another understands methods. Recent insight into the human student (who knows nothing). This is it. This is true for members of the same mind demands a shift from “competency- not education (or effective training); it is immediate family, let alone people from based” learning to “outcomes-based” simply communication between a leader different places who have been educated and “discovery” learning.16 Competency- and subordinate. Decades of progress in different cultures. An advisor has as based learning is the norm for many in the education field have shown that much (if not more) to learn from his Americans, as it has long been prevalent this misunderstanding of education is counterpart as he does from his advisor. in the U.S. education system at all levels. completely ineffective in any context. To It goes without saying that a foreigner The U.S. military has institutionalized a have any chance of success, the advisor who arrives among a host-nation military competency approach to learning based must completely abandon any inclination force will be instantly rejected if he pro- on the education and management phi- toward this approach, as it is grounded in ceeds with arrogance, trying to “teach” losophies of the early 20th century.17 Based out-of-date learning models refuted by his ways to another group of people who on the research of psychologists and edu- scholars and educators such as Dr. Robert have good reasons for what they do and cators such as Dr. Bjork, innovators have Bjork, distinguished research professor at a lifetime of learning behind them. At worked to reform education in all con- the University of California, Los Angeles, the very best, the advisor might receive a texts. Whether teaching math to children Department of Psychology.14 polite nod from a group of students who in a public school or advanced tactics to People learn through interaction and will revert to their original ways as soon Soldiers, teachers are most effective when experience. Simply conveying informa- as advisors leave the room. Formal meet- they act as facilitators, and students learn tion as we have in our training courses ings and key leader engagements will, more when they are encouraged to take since the industrial age will never be without a doubt, be part of any advisor ownership of the learning.18 This blurs the as effective as empowering people to operation. During these engagements, traditional line between teacher and stu- understand something on their own. in which international advisors and host- dent. A new approach to military advising The advisor is both a teacher who has nation partners communicate intent, that properly emphasizes the importance entered a situation with goals and desired review progress, and make important de- of mutual learning requires a shift from outcomes for his counterparts, but more cisions, the advisor should keep in mind the influence of competency-based educa- importantly, a facilitator who allows that mutual learning is occurring. Every tion to engagements focused on discovery students to apply what they already meeting is an opportunity to influence a and outcomes. know, receiving new information and counterpart, as much as it is an oppor- Processes must be implemented understanding it in their own way. A tunity to learn something new about the in order to create systems and build

104 Features / The Missing Link in Capacity-Building JFQ 86, 3rd Quarter 2017 capacity. A group of individuals can learn process that can be improved, or is the structure: delivering the right combat something, and perhaps pass this knowl- lack of a codified process what is prevent- and policing capability to a dynamic bat- edge on to some extent in a “train the ing the development of capacity? Before tlespace while developing the capacity trainer” model, but advisor engagements trying to influence the rules of someone to manage their own forces in the long must focus on shaping processes nearly as else’s game, we must first learn his rules. term. Force management is an important much as they focus on educating individ- Sometimes, published guidance is in discipline, as it encompasses virtually all uals. In a sense, processes are the product place that the advisor can obtain, study, aspects of how an organization structures of learning within an organization. A and use as a starting point for engage- itself to achieve its mission. Force man- process is a framework for how things are ments with counterparts. Often, no such agement is a useful example of a critical done. The U.S. military understands pro- guidance exists and an advisor must learn capacity as the ability to effectively deter- cess well; so much of our work and even how things are done from counterparts mine force structure has both immediate our lives are governed by instructions on as they train and learn together. As train- impact and great importance to the long- how things are to be done. Where the ing is conducted, what is learned can term growth and development of the U.S. military is absent is in not explaining start to form a base from which codified organization. We were essentially helping the “why” behind a process. Education doctrine can be developed. An effective our Afghan partners define the capabili- explains the “why.” If a system is going advisor seeks to understand her operating ties that are needed to defend both their to become self-perpetuating, people must environment and gently shape conditions people and their nation, develop their be given a framework for the training and toward the desired endstate. Ideally, the own solutions to resolve gaps in their education, one that will give shape and advisors will leave their counterparts police and military capabilities, and de- direction to their repeated interaction. with formal guidance that is somewhere termine their requirements based on this The advisor often begins her work between how things were done prior to analysis. The close linkage to fiscal/bud- with a process in mind. With varying de- their arrival and how things are done by get capacity and human resources systems grees of success, we often seek to impose the advisor’s home country. is impossible to miss. We collaborated blueprints on foreign forces based on closely with our CSTC-A and Operation what has worked for our organizations. Case Study: Kabul, Afghanistan Resolute Support teammates advising on This is neither all good nor all bad; after Our theory of train, advise, and assist budget and force generation, while we all, our counterparts lack the ability to operations was shaped by real-world focused on “spaces, not faces,” that is, the do something, and we are providing a experience with the Afghan National authorizations for personnel and equip- way of doing it from our own experience. Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF), ment, and how to determine them.20 At the same time, this approach can be particularly the Ministry of the Interior Force management capacity serves disastrous. People shape processes, and (MOI), which oversees the Afghan as a useful starting point for a discussion processes shape people as they guide their National Police (ANP). We sought to of ministerial capacity, as it exemplifies a interaction. This is how a complex, adap- apply these concepts as we learned them system that must endure for the Afghan tive system works. How and why things by implementing adaptive learning as MOI to effectively manage its police are done in a host nation is influenced part of our train, advise, and assist oper- forces. Like many systems at the ministe- by a myriad of factors, most of which ations. For our theory to be truly tested rial level, force management is complex, we have no control over. Introducing a and proven, it must be given time. Also, involving codified administrative pro- process developed by the U.S. military similar methods must be applied across cesses as much as careful analysis and and expecting that it will be successfully a range of cases and data collected. creative thinking on the part of groups adopted by a host nation without modi- Unfortunately, capacity-building takes and individuals. It is critical that Afghan fication is a recipe for failure. A military time and hard metrics are often scarce force managers can properly document force may already have processes in place when it comes to irregular warfare. This personnel and equipment authorizations that an advisor is unaware of, individuals case, however, is instructive because it with the help of their coalition advisors. come from different cultures and have realized qualitative results at the tactical This important task relates directly to entirely different perspectives, and our level and has helped us to understand the resources that the international com- processes are often built over time and how similar efforts may be designed and munity is using to resource the ANP. It partner nations are often incapable of im- implemented in the future. also allows all components of the nation’s plementing them as they are right away.19 As part of Combined Security police forces to effectively, man, train, Instead, advisors must understand Transition Command–Afghanistan’s and equip themselves. what processes are already in place within (CSTC–A’s) Capabilities Development As importantly, Afghan ministries a host nation. How do people do things, Directorate (CDD), our team was tasked must begin to take the lead in managing and why? This comes with understanding to train, advise, and assist the Ministry of their force structure and determining fu- the whole system and how it has devel- Defense (MOD) and MOI in all aspects ture requirements. This requires far more oped. Is there an ineffective process in of force management. It was our mission than administrative procedure; Afghan place that must be changed, an effective to help the Afghans manage their force leaders must possess the skills to analyze

JFQ 86, 3rd Quarter 2017 Webber and Vandergriff 105 their military and policing capabilities. host-nation translators; both were equal Afghan officer confided to his advisors: Not only do Afghan ministries require facilitators of learning. the students did not feel “talked down analytical capacity, but also those tasked ANP and ANA officers selected for to” or “talked at.” They were not bom- to lead and manage them must be criti- the first course were distinguished in their barded with foreign concepts, or lectured cal and creative thinkers. In developing profession, and, except for two junior by others on “the right way”; they led the Afghan force management capacity, we officers, the majority were colonels, way and learned from each other.24 are trying to build people as much as we along with several lieutenant colonels The success of the first joint MOD- were working to build processes.21 and majors. Follow-on courses included MOI class demanded the facilitation of a As our military and civilian advisors members of mid-level and junior officers second course, this time for junior ANP were working hard to bring order to the and some senior noncommissioned of- officers only. Based on a careful after ac- disparate records that documented the ficers. Each session would begin with tion review of the first class, CDD advisors Afghan force structure, our team took its an introduction by either an Afghan decided to keep this class smaller and to first steps toward educating Afghan force or coalition general officer (key leader focus on rising leaders. Now that their managers with an 8-week course for our engagements with our counterparts and leadership, often set in their ways, had counterparts titled “Force Management: meetings with our chain of command been exposed to adaptive learning and The Basics.” Course objectives were built were critical to organizing these efforts), more advanced force management con- on material that force management advi- and then our contracted advisors would cepts, it was safe to train their subordinates sors had used for their counterparts, and begin to facilitate discussion. Class usually who now had a better chance to apply included U.S. Army force management began with a problem, or an open-ended their learning on the job with the ap- doctrine. Our advisors then applied adap- question: “How do I build a brigade?” proval of their chain of command. These tive learning to shape the course based Students would then work in groups to students, mostly junior officers, had more on an Adaptive Course Model (ACM), think creatively about the given problem. formal schooling than their superiors and a revolutionary model that has achieved After collaborating, groups were asked were even more open to improving their success when applied to U.S. Army train- to brief their solution to the class. This problem-solving skills and learning new ing. This “discovery-based” learning generated further discussion, during concepts from each other and our advisor model is grounded in Adaptive Soldier which our counterparts, many of whom team. Group problems and exercises such Leader Training and Education meth- had spent their whole lives at war, began as the “build a brigade” exercise gener- odology (ASLTE), designed to instill to think critically and practice the cogni- ated endless discussion. At one point, a adaptability within students at all levels tive skills of senior leaders and managers. young lieutenant lectured the class on the by engaging them as active participants Rather than using our handouts to drive importance of thinking strategically and in learning. Under ASLTE, ACM em- the learning, we let the class drive itself, holistically about problem-sets before de- phasizes outcomes over metrics by using connecting students’ ideas and assertions termining solutions. His comments would discussion, open-ended problem-solving, with key force management concepts as not have been out of place in a U.S. War wargames, and free play exercises to push understood by the U.S. military.23 College seminar. students mentally and physically. These Student enthusiasm for the course As these classes, supported by our methods proved effective in the U.S. was remarkable. These were seasoned vet- coalition chain of command and our Army Reconnaissance course, and were erans who may have begun their officer Afghan general-officer principals con- adapted to a new context of advising at development under Russian advisors, or tinued, our advisor team persisted in its the ministerial level.22 in the mountains opposing them. Some day-to-day work. We still worked with Previous course slides were stripped had been formally educated in Western advisor organizations across Resolute down and used to make hardcopy schools. Others had little formal school- Support to facilitate the approval of new handouts, leaving key points and broad ing. Every one of the students in surveys requirements, ran the funding approval concepts, discarding specific doctrinal stated they had not experienced this type process for capability enhancements, terms and restrictive, step-by-step pro- of learning, where they were involved in and engaged our Afghan counterparts cesses. Our host-nation interpreters, every aspect of the course, and not just in formal meetings. After two success- whom our team and leadership have briefed endlessly with PowerPoint slides. ful classes, much of our time became elected to refer to as the technical advisor Students were eager to contribute, asking devoted to the documentation and team, reviewed and actively contributed questions, connecting course material to validation of force structure authoriza- to the class materials. Not only did the their everyday experiences and challenges tions, an important task for the success technical advisors translate and edit, but as officers, and respectfully challenging of our directorate and our Afghan they also reviewed course outcomes and one another in vigorous debate. Advisors, counterparts. These conditions enabled improved the content to make it use- who were optimistic about the course, a critical evolution in our methodology. ful and relevant to their countrymen. had their moderate expectations far ex- Working together, we found ways to During the course, there was no distinc- ceeded by the climate of the classes. The continue learning from our counterparts tion between coalition advisors and reason for this was clear, as one senior and training them. We devised ways to

106 Features / The Missing Link in Capacity-Building JFQ 86, 3rd Quarter 2017 Chief Master Sergeant of the Air Force James A. Cody (center) attends Afghan air force senior enlisted seminar at Hamid Karzai International Airport, Afghanistan, April 6, 2016 (U.S. Air Force/Nicholas Rau) combine educational efforts with formal a question or problem-set related to a American public education system would workshops and engagements, using them real-world challenge. We would then not have enabled this kind of learning. to drive our understanding of an effective brainstorm with our counterparts, writing Sometimes, it would take us three classes ANP force structure while empowering all their input, whether it seemed im- to accomplish what we had intended in our counterparts to lead the process and mediately useful or relevant to us, on the one class (determining a specific equip- learn from it. We began to work together whiteboard. As each workshop included ping scheme, for example), but we to determine the requirements for the at least one interpreter or liaison, lan- realized that this was not only acceptable police force, while simultaneously setting guage barriers were not an issue. It was given the environment, but also necessary. conditions for our counterparts to insti- important, however, that students saw It has only been a short time since tutionalize this knowledge. their input captured, validated, and used these efforts began, and they continue Our coalition military and civilian to generate further discussion. to evolve. A scientific evaluation of our advisors worked together and with other The climate of these engagements approach is impossible now. However, advisory organizations to analyze the task would be foreign to most U.S. military the response we received from our at hand and requirements for the ANP. officers. There was no program of instruc- counterparts, and the increase in our Before communicating our thoughts to tion, no list of enabling objectives, no ability to perform our core functions in our counterparts, we allowed them to PowerPoint, and no “foot-stomping, support of ANDSF force management, inform our understanding and tackled the check the block” mentality. When we indicated that we had struck gold. It is problem-set together. We began to teach began a session, we realized that we important to note that our training activi- classes “guerrilla style,” embracing the were out on a limb: with a general idea ties were enabled by our culture as a team chaos and fluidity of the environment. of an outcome based on problems we and approach to advising. Prior to and As we were always collaborating among were trying to solve as an organization, throughout these initiatives, we made it ourselves, we had something to discuss we would let our students lead the way. a priority to bond with our counterparts. with our counterparts. Classes were Often, classes would depart from our ini- The U.S. military has come to under- almost spontaneous: if we could gather tial concept and take an entirely different stand the importance of building rapport; only a few of our counterparts together, route. These “rabbit holes” were often our team embraced this philosophy and we would set up our white board and get productive, teaching us more about our took it a step further.25 We built profes- to work. As in the more formal classes, counterparts and their world. A formal sional working relationships, and often we would often begin by introducing military course or even most classes in the true friendships with our hosts. Prior to

JFQ 86, 3rd Quarter 2017 Webber and Vandergriff 107 and after formal engagements with gen- tal institutions, are the “tactical level” 2013). Kilcullen applies a “systems logic” approach to problems of development and eral officers, we spent time in the offices of capacity-building. The methods with conflict that shaped the authors’ thinking on of their staffs, drinking tea, practicing which we engage our counterparts will these matters. one another’s languages, discussing fam- determine whether train, advise, and 11 Ibid., 255–260. ily, our homes, and perhaps more than assist methods are effective in building 12 Carl von Clausewitz, On War, ed. and anything else, telling jokes. At times, we partner capacity. JFQ trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princ- eton: Princeton University Press, 1989), 94. could gently guide these conversations 13 Joint Publication 3-05, Special Operations to force management, at others we just (Washington, DC: The Joint Staff, July 16, appreciated them for what they were: Notes 2014), 28. an opportunity to meet new friends and 14 Robert Bjork, “How We Learn Versus 1 connect with those who had readily wel- Robert Gates, “Helping Others Defend How We Think We Learn: Implications for the Themselves,” Foreign Affairs 89, no. 3 (2010), Organization of Army Training,” unpublished comed us into their homeland. 2–6; Harry Yarger, Building Partner Capacity briefing presented at Science of Learning Work- The advisor must understand the (Tampa: Joint Special Operations University, shop, University of California, Los Angeles, importance of human connections and 2015). August 1, 2006. trusting relationships in enabling every- 2 This issue has received some attention 15 Kilcullen, 255–260. thing from military training to formal from the military and has been the subject of 16 Donald E. Vandergriff, “The Missing excellent scholarship that remains to be op- Link: How to Develop for Mission Com- negotiations. Still, we must treat our erationalized. See also Terrence Kelly, Security mand,” unpublished working paper, December relationships with counterparts as ends in Force Assistance in Afghanistan: Identifying 17, 2016, 1–3; Phil Hill, “Competency-Based themselves. Just as we bond with our fel- Lessons for Future Efforts (Santa Monica, CA: Education: An (Updated) Primer for Today’s low Servicemembers, we must bond with RAND, 2011); Austin Long, Building Special Online Market,” available at . and sisters wearing the uniform of the Todd Helmus, Advising the Command: Best 17 Vandergriff, 1–3. United States, they are serving alongside Practices from the Special Operations Advisory 18 Paul Howe, Leadership and Training for us. By putting on their uniform, they risk Experience in Afghanistan (Santa Monica, CA: the Fight (New York: Skyhorse, 2011); Bjork; everything to defend their homeland and RAND, 2015). Vandergriff, 1–11. 3 their families. Only by embracing our T.X. Hammes, “Raising and Mentoring 19 Kilcullen, 255–260. Security Forces in Afghanistan and Iraq,” in 20 See also Garrett Heath and Stephen E. hosts, becoming a part of their world, and Lessons Encountered: Learning from the Long Webber, “Developing Afghan Force Manag- fully immersing ourselves in the operating War, ed. Richard D. Hooker, Jr., and Joseph J. ers,” Army AL&T Magazine (October–Decem- environment can we conduct effective Collins (Washington, DC: NDU Press, 2015); ber 2016), 59–63. train, advise, and assist operations. Obaid Younossi, The Long March: Building an 21 See also “Establishing Enduring Sys- Afghan National Army (Santa Monica, CA: tems,” Defense Video Imagery Distribution RAND, 2009); Leslie Payne, Leveraging Obser- System, May 27, 2016, available at . around the world in pursuit of our 4 Lauren Fish, “Painting by Numbers: 22 Vandergriff, 5–8; see also William R. strategic interests. When the decision is A History of the U.S. Military’s Phasing Burns, Jr., and Waldo D. Freeman, Developing Construct,” War on the Rocks, November 1, an Adaptability Training Strategy and Policy for made to build capacity within a foreign 2016, available at . 23 See also Stephen E. Webber, “Afghan those at the operational and tactical 5 Joseph J. Collins, Understanding War in Leaders Celebrate Achievement in Force level with the freedom to make deci- Afghanistan (Washington, DC: NDU Press, Management Course,” Operation Resolute Sup- 2011), 75–78. port, July 2016, available at . must be informed by the education Constructivism,” The Journal of Constructivist 24 Dan Grazier, “Military Reform Through discipline and learning theory. After Psychology 21, no. 1 (2008), 16–24; Alexander Education,” Straus Military Reform Project, considering to what end we intend to Wendt, “Anarchy Is What States Make of It: (Washington, DC: Project of Government The Social Construction of Power Politics,” Oversight, October 18, 2015), available at influence a foreign institution and how, International Organization 46, no. 2 (April . Captain Dan Grazier, USMC ogy to our advising operations and nomic Instruments of Security Policy: Influencing (Ret.), now a fellow at the Straus Military tactics. Without a means to effectively Choices of Leaders (New York: Palgrave Macmil- Reform Project, participated in one of Donald lan, 2011), 14–15. E. Vandergriff’s courses at Fort Benning, GA, engage counterparts, our broader stra- 9 Hammes, 279, 283. and wrote this article about it. tegic goals will not be realized. Engage- 10 See also David Kilcullen, Out of the 25 Kelly; Long; Helmus. ments, even at the highest levels of Mountains: The Coming Age of the Urban command and host-nation governmen- Guerrilla (New York: Oxford University Press,

108 Features / The Missing Link in Capacity-Building JFQ 86, 3rd Quarter 2017 Swiss grenadier takes part in raid commando competition in 2007 (Courtesy Ltpcb)

ussia’s revanchism toward its neighbors and its strong desire Building a Stay- R to extend power into traditional spheres of influence have major security implications for a number of post- Behind Resistance Soviet states. This policy is magnified by Vladimir Putin’s “Russian World” ideology, which implies that any former Organization Soviet republic with either an ethnic Russian population or an unresolved territorial or security dispute with The Case of Cold War Russia faces a potential national secu- rity threat ranging from internal sub- Switzerland Against the version to outright territorial invasion by Russian forces. The Russian occu- pation of Crimea in March 2014 and Soviet Union the Kremlin’s intervention in eastern Ukraine between February and Sep- By Kevin D. Stringer tember 2014 demonstrate this risk to bordering states and overall European stability.1 In particular, Russian use of hybrid warfare amplifies the threat. Colonel Kevin D. Stringer, USA, Ph.D., is Director, Strategy, Plans, and Policy (J5) at Special Operations Hybrid warfare is an effective mix of Command Europe. military and nonmilitary activities with

JFQ 85, 2nd Quarter 2017 Stringer 109 In spirit of Swiss direct democracy, the 2008 official photograph of Swiss Federal Council depicted them as everymen (Courtesy Swiss Federal Chancellery) conventional and irregular components operations forces (SOF) considerations in subject to call-up for both military and ranging from diplomatic and legal supporting such efforts. nonmilitary functions, and the national campaigns to clandestine transfers of infrastructure and industrial produc- armed personnel and weapons. These A Review of Total Defense tion base were co-opted and tooled for activities fall short of actual armed con- The goal of the Cold War Total Defense possible defense usage. With extensive flict and can destabilize and subvert a model was whole-of-society involve- civil defense frameworks and wide civic target nation’s stability and sovereignty ment in defense matters. The concept integration into security plans, this but not trigger North Atlantic Treaty was to have the entire country involved democratic and neutral state achieved a Organization (NATO) or bilateral treaty in national security—not only the mili- high level of societal resilience during the commitments.2 To mitigate this risk, a tary, but also the private sector, local Cold War period.4 targeted state’s society must be ready to government, and nongovernmental conduct resistance should all or parts of organizations. During the Cold War, Total Defense and Resistance its territory be occupied or subverted small states prepared a large array of Swiss defense preparations during the by a foreign invader or its proxies. This tools such as total mobilization, guer- Cold War are instructive for small requirement implies looking back to the rilla warfare, civil resistance networks, countries at the strategic level for Total Cold War concept of “Total Defense” and clandestine organizations to achieve Defense and at the operational level for for some applicable models to evaluate national security objectives and deter unconventional warfare and resistance and implement. The Cold War–era case Warsaw Pact aggressors.3 missions. Unconventional warfare is of Switzerland, a small, neutral state Switzerland is an example of a state defined as those activities “conducted to that prepared for resistance against the that practiced this doctrine during the enable a resistance movement or insur- Soviet Union, provides valuable inputs Cold War. Its defense went far beyond gency to coerce, disrupt or overthrow to the creation of stay-behind resistance the armed forces and included the eco- an occupying power or government.”5 organizations in the modern context nomic and psychological mobilization of These arrangements are also politi- and informs U.S. interagency and special the population. The entire populace was cally relevant, since as a neutral country

110 Recall / Building a Stay-Behind Resistance Organization JFQ 85, 2nd Quarter 2017 during the Cold War, Switzerland had an enemy—would signal to an aggressor necessary, be carried out.”15 This official to be self-reliant for defense and could that the only gain in attacking Switzerland position of the Swiss government to con- not count upon allies or other states for would be the occupation of a hostile area, duct resistance in enemy-occupied Swiss support or intervention. This same situa- denuded of economic or transportation territory remained unchanged until the tion could arise for neutral states such as value, with continued resistance by a end of the Cold War. Finland or Sweden today, or even Eastern determined and armed population.10 The Yet these resistance operations were to European countries whose fellow alliance objective of Total Defense was to make be well integrated with the operations of members might hesitate to intervene in Switzerland an indigestible and costly to a robust, conventional force. Under the an action that might be short of war or in consume “hedgehog” to potential adver- organizing concept of the so-called Swiss the gray space of hybrid warfare. saries—in this case, the Soviet Union or Army 61, the military consisted of three At the strategic level, the Swiss viewed its Warsaw Pact allies. field army corps designed to protect the the military as only one element of A critical component of Total Defense heartland, and one mountain army corps national power to achieve their security was the ability to conduct resistance oper- for the alpine regions. These 4 army corps objectives. In the early 1960s, the Swiss ations in enemy-occupied Swiss territory. were organized into 12 divisions—3 Federal Council postulated a shift from Despite its neutral status, Switzerland field, 3 mechanized, 3 mountain, and 3 the concept of National Defense to feared an invasion of the Red Army in the border—supplemented by a mix of 14 Total Defense, which incorporated the post–World War II period and conducted border, fortress, and redoubt brigades.16 diplomatic, informational, economic, and extensive research and analysis on resis- At its peak, Swiss Army 61, with its re- social elements of national power into tance movements and irregular warfare. cruitment based upon a militia concept a traditionally military domain.6 Swiss One popular misconception about Swiss of universal conscription, encompassed foreign policy oriented on the strategy preparations for resistance is that the 625,000 personnel.17 This number stands of armed neutrality, while maintaining Swiss military establishment followed the in relation to a 1962 population of 5.5 sufficient access to external markets for writings of Major Hans von Dach. In million.18 The main battle doctrine re- inbound and outbound trade. Social pol- Total Resistance, his seven-volume series volved around a defense-in-depth with icy was designed to buttress the physical on unconventional warfare, von Dach static units to channel Soviet forces into and psychological resilience of the na- propagated a concept of resistance con- destruction zones, and mobile units for tion.7 For example, to lower vulnerability ducted by the entire population, which counterattacks.19 An integral part of this to foreign propaganda, Switzerland main- he termed partisan warfare.11 The Swiss plan was resistance in occupied Swiss ter- tained an objective national news service, General Staff rejected this approach amid ritory, should regular defense fail. After promoted education among the popu- concerns over the law of land warfare the operative collapse of regular military lace, and engendered national pride in and the maintenance of governance over units, the remnants of these formations Swiss institutions.8 Economic policy was a population of partisans, and chose would continue the fight in the occupied designed on the principle of autarky, with instead a conventional doctrine with an regions as guerrillas and partisans. In reserve food supplies and materials main- integrated resistance plan.12 The Swiss parallel, the civil population in these areas tained at national, local, and individual military’s other major concern was that would practice nonviolent resistance levels. Civil defense became a cornerstone an overemphasis on von Dach’s partisan within the parameters of international of population protection to ensure the warfare would neglect other important law. A preestablished resistance cadre survival of the nation in the event of components of Total Defense.13 organization would support and bring nuclear, chemical, or biological warfare.9 The government’s 1973 Swiss coherence to these efforts. The potential In essence, the strategic objective was to Security Policy Report explicitly stressed risk of repression and counterviolence make the society resilient to any form of the need for resistance in occupied was noted, and the government called outside aggression, physical or otherwise, regions—hence, the national defense upon the populace to prepare itself for through a holistic Total Defense meth- requirement for the classical stay-behind such eventualities.20 odology. This same objective is relevant unconventional warfare mission and an today for those former Soviet states that organization to carry it out. Section 426 Resistance Organization find themselves targets of Russian hybrid of the report stated, “The occupation Like other threatened Western countries, operations and subversion. of the country must not mean that all Switzerland set up covert organizations A general principle guiding Swiss resistance has ended. Even in this case, tasked with the conduct of resistance in defense efforts was dissuasion, a form an enemy shall meet not only with the the event of a full or partial Soviet occu- of psychological deterrence. This con- population’s antipathy, but also active pation. The Swiss Federal Council also cept—when combined with powerful resistance.”14 Section 717 of the same established a government-in-exile loca- conventional forces, guerrilla resistance, publication highlighted, “Guerrilla tion in Ireland for such an eventuality.21 and the self-destruction of Switzerland’s warfare and non-violent resistance in oc- As a result of its research, the Swiss gov- industrial, communications, and trans- cupied areas are being prepared within ernment at first designated the so-called portation networks to deny their usage to the limits of international law, and will, if Special Service to organize popular resis-

JFQ 85, 2nd Quarter 2017 Stringer 111 tance to the enemy and supply the gov- is understood as a “clandestine cellular Professions included a school principal, ernment-in-exile with intelligence. The organization within the resistance move- nurse, hospital administrator, medical Special Service was made up of three ment that has the ability to conduct doctors, engineers, and academics.27 hierarchical levels, with the top level operations in areas that are inaccessible Recruitment occurred slowly, with a care- consisting of a small group of directing to guerrillas, such as urban areas under ful vetting and selection process. Once officers, members of the regular military the control of the local security forces,” enrolled, the members were trained and who always dressed in their military uni- and a partial auxiliary is “that portion allocated to one of the approximately forms and who were responsible for the of the population that is providing ac- 80 resistance regions spread across the administration and training of the secret tive support to the guerrilla force or the country. The manning for P-26 was set at army. The second level was made up of underground.”24 800 personnel, about half of which had “trusted persons” who spread across Operationally, the P-26 concept been recruited by the time of its deactiva- Switzerland and were responsible for the offers four areas for contemporary con- tion in 1990. The 6-to-10 person units recruitment of resistance fighters and sideration on how to set up a clandestine found in the 80 resistance regions were supporters who formed the third level organization for the conduct of resistance autonomous, and each had an active and in their respective parts of the country. in the case of occupation. First, the group sleeper cell assigned, with the active cell The persons recruited by the second prepared for four possible and plausible having no knowledge of the existence level could themselves recruit a number operational scenarios: of the sleeper cell.28 A typical cell had an of new members to join the resistance operational chief, communicator, courier, a foreign military transiting Switzer- organization. •• and demolitions/engineering specialist.29 land and occupying only a portion In 1979, the Swiss government trans- Finally, the degree of planning, detail, of territory without the goal of full formed and redesignated the initial set-up training, secrecy, and operational security occupation into the P-26 organization, a designation conducted by P-26 within the context of a foreign power attacking Switzer- derived from the 26 Swiss cantons.22 •• a democratic society lends itself to further land and occupying a portion of ter- Defense planners conceived of P-26 as a study and research for the operationaliza- ritory with the ultimate goal of full top-down, cadre-led structure rather than tion of resistance plans during peacetime. conquest and occupation a broad, decentralized civilian resistance full conquest and occupation by a movement envisioned and advocated by •• Conclusions for foreign army von Dach. Like the Special Service, the Contemporary Planning the overthrow of the Swiss govern- P-26 organized into three levels. The •• Given the specter of Russian irredentism ment by external forces resulting in P-26 command staff consisted mainly in Eastern Europe, threatened coun- the occupation of Switzerland.25 of senior military officials on civilian tries such as Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, contracts or secondment. On the second Second, the Swiss government placed Moldova, Georgia, and even Kazakhstan and core level, the cadre organization the organization outside of the traditional must reevaluate their national defense formed the secretive and well-trained military and government bureaucracy to strategies for their ability to conduct nucleus of the resistance underground. protect its members from discovery in the resistance or unconventional warfare This formation possessed a decentralized event of occupation and to preclude its on all or parts of their sovereign terri- organizational model based upon the surrender as part of an overall capitula- tory. Historical analysis can inform this development of distributed clandestine tion agreement. Its military leader was process. Unsurprisingly, the Russian cells. The third level would only have hired under a private-sector contract, military draws upon its historical experi- been recruited by the cadre organization and personnel signed an employment ence in the Russian Civil War and Soviet if Switzerland had come under foreign convention via a front company delineat- Cold War for the components of its occupation. The government tasked ing rights and obligations, with members hybrid warfare model. Similarly, at-risk P-26 with recruiting and training core paid and insured discreetly by the federal states can review the Cold War period personnel who could continue the fight government. During peacetime, P-26 fell and, through the careful study and after an occupation. P-26 executed this under the direction of the Swiss Chief of analysis of appropriate historical resis- by setting up stay-behind arms caches, the General Staff.26 tance and unconventional warfare cases, storing specialized equipment that would Third, for recruitment, P-26 sought can assess previously used concepts for be required by the resistance movement, members who were balanced, indepen- possible adaptation, application, and and organizing the necessary infrastruc- dent, stress-resistant, and trustworthy, integration into a national resistance ture for the coordinated command of the but with a low profile from both charac- strategy. Although not actually tested resistance from unoccupied parts of Swiss ter and societal dimensions. They were by war and Soviet occupation, the territory or from a potential exile base.23 to have regular jobs that would provide Swiss example illustrates a pragmatic In essence, P-26 provided the framework cover for periodic training absences. approach for a small European state in for the creation of both an underground Many had no military service records, preparing for resistance in the event of and partial auxiliary. The underground and there were also a minority of females. full or partial occupation of its national

112 Recall / Building a Stay-Behind Resistance Organization JFQ 85, 2nd Quarter 2017 Swiss army infantry squad conduct building search demonstration, October 27, 2006, in Thun (Courtesy TheBernFiles) territory by threat forces. The Swiss case Swiss identity that provides an important network establishment, with new recruits study also provides reflections for U.S. foundation for societal resilience and being brought into the underground and interagency or SOF support to allies resistance to foreign occupiers. This auxiliary forces only after hostilities are considering resistance as an integral prerequisite is an important lesson for the initiated. Naturally, other models can and element of national defense. Several Baltic nations and the integration of their should be evaluated. Of particular interest lessons for evaluation come to the Russian and Polish minorities. is the recruitment of nonmilitary person- forefront. Second, articulating the Total nel conducted by the P-26. In an age First, the Swiss profile as a small Defense concept and resistance mission in of biometrics and electronic databases, country with limited resources has rel- official national security documents pro- this approach could provide a resistance evance for its equally small European vided clear and essential policy guidance movement a greater degree of security cousins. While a RAND report on Swiss for a whole-of-government approach to against aggressor pacification operations. unconventional warfare highlighted the these efforts. The 1973 Swiss Security Fourth, resistance planning and mountainous topography and homog- Report is one example of the need for operations must be well integrated with enous nature of Swiss society as major current governments to provide national- an adequate conventional military force differences with the Baltic countries, this level direction to these defensive efforts. deterrent. Resistance operations alone are assertion is incorrect.30 On the contrary, All elements of national power must insufficient in deterrent effect to dissuade the Swiss P-26 resistance organization be integrated into a defense concept, an aggressor. The Swiss coupled a resis- would have conducted its operations in and the psychological/information war tance concept and organization with a the rather flat Swiss Mittelland, which component takes a leading position for four-corps, 625,000-person conventional encompasses most of the population cen- preparation. As shown in the Swiss case, military force, which represented almost ters as well as the industrial engines of the credible media outlets, an educated, crit- 12 percent of its population in time of economy. This pre-alpine region is also ical-thinking population, and a degree of national emergency. not much different than the topography national pride are antidotes to adversarial Finally, Switzerland did not possess a found in the Baltics. Additionally, the propaganda campaigns. true SOF capability during the Cold War. Swiss population is highly heterogeneous, Third, while guerrillas may come Today, SOF are traditionally responsible having German, French, Italian, and from parts of the armed forces, a clan- for unconventional warfare and resistance Rhaeto-Romanic regions. The Swiss destine cadre organization can provide missions, and they can be an important have successfully meshed these diverse one structural model for unconventional catalyst for resistance planning and cultural and ethnic groups into a single warfare preparation and clandestine preparation by facilitating unified action

JFQ 85, 2nd Quarter 2017 Stringer 113 with their interagency brethren to achieve out Threat: The Swiss Concept of General Defense,” Journal of Peace Research 19, no. 3 unity of effort in resistance operations. (1982), 205–225. New from The Cold War ended with the disso- 9 Walt and Patton. lution of that “Prison of Nations” called 10 Fischer, 205–225; Walt and Patton; and NDU Press the Soviet Union. Yet an irredentist Gustav Daeniker, Schweizerische Selbstbehaup- for the Center for Strategic Research and revanchist Russia has emerged after tungs-Strategien im Kalten Krieg (Frauenfeld, Strategic Forum 298 Switzerland: Huber Verlag, 1996), 30–31. almost two decades to replace it. Already 11 Marc Tribelhorn, “Terror-Rezepte aus Cross-Functional Teams in Defense casting its shadow on the NATO mem- der Schweiz,” Neue Zürcher Zeitung, July 26, Reform: Help or Hindrance? bers of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, 2013, 12. By Christopher J. Lamb the Kremlin may look to other post-So- 12 Bundesrates an die Bundesversammlung There is viet states such as Moldova, Kazakhstan, betreffend die Organisation des Heers (Truppen- strong bipar- ordnung) (Bern: Bundesrat, June 30, 1960), or Georgia for further “Russian World” tisan support 329. 31 adventurism. Considering how to 13 Tribelhorn, 12. for Section adapt the Cold War concept of Total 14 Bericht des Bundesrates ueber die Sicher- 941 of the Defense to current events, especially its heitspolitik der Schweiz. Konzeption der Gesamt- Senate’s ver- critical resistance element, is an impor- verteidigung, Berne, June 27, 1973, 16. sion of the 15 Ibid., 38. tant task for national policymakers and National 16 Bundesrates an die Bundesversammlung their SOF elements to evaluate. The betreffend die Organisation des Heers, 367–368; Defense Swiss Cold War experience provides a and Heinz Haesler, “Grundsaetzliche Ueberle- Authorization Act for 2017, which useful starting point. JFQ guungen eines ehemaligen Generalstabschefs,” requires the Pentagon to use cross- in Erinnerungen an die Armee 61, ed. Franz functional teams (CFTs). CFTs are Betschon and Louis Geiger (Frauenfeld, Swit- a popular organizational construct zerland: Verlag Huber, 2009), 96. Notes 17 Haesler, 96. with a reputation for delivering bet- 18 World Bank data, 2016. ter and faster solutions for complex 1 Roy Allison, “Russian ‘Deniable’ In- 19 Kleine Heereskunde (Bern: EMD, 1992), and rapidly evolving problems. The tervention in Ukraine: How and Why Russia 13–14. Department of Defense reaction to Broke the Rules,” International Affairs 90, no. 20 Mauro Mantovani, “Der ‘Volksaufstand’: the bill has been strongly negative. 6 (2014), 1,255–1,297. Vorstellungen und Vorbereitungen der Schweiz 2 H. Reisinger and A. Golts, Russia’s Hy- im 19. und 20. Jh,” in Military Power Revue Senior officials argue that Section brid Warfare: Waging War below the Radar of der Schweizer Armee, Nr. 1 (2012), 52–60. 941 would “undermine the author- Traditional Collective Defence, NATO Research 21 Daniele Ganser, “The British Secret ity of the Secretary, add bureaucracy, Paper no. 105 (Rome: NATO Defense College, Service in Neutral Switzerland: An Unfinished and confuse lines of responsibility.” November 2014). Debate on NATO’s Cold War Stay-behind 3 The Senate’s and Pentagon’s dia- Milton Paul Davis, “An Historical and Armies,” Intelligence and National Security 20, Political Overview of the Reserve and Guard no. 4 (December 2005), 553–580. metrically opposed positions on the Forces of the Nordic Countries at the Begin- 22 Lucien Fluri, “Ehemalige Geheimarmee value of CFTs can be partially recon- ning of the Twenty-First Century,” Baltic P-26,” Solothurner Zeitung, July 14, 2012. ciled with a better understanding of Security & Defence Review 10 (January 2008), 23 See Bericht der Parlamentarischen Unter- what CFTs are, how cross-functional 171–201. suchungskommission zur besonderen Klaerung 4 groups have performed to date in Switzerland and Sweden both practiced von Vorkommnissen von grosser Tragweite im Total Defense. See Robert Dalsjo, “From Self- Eidgenossischen Militaerdepartement, Bern, the Pentagon, and their prerequi- Sufficiency to Solidarity: The Transformation November 17, 1990; Martin Matter, P-26. Die sites for success. This paper argues of Sweden’s Defence and Security Policies,” Geheimarmee, die keine war (Baden: Verlag hier there is strong evidence that CFTs in Strategic Management of Military Capabili- + jetzt, 2012); Tribelhorn, 12. could provide impressive benefits if ties: Seeking Ways to Foster Military Innovation 24 Mark Grdovic, A Leader’s Handbook to the teams were conceived and em- (Tokyo: National Institute for Defense Studies, Unconventional Warfare, SWCS Publication 2013), 141–160. 09-1 (Fort Bragg, NC: U.S. Army John F. ployed correctly. 5 Joint Publication 3-05, Special Operations Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School, (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing 2009). Office, 2014), xi. 25 Matter, 47. 6 Jon A. Fanzun and Patrick Lehmann, 26 Ibid., 153–154. “Konzeptionelle Grundlagen der Schweizer 27 Ibid., 82. Aussen-und Sicherheits-politik,” in Zuercher 28 Ibid., 50–58. Beitraege zur Sicherheitspolitik und Konfliktfor- 29 Fluri. schung, Nr. 57, ed. K. Spillmann et al. (Zurich: 30 Jan Osburg, Unconventional Options ETH, 2000), 63–86. for the Defense of the Baltic States: The Swiss 7 Lewis W. Walt and George S. Patton, The Approach (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2016), Swiss Report: A Special Study for Western Goals 8, available at . Visit the NDU Press Web site for Foundation, 1983). 31 Reisinger and Golts. more information on publications 8 Dietrich Fischer, “Invulnerability With- at ndupress.ndu.edu

114 Recall / Building a Stay-Behind Resistance Organization JFQ 85, 2nd Quarter 2017 the theme in new ways using different victory resulted as much from Allied ef- battles and their actors. fort as it did from Nazi mistakes. Still, Regarding the Russo-Japanese War, Horne ponders, counterfactually, what Horne explains that while neither the history would have recorded had hubris, Russian nor the Japanese army performed to include ignorance of history and an spectacularly, the Japanese navy surprised ideological and racial fanaticism, not oc- the Western world with its overwhelm- cluded Hitler’s vision when he decided ing victory against the Second Pacific upon the perilous thrust into Russia. Squadron at the Battle of Tsushima, The Axis powers did not have a mo- thereby establishing fertile soil for hubris nopoly on the proclivity to believe in one’s to take root. To wit, according to Horne, infallibility. Indeed, examining General the Japanese naval victory coupled with Douglas MacArthur’s leadership during their Pyrrhic victory in Manchuria not the Korean War and France’s inglorious only forced the Russians to the negotiat- surrender at Dien Bien Phu, Horne writes ing table at Portsmouth in autumn 1905, a fitting recapitulation and coda for the but it also sowed the seeds of the “myth theme of hubris and peripeteia. In the case of Japanese invincibility.” of MacArthur, Horne juxtaposes his demi- Belief in this myth stoked the fires of god status with the shame that followed militarism in Japan during the interwar his dismissal from command. Horne years. Those flames blinded Japan to argues that MacArthur’s belief that “gen- its strategic reality, thereby leading to erals are never given adequate directives,” its overreach in Mongolia, a crippling coupled with his performance leading to Hubris: The Tragedy of War defeat at Midway, and its eventual sur- the Chinese intervention in autumn 1950, in the Twentieth Century render in August 1945. For Horne, stoked his hubris and caused him to act pride caused Japanese leaders to misap- in ways that undermined his civilian lead- By Alistair Horne propriate historical analogy and attempt ers’ policy aims. In turn, a tragic reversal HarperCollins, 2015 to view their battles with the Soviets and of fortune followed as exemplified by the $28.99, 400 pp. Americans as nearly identical to their humiliating “bug out” by United Nations ISBN: 978-0062397805 struggle against Tsar Nicholas II’s Russia forces and President Harry Truman’s de- Reviewed by Ryan A. Sanford in 1905. According to Horne, an earlier cision to replace the general in April 1951. generation’s victory paved the way for its Overall, Horne’s thesis and argument successor’s defeat. Excessive pride made are compelling. There are, however, some ubris, or excessive pride, com- brittle the strategic decisionmaking pro- weaknesses worth noting. While many will prises one part of a tragic dyad. cess where, in fact, elasticity was needed appreciate Horne’s masterful grasp of his- H The other part of the dyad to account for and adapt to changes in tory and his ability to tie together events is peripeteia, or a sudden reversal of the strategic environment. that seemingly do not cohere, his habit of fortune. For historian Alistair Horne, Using the Nazis’ perilous foray into ascribing many of the decisions, actions, the hubris-peripeteia dyad comes to the Soviet heartland as a new subject, and outcomes in his examples to hubris the fore in the decisions and actions of Horne further develops the hubris- ignores the reality that war is inherently some of history’s best-known leaders peripeteia theme. Here, he argues that complex. In other words, the path from and commanders, whose arrogant German arrogance, exemplified by its hubris to disaster is not always straight. overreach led to rapid reversal, defeat, ideology and selective ignoring of his- Nor does every case hinge on individual and shame. In Hubris: The Tragedy of tory, set the foundation for eventual Nazi or institutional hubris. Given the same War in the Twentieth Century, Alistair defeat. Whether discounting the Russian conditions and actors, small perturbations Horne examines six 20th-century battles army’s resurgence in Mongolia or hold- in seemingly insignificant components of to show how an inability to assess the ing in high, but uncritical, regard the the larger battle could result in different strategic context properly, an overesti- Wehrmacht’s performance in Western outcomes. Such is the nature of nonlinear- mation of one’s ability, and, potentially Europe, Horne asserts that Adolf Hitler ity inherent in human endeavor. most significant, an ignorance of histo- never examined the strategic context, and Still, Horne’s argument that hubris ry’s lessons, preceded many inglorious how it had changed, before Operation was the sufficient condition for the re- failures on the battlefield. Much like a Barbarossa. Hitler’s geopolitik and belief versals of fortune in his examples might Baroque composer, Horne establishes in the superiority of ethnic Germans have been more convincing had he used the hubris and peripeteia theme of his blinded him to reality, which led to the methodology of process tracing. Even fugue using the Russo-Japanese War the Nazi reversal of fortune. That said, in failing to follow such a methodology, as the exposition, and then presents Horne acknowledges that the Allied Horne could have provided the reader

JFQ 86, 3rd Quarter 2017 Book Reviews 115 with the tools to conduct such an inquiry. who perished in the wheat-bearing land of With only a limited bibliography and a Gela; paucity of notes, however, such an in- of his noble prowess the grove of Marathon quiry would prove daunting. can speak, Despite these minor issues, Horne’s work is instructive, especially because and the long-haired Persian knows it well. of the author’s consistent reminder of the fate awaiting those who ignore the It serves as one more reminder of past. In fact, such a theme could have why the past appears to be of little use to easily taken pride of place in this work. Americans who look forward to a brave Horne’s explanation of how the Battle of new world. Tsushima, the 1940 Blitzkrieg, and the Professor Paul Rahe has directly chal- Battle of Verdun persisted as analogies lenged those assumptions that history for the Japanese at Midway, for Hitler is bunk. His Grand Strategy of Classical during Barbarossa, and for the French in Sparta is a brilliant study of Spartan strat- Indochina, respectively, shows the power egy during the Persian Wars (500 to 479 analogies wield within the mind of the BCE) that deserves to be read by those decisionmaker. In fact, Horne’s examples few still interested in the conduct of grand provide additional evidence of the power strategy and the choices, good and bad, of historical analogy, much as Yuen Foong made by leaders under the pressures of Khong described in Analogies at War. war. He has laid out the obvious as well For Horne, the arrogant not only tend to as the underlying factors that eventually ignore history, but they also are heavily The Grand Strategy of Classical led to victory on the part of the Spartans inclined to extend beyond their abilities. Sparta: The Persian Challenge and their Greek allies against the great Indeed, Horne’s six examples demonstrate By Paul A. Rahe empire of Persia. The victory of the Greek the validity of Clausewitz’s concept of a Yale University Press, 2015 states was by no means inevitable. Their culminating point and the importance $34.95, 424 pp. opponents not only had an immense of reading the strategic context correctly ISBN: 978-0300116427 superiority in numbers, but from the be- to assess when such overreach will prove ginning also possessed an advantage in the detrimental. Given the complexity of the Reviewed by Williamson Murray general disunity of the Greek city-states. strategic environment in the Pacific and Thus, it took extraordinary political and ongoing operations in the Middle East, strategic skill for a few Greek leaders to such reminders are helpful. t the end of the 20th century hold their fragile alliance together. Finally, some may find Horne’s lack of and the beginning of the 21st For Sparta, its leaders, and their any prescriptive counters to the influence century, Americans and their A strategy, the problem was both internal of hubris to be a detriment. Yet this, too, military leaders have had all too little and external. On one side, they con- is a strength. With a prescription, one sense of the importance of history and fronted a deeply hostile population of can easily fall prey to “checking the box,” too little grasp of literature on thinking helots, whom they ruled with a ruthless- all while treading the path of hubris. about strategy and the role of military ness that still echoes through the ages. Instead, Horne cautions that hubris is power in the world. In fact, in the Those helots were essential to Sparta’s insidious. While one is most vulnerable to massive assault by the literati of the military power because they provided its effects during triumphant moments, intellectual world, America’s elites have the sustenance on which the economy the pathogen lingers. Thus, an awareness come to regard the dead men of ancient and warrior polis depended, since the of its presence is, for Horne, the best Greece as thoroughly suspect and not Spartans forbade any kind of industry or medicine of all. The knowledge of hu- worthy of serious study. In that regard, trade to its warrior citizens, whose sole bris’s infectiousness and the willingness to the stele (tombstone) that marked the business was preparation for war. Not admit one’s fallibility may prove the clos- grave of the great Greek dramatist surprisingly, the Spartans confronted the est thing to an inoculation against hubris Aeschylus identifies him as a veteran of potential of massive revolt among the and its most dangerous manifestation, the pitched battle between the Persians helots, revolts that their neighbors were peripeteia. JFQ and the Athenians at Marathon in 490 more than willing to support. Thus, they BCE, with no mention of his dramatic were deeply conscious of the importance triumphs. His memorial reads: Lieutenant Colonel Ryan Sanford, USAF, is of balancing their internal dangers with currently an Operations Officer and is a graduate the external threats in the Peloponnesus. Beneath this stone lies Aeschylus, son of of the School of Advanced Air and Space Studies Against Sparta’s ancient opponent, and the Test Pilot School. Euphorion, the Athenian,

116 Book Reviews JFQ 86, 3rd Quarter 2017 Argos, they waged a series of wars over Doing battle with the Medes and crowning were largely responsible for keeping the the centuries to maintain their superiority Athens alliance together, and then in the sum- in the Peloponnesus. For the Arcadians, mer of 479 BCE, the Spartan generals the other independent Peloponnesians, Very few, awaiting and welcoming war at directed the combined force of hoplites the Spartans bound their city-states as the hands of the multitude. to a great victory that ended the Persian tightly as possible to the Spartan regime. threat to Greek freedom. As Rahe underlines, Sparta maintained The Spartans arrived late for the In the largest sense, it was the superi- a highly successful strategy “designed to battle because of a religious festival, but ority of Greek strategy that would allow keep their Argives out, the helots down, it was not due to chance. The Persians’ them to hold onto their freedom. Rahe’s and the Arcadians . . . in.” intelligence on the Greeks obviously history, then, is crucial because it ties the But Sparta’s strategic approach would knew the Spartans and their religious sen- pressures of war and battles to the execu- work only so long as the Peloponnesus sibilities and struck the Athenians when tion of an effective strategy. Here, both confronted no external threat. And at the the Peloponnesians would not be avail- the Spartans and the Athenians proved end of the 6th century BCE, that threat able. The same factor in Sparta’s deeply far superior to their Persian opponents. appeared with the rise of Persia and the religious commitment to its traditions oc- Rahe sums up what the Spartans and their creation of a great empire lying to the curred a decade later. As Rahe points out, allies had achieved in the following terms: east of the Aegean. Rahe’s story then is Leonidas and the 300 would go down “That an alliance of small cities . . . should a brilliant account of how the Spartans to defeat in 480 BCE at Thermopylae stand up to and annihilate what was argu- adapted their strategy to an entirely because the main Spartan army was ably the largest army and most formidable different world that they had ruled detained at home celebrating a religious fleet ever assembled—this was and still so successfully in the past. It is a tale of festival in the Peloponnesus. is a wonder well worthy of extended great leadership, the difficulties of mak- Ten years after Marathon, the Persians contemplation.” For those interested in ing effective grand and military strategy returned with a massive land army and understanding strategy in the real world in the face of quarrelsome allies, and the navy. Here, the alliance between the and the price that men have been willing importance of the sharp end of combat. Spartans and the Athenians would hold to pay for their freedom, this is a book The Persian threat to the Greek city- together in spite of the extraordinary dif- well worth reading. JFQ states had begun to emerge at the turn ferences in their cultures and politics. The of the 6th century BCE as the Persians Athenian Themistocles, son of Neocles, spread their control over the Middle East perhaps the greatest strategist of all time, Professor Williamson Murray is the author or editor of over 20 books, most recently A and through Anatolia toward the Aegean. had seen the danger with the greatest Savage War: A Military History of the Civil War The city-states along the western fringes perception. Well before the Persians (coauthored with Wayne Wei-siang Hsieh). of Anatolia resisted, but received insuf- moved in 480 BCE, Themistocles had ficient military aid from the Greeks in the already persuaded his fellow countrymen Western Aegean to fend the Persians off. to spend the whole windfall they had re- It was inevitable that the Persians would ceived from their silver mines at Laurium attempt to spread their power and rule to expand the Athenian fleet instead of across the Aegean into Europe. In the spending it on themselves at a time when late 490s, they moved against the Greek the Persian threat still appeared distant. city-states on the mainland of Europe. It was as if in the present day and age, the Many Greeks “medized” (threw their lot American people agreed to spend their in with the Persians), but the Spartans entire social security payments on buying and the Athenians refused. new equipment for the American military. The result was an invasion of Attica That fleet was to provide the margin of and the astonishing victory of Athenian Greek superiority in defeating the Persian hoplites over the Persian army on the fleet at Salamis. plains of Marathon in 490 BCE. Almost But, as Rahe points out, the naval 200 Athenians died in the battle, and victory at Salamis did not end the threat, their epigram noted: as accounts of the war, most written by Athenian sympathizers, suggest. While Reputation, indeed, as it reaches the ends Xerxes and the Persian fleet scuttled off of the sun-lit earth from the Aegean in flight after Salamis, the massive Persian army remained to the valor of these men shall make manifest: threaten the Greeks not only with battle, How they died but also with efforts at subversion to break up the Greek alliance. The Spartans

JFQ 86, 3rd Quarter 2017 Book Reviews 117 distinction ensconces him as nonpareil Those documents also assist the among Presidents in dealing with the authors’ attempts to correct the record threat. President Reagan’s thinking was about the fall of communism. Specifically, encapsulated in a simple, trenchant state- they assert the Soviet Union’s demise did ment he made as governor of California: not “just happen,” to put it colloquially. “We win and they lose.” His outlook Contrary to myth, President Reagan was very basic, very fundamental, and, it is far more than what some journalists must be added, very timely, as the earlier described as a casual spectator, simply strategies to counter the Soviet Union watching the Cold War events unfold fluctuated between détente and contain- toward an inevitable conclusion. The ment. Reagan said no to both. authors claim that Reagan was the instru- The authors eloquently and ef- ment of change, unswerving from his fectively highlight those early events endstate. Nor did Reagan alter his views shaping Reagan’s views. They return to in the face of the media swoon over his days with the Screen Actors Guild Mikhail Gorbachev when that Soviet when Reagan, the actor, was deeply leader entered the international scene. moved by Witness, the autobiography The intense focus on Reagan and his of one-time communist Whittaker high-level measures is one of this book’s Chambers. For Reagan, the book de- shortcomings. The reader may notice a lineated the ends, ways, and means of slight neglect of other factors affecting communism, and basically set him on the demise of the Soviet Union. There is the conservative course he followed good coverage of the internal suffering The Grand Strategy for the rest of his life. His 1964 speech from the malaise produced by com- That Won the Cold War: delivered on behalf of Barry Goldwater’s munism; the Soviet people were indeed Architecture of Triumph Presidential campaign, titled “A Time dissatisfied with “the great Lie.” Reagan for Choosing,” stands out as another took advantage of that dismal internal Edited by Douglas E. Streusand, milestone of Reagan’s views. Specifically, state of affairs, knowing it created fertile Norman A. Bailey, Francis H. Marlo, Reagan surmised the United States ground for the effects of Radio Free and Paul D. Gelpi could not play defense all the time; it Europe (RFE), which Reagan’s adminis- Lexington Books, 2016 would lose. Eventually, he concluded the tration reenergized after it had languished $95.00, 296 pp. United States must eschew détente and in the 1970s. ISBN: 978-0739188293 take a strategic initiative to roll back— Also, the absence of argument makes Reviewed by John Culclasure not just counter—the communist threat. the book come across as fawning. The The documentation and primary authors’ individual chapters consistently sources in the book’s second part are reinforce each other, with no attempts or anyone crediting and honoring fascinating reading in themselves. made to counter or debate the other con- Ronald Reagan as the President Drawing on declassified National tributors’ theses or points of view. F who defeated communism, this Security Decision Directives and talking Furthermore, the book’s focus on is a must-read book. The authors of points, some included as appendices, high-level strategic exchanges creates the various chapters—several were the authors show the 40th President as a dearth of coverage of operational members of President Reagan’s an able planner, very much involved exploits. The military build-up during National Security Council staff— during his first term’s outset. While the Reagan’s administration is not really single him out as the progenitor of the documents capture only a short span of addressed. There is no mention of the “grand strategy” that brought down his Presidency’s early years, Reagan’s seminal Goldwater-Nichols Department the Soviet Union. The book begins burst of energy is nevertheless evident; of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986. as a record of the formative events he shines as a crafter of a strategy that Neither the Joint Chiefs of Staff nor the shaping Reagan, the man, in terms was indeed “grand.” It was never static, Chairman receive much attention. When of his views and perceptions of com- and it entailed, as evidenced in the docu- they do appear, however, it is heartening munism. In the second part, the reader ments, all sources of power: diplomatic, to see them as cooperative actors for the discovers the broad sweep of the many informational, military, and economic. most part. discussions, meetings, and decisions Indeed, Reagan wanted them all work- President Reagan’s methodical dis- that helped Reagan see the fruition of ing cohesively to fight the Cold War and section of the entire Soviet problem is his strategy to win the Cold War. to win it decisively. Reagan’s great faith instructive, reflecting the system’s ap- Reagan intended to defeat commu- in U.S. technology is also evident in ex- proach, which is now a major part of joint nism; in essence, he went to war. This cerpts of his personal diary. publications. Also, the book’s sections

118 Book Reviews JFQ 86, 3rd Quarter 2017 dealing with the power of information lend themselves well to future joint oper- ations. Current articles about information operations are replete with the need for fine-tuned narrative, key leader engage- ment, and considerations of the proper target audiences. This is bolstered by a very instructive reference to RFE by the dissident Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn, who ex- horted the medium’s power but deplored its ineffective content in the 1970s. Given the way the book demonstrates Reagan’s steadfastness, future command- ers in chief might be inclined to follow his example to address the threats facing the United States in much the same way. After all, one of the newer principles of war is “perseverance.” Future Presidents will, in essence, have a grand strategy model should they need it. JFQ From NDU Press Professor John Culclasure teaches at the U.S. Women on the Frontlines of Peace and Security Army Command and Staff Officers’ Course at Fort Belvoir, Virginia. Foreword by Hillary Rodham Clinton and Leon Panetta NDU Press, 2015 • 218 pp. This book reflects President Barack Obama’s commitment to advancing women’s participation in preventing conflict and keeping peace. It is inspired by the countless women and girls on the frontlines who make a difference every day in their communities and societies by creating opportunities and building peace. Around the globe, policymakers and activists are working to empower women as agents of peace and to help address the challenges they face as survivors of conflict. When women are involved in peace negotiations, they raise important issues that might be otherwise overlooked. When women are educated and enabled to participate in every aspect of their societies—from growing the economy to strengthening the security sector—communities are more stable and less prone to conflict. Our understanding of the importance of women in building and keeping peace is informed by a wide range of experts, from diplomats to military officials and from human rights activists to development professionals. The goal of this book is to bring together these diverse voices. As leaders in every region of the world recognize, no country can reach its full potential without the participation of all its citizens. This book seeks to add to the chorus of voices working to ensure that women and girls take their rightful place in building a stronger, safer, more prosperous world. Available at ndupress.ndu.edu/Books/ WomenontheFrontlinesofPeaceandSecurity.aspx

JFQ 86, 3rd Quarter 2017 Book Reviews 119 USS Hopper prepares to moor in Homer, Alaska, in conjunction with its participation in biennial training exercise Northern Edge 2017, which includes units assigned to Alaskan Command, U.S. Pacific Fleet, U.S. Third Fleet, Marine Corps Forces Pacific, and U.S. Army Pacific, April 29, 2017 (U.S. Navy/Joseph Montemarano)

Adaptive Doctrine Infusing the Changing Character of Warfare into Doctrine

By Gregory E. Browder and Marcus J. Lewis

The nature of war is changing. . . . It is my assumption today that it would be very difficult for any conflict to be isolated to a region. Any conflict we have will be trans-regional, multi-domain and multi-functional.

—General Joseph F. Dunford, Jr.

120 Joint Doctrine / Adaptive Doctrine JFQ 86, 3rd Quarter 2017 Figure Adaptive Doctrine

o support J e must B means of o cope with Strategic Guidance Enhance the operational Central Idea Conditions National Security Strategy effectiveness of joint forces by The Joint Staff, as part of the joint doctrine development community, Dynamic threat environment National Military Strategy providing fundamental principles provides an adaptive joint doctrine development process that is timely, Transregional Multi-domain, that guide the employment of Unified Command Plan agile, and responsive to the needs of the joint force. Executed through Multi-functional (TMM) U.S. military forces toward a Changing audience Capstone Concept for Joint common objective. Declining resources Operations Process Joint Operating Environment Adaptive Priorities Reuires Doctrine Strategic Engagement CCMDs Products JFD Directors Governed by In coordination with Interagency CJCSI 5120.01 CCMDs Other Stakeholders CJCSM 5120.01 Services CJCSI 5705.01 CSAs CJCSI 2700.01 Interagency Joint Doctrine Development SOP Joint Force Development Allied Doctrine Campaign Plan

o do this we must hange Assess

Adaptive to Priorities Adaptive Process Adaptive Product Line (Integration Assessment Feedback CJCS Priorities/NMS/41 Revise policy Tailored to the need of customer Assess for doctrinal trends CCMD Input One draft Tiered Hierarchy CCMD Exercises/OPLANS/Lessons Learned Campaign Plans Reduce number of JPs Appropriate content Receive Feedback CCMDs/Services/CSAs/J-7 Functions/JS OPLANs Revise/change/maintain/fast track Appropriate reviews Informs Priorities and Product JFD Input Appropriate assessments Technical/electronic alternatives

he changing character of warfare idea of how the Joint Staff has updated level of effort is applied to each JP demands a more flexible doc- the process. The following details revision to enhance its usefulness and T trine development approach. In further explain the three components currency. response to the risk associated with of the updated Adaptive Doctrine Product. J7 has also decided to reset revising joint publications (JPs) based development approach. the JP library to determine whether on their age, the Director of Joint Force Priority. The JP hierarchy has been content as it is presently represented in Development, Vice Admiral Kevin D. reviewed, detailing the association and the doctrine library is best suited to be Scott, recognized that JP development usefulness of a particular publication to maintained as is; consolidated in another must be prioritized based on top-down the National Military Strategy and joint joint publication(s); recategorized as a guidance and bottom-up refinement. force. That analysis provided a baseline different product such as a subject specific As a result, the joint doctrine develop- from which combatant commands, Joint manual or handbook to ensure joint doc- ment process is being redesigned. This Staff, and Service inputs were used to trine is appropriately tailored; or should Adaptive Doctrine approach will reduce prioritize the library and calendar year be eliminated altogether. These efforts the time required to revise publications; 2017–2018 Joint Doctrine Development will further inform whether changes are ensure the process is being effectively and Assessment Schedule. needed to our current product line to managed to produce high-quality revi- Process. To meet process redesign meet resource and manpower limitations. sions; and reset the content of the joint challenges, the Joint Staff J7 is instituting This Adaptive Doctrine approach doctrine library to reflect a portfolio several key policy changes such as single will ensure joint doctrine development is that is lean, appropriately linked to joint staffing of revision drafts during the JP responsive to strategic guidance, the joint warfighting functions, and is manage- development process; by exception, a force, and remain timely based on contin- able within manpower and fiscal limita- second draft may be required. This ad- uous assessment and feedback from the tion. The figure explains the central justment will reduce the revision process end user. As transregional, multidomain, time from 17 to 12 months. However, and multifunctional threat environments this streamlined process necessitates the continue to evolve, we must capitalize on Lieutenant Colonel Gregory E. Browder, USA, is highest quality initial input from Joint our ability to adapt the joint doctrine that Deputy Division Chief, Joint Doctrine Division, Doctrine Development stakeholders. guides joint force commanders and their Joint Staff J7. Lieutenant Colonel Markus J. Lewis, USA, is a Strategic Planner, Joint Doctrine Additionally, the development process is staffs as they prepare to conduct missions Division, Joint Staff J7. being refined to ensure the appropriate worldwide. JFQ

JFQ 86, 3rd Quarter 2017 Browder and Lewis 121 Captain Timothy Black pilots KC-135 Stratotanker on combat refueling mission over Southwest Asia while two Navy F/A- 18C Hornets fly alongside, May 21, 2017 (Air National Guard/Andrew J. Moseley)

JP 3-0 is the keystone document of the joint operations series. It provides the Joint Publication 3-0, doctrinal foundation and fundamental principles that guide the Armed Forces in all joint operations. The 2017 JP 3-0 Joint Operations is not a radical departure from previous versions. The majority of changes ensure the publication now contains the most By Rick Rowlett current terms, definitions, and refer- ences based on changes to other JPs in the joint doctrine library since approval he Joint Staff Director, Joint operations.2 In a measure to increase of the 2011 JP 3-0. For example, the Force Development Director- access to and understanding of joint joint community’s recommendations ate (J7), signed a revised Joint doctrine, General John Shalikashvili, T 3 resulted in additional relevant informa- Publication (JP) 3-0, Joint Operations, Powell’s successor, issued the 1995 tion on joint electromagnetic spectrum on January 17, 2017. This JP 3-0 is JP 3-0 in a hard-copy, purple-covered operations (JEMSO)—those activities the latest in a series that began with a format as part of a Joint Doctrine consisting of electronic warfare and joint January 1990 “test publication” titled Professional Library Desk Set.4 The electromagnetic spectrum management Doctrine for Unified and Joint Opera- Chairman also made the joint doctrine used to exploit, attack, protect, and man- tions.1 General Colin Powell approved library available on the Internet. Since age the electromagnetic environment the first official version of JP 3-0 in then, the joint doctrine development to achieve the commander’s objectives. 1993 based, in part, on agreements community has revised JP 3-0 in 2001, JEMSO is an important topic in JP reached among the Joint Chiefs of Staff 2006, and 2011. There also was a 6-01, Joint Electromagnetic Spectrum on a number of debated aspects of joint Change 1 in 2008 to ensure continuity Management Operations, and JP 3-13.1, with JP 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces Electronic Warfare. Similarly, JP 3-0 of the United States, and a Change 2 in authors expanded content associated with 2010 to incorporate text on cyberspace Rick Rowlett is Lead Joint Doctrine Integrator, the “protection” joint function by adding Joint Doctrine Division, Joint Staff J7. and cyberspace operations.

122 Joint Doctrine / Joint Publication 3-0 JFQ 86, 3rd Quarter 2017 paragraphs on protection of civilians, consistency in language. Both JPs modi- which may be the primary purpose of a fied their discussions of phasing joint New from mission or a supporting task. Addressing operations for the same purpose. JP 5-0 this topic in JP 3-0 provides continuity eliminates the figure that depicts phas- NDU Press with several other JPs, such as JP 3-07.3, ing. JP 3-0 retains a figure that shows for the Center for Strategic Research Peace Operations, and JP 3-07, Stability; notional phases on an operation, but the Strategic Forum 295 each covers protection of civilians in their associated text clarifies that it represents Reflections on U.S.-Cuba specific context. only one alternative. Actual phases will Military-to-Military Contacts Beyond the type of updates men- vary according to the nature of the opera- by Hal Klepak tioned above, it is essential that the tion and the joint force commander’s President constructs and language on overlapping decisions. The objective of ensuring Barack topics are consistent and complementary doctrinal continuity and consistency also Obama’s visit between JP 3-0 and JP 3-20, Security applies to the relationship between JP 3-0 to Cuba in Cooperation, JP 5-0, Joint Planning, and and JP 1, which is currently in revision March 2016 JP 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the and scheduled for publication in fourth opened up United States. Thus, the more significant quarter 2017. the possibility changes in the new JP 3-0 focused on The JP 3-0 revision was informed by of strategic this objective. the latest information available from joint benefits for Security cooperation encompasses ef- community feedback; various lessons both nations. Well after over 50 forts by the Department of Defense with learned and best practices from cur- years of hostility, however, it will foreign security forces and institutions rent operations; and relevant, validated not be easy to keep this nascent to build relationships that help promote constructs identified during assessment relationship on track. Avoiding U.S. interests and enable partner nations of approved joint concepts. The revision missteps requires a deep knowledge to provide the United States access to focused on achieving continuity and ap- of Cuba and particularly its Revo- territory, infrastructure, information, and propriate balance across JPs of related lutionary Armed Forces (Fuerzas resources. Security cooperation also helps topics such as security cooperation and Armadas Revolucionarias, or those organizations build and apply their joint planning. Achievement of that FAR). The FAR are a complex and capabilities and capacities consistent with objective ensures that the revised keystone powerful institution that enjoys U.S. defense objectives. JP 3-0 discusses joint operations publication will remain a great public respect—more so than security cooperation in the context of relevant and current doctrinal foundation Cuba’s Communist Party—and military operations across the conflict for all other JPs. JFQ remain central to the function- continuum at the low end of the range ing of the Cuban economy and of military operations. Combined with state. Broadening rapprochement military engagement and deterrence, Notes without the support of the FAR is security cooperation helps maintain U.S. inconceivable. 1 global influence and keep day-to-day Joint Publication (JP) 3-0, Doctrine for This paper offers insights con- Unified and Joint Operations (Washington, DC: tensions between nations or groups The Joint Staff, January 1990). cerning the FAR. It argues that it will below the threshold of armed conflict. 2 On November 23, 1992, General Colin be important to expand cooperation Chapter VI in JP 3-0 focuses on military Powell signed a memorandum (CM-1502-92, in the right areas and that it will be engagement, security cooperation, and Subject: A Doctrinal Statement of Selected important to start small, go slow, deterrence. Joint Operational Concepts) that formalized build trust, consult early and often, an accompanying paper titled A Doctrinal Joint Planning, the focus of JP 5-0, Statement of Selected Joint Operational Concepts. let Cuba take the lead, and avoid touches all aspects of joint operations. JP This paper represented agreement among the imposing or reflecting a U.S.-centric 3-0 and JP 5-0 authors collaborated to Joint Chiefs of Staff on selected aspects of joint view of civil-military relations. ensure continuity between these keystone operations, and was intended to guide develop- JPs during each revision cycle. JP 3-0 is ment of the 1993 JP 3-0 as well as JP 3-03, Doctrine for Joint Interdiction Operations, and the proponent publication for operational JP 3-09, Doctrine for Joint Fire Support. art, while JP 5-0 is the proponent for 3 Admiral David Jeremiah served as acting operational design and the joint planning Chairman for 23 days between Generals Powell process. While focused at the operational and Shalikashvili. 4 level, content in both JPs addresses stra- The desk set also contained other keystone JPs, a CD-ROM, and a VHS video. tegic and tactical issues. For example, the introduction of theater campaign plan- Visit the NDU Press Web site for ning in JP 5-0 resulted in related changes more information on publications at ndupress.ndu.edu in JP 3-0 to ensure continuity and

JFQ 86, 3rd Quarter 2017 Rowlett 123 New from Joint Publications (JPs) Under Revision NDU Press (to be signed within 6 months) for the Center for Complex JP 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States Operations Like, Comment, Retweet: The State of JP 3-07.3, Peace Operations the Military’s Nonpartisan Ethic in the JP 3-12, Cyberspace Operations World of Social Media by Heidi A. Urben JP 3-22, Foreign Internal Defense Past research JP 3-24, Counterinsurgency contends JP 3-27, Homeland Defense that with the exception JP 3-33, Joint Task Force Headquarters of voting in JP 3-35, Deployment and Redeployment Operations Presidential JP 3-57, Civil-Military Operations elections, military offi- JP 3-72, Nuclear Operations cers’ politi- JP 4-02, Joint Health Services cal participation is fairly muted. Through a survey of more than JPs Revised (signed within last 6 months) 500 military elites attending the United States Military Academy JP 2-03, Geospatial Intelligence in Joint Operations and National Defense University, JP 3-0, Joint Operations this case study seeks to establish JP 3-01, Countering Air and Missile Threats the nature and extent of politi- cal expression throughout social JP 3-13, Information Operations media and whether such expression JP 3-13.4, Military Deception is in keeping with the norm of JP 3-15.1, Counter-Improvised Explosive Device Operations nonpartisanship. Findings suggest that while most JP 3-59, Meteorological and Oceanographic Operations military elites continue to identify as JP 4-01, Defense Transportation System conservative and Republican, fewer JP 4-01.6, Joint Logistics Over-the-Shore appear to do so today than at any other time over the past 30 years. JP 4-06, Mortuary Affairs Military elites who identify as liber- JP 4-08, Logistic Support of Multinational Operations als and Democrats are more likely to JP 5-0, Joint Planning have more politically diverse military friends on social media, but are also more likely to report feeling uncom- fortable by their friends’ politics. This study concludes by considering the implications these findings carry for the norms of an apolitical, non- partisan military.

Visit the NDU Press Web site for more information on publications at ndupress.ndu.edu

124 Joint Doctrine JFQ 86, 3rd Quarter 2017 From NDU Press Charting a Course: Strategic Choices for a New Administration 2016 • 396 pp.

The Trump administration takes office in a time of great complexity. The President faces a national security environment shaped by strong currents: globalization; the proliferation of new, poor, and weak states, as well as nonstate ac- tors; a persistent landscape of violent extremist organizations; slow economic growth; the rise of China and a revanchist Russia; a collapsing Middle East; and domestic policies wracked by division and mistrust. While in absolute terms the Nation and the world are safer than in the last century, today the United States finds itself almost on a permanent war footing, engaged in military operations around the world.

This book, written by experts at the Defense Department’s National Defense University, offers valuable policy advice and grand strat- egy recommendations to those senior leaders who will staff and lead this administration in national security affairs. The President and his staff, Members of Congress, and the many leaders throughout government concerned with the Nation’s security interests should find this book valuable. Their task is not an easy one, and this volume’s insights and reflections are offered with an ample dose of humility. There are no silver bullets, no elegant solutions to the complex problems confronting America and its leaders. This volume provides context and un- derstanding about the current national security environment to those in the Administration as they prepare to lead the Nation during challenging times. To those senior leaders who bear the heavi- est responsibilities, these policy insights may chart a course forward.

The lessons encountered in Afghanistan and Iraq at the strategic level inform our understanding of national security decisionmaking, intelligence, the character of contemporary conflict, and unity of effort and command. They stand alongside the lessons of other wars and remind future senior officers that those who fail to learn from past mistakes are bound to repeat them.

Available at . JOINT FORCE QUARTERLY ISSUE EIGHTY-SIX, 3RD QUARTER 2017

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National Defense University, Washington, DC National Defense University, Washington, The Armed Forces Officer“This new edition of The Armed Forces articulates the ethical and moral underpin- nings at the core of our profession. The special trust in us by the Nation and confidence placed we protect is built upon this foundation. I commend members of our officer corps to embrace the principles of this important book and practice them daily in the performance of your du- I expect you to imbue these values in the next generation of leaders.” ties. More importantly, Available at . New from NDU Press New from Officer The Armed Forces 2017 • 212 pp. ChairmanStaff: of the Joint Chiefs of Dunford, Jr., From the Foreword by General Joseph F. C. Marshall, then serving George “In 1950, the great Soldier-Statesman Secretary as the of Officer page for a new book titled The ArmedDefense, signed a cover Forces . That original Marshall, who later explained that was written by none other than S.L.A. version of this book Secretary Marshall had ‘inspired the undertakingpersonal conviction that American due to his military officers, of whatever service, should share common ground morally.’ ethically and it addressed an of the Cold War, emergence at the dawn of the nuclear age and the Written officer a strategy of nuclear deterrence, corps tasked with developing facing unprecedented deployments, and adapting to the creation of the Department- of Defense and other new orga nizations necessary to manage the threats of a new global order. Published for the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff University Press by National Defense Have you checked out NDU Press online lately? Have you checked