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Home , Independence Gate, Korean Empire, Tang Shaoyi, Treaty of Shimonoseki, Tributary state, Zhou Fu

International Journal of Korean History (Vol.15 No.2, Aug.2010) 97 G

Transformation of the Dualistic International Order into the Modern Treaty System in the Sino-Korean Relationship

Song Kue-*

IntroductionG G Whether in the regional or global scale, the international order can be defined as a unique system within which international issues develop and the diplomatic relations are preserved within confined time periods. The one who has leadership in such international order is, in actuality, the regardless of the rationale for their leading positions, and the orderliness of the system is determined by their political and economic prowess.1 The power that led in the pre-modern era was . The pre- modern East Asian regional order is described as the system. The tribute system is built on the premise of installation, so it was important that China designate and proclaim another nation as a tributary . The system was not necessarily a one-way imposition; it is possible to view the system built on mutual consent as the tributary state could benefit from China’s support and preserve the domestic order at times of political instability to person in power. Modern capitalism challenged and undermined the East Asian tribute

GGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGG * HK Research Professor, ARI, University 98 Transformation of the Dualistic International Order into the ~ system led by China, and the East Asian international relations became a modern system based on treaties. The Western powers brought the former tributary states of China into the outer realm of the global capitalistic system. With the arrival of Western imperialistic powers, the East Asian regional order faced an inevitable transformation. In this situation, Japan showed acceptance of the Western superiority in its relations with the West, while it tried to grasp the of the new regional order through the post- policies of strengthening the domestic economy and military. Japan brought into Korea the modern diplomatic system based on treaties by concluding “the Treaty of Kanghwa” and further tried to end the tribute system and create a new order in East Asia by winning the Sino-Japanese War and forcing “the Treaty of ” on China in 1895.2 One may think that the new Korea-China relations under the modern treaty system had been determined by the power and diplomatic skills of that the two nations at that time. China, however, tried to hold onto the tribute system by emphasizing the tributary status of Korea in the document of “the Korea-China Regulations for Maritime and Overland Trade”. Accepting this, Korea kept the pre-modern position as a tributary state of China, while it mad agreement with Japan and Western Powers on the modern treaty system. Therefore, Korea found itself in dualistic international relations. Eventually this dualistic nature of Korea’s diplomacy made a transition to the modern treaty system as China’s tribute system collapsed as result of its defeat in the Sino-Japanese War and “the Treaty of Commerce between Korea and China” was established in 1899. There have been many studies on “the Korea-China Regulations for Maritime and Overland Trade”, and “the Treaty of Commerce between Korea and China”. A general agreement emerged on the idea that the Korea-China relations transformed into a modern one based on treaty after the Treaty of Commerce, but there are disagreements on the character of the relationship after the agreement of “the Korea-China Regulations for Maritime and Overland Trade”.3 Song Kue-jin 99

Concerning the pre-modern Korea-China relationship, Koo Sun-hee has provided an important insight. She argues that though lacking in imperialistic aspects, China managed to continue the traditional tribute system, thus actually attempting to put Korea under its colonial rules..4 Many scholars of “the Treaty of Commerce between Korea and China” have accepted this view and define the Korea-China relationship as that of the imperialistic power and the occupied. However, Koo’s argument is no evidence of China’s imperialistic nature other than the fact that Chinese external pressure on Korea was aggressive and leading to hindering Korea’s development to a modern independent nation. On the other hand, Larsen interpreted the Korea-China relationship as that of an “informal” .5 He contributed to the study of the Korea-China relationship by showing how China tried to maximize the imperialistic economic interest through the emphasis on China’s technological empowerment and prevent Japan and Russia’s influence over Korea through the adoption of the open ports system and by making use of treaties, international laws and “multilateral imperialism.” Nevertheless, his analysis does not differ so much from that of others, in that it lacks stronger factual evidence. This main object of my work is to examine how the Korea-China relationship was gradually transformed from the dualistic international order to a modern system.6 It is true that the Korea-China relationship changed after the Treaty of Kanghwa, but before then, the fundamental nature of the relationship remained the same. The customs of paying the tribute to China went on as usual; Kojong evidently did not change his view towards the relationship much either, as he sought Chinese military support to maintain his rule whenever political instabilities emerged. There were understandable attempts to change such realities but they all ended in failure. The real qualitative change in the Korea-China relationship took place after China lost to Japan and “the Treaty of Commerce between Korea and China” was singed in 1899. Based on my paper particularly concerns the transition from the dualistic international order to a modern treaty system. 100 Transformation of the Dualistic International Order into the ~

Modern Treaty System and the Tribute System

When agreeing to the Treaty of Kanghwa, Korea understood it as an extension of the previous relationship between two neighboring countries under the tribute system, but Japan intended to establish the modern treaty relationship between the two countries. This treaty was only a beginning. Ultimately, using the modern but unequal, treatiesas a stepping-stone, Japan invaded Korea, and as a result Korea received great damages. After 1882, a series of unequal treaties with the Western powers, including the US, Great Britain, France, Germany and Russia, was imposed upon Korea. For the people of Korea for whom China had been the center of the world, a change equivalent to earth-shaking chaos began and the international events now affected their daily lives.7 After the modern treaty system had been introduced, Korea tried to resolve the issues surrounding its trade with China in order to fend off Japan’s economic intrusion.8 When sending Uh Yun-jung to China to negotiate on trade, Kojong wanted new solutions for opening of the markets near the border areas requiring expensive security measures, as well as for the issues of tribute emissaries of the two parties. Most of the bureaucrats opposed this, considering it as an attempt to shift the traditional tribute system.9 Some studies have considered Kojong’s action as “an attempt to shift the Korea-China relations as an equal relationship under the common international laws,”10 but this view is problematic in that it overlooks Kojong’s consistent dependency on China until the Sino- Japanese War. China took Korean suggestions on trade as a bold challenge to its authority, and considered Korean inquiry for China to send a residing envoy in Korea as a violation of the customary rules of the tribute system.11 In his meeting with Zhou Fu, Uh argued that this inquiry does not necessarily change the traditional relationship, but China rejected his claim.12 When the Military Uprising in 1882 broke out, Kojong sent a letter to Kim Yun-sik, an emissary to and instructed him to ask for Song Kue-jin 101

Chinese support. Accepting Korean request for military intervention, China sent troops to Korea in order to suppress the Military Uprising. In the end, the uprising was brought under control by the Chinese military and the Chinese troops was stationed in Korea. In order to secure political stability and to calm down the public, Kojong stipulated plans for a political reform and sought ’s opinion through Cho Young- ha, a new appointee as an emissary to China, as well as his deputy Kim Hong-jip and assistant Yi Cho-yun.13 The Military Uprising provided China a good opportunity to legally strengthen its position as the ruling authority in Korea. Chinese intention of keeping Korea under its influence was realized by the continuation of the pre-modern tributary system, not a shift to an imperialistic approach. At the time of writing “the Korea-China Regulations for Maritime and Overland Trade”, Li Hongzhang reported to Chinese authority the Regulations were written after enough consideration has been paid to the Huidian (the basic administrative laws of China) and the common international law; that it was different from a treaty; and that, even the Regulations somewhat changed the traditional ways and reflected new needs, it did not require China to make concessions to a tributary state.14 As for the meaning of the “tribute-paying country,” some have interpreted it as meaning “” in the world of the common international laws, but we should just see it as reflecting Chinese intention to protect the tribute system while acknowledging the common international law. Korean representative, Uh, debated with Chinese Zhao Fu and Ma Jianzhong regarding the contents of the Rule. Uh also admitted that the Rule’s contents were in line with the tribute system. While acknowledging the system, Uh requested that some revisions to be made lest Japan or the Western powers would also make similar demands. He especially questioned issues of , fishing in the seas of the two nations, Chinese trade activities in and inner lands, and customs.15 China asserted that treaties can be only concluded between nations of comparable power, and “the Korea-China Regulations for Maritime and Overland Trade”, as the name shows, was different from a “treaty”.16 The 102 Transformation of the Dualistic International Order into the ~

Regulations was a special exception China made for the case of Korea, and it should be differentiated from other treaties Korea had with other countries. As for the request for revision so that the Regulations does not become an example for other countries, China disregarded it as Korean attempt to be its equal and evidence that Korea only fears Japan but not China. If Korea is worried that other countries would take advantage of the Regulations, China demanded, that Korea include a provision clarifying its status as Chinese state. 17 Due to China’s military station after the Military Uprising, Korea had no other choice but concede to Chinese political and military pressures, and Korea had to sign on “the Korea-China Regulations for Maritime and Overland Trade” in 1882.18 Here, we need to pay close attention to China’s claim that Korean status as a tributary to China needed no further clarification. This fact necessitates rethinking of the view that China tried to shift its relationship with Korea into a modern imperialistic one. Rather than considering Kim Yun-sik and Uh Yun-jung’s acknowledgment of the provision on the protectorate status as “a failure to see China’s intention of transforming Korea-China relationship to a modern imperialistic one,”19 we should now carefully criticize the failure of Korean ruling class centering around Kojong in making necessary reforms under the realities of dualistic international relations. Dispatch of traditional envoys to China, a symbolic practice under the tributary system, continued in until the break-out of Sino- Japanese War. In addition, Korea alone dispatched traditional emissaries to China, after the 1884 Sino-French War.20 Current studies argue that Kojong made a great effort to liberate Korea from the control China, but the very China-dependent attitude of Kojong provides evidence to the contrary. Even when Li Hongzhang was about to withdraw the half of the Chinese troops from Korea, Kojong made a plea to make them stay.21 The dualistic international order originating from Korea was a fact that Western powers acknowledged. Although the Western powers had negative views about China’s ruling authority on Korea, they acknowledged the special Korea-China relationship unless it did not go against their national Song Kue-jin 103 interests. Even the US, towards which Korea had a favorable view, only kept its negative view towards China’s authority over Korea but did not pursue to eliminate it. While the British are considered for having implemented the modern treaty system in Korea through the Treaty of Friendship and Commerce between Great Britain and Korea, they also diplomatically supported China’s authority over Korea by making the British ambassador in China to have a secondary position for Korea and by only keeping a consul general in Seoul and a consulate in Chemul- po.22 The Western powers recognized China’s authority over Korea, but not the suzerain in the sense of the modern treaty system.

Ambiguity of the “Korean-Russian Secret Agreement” Theory and Kojong’s Attitude

The Kapsin Coup of 1884 was an attempt to consolidate Korean dualistic international order into the modern treaty system. It was an unacceptable event for China which was trying to defend the tribute system. China immediately intervened and suppressed the coup. The common assumption among the scholars with regard to this event is that Korea used the principle of “using barbarians to control barbarians” and made Russia involved through a secret agreement in the hopes of containing China’s influence given the changing status quo among the powers surrounding Korea after the coup.23 However there is no solid evidence of such secret agreement. It is highly probable that the secret agreement was in fact a rumor originating from the cautious eyes of the surrounding countries on the overly frequent contacts between Korea and Russia after the treaty had been signed between the two in 1884. In fact, Chen Shutang reported to Li Hongzhang that Kojong did not seem to have been involved in the sending of the secret document. 24 Such uncertain rumor has become an acceptable theory concurrently as the movement to view Kojong as an independent- minded leader trying to fend off China’s influence using the surrounding 104 Transformation of the Dualistic International Order into the ~ powers’ competition, has gained supporters. The dualistic international order in East Asia surrounding Korea was becoming more complex at that time. As the Germans and Russians sought influence over Korea through the German Ambassador P. G. Möllendorff, the China-backing British and the Japan-backing Americans shared a mutual interest in preventing the Russia’s southern expansion. Given the complexity of the situation, after the Tianjin Treaty, Japan momentarily condoned China’s rights over Korea and showed more passive stance towards the Korea problem. 25 The rumor about the Korean-Russian Secret Agreement was what spread under such circumstances. China did not trust the inconsistency of Kojong’s words. China doubted that Kojong was setting a tug of war between China and Russia, as he requested Russia to keep five to six military ships at the Incheon port, but at the same time asking China to offer protection from Russia. China also interpreted that Kojong’s involvement with Russia also had a political origin, as he doubted that the king’s father Heungsun Taewon'gun was trying to regain power with Chinese support, and was also secretly communicating with Japan through Kim Okkyun. 26 In actuality, however, Korean relationship with Russia at that time was not so close enough to talk about cooperation to chase China out of Korea. In fact Russia even threatened to occupy Cheju Island when Korea objected to Russia’s dispatch of military adviser to Korea.27 Kojong asked China to dispatch troops after the secret agreement with Russia had prevailed, 28 and this show took advantage of the tribute system in order to secure his . Kojong’s request for the troops came out from anxiety about the spreading of domestic instability since the withdrawal of China troops after the Tianjin Treaty. In 1885, Kojong dispatched Kim Ka-jin as a special emissary and pleaded with the China to dispatch his troops and help calm down and assure the people of Korea. Kojong assessed that Korea had overcome the past political uprisings with the assistance of the China, and especially in the case of the 1884 Coup, Chinese military station could save Korea out of crisis and helped Song Kue-jin 105 it gain political stability. Kojong said the following: “the people of Korea are frivolous and often cause conflicts...These internal conflicts did not influence other countries under the policy of isolation, but since the opening of trades with other countries in 1882, people live with foreigners at the same residences and domestic conflicts thereby causes harm to other countries.” Kojong felt unsafe as the domestic and international political events abruptly unfolded after withdrawal of Chinese troops, and so he requested the Chinese Emperor to send troops again to help him regain control over the people of Korea. Resending troops to Korea after China and Japan withdrew troops out of Korea after concluding the Tianjin Treaty was a complicated international problem. Therefore, Kojong’s request could not be accepted. It only made Kojong an unreliable figure, and caused China to actively intervene in Korean political issues thereon. There is no enough evidence on the second Korean-Russian Secret Agreement supposedly initiated by Kojong and other Korean bureaucrats in 1886. Several sources confirm the sentiment in Korean court opposing ’s dominance. Be aware of this anti-Yuan sentiment, Yuan attempted to dethrone Kojong by falsely reporting Chinese that Korea was trying to approach Russia, but Li Hongzhang judged Yuan’s report was ungrounded, and rejected his request, as the anti- Kojong movement was weak and clear evidence on the “Korea-Russian Secret Agreement” did not exist. Li did so because Japan strongly criticized the movement to dethrone Kojong and the Russian Embassy guaranteed that there was no such “Secret Agreement.”29 O. N. Denny rejected the possibility of the secret agreement between Korea and Russia. Denny asserted that the talk of secret agreement was “an outcome of Yuan Shikai’s pressure on Kojong to acknowledge a document he has never written.”30 At the rumor of a movement to dethrone him, Kojong tried to dispatch envoys to various nations in order to overcome the crisis of his regime.31 This was possible because, although Korean relationship with China was based on the pre-modern tribute system, its relationship with Japan and 106 Transformation of the Dualistic International Order into the ~ other Western powers was based on the modern treaty system under the dualistic international order in which it placed itself. At that time, appealing to the tradition of the tribute system, China tried to deter Korea from sending envoys to other countries, but China could not force Korea to listen to it, because Korea also participated in the modern treaty system. Nevertheless, Yuan Shikai tried to stop Korea based on the reasoning that dispatch of envoys violated the tribute agreement between Korea and China. On the other hand, Li Hongzhang who was actually in charge of the policy regarding Korea, accepted Korean action on the condition of “three step procedure (of reporting to China in foreign nations)” in other words, he restricted Korean diplomatic rights as much as possible.32 As Pak Jung-yang did not follow the three step procedure with the objection of the US, China pressured Kojong to call Pak back to Korea. After all Kojong had to accept the requirement. The continuation of the tribute system was reconfirmed when China sent traditional envoys to a loyal funeral of Queen Dowager Cho in 1890. Korea had requested China not to send the envoy as Korean fiscal condition was not good and it did not have enough resources to properly greet such an envoy. To this, China argued that it owed Korea a special obligation of caring for a tributary state as the rules of the system could not be easily changed, and promised Korea to help it reduce the financial burden of accepting the envoy. In the end, the envoy arrived through the sea route as one way of reducing the cost. Kojong went out of the palace to personally greet the envoy, and knelt down to offer a bow to the .33 Kojong’s tendency to seek Chinese military support under the threat to his power became clear again when Donghak Peasant Movement occurred. When the peasant forces attacked several government offices in Jeolla Province and increased their influence, Korea again discussed the possibility of Chinese military dispatch. In a meeting with government officials, Kojong did express his reservation for the request for dispatch of foreign military forces. This, however, was nothing more than a political gesture. In secret, Kojong sent Sung Ki-woon to Yuan Shikai and Song Kue-jin 107 asked for military assistance. To this, Yuan argued that Korea could not resolve this situation by itself and was trying to get Chinese protection, and as a “grander nation,” China was obligated not to reject Korean call.34 Even if Korea had the premature concept of being independent from China and even if Kojong did try to end the tribute system as majority of scholars insist, ending the tribute system was a difficult task under the reality of politics dominated by Kojong and his followers. The rumor of Korea-Russian Secret Agreement well illustrates such reality. Although it is possible that Kojong may have developed the idea of making a secret agreement with Russia, there is no evidence showing that his ideas did actualize. Only is there enough evidence to the contrary that shows Kojong’s continuing dependency on China in his frail attempt to protect his rule. To China which was trying to preserve its tribute system, its involvement in the issues of Korea was only natural. In the end, dispatch of the Chinese military provided rational for Japan’s military intrusion, and the East Asian international order changed greatly through the Sino- Japanese War.

Breakdown of Tribute System and Transition of Korea-China Relationship

In 1894, the Japanese army broke into the Korea palace and invaded the Chinese embassy. At that time, Yuan Shikai had already returned to China and Tang Shaoyi, who handled the tasks in place of Yuan, also returned. Official diplomatic relations between China and Korea was temporarily suspended, which also meant that the tribute system came to a halt.35 The Chinese stance to retain the tribute system against the modern treaty system failed to establish the grounds to sustain the existing relationship with Korea within East Asia’s rapidly changing circumstances. Upon his retreat from Korea, Tang Shaoyi commissioned the protection of Chinese people, their cargo and property to C. T. Gardener, the British Acting Consul General in Korea.36 Around the time 108 Transformation of the Dualistic International Order into the ~ of Tang’s withdrawal, Gardener asked Korea to blockade the Chinese embassy, because of frequent theft by Japanese and . Korea drew up a relevant material and sent it to the British embassy in response to Gardener’s request and, accordingly, any negotiating matter related to the Chinese was placed under the jurisdiction of the British Consul General in Korea.37 In 1894, however, the Korea government promulgated “the Regulations for the Protection of Chinese Merchants”, which restricted the Chinese residences, prohibited the entrance of the Chinese to the inlands, and further regulated procedure-expiration date of residence registration and procedure of residential transferral, prohibition of military supplies treatment, limitation of Chinese visitors to Korea, control and trial of judicial violations of the Chinese.38 Among these, a dispute rose on the policy that the jurisdiction of the Chinese in Korea completely belongs to the Korea government. In 1894, Walert C. Hillier, the British Consul General in Korea claimed rights to dispatch an inspector official to the trials based on the Article 8, Section 3 of “the Treaty of Friendship and Commerce between Great Britain and Korea” signed in 1883, but the Ministry of Foreign Affairs rejected his allegation by pointing out that he was not a Chinese official. 39 Therefore, the Chinese encountered a transitional circumstance where they were officially protected by the British Consul General, but supervised under “the Regulations for the Protection of Chinese Merchants”. In 1895, China and Japan signed “the ” in order to conclude the Sino-Japanese war. The first clause of this treaty reads “China recognizes definitively the full and complete independence and autonomy of Korea, and, in consequence, the payment of tribute and the performance of ceremonies and formalities by Korea to China, in derogation of such independence and autonomy, shall wholly cease for the future” 40 Accordingly, China officially recognized Korea as an independent state for the first time and abolished every tributary ceremony that China had requested Korea to perfume. Because Korea was no longer a tributary state, there could no longer be the tributary system. Song Kue-jin 109

Nevertheless, there were still many obstacles that the Korea-China tribute system would need to overcome in order to transform the relationship to a modern treaty system. Meanwhile, Britain, who was ‘officially’ commissioned the protectoral rights of the Chinese living in Korea, was in a disagreement with Korea between the jurisdictional rights on these Chinese. In 1895, Hillier met Kim Yun-sik, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, to officially inform that the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs requested Britain to take care of every matters related to the Chinese in Korea. Upon his acceptance, Kim requested that Britain also takes care of the Koreans living in China, and Britain complied. According to the series of bilateral agreements, “The Regulations for the Protection of Chinese Merchants” were withdrawn and “the Treaty of Friendship and Commerce between Korea and UK” came to effect on the Chinese in Korea.41 Soon after the end of Sino- Japanese War, China argued it was wrong to commit entire protection of the Chinese to the British Consul and dispatched Tang Shaoyi to Korea, not as a government official but under the title of a General Trade Councilor.42 Yet, Tang Shaoyi was not an ‘official’ diplomat since there were no diplomatic ties between Korea and China at the time. Therefore, the British Consul in Korea still had the hold on the protectoral rights of the Chinese in Korea. Such transitional phase continued until “the Treaty of Commerce between Korea and China” was contracted.43 Kojong eagerly pushed to conclude a treaty with China. In this behalf, Tang Shaoyi sent negative signals towards the contraction of the treaty, judging Korea not as an independent state since Kojong was residing in the Russian embassy.44 Thereupon, Korea mentioned that the king will return to the palace as soon as Russia sends troops and suggested that they send an envoy to China after the king’s return. Tang Shaoyi, on the other hand, argued that a nation which could not stay independent without foreign military support was merely a that lacked , wherefore China could not send an envoy according to international law.45 Although China had publicly recognized Korea as an independent state 110 Transformation of the Dualistic International Order into the ~ in accord to the Treaty of Shimonoseki, China made multilateral efforts to sustain the existing tributary system. In 1896, Tang Shaoyi took a sensitive stance by scrutinizingly reporting on the demolishment of the Youngeun Gate and the construction of the , which were Korean effort to display its independence to the outside.46 In 1896, Tang Shaoyi reported that Kojong is strongly willing to send an envoy to sign up a treaty with China. In addition, Tang thought that an even treaty could not be made despite the shift in both domestic and foreign circumstances because Korea had remained as a tributary state for centuries. He suggested that in order to prevent Korea to send an envoy to conclude a modern treaty, it would be preferable to do as the British or Germans did: send a consulate general to discuss the details, notify the fact to Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs and send a consulate en poste in each open port. 47 China confirmed Tang Shaoyi’s proposal and appointed him to the Chinese Consul General in Korea in 1896. Under the change in Tang Shaoyi’s title and status lied China’s calculus to prevent the visit of Korean envoy in the first place.48 Still, he did not possess bargaining rights since he did not inform Korea of his appointment to the Consul General.49 Therefore, he had limitations in intervening to protect the Chinese, and he was also excluded from the conference on the management of foreign settlements by the embassies.50 Meanwhile, Korea made a treaty proposal and attempted to dispatch Sung Ki-hun to China. The treaty draft by the Korea government’s included an article, which stated that a Chinese who commits crime in Korea will be extradited to Korea, and vice versa. The other articles were identical to the treaties that Korea had signed with other nations.51 In 1897, the movement to declare imperial regime and establish the Altar of Heaven was staged in Korea. Insisting that Korea cannot adopt the title ‘emperor’ on equal terms with China, Tang Shaoyi attempted to stem this movement with other countries.52 In disregard of such efforts, Korea was renamed itself as the Greater Korea in 1897, established new diplomatic relations with foreign countries, and tried to make a modern treaty with China. China did not approve the construction of the Altar of Song Kue-jin 111

Heaven on the soil of the South Royal Villa – the former residences of the Chinese envoys. China also saw the title ‘emperor’ for Kojong only as usurpation of the title, and observed whether other nations acknowledged the inauguration of ‘the Greater ’. China believed that Korea still does not have sovereignty due to the Russo-Japanese secret agreement at that time, and therefore cannot conclude a treaty.53 Yet, Korea constantly attempted to sign a treaty with China through the influence of neighboring powers. In 1897, Kojong had sound out Macdonald – the British Consul General in China, who came to present his credentials – on the prospects of a contract between Korea and China.54 After the establishment of ‘the Greater Korean Empire’, he again put pressure on China in 1898 through the Russian Minister in Korea, and also through each country’s Ministers and Inspector General of Customs. They criticized that China’s disapproval on signing the treaty was based on the intention to pose ‘the Greater Korean Empire’ subject to itself, and urged China to exchange envoys.55 In 1898, Tang Shaoyi reported that sending diplomatic delegates is no longer evitable since Russia, Japan, and other powers are supporting Korean motion to sign a treaty with China.56 In 1898, China finally sent an envoy to Korea under the judgment that it would be rather face-saving to send an envoy to Seoul before the Korean special envoy visits , and also that it is wiser to avoid suspicion from others by referring the context of the treaty from other countries’ examples. Accordingly, China appointed Xu Shoupeng to the Imperial Inspector Minister en poste in Korea, and notified this fact to the Greater Korea Empire as well as every embassy in Korea.57 In 1898, Jordan, the British Consul General in Korea, Brown, the Inspector General of Customs, Matyunin, the Russian Minister in Korea found out that the China would send a delegate to Korea to draw a treaty and objected to Tang Shaoyi for using the term ‘stationed’ even before the treaty was signed, naming Korea as Korea, and for the form of the credential.58 In 1898, China prepared a credential that named Korea as the Greater Korea Empire and Kojong as ‘the Great Emperor’, since China did not afford to ignore the foreign powers’ support for the Greater 112 Transformation of the Dualistic International Order into the ~

Korea Empire and its diplomatic relations.59 This meant China’s complete abandonment of its traditional tribute system as well as the acknowledgement that China would establish new diplomatic relations based on the modern treaty system. This also signifies the end of the transitional phase of Korean-Chinese relations after the Sino-Japanese War.

The Significance of the Modern Treaty between Korea and China

Xu Shoupeng prepared a draft of 14 clauses60 based on the treaties that Korea had signed with Britain, the , and Japan and reported it to the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which later readjusted the draft into 17 clauses during an editorial debate.61 In 1899, Xu Shoupeng opened a preliminary conference in the Chinese embassy in Seoul for the sake of a credential presentation.62 Xu Shoupeng presented his credential and submitted a commission of full powers to Emperor Kojong at the Hamnyung-jeon of Kyungun Palace. The press published this incident with heavy headlines and Koreans positively evaluated the signing of an equal treaty.63 The plenipotentiaries of each party, Pak Je-sun and Xu Shoupeng, went through eight meetings for almost 6 months until the final draft was written, and could finally exchange the instruments of ratification through the period of more than 10 months.64 The procedures to conclude the treaty was ran according to the State Council Official Regulations proclaimed in 1898 through the 19th edict and the National System of the Greater Korea Empire in 1899. The procedures included issuing commission of full powers, creating State Council’s treaty draft, negotiating the carte blanched Ministry of Foreign Affairs, State Council’s request to the emperor for the approval of the treaty draft, the emperor’s ratification, contracting a compatible treaty, and including it in the gazette, et cetera. The conclusion of “the Treaty of Commerce between Korea and China” could reach a conclusion of treaties with in 1901 and in 1902.65 Song Kue-jin 113

Although Korea prepared the materials for the contraction of “the Treaty of Commerce between Korea and China”, in reality the negotiation between the two countries was led solely by the sources that China had prepared. China asserted that the sources were based on the treaties which two countries had previously signed with other countries, and that any different clauses from other previous treaties are the results of consideration for current circumstances of both parties for the sake of peace. In terms of principle, Koreans accepted the idea.66 Yet, unlike “the Korea-China Regulations for Maritime and Overland Trade”, negotiation on “the Treaty of Commerce between Korea and China” was prolonged due to some differences in opinion, the most controversial one being the debate on extraterritoriality and the abolition of the Chinese trade in Seoul. At the time Korea believed that a clause that negates extraterritorial rights should be added, stating that “a clause should be added in the treaty which states that the Korean authority should have control over the Chinese in Korea, and vice versa following the Western practices”.67 In response, Xu Shoupeng judged that the treaty between Korea and China should follow the examples of Western treaties signed with both Korea and China, according to which the jurisdiction of the Westerners in either Korea or China should be handed over to their home countries.68 There also was an internal debate on the abolition of extraterritoriality itself, but eventually the clause on extraterritoriality was stipulated with its essence being nationality principle of the defendant, the rights of the defendant’s country to dispatch an inspector official to the trials and bilateral regulations.69 At the time, the clause on extraterritoriality was not only problematic to Korea-China relations, but also to the entire modern treaty system. Therefore, “the Treaty of Commerce between Korea and China” included unequal elements that approved extraterritoriality similar in a sense to “the Treaty of Amity and Commerce between the Unite Sates of America and Korea” signed in 1882; yet, it can be evaluated as ‘equal’ in that it was unequal to both sides.70 “The Regulations for the Protection of Chinese Merchants” in 1894 did not allow the Chinese to enter the Korean inlands. However, according to 114 Transformation of the Dualistic International Order into the ~ the Regulations on Chinese Merchants legislated the General Trade Councilor Tang Shaoyi, “one who seeks to purchase local specialties outside must be guaranteed by one or two great merchants”.71 There are assessments on this effort as a desperate countermeasure72 to prevent inland commerce by the Chinese, but it seems to be more of a part of the effort to alleviate the application of “The Regulations for the Protection of Chinese Merchants”. In fact, inland commerce by the Chinese rapidly grew since 1897 to surpass the extent before the Sino-Japanese war, and there were quite a number of influential merchants who resided in inland commercial centers.73 Korea also proposed the abolition of the Chinese trade in Seoul.74 Incessant conflicts occurred as the Korean’s commercial supremacy suffered severe damages due to the Chinese trade in Seoul, which “the Korea-China Regulations for Maritime and Overland Trade” had approved.75 In 1898, the and the Central Merchant Association of the Greater Korea Empire jointly appealed to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to prohibit foreign merchants from illegal residence in the inlands and to abolish the Chinese trade in Seoul through revision of the treaty. Pak Je-sun, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, ordered local offices to prohibit inland commerce by foreigners, but also said that abolishing the Chinese trade in Seoul was difficult due to the costs.76 During negotiations with China, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs claimed the abolition of the Chinese trade in Seoul and explained that Korea’s proposal is based on the premise that the Western countries they will follow China as stated in their treaties with Korea, if the Chinese government abolishes the Chinese trade in Seoul first. In response, Xu Shoupeng asserted that unless the regulations on the foreigners’ rights to trade in Korean lands is repealed from the treaties between Korea and each country, it should also be specified in “the Treaty of Commerce between Korea and China”, for the clause on the foreigners’ trade in Seoul already exists in the treaties between Japan and the West.77 Xu Shoupeng displayed an uncompromising attitude to Pak Je-sun that he is ready to rupture the negotiation if Korea insists to abolish the Chinese Song Kue-jin 115 trade in Seoul. Pak claimed that solving the problem between China would justify the same request to other countries, since the Chinese trade in Seoul originated from “the Korea-China Regulations for Maritime and Overland Trade”; nevertheless, it was difficult for Korea to rebut China’s logic as much as it was difficult to carry out a solution between other countries.78 Discussions on the treaty made a rapid progress as Korea eventually yielded and, thus, “the Treaty of Commerce between Korea and China” could reach a conclusion in 1899. “The Treaty of Commerce between Korea and China”, being signed under the Greater Korea Empire and international law, became a model for the treaties in the future. Despite inclusion of inequality, a general feature of modern conventions, “the Treaty of Commerce between Korea and China” also was negotiable and mutually beneficial to an extent. Since “the Treaty of Commerce between Korea and China”, the East Asian international order surrounding Korea made a final transition to the modern treaty system. The road the Greater Korea Empire would take under the complicated East Asian international order was to overcome the inequalities of the modern treaty system and to defend its independence. Yet, Kojong remained dependent on foreign powers to maintain his own regime in every effort. He focused on removing his political rivals and he often made dogmatic decisions on important security issues such as diplomatic and military policies, and kept secret to the state council meeting.79 As a result, there were various attempts to enhance national prosperity and defense through reformation, but these efforts failed to reach internal consensus.

Conclusion

As the Western powers stretched their influence to East Asia, the international order surrounding Korea changed from a tribute system to a modern treaty system. China tried to maintain the tributary relations with Korea, while Japan planned to invade the continent via Korea as its post. 116 Transformation of the Dualistic International Order into the ~

Moreover, Russia looked into Korea for the sake of advancing to the Pacific, and Britain struggled to contain Russia. Korean strategic importance was consequently amplified at the time. Nevertheless, the transition from a tribute system to a modern treaty system was by no means uniform and unilateral, but rather more complex and multilateral. Also, a certain period of transition was inevitable when a prolonged regional order came across a new one. Such aspects are typically evident in the East Asian international order surrounding Korea. Although Korea was incorporated into the modern treaty system after the Treaty of Kanghwa, the East Asian international order surrounding Korea did not change straight into a modern treaty system but shifted to a dualistic international order in practice. China institutionally maintained the tribute system by signing “the Korea-China Regulations for Maritime and Overland Trade”. The of the time that led the dualistic international order surrounding Korea was China. Because of China who did not recognize Korea as an independent state then, Korea had many limitations in active participation in the international society. Therefore, breaking away from China’s external pressure appeared as an important objective. There had been some groups who attempted to promote internal reform and escape from China’s interference but they failed due to China’s intervention and Kojong’s pro-Chinese dependent policies. Although Kojong also did have the intentions to alleviate China’s tribute system in concert with the West, he prioritized stability of his power and repeated historical actions by requesting for Chinese troops when his regime was threatened. The dualistic international order came to an end with China’s complete denial of the tribute system in the Treaty of Shimonoseki following the Sino-Japanese War. Yet, China still tried to preserve the special relationship with Korea by only permitting the recovery of relationship up to signing “the Korea-China Regulations for Maritime and Overland Trade” and mutually sending the consular representatives. Therefore, the Korea-China relationship, not readily included in the modern treaty system, had a certain period of a transitional phase. However, China’s Song Kue-jin 117 effort to reinforce its influence over Korea by preserving the special relationship was no longer viable. In consequence, China decided to sign the modern treaty following the establishment of the Greater Korea Empire, and the active involvement of Britain, Russia and Japan, as well as to deal with the practical issue of protection of Chinese people. the Greater Korea Empire and China officially established a modern treaty relation after founding “the Treaty of Commerce between Korea and China” in 1899. This incident marks the change of the international order of Northeastern Asia from a dualistic existence of a modern treaty system and a tribute system to a modern treaty system. The international community could only acquiesce in the Japanese colonization of the Greater Korea Empire after Japan – the nation that was rising as the dominant player in the East Asian international order around Korea – won Russo-Japanese Wars. However, superficially the modern treaty system was founded on the idea that individual countries have equal in international relations, even though in reality, this system had resort to military power to resolve international conflicts. This point leads me to guess that If Korea and China had adopted the modern treaty system before the Sino-Japanese War, and had jointly maneuvered against the Western and Japanese hegemony, the Korea and China relationships might have developed in a different direction. Then, is it too-farfetched to conclude that the establishment of the modern treaty between Korea and China was belated?

Keywords a Dualistic International Order, Tribute system, Korea-China Relationship, Modern Treaty System, the Korea-China Regulations for Maritime and Overland Trade, Korean- Russian Secret Agreement, Kojong, the Treaty of Commerce between Korea and China. G G 118 Transformation of the Dualistic International Order into the ~

G

Notes : G 1 Hedley Bull, The anarchical society : a study of order in world politics, 3rd ed. (New Jersey: Press. 2002). Also, James N Rosenau, Governance without government: order and change in world politics (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992). 2 Kim, Key Hiuk, The Last Phase of the East Asian World Order: Korea, Japan, and the Chinese Empire, 1860-1882 (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1980). 3 Analysis of greater depth can be found in Koo Sun-hee, “Research Trend and Analysis in the Historical Study of the Modern Korean-Chinese Relations”, The Issues and Study of Sino-Korean Relations in the Korean, Chinese and Japanese Academia (Northeast Asian History Foundation, 2009). 4 Koo Sun-hee, Study of Korea’s Policies towards Qing in the Modern Era (Hyean, 1999). 5 Kirk W. Larsen, Tradition Treaties, and trade : Qing imperialism and Chosǂn Korea, 1850-1910 (Cambridge, Massachusetts : Harvard University Asia Center, 2008). 6 Here, we could highlight the studies on Yu Kil-jun’s dual system theory by and Harada Kaeru and Chung Yong-hwa; but the focus of their work was not on Chosǂn-Qing relationship. See Harada Kaeru, Chosǂn’s Opening and Modernization (Keisuisha, 1997); Chung Yong-hwa, Political Thoughts of the Civilization: Yu Gil-jun and Modern Korea (Moonji Publications, 2004). 7 Kim Dong No, Modern Era and the Prelude for Occupation (Changbi Publishers, 2009), 32. 8 Akizuki Nozomi, “Process of Concluding the Chosǂn-China Trade Trade Rules,” Chǀsen Gakuhǀ 115 (1991), 105. 9 Institute of Modern History, Academia SINICA, Historical Documents of the China- Japan -Korea Relations during the Qing’s last Era (hereafter, “Historical Document”) 2, April 22, 8th year of the Guangxu reign, 591-592, 597. 10 Koo Sun-hee, Ibid., (1999), 61-62. 11 Munhae Press, Documents of the Negotiation between China and Japan during Qing Guangxu reign (hereafter, “Negotiation Documents”: 3, April 22, Song Kue-jin 119

8th year of the Guangxu reign, 17-18. 12 Historical Documents 2, April 22, 8th year of the Guangxu reign, 591-601. 13 Historical Documents 3, August 8, 8th year of the Guangxu reign, 910-917. 14 Historical Documents 3, August 30, 8th year of the Guangxu reign, 979. 15 Historical Documents 3, August 30, 8th year of the Guangxu reign, 983. 16 Historical Documents 3, August 30, 8th year of the Guangxu reign, 984. 17 Historical Documents 3, August 30, 8th year of the Guangxu reign, 986. 18 For more details, see Kim Jong-won, “Regarding the Chosǂn-Qing Land and Water Trade Rule,” Academic Journal of History 32 (1966). 19 Koo, ibid., (1999), 87. 20 Kim Chung-gi, “Qing’s Chosǂn Policies (1876-1894),” Study of the 1894 Peasant Wars (Yǂksabipyǂngsa, 1993), 42. 21 Im Kaye Soon, “Korean-Russian Treaty and Qing’s Response,” Korea and the Powers before and after the Sino-Japanese War, (Academy of Korean Studies, 1984), 66. 22 Choi Moon-hyung, “Korea Policies of the Powers and the Circumstances in the Last Years of Chosǂn,” Korea and the Powers before and after the Sino- Japanese War (Academy of Korean Studies, 1984), 66. 23 Koo Sun-hee, Ibid., (1999), 101-102. 24 Historical Documents 4, June 17, 11th year of the Guangxu reign: 1885-1886. 25 Choi Moon-hyung, Ibid., (1984), 19-26. 26 Negotiation Documents 9, September 22nd, 11th year of the Guangxu reign, 4-8. 27 Historical Documents 4, August 30, 8th year of the Guangxu reign, 1870-1871. 28 Institute of Modern History, Academia SINICA, “Korea King’s Secret Request for Military Dispatch and Stabilization of the” Preserved Official Records of Envoys in Korea, 01-41-001-03. 29 Negotiation Documents 10: 7 (December 27th, 12th year of the Guangxu reign). 30 O.N. Denny, translated edition by Shin Bok-Ryong and Choi Su-kǎn, China and Corea (Jimmundang, 1999), 42. 31 About this, see Lim Mingde, Yuan Shikai and Chosǂn, (Institute of Modern History, Academia SINICA, 1970), 159-172. 32 Koo Sun-hee, Ibid., (1999), 163. 33 Historical Documents 5, August 30th, 16th year of the Guangxu reign, 2826- 2828. 34 Negotiation Documents 1, April 29, 20th year of the Guangxu reign, 246-247. 35 For later diplomatic relations between China and Chosǂn, see , Youngok, 120 Transformation of the Dualistic International Order into the ~

“Diplomatic Relations Between and Chosǂn Dynasty (Korean Empire), 1895-” The Korean Academic Journal of Chinese Studies 50, (The Korea Society for Chinese Studies, 2004), 217-235.. 36 Kwon Seok-bong, “Post-Sino-Japanese War Korea-Qing Relations Studies” Korea and the Powers, before and after the Sino-Japanese War, (Academy of Korean Studies, 1984), 192-201. 37 Kwon Seok-bong, Ibid., (1984), 192-194. 38 Annals of Chosǂn Dynasty: Kojong, November 20th, 1894 (Use original-text service of National Institute of Korean History), http://www.history.go.kr/. 39 Kwon Seok-bong, Ibid., (1984). 40 See ed. Choi Deok-soo, Korean Modern History Seen through Treaties, (Yǂllinchaekdǎl, 2010). 41 Kwon Seok-bong, Ibid., (1984), 207. 42 Ibid., 207. 43 Koo Bumjin, “Korea-Qing Diplomatic Conflicts on Interpreting some Provisions on “‘the Treaty of Commerce between Korea and China’”,” The Historical Review 83, (The Daegu Historical Society, 2006), 209-210. 44 During the Russian Legation (Agwan p'ach'ǂn), Kojong stayed in the Russian Ministry in Korea from February 11, 1896, to February 20, 1897. 45 Historical Documents 8, June 2, 22nd year of the Guangxu reign, 4856-4857. 46 Historical Documents 8, June 15, 22nd year of the Guangxu reign, 4869-4870. 47 Historical Documents 8, 4958-4959. 48 Historical Documents 8, 4968-4969. 49 Lee, Youngok, Ibid., (2004), 222. 50 Eun Jungtae, “The Conclusion of the Korea-Qing Commercial Treaty in 1899 and the Daehan Empire,” Academic Journal of History 186 (The Korean Historical Association, 2005), 31. 51 Historical Documents 8, February 11, 23rd year of the Guangxu reign, 4980- 4990. 52 Historical Documents 8, May 5, 23rd year of the Guangxu reign, 5009. 53 Eun Jungtae, Ibid., (2005), 32. 54 Historical Documents 8, May 5, 23rd year of the Guangxu reign, 5021-5023. 55 Eun Jungtae, Ibid., (2005), 33. 56 Negotiation Documents ⿧, April 28, 24th year of the Guangxu reign, 989 57 Eun Jungtae, Ibid., (2005), 33. Song Kue-jin 121

58 Historical Documents 8, July 12, 24th year of the Guangxu reign, 5145-5150. 59 Eun Jungtae interprets China’s such change is due to the Hundred Days’ Reform. Yet, he does not specify the details. Eun Jeong-tae, Ibid., (2005), 33. 60 Lee, Youngok, Ibid., (2004), 225. 61 See Kwon Seok-bong’s “The Conclusion of “the Treaty of Commerce between Korea and China”,” Eastern Academic Journal 54-56 (Institute of Korean Studies at , 1987), 94-101. 62 Eun Jungtae, Ibid., (2005), 42. 63 Eun Jungtae, Ibid., (2005), 42. 64 See Kwon Seok-bong, Ibid., (1987), 110-126. 65 Eun Jungtae, Ibid., (2005), 43. 66 Kwon Seok-bong, Ibid.(1987), 108-111 ; Eun Jeong-tae, Ibid., (2005), 43. 67 Historical Documents 8, February 13, 25th year of the Guangxu reign, 5202. 68 Historical Documents 8, February 13, 25th year of the Guangxu reign, 5202. 69 Lee, Eunja, “A Study on the Korea-China relation as viewed through the China`s practice of Extraterritoriality in the Daehan Empire after “the Treaty of Commerce between Korea and China” Period(1900~1905),” Myǂngchǂngsa - yǂngu 26 (2005), 93. 70 Kwon Seok-bong, Ibid., (1987), 97-98. 71 Historical Documents 8, July 15, 22nd year of the Guangxu reign, 4906. 72 Lee, Eunja, Ibid., (2005), 92. 73 Lee, Byeong cheon, “The Influx of Foreign Merchants and the Response of the Korean Merchants in the Opening Era,” PhD diss., Seoul National University (1985), 144-160. 74 Historical Documents 8, February 13, 25th year of the Guangxu reign, 5202. 75 See Lee, Eunja, “The Study on the Korea-Chinese Relation Changed after the Sino-Japanese War (1895~1899) through Analyzing Legal Cases between Korea and”, Chungguk-hyǂndaesa-yǂngu 38(2008); Lee, Eunja, “Sino-Korean Civil Lawsuit Cases during the Korean Imperial” Dongyangsahak-yǂngu 10(2007); Koo Bum-jin, Ibid. (2006), Lee, Young-ok, Ibid.; Ryota Ishikawa, “Commerce between Chosǂn and Chinese people in Case of Hansǂng during the Open-port Period”, Annual Bulletin of Chosǂn Studies 10 (Kyushu University, 2007). 76 The Independence News, October 10, 1898, Letter section; Ibid., October 18, 1898, Miscellaneous. 77 Eun Jungtae, Ibid. (2005), 47. 122 Transformation of the Dualistic International Order into the ~

78 Kwon Seok-bong, Ibid., (1987), 120. 79 Hyun Kwang-ho, The Korean Empire’s Foreign Policy (Sinsowon, 2002), 16.

†G

GGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGG Submission Date: 2010. 4. 25 Completion Date of Review: 2010. 5. 25 Accepted : 2010. 7. 20 Song Kue-jin 123

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Song Kue-jin

The transition from a tribute system to a modern treaty system was by no means uniform and unilateral, but rather more complex and multilateral. Also, a certain period of transition was inevitable when a prolonged regional order came across a new one. Such aspects are typically evident in the East Asian international order surrounding Korea. Although Korea was incorporated into the modern treaty system after the Treaty of Kanghwa, the East Asian international order surrounding Korea did not change straight into a modern treaty system but shifted to a dualistic international order in practice. China institutionally maintained the tribute system by signing “the Korea-China Regulations for Maritime and Overland Trade”. The superpower of the time that led the dualistic international order surrounding Korea was China. Because of China who did not recognize Korea as an independent state then, Korea had many limitations in active participation in the international society. Therefore, breaking away from China’s external pressure appeared as an important objective. There had been some groups who attempted to promote internal reform and escape from China’s interference but they failed due to China’s intervention and Kojong’s pro- Chinese dependent policies. Although Kojong also did have the intentions to alleviate China’s tribute system in concert with the West, he prioritized stability of his power and repeated historical actions by requesting for Chinese troops when his regime was threatened. The dualistic international order came to an end with China’s complete denial 124 Transformation of the Dualistic International Order into the ~ of the tribute system in the Treaty of Shimonoseki following the Sino-Japanese War. Yet, China still tried to preserve the special relationship with Korea by only permitting the recovery of relationship up to signing “the Korea-China Regulations for Maritime and Overland Trade” and mutually sending the consular representatives. Therefore, the Korea-China relationship, not readily included in the modern treaty system, had a certain period of a transitional phase. However, China’s effort to reinforce its influence over Korea by preserving the special relationship was no longer viable. In consequence, China decided to sign the modern treaty following the establishment of the Greater Korea Empire, and the active involvement of Britain, Russia and Japan, as well as to deal with the practical issue of protection of Chinese people. The Greater Korea Empire and China officially established a modern treaty relation after founding “the Treaty of Commerce between Korea and China” in 1899. This incident marks the change of the international order of Northeastern Asia from a dualistic existence of a modern treaty system and a tribute system to a modern treaty system. The international community could only acquiesce in the Japanese colonization of the Greater Korea Empire after Japan – the nation that was rising as the dominant player in the East Asian international order around Korea – won Russo- Japanese Wars. However, superficially the modern treaty system was founded on the idea that individual countries have equal in international relations, even though in reality, this system had resort to military power to resolve international conflicts. This point leads me to guess that If Korea and China had adopted the modern treaty system before the Sino-Japanese War, and had jointly maneuvered against the Western and Japanese hegemony, the Korea and China relationships might have developed in a different direction. Song Kue-jin 125

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(ᘂȽḥ(Łಅݡ⦺Ʊ ᦥᖙᦥྙᱽᩑǍᗭ HKᩑǍƱᙹ

௝ ᅖᰂܩ᳑Ŗℕᱽᨱᕽ ɝݡ᳑᧞ℕᱽಽ ᱥ⪹ࡹ۵ ŝᱶᮡ ݉ᯝ⦹Ł ᯝႊᱢᯙ äᯕ ᦥ ⦹Ł ݅໕ᱢᯙ äᯕᨩ݅. ੱ⦽ ᯝᱶ᜽ʑ ࠺ᦩ ḥ⧪ࡹᨩ޹ ḡᩎḩᕽa ᔩಽᬕ ḩᕽ᪡ อӹí ࡹ໕ ᯝᱶʑe ŝࠥʑෝ Ñ⋁ ᙹၷᨱ ᨧ݅. ᯕ۵ ᳑ᖁᮥ ࢹ్᝝ ࠺ᦥ᜽ᦥ ǎᱽ ḩᕽᨱᕽ ᱥ⩶ᱢᮝಽ ऽ్ӽ݅. v⪵ࠥ᳑᧞ ᯕ⬥ ᳑ᖁᮡ ɝݡ᳑᧞ℕᱽᨱ ⠙᯦ࡹḡอ ᳑ᖁᮥ ࢹ్᝝ ࠺ᦥ᜽ᦥ ǎᱽḩᕽa ݉ᯝ⦹í ɝݡ᳑᧞ℕᱽಽ ᱥ⪹ࡹḡ۵ ᦫᦹᮝ໑ ᯕ ᵲᱢ ǎᱽḩᕽa ᯲࠺⦹Ł ᯩᨩ݅. ᵲǎᮡ 1882֥ ᳑ℎᔢၝᙹයྕᩎᰆᱶᮥ ℕđ⧉ᮝಽ៉ ᳑Ŗℕᱽෝ ᱽࠥᱢᮝಽ ᮁḡ ᵲǎᮡ ᯝᅙŝ ్᜽ᦥෝ čᱽ⦹ʑ ᭥⧕ ɝݡ᳑᧞ℕᱽᨱ ᳑ᖁᮥ ᱢɚᱢᮝಽ ҭᨕ .݅⧩ ᯕಅ ⧩݅. ݚ᜽ ᳑ᖁᮥ ࢹ్᝝ ᯕᵲᱢ ǎᱽḩᕽෝ ᯕҩ ➉ǭǎa۵ ᵲǎᯕᨩ݅. ᵲॅ ǎᮡ ݚ᜽ ᳑ᖁᮥ ࠦพǎᮝಽ ᯙᱶ⦹ḡ ᦫᦹʑ ভྙᨱ ᳑ᖁᯕ ǎᱽᔍ⫭ᨱ ᱢɚᱢᮝಽ ⦽ₙᩍ⦹۵ ߑᨱ۵ ฯᮡ ᱽ⦽ᯕ ᯩᨩ݅. ঑௝ᕽ ᵲǎ᮹ ᫙ᦶᨱᕽ ჸᨕӹ۵ äᯕ ᵲ᫵ ŝᱽಽ ॒ᰆ⧩݅. ᳑ᖁᨱ۵ ᵲǎ᮹ eᖎᨱᕽ ჸᨕӹŁ ԕᇡ}⩢ᮥ ϡ⧩޹ ᖙಆᯕ ᨧḡ ᦫᦹᮝӹ ᵲǎ᮹ }᯦ŝ Ł᳦᮹ ᵲǎ ᮹᳕ᱢ ᱶ₦ᮝಽ đǎ ᝅ➉⧩݅. Ł᳦ࠥ ᕽǍ᪡ ಆ⦹ᩍ ᵲǎ᮹ ᳑Ŗℕᱽෝ ᪥⪵᜽┅Łᯱ ⦹۵ ᮹ࠥෝ aḡŁ ᯩʕ ⧩ḡอ ᯱᝁ᮹ ǭ⩲ ಆᮥ ᦩᱶ᜽┅۵ äᮥ ᬑᖁᱢᯙ ŝᱽಽ ᔝᦹŁ ᱶǭᯕ ᭥⩲ၼᮥ ভᨱ۵ ᵲǎǑ᮹ ❭ᄲ .݅⧩ᮥ ᫵ℎ⦹۵ ၹᩎᔍᱢ ⧪᭥ෝ Ñॎ ᖙ┅᳑᧞ᨱᕽ ᳑Ŗℕᱽෝ ᱥ໕ ᇡᯙ⧉ᮝಽ៉ ᯕᵲᱢ ǎᱽḩᕽיℎᯝᱥᰢ ᯕ⬥ ᜽༉ ᪡⧕ࡹᨩ݅. ə౑ߑࠥ ᵲǎᮡ ᳑ᖁŝ ☖ᔢᰆᱶᮥ ℕđ⦹Ł ᩢᔍෝ ᔢ⪙❭č ⦹۵ ۵ .݅⧩ಆי ᙹᵡʭḡอ šĥෝ ⫭ᅖ⦹ಅŁ ⧩ᮥ ᐱ ᳑ᖁŝ᮹ ✚ᙹ⦽ šĥෝ ᮁḡ⦹ಅŁ əญ⦹ᩍ ⦽ᵲšĥ۵ ňၵಽ ɝݡ᳑᧞ℕᱽᨱ ⠙᯦ࡹḡ ༜⦹Ł ᯝᱶʑe ŝࠥℕᱽෝ w í ࡹᨩ݅. ⦹ḡอ ᳑ᖁŝ᮹ ✚ᙹ⦽ šĥෝ ᮁḡ⦹ᩍ ᯱǎ᮹ ᩢ⨆ಆᮥ v⪵⦹ಅŁ ⦽ ಆᮡ ޵ ᯕᔢ ᝅ⩥ࢁ ᙹ ᨧ۵ äᯕᨩ݅. đǎ ݡ⦽ᱽǎ᮹ ᙹพŝ ᩢǎ్᜽י ᵲǎ᮹ ᦥᯝᅙ᮹ ᱢɚᱢᯙ }᯦, ᵲǎᯙ ᅕ⪙௝۵ ⩥ᝅᱢᯙ ྙᱽಽ ᵲǎᮡ ɝݡ᳑᧞ᮥ ℕđ 126 Transformation of the Dualistic International Order into the ~

ʑಽ đᱶ⧩݅. ݡ⦽ᱽǎᮡ ᵲǎŝ 1899֥ 9ᬵ ⦽ℎ☖ᔢ᳑᧞ᮥ ℕđ⦹Ł ɝݡᱢ ᳑⦹ ᧞šĥෝ Ŗ᜾ᱢᮝಽ ᙹพ⧩݅. ᯕ۵ ᱥ☖ᱢᯙ ᳑Ŗℕᱽ᪡ ɝݡ ᳑᧞ℕᱽa ᯕᵲᱢᮝ ಽ ᯲࠺⧩޹ ᳑ᖁᮥ ࢹ్᝝ ࠺ᇢᦥǎᱽḩᕽa ɝݡ᳑᧞ℕᱽಽ ᪥ᱥ⦹í ݉ᯝ⪵ࡹᨩᮭ ᮥ ᮹ၙ⦽݅. ɝݡ᳑᧞ℕᱽ۵ ⢽໕ᱢᮝಽ۵ bb᮹ ǎaෝ ݡ॒⦽ ᳕ᰍಽ ݡᬑ⦹۵ äᮥ ⢽ႊ⦹ḡ อ ᝅᱽಽ۵ ǎa e᮹ ᇥᰢᮥ ᱥᰢᮝಽ ⧕đ⦹۵ Ǒᔍಆ ᵲᝍ᮹ ℕᱽᩡʑ ভྙᨱ ᳑ ᖁᮥ ࢹ్᝝ ࠺ᦥ᜽ᦥ ǎᱽḩᕽ᮹ ➉ǭǎaಽ ᇡᔢ⦹޹ ᯝᅙᯕ ℎᯝᱥᰢŝ ్ᯝᱥᰢᨱ ᕽ ᜚ญ⦽ ᯕ⬥ ݡ⦽ᱽǎᮥ ᜾ၝḡ⪵⦹۵ ߑᨱ ǎᱽᔍ⫭۵ ࠺᮹⧁ ᙹၷᨱ ᨧ۵ ⩥ᝅᯕ .ᮡ qᯕ ᯩ݅܇ ᨩ݅. ᯕᱱᮥ Łಅ⦽݅໕ ᳑ᖁŝ ᵲǎ᮹ ɝݡ᳑᧞ ℕđᮡ ভ

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