Assessing International Democracy Assistance: Key Lessons and Challenges Lise Rakner, Alina Rocha Menocal and Verena Fritz
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Project Briefing No 14 • August 2008 Assessing international democracy assistance: Key lessons and challenges Lise Rakner, Alina Rocha Menocal and Verena Fritz n 2006-2007, the Overseas Development ratisation has been a prominent issue in inter- Institute (ODI) and the Chr. Michelsen national policy-making and many bilateral and Institute (CMI) carried out a study on multilateral organisations, as well as national international democracy assistance – or and international non-governmental organisa- Idonor efforts to help build and/or strengthen tions, have strived to support democracy. democratic governance in developing coun- Yet, in the new millennium, the ‘democratic tries undergoing democratic transitions – as optimism’ linked to the global triumph of part of a broader project on ‘Good Governance, democracy has given way to more sober apprais- Aid Modalities and Poverty Reduction’ com- als about the health of democratic systems in missioned by Irish Aid. This Project Briefing the developing world. Initial expectations that summarises the key findings of that study. It countries experiencing democratic transitions provides a broad overview of the democratisa- would move in a linear fashion towards consoli- Key points tion processes that have swept across Africa, dated, institutionalised democracies have not Asia, and Latin America since the 1980s, and been met. Instead, most of these countries now • The central challenge for highlights some of the main lessons and impli- occupy a precarious middle ground between international democracy cations for international democracy assistance outright authoritarianism and full-fledged assistance is how to to inform future donor practice. democracy, while a number of others has expe- support ‘hybrid’ regimes rienced (partial) reversals to authoritarianism (see Table 1). These ‘hybrid regimes’, combin- • The relationship between Democracy’s Third Wave and its ing authoritarian traits with some features of a democratisation and limitations democracy, sit at the heart of more or less weak ‘good governance’ can be Over the past three decades, democratisa- states and have become increasingly common, complex, with the two at tion processes have brought about a remark- especially in Sub-Saharan Africa. times pulling in opposite able transformation in the developing world. directions According to Freedom House there were 41 democracies among the existing 150 states in Why democracy assistance? • Donors need to recognise 1974. By 2006, 123 of the world’s 192 states were Democracy assistance responds to a variety the tensions between considered ‘electoral democracies’. From the of foreign government and donor motivations long-term processes of beginning of this so-called Third Wave, democ- and interests, including foreign policy, security, democracy and the need for quick results Table 1: Classification of regimes in sub-Saharan Africa and Latin America, 1972 and 2005 Overseas Development Institute ODI is the UK’s leading independent 1972 2004 think tank on international develop- ment and humanitarian issues. Autocracies Hybrid regimes Democracies Autocracies Hybrid regimes Democracies ODI Project Briefings provide a Sub-Saharan 25 9 2 15 17 10 focused and specialised summary of Africa a project, a country study or regional Latin America 4 9 7 2 8 10 analysis. and Caribbean This and other ODI Project Briefings Source: Freedom House (2007) ‘Map of Freedom in the World’, are available from www.odi.org.uk see http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=363&year=2007 Project Briefing assistance is to support the stabilisation and deep- Box 1: Democracy assistance and the broader ‘Good Governance’ ening of democratic regimes and promote greater agenda effectiveness of the state in ways that are compat- While democracy promotion has constituted a significant part of development ible with a democratic regime. assistance for two decades, it is only one part of a much broader international Whether the international community is equipped agenda to support ‘good governance’. Donor programmes under the heading to embrace this new challenge successfully remains of ‘good governance’ go far beyond the normal scope of democracy assistance, an open question. Nevertheless, nearly three dec- extending to all aspects of how states are governed – that is, the rules by which ades of democracy assistance experience have governments are chosen and state power and authority are exercised. yielded many important lessons, offering significant Clearly, the democracy and good governance agendas overlap. For example, opportunities to improve current practice. accountability and checks and balances are important to both. However, other The impetus for democratisation must come aspects of the governance agenda, such as state capacity and effective service from within. To be successful democratisation delivery, have no necessary relation to democracy. Indeed, the relationship processes need to be driven from within countries between democratisation and improving other aspects of governance can be and supported by key domestic actors. As shown complex, with these two agendas pulling in opposite directions. Democratisation in Iraq, efforts to impose democracy from the out- often entails diffusing power more evenly across a greater number of actors both side without the necessary domestic support are within and outside government, while strengthening state capacity and improving unlikely to be sustainable, and may well backfire. performance may call for greater centralisation of power and autonomy in the decision-making process. While external factors can play a significant role in democratisation processes, acting as triggers (as happened at the end of the Cold War, for example) geo-political, humanitarian, diplomatic and devel- and influencing strategic domestic actors, they can- opmental goals. Donors have supported democ- not act as substitutes for domestic support when it ratisation efforts in the belief that democracy, as is lacking. External governments and donors need a system of governance, provides more benefits to be both realistic and humble about what can be than authoritarianism, both internally and at the achieved from the outside. international level. The aftermath of the 9/11 terror- Donors should not rely on an idealised blueprint ist attacks and growing concern with what the inter- of democracy. In general, a review of the literature national community defines as ‘fragile states’ have suggests that democracy assistance has been char- given new resonance and urgency to the democracy acterised by a lack of sensitivity to context. In areas assistance debate. At the rhetorical level at least, such as support for political parties and the judici- the goals of security, state-building and the promo- ary, there is a widespread perception that much tion of democracy are now closely linked – even if democracy assistance is based on an idealised and pursuing all these objectives has proven consider- Western-based notion of democracy that not even ably more challenging in actual practice. the most advanced Northern democracies have On this basis, democracy assistance projects achieved. Donors tend to promote standard reform and related efforts have mushroomed since the templates rather than adjusting their programmes 1990s. Activities range from electoral assistance to the specific political, social and economic power and support for civil society and free media to the relations in different countries. This has meant that, promotion of judiciary reforms and the rule of law. very often, donor activities lack flexibility and are While it is difficult to find figures on aggregate unresponsive to the needs and concerns arising in amounts, it is estimated that by 2003-2004 total a country. annual expenditures on democracy promotion by Donors should do more to strengthen account- official donors totalled around $2 billion. More than ability. Despite considerable efforts to strengthen $800 million was provided by USAID alone; while the institutions of accountability such as electoral Germany and the UK were the largest funders in channels, legislatures, the judicial system and local Europe. Democracy promotion financed by donor government – executive dominance remains strong agencies now accounts for between 5% and 10% of in many developing countries. ‘Strong man’ politics total official development assistance. remains a marker of the political systems of many, if not most, developing countries undergoing democ- ratisation. The general tendency of aid to support Democracy assistance: Lessons incumbent regimes and rely on agreements with the learned and challenges ahead executive may itself contribute to this entrenchment This study examined five areas of democracy pro- of power within the executive and undermine other motion that are particularly important for donors: efforts to strengthen domestic accountability. i) elections and electoral processes; ii) political Democracy assistance should, therefore, give parties; iii) judicial reform; iv) civil society; and v) more emphasis to the strengthening and formalisa- the media. As mentioned, many attempts at democ- tion of rules governing executive powers and duties, ratisation during the Third Wave have resulted in as well as those of other branches of government, hybrid regimes and/or in uncertain democratic sys- including the legislature, judiciary and civil service. tems characterised by weak states. As a result, the The aim should be to develop the independence central