REPORT FROM A ROUNDTABLE HELD IN CONJUNCTION WITH THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF ’S PLANNING STAFF

SELF-DETERMINATION , Territorial Integrity, and the Right to

Patricia Carley

UNITED STATES INSTITUTE OF CONTENTS

Summary v

Preface ix

1 Introduction 1

2 A History of the Self-Determination Concept 3

3 The Rise of Contemporary Self-Determination Movements 5

4 The Self-Determination Principle: Legal Definitions and Obligations 8

5 A Specific Case: The Crisis in Chechnya 11

6 U.S. Interests and Possible Policy Options 13

7 Conclusion 18

About the Author 19

About the Institute 20 v

Recognizing the challenge to peace posed by de- mands for self-determination (and ’ responses to them), the Institute of Peace, working with the Policy Planning Staff of the U.S. Department of State, assembled a group of policymakers and scholars to examine the origins, growth, and strategies of such movements, and to discuss whether universal principles can be devel- SUMMARY oped to inform international, and particularly U.S., responses. This report summarizes the discussions at that meeting. Self-determination as a political force in interna- tional society is a relatively recent phenomenon, emerging in the aftermath of World I and the breakup of the Ottoman and Austro-Hungarian as a demand of national groups seeking to divide . President Woodrow Wilson was the statesman most closely identified with the self- determination principle, though ironically the term does not appear in his “Fourteen Points” speech. While he referred to minority rights within a larger state, he rarely mentioned the establish- he right to self-determination has become ment of new, independent states. one of the most complex issues for U.S. for- Self-determination became officially sanctioned Teign policymakers and the international after 1945, when it was included in the United Na- community at large. Confusion over the issue tions , though it applied to existing states, stems not so much from whether there exists a not to or national groups. However, self- right to self-determination, which is included in determination quickly evolved from a principle to many international documents, but a right, especially after the 1960 UN Declaration from the failure of those documents to define ex- on the Granting of to Colonial Peo- actly who is entitled to claim this right—a group, a ples, when the term came to denote decoloniza- , or a nation—and what exactly the right con- tion. Still, self-determination applied to fers. At the same time, the international system, and not to peoples. particularly in the post–World War II era, has Since the 1970s, there has been a move to com- steadfastly defended the inviolability of existing bine the ideas of minority rights and decoloniza- nation-states’ borders, regardless of how and when tion, and the result has been a tendency on the they were determined. part of some advocates to define self-determina- In recent years, many groups that constitute mi- tion as conferring the right to independent state- norities in their states have invoked the “right to hood on every distinctive ethnic group. self-determination” in their demands for auton- Many observers of this trend share the concern omy—or, in some cases, secession—and have re- that confusion about what the principle of self- sorted to to pursue their aims. These determination means and what putative rights it groups typically justify their demand for self-deter- confers is helping to fuel the violence characteriz- mination as a way to end years of repression and ing contemporary independence movements. Yet human rights violations by the majority ethnic the realities of the international system provide a group or the central . The absence of a rationale of sorts for such movements, including precise definition of what the right to self-determi- the view that internationally recognized borders nation entails has left the international commu- are “artificial, arbitrary, and accidental” and that nity, and the states concerned, without guiding they in fact legitimize the combining of different principles with which to respond. peoples arbitrarily, and often against their will, vi

within the same territory. Moreover, the growth of conclusion the is largely these movements is not a temporary phenome- unwilling to draw. Thus the question becomes, non, but the direct result of changes in the world Can a principle be developed that stands some- wrought by the universal application of Western where in between recognized human rights stan- ideas such as and human rights. Most dards and the right to self-determination? of the world’s peoples have little experience with Somewhat ironically, the very propagation of the West’s long history of sovereignty and state- the idea of human rights intensifies demands for hood and are thus not prepared to adhere to the greater recognition among minority groups that in- Western insistence on the inviolability of existing voke claims of human rights violations to support borders. Those in the West who are alarmed by the their demands. However, the idea that human growth of these nationalist movements should rights and political stability are bound to clash is consider not whether these contemporary mani- tenuous, since states held together through terror festations of are legal or appropriate, and repression are rarely stable in most senses of but rather that they are happening—and that they the word. In the end, though, it may not be possi- very likely cannot be stopped. The potential for vi- ble to compel an oppressive government to end its olence and international instability becomes even unacceptable actions toward a minority group if more obvious when one considers that some still outside are unwilling to intervene with very large empires, such as Russia and China, are military force. likely to be affected by these movements. U.S. policy interests in the self-determination Unfortunately, turning to international legal debate beg a preliminary question: What exactly standards on the right to self-determination does does the United States care about with regard to not resolve the problem, since the right has never self-determination movements—the outcome of been explicitly defined. In any case, it is impracti- the struggle (i.e., the shifting of boundaries and the cal to assume that legal principles alone will re- proliferation of states) or the means used to obtain solve what are essentially territorial and political it (i.e., the violence that frequently accompanies disputes. Because the right has never been defined, such struggles)? Unfortunately, American diplo- the notion of self-determination typically embraces macy often cannot decide between these two inter- several different meanings, none of which ad- ests, making a response that much more difficult dresses the central issue of how to respond to a na- to formulate. Generally, though, the United States tional or other identity group’s aspirations for con- should be less concerned about outcomes in these trol over the lives of its members. struggles than about the means used; international Without a , any new definition of self- political stability is more likely to be maintained by determination must include customary human focusing on the process than by trying to manipu- rights standards (e.g., respect for and late events to arrange a predetermined outcome. minority rights) and the right of an appropriate The options for a minority group waging a body to enforce those standards. In their later struggle for self-determination do not have to be stages, self-determination movements typically be- viewed in the zero-sum terms of independence or come the target of human rights violations, which assimilation, despite the fact that should be addressed before they reach the often in- tends to reinforce this approach. The United States tractable phase of organized struggle against the could encourage the practice of granting some in- state. However, the right to self-determination termediate status short of independent statehood must be separated from the right to secession and to unrecognized peoples or other distinct eco- the establishment of independent statehood, with nomic or political entities. Parallel or multiple rep- the understanding that there are intermediate cate- resentation for substate entities that function au- gories short of statehood that can address a minor- tonomously (such as ’s participation in the ity group’s interests and aspirations, such as mem- General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade) can pro- bership in various international forums or regional vide outlets for what otherwise might be secession- organizations. Human rights violations are easy to ist pressures. Legitimate secessionist aspirations condemn; the dilemma is whether they justify the could be diverted to nonterritorial demands, thus persecuted group’s secession from the state, a avoiding a strictly territorial interpretation of vii

self-determination. The United States might also States should not be willing to tolerate another consider advocating a change in the current sys- state’s repression or genocide in the name of terri- tem that allows the government to conduct its af- torial integrity. Secession can be a legitimate aim of fairs only with other states and not with subunits some self-determination movements, particularly within states. However, offering subgroups some in response to gross and systematic violations of sort of recognition or representation in interna- human rights and when the entity is potentially tional forums or organizations may ultimately lead politically and economically viable. to greater demands from smaller and smaller iden- Unfortunately, there is no easy solution to the tity groups for independence and UN representa- dilemmas presented by self-determination move- tion. ments in the world today. Clearly, in the face of the The United States may have no choice but to growing number of such movements, establishing avoid the pronouncement of clear doctrines and a definition of the right to self-determination is principles regarding self-determination move- necessary, though agreement on such a definition ments and thereby avoid being driven to intervene will not be easy—and even then, it will not likely be in conflicts according to rigid principles that cer- conclusive and unequivocal. The desire among na- tainly do not apply in every instance. The United tional groups to seek self-determination is not a States should, however, make absolutely clear that simple matter with a single cause. Rather, it stems secession has not been universally recognized as from multiple sources, including the denial of mi- an international right. It may choose, on the basis nority rights, territorial disputes, national aspira- of other interests, to support the secessionist tions, and the belief in economic and political via- claims of a self-determination movement, but not bility, among others. This desire may develop because the group is exercising its right to seces- gradually until the last resort to violence and seces- sion, since no such right exists in international law. sion come into play. Unfortunately, the inattentive- At the same time, an absolute rejection of secession ness of the world community often makes what is in every case is unsound, because the United in fact a gradual process seem very sudden. ix

stakes and the resolve of the players to pursue their aims at all costs. With its mandate to pursue the study of peace- ful resolution to international conflicts, the United States Institute of Peace convened a meeting on “Self-Determination: Sovereignty, Territorial In- tegrity, and the Right to Secession” in February 1995. The all-day session, organized in conjunc- PREFACE tion with the Policy Planning Staff at the U.S. De- partment of State, allowed government policymak- ers and outside experts to gather and discuss freely, practically, and informally the complex is- sues surrounding self-determination and seces- sionist movements. The informal nature of the dis- cussions is particularly important, because in the West the issue of self-determination is often ad- dressed from a formal, legalistic standpoint. While most of the participants in this session were well acquainted with the political and legal terminology used to describe self-determination, what it means in practical terms is by far the trickier issue. Be- cause self-determination encompasses so many is- he thorny topic of self-determination has in- sues—including individual and minority rights, re- creasingly demanded the attention of U.S. gional , government repression, Tpolicymakers and the international commu- territorial integrity, state sovereignty, and claims to nity. Partly because of the postwar communica- independence, to name but a few—the most diffi- tions revolution, peoples around the globe have an cult task in planning such a meeting was to deter- increased awareness of the state system’s seem- mine which aspects of the issue would be ad- ingly permanent configuration and of their place dressed. The resulting focus on territorial integrity in it. Some of these groups, whether in pursuit of and the right to secession should not suggest that greater international recognition or in response to the other aspects are not important; rather, it was repressive government , are now seeking to an attempt to set limits on a topic that can easily exercise what they see as their right to self-determi- become extremely complicated and broad. nation, which they assume includes the right to in- The discussion proved to be so valuable that the dependent statehood. Do such groups have this Institute decided to make it available to a wider au- right? Is this an inevitable consequence of the dience. The session’s report, we believe, fills a gap processes of imperial , , in the literature available to members of the U.S. and increased global awareness? How should the policy community who do not always have the op- international community, and the United States in portunity to read longer, more in-depth, scholarly particular, respond? treatments of the subject. While the United States All too frequently, self-determination move- Institute of Peace has published many works ex- ments resort to violence to achieve their aims. The amining the causes behind various self-determina- origins of these movements sometimes remain ob- tion movements—books such as Minorities at Risk: scure, however, and the outside world pays little A Global View of Ethnopolitical Conflicts by Ted attention to them until conflict breaks out, leaving Robert Gurr and its Series on Religion, National- similarly inclined groups with the “lesson” that vio- ism, and Intolerance—this is the Institute’s first ef- lence is the only practical course of action. And, of fort to address the theoretical and practical aspects course, it is that much more difficult to determine of the self-determination problem in such a com- a policy response when conflict has raised both the prehensive manner. The Institute plans to hold x

follow-up meetings to explore the self-determina- like to thank Adam Wasserman of the Department tion issue further, and reports from those sessions of State’s Policy Planning Staff for helping to orga- will also be made available. nize the meeting. This report was prepared by Ms. The meeting was organized by Institute pro- Carley and edited by Peter Pavilionis. gram officer Patricia Carley. The Institute would 1

of states. They have also defended the right of peo- ples to self-determination as outlined in the UN Charter. However, the self-determination principle has been interpreted differently at different times and has been inconsistently applied as a result. In the wake of rapid political, social, and technologi- cal changes in the world, distinct national groups have pushed demands for their own states to the INTRODUCTION top of their political agendas. These national groups have armed themselves with the claim to self-determination, in which the right to secession 1 is seen as an implicit, integral part. Because the is- sue is so complex and potentially explosive, the re- sponse of the international community has fre- quently been to sidestep it. However, this nonresponse is becoming in- creasingly untenable as the inconsistencies in the present system become more obvious. As a greater number of national groups demand some level of recognition, the international community finds it- self without concrete principles with which to re- spond. The failure to define self-determination ex- he right to self-determination as declared in plicitly, while perhaps intentional, has left U.S. many international documents is fast be- policymakers and international organizations ill Tcoming one of the thorniest issues for the in- equipped to respond to the ever-increasing num- ternational community and U.S. - ber of claims from currently unrepresented (at makers in particular. Considerable confusion and least in nation-state form) minority and other na- conflict have resulted not so much over the notion tional groups throughout the world. of the right to self-determination, proclaimed in In practical terms, the current system provides a such documents as the International Covenants seat at the for , but not for on Human Rights and the Helsinki Final Act, but the Kurds. Armenians and Uzbeks are now legally over the definition of self-determination. What ex- outside the bounds of Soviet-cum-Russian colo- actly does this right entail—autonomy? statehood? nialism, but other non-Russians currently in the What other rights come with it? Who is able to ex- Russian (such as the Chechens) are ercise it? Who is not, and why? not—not least because they were designated with a Since the end of World War I, and especially different ethno-territorial status in Stalin’s policy of since World War II, the world has ordered its af- national delimitation. Certainly the unchecked fairs with an international system based on the proliferation of new states is not a desired out- concept of states whose borders, no matter how come, but the reasons frequently cited against se- they were originally determined, are considered in- —the need for stability and the inviolability violable. However, few, if any, nation-states have in- of borders—are falling on the increasingly deaf ears ternational borders that unambiguously encom- of those who consider them nothing more than a pass one nation or people, or even several peoples smoke screen to protect an existing—and, in their who voluntarily agreed to become part of one eyes, unjust—system. state. Many peoples, distinct and recognizable by As with many human rights matters, the likeli- most criteria, do not have their own nation-states, hood that an unrepresented national identity and they find themselves a discrete minority group will move beyond demands for equality to within a state. In some cases, they are divided fight for independence depends to some, perhaps among several states. a large, extent on the nature of the government The United Nations, and other international or- that has sovereignty over the group. Peoples who ganizations have steadfastly defended this system are denied basic cultural, linguistic, and political 2

rights by their rulers are more likely to resort to vi- States Institute of Peace convened a small study olence than those who have been given a large group in February 1995 to address the issue. The measure of local autonomy. Institute worked with the Policy Planning Staff of Encouraging democracy and respect for human the U.S. Department of State to bring together rights and granting local autonomy might be the lawyers, political scientists, and regional experts answer to the self-determination dilemma, but this who have considered this question in the wider approach does not resolve the matter across the sense, along with relevant policymakers who un- board, as self-determination struggles leading to derstand the practical aspects of the problem. The separatist demands exist in developed democra- discussion was chaired by Max Kampelman, vice cies (e.g., ’s Quebecois separatists and the chairman of the Institute’s board of directors and Scottish National Movement). Some nations or former U.S. ambassador to the Conference on groups feel so aggrieved, so repressed by their (now Organization for) Security and Cooperation rulers, that offers of local autonomy that might in Europe (CSCE, now OSCE). The purpose of the have sufficed at one point are no longer adequate. meeting was to discuss candidly the nature of self- It is as if a certain line has been crossed, a point of determination, its evolution, and the range of re- no return, beyond which full independence be- cent applications. The primary focus was whether comes the only acceptable goal. universal organizing principles can be formulated to guide U.S. policymakers, and what likely chal- lenges and opportunities will be presented by fu- U.S. Interests ture appeals to the right to self-determination. The discussion raised several questions of key For its part, the United States has largely avoided significance to policymakers. Do international or- defining exactly what the right to self-determina- ganizations to which the United States belongs— tion includes. It is usually defined by describing such as the UN and OSCE—provide adequate guid- what it does not include—the right to secession, for ance on the self-determination issue for policy- example—but that response has not proved to be makers? If not, is it possible to develop a set of gen- adequate, nor has it been found acceptable to eral principles to use in responding to self-determi- many of the peoples in question. nation crises? In other words, to what extent is The question should be asked, Must self-deter- each situation so specific that general principles mination be explicitly defined? Why should the simply cannot be applied? What activities are ac- United States want to address this complex and ceptable for a to use to hold itself potentially explosive issue? Perhaps there is no together? How can potential problems be identi- practical course but to continue to approach the fied before they erupt into conflict? More practi- matter on a case-by-case basis, taking into account cally, what influence can the United States exert on other strategic, political, and economic interests in the governments and peoples involved in such each instance. However, this course does have its conflicts? drawbacks, as witnessed in the continuing chaos and the that often accompany self-deter- mination movements.

The Institute Roundtable

Recognizing the challenge to that de- mands for self-determination present, the United 3

nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the con- cept of self-determination was seen almost invari- ably in terms of another, much more important, political goal of promoting world peace. These limitations on self-determination were ac- cepted by President Woodrow Wilson, who was, A HISTORY OF THE according to Hannum, the statesman most closely identified with the principle. Ironically, however, SELF-DETERMINATION the term “self-determination” does not appear in Wilson’s “Fourteen Points” speech, which primar- CONCEPT ily addresses autonomy and minority rights. More- 2 over, Wilson distinguished between “internal” and “external” interpretations of self-determination; the former, referring to a people’s right to choose its own form of government without outside pres- sure, was of far greater concern to him. Indeed, he rarely mentioned the external aspect of self-deter- mination, the one associated with the establish- ment of independent states. Wilson did want an article on self-determination included in the Covenant of the , but he was overruled on this point, not least by the European urst Hannum of the Fletcher School of powers, which were extremely suspicious of the Law and described three eras term. Wilson’s views on self-determination, Han- Hthat have shaped the history of the con- num stressed, should be understood in the con- cept of self-determination. The first era began in text of his emphasis on a state’s internal — the nineteenth century and lasted through the the protection of a minority’s cultural and Wilsonian period, ending in approximately 1945. linguistic rights. Wilson never considered self- Hannum reminded the participants that John Stu- determination to be an absolute right. art Mill, among others, first suggested the connec- The establishment of the United Nations in tion between ethnicity, language, and culture on 1945 marked the beginning of the second era of the one hand, and statehood on the other, a view the self-determination idea. Unlike the League of that informed many of the nationalist movements Nations Covenant, the UN Charter mentions self- of the nineteenth century. Ironically, Hannum con- determination twice. However, Hannum pointed tended, the classic nationalist movements of that out, the term very clearly applies to states and not era were not about the breakup of empires, but to peoples or groups. Yet, once the idea was writ- about the unification of “nations” such as ten into the Charter, it very quickly evolved from a and . It was only after the Ottoman and Austro- principle to a right. The UN continued to define Hungarian empires began to disintegrate that self- self-determination in broad language but, again, it determination became a rallying cry of smaller na- was never seen as an absolute or unlimited right. tional groups as a means of dividing, rather than The most important document in the promo- unifying, territory. tion of the right to self-determination, and one At this time, Hannum continued, the essential that provides a clear indication of its meaning qualities of the concept of self-determination were, during this era, was the 1960 UN Declaration on first, that it was a purely political principle, usually the Granting of Independence to Colonial Peo- referring to some sort of autonomy rather than ples. According to Hannum, the criteria underly- statehood for ethnic or national groups, and sec- ing the right did not include possession of a dis- ond, that the right was not absolute, but relative: tinct ethnicity, language, or culture; rather, Certain political and economic requirements, such self-determination was simply a more appealing as economic viability and geographic size, were term for decolonization. In fact, four principles necessary to warrant statehood. Finally, in the late characterize self-determination during this era. 4

First, self-determination referred only to decolo- decolonization in the late 1970s and continues to nization. Second, it did not apply to peoples but to the present. This stage is characterized by the at- territories. Third, self-determination was now con- tempt in recent decades to fuse the first two eras; sidered an absolute right—though, again, for that is, to combine the ethnic and cultural rights of only; this marked a significant change minorities that Wilson championed with the terri- from the previous era. Finally, self-determination torial absolutism of decolonization. The result has did not allow for secession; instead, the territorial been a tendency to redefine self-determination to integrity of existing states and most colonial terri- mean that every distinctive ethnic or national tories was assumed. The essential quality of self- group has a right to independence. But though determination during this era, Hannum empha- self-determination has taken on this new meaning sized, was not that all peoples had the right of in a popular sense, it has not been accepted by any self-determination, but that all colonies had the state or by international law. right to be independent. The third, and most problematic, era in the de- velopment of the concept began with the end of 5

way it is,” since all too often in the case of self- determination and other nationalist movements “the law is running after reality.” In examining the causes behind the outbreak of self-determination movements, several realities of today’s world sim- ply cannot be ignored. First, Fuller maintained THE RISE OF that existing borders between internationally rec- CONTEMPORARY ognized nation-states are “artificial, arbitrary, and accidental.” Furthermore, they are not permanent. SELF-DETERMINATION Second, although some states, mostly in the West, are a reflection of the congruence of ethnic and ter- 3OVEMENTS ritorial boundaries, most are not so constituted. M These other states are typically “mini-empires” or even greater empires of ethnically distinct peoples who find themselves arbitrarily forced to live within the same borders. Third, the current concern over self-determina- tion is not merely a “post-Soviet blip”; that is, the dilemma is not just a regional, short-term phase following the breakup of the . Many peoples around the globe are going through their own process of self-discovery. More than ever be- he combination of self-determination’s origi- fore, these peoples seek liberation to “get back to nal definition and later interpretations has their history.” The origins of this self-discovery Tcaused considerable confusion, Hannum process, Fuller said, are many. There is a growing stated. Today, the goal of states should be, first, to international awareness that “things do not have to identify and explicitly define self-determination be they way they are,” as identity groups discover and the criteria that determine which entities are that they no longer have to endure intolerable entitled to exercise the right. Contemporary politi- forms of government. This awareness has been ac- cal movements that demand the right to secede celerated by the contemporary application of the have frequently resorted to violence precisely be- Western heritage of democracy and human rights, cause of the confusion and uncertainty surround- and the peculiarly American notion of individual ing their proclaimed goal of self-determination, fulfillment. It is Americans, Fuller maintained, who and both international law and official Western re- are in fact “corrupting the rest of the world” with actions have done little to clarify the situation. Sec- these ideas. ond, the international community should develop According to Fuller, it is perhaps ironic that the some parameters that determine exactly what the attraction to democratic values encourages ethnic right to self-determination includes. For example, self-awareness and, in some cases, secessionist according to Hannum, some people or groups may movements. Though it may be a cliché, it is evident be entitled to invoke and exercise this right, but it that the revolutionary developments in mass com- should be made clear that this does not necessarily munications are largely responsible for the spread include the right to independent statehood. of these ideas. In many instances, the introduction of such democratic values as freedom of speech, assembly, and the press are accelerating the devel- Modern Realities: The Impermanence opment of minority groups’ self-awareness and, in of Borders and Raised Expectations some cases, demands for greater autonomy or even independence. Furthermore, there is a new Graham Fuller of the RAND Corporation declared kind of globalized elite that is increasingly alien- that the United States must be prepared to under- ated from the “lumpen” masses. Some of those stand the world “not the way it ought to be, but the who are disadvantaged as a result of rapid global 6

economic changes are turning to ethnicity and na- in the camp of “matured ”—in western tionalism to address their grievances. The “mass Europe, for example—whose members are rela- culture” emanating from the United States reflects tively “fulfilled” in terms of identity and are thus this gross imbalance of economic power and in- comfortable surrendering varying degrees of sov- creases resentment among disadvantaged groups ereignty. Another, much larger, group of peoples the world over. Nationalism, ethnicity, and religion lacks such fulfillment and thus clings tightly to are increasingly used as instruments in expressing their ethnic sources of identity. For example, it is such resentment. This is apparent in many Third very difficult to tell the Kazakhs to accept a multi- World countries that are experiencing rapid eco- ethnic state cheerfully when they have just come nomic development and urbanization along with out from under Russian domination. For a Kazakh, declining public accepting a multi- services. In these ethnic state is tan- countries, margin- tamount to allow- alized groups he continent of Africa is likely to be a ing the Russians to search for new continue their aim sources of identity “staggering mess” as the concepts of of destroying and loyalty other ethnicity and borders enter future debates Kazakh language than those offeredT and culture. Thus, by a state that has over identity. the nation-building apparently aban- agenda of the doned them. The Kazakh people is adoption of alter- markedly different nate sources of identity, such as ethnicity and reli- from a similar Western agenda, which typically em- gion, and their use as political instruments is be- phasizes ethnic and cultural “diversity.” The reality coming increasingly common. is that some peoples are moving away from a Echoing some of Fuller’s assertions, Kampel- nation-state identity and giving up some sover- man noted that people in some countries are eignty, while other groups—the majority—are de- healthier and living longer than ever before; how- manding the right to establish themselves in a new ever, a significant portion of the world has not en- nation-state, to build a “national project.” joyed such an improvement in living standards. According to Fuller, the issue now is not Global communications (mainly television and whether these manifestations of nationalism are le- films) display these higher living standards to the gal or appropriate, but simply that they are hap- world’s population, including those who have not pening. The question is what the West’s response benefited from modernization. Understandably, will be. This process cannot be stopped, he con- they too want to experience the benefits, and ten- tended: “There are no rules for saying that the sions arise from the “unstoppable drive” of people gates of nationalism are closed because the rules in the Third World wanting what the advanced in- are being changed all the time.” It is not sufficient dustrial nations already have. This situation threat- to say “just assimilate,” because most groups are ens those in the wealthier nations who are con- simply not going to “commit cultural suicide” cerned that their benefits will decline as more through such assimilation. Furthermore, Fuller economic resources are transferred abroad and said, the world is going to see some very big em- those in the Third World who lead more tradi- pires, including China and Russia, affected by tional lives and generally do not aspire to what these developments. The continent of Africa is they perceive to be “crass Western materialism.” likely to be a “staggering mess” as the concepts of ethnicity and borders enter future debates over identity. Unfulfilled Nationalism Scott Thompson of the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, a member of the Institute’s board Fuller also described a global “cycle of ethnicity” of directors, disagreed with this last point, arguing currently under way that has divided the world’s that in many Third World countries, such as those peoples into two loose categories. There are those in Africa, new loyalties to the state are in fact 7 emerging. Over a period of forty years, for exam- their (e.g., the USSR or the Russian ple, there have been no major challenges to the Federation) were in the process of breaking up and colonial borders on the African continent. Indeed, that the same purportedly juridical result—the for many African states, the colonially contrived emergence of an independent state—could be vali- borders are the basis for their identity, and a new dated through the supposedly “legal” claim of self- generation of elites in these countries owes its alle- determination. giance to the state—though this is often the case, David Scheffer of the Department of State dis- Thompson admitted, for less than admirable rea- agreed with Damrosch’s contention that the inter- sons. national reaction to Yugoslavia’s dissolution has In response, Fuller maintained that there will fueled not only the resulting mass violence, but undoubtedly be a period of immense global chaos other peoples’ claims to the right to self-determina- in the future. The United States is caught between tion as well. According to Scheffer, there is no evi- what international law prescribes, on the one dence that if Yugoslavia had stayed together there hand, and what its commitment to democratic val- would not have been acts of genocide. No one can ues and human rights implies on the other. Provid- now establish for certain that there would not have ing these restive groups with financial assistance been a vicious even in a unified Yugo- may ease the situation, but it will not solve the slavia. In fact, a great deal of the fighting occurred problem, since these “urges are not at heart eco- before the breakup of the in 1992. Now, nomic.” Rather, they go to the matter of self- however, it seems like conventional wisdom to as- identity and knowing one’s place in the world. sert that if only the Western powers had restrained their willingness to recognize the independence of the former Yugoslav , none of the fighting Yugoslavia’s Breakup and the would have occurred. Demonstration Effect Kampelman argued that, regardless of whether or not hasty Western recognition of the Yugoslav Outlining some of the reasons that the world is republics fueled independence movements, many seeing such an unprecedented growth in seces- other peoples demanding self-determination have sionist movements, Lori Damrosch of Columbia now seen in the Yugoslav situation that violence University Law School suggested that the current can work; after all, he said, it is working for the problem is only partially a reflection of ancient ani- Serbs. It is difficult to ask other groups to re- mosities among peoples. The international re- nounce violence when it has gone so completely sponse to the situation in the former Yugoslavia unpunished in the former Yugoslavia. Peter has also exacerbated the problem. Other relatively Schoettle of the Department of State pointed out small ethnic groups in the world, Damrosch ex- two other cases that illustrate why current self- plained, have likened themselves to the various determination problems have become so acute, ethnic groups in the Balkan territory and have often turning violent. Tamil separatists in Sri come to believe that they too can get a similar re- Lanka and the Turkish community in have sponse from the international community to their sought a political solution to their grievances for demands for self-determination. That response, es- decades. It became clear, however, that nonviolent pecially from the European Community, suggested means were simply not working; consequently, the that a “federation” in the process of disintegration two groups resorted to violence. Schoettle sug- could seek “validation of a secessionist outcome gested that even if there were an international fo- on the basis of a process that purported to be ju- rum that could have heard their grievances, or a ridical, but in reality was essentially political,” ac- legal mechanism in place to respond to them, the cording to Damrosch. Leaders of other secession- violent outcome probably would not have been ist movements, she maintained, could believe that different. they were in the midst of the same process, that 8

definition, the “democracy gloss” on self-determi- nation, fails to answer this question, since democ- racy is essentially , and in most cases the majority is more likely to trample on than to honor the rights of a minority identity group. Fur- THE SELF- thermore, international law is not univocal on the of independent statehood; it is currently soft- DETERMINATION ening its “premium” on statehood by allowing non- PRINCIPLE: LEGAL state actors to play roles in the articulation and en- forcement of international law. DEFINITIONS AND The third basic proposition about the legal con- 4 text of self-determination is that it is not a “suicide OBLIGATIONS pact” in that it does not oblige any state to subju- gate its own self-interest. Law is basically an ex- pression of self-interest and has evolved accord- ingly over time. The fourth proposition is that law is constantly changing. After several distinct eras, Steinhardt maintained, the self-determination norm is at a leg- islative turning point. There are several new mean- ings or “clusters of principles” that should be in- cluded in the right to self-determination, just as alph Steinhardt of George Washington there are new ways in which the right should be in- University Law School outlined four es- terpreted. Rsential propositions regarding self-deter- First of all, the right to self-determination must mination and international law. The first is that the be addressed in light of customary human rights law simply will not definitively resolve competing concerns, especially those of interest to identity claims for power or territorial disputes, though it groups. Second, it should be understood that iden- can provide the requisite mechanism in attempts tity groups have options short of statehood to air to do so. Yet the paradox remains: Self-determina- their demands. Specifically, they have the right to tion has little legal meaning but is nevertheless a participate in bodies such as assemblies of national tremendously powerful political principle. minority affairs, local autonomous administra- The second proposition regarding the legal con- tions, decentralized and local forms of govern- text of self-determination is that international law ment, and mixed commissions (either regional or is not “univocal” on the subject. Self-determination international) to facilitate a continuing dialogue on has never been defined; hence, its mere mention the issue. All of these are possible institutional conjures up several different meanings at once. Ac- arrangements short of statehood that the United cording to one definition, self-determination refers States could encourage. Third, the right to self- to the end of and the creation of new determination must include the right of enforce- states. Another says that self-determination is ment and scrutiny by an appropriate body, mean- shorthand for the rights of states; that is, the sover- ing the abandonment of the idea that self-deter- eign prerogative that defines relations among ex- mination somehow erects a wall of exclusive do- isting states (the right to their own political des- mestic for any country. tiny, the right to equality in relations with other Kampelman stressed that the right to self-deter- states, etc.). Yet another meaning of self-determina- mination must be separated from the right to se- tion involves the protection of individual and col- cession. Many international documents have es- lective human rights and popular democratic rule. tablished self-determination as a right, but it has The problem is, Steinhardt continued, that none never been defined. Thus, many documents con- of these definitions speaks to the central issue of tain a contradiction between the right to secession how to respond to an identity group’s aspirations and the right to territorial integrity, and such docu- for control over its own future. Even the third ments should seek a balance in separating the 9

rights to self-determination and secession. The lat- Self-Determination and Human Rights ter is simply not, according to Kampelman, inher- ent in the legally stated right of self-determination. Fuller suggested that the very propagation of the Self-determination may be an internationally rec- idea of human rights intensifies demands for ognized principle, but secession is a national issue, greater recognition among the unrecognized peo- one for states themselves to decide. For example, a ples of the world. In telling other states to observe government may wish to allow its nation’s con- the human rights of their citizens, the United stituent parts the right to secession in its own set of States is giving these citizens a greater forum to de- laws, but no international documents compel it to mand more for themselves. Steinhardt concurred do so. Self-determination, Kampelman main- by suggesting that self-determination is a “symp- tained, means inter alia the right to cultural inde- tom” of the human rights crisis. In fact, claims to pendence, religious freedom, and the use of one’s self-determination usually indicate a human rights own language, but not secession. Unlike secession, problem in its final stages. This is one of the main these rights are “manageable,” making it possible reasons that complaints about human rights viola- for the United States to both address and influence tions must be addressed before they reach this them. stage. Jamison Borek of the Department of State In this context, Scheffer disagreed with Han- pointed out that legal principles are not the driving num’s assertion that the concept of self-determina- factor behind either self-determination move- tion must return to the more static framework of ments or U.S. policy to- previous eras. Scheffer ward them. After all, the said rather that self-de- United States has not termination “is a real- taken a position on the any international docu- ity from which we can- precise legal definition of not escape,” since self-determination. Nor ments have established there are people all has the scope of the term over the world who “peoples” been deter- Mself-determination as a right, but it are “screaming that mined, and the debate has never been defined. word.” What is continues over whether needed, he said, is self-determination in- greater recognition of cludes a right to secede the postcolonial devel- outside the context of decolonization. In general, opment of human rights law and principles as an the United States has not recognized the right to influencing factor on self-determination move- secession for portions of established countries. ments, however they are defined. Moreover, he Moreover, in keeping with the general U.S. orienta- continued, democracy is increasingly considered tion toward individual rights, U.S. policy prefers to an “entitlement.” Even the United Nations is em- speak to individual human rights (including civil bracing this view in its formal documents, and and political rights) rather than group rights such peoples in the process of asserting their right to as self-determination. It is not productive, Borek self-determination increasingly look to interna- continued, to debate legal principles in the ab- tional language on human rights as a moral pillar stract without addressing pragmatic realities. A to support their claims. fundamental problem is what the United States Referring to the international community’s de- and other countries are willing and able to do sire to maintain world peace, Schoettle noted that about situations in which governments actively op- in the past, the goal of world (and regional) peace press minority groups in their countries. While the has generally ranked higher than the defense of response options range from economic sanctions human rights. Which goal is more important to the to the use of force, ultimately it is not possible to United States today? The policy of holding up re- compel an oppressive government to change its gional peace as a more important goal than human behavior if other countries are not prepared to in- rights risks achieving the opposite. Groups seeking tervene militarily. independence will quickly realize that by creating 10

enough violence—significantly disturbing the wracked with internal dissent and held together peace—their demands will more likely be satisfied, only through terror and repression are not neces- or at least addressed, eventually in the name of sarily useful in the promotion of U.S. national in- promoting peace. This will drive such groups to terests. In other words, such states do not merely ever more extreme, peace-threatening actions. The pose a choice between human rights and stability goal of maintaining regional peace also raises a for the United States, since a state that routinely vi- moral question: Does the United States, or any olates its citizens’ human rights is rarely stable. member of the international community, have the Kampelman added that the “confrontation” be- right to tell a minority group that its human rights tween human rights and self-determination could must be curtailed in some form to promote world be largely avoided if secession were not an inher- peace? ent part of the discussion. The issue of human rights and their violation is Gidon Gottlieb of the University of Chicago relatively easy to react to, according to Borek, since Law School pointed out that in many ways the en- acknowledged international standards exist. The tire discussion about human rights and the right much more difficult question involves the right to to self-determination takes place in a Western (and secession and independence: Does a people have a largely American) context. From the U.S. perspec- right to independence? If there is going to be a tive, concern about human rights is based on principle that recognizes this right, there must be American values and adherence to a particular some consideration of whether that people has the view of individual rights. However, in many states capability to establish independence and, if not, that are on the receiving end of Western criticism whether the United States or any other state is go- over human rights, such rhetoric is perceived as an ing to help them in the task, even if military force instrument to advance a certain minority group’s must be used to do so. On this point, Borek sug- claims to independence. It is impossible for the gested, there must be some realism. After all, the United States to ignore the impact of its human United States is not in a position to support such rights arguments at the other end, where they may endeavors all over the world. The crucial question be (perhaps deliberately) misinterpreted as sup- in the interim is, Can the international community port for some group’s claims, while the U.S. objec- find a guiding principle somewhere between de- tive may be precisely the opposite. The bottom fending human rights and upholding the right to line, according to Gottlieb, is that the “consumers” self-determination? of the human rights discourse in other countries Fuller reiterated that there need be no clash be- may understand such claims in a very different tween American values such as human rights and way than they are intended, a reality that cannot the need to promote stability in a particular country, be ignored. as neither of these is an absolute. Nations that are 11

problems arose in U.S. policy toward the Chechen conflict not because the United States reiterated its recognition of Russia’s sovereign rights, but be- cause that reiteration implied an approval of Russi- a’s methods of asserting its sovereignty. It is impor- tant to be consistent, Kampelman said. If minority groups are told that achieving their aims through A SPECIFIC CASE: THE violent means is unacceptable, then central gov- ernments must be told this as well. The United CRISIS IN CHECHNYA States did not make this clear to the Russian gov- ernment in its initial reaction to the Chechen crisis. 5 Hannum suggested that in seeking a solution to the Chechen conflict, greater attention should be given to the example of Tatarstan, which was will- ing to accept a “fuzzy, legally imprecise set of docu- ments” in negotiating its status within the Russian Federation that essentially deferred the most diffi- cult questions indefinitely. This arrangement may not solve all the problems between the Russian government and the country’s non-Russians, but it is an alternative to violent conflict. Patricia Carley of the United States Institute of Peace pointed out cheffer advised policymakers to use the cri- that the history of the Russians and Tatars is quite sis in Chechnya as the basis for analyzing different from that of the Russians and Chechens. Ssimilar situations in the future. Events dat- The Tatars have been part of “Russia” since the six- ing back to 1991, when President Dzhokhar Du- teenth century, even though for some Tatars this dayev first declared Chechnya’s independence does not justify continued Russian domination. from the then Soviet Union, should be analyzed to Not until the nineteenth century did the Russians determine if there was a basis in our relations with conquer and colonize the Chechens in a particu- the Soviet and Russian governments to discuss the larly lengthy and brutal campaign that continued Chechen situation in light of how human rights well into this century and included Stalin’s reloca- and democratic principles were being applied tion of the entire Chechen population during there, and how, if necessary, those principles could World War II. be further analyzed with regard to particular types Furthermore, as the Chechens see it, they were of autonomous relationships. Scheffer suggested colonized by the Russians only a few decades ear- that such an analysis could be useful in maintain- lier than the Central Asians, who have become in- ing stability in the Russian Federation. Stability is a dependent from Russia. Carley stressed the impor- concern, he noted, since the consequences of in- tance of understanding situations such as the stability, whether in terms of crises or the conflict in Chechnya from the viewpoint of the need for humanitarian aid, pose a potential threat people themselves—in this case, the Chechens. For to the larger American aid program to Russia. A lit- the United States to be of any help in diffusing this tle preemptive work in this case would have been situation, it must try to understand Chechen moti- extremely useful, Scheffer added. vations and grievances and the history of their rela- Adam Wasserman of the Department of State tionship with Russia. Statements about legal prin- pointed out that though the self-determination is- ciples and territorial integrity mean little to people sue is legally unsettled, the United States has made who believe they are fighting for their very exis- its position on the issue clear in practical terms. Re- tence. garding Chechnya, the United States has consis- Gottlieb maintained that the Chechens have al- tently affirmed the territorial integrity of the Rus- ways had the status of a —they have sian Federation, and there has been little ambi- never had any other existence. In other words, the guity in this stance. Kampelman contended that Chechens have always been subject to some 12

colonial or other major power. Under an earlier in- past experience does not necessarily justify the ternational legal system, the Chechens would have perpetuation of a particular current status. In any had no basis for advancing the type of claim to in- case, can it be considered the “fault” of the dependence they are now pursuing, and the cur- Chechens, or any other peoples, that they have had rent international system, according to Gottlieb, is the misfortune of existing as a tributary state for at fault for raising their expectations to the point much of their history? In other words, must this that they feel justified in making such a claim. Car- status determine their future as well? Can the ley pointed out, though, that millions of people United States openly acknowledge that the repres- throughout the world used to know only the exis- sive status the Chechens—or any other similarly tence that Gottlieb described, and many of them oppressed peoples—have always known is the one now live in independent states; thus, looking to in which they must remain? 13

United States care about regarding struggles for self-determination—the aim of the struggle or the means employed? Does the United States object only to the shifting of borders as a threat to its na- tional interest, or is it more concerned with the means used to make those changes? If the concern NTERESTS AND is with the means, the United States would most U.S. I likely not object to groups that seek to change ex- POSSIBLE POLICY isting borders as long as they refrain from using vi- olence and do not violate international law. Or per- OPTIONS haps the United States would object to redrawing 6 borders along specifically ethnic and religious lines, regardless of the means. In fact, Nix continued, American diplomacy and rhetoric are often in conflict over these issues. If border changes are the primary concern, the range of that concern will be relatively narrow, since there are only a certain number of border changes that the United States would consider threatening to its . If the means of effecting these changes is the paramount issue, some action may be required to make groups accountable for efore turning to how the United States the way they attempt to achieve their goals. How- should address current self-determination ever, if the main objection concerns the goal of re- Bmovements, Gottlieb raised the question of drawing borders along religious and ethnic lines, whether or not the United States should care the United States should be prepared to involve it- enough to become a party to these disputes at all. self more heavily in the matter than in previous, He contended the United States should perhaps similar cases. Clearly, Nix concluded, the United care more about waves of migration in Europe, States “needs to be more precise about which of which are pushing the continent’s politics in the these three options it is really concerned about.” direction of political extremism. However, the Hannum stated that the United States should United States should also care about self-determi- generally be less concerned with the outcome of nation movements, he said, because several cur- these situations than with the means used. Order, rent conflicts have the potential to change the face stability, and predictability are more likely to be of some of the major actors on the world stage, in- maintained, he said, by insisting on a peaceful cluding our immediate neighbors—witness the process of resolving conflicting claims than by try- separatists in Canada and the Chiapas ing to manipulate events to arrange a predeter- rebels in . Finally, the United States must mined outcome. care, because if it does not assert its values in the international arena, U.S. foreign policymakers will lose the support of the American public to an even Promoting Human Rights greater extent than is the case now. Damrosch asserted that the U.S. government should use all available means of nonforcible lever- What is the Primary American age to prevail on other governments to respect the Concern? human rights of all minority groups within their states. In some cases, demands for greater auton- Crystal Nix of the Department of State proposed a omy can be supported, but she was skeptical about crucial preliminary question in determining what the United States, as a matter of policy, endorsing the U.S. policy response to self-determination demands for self-determination and the creation of movements should be: What exactly does the new states. According to Damrosch, the only 14

instance in which the United States may decide for parallel or multiple representation for territorial reasons of policy to support the emergence of a units that function autonomously in such areas as new state is in the “genocide or postgenocide” trade and international economic relations, pro- phase. In that instance, all “legal inhibitions” could viding outlets for what might otherwise be seces- be “shucked aside.” sionist pressures. According to Hannum, the self-determination Damrosch went on to suggest that the U.S. gov- debate would be much clearer if the United States ernment might consider expanding its range of of- simply stated that there is no right to secession, ficial contacts in the international community from with the possible exception of responding to geno- strictly interstate relations to contacts among sub- cide (though such an exception would put the units of states; such contacts could be developed United States in the position of arguing that the through functional relationships with unofficial Kurds have a right to a separate state). Besides, entities. For example, Damrosch noted that the U.S. foreign policy already has a method for deal- Russian of 1993 allows some flexibil- ing with minority problems in other countries: hu- ity in the establishment of foreign relations by sub- man rights. Human and minority rights norms units within the Russian Federation; and Tatarstan, continue to evolve, and the United States should after negotiating with Moscow, was given a very declare its position as one of concern for the hu- functional flexibility in its external relations. An- man rights of every state’s citizens. Beyond that, other option for the United States is economic the United States should not enter into the debate sanctions, which, Damrosch suggested, could be on the merits of self-determination claims. In fact, used in a differentiated fashion—either to punish responding directly to claims for self-determina- the bad or reward the good territorial unit claiming tion is probably the worst policy option for the the right to self-determination. United States. Similarly, Steinhardt suggested that the United States should recognize as legitimate intermediate types of association to protect vulnerable popula- Providing Outlets for Minority Groups tions. U.S. policy should not imply that minority groups’ options are limited to secession or noth- “Sovereignty does not have to be a zero-sum ing. Scheffer agreed that it is in the U.S. interest to game,” Damrosch said, though international law deal with more than just central governments; unfortunately tends to reinforce the zero-sum ap- there should be a dialogue with the subnational proach. For example, when Taiwan lost its seat at groups involved as well. However, the United the United Nations to the People’s of States should strive to hold minority groups ac- China, there was one big winner and one disap- countable so that they understand they have cer- pointed loser. Now, however, Taiwan is pursuing a tain responsibilities as well, not only under inter- more pragmatic arrangement of representation for national law but also in their domestic actions. two governments from one divided state, using the Damrosch agreed that these groups should be precedents of Germany and Korea. Unlike the UN, held accountable, but questioned whether the Damrosch noted, international bodies that govern United States could hold out as a “carrot” the possi- such spheres as trade and finance do not use the bility that, if they are democratic enough, they will zero-sum approach. In these bodies, economic re- eventually gain international recognition. Scheffer alities frequently take precedence over strictly for- countered that independence need not, and in mal notions of sovereignty. Taiwan retained its most cases would not, be one of the carrots of- membership in the Asian Development Bank, for fered, as many intrastate political arrangements example, after its UN membership was revoked. short of independence are available, all with vary- Similarly, Hong Kong and Macao enjoyed member- ing degrees of autonomy. ship in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Gottlieb said that more effort should be made to Trade (which has been succeeded by the World offer new outlets for legitimate aspirations of self- Trade Organization) under provisions allowing determination movements in order to divert them participation by nonstate entities that have func- to nonterritorial demands. Simply put, minority tioning autonomy over their international eco- groups need an international forum to express nomic relations. Policy options should include their desires, and a variety of regional organizations 15

could offer them such an arena. There is a need to recognize them. Members include the Chechens, “deconstruct” the self-determination principle, Tatars, Bashkirs, Chuvash, Gagauz, and Abkhaz, Gottlieb said, to demonstrate that it has other in- all of whom are distinct peoples of the former So- terpretations than just the territorial and that there viet Union who live within the territory of a state are different ways identity groups can lead and ex- dominated by a different ethnic group. Other press national life. Not every nation can be given a members are , , and . territorial state, so there should be other options Many of UNPO’s members, Carley pointed out, under the self-determination rubric and new ways consider themselves colonies, and many are, in of relating to national minority groups in the inter- fact, in the generally recognized sense of that term. national arena. The State Department could be the Furthermore, they believe that they did not gain in- pioneer in such an effort, but the legislative branch dependence during the two great periods of decol- can be in the forefront as well. Nongovernmental onization—immediately after World War II and fol- organizations (NGOs) can also play a leading role lowing the breakup of the USSR—simply because in this regard in much the same way as they pro- of bad luck or a quirk of fate, but not because they vide advance warning of potential subnational are any less deserving. Will the international com- conflicts. Congressional hearings already provide munity continue to ignore this group at its peril? one way for minority groups to express their griev- Unlike other participants, Hannum cautioned ances and speak about their national against offering subgroups some sort of recogni- as something other than states. In general, Gottlieb tion or representation in regional or trade organi- asserted, the international community must zations or providing UNPO with a platform at the change the perception that self-determination UN, which he said may ultimately lead to greater leads only to the formation of a new state. Rather assertions from smaller and smaller identity than setting the threshold of international recogni- groups, to the point where each is demanding in- tion at the highest level of the state, organizations dependence and a seat at the UN. Raising false and international conventions should be open to hopes, according to Hannum, may be the very other political entities as well. worst step to take. International law and politics— Responding to the notion that aggrieved minor- and U.S. policy—must reflect only the possible. But ity groups should be satisfied with some status which approach is preferred: diffusing statehood other than statehood, Gottlieb acknowledged that aspirations by offering platforms to nonstate sub- this suggestion was in no way a universal remedy, units or providing such platforms only sparingly although it might work in the case of the Basques to avoid raising a minority group’s expectations? or the Corsicans. Its purpose is not to provide Gottlieb replied that both approaches are neces- maximal solutions for minority groups, but a “re- sary. With regard to the UN, providing platforms is lease process” for the United States and the groups probably a potentially destabilizing policy. How- themselves. It may be possible to satisfy some na- ever, in the case of technical conventions on such tional minority groups with something other than things as assigning communications frequencies, statehood, though such solutions will not always maritime rules, or environmental protection, par- be acceptable or realistic. Fuller responded that ticipation need not be limited to states. Gottlieb in- any attempt to offer minority groups outlets in the sisted that the aura surrounding statehood should international arena will be extremely menacing to be minimized and devalued. the many “bad-guy” states that rule over them. Carley suggested that the United States and other Western governments consider giving more Proclaiming a Clearly Defined Principle attention to such groups as the Unrepresented Na- tions and Peoples Organization (UNPO), which Gottlieb asserted that the United States really has no met in The Hague in January 1995 to determine choice but to “avoid clear doctrines and clear princi- where potential conflicts over self-determination ples” when it comes to self-determination move- movements might arise. This group of peoples that ments, as it would be “disastrous” for the United do not have seats at the UN has been in existence States to be driven to intervene in remote conflicts since 1991 and was organized in part to protest the by rigid principles that could not possibly apply international community’s unwillingness to across the board. There are simply no appropriate 16

global principles, and no arrangements should be movements include , Taiwan, Hong Kong, promoted in terms of global principles. The only Tibet, , and parts of Kurdistan. exception is the defense of human rights; for exam- Generally, Fuller maintained, it is in the interest ple, the absolute unwillingness to tolerate geno- of the United States to see the proliferation of de- cide. Agreeing with Hannum, Gottlieb maintained mocratic states in the world. Undemocratic states that the United States should have a policy of “pas- that rely on force and repression to maintain their sivity,” meaning that it should not take sides dur- existence not only run counter to American princi- ing a conflict or take a stance on a particular out- ples, they are also unstable—maybe not so much in come. Instead, the United States should use its the short term, but certainly in the longer term. leverage to push toward an accommodation. Fur- Steinhardt contended that the United States thermore, Gottlieb suggested that more could be should take a very high-profile position in interna- done to make groups understand the costs of tional institutions, especially those that are region- statehood—not only the economic costs, but the ally based, since these organizations have gener- political ones as well. Hannum agreed that policy- ally proved to be good forums for articulating the makers must keep their pronouncements on this idea that certain practices and behaviors of states issue ambiguous, as it is impossible to articulate are required by law—a sort of psychology of com- self-determination explicitly and absolutely. How- pulsion. ever, principles such as human rights, democracy, Robert Hansen of the Department of State and nonviolence can be articulated, and should be pointed out that there is danger in fostering confu- supported and promoted consistently. sion between the standards for self-determination On the other hand, Fuller noted that even ex- and state recognition on the one hand, and the pressing ambivalence on the subject of self-deter- question of what the United States is prepared to mination movements will make the United States do to effect that policy on the other (i.e., what appear as an enemy to much of the Third World by Americans are or are not prepared to sacrifice in threatening those states’ national unity. Obviously, terms of money and troops). Though the United early intervention in such situations is highly de- States may decide not to take an active part in sup- sirable, and Fuller suggested an approach along porting a particular self-determination movement, the lines of marriage counseling. In any conflict be- that decision may not make it any less important tween a and a secessionist that there be clear, defensible legal standards when movement, all options short of “divorce” should be it comes to providing moral support. Perhaps considered: cultural autonomy, political auton- more effort should be devoted to making a distinc- omy, federation, , or international tion between these two options. guarantees, to name a few. In any case, the United States should most defi- nitely “put states on notice” that their repressive Approaching the Claim to Secession policies will likely lead to the emergence of prob- lems with their minority groups. Perhaps such no- Secession has not been identified as an interna- tice could best be handled by NGOs to avoid the tional right, and Kampelman declared that this fact political implications of warning a state that it is should be made clear to all groups with claims to courting instability. Fuller stated that the United self-determination. If a particular group wants in- States would do well to make it clear to states that dependence, he said, it can agitate, propose negoti- if they cannot satisfy the cultural aspirations of ations, and/or initiate a propaganda campaign to their minorities, they are headed for trouble. The convince the international community that its sta- United States should also make it clear that it is not tus as part of another state is unjust. If major going to be a guarantor of an unacceptable status bloodshed would likely result from such actions, quo. Scheffer agreed that NGOs could publicly this would be because of a decision the minority identify these potential hot spots, since govern- assumed when it chose to agitate for indepen- ments cannot do so publicly, though they should dence. This is not to say that the United States privately. He further suggested that places to watch should overlook the bloodshed, but that it should in the future with regard to self-determination make clear to those seeking independence that 17

they cannot object to the violence waged against whatever the parties to the negotiations decide. them by claiming they were simply attempting to Though it may be the case that some on either side exercise their “right” to secession. In the end, it will not want to enter negotiations, there are fre- may be in the U.S. national interest to help this quently cleavages within groups that leave some group, but not because any international rights factions willing to negotiate. Furthermore, the have been violated. Kampelman stressed that the United States should examine cases in which ac- extent to which the United States and other states commodated outcomes have occurred, how and make it clear that secession is not an international why they did, and which institutional arrange- right will lessen the likelihood that violence will be ments were instrumental in resolving the conflict. used toward this goal. In these instances, other av- Several options are available, such as the formation enues would likely be pursued. of power-sharing or coalition governments and a Secession is, according to Steinhardt, a legiti- proportionality of government appointments, op- mate exercise of self-determination in some cases, tions that typically form a crucial part of a negoti- particularly in response to gross and systematic vi- ated settlement. The main goal is to de-link ethnic- olations of human rights and when the resulting ity from the state and from citizenship. It was entity is economically viable. Thus, a rigid rejec- pointed out, however, that the cases that are usu- tion of secession is unsound. Policymakers should ally the easiest to deal with are those in which the abandon the distinction between self-determina- parties are willing to negotiate. It is possible, for ex- tion and other categories of human rights. Like- ample, to imagine negotiations between Ottawa wise, Alan Romberg of the Department of State and Montreal or and Edinburgh. All too noted that the right to secession cannot always be often this is not the case, and the fundamental excluded as a matter of principle. The rights to self- problem or conflict stems from the inability of the determination and secession may not be identical, sides to agree on the terms under which they but they are also not entirely incompatible. Stating might consider even entering into negotiations. that it is the means and not the aim of self-determi- nation movements that should be of concern to the United States, Romberg suggested that some standards of behavior for achieving the goal of in- dependent statehood may be necessary. The participants did not view elections as a satis- Steinhardt maintained that the United States factory way to determine the political status of a should not allow its policy options to become po- particular region because secession is not an issue larized because of an apparent tilt against seces- that can be voted on. Sisk mentioned the difficulty sion. Kampelman argued in favor of such a bias, of relying on majority rule. Very often the cause of since secession frequently entails mass violence. the problem in the first place is that a minority Certainly, Steinhardt acknowledged, the United group believes it is repressed by the majority. Han- States should be concerned about the unchecked num stated that the problem with elections is that proliferation of states, but the question remains: if, say, Quebec voted to secede, smaller national What is the United States prepared to tolerate in groups within Quebec would have to be given the the name of territorial integrity? same right. Carley raised the problem of evaluating the validity of elections in essentially totalitarian or post-totalitarian states, reminding participants that Negotiations only a few months before the Soviet Union col- lapsed, its citizens voted en masse to remain part Timothy Sisk of the United States Institute of Peace of the USSR in elections that were very much like suggested that one option for resolving the old Soviet-style polls. Kampelman said that, ulti- dilemma of self-determination versus territorial in- mately, it would not be useful for the United States tegrity is the promotion of a negotiated settle- to set elections as a condition for any kind of pol- ment—to the extent that it is possible. The United icy decision it wants to make. States need only make clear that it will abide by 18

7CONCLUSION

here is no easy solution to the dilemmas posed by self-determination movements in Tthe world today. Clearly, in the face of the growing number of such movements, there is a need to establish a more concise and workable def- inition of the right to self-determination, though such a definition will not be easily arrived at, and even then it will most likely be inconclusive and equivocal. In any case, the international commu- nity would do well to recognize that the desire among identity groups to seek self-determination is not a simple matter with a single cause. The urge to seek self-determination has multiple origins, in- cluding the denial of minority rights and other forms of government repression, territorial dis- putes, national aspirations, and perceptions of eco- nomic and political viability, among others. It de- velops gradually until violence and secession come into play as a last resort. Unfortunately, the inattentiveness of the world community often makes what is a gradual process seem all too sud- den. Perhaps carefully analyzing the origins of self- determination movements, addressing the most salient factor or factors in a particular identity group’s claim or struggle, and attending to them promptly and directly will help the United States and the international community address these demands before violence and secession are seen as the only means of achieving them. 19 ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Patricia Carley is program officer for the former Soviet Union and at the United States Institute of Peace, where she also works on broader issues such as the OSCE and Western relations with the Islamic world. She is the author of several Institute publications, includ- ing The War in Tajikistan Three Years On, Turkey’s Role in the Middle East: A Conference Report and The Future of the CSCE. She received her B.A. in Soviet studies from the University of Texas at Austin in 1981 and an M.A. from George Washington University in 1983. Be- fore coming to the Institute, Carley was a staff adviser at the Com- mission on Security and Cooperation in Europe. Her other publica- tions include the section of Human Rights and Democratization in the Newly Independent States (1993), “Turkey and Central Asia: Reality Comes Calling” in Rivalries in the New Eurasia: Russia, Turkey and (M. E. Sharpe, 1995), and “The Legacy of the Soviet Political Sys- tem and the Prospects for Developing in Central Asia” in and Civil Society in Russia and the New States of Eurasia (M. E. Sharpe, 1995). 20 ABOUT THE INSTITUTE

The United States Institute of Peace is an independent, nonpartisan federal institution created by Congress to promote research, education, and training on the peaceful resolution of international conflicts. Established in 1984, the Institute meets its congressional mandate through an array of programs, including research grants, fellowships, professional training programs, conferences and workshops, library services, publications, and other educational activities. The Institute’s Board of Directors is appointed by the Presi- dent of the United States and confirmed by the .

Chairman of the Board: Chester A. Crocker Vice Chairman: Max M. Kampelman President: Richard H. Solomon Vice President: Harriet Hentges Board of Directors

Chester A. Crocker (Chairman), Distinguished Research Professor of Diplomacy, School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University Max M. Kampelman, Esq. (Vice Chairman), Fried, Frank, Harris, Shriver and Jacobson, Washington, D.C. Dennis L. Bark, Senior Fellow, Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace, Stanford University Theodore M. Hesburgh, President Emeritus, University of Notre Dame Seymour Martin Lipset, Hazel Professor of , George Mason University Christopher H. Phillips, former U.S. ambassador to Mary Louise Smith, civic activist; former chairman, Republican National Committee W. Scott Thompson, Professor of International Politics, Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University Allen Weinstein, President, Center for Democracy, Washington, D.C. Harriet Zimmerman, Vice President, American Public Affairs Committee, Washington, D.C.

Members ex officio Ralph Earle II, Deputy Director, U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency Toby Trister Gati, Assistant Secretary of State for Intelligence and Research Ervin J. Rokke, Lieutenant General, U.S. Air Force; President, National Defense University Walter B. Slocombe, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Richard H. Solomon, President, United States Institute of Peace (nonvoting) Other titles in the Peaceworks series:

Turkey’s Role in the Middle East: A Conference Report by Patricia Carley (Peaceworks No. 1) Central Asians Take Stock: Reform, Corruption, and Identity by Nancy Lubin (Peaceworks No. 2) From the Managing Chaos conference: Keynote Addresses by Les Aspin and Ted Koppel (Peaceworks No. 3) Sources of Conflict: G.M. Tamás and Samuel Huntington on “Identity and Conflict,” and Robert Kaplan and Jessica Tuchman Mathews on “‘The Coming ’ and the Nation-State under Siege” (Peaceworks No. 4) NGOs and Conflict Management by Pamela R. Aall (Peaceworks No. 5) Humanitarian Assistance and Conflict in Africa by David R. Smock (Peaceworks No. 6)

Peaceworks No. 7. First published March 1996.

The views expressed in this report are those of the author or conference participants alone. They do not necessarily reflect views of the United States Institute of Peace.

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Phone: 202-457-1700 E-mail: [email protected] Internet: gopher.usip.org UNITED STATES INSTITUTE OF PEACE 1550 M Street NW Washington, DC 20005 Peaceworks No. 7