Project Briefing No 14 • August 2008

Assessing international democracy assistance: Key lessons and challenges Lise Rakner, Alina Rocha Menocal and Verena Fritz

n 2006-2007, the Overseas Development ratisation has been a prominent issue in inter- Institute (ODI) and the Chr. Michelsen national policy-making and many bilateral and Institute (CMI) carried out a study on multilateral organisations, as well as national international democracy assistance – or and international non-governmental organisa- Idonor efforts to help build and/or strengthen tions, have strived to support democracy. democratic governance in developing coun- Yet, in the new millennium, the ‘democratic tries undergoing democratic transitions – as optimism’ linked to the global triumph of part of a broader project on ‘Good Governance, democracy has given way to more sober apprais- Aid Modalities and Poverty Reduction’ com- als about the health of democratic systems in missioned by Irish Aid. This Project Briefing the developing world. Initial expectations that summarises the key findings of that study. It countries experiencing democratic transitions provides a broad overview of the democratisa- would move in a linear fashion towards consoli- Key points tion processes that have swept across Africa, dated, institutionalised democracies have not Asia, and Latin America since the 1980s, and been met. Instead, most of these countries now • The central challenge for highlights some of the main lessons and impli- occupy a precarious middle ground between international democracy cations for international democracy assistance outright authoritarianism and full-fledged assistance is how to to inform future donor practice. democracy, while a number of others has expe- support ‘hybrid’ regimes rienced (partial) reversals to authoritarianism (see Table 1). These ‘hybrid regimes’, combin- • The relationship between Democracy’s Third Wave and its ing authoritarian traits with some features of a democratisation and limitations democracy, sit at the heart of more or less weak ‘good governance’ can be Over the past three decades, democratisa- states and have become increasingly common, complex, with the two at tion processes have brought about a remark- especially in Sub-Saharan Africa. times pulling in opposite able transformation in the developing world. directions According to Freedom House there were 41 democracies among the existing 150 states in Why democracy assistance? • Donors need to recognise 1974. By 2006, 123 of the world’s 192 states were Democracy assistance responds to a variety the tensions between considered ‘electoral democracies’. From the of foreign government and donor motivations long-term processes of beginning of this so-called Third Wave, democ- and interests, including foreign policy, security, democracy and the need for quick results Table 1: Classification of regimes in sub-Saharan Africa and Latin America, 1972 and 2005 Overseas Development Institute

ODI is the UK’s leading independent 1972 2004 think tank on international develop- ment and humanitarian issues. Autocracies Hybrid regimes Democracies Autocracies Hybrid regimes Democracies ODI Project Briefingsprovide a Sub-Saharan 25 9 2 15 17 10 focused and specialised summary of Africa a project, a country study or regional Latin America 4 9 7 2 8 10 analysis. and Caribbean

This and other ODI Project Briefings Source: Freedom House (2007) ‘Map of Freedom in the World’, are available from www.odi.org.uk see http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=363&year=2007 Project Briefing

assistance is to support the stabilisation and deep- Box 1: Democracy assistance and the broader ‘Good Governance’ ening of democratic regimes and promote greater agenda effectiveness of the state in ways that are compat- While democracy promotion has constituted a significant part of development ible with a democratic regime. assistance for two decades, it is only one part of a much broader international Whether the international community is equipped agenda to support ‘good governance’. Donor programmes under the heading to embrace this new challenge successfully remains of ‘good governance’ go far beyond the normal scope of democracy assistance, an open question. Nevertheless, nearly three dec- extending to all aspects of how states are governed – that is, the rules by which ades of democracy assistance experience have governments are chosen and state power and authority are exercised. yielded many important lessons, offering significant Clearly, the democracy and good governance agendas overlap. For example, opportunities to improve current practice. accountability and checks and balances are important to both. However, other The impetus for democratisation must come aspects of the governance agenda, such as state capacity and effective service from within. To be successful democratisation delivery, have no necessary relation to democracy. Indeed, the relationship processes need to be driven from within countries between democratisation and improving other aspects of governance can be and supported by key domestic actors. As shown complex, with these two agendas pulling in opposite directions. Democratisation in Iraq, efforts to impose democracy from the out- often entails diffusing power more evenly across a greater number of actors both side without the necessary domestic support are within and outside government, while strengthening state capacity and improving unlikely to be sustainable, and may well backfire. performance may call for greater centralisation of power and autonomy in the decision-making process. While external factors can play a significant role in democratisation processes, acting as triggers (as happened at the end of the Cold War, for example) geo-political, humanitarian, diplomatic and devel- and influencing strategic domestic actors, they can- opmental goals. Donors have supported democ- not act as substitutes for domestic support when it ratisation efforts in the belief that democracy, as is lacking. External governments and donors need a system of governance, provides more benefits to be both realistic and humble about what can be than authoritarianism, both internally and at the achieved from the outside. international level. The aftermath of the 9/11 terror- Donors should not rely on an idealised blueprint ist attacks and growing concern with what the inter- of democracy. In general, a review of the literature national community defines as ‘fragile states’ have suggests that democracy assistance has been char- given new resonance and urgency to the democracy acterised by a lack of sensitivity to context. In areas assistance debate. At the rhetorical level at least, such as support for political parties and the judici- the goals of security, state-building and the promo- ary, there is a widespread perception that much tion of democracy are now closely linked – even if democracy assistance is based on an idealised and pursuing all these objectives has proven consider- Western-based notion of democracy that not even ably more challenging in actual practice. the most advanced Northern democracies have On this basis, democracy assistance projects achieved. Donors tend to promote standard reform and related efforts have mushroomed since the templates rather than adjusting their programmes 1990s. Activities range from electoral assistance to the specific political, social and economic power and support for civil society and free media to the relations in different countries. This has meant that, promotion of judiciary reforms and the rule of law. very often, donor activities lack flexibility and are While it is difficult to find figures on aggregate unresponsive to the needs and concerns arising in amounts, it is estimated that by 2003-2004 total a country. annual expenditures on democracy promotion by Donors should do more to strengthen account- official donors totalled around $2 billion. More than ability. Despite considerable efforts to strengthen $800 million was provided by USAID alone; while the institutions of accountability such as electoral Germany and the UK were the largest funders in channels, legislatures, the judicial system and local Europe. Democracy promotion financed by donor government – executive dominance remains strong agencies now accounts for between 5% and 10% of in many developing countries. ‘Strong man’ politics total official development assistance. remains a marker of the political systems of many, if not most, developing countries undergoing democ- ratisation. The general tendency of aid to support Democracy assistance: Lessons incumbent regimes and rely on agreements with the learned and challenges ahead executive may itself contribute to this entrenchment This study examined five areas of democracy pro- of power within the executive and undermine other motion that are particularly important for donors: efforts to strengthen domestic accountability. i) elections and electoral processes; ii) political Democracy assistance should, therefore, give parties; iii) judicial reform; iv) civil society; and v) more emphasis to the strengthening and formalisa- the media. As mentioned, many attempts at democ- tion of rules governing executive powers and duties, ratisation during the Third Wave have resulted in as well as those of other branches of government, hybrid regimes and/or in uncertain democratic sys- including the legislature, judiciary and civil service. tems characterised by weak states. As a result, the The aim should be to develop the independence central challenge for international democratisation and capacity of other government branches and 2 Project Briefing

strengthen the horizontal accountability mecha- nisms among them. At both the national and local Box 2: Supporting political parties – democracy assistance as levels, democracy assistance should also seek to politically savvy improve transparency by identifying innovative ways Political parties have remained one of the weakest links in democratic to build the autonomy and capacity of oversight development in many incipient democracies, particularly in Africa and Latin institutions such as freedom of information agen- America. Research suggests that the weak capacity and durability that parties cies and ombudsmen. Donors should, for instance, exhibit, linked to the personalisation of politics and the prevalence of patronage adopt a more concerted and united approach than networks and clientelism, constitute a major obstacle to the institutionalisation they have to date to encourage the passage of free- of democracy. Yet, political parties have been neglected by the international dom of information laws in Africa, and they should community. work closely with domestic supporters of such Donors are reluctant to engage in work that is perceived as directly political. reforms to give such laws real teeth. However, efforts to strengthen party systems do not need to be partisan. Donors should work with actors outside the Donors and implementing agencies can choose to be balanced in providing donor ‘comfort zone’. One way to counter execu- support, working with parties across the political spectrum and focusing on their institutionalisation (establishment of internal rules; regularisation of funding; tive dominance is for donors to cast their nets wide developing a programmatic basis), an area of widespread if not universal and engage with a variety of actors. The interna- concern. tional community has already made considerable progress in this direction, as shown by its efforts to support civil society, strengthen the judiciary, and dictions between the long-term nature of democ- foster a free, independent, and responsible media. racy-building and the need for results. Building However, donors tend to restrict their interactions to democracy is a prolonged and non-linear process a limited range of actors and have not fully engaged that requires long-term commitment. This calls with others that may provide equally useful entry for patience and willingness to accept setbacks. points for international democracy assistance. In However, because of the pressure to show ‘results’, general, the international community needs to do donors continue to pursue forms of democracy pro- more to reach out to societal actors in rural areas, motion that are too short-term, focusing on the tan- as well as to groups from which they have kept gible and high visibility elements such as elections, their distance, considering them too political or too for example, rather than the long-term strengthen- militant, including trade unions, farmers’ unions, ing of other key institutions. They are also given to faith-based groups, and crucially, political parties frequent changes in policy direction. Donors need to (see Box 2). take more seriously the potential tensions that arise It is vital to balance different donor goals and among the kinds of assistance that they provide as improve policy coherence. As highlighted in Box a result of these very different time horizons. 1, democracy assistance is only one aspect of a The sustainability of many interventions needs much broader donor agenda to promote ‘good to be addressed. Donor assistance has changed the governance’ and development, and the relation- organisational landscape of many countries, but it is ship between democratisation and improving other less clear whether democracy assistance has stimu- aspects of governance may not be straightforward. lated the emergence or further development of a One of the central challenges for donors is, there- vibrant home-grown civil society. Donors have much fore, to appreciate that ‘all good things’ do not work to do in strengthening domestic civil society necessarily go together. When donors make choices organisations so that they can become sustainable regarding which forms of democracy assistance to and self-sufficient over time. Donors should also be provide, they also should take into consideration more sensitive to the implications of their exten- other aspects of good governance that may or may sive reliance on international non-governmental not combine with democratisation efforts in a mutu- organisations (INGOs). While INGOs are often better ally reinforcing manner. Freedom and other forms of placed than domestic NGOs to acquire a voice and political liberalisation need to increase alongside influence policy processes, this may disadvantage an expansion of state capacities and a framework home-grown civic organisations, weakening their of formal institutions that can adequately channel capacity and sustainability. and contain those freedoms. The case of the media There is a need for greater harmonisation and in Rwanda, which played a significant role in height- alignment in democratisation assistance. Donors ening ethnic tensions and disseminating hatred, is should prioritise harmonisation and alignment if a particularly harrowing example of what happens democracy assistance is to become more effective. when the former develops without the latter. This remains a challenge, within donors’ individual It is also essential to acknowledge that democ- programmes as well as collectively. Donor frag- racy assistance takes place alongside the pursuit of mentation and lack of alignment of programmes to other foreign policy objectives. Greater policy coher- country priorities tend to undermine already weak ence is, therefore, highly desirable to ensure that institutions, especially in hybrid regimes. This has efforts on one front are not undermined by activities important implications for overall governance and in other areas. state capacity, and ultimately for the effectiveness Donors should come to terms with the contra- with which aid can be used in-country. 3 Project Briefing

More meso- and macro-level evaluations of evaluations that are either thematic (e.g. assistance democratisation assistance are needed. While the to media) or that review a range of interventions menu of democracy assistance has increased over and their impact on a country’s democratisation time, knowledge about its long-term effects remains dynamic are extremely rare. The academic com- limited. Efforts to share knowledge of best practices munity has failed, with a few notable exceptions, and lessons are limited and partial. While donor to fill this gap and democracy assistance is poorly agencies have begun to evaluate their democracy represented among scholarly titles. It is now vital promotion, evaluations tend to focus on particular to develop evaluation methods that can assess the projects in particular countries. More systematic depth and consolidation of democratisation.

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Readers are encouraged to quote or reproduce material from ODI Project Briefings for their own pub- Project information lications, but as copyright holder, ODI requests due Irish Aid has commissioned ODI, CMI and additional partners to analyse other donor initiatives that are connected to the de- acknowledgement and a mocracy assistance agenda, including decentralisation and efforts to combat corruption. While these are beyond the scope of copy of the publication. this Project Briefing, an overview of the project can be found at www.odi.org.uk/pppg/politics_and_governance/what_we_do/ © Overseas Development Politics_aid/Governance_Aid_Poverty.html., Institute 2008 This Project Briefing was written by Lise Rakner (Chr. Michelsen Institute, [email protected]), Alina Rocha Menocal (Overseas ISSN 1756-7602 Development Institute, [email protected]) and Verena Fritz (World Bank, [email protected]).