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Balancing Act: Countering Digital Disinformation While Respecting Balancing Act: Countering Digital Disinformation While Respecting Freedom of Expression Broadband Commission research report on ‘Freedom of Expression and Addressing Disinformation on the Internet’ September 2020 Balancing Act: Countering Digital Disinformation While Respecting Freedom of Expression Broadband Commission research report on ‘Freedom of Expression and Addressing Disinformation on the Internet’ Introduction Editors: Kalina Bontcheva & Julie Posetti Contributing authors: Kalina Bontcheva University of Sheffield, UK International Center for Journalists (U.S.); Centre for Freedom of the Media, University of Sheffield (UK); Reuters Julie Posetti Institute for the Study of Journalism, University of Oxford, (UK) Denis Teyssou Agence France Presse, France Trisha Meyer Vrije Universiteit Brussel, Belgium Sam Gregory WITNESS, U.S. Clara Hanot EU Disinfo Lab, Belgium Diana Maynard University of Sheffield, UK Published in 2020 by International Telecommunication Union (ITU), Place des Nations, CH-1211 Geneva 20, Switzerland, and the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, and United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), 7, Place de Fontenoy, 75352 Paris 07 SP, France ISBN 978-92-3-100403-2 This research will be available in Open Access under the Attribution-ShareAlike 3.0 IGO (CC-BY SA 3.0 IGO) license. By using the content of this publication, the users accept to be bound by the terms of use of the UNESCO Open Access Repository. 2 Authors Contents Foreword ......................................................................................................................................... 7 Executive Summary .....................................................................................................................8 1 Introduction ..........................................................................................................................17 2 Typology of Disinformation Responses ....................................................................... 36 3 Research Context and Gaps ..............................................................................................41 4 Identification Responses .................................................................................................. 65 4.1 Monitoring and fact-checking responses ..................................................................................................66 4.2 Investigative responses ..........................................................................................................................87 5 Ecosystem Responses Aimed at Producers and Distributors ................................. 96 5.1 Legislative, pre-legislative, and policy responses .....................................................................97 5.2 National and international counter-disinformation campaigns ....................................113 5.3 Electoral-specific responses .............................................................................................................123 6 Responses within Production and Distribution ....................................................... 140 6.1 Curatorial responses .............................................................................................................................141 6.2 Technical / algorithmic responses ............................................................................................... 169 6.3 Demonetisation and advertising-linked responses .............................................................190 7 Responses Aimed at The Target Audiences of Disinformation Campaigns .....202 7.1 Normative and ethical responses .................................................................................................203 7.2 Educational responses ........................................................................................................................ 218 7.3 Empowerment & credibility labelling responses ....................................................................................................................................................231 8 Challenges and Recommended Actions ....................................................................248 9 List of Sources Consulted ............................................................................................... 267 Appendix A ................................................................................................................................. 322 Contents 3 Figures Figure 1. Top-level categories of disinformation responses ........................................................... 37 Figure 2. The 4 top-level response categories and their eleven sub-categories. �������������������38 Figure 3. Chart Source: Buzzfeed News (Silverman et al., 2020) ��������������������������������������������������50 Figure 4. A geographical map of the IFCN signatories (67 verified active and 14 under renewal in early 2020) .............................................................................................69 Figure 5. A view of the Duke University Reporters’ Lab fact-checking database .....................71 Figure 6. A view of Facebook third-party fact checking network by continent ...................... 72 Figure 7. Map view of Facebook third-party fact checking network worldwide distribution ....................................................................................................................................... 73 Figure 8. Distribution of Facebook third-party fact checking programme by organisations involved ................................................................................................................ 74 Tables Table 1. Simplified version of the political disinformation campaign categorisation scheme devised by Brooking et al. (2020). ...........................................................................46 Table 2. Distribution of Facebook’s third-party fact checking network by country and number of operations ................................................................................................................... 73 Table 3. Legislative, pre-legislative, and policy responses (mapped against study taxonomy) .............................................................................................................................................. 107 Table 4. National and international counter-disinformation campaigns ��������������������������������� 115 Table 5. Curatorial responses from internet communication companies �������������������������������146 Table 6. Curatorial responses from internet communication companies to the COVID-19 Disinfodemic ........................................................................................................... 160 4 Contents The designations employed and the presentation of material throughout this publication do not imply the expression of any opinion whatsoever on the part of the Broadband Commission for Sustainable Development concerning the legal status of any country, territory, city or area or of its authorities, or concerning the delimitation of its frontiers or boundaries. The ideas and opinions expressed in this publication are those of the authors; they are not necessarily those of the Broadband Commission for Sustainable Development and do not commit the Commission. Members of the Working Group on Freedom of Expression and Addressing Disinformation 1. Hessa Al Jaber, chairperson Eshailsat 2. Bocar Ba, SAMENA 3. Moez Chakchouk, Focal Point, UNESCO 4. Piotr Dmochowski-Lipski, EUTELSAT IGO 5. Ramin Guluzade, Republic of Azerbaijan 6. Carlos Manuel Jarque Uribe, America Movil 7. Beeban Kidron, 5Rights Foundation 8. Robert Kirkpatrick, UN Global Pulse 9. Yee Cheong (Dato’) Lee ISTIC 10. Adrian Lovett, The Web Foundation 11. Philipp Metzger, DG Swiss Ministry of Communications 12. Paul Mitchell, Microsoft 13. Speranza Ndege, Kenyatta University 14. Patrick Nyirishema, Focal Point, Director-General Rwanda Utilities Regulatory Authority 15. Joanna Rubinstein, World Childhood Foundation 16. Achim Steiner, UNDP (via Minerva Novero-Belec) Expert oversight group Fabrício Benevenuto (Federal University of Minas Gerais) Divina Frau-Meigs (Université Sorbonne Nouvelle - Paris 3). Cherian George (Hong Kong Baptist University) Claire Wardle (First Draft) Herman Wasserman (University of Cape Town) 5 Acknowledgements: Guy Berger (UNESCO) Guilherme Canela De Souza Godoi (UNESCO) Oscar Castellanos (UNESCO) Jo Hironaka (UNESCO) Anna Polomska (ITU) Cedric Wachholz (UNESCO) Martin Wickenden (UNESCO) Joanna Wright (University of Sheffield) Shanshan Xu (UNESCO) Additional feedback received from Broadband Commission Working Group member organisations: UNDP (Minerva Novero Belec, Robert Opp) UN Global Pulse (Chis Earney) 6 Foreword As the past few months have shown, online communication is essential in today’s world. The Internet plays a key role when it comes to accessing education, culture and quality information. It allows us to work from home while staying in touch with family and friends. Now more than ever, online communication is at the heart of our connected societies. This greater connectivity goes hand in hand with greater opportunities. It empowers people with information and knowledge, which in turn supports development and democracy. Audrey Azoulay It diversifies language, enables us to do business, and encourages us to appreciate different cultures. UNESCO Director General However, online communication
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