CEU eTD Collection Word count: Word count: 93 249 Degree of Doctor of Degree of Philosophy for the oftherequirements fulfillment inpartial submitted A dissertation From Bright Light to Blackout: The Influence of the Europeanization Paradigm on Foreign Bulgarian andTransportPolicy andEnergy Department of International Relations and European Studies Central European University European Central Infrastructure Policy Gergana Dimitrova Gergana Béla Greskovits Béla Supervisor: by Budapest, September 2008 Budapest, September CEU eTD Collection Gergana Dimitrova ideas authors. material or from other unreferenced different from CEUI hereby declare thatnoparts of thesisthe have beenno to institution submitted other towards a degree. To my knowledge nor does the thesis contains Declaration ii CEU eTD Collection fully policymakingdominated crises. during the two largely Policy shapedwas bythe rationality economic nor calculation strategic Neither industry. energy nuclear with the national and economicdignity, developmentand prosperity, all wereequated which of sovereignty, interests, national on focused by was a discourse outperformed public. It influence andthe the elite failedto paradigm Europeanization the Kozloduy crisis, the resistance. During domestic policy and options outcome,delegitimized alternative and in order to join thedeterminednational interest the asaninterestin demonstrating Euro-Atlantic solidarity EU and NATO sooner out by identity Bulgaria’s defining non-Balkan.as European itbasis,and On this rather thanforeign started policy doctrine Theleadership’s Europeanization-inspired framework. later, predetermined social Kosovo crisis,itwelfare. During thewasdeployed asthepolicymaking dominant the policyproject of identity transformation with a grand project of economic development and joined construction that agrand paradigm asatwo-sided emerged The Europeanization unsafe nuclear units at the Kozloduy Nuclear Power Plant. four decommissioning allegedly premature envisaged the safety of that conditionality nuclear againstEU resistance by Bulgaria’s wascaused crisis Thecontroversy. second heightened domestic despite NATO’ssupportwar againstYugoslavia air decision to Bulgaria’s involvementin Kosovo conflict the and was causedby government’s the followed crisis first The policy. infrastructure energy and transport and policy foreign emerged asBulgaria’s paradigm indominant policy thelate1990shas impactedon that which approach mechanism Europeanization the through I trace the policymaking, On in-depth basisthe of important crisiscase studies in of two Bulgarian periods mobilization. political of process in the ideas policy of power symbolic the employ actors political which in manner the on and frameworks, these shape that discourses policy rival the between interplay on the agenda, europeanization tothe approach policymakers’ structure that frameworks focuses on interpretive the in It Bulgaria. process europeanization the account of dynamics the aconstructivistThis presents dissertation Abstract iii CEU eTD Collection development. and growing of incompatibility energyinfrastructure agendawith transport Bulgaria’s its of perceptions reflected has also It self-esteem. of collective sense Bulgarians’ international marginalization and domestic socio-economic crisis and to recover Bulgaria’s respond itsto diminishing ability has to paradigm reflected Europeanization the of impact policy diminishing The debates. policy in the participate to authority moral affirm andto their interest, thenational hegemonic of produce constructions agendas, to their proponents have utilized the symbolic power of policy ideas to enframe their policy itsof impact hasdependedonhowskillfully rivals and Europeanization approach the policy The too. mattered, has mobilization Political connected. project developmental became vulnerable to challenges also due to its failure to keep itsinternational identity ideologicalproject and andenvironments.domestic its changing the During of the influence Kozloduy the under crisis, elements the paradigm‘identity’ its of importance decliningthe dueto been partly has decline Theparadigm’s paradigm. Europeanization The dissertation analyzes thefactors that account for the changing effectiveness of the interpretive frameworks guided that policymaking. divergentability influenceits Europeanization the of paradigm and rivals to the iv CEU eTD Collection Daniel, who shared me with a laptop forstagingshared several meDaniel, major with who months a laptop without protests. I would have not finished this thesis if it were not for the love and good mood of my son to helpme with project. this time extra took both they network); Bankwatch (CEE Kovatchev Petko and Transport) being forimportant this thesis. Many to Mr. Krastev Ministry thanks (Bulgarian of International Policy Fellowships program of the forOSI aresearch project that ended up manuscriptwere veryhelpful. have greatlybenefited I of from the support the forwith, guiding mein mystudies. Comments by Guzzini Stefano unpublishedon an members of the IRES and Political Science departments that I have had a chance to work specifically for his invaluable helpin lastthe stages of thesis I writing. thank allfaculty I have inspiration that yearsin duringwhich received the andwe have together, worked for and theguidance, comments, my Greskovits indebted Béla I am to supervisor Acknowledgements v CEU eTD Collection Paradigm during Bulgaria’s Involvement inthe ...... 60 Kosovo Crisis ‘We Will Hostage Not Be to the Balkans’: Politics Identity Europeanization andthe Europeanization Midway between Europe and ...... 11 the Balkans Introduction: Two Stories of Bulgaria’s Europeanization...... 1 The Construction of Bulgaria’s 101 ‘Strategic Bridge’...... Danube Bridge-2 and Bulgaria’s Kosovo Crisis Policy...... 84 Rival Ideological Positions: The Sovereignty ...... 80 Discourse Ideological Underpinning of the ODS Government’s Kosovo Crisis Policy...... 66 Bulgaria’s ...... 63 Quest for Compensations Domestic Repercussions of the Kosovo Conflict...... 61 ...... 58 Summary The Nationalism/Sovereignty Discourse...... 56 The Ascent of Bulgaria’s Europeanization Paradigm...... 42 Bulgaria and the External Discourses on the Balkans...... 41 Balkanism and the Major Policy Approaches ...... 23 towards the Balkans Balkanism and the International Response to the Yugoslav Conflicts...... 20 The Discourse of Balkanism...... 11 Ideological Enframing 111of Danube Bridge-2...... The Policy Approach to Transport Infrastructure 105 Development...... Europeanization and Infrastructure 101 Development...... Role of Stakeholders ...... 99 and Sectoral Lobbies Importance and Feasibility of the ...... 89 Second Danube Bridge The Danube Bridge-2 Project...... 84 The Doctrine of Proactive Euro-Atlantic Association...... 76 The Doctrine of Differentiation ...... 70 from the Balkans Bulgaria’s Balkan ...... 67 Predicament Pressure for Adequate ...... 63 Compensations Political Costs...... 61 Bulgaria’s Civilization ...... 50 Choice Europeanization, Balkanism and the Domestic Intellectual ...... 45 Environment Europeanization, Nationalism, and Bulgaria’s ...... 42 Historical Experience The Europeanization Approach to the Balkans...... 30 The ‘Legacies of Ethnic Conflicts’ Approach and the ‘Transition’ Approach...... 23 The ‘Other’ Story of Yugoslavia’s ...... 17 Breakup Balkanism and the Wars in Yugoslavia...... 14 The Return of ‘Cultures’ as ...... 13 Explanatory Variables The Balkans on the Cultural and Civilizational Maps of Europe...... 11 Table ofContents vi CEU eTD Collection Conclusions: Another Story of Bulgaria’s 210Europeanization...... Understanding theDecline of the Europeanization Paradigm during the Kozloduy Crisis Imposed Closure 115 of the Old Units ...... of the Kozloduy NPP ‘We Didn’t Need This Europe’: Setbacks of Europeanization inthe Case of the EU- ...... 162 ...... nesadn h oe n ekeso ugrasErpaiainPrdg ...... 233 ...... Understanding andWeakness thePower ofBulgaria’s Europeanization Paradigm 226 The PolicyImpactof Bulgaria’s Europeanization Paradigm: AConstructivist Account...... Explanatory 210 Power of Ideas...... 208 ...... Summary Nuclear Nationalism vs. 180 Europeanization: ...... Ideological Power Is Nuclear 162 Energy a Vital ...... National Interest? umr ...... 160 ...... Summary Ideological Enframing 136of the Nuclear ...... Energy Issue Key Factors in 133the Kozloduy Crisis...... The Belene 130 Project...... From Kozloduy to Belene: Domestic Politicization 118 of the Nuclear ...... Energy Issue International Pressure for the Early Decommissioning 115 of Kozloduy’s ...... Units 1-4 114 ...... Summary Political 236Mobilization...... Position vis-à-vis 234the Rival Nationalist ...... Discourse Compatibility with the Existing 233 Ideological ...... Environment Deployment and Decline of Bulgaria’s Europeanization 228 Paradigm...... The Ascent of Bulgaria’s Europeanization 227 Paradigm...... The Impact of Ideas 215 on Policy: ...... Key Theoretical Issues Rival Views on the Explanatory 210 Power of Ideas...... Impact of Political 194 Mobilization...... Underlying Structure of Ideas and 182 Attitudes in ...... Bulgarian Society Decline 181 of Balkanism...... Nuclear Energy vs. 178 Other Priorities...... 175 Nuclear Energy ...... and Social Welfare Energy 174 Center vs...... Energy Colony Nuclear Energy and Electricity 170 Exports...... Economic Significance of the Nuclear 164 Energy Sector...... 162Nuclear Energy ...... and National Security Basic 146 Tenets of ...... Nuclear Nationalism The Discourse of 140Nuclear Nationalism...... 136 The Europeanization ...... Paradigm 135 ...... Public Attitudes 133The Nuclear Energy Lobby...... 133 Political Costs...... vii CEU eTD Collection als...... 312 Tables...... 310 Maps ...... and Figures 249 ...... Bibliography Table 5: Distribution 314 losses of electric ...... power Table 4. Energy 313 intensity of the economy...... Table 3: Electricity Production and Exports 313 in Bulgaria...... 312 Table 2:AnnualGDP GrowthFinal GrowthElectricity Consumption Vs.of inBulgaria..... 312 ...... Table 1:Shareof theKozloduy NPP inoverall electricity production inBulgaria Figure 1: Public support for EU membership 311 in Bulgaria...... Map 1: Pan-European 310 Corridors ...... Crossing Bulgaria Lessons for Europeanization on the Periphery 246 of Europe...... The Importance 243of Infrastructure...... Combating Marginalization...... 241 List of Maps, Figures, and List ofMaps,Figures, Tables viii CEU eTD Collection that, despite the formal bid for European integration, left Bulgaria in left as zone a gray Bulgaria integration, bid formal the for European despite that, disoriented, rightwingwas bloc. anti-communist It a period of indolence geopolitical often and adisorganized, and reforms, radical of wary former communists between In the early Agreement. In late 1995,Bulgaria its submitted official forapplication EUmembership. phases1992) negotiationsAssociation started signingan office with to from EUon the 1991 of (in (SDS) Forces Union of Democratic rightwing post-socialist anticommunist the of government the In1992, in makeprogress this respect. failed to anysignificant first the freeelections, won which (BSP), Party Socialist Bulgarian into renamed party, communist former the transition,of government elites. The communist reformed of barely power the to return immediate Bulgaria’s starting position favorablewas not tofast European integration because of the the slowly. evolved ‘Europe’ and Bulgaria between relations political socialism, of end After the four units of Bulgaria’s nuclear power plant(NPP). sphere closure EU-impose of the them after that supposedly await blackouts with electricity the remainedthe light at the splitend Back in intointegration imagined European 1999,Bulgarians as readily the Union of (EU) the tunnel. Now many less is yearsis Now, this longer than butit allprobably stillten later, no true, obvious. of them would more readily associate it mechanisms” ( mechanisms” security relations, economic organization, political values, maps traditions, of maps –the symbolic several on location desired country’s “the articulated aspirations civilizational Bulgarians’ that Program, suggested Nations Developmental United publishedby the Bulgaria, on Report Development Human 1999 The choice’. ‘civilization country’s the 1990s domestic frequently publicand debates political the problem evolved around of Although is atBulgaria historically geographicallyand end the part of Europe, of the their country as part of Europe is obvious. ( see to ofrespondents desire The tradition… political European Western the precisely more In terms of civilisationchoice the majority of Bulgarians choose the European model –and Introduction: TwoStoriesofBulgaria’sEuropeanization Human DevelopmentReport Chapter 1 Ibid 1999,15): ., 5) 1 CEU eTD Collection 1 deserves be to quoted atlength: story of Bulgaria’s virtuous cycle of economic development and democratization miraculously. trajectory The changed transition tangible,once atmembership Bulgaria’s 1999‘Helsinkithe wasMoment’ a moment. Withdefining prospect the of EU – Stability leading (ESI) by – theInitiative European European tankstory think a told the transformation. In post-1997 waysBulgaria’s tell story of to the There aredifferent start negotiations.EU accession wasinvitedHelsinki to Bulgaria Summit Atlantic foreign both integration Atdominated EU’sthe and policy. domestic 1999 around 80%(seeGraph 50%to around in term During the Euro- 1). office, ODS’s membership. Betweenfor1997 and1999,public EUmembership support grewfrom EU on consensus a pronounced solemnly parties major all crisis, the after Immediately its legitimacy(ODS) and government(in to lentstrong between 2001). 1997 and office Forces Democratic United the of coalition for the majority parliamentary a comfortable The crisis in details 1996(for late see secured thaterupted 1997). Ganev social protests rampant resign amidst to was forced and collapse economic and financial to Bulgaria The notorious government between office BSP’s Videnov 1997)led 1994 and (in investors. It had fallen the unstable and to in both ethnic to the conflicts Yugoslavia Due performance. country’s economic domesticwhole, Bulgaria’s Onthe models. anti-Western and pro-Western between political directionless wavered politics regards international andstatus geopolitical location. Both foreign policy and domestic transitionsituation, was Bulgaria closer to wasfailure not on thanthe mapsto success. of foreign And so was the The ODS coalition united the SDS and several smaller and less influential parties. lessinfluential and smaller several and SDS the united coalition ODS The civilizations, and the Commission’s report surprised nobody arousedand little comment. different civilization (Orthodox/Byzantine). Yet today is there evidenceno ofclashing a to belonged they since EU, the join ever should Romania nor Bulgaria neither that declared president Giscard D’Estaing andformerGerman chancellor Helmut Schmidt, hadpublicly French former statesmen, senior respected most of Europe’s two ago, decade a than Less politics, and pooreconomic policy. (ESI 2005a, 5l) from disaffected public a elite, corrupt a with combined are processes democratic formal where the categoryinto CarothersThomas labeledhas ‘fecklessdwelling pluralism,’ ina‘gray zone’ 2 1 CEU eTD Collection disillusioneddistrust with and politicalabstaintended to politics from parties and to were citizens low; was institutions in Bulgarian trust story, this to According (Krastev 2002). to refers ESI the that transformation miraculous of sameperiod the by institutes, A however, toldpolicy story Balkan about and adifferent research report developmentandin terms identity of in– to order detach themselves from such images. pursue their un-balkanization and europeanization inboth – terms of socio-economic attached to the Balkans, one would expect Bulgarians to voluntary and even eagerly andviolence imagesets by from andconflict that of Balkansaparttainted Europe the the candidate for such a miraculous transformation. Marginalized by a powerful discourse a been good has ostensibly Bulgaria long-term reforms. of infavor elites’ agendas influence policy bringand effective diffusion about in andchange chaining succeed political are developments determined models. by European diffusing European Strong 1990saslate theoutcome On ofinternational domesticinfluence. this interpretation, its explains the since policy transition and Bulgaria’s account choices Europeanization The region. the restof the to models as serve should that stories success are Romania For these proponents of the Europeanization perspective for the Balkans, Bulgaria and see also EPC 2008, 35) who waselectedNovember in but 2001,thereforms again were not affected. (ESI2005a, 5; Parvanov, Georgi president socialist with cohabit to had soon government new The slow. not less than ninety days before the election, theformed pursuitwas of EU economic renovation and politicaleconomic criteriafor did movement whose Saxecoburggotski, Simeon king exiled voters threw out theEU-oriented reformist government of IvanKostov favorin of the former Bulgarian when 2001, June in Thus irreversible. proved soon developed that momentum The beengrowing steadily, powered by the objective of catching up to EU levels. have economies Romanian and Bulgarian the years five last the During standards. European ideological spectrum. Institutional reforms and economic policies became firmly anchored to membership negotiations led to anextraordinary convergence of political programs across the success in the yearsexisted inboth countries eversince the fall of communism, beforeyet they had achieved only limited the immediatelate enoughto give it adirect political salience. Domestic 1990s.champions of reform had became process EU-integration the once decisively The changed countries both of fortunes The decision taken in 1999Turkey… of that than indramatic less no Helsinkitransformations through gone have Bulgaria and Romania to begin 3 CEU eTD Collection strategic behaviorstrategic elites of havecover utilized Europeanintegrationuptheirwho self-to the hand, one the on emphasized, has It deal. a great neglect to is process political smooth and that to neglect the country’s socio-economic development and the domestic The second story tells itwhat way has that. done us that Bulgaria’s not butit does tell ideapolitics Bulgarian us in has affected Europeanization the strongly transitionmodels strategically modified, areresisted, or by political utilized Itsuggeststhatelites. to ‘Europe’ hasBulgaria’s ‘socialization’ models into European not but does want toknowif these been anything policybut models,but does notask how they take root in the local policy process. Itstresses of importance underscores European the with local It interacts political the process. it all, if at how, and change induces it how understand us help not does but change Itshows officiallyfor left Europe. of thethat pressure inducesEU conditionality policy it before Balkan Bulgaria was that made has itdifference not what tell does us but from status ‘upgraded’‘European’, its countryhasshows‘Balkan’ the apparently to that questionsleaves It it unanswered. important also EU membership. Yet, transition to in Bulgaria’s outcome policy overall the describes one first The useful. are stories Both couldbut not change policies (Krastev 2002, 29). citizens andintensified itperceptions voters’ electionsthat could change governments of welfare the for responsibility of lack their excuse to elites allowing by representation it democratic of confounded crisis the reforms. into Yet, theand country locked for ensured the disciplined elites mixed Bulgaria.policies, predictability of blessing It profound crisis.including Inthisstory, external pressure, European conditionality, wasa of ina democracy a state story about this wasa andwas widening. Inshort, citizensthe elites between the gap the butaction forlack collective capacity the of missing dueto was protest organized representation; were akey of symptom of a crisis democratic of perceptions widespread widespread; corruption personal insecurity; was corruption ineffective; were policies welfare endemic; was unemployment widespread; was poverty growing; social and economicdeindustrialized; standardsliving of in werepersistently social decline; inequality was was economy the elites; the dislocation of agenda reform the of nor country in the developments was accompaniedvoting; the majorityby a growing of citizens sense approved of neither of the political, social, and economic 4 CEU eTD Collection discourses and relevantfor factors policymaking.discourses other policy rival between interaction the of picture provide aclearer therefore, periods, Such contestation. limit or dissent contain and policies, their legitimize coalitions, their policy in choices a way wouldthat enable successfullythem mobilizeto political present and enframe to efforts their intensify actors political crisis, During ideological. suspended givesway and politicsisto much more that contentious and more explicitly is when‘normal politics’ areperiods becausethese oncrisis situations I havefocused nuclear energy lobby and thelocal political opposition. Kozloduy stance general the of by and public activethe campaigns pro-Kozloduy of the nuclear bythestrong pro- at Kozloduy the wasprompted units resistance NPP. This decommissioningpremature four allegedly of andnon-upgradeable unsafe Soviet-built envisaged the that conditionality EU nuclearsafety against by resistance Bulgaria’s caused was crisis second The of decision. the costs high political potentially the despite and controversy domestic heightened Yugoslavia despite against Organization (NATO) and provide solidarity Euro-Atlantic demonstrate to decision bythegovernment’s caused crisis was anThe crisis. Kosovo in the airinvolvement Bulgaria’s is period such first The policymaking. corridor offor thethe militaryhas influenced policymaking.Ihave this byin-depth done case studies workings the of paradigm campaignpolicy thatemerged policy asBulgaria’s inapproach late1990s dominant paradigm the inprocess ofBulgaria andtooutlinemechanism the through which Europeanization the the Northin ask. My dynamics the isunderstand europeanization the to in to of this project goal theAtlantic bridgestories In this I try two dissertation to andfail thatthey the questions answerthe course Treaty voluntarily. models European adopted ever have elites ruling of policy byimposing external andconstraints forcing compliancenot butdoes ask if twothe influenced has conditionality that suggests it compliance: induced has importantconditionality socialist have and rivalsapproach its Europeanization forBulgaria’s madeany post- difference crisis asthe such discourses policy local ask if not does It transition.questions. important unrelentingperiodsthe hand, other the on and, projects, political pressureirresponsible socially and interested of ItEU conditionality does in on policymaking.notBulgaria’s deal Yet, it also neglectswith some the contentious process through which 5 CEU eTD Collection European identity despite the costs involved. The interest-centered part of interest-centeredinvolved. partof identity doctrine the European The thecosts despite its in entailed obligations moral the on take to ready was that and region the on from Balkansthe by presenting the country as one thatexerted aeuropeanizinginfluence Bulgaria differentiating focusedof doctrineon the part identity-centered The structure. identity/interest dual a with doctrine policy foreign a of form in the deployed was It analyzing making decision during this crisis. to key the thus is paradigm Europeanization The decision. policy ultimate the justified for with Milosevic) and support equated policywhich other (e.g.neutrality,was options anddelegitimized discarded stance), a pro-NATO (namely defensibleoptions policy rangeand the morally established of later), ratherthan prudent community sooner supporter of valuesEuro-Atlantic be in to allowed joinorder to Euro-Atlanticthe acommitted as identified be to (namely identity this of view a with interest national Bulgaria’s toBalkan, identity (namely asopposed a European, determined the one), affirmed leadership the paradigm, this of basis the On framework. interpretive During the and welfare. social development aprojecteconomic of with Kosovo crisis,constructionjoined that of aproject ‘europeanizing’ identity and ‘civilizing’ Bulgarian the ideological asatwo-pronged Itemerged economic development. political and Europeanizationfuture for Bulgaria’s formulate aset of guidelines policy to leadership enabledthe the1996/1997crisis after frameworkinterpretive that and servedasacomprehensive paradigmThe Europeanization paradigm ascended in conditions of economic andwas politicalmobilization. distress and competition againpolitical deployedin together of process the policy discourses holding these andarguments representations as havein andsymbols, employedframeworks, whichpolitical actors the manner the on an interpretive have these shaped that ideological constructions and policy discourses interplay onthe rival between issuesthe of approach to europeanization, policymakers’ have that structured frameworks focus interpretive on the weneedto dynamics these tounderstand In order one. rationalist thanbyanarrow approach theoretical by in grasped better of are dynamics a constructivist Bulgaria europeanization the that Iargue bythecasestudies, material On provided basis of empirical the the 6 CEU eTD Collection discourse, and the concomitant inability of the Europeanization discourse, toinfluence inability andtheconcomitantdiscourse, of Europeanization discourse, the thepro-nuclear of ability is the conditionality safety EU nuclear against resistance forleast at isWhat accounts Bulgaria’snuclear or unconvincing disputable. coalition Bulgariafinancial support and hasreceivedfrom each of EU, the pro- argumentthe forfeiteddisputed, profitfrom the Kozloduy closed much hasbeenunits smaller than the in this carry day notthe does Economic rationality story. energy of power. a nuclear status Bulgaria’s Theconstruction of Bulgaria’s unfinished second NPP with the declared intentioneconomic to preserve of favor in reopeningleadership second the pair In2002,the units. of the re-launched campaigned continuously has Bulgaria feasibility and contentious remained issue the EU, the from units pressure underrelentless the Bulgariaclosed costthe of EU accession. Although at even units old offour keeping on intent appeared now Bulgaria’sBulgarians Euro-enthusiastic once development/prosperity, all of which were equatedsecond with the nuclear energy industry. The discourse focused on nationalNPP interests, sovereignty, national dignity,has and economic civic lobby Thepro-nuclear politicalnuclear organizations energy actors, and groups. been bitterlyoutperformed bya discourse upheldpro-nuclear by a powerful informal coalition of of influencecrisis. failedbehavior paradigm elitethe andthepublic the The to and was Kozloduy the during changed radically of paradigm Europeanization The fortunes the interest. economic safeguard national andit the center; appeared to infrastructure role of a regional position of a stabilizing factor and a trustworthy partner of the West in the region, and its ridden Bulgaria’s itBalkan zones; from invulnerability demonstrated Balkan its crises, circumvented Yugoslavia and symbolicallythus Bulgariadisengaged from conflict- the that Western Europe to provideda route It doctrine. foreign policy government’s of the base were atthe that arguments and causal imageries key all the enacted project the but wasdubious, Bridge-2 of Danube feasibility the economic factors: material than rather The form economic forof compensations is requested by the accounted ideational also Bulgaria and Romania. compensations in the form of constructing economic and a second bridgeintegration, on the Euro-Atlantic Danube fast of betweenform in the compensations political linked identity demonstrations of European and Euro-Atlantic solidarity pursuit the to of 7 CEU eTD Collection the national interest in line with their favored policy approach, and on whether their whether on and approach, policy favored their with line in interest national the in articulating are agendas,enframing howsuccessful their proponents on policy their proponentsproponents are their how coherent on have depended in rivals andits approach Europeanization pursuingare their infortunes of The the mobilization. of isdomestic political theprocess factor political utilizing mobilizationenergy wouldsector) lead successfulto and dignified European integration. Afourth nuclear the of development the through (achievable strategies, development economic national the on how skillfulonly by asserting project that usurpedthe‘economic development’ discourse pro-nuclear symbolic their economic This development. ability duringwas impaired the Kozloduy crisis and the powersustain underlyingthe integration assumption European that would lead gradually to and to development andeconomic identity transformation of project simultaneous of rival of maintainitscoherence appearstohavedependedonitsa to ability dualstructure and appeal paradigm’s The approaches. policy policyrival vis-à-vis position paradigm’s the was factor for agenda. theeuropeanization Athird support public welfare andweakened discourses Changesenvironment. economic development environmentand in emphasized this ideological to thechanging was domestic paradigm’s factor the Another relationship when elements of Bulgaria’s Europeanization paradigm and leftit vulnerable to contestation. weakenedthe‘identity’ the discourse) former the decline (especially of this environment in Changes in Balkanspolicy. community’s the international approach Europeanization international an by influential by increasingly and the asun-European depicting Balkans the discourse simultaneously created environment ideological international changing the to relationship istheparadigm’s factor One paradigm. Europeanization the of decline for riseandthe the account that factors important six I identify policy option. anundesirable as conditionality of EU accession acceptance designated have basis this on and industry energy nuclear the of development extensive through development in economic interest an as interest national the articulated have They identity. ‘European’ its de-emphasized have and power energy nuclear regional a of identity Bulgaria’s emphasized have crisis Kozloduy in the stakeholders key the approach Kozloduy to the influence Underdilemma. pro-nuclear the of the discourse, policymakers’ the and public’s the guided have that frameworks interpretive the 8 CEU eTD Collection study of the Kozloduy crisis. In the last chapter Iaddress the theoretical issues at stake in case the present five four and Chapters crisis. Kosovo the of study case the presents ascent of Bulgaria’s powerful the traces policy and paradigm situated been of has Europeanization. Bulgaria in which Chapter environment three ideological international the presents chapter next The sections. large in five analysis the organized have I adopting European values and identity. adaptation EUrules, to policy and institutionalguidelines andsetup, for theprocessof process for the of stands domestic while ‘europeanization’ approach, particular policy and stands Inmy for a letter) (capital ‘Europeanization’ ‘europeanization’. analysis, ‘Europeanization’ between terms the Idifferentiate approach’. synonym for ‘policy representations (Doty I have 1996, 6). usedthe specificterm ‘policy asa discourse’ these to related conditions and practices social the to alsobut are produced, representations inwhich a body texts of to refers ‘discourse’ term The academics, etc. journalists, writers, by and presented policy-makers, evaluated phenomena aredepicted, in which ways the for stands ‘representations’ term The power. ideological their the degreeof differentiate to inorder approaches policy and paradigms between policy Hence,less Idifferentiate is andmore that contested. extensive, lesscomprehensive, denote anhave the but ‘policy used term interpretiveto approach’ framework, too, one policymakingthe uncontested and for most andisfor the process, part taken I granted. discoursethe and languagesharedby covers policymakers, all fundamental elements of and the way the‘world functions’ (Hall 1993, 279).A policy paradigm is in embedded achieveof problems,instruments nature policy the thatcanbe goals, these usedto involvedactors specifies inthepolicymaking andthat the process, of goals policy, the all is to comprehensible anthat framework interpretive denote to ‘policy term paradigm’ FollowingHall,use the I Iusearenecessary. terms regarding the Several clarifications development. andagenda andenergy agendaof the infrastructure transport has factor between been Europeanization esteem.the Asixth perceivedcompatibility the growing social malaise the of at home, problem the and sphere and to thusinternational the in recover Bulgarians’marginalization Bulgaria’s of senseproblem of collective self- policyfactor is issues. Afifth ability the Europeanizationof tacklethe paradigm to the particularmoral‘speak’ about areperceived havingsufficient authority to proponents as 9 CEU eTD Collection chapter concludeschapter by in about europeanization some lessons drawing Balkans. the Europeanization paradigm has impacted upon policymaking in Bulgaria. Thislast twothe case studies in to order outline amore general mechanism which through the basis Ijoin framework this of andtogether the rethink empirical material by provided the analysis, present the basic tenets of a constructivist theoretical framework, and on the 10 CEU eTD Collection hierarchy hierarchy thatwere civilized,between industrializedsocieties andguided advanced, by humankindthat developed in a linear evolutionary manner a –constructed symbolic The development 75-6). underlying(Todorova 1997, 63;Ballinger assumption 1999, – of a low socio-cultural stage still at were Balkans thatthe theconviction solidified also incultures. This interest livingprovoked differentthe ethnic groups peninsulabut the on bestudy place to aperfect to by history the civilizedthe of world uncivilizedexploring Enlightenmentthe was blessingfor asimilarlymixed Balkans.the The region appeared The 92-5; Herzfeld109-10). preoccupation with ‘stages 1987, of by evolution’ brought disappointmentintowith region’sthe cultural and civilization hybridity 1997, (Todorova enthusiasmthe Greek independence backfired but enthusiastically support to Europeans Theimage 4). chapter of asthecradle encouraged of civilization European Balkans the ancient modern barbarism and with civilizations (Ballinger 1999,74; 1997, Todorova Until the end of the 19 The Balkanson the Cultural andCivilizational Maps ofEurope The Discourseof Balkanism have ideological that international structures shapedthisparadigm. and domestic the 1990sandanalyze in inthe late Bulgaria paradigm of Europeanization the ascent the trace I itself. Second, Bulgaria on and community international the policy of andBalkan havehadontheBalkans culture, about politics andsocieties, conceptions beliefs shared widely and Balkans the of representations circulated widely that effects the on focus I First, steps. in two question the answer I country? European normal Bulgariamadeit tobeit before asBalkan thatstarted asa wasperceived has difference What ask: not did Europeanization of influence the under transformation miraculous Bulgaria’s of story ESI’s the that firstquestion the with deals This chapter Europeanization Midway between Europe and theBalkans Europeanization MidwaybetweenEuropeand th century, the Balkans were associated at the same time with Chapter 2 11 CEU eTD Collection variationof Orientalism and colonialist discourses (Baki the European territories that used to be under Ottoman rule. In this interpretation,Balkanism emerges as a beenreplicated within Europe itself and thusdrawnhave symbolic a between border Europe ‘proper’ and have representations Orientalist way the on focuses debate inthe side other The 6-9). 1998, Goldsworthy Balkans as hybrid andambiguous (Todorova78; Allcock 1997, andYoung 2001, 227-9;Norris 1999, 5-8; Orientalism conveys theOrient as fundamentally different from the West, Balkanism represents the that Balkanism should be differentiated from Orientalism (and other colonialist discourses) because while 4 identity of the West itself. colonial domination. Third, the constructionof the Orient has beenimplicated in the constructionof the humane West. Second, Orientalism and Orientalist knowledge were intricately related to the project of the Orient as backward,3 stagnant,Goldsworthy 1998; Hatzopoulos 2003.Forsimilar a inferiorstudy on Eastern Europe see Wolff 1994. and fundamentally different from the rational, developed, and 1994; Chambers and Curti 1996; Castle 2001). Moore- 1990; Young 1999; Paolini Gilber, Stanton, Maley and 1998; 1997a, 1997b;Ashcroft, Griffits,Loomba and Tiffin 1995;Williams and Chrismanothers, among see, discourses colonialist on debates (Baki or treated as a ‘Balkan’ variation of Orientalism variation of as a‘Balkan’ treated or is (1997)) as discourse by eitherwascoined term Balkanism designated (the Todorova Baki 2 Balkans the on discourse Western a distinct speak about to allowanalysts to resilient and coherent sufficiently patterns followed have Balkans the of Representations (Todorova 1997, 119-28). its instability political and unpredictability makeup,its to complex and ethnic to culture, its the linkedEuropeanness hybrid, of to Balkans wasprincipally though Oriental, religiously, incompatible Europe‘proper’. and politically The with perceived un- ‘powder keg’ ( of Europe the as identified conclusively was region The terrorism. and conflict, ethnic lawlessness, violence, savagery, inof grip the Balkanswere the that perception outside world’s the Archduke Ferdinand inSarajevo,which ofWorld outbreak signaled the WarI,solidified 1903 Belgrade regicide, 1913Balkan the war, andthe assassination of Habsburgthe fightingdispute and decisions overafterof Macedonia the 1878Berlinthe Congress,the The 1997,123). (Todorova negative altogether and Western world, the shared across Around the time of World War I, the image of the Balkans was already relatively stable,category. agricultural, backward, irrational andlatter Balkan squarely in 1997, 109-11). societies (Todorova the were put uncivilized, were that societies and moderation, and rationality The uniqueness of the Western discourse on the Balkans has been subject to debate. One camp argues camp One debate. to subject been has Balkans the on discourse Western the of uniqueness The According to its critics, Orientalism has had three basic tenets (see Said 1979). First, ithas constructed Fora detailed discussionof Western representations of the Balkans, see Todorova 1997;Norris 1999; ü -Hayden1995; Baki ü -Hayden and Robert Hayden Robert -Hayden and1992; Baki ü -Haydenand Hayden 1992; Allcock Young 2001; and Iordanova 2001; Ibid ., 117-22; Itwasregardedasculturally, ., Norris 1999,11). ü ü 3 -Hayden 1995; Norris 1999, 11). In -Hayden 1999,11).In Norris 1995; the -Hayden1995, 919-20; forthe basic scholarly or of the broader colonialist discourse 2 . This . 12 4 CEU eTD Collection non-Western, Slavic-Orthodox sphere ( Slavic-Orthodox non-Western, infalls the civilization, of European cradle including alleged the region, the The restof through Balkans,the along southern the andborders of Slovenia eastern andCroatia. goes civilization Western of border the example, for scheme, Huntington’s to According of frameworks,view of the Balkanssuch are predestined for tension and discord. influential as From Huntington’s inter-civilizational of (1996). conflicts pointtheory the such factors, used civilization asexplanatory culture that and frameworks of analytical The of reemergence Balkanism in 1990swas by encouraged the influence increasing the The Returnof ‘Cultures’ asExplanatoryVariables setup. reemerging discourse of Balkanism was fitable to intowell the existing ideological War, the Cold the endof the after Thus, waspreservedandreinforced. Europe European history. The Slavic-Orthodox sphere is anywaysphere deemedhistory.European Slavic-Orthodox The therefore or unable, have remained aloof from the foundational moments and the important processes of Muslim, and economically backward. Being part of the Ottoman or Tsarist empires, they or Orthodox are sphere intheSlavic-Orthodox peoples The development. economic politico- and experience historical in religion, differences of because incompatible inremained (Baki place background.in theGeneral inferiority, perceptionsEastern of however,Europe’s a of large Thediscourse Balkanism extentreceded to marginalized cultural differences. West the and between communism ideological rivalry Cold War,the the During development, and progress (Todorova 1997, 119). identity for order,civilization,hasthat European stood andstabilized underscored hybrid/Oriental culture and violence characteristicand volatility, have Balkans the their With entity. other the of identity the of formation the in role indispensable ascribedbeen identities have particular of of process Balkans, construction the discursive to both the Balkans and Europe. Each of the two entities has played an ü -Hayden 4). and-Hayden 1992, The symbolic of Hayden geography Ibid ., 158-63).be., Thetwospheres areheldto 13 CEU eTD Collection the Ottoman Empire from independence achieved region the since Balkans inthe hasbeen place that taking in the 19 Turning ablind eyetothemodernization and adoption of institutionalwestern models difference and between SoutheastEurope Central/Western (Schöpflin Europe 1999). The Ottoman legacy of the Balkans is pointed out as key evidence of thefundamental like the EUand NATO1996, 160-1, (Huntington 1991,23). inintegrate institutional develop andto unlikely, Western stabledemocracy structures to social knowledge” ( social structures is not matched intellectually, cognitively or semantically by society and in “themodernization are poor of for complexity where a region profound genuine and democracy and bottom Euro-Atlanticline integration.view The of isthatprospects this for institutions incapable modern leaves necessary the complex introducing region the of makes the Balkan worldview incompatible with Western valuesand and norms that legacy be a that Balkan to societies by inherited allegedly modern structures social profoundly dismissive of needthe for historical knowledge” ( “were fact in that explanations about brought work, semi-scholarly visible publicly and accessible of favor in scholarship of marginalization overall the with together more serious analytical (Djordjevich work The2003, 3-4). fad for old historical subjects, against won history Balkan cyclical allegedly the from derived explanations Simple to turn thesubject newcomers to numerous scarcity and irrelevance of scholarly analysis on the Balkans frequently led the The Europe. Southeast about Yugoslavia or about either little knew one– American fall Western federation –especially the to public the Whenconflicts. the started apart, the understand through and an appealing respondto interpretivewhich framework to The violentbreakup of Yugoslavia Balkanism. rejuvenated Balkanismseemedtooffer Balkanism andtheWars in Yugoslavia Djordjevich2003, 6) as thesignposts needed tounderstand whatwas happening now.journalist, (a quoted in onand theCatholic-Orthodox schism –long forgottensubjects which hadsuddenly reemerged outold of books and onBalkanprint history,Ottoman Austro-Hungarianand onthe empires, Ibid ., 69; see also Djordjevich 2003, 10-1). th century, the ‘civilization’ approach considers the pre- the considers approach ‘civilization’ the century, Ibid ., 4). This body of 14 CEU eTD Collection The latter, however, remains unexplained and rather mythical mythology. itself: to susceptibility collective Serbs’ the to due politics Serbian contemporary andexploited mythsbut that these nurtured by suggests determine Serbianelite the nationalism as irrational ( irrational as nationalism Yet, even as Kaufman ( asescalating aredepicted security dilemmas conflicts Yugoslav posits a rationalmanipulation provocationsand violent by elitethe seekingtosecurepolitical The power. explanation populationthe former Yugoslaviaof its andthat escalation was resultthe intentionalof of the conflict,Kaufmanfor example, thatethnichigh (2001)suggests notinitially hostility was among he account, such one In brandsbackdoor. the through slip to behavior violent and Serbianmentality Balkan imagery ethnic explanations –haveletantagonisms recurrent of ‘traditional’ invoking likely offall Even Yugoslav conflicts– least accounts forrationalist ones the the the to differentcivilizationssee van (e.g. 1998, der Port 110-34; Bax 1995,102). inand border zonebetween of destruction civilization unstableconflict-ridden the conflict, war, of experience historical recurrent of the effects as unavoidable regarded makeup of Balkanpeoplesthe 1997, 137;Djordjevich (Todorova are 2003, 4)or psychological inbuiltinto the ethos toawarrior traced are conflicts the of violence and irrationality The federation. the in processes disintegrative the by again unleashed by politics suppressedbut weretemporarily that were communistYugoslavia’s regime Balkan and of culture features constant as areregarded conflicts and religious ethnic region (e.g., see Kaplan region 1993; Meštrovi (e.g., the to intrinsic phenomenon a as it interpreted have and Balkans in the violence ethnic of uncontrollability and irrationality purported the with concerned been have accounts Such trace on scopeandthe quality explanationsof of Balkan (Iordanova events 2001,73). knowledge – aptly nicknamed as history’ – ‘instant was mushrooming,leaving a clear similar arguments by a Southeast Europeanscholar see Pirjevec 1995, 87-9) inflexible, self-defeating belief in their ownunassailable righteousness. ( since they might involve betrayal… The Serbs prosecuted the warwith their traditionally suspect treachery, plotsand therefore and be suspiciousofnegotiationsto ordeals of any kind, The [battle of Kosovo myth] encourages a tendency Serbianin political culture constantly to Ibid ., 171). He argues that nationalistconsciously myths171). Hearguesthat were ., ü , Letica and Goreta 1993). Ethnic and hatred andGoreta , Letica Ibid Ibid ., 172, 192;for ., 165-6, 184-8).., 15 CEU eTD Collection “sad fact” that the Balkans’ past – Ottoman domination and earlier dominations –placed earlier dominations and domination – Ottoman past Balkans’ the that “sad fact” of the present conflict by highlighting analogies with the past. One root was found in the introductionnew focused revealingICB 1996,vii;Hansen2000). The the deeproots on 1912 and 1913Balkan wars, complete with introductiona new (Todorova 1997, 3-4; the on report old an reprinted Endowment Carnegie the war, Bosnian the of midst the focused inwon analyses day the in theearly Yugoslav In the on policy conflicts. 1993, strife bylong-standing ethnic haunted mired intheandThe image as Balkans past of the in sight(Iordanova 2001,76). instability were of ethnic anysigns before circulating long started anewworld“to war” Predictions thatMacedonia would follow path the “disastrous of Bosnia” and leadwould was indirectly involvedeven inthe orshowedsigns ofintentionconflicts doso. to Greece) Bulgaria, factnone (e.g.Romania, of Balkan the other despite the countries that scenarios of imminent spillover of instability ApocalypticMany 1997, 136). (Todorova simply labeledwarsanalysts as‘Balkan’ the to the rest of the region were proliferating conflicts has tended to obscure the particularly the obscure has to tended conflicts dangerous Preoccupied with ancient Preoccupied with 1995, 297-8).(Woodward asconflicts theinevitable outcome of intractability the of in ethnic relations Balkansthe drawing heavily on historical analogies and explanations, andby representing the interpretations of Yugoslav the wars by theirfratricidal by underlining character, identities 2003, 27-8).Global (Hatzopoulos media Western and strengthened such and politics current determines and – ideologies and myths nationalist – through continually present in the recurs allegedly past the Balkans, the In world. Western the of characteristic development progressive of path natural the follow not do Balkans the that cycles of violence in Balkan history 2001,72). (Iordanova Its underlyingis argument of narrative anappealing has constructed Balkanism that revived body knowledge of By picking and choosing particular events out of complex historical developments, the irrationalityled chauvinist eachsidethat turn to (Kaufman 2001,200). butas profoundly yetBalkan, causedbyinexplicable, nationalism pervasive,and ones, rational as ‘normal’ characterized not arethus dilemmas security The Yugoslav Balkan border zone, the body body the knowledge border zone, Yugoslav withthe dealing of Balkan ethnicfeuds, Yugoslav Balkan mental pathologies, and the and pathologies, mental character of conflicts. these of character 16 CEU eTD Collection irreversibly permeated with an un-European predisposition towards violence ( towards predisposition with an un-European permeated irreversibly ended upwith due totheir pessimisticthe notion that history Balkanswere the introduction however, ‘improvement’possibility inBalkans. report’s In 1993, the the of Framed4). by vision the West’sthe of civilizing mission, old allowed the report the for andanyinherent (2000,353- from unchangeable traits civilization than Europe rather to assumed that the civilizationtrue and United the (US)– Europe States –andthe backward Balkans, butdeficiencies of constructed between ahierarchy only the 1914Carnegie the report As Hansen argues, the Balkans were due from a distant tribal (Kennan, inpast...” 1997, quoted 5).Todorova only to long-lasting inherited,“drew of deeper traits presumably, nationalism on character that aggressive separationwas Another inBalkan states’ 356). root 2000, Hansen (Kennan, presentday the quoted non-European regionthe in domain remained of non-European till a the civilization that political power, and the ideological legacies of communism. of legacies ideological the and power, political to market democracy, useof the nationalism mobilizationas atool for in for struggles from communism transition Yugoslavia’s thataccompanied conflicts and constitutional decline include the economic factors Such account. into were taken factors explanatory relevant ifother differently told been have could demise Yugoslavia’s of story The The ‘Other’Storyof Yugoslavia’s Breakup Could demise Yugoslavia’s be analyzed differently? inexplicable the civilized mindanyway) bundleand(to Balkan hatred violence? of and of unmanageable, unchangeable, arguments repetitive by served well policymakers it quality the Wereprovided. withquestionable understandingthat the regard to of shocking violence West’sownhistory in butwas 1997, 6-7), the also(Todorova lossSuch not interpretive framework onlyan memory of demonstrated comparably of civilizing mission could break. in a cycle of ethnic strife andviolence that neither the passage of time nor the West’s andcaught culture, of European nationalism, deprived miredandin tribal history 356), Ibid 17 ., CEU eTD Collection 1995, 99).Gradually,itinto demands escalated for turning Yugoslaviainto a interest and invoked moral and arguments imagesofnational exploitation (Woodward in being national Resistance increasingly republics’ terms framed 102). the of was ( government federal and reforms the the both resist to republics in northwestern the governments the encouraged on welfaresystem, the theattack with Conflicts over the distribution and control of economic assets and resources, together theirsubsidize regions resources to poorer 1995,60-3). (Woodward away viewin took their policy that redistribution federation’s against the andgrumbled Croatia were losing control over economic policymaking and foreign currency earnings detrimentof the republicsthe ( to government federal the of favor in assets economic over authority political of balance ( conflicts political ensuing the manage beingby building countered safety nets social or politicalinstitutional and capacity to of were not andreforms, The destabilizingstable order however, government. effects feelingsof werebreeding basespersonal insecurity social which and erodingof the all and deindustrialization, inflation, unemployment, deprivation, were accompanied by ( foreign deal itsdebt large into with order reforms economic implementingYugoslavia started measures austerity and launchedthoroughgoing as undermined of were gradually stability sources the 1980s,however, the Throughout wellbeing. economic relative of conditions political andsocial 2). 1995,chapter (Woodward rights The model well worked in nations individual the andprotection republics, and of on in form security civil, the of constituent federation’s to the sovereignty shared guaranteed system that economic politico- complex a on based was structure internal Yugoslavia’s politics. international depended onits internal aswellstructure, as on Yugoslavia’s balancing role in Cold War federationWoodward,had the Jovic 2001,101-3).Accordingstability the to of market2003, 171; see Emmert democracytransition (1995; also from communism to federation’s accompanied that the conflicts andconstitutional economic decline the especially and Yugoslavia, communist in tensions social and political economic, the were federation the breakup of ultimate the andfor nationalism rising for reasons has of In herdetailed breakupthe Woodward argued that account the of Yugoslavia Ibid ., 59; The ICB 1996,26). ., wealthy Sloveniaand Ibid ., 383). In addition, the reforms shifted the Ibid Ibid. ., 50-9). The reforms , 61-3; Jovic 2001, 18 CEU eTD Collection nationalisms (Jovic 2001, 105; ICB 1996, 24). At the same time, the lack of a At thesamesingle lackof 24). nationalisms time,the ICB 1996, 2001,105; (Jovic nations’ the 1974constitution constitutive underthe nurtured was restructured federation the which of basis the on ideology anti-state The nationalism. of rise the explaining towards way some go too, regime, communist Yugoslavia’s of legacies ideological The itsmistake effects for its causes (1995,271). andaround, toexplain Yugoslav the crisis with historical feuds and is ethnichatreds to encouraged theuse of historical memories, arguments, andmyths, other notthe way that aterritory people with the associate it to was desire the Woodward, to According protections minoritiesof citizens intoin transformed processthe of borders. redrawing fought over statehood,elite survival 1995, 339; (Woodward Jovic 2001,103-4; ICB 1996,25). The wars were over rights to memories ethnic conflictsof becamelive an mobilization,efficienttool for and propaganda, on a particularhistorical that It wasonlyatthis point 24-6). 106; ICB 1996, 1995, 82-93; Jovic 2001, territory, and over rights and nationalist intellectuals, popular protest, andintellectuals, protest, demandsfor sovereignty popular nationalist ingainlinked and exclusionary to order who, claims toterritory to support, public of basis the on constituencies their to appealed who leaders of position the strengthened accompanied and that economic political liberalization Yugoslavia’s authority radicalization of demands for republican sovereignty, and the collapse of social order based on ancient ethnic On hatreds. this view, escalating internal instability, about nationalism andethnicviolence thatdiffers from story the by told explanations astory tell communism of legacies the on based demise Yugoslavia’s of Explanations over territory, andinternational 1995,201; (Woodward recognition Jovic 2001,102-3). control sovereignty, over conflicts into mutated gradually issues political and economic predominantly concerned originally that conflicts argument: basic the on agree they however, whole, On the collapse. federation’s for the account factors economic which extent disagree the 102). Scholars to about of interpretation 2001, this supportive (Woodward 1995, 76-7). nationalism republican-centered to alternative liberal a of emergence the prevented press liberal 6 104). 1995, (Woodward debt its refinance to necessary credits to access easy special sphere. With the end of the Cold War, Yugoslavia lost itsstrategic importance to the West, as well asits 5 led breakup the that to crisis a constitutional andcaused confederation, Thecommunist party’s efforts to undermine the influence of liberal political and social forces theand Thefederal government wasdestabilized further by Yugoslavia’s changing position inthe international 5 ( Ibid. 6 (Woodward , 15;Jovic 19 CEU eTD Collection widely accepted by international publics were arguments about the fundamental fundamental cultural aboutthe were arguments publics byinternational accepted widely 9). Proponents of this explanation traced the roots of the conflicts deep intohistory. Also regimehad that held them 1995,frozen 2002, (Woodward 7;Bose 18-9; Andreatta 1997, communist collapseof the authoritarian after the hatreds by of eruption ethnic the warcaused asacivil was perceived conflict the of Balkanism: basic tenets the reflected in conflict Bosnia in well conflicts as (as of Croatia) preceding the and Slovenia policy of relevance Balkanism. of One twothe widely explanationsaccepted of the the demonstrated Yugoslav conflicts tothe response community’s The international Balkanism andtheInternational Response totheYugoslav Conflicts developments. social and political economic, over precedence takes invariably nationalism 2003,34-6).In communist/internationalistsuch accounts, disguise (Hatzopoulos structures ethnicviolence), gradual of conflict of and asaprocess communist social erosion (i.e. politics forces of Balkan of freezing characteristic the as aperiod of temporary under 105; van der Port1998,11-2). The communistin period thehas beenYugoslavia perceived pressure breakup has of federation been(forthe position latter openly the rejected see Bax 1995, Yugoslavia’slegacies communist havebeen overlooked either or theirin role the violent of nationalism,constitutional, of and ideological structures communist Yugoslavia. accounts, Inthese economic, the of failures sensational, less albeit destructive, these of analysis eschewed have onancient hatreds ethnic have focused warsthat of Yugoslav Popularthe accounts or as a period of nationalism in a communism ( communism to the emergence of nationalism as a major political ideology after the end of weakness liberalismof the communistduring regime, this peculiarideological setup led an externalan Soviet ‘enemy’ ofrepublican nationalisms (Jovic2001, 106). 7 nationalisms republican to an alternative could theemergence identity serve as nationalism Yugoslav of Yugoslav that prevented Yugoslav cultural spacerepresent and citizens institutionspolitical of to with a In addition, communist Yugoslavia’s independence from the Soviet Union precluded the identificationof Ibid ., 104). 7 (Jovic 2001,105-6).In combination with the 20 CEU eTD Collection Serbia, Croatia and Slovenia. and Croatia Serbia, the destabilizationof Bosnia; and in the EU’s failure of use effectivean carrot-and-stick strategy vis-à-vis attentionto minority rights early enoughto strengthenmoderate political and social forces to and prevent determination,while ignoring the claims of ethnic minorities within the republics; in the failure to pay due 9 amendment banning the country’s participation in Balkan associations ( Parliament to explicitly define Croatia asaCentral Europeancountry to and pass a constitutional presidential slogan elections‘Tudjman, onthe Balkans’ notthe (Razsa andLindstrom 2004,639), asked the prevent to upon called and penetrationof into Europe Islam (Hedl104; Perica 2002, 187-8).Tudjman, 2000, who won civilization 1997 the Western of boundary the on positioned nation European old an imprisonment in the prolonged un-Europeana after West’ and culturally the to return and religiously‘Croatia’s about alienBalkans, and about pronouncements by Croatia’s fate of accompanied was era Tudjman civilization(synonymous with Croatia) against dictatorship and barbarism (Woodward 1995, 208). The memberof the Western civilization and portrayed theconflict withSerbia as a struggle of democracy and incompatibility thesis already communismduring (1997,311-45), invoked Croatia’s moral rights as a ICB 16;1996, Emmert 2003,162). CroatianPresident Tudjman, who had developed civilizational the voguetruly in atthetime of federation’s the dissolution(e.g. see Letica 1989,188-95; Tudjman, quoted in 8 and undermined resolved never were groups, ethnic three ofBosnia’s projects building nation- of the recognition ifreluctant, tacit, the country and asasovereign Bosnia Tensions between the two alternative explanations, as well as between the recognition of ineffective. measurescritics, were both to According called focused on Explanations against sanctions for Serbia. Serbian aggression policy focused response of on containment conflictthe 1995,9). (Woodward a presupposed incompatibility civilizational and age-oldanimosities focused ethnic on explanation international community. The of the response policy the predetermined war Bosnian of the explanations alternative two the haderupted, conflict Once the in first place conflicts the prevent these its failure to to factor wasacontributing conflicts Yugoslav the causes of acknowledge the real failure to community’s international the that Critics have argued 62). federation 2002,18-9;ICB1996, parts former1995,7;Bose other of the (Woodward it began resultwas the Serbian aggression that of inSlovenia andspread and Croatia to by was that US, the mostly promoted conflict, Bosnian the of explanation Theother 21). the leaders of the three 1995, The (Woodward 221). incompatibility civilizational wasalsothesis advancedby ethnic groups that clashed federation Yugoslav into the inbuilt tendencies for thedisintegrative accounted in the Bosnian warallegedly that andBosniacs, Serbs, between Croats, incompatibility and civilizational This was demonstrated, for example, in the decision to recognize the republics’ right of self- right republics’ the recognize to decision the in example, for demonstrated, was This Arguments about aputative civilizational divide in the regionpredate communist Yugoslavia but came 9 (Woodward 1995; (Woodward Andreatta 1997; Gow 1997, chapters 3,4). RFE/RL Newsline 8 (ICB1996,15- 4.11.1997). 21 CEU eTD Collection 1997; ICB 1996, 37-75). transformedindependent itinto an participant conflict inthe (Woodward 1995; Andreatta 1997;Gow which aggressor, illegitimate an as army of the treatment the and end, this to devoted effort and resources modest the and conflict of the settlement afair guarantee US to the of objective the between discrepancy order, disagreements among the majorinternational actors and the failure of collective action, the chaos ininternational security structures during the periodfrom oftransition theColdto a War worldnew 10 groups ethnic thethree between a settlement andsought as acivil theconflictwar ittreated Bosnianitpromoted wiling independence,was not touse defendforce to it. In practice, community international the While response. international the of effectiveness the influential interpretive frameworks in US foreign policy – the ‘Vietnam war’ narrative war’ ‘Vietnam –the policy foreign in US frameworks interpretive influential crisisBalkanism(Paris in2002, 440). theof rendered the Kosovo most terms of one settlewas impossiblea widerininto to aconflictthat explode could and that easily war involved get to US the of unwise was it that prove could non-intervention of supporters interpreting the conflict asan of outgrowth centuries-oldirrational ethnic hatreds, intervention. ‘powder By keg’ representing the Balkans asadangerous by and policy legitimization crisis, the Kosovo during Itwasagain justify too. used to non- for tool framework andaconvenient interpretive asapowerful utilized Balkanism was 1995, 285-9). 1997,9-12; beWoodward solve could expected not to powers itexternal (Andreatta then feud nature, tribal historically a cyclical of predetermined wasYugoslav case an the if non-intervention: justifying for useful was Balkanism of discourse the situation, In this 1996,57-8). 1995,273;Andreatta 1997,9-13; ICB violationsrights (Woodward humandeter Serbianaggression tostop Western puttingand governments pressureon were opinion public domestic and media mass time, same the At lives. soldiers’ risk engagemilitary and unwillingto weretherefore The major powers Western states. major of interests the thestrategic stability international or not threaten war did The Bosnian were disenfranchised 1995, 169-98). (Woodward Non-nationalist political forces were ignored andundermined; pro-Yugoslav citizens in effectallowing interpretation this becometo self-fulfilling1995, 299). (Woodward as an andone, interpretation of conflicttheir groups thus the theirethnic accepted ethnic of representative as politicians nationalist treated actors International divisions. ethnic Otherfactors that contributed to the international community’s failure to resolve the conflict were the 10 (Woodward (Woodward 1995, 274; ICB 1996, 47).International interventions reinforced 22 CEU eTD Collection ( socialist transition to market democracy that was already was already underway. democracy marketthat to transition socialist (seeICB1996) andtheagenda inidentified of post- wasconflict-prevention course the minority problems were ethnic potentially explosive Balkans,too, restof the For the war-torn Balkan societies. of international towards determinantthe community’s policy important were an ofethnic conflict legacies the however, At sametime, 89). the 2002, democraciesmarket 1997; Bose societies into (Paris transformation war-shattered of is for peace the foundation thebest that assumption the upon liberalization, economic peacebuildingperiod, in the Balkans waspursued primarily democratizationthrough and WarLike by aroundthe elsewhere dominated intheglobe post-Cold peacebuilding. initially agendawas post-conflict areasof Balkans,the the In thewar-shattered Approachandthe of Conflicts’ Approach The ‘Legacies ‘Transition’ Ethnic period. conflict in post- the salient becameespecially in relationship This Balkans. the democratization) Balkanism has always related to the issue conflicts. of democratization Yugoslav the with together (or end the impossibilitynot did Balkanism of of relevance policy The Balkanism andtheMajor Policy Approaches towards theBalkans unless itstepped in prevent to spread the instability of ( and servedasawarning the that US could (again)end upfighting amajorin war Europe War Worldof with outbreak First analogies the the historical encouraged representations of intervention militaryfor involvement arationale USSuch provided (Paris 2002,434). Europe, supporters to Balkansthe butalso not only the restof spill to instability over to and moment cause any explodecould at as a keg’that Kosovo‘powder representing Ibid in quoted Gorton, (senator imminentdebacle policy asan was depicted war”– cold of a midst the in in Vietnam was there than justification less – “with Kosovo in involvement ofyears.US forhad hundreds simmered that conflict civil incomprehensible Ibid ., 444). But Balkanism came inhandy for legitimizingintervention, too.By ., 444). Like the Vietnam war, the Kosovo war was portrayed as an intractable and anintractable war wasportrayed as Kosovothe ., 444).Likewar, Vietnam the Ibid ., 434-6).., 23 CEU eTD Collection rights and neglected other, arguably more urgent, social issues (interviews D; E). country like Croatia, forexample, many international projects still focusedonbasic humanand minority to representatives of non-governmental organizations, eveninthe early 2000s a democraticallyin stable 11 rights minority and human of protection ensure to and law, of rule the install lines along non-ethnic control, to civil and mediafreeof political organized society managementconflictthrough seeCFRCPA (e.g. tobuild 2002;USIP 2002), revive or region the of potential conflict the reduce is to Balkans in the involvement international of primary post-conflict task the approach, conflicts’ ‘legaciesethnic of to the According 1998,79). (Chandler society civil fragmentationandlackof ethnic resultof have believedthe been to warsare ethno-political The Yugoslav (Krastev 2002, 9). primarily are Balkans in the problems aspolitical inasmuch problems Balkan with Balkans. Theformer assumes thatdealing with ethnic problems is key the dealing to different two approacheson that,their could theright, own policy towards guide Managing thelegacies of andmanagingethnic conflicts have transition in beenprinciple ethnic conflicts’ of ‘legacies The approaches has for problems policymaking. Each brought two the of approach has been solution for ethnic disputes. criticized for market intoBalkan believed democraciesstates isassumingbe viable long-term to theonly transforming time, same the At that protection). minority and media, independent nationalist society, rhetorichas had policy implications for democraticof transition (hence the emphasis on civil intheof region relations ethnic nature cross-purposes. Theallegedlyexplosive at work approachesissuesbrought forefront tothe twothe of havenotappeared transition), to have peace of ethnic in periods of and (long time Balkans) the parts inother than have much(ethnic reconciliation agendas been inimportant more areas post-conflict areas across hasvaried importance relative their Although comehave together. approach inIn practice, Balkansthe the ‘legacies ethnic conflicts’of approach and the ‘transition’ liberalization. economic democratization simultaneous beachieved through and in can only the Balkans future sustainable conflict-free posits that Eastern Europe, of whole the paradigm across apowerful been has which approach, transition the hand, other the On priorities. xviii).1996, 150-7, issues, ethnic andminoritiesof relations Security treatment arevital This approach influenced international democracy assistance in the region (Krastev 2002, 9). According 9). 2002, (Krastev region the in assistance democracy international influenced approach This 11 (ICB 24 CEU eTD Collection ‘legacies of ethnic conflicts’ approach, the democratization approach, too, hasbeen too, approach, democratization the conflicts’ approach, ‘legacies of ethnic democracies neglect and the of localin specificities favorof models.universal Likethe effectiveness of strategies top-down of installing democratic institutions in new the challenged also Theyhave democracies. of established characteristic arrangements institutional modeling, wherebynew reproduce democracies institutional the democratization with equate tendency the to on focused have Critics McMahon 2001). 2001; 1999;Belloni Stubbs 1996;OSFBosnia-HerzegovinaSampson 2001; 2001; validityto universal Mendelson and (Carothers Wedel 1999; Glenn 2002; 1998; Burgess its of claims onaccount has beencriticized in particular approach The democratization andlegacies post-conflict have seemed bleak manyto policy analysts. success inBalkan feature a societies that uniquely frustrating mixof post-communist and liberalization economic of political effects polarizing handle the to ill-equipped especially societies are conflict aspost- inasmuch internationalism’) as ‘liberal to has beenreferred it often context inindeed of the problematic, potentially peacebuilding damaging, (in context this 2002,222-3).(Greskovits The transition isapproach deemed be to even more legacies communist economic and political cultural, impairing societies’ these to due in particular, societies in post-communist impossible, altogether or is difficult, liberalization economic and political simultaneous that argued been has it alternatively, dissatisfied majorities prone to bring populist authoritarian regimes topower; and thevast welfarestate by by undermines creating democracy undermining thereby liberalization economic been arguedthat ithas this context, democracy.market In to transition countries’ (CEE) European Eastern and Central of context the in debated desirable tosimultaneously pursue political and economic liberalization has been widely 2002, 9-10). The assumption of transitionthe itthat is approach possible both and (Krastev transition post-communist of andissues states inBalkan process political actual could have destabilizing effects in post-conflict societies (Paris 1997, 73-82). economic and political liberalizationoften work atcross-purposes whenand, pursued simultaneously, adequate welfare of and absence redistributionthe In term. policies, short the it, in too,least can exacerbate at ongoing conflicts. inequalities, economic Inaddition, widen to tends societies shattered can thus reinforce already existing divisions in post-conflict societies. Economic liberalizationin war- 12 isthe legitimization policy Political liberalizationencourages political mobilizationand theexpressionof conflicting interests, and essence 12 (Paris 1997, 73-82). The transition agenda’s prospects (Paris Thetransition agenda’sof prospects 1997,73-82). of Balkan politics, and for thus neglecting both the both neglecting thus for and politics, Balkan of 25 CEU eTD Collection capacity to assist, supervise and regulate others in their path towards democratization, towards in path their others and regulate superviseassist, to capacity the have that countries sovereign fully between international for distinction a create they necessity regulation, and destabilization, for potential immaturity, democratic to attest characteristics such When culture. of adequacy and traits, civilizational society, hingeshierarchy judgments on on cultural characteristics such as presence ofcivil their degreeof democratization 66; Chandler 2000,14).The(Burgess 2001, new of in parts hierarchy on the anddepending lower democracies, rest the the ‘consolidated’ ithas of West and group ‘rest’,positioned in countries (Western) developed the the the between distinction the eroding of Instead hierarchies. new created has consensus democratic the current legitimate, longerno considered are societies ‘unfit’ culturally to todeny democracy andattempts rejected been hasseemingly way ethnocentrism while in Critics arguedthat this have inanalyzeddegrees of terms democratization. of divergent the For beDoty two positions reconciled,1996, 127-44). todemocracy is societies have been evenpessimisticsober and (Burgess 2001, 55-9;Chandler 2000,17; in non-Western of democratization prospects the of butassessments universal value Democracy promotion emphasizes either. cultural approach differences. transition in the Democracyabandoned not is is deemed Balkans’ to be ‘the of a category distinct The of schemes representational Balkanism. (ICB 1996,xiii).all this ismost approaches, Of clearly one in grounded the peace,… and since a toforintervention Europe” “a lastingfor menace they shame are case a difficult with Balkans) the excludes emphatically (that world” civilized “thethe present Balkans the that is approach the of assumption A foundational it. for directions nevertheless sets the region apart from Europe before itsets out to formulate policy approach conflicts’ of ethnic ‘legacies understanding the Balkanreality, guide to policymakers to ‘think’ about the Balkans. Even when it discards ‘instant’ history as a Let us, however,(Krastev 2002, 11-2). pose to consider innew democracies logic grasp process of political the internal the to judged unable the issue of how the two approaches have taught 26 CEU eTD Collection ‘real’ democracy in many ofparts worldthe (Doty 136).1996, democratization project todefend its claims to universality eventhe in face of continuous failure to install 13 wasbroadened mandate time its and of indefinite period for an DPA wasextended the of implementation civilian the of in charge was that (OHR) Representative High the lastin transition Office forthe of 1997theterm of was intended period, ashort only to administration Although international the Bosniafor self-government. prepare andto toguide was process tasked international peaceanddemocratization the organizations Following inBosnia. mission peacebuilding asthe such inpeacebuilding, intervention international the incasesof direct most obvious consequential and been have These assumptions signing sucha 26; for seeICB stance of political preferencesofthelocal populations irrelevantare considered 2000, (Chandler the Dayton opinion,legitimized, and asunavoidable. consent, isand The evenpresented thus conflict resolution.Peace A manage regulatory autonomously andto interventionistnot but power to role fornationalists the internationalbring to trusted be communitycan Balkans Agreement adequate political values. culturethe and Bothof proper imply assumptions these that region is susceptible(DPA), toviolent ethnic the that conflictare and that Balkanconcurred, have societies and approaches leadersboth lack which on assumptions, major Two policy. Balkans a community’s international the consortiumlegitimized and influenced have that assumptions practical into ofBalkanism some haveelements translated approach ‘transition’ of the and approach ethnicconflicts’ of ‘legacies the both their differences, Despite society. andcivil culture in of democratic terms from West the be farthest to are believed with their ethnic-based culture and irrational proclivity for nationalism and chauvinism – international surveillance, but of all post-communist states onesthe in Balkans– the in needof and unstable be potentially to areheld All newdemocracies case. special in the Balkans as of have democratization should conceived approach Thus, while transition the intheory a routine case of a universalto supervision and regulation trend,beshould subject that themselves governing democratically of incapable andcountries in practice it has treated it as a This distinction perpetuates the difference that democratization isexpected towipe out andallows the 13 1996, xiii-ix). (Chandler Doty 2000,9-7; 1996). 27 to CEU eTD Collection nationalist obstructionism ( obstructionism nationalist imposemission, to a unitary multicultural eliminatemakeup onBosnia, and to of democratization the costs the despite ownhands inits firmly process democratization take presumesthe perspective that divisions thepermanency in theBalkans, to ethnic of disabling politically the abandon to community international the of unwillingness the hasnot the groups reflected stancestemmed Bosnian the buthas from of people rather between view, standoff threeethnic the the multiethnic this On obstacle to democracy. seemingly ethnicidentitiesrigid fixedof Bosnians arenot andimmutable,an and arenot the that assumption the on based is – itself OHR the by as well as tanks, think and the liberalIn pro-interventionistby liberal contrast, –upheld policy perspective analysts 2). by provoked imprudencethe of internationalthe community 2000,170- (Chandler the West history. is anddigsinto conflictcould danger with concerned the the It recur that could be and Balkanism of discourse the drawson explicitly perspective The conservative mired intoantagonistic ethnic (Chandler andreligious groups 2000,169;Bose2002, 42-7). anotheralso and dangerous potentially destabilizing inasociety irreversibly intodivided intractable liberalimpose on democracybeBosnians andaunitary futilestate tonotonly but to attempts considers perspective this in 2000,182), farawayChandler (Zakaria, quoted the world” for makesafe democracy “to rather but democracy” for safe world crisis, makewant“to the not do who those viewof Being generally natureBosnia. of the this time very the to due misplaced and asunrealistic endeavor the has renounced Bosnia one of democratization in the involvement community’s international the on view The conservative heateddebate. hasprovoked case Bosnian The unprecedented in andintervention media. the engineering evenfrom refrained electoral involved in all areas of government, policymaking, and institution building, and hasnot directly been has community international the 1997 since representatives, Bosnian 2000,25-6).Instead toelected ESI of transferring governmental powers gradually local politicians Martin 2000,43-55;Knaus (Chandler 1997; Westendorp and 2003, 64; to unilaterally impose legislation and enactpunitive measures against obstructionist include institution building,over governance extensivepowers includingand thepower Ibid ., 164). Next to nationalist politicians, the DPA (where 28 CEU eTD Collection lacks democratic culture and capacities could not be achieved by self-government but be byself-government not could achieved and culture democratic lacks capacities inthat asociety leastinitially, democratization at that, hassuggested Such legitimization Bosnian politicians: Bosnian than servebetter ithas assumed to that citizens interests of Bosnian ‘real’ the to referring The OHR has legitimized2003a: 42; see also Ashdown 2004). and preventing for itfrom slipping backintoviolence (that bothered conservatives) (ICG itsinsist) critics liberal (as tendency self-government for country the preparing for both imperative to bypass and situation the of adversity by the justified measure as atemporary democracy” and transparency legality, of norms thethe over “roughshod rides occasionally local that intervention politicalintrusiveinternational have presented democratization of project Supporters Bosnian the process2004). leadership(Beecroft of lack and despair, fall cynicism, victim to citizens spite”, and obstinacy of alsomixture Balkan a “quintessentially to due where, and by absent, sorely are life” organising in…political 2008), where“alternativeattraction principles of or poles 162), where nationalism is entrenched and “nationalist politics is ever present” (Laj present” is ever politics “nationalist and is entrenched wherenationalism 162), mostthe basic in spokesman, principles democracy”of (OHR’s quoted Chandler 2000, ill ease with even at society, as“a sick deeply been has characterized society Bosnian democratization. to and adverse organized ethnically is currently Bosnian culture assumption Bosnia: shareanimportant about that positions Theseconflicting seemingly extension and the increasing use of OHR’sthe powers: ( nationalists of cement power the to speech have have democracy been for all because harmful deemed tended Bosnian they freedom free veto andof elections areguaranteed), rights ethnic unrestricted groups’ Carpenter27; 2002, Ashdown2002: 4,quoted in community. (Westendorp, quotedChandler in 2000, 162,see 157; Petritsch,also quoted in properly, the real interest of the population, which is to cooperate withthe international population their serving not are They perspective. wrong a have leaders] Bosnian [The HighRepresentative is unwrittenthe but functional part of the constitution. (ICG 2003b, 10) waronslackers and recidivists, offers and glimpses inspiring uplandsof ahead…Thesunlit the wages defence, the plots looms, insolvency when alarm the sounds who he is It promoter. and defender moderniser, reformer, chief Bosnia’s as work to continues Representative High The Ibid ., 165).These critics have welcomed the gradual BRR 29.7.2003; Laj þ ak 2007) þ 29 ak CEU eTD Collection Montenegro, and Kosovo. and Montenegro, 14 Balkans and the development in1998, in partnerships monitoring accession 1997and introduction ofpre-accession the following especially countries, (SEE) European Southeast of affairs in the EU of theThe hasapproach been gaining strength parallel with increasingthe involvement of the Stabilization –namelystraightforward integration European the of into Balkans the ‘mainstream’. ‘Balkan’ According the Europeanization solution approach, problemsis the to to and Associationfor theBalkans Perspective A European Process for theThe EuropeanizationApproachto the Balkans Western 2005a, 2007b; ICG 2007,23-8). Europeanization is winning the dayin Balkans.the Representative’s (Ashdownemergency powers” 2003a, 2003;see alsoESI 2003b, pull of the Euro-Atlantic institutions [would replace] the push of the High 4-6). The new vision on Bosnia, apparently shared by the OHR itself, envisages that “the 2003a, 2007a,2007b,ICG2007, policyESI Martin soft-power and 2003; (Knaus tools unproductive, and the prospects using detrimental to of much more the EU’s sustainable disables Bosnia’s democracy representative isand increasingly illegitimate, thus powers special OHR’s of the use authoritarian the havearguedthat critical.turned They situationthe in some Bosnia, of liberal previouslythe pro-interventionist policy analysts As OHR’s the was intrusivepolicy moregrowing despite the normalization gradual of chapter 7). by only imposition madeof by decisions international the community (Chandler 2000, leverage in the region and undermine local pro-Europeanization political As inleverage forces. region the political and undermine local pro-Europeanization promise a ‘common of destination’European for Balkans,the it wouldits destroy 8; ICB 2005,12).By implication, isif assumption the that EUreneged the onits 2008, ofeuropeanization inprocess (vanMeurs andYannis 2002,2;EPC SEEcountries can Europe be achievedbyasweeping instability, Southeast and democracy prosperity The term ‘Western Balkans’ currently refers to Albania, Bosnia, Croatia, Macedonia, Serbia, Macedonia, Croatia, Bosnia, Albania, to refers currently Balkans’ ‘Western term The 14 (officially formulatedis in 2000). It based on conviction the durablethat 30 CEU eTD Collection security threats in the region. It envisages EU involvement in resolving outstanding in resolving involvement EU envisages It region. in the threats security remaining of the is containment the approach Europeanization the of The secondpillar locked behindwalls of visa (ESI2005a, restrictions 1,2005b, 3;ICB 2005, 28). and instability, and unemployment poverty, to doomed ghetto’, ‘European a into region the of transformation and Europe) Southeast of rest the (including Europe of rest the between and Western alternative isbleak the Balkans gap – awidening developmental 2004,In 4,2005b).11, 2002, of viewproponents the Europeanization, the of the (ESI2003b, 2- real changebring intheBalkans andto about reforms liberalization and economic demandfaster to leverage the EU’s increase would such is a policy belief that underdevelopment, and eliminate of sources the political andeconomic instability. The decline, deindustrialization tackle chronic problems socio-economic such as and rural reverse economic to innecessary order are deemed cohesion and structural reforms involvement, of activeStronger financial all,promotion and, EU commitment, above 5, 2003b,2-11). in forassistance economic isno 2002, reconstruction (ESI longer Balkans the adequate Carothers 2002;Krastev According of proponents 2002). Europeanization, to EU setting has upwhatCarothers aptly as‘fecklessdescribed 2002,4-12; (ESI democracies’ Thesehave been gradually crises conflict. nationalism and ethnic problems graverthan as identified been have Balkans Western the in representation democratic of crisis the Investment Bank (EIB) (CEPS 1999). Currently, the profound socio-economic crisis and a subsidiary European the developmentof to infrastructure and economic reconstruction boards, with complete Euroization to follow, and granting direct responsibility for currency EURO-dominated of introduction immediate liberalization, region were trade development.remedies Among proposed the for earliest economic the problems of the is one first basic The three pillars. Balkanshas the to approach The Europeanization 2005b,(ESI 3,see also5-7). 2005c, would lead that backdestructive of the theregion destabilization politics “to past” the muchfor needed reforms a and would initiate vicious circle ofexclusion and is fear the political currents, incentives thatafailure of destroy would Europeanization isEuropeanization held tobe onlyvisionthe capable of competing with nationalist 31 CEU eTD Collection enabling of functions approach the have beenwringedin a powerful historical analogy: 2005b).another Balkan 2008,38;ICG2007,22-3; ESI Thepolitically (EPC crisis toprevent enough soon a reality Western Balkans the of integration make theEuropean thatcould approach andstrategic more of political in a favor enlargement approach to performance-based and conditionality-based thestrict abandon EU the that necessitate integration’ solutions in‘Fast European could Western thusbereplicated Balkans. the Romania and Bulgaria of miracles europeanization the that is idea The countries. these tangible, strengthen pro-European tothus within and pro-reform andpolitical actors give Balkan countries a feeling of inclusion, tomake the promise of EU integration more motivate and to expected are membershipcategories special rationale: share acommon integration’European solutions ‘Fast Klotzle ICB2005,14). 11; Kempe 2006,15; and as date advocate 2014 of target the 2005b,EU enlargementtotheWestern Balkans (ESI proponents2005a, 10,2005b, of region 2003b,9, 4-6). Most (ESI Europeanization the on bear to tools institutional and financial its all bring immediately to EU the allow in to and,enable access in turn, to programs, pre-accession negotiations, them order to for accession beforethey qualify even countries Balkans to Western status candidate culture (CEPS1999,18-9). recently, More has made ESI the a full grantingcase for institutional and political EU into members associate ‘socialize’ to expected was basis, Whyte Participation in 2002;Emerson 2000,2001). EUinstitutions, alimited albeiton associate membership for Western Balkans countries was envisaged (CEPS1999; of new type a approach, of Europeanization the statements Inearly membership. integrationThe ispillarthird fastEuropean Balkansthe the throughspecial of formsof and1999), in guaranteeing stability Meurs Yannis(van and 2002,14-5;CEPS1999). CEPS 2002,14-5; van Meursand Yannis 336; the region (Emerson 2000, democracy to indisputes, removing thelegacies of ethnic conflicts, inbringing and law,order century has arrived. (ICB2005, 6) SarajevoIt is in summer in the of 2014 thatEurope should demonstrate that anew European destruction…. It was in Sarajevo in the summer of 1914 that Europe entered the century of madness and self- 32 CEU eTD Collection ‘language’ and ‘method’ of the EU is the replication of European models The 2, 13). 2002, (Emerson prosperity seek toextendits paradise of peace and and the use of periphery of Europe in which the EU should increase its influence and whichto it should ageographical the of areaon In response,delineate Europeanization proponents the US to use force to make the hostile outside world safe for democracy ( result of Europe’s the are militarypresent in the but weaknessfuture, bright the andinto are dependenta glimpse be might on the power prosperity”, relative and willingness of of containedpeace and of andpersuasion,paradise world anditsrules “post-historical transnational negotiations, andpersuasion 2002).On view,Europe’s (Kagan this self- that rejects the use of force in favor of self-imposed rules, international cooperation, of superiority and have theviability of questioned ‘postmodern’the system European of‘hard(Emerson feelings Proponents power’ solutions 2002,1). defiedEuropean have of EU” the method the language or the is “not and unilateral” and pre-emptive “military, US foreign policy doctrine which, according to proponents of Europeanization, is contemporary the to is partly a response 2000s) in early the itdeveloped (especially as The soft power legitimacy.of TheEuropeanization approach EUderives from the entails. integration that costs bearthe countriesto of accession of infavor membershipdomesticcould tothe willingnesscontribute thatEU consensus is for2005b,A EU’ssoft the broad EPC 2008,7). 2; power prerequisite thepresenceof 2005a,2, in (ESI andKosovo andBosnia international protectorates of the existence conflicts armed of legacies the due to difficult and be specific to are deemed ahead tasks Western isholdBalkans, Croatia and Turkey believed to if asimilarpotential,even the andsoftpower of conditionality. enlargementThe forthcoming the to the enlargement Romania is enormous heldtodemonstrate the potential integration transformative of EU CEEcountries, towards Bulgaria and the The enlargementsuccess of EU’s 2007a, 3). power, defined is approach The ideological theidea foundation of of soft Europeanization the Europe’s simply as the power to make othersLegitimacy “want what Ideological Underpinnings of and Approach: Europeanization the thePower Soft EU wants” (ESI Ibid .). 33 CEU eTD Collection democratic character ( character democratic its and legitimacy itensures because peace–iscentral of Kantian the extension eternal the legacies of war (EPC 2008, 15-6). Yet, the dominant view is that ifisYet, the involvementview 2008,15-6). that legaciesthe dominant of war (EPC EU and nation-building unfinished projects, challenges’ security such asremaining threats, based withhard-power ‘specific for models dealing are necessary that analysts suggest them by overtaking theirfunctions in an unaccountable manner 2005a,2-10).Some (ESI institutions of local instead term weakening strategy and strengthens developmental is tobeKosovo, about mainly applied in because post-independence it along- offers model building tothe hasinsuperior that of state beenapplied and authoritarian Bosnia stability modelsthan thatrely 2005b,on peacekeepingIt is(ESI 3). alsoconsidered This basedsoft-power model is deemed tobeacheaper way of ensuring regional slow but unrelenting transformation of the state” (ESI 2005a, 6). 2005c,1) andtoachieve circle a virtuous “a “into (ESI of andreform development” Under2003b,11). is 1, these tolock conditions, themodel expected Balkan countries institutionalbe engagement extensive has 2005b;to (ESI2005a,10, 11; ICG EPC 2008, has to be voluntary, cheap, 2005a,perceived and 3-10).themodel (ESI For durable work, membershipto yet are ‘revolutionary’, changethat regime and transformation motivates membership as achievablestates. Itmembership. Itis based on extensive EU involvementinand institution buildingin candidate is EU for candidates understoodnotin countries applied building member-state of model toois the Balkans distant, as is centerof the the Europeanizationthe approach The model at to EU policy that of a model and ofthe ‘voluntary EU’s financial empire’, and in which the lure of EU hegemonic possession old-style hegemonicpossession and terms of Europe’s ‘vital concern’ and not in terms of ‘vital interest’ that “smells of clarity” fittingly (Emersonhasbeen framed of 2002, 2).Theapproach US power in “brutal to the asopposed prosperity, and persuasion of asapostmodernparadise Europe totheimage of fully field subscribe butotherwise in international the capabilities limited 2005b,15; 2).TheESI proponents of Europeanization allegations counter EU’s the of fragmentation ( state conflictsand suppress moderate ethnic or are expectedto ideathe ofa‘common of roof’European and the overarching power postmodern Europe the promise of EU membership as a carrot in the process of conflict resolution, whereby Ibid ., 13). Realpolitik ” ( Ibid ., 20). Its normative20). Its foundation ., – Ibid ., 4- 34 CEU eTD Collection ‘re-dignify’ Balkansthe asa region”European Meurs The (van andYannis 2002,9). Europe” (CEPS 1999, 16), or by welcoming the efforts of certain “forces in the region to civilization by callingforand democracy, bring efforts to Balkans into the “civilised adopt Europeanvalues the by (van Balkansto the of YannisMeurs and urging 2002,8), fragmentation” instability, state land and ethnic divisions Balkansthe asthe of perpetual of imagery the colours brighter in painted only have 1990s… in the “developments that questioning fitness Europeanness forby noting example andcultural of the Balkans, the likeEuropeanization, it, by thepolicy before starts approaches often off implicitly EUfaces thatproblems the in Balkans. the nationalism,instability Europeanand stability threats to when defining the policy conditions in Balkans.the The Europeanization hasapproach invoked ethnic violence, social, disastrous upbythe economiccultural, about political,propped and a consensus legitimacy consensus involvement the inherent of about has beenEuropean tacitly consensus-based ‘methods’ would beunthinkable this without assumption. However, the conception The populations. from recipient support unlimited andensures legitimate inherently democratic andconsensual character of EU governance makesEUinvolvement of tight the isbuiltthat assumption the or of upon form sticks. Theapproach of carrots in the whether conditionality, EU of EUapplication to down boil mostly prescriptions policy conditionality processes, of europeanization the ownership’ ‘regional to references frequent despite Balkans outsideitrethink notdoes Yet, in Europe. applied the to compel policymakers Southeast as part the approaches policy other to alternative isapowerful approach The Europeanization framework of the of Balkanism.EU’s persuasion-basedVestiges of Balkanism Despite the stress onreforms), and a policy of voluntary softtransformation ( power policy of containment,and to enlargement,and soft-power tools (such as inducement of from costly morallyand unjustifiable hard-power tools (such as imposition), andfrom a in the Balkans is haveto sustainablemust effects,it positive from shiftprotectorates, Ibid ., 7-13; ICB 2005, 8-11). 35 CEU eTD Collection peace ( looms stability and ghetto toEurope’s as athreat that Balkans appearasanisolated violence” can still be felt(ICB 2005,4).In picturethe drawn by Europeanization, the “smell of the andwhere conditions social by and economic aggravated dire are distrust as a“depressing” 330), (Emerson desperation andwhere336, region people’s 2000, haveimposed be law and to where order “territories”, “unruly” as been described huge security to the threat Union European itself”the 2002, 3).Theyhaveof (Patten like [,posing] crime and descended have “[c]orruption where carrion a crows organised 2002,7)and it 2001b; vanMeurs 2002, 1;seealso crisis” intotopple (Patten can still of part any moment any “at where region volatile a as described been have Balkans The 1). 2001a, seePatten and(e.g. reversals setbacks with metresistance, is andslow typically andKlotzle 2006,18).‘In Balkans’the –as story the usually begins is – progress always region (Kempe the be applicable” to “highly – aresaidto crime andfailure, organized – terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, regional conflicts, state historically befitted theBalkans, all facingsecurity inkey threats Europe 21 the flourish” 2008,13; has 2006,7;seealso EPC andKlotzle (Kempe ICB 2005,7).As to crime corruption and organised law allow mechanisms rule“inadequate of where and below the surface” simmerjust tensions ethnic regional and destabilizing domestic insecure wheremake “potentially environment, struggling an theirway through to areseen institutionsas Weak administrations and states, forpotential destabilization. a strong having as seen is region the threats, security reduced effectively have to said are processes While europeanization in Balkans. the conditions catastrophic the noting off with starts often paradigm Europeanization in vein,the buta related Alternatively, practical and cultural adjustments it entails” (Patten 2001a, 3, emphasis in the original). leaders who talk about europeanization] whotalkleaders about “how many [Balkan about worried have accordingly of promoters Europeanization categorical in change course the of Balkans’]history”[the (CEPS1999,34).Some induce real inpolitical,change economic andsocietal behaviours, a effectively be to would required “Massive and constraints incentives project: Europeanization cultural immaturity of the Balkans is assumed to complicate the tasks ahead of the Ibid ., 4): ., really understand what it means, or the major the or means, it what understand st century 36 CEU eTD Collection the OHR’s authoritarian powers. OHR’s authoritarian the would be required bytheEU break nationalistto resistance would notbe akin rather to that determination of intensity the if unclear remains it Bosnia, in activities OHR’s the of analysis own ICG’s the of light in then But trick. the do would involvement morea determined EU ontosuggest however, that goes The think 22). tank, suffice toovercome nationalist resistance in hasbeen Bosnia proven (2007,19- wrong Group (ICG), for example, the assumption that the lure of EU membership alone would Crisis International theleadingthink tank According to revolutionary changes. expected the about bring can alone process integration EU the that convince to fail relationship For all the perceptivenessEU integration and Balkanpeace and prosperity. between equation the yield of that their relationships causal concrete the analyzed have analyses,analysts even those Few Balkan into European the peace andparadise of isentry prosperity. problems that have analyzed Meurs (van region” of the this causal3). Some even warn that the EU might become a “hostage of the destabilizingfor modernisation development, and in transition, all one” (van Meurs and Yannis 2002, potentials that the process of EU integration in the region would qualify automatically as a strategy is it itself. that analyses “abold approach hypothesis suggest the Europeanization Some feasibility of of critical analysis the discourages and thus approach Europeanization the up implicitly consensusthe props indispensability by on the proposed solutions the of Balkans in the affairs of state dire the on consensus the isthat implication first The state has had implications for Europeanization-inspired policy analyses. definition faces problemand ofthe policy Balkan Europeanization ineach every that ‘theof construct Balkansynoptic generalizing a whole, a as Balkans the with problem’representations these has been of indiscriminate association general however,the and through that deny them.argue, I articulated.The Thesocio-economic use of this construct problems as of a theready-made Balkans are well known and the point is not to erosionof the EU's credibility in the world. ( conflicts, constant flows of immigrants, flourishing of Balkan-based criminal networks and the Political instability in the Balkans threatens Europe with the prospects of neverending military 2002, 7). Yet, they still have us believe that the remedy for Ibid ., 6) 37 CEU eTD Collection way in which SEE countries’ political and power relations interact or interfere with interfere or interact relations andpower political countries’ SEE way in which paradigm is with the unconcerned a different The Europeanization of order priorities. live onorbelow thepoverty line” (Laj of pieces of legislation and regulations in line with the EU”, when “half the population doubt whether itis really feasible, or even prudent, to expect Bosnia adoptto “thousands would ofEuropeanization few proponents For example, (Krastev neglected 2002, 15). period in the countries in SEE developments economic means and political,itthe social also that amainstream But region. produce European as possible and soon as of dispose ‘Balkans’ the isto Europeanization approach the goal the means thatof aregrave problems ‘Balkan problems’ the that The presumption for pro-European reforms. cases’ ‘hard as identified societies in transformation revolutionary instigating of task the isof is policy understudied.the if unclear model the remains thus process up to It really component domestic the to their relation while change for policy (EU)pressure external achieve, focus comparisonbut they to thealso tasksthey are supposed with primarily on Notonlyarein instruments modest socialthe (ESI2005a,6-8). these policy partners dialogue mechanismsprocess through developmentbetweenthe for consultation and of by improving betackled democraticProblems the democraticof representation are to assistance. structural EU for frameworks as and strategies developmental general Developmentalfrom apart countries suggestion the SEE that should design implementNationaland Planshow to pursue the mammoth and complex task of socialthat and economic convergence, shouldmonitoring and by the process of adopting EU legislation. There isnot much analysis on be EU andof should beinstigated forward bycontinuous administration the pushed approved reform Radical less revolutionary. are stage ateach envisages ESI the that mechanisms by the EU the causal Yet, concrete 2005a,6-8). (ESI democratic process the transformation of and shouldconvergence serve both reform institutions andpublicwith social andeconomic proceeds administration, of as with a radical with begins The model Balkans. Western the to suitable EU approach most the the by as Or let buildingmodel us take examplethe ESI member-state the level of propagated the of development of the rest of Europe, and ends with þ ak 2007)and could in be by theory servedbetter until EUmembership are 38 CEU eTD Collection the past and past the policies in which they have nothad a say. the postmodernEuropeanization proponents have tended disregardto the reactions of Balkan basis, societies to self-interested than rather normative its power and EU the of system postmodern that, logicin of justification of the former.the Assured by the professed superiority short-termof the follows the latter of logicthe the justification of countries), incandidate (showcased power with in soft of protectorates) hard EU(showcased replacethe the power at least,necessary. Despitehas the desireas of also many but proponents legitimate, of as madeEuropeanizationonly not represented to completely been has region in the involvement them recipientsimmature is thatofA second implication of the representationthese of Balkan countries as unstable and culturally countries2002, 8, emphasis in the needoriginal). not be treated as equal partners of the EU. EU a “breakthrough that would lead that a “breakthrough region the is toachieve expected –namely Europeanization Balkans inthehistorically antagonistic hasby invoking beencompensated greatness usually the of goal the that into“civilian, (CEPS 1999,bewhich the Balkans16) would brought civilised Europe” implementation of these proposals. The lack of sufficientand analysis of rationale the the to relate might opposition or support local how analyzed been not has 2002, 6-7).While(Patten europeanization thoroughgoing itpolicies havebeen proposed, set for the Balkans “respond directly to the preoccupations of people across the Balkans” Europeanization have relied on opinion of Other proponents polls324, 331). large 2000, be supportivepopulation (Emerson would at to show thatthe and thecommunity prioritiesbusiness honest the but crime, and that corruption from the profiting EU those has from come only might europeanization to opposition that suggest to content been have analysts Some approach. thishasbeen an odd local structures, by power resilient created reform to obstacles lamented has community international the which with frequency and the projects Europeanization Balkan of the ahead difficulties admitted Given the policy the direction. change and not cannot should political becauselocal processes europeanization processes, towards stability, co-operation prosperity” stability, co-operation and (van Meurs andYannis away from the divisions and the conflicts of process through 39 CEU eTD Collection Europe. fast association with countries’ for europeanizing European askeyprerequisites values assumptions but also of Balkanism identity considers transformation and adoption of models. not some Yet, this of only EU developmental basic approach the preserves with line in Balkans in the change social and political on focused isprimarily approach Unlike Balkanism, is which manage transition. way bestto asthe with Europe association encourages It integration. EU is fast function andsecurity of a their Balkan development that countries’ assumes policy Balkans incommunity’s international the In sum,approach Europeanization the European identity. a for choice Balkancountries’ and the order European the normative superiority of is the offer to has approach Europeanization the that remedy only the that and exist will accountability.is What is clear thatproblems oflegitimacy and accountability anddo destination identity and would settle problemslegitimacy of and democratic identity” ( society, politics, –economics, sense fundamental most in the model EU “the has chosen from ‘socialize’, is country is inreality that country every expected tothis pressurized no that noted been has it While norms. and rules EU into ‘socialization’ membership period of pre- less or moreprotracted a presupposes approach Europeanization believed solution thatthe is full (Emersonmembership 2002,7).Yet, the The legitimacy deficitof ‘virtual’ membership have EU been Itisacknowledged, too. thanmore accountable. rather effective more involvement EU making of ways with concerned predominantly been Yannis Inreality, 2002,22). however, Europeanization-inspiredpolicy analyses have setting andtheBrussels-imposed EU membership”conditionality for Meurs (van and integrationEU towards with the inevitable intrusiveness, EU norm- comprehensive process regional/localin the ownership for greater demands balance “creatively the analysts have these haverecognized problems. They itis acknowledged that necessary to Europeanization andtheir2002). (Krastev for policies responsibility these consequences elected of control the limits It governments over domestic policiesimplication, and, by deny them allows to representation. democratic complicates conditionality EU Ibid ., 20). It only remains unclear if and how the choice for aEuropean choice the how and if unclear only remains It 20). ., primarily focused on identity identity focused on issues, Europeanization the 40 CEU eTD Collection focused identity. on Bulgaria’s affirming European Although of discourse the Balkanism politics identity with policymaking mingle to unclear sufficiently were they time, same Atthe forces. pro-europeanizationpolitical support andto attitudes europeanization inclusionProspects of into ‘club’ the were good enough to encourage pro- Bulgaria’s ambivalent position was thus particularly propitious for europeanization. integration. place and in fears ofits Europe, possible from exclusion processthe of European its about uncertainty reputation, international country’s the about anxiety provoked It a purely ‘Balkan’ case, Balkanism its unsettled self-identification as a country.European ititjoinseemedchange.had Europe, that consideredbe Although to to Bulgaria wasnot identity and to Bulgaria partof anintegral Bulgarian transformation If politics. wanted One of the main effects of the strong Balkanism discourse was to make issues of identity Europeanization inapproach international the community’s Balkans policy on Bulgaria? influential increasingly the of and discourse Balkanism the of effect the been has What states. such astheVisegrad group frontrunners European Central with up keep not could obviously that case intermediary an was it however, context, European East broader the In Balkans. the of areas conflict stability and in many respects political relative because it itforretained was a europeanization promising case context, was more similarjudgments aboutthe region. IntheBalkan from indiscriminate image frequently suffered to the CEE countries its by international it butitwas affected because of of center Balkanism thanthe attention to the post- ethnic initsthe internaland conflicts neighborhood retained peace. Itwasnotinethnic in it uninvolved remained contrary, tothe scenarios Despite approach. Europeanization forcase both the international discourse of the forBalkanism and community’s westernizingthe and Central Europe the violentBalkans. Bulgaria hasbeen a borderline between of Europe map mental the on zone yetprecarious, a gray, to Bulgaria relegated mostDuring of transitionthe Western andgovernments period, have public opinion Bulgariathe External and Discourses onthe Balkans 41 CEU eTD Collection on the basis of comparison, imitation, and sometimes rejection, of European models and values and developmentthe of Bulgarian cultural identity was conceived and out carried reshuffling of profound society. values The of traditional of the by gradual retreat the in started 19 the that of social in the course transformation the points asreference models were used Bulgaria’s modern throughout central history. pre-socialistcultural European debate wasa debate in Theeuropeanization europeanization Bulgaria. novel anything about is hardly there challenge, unprecedented as anovel and project Europeanization Despite inboth the in– visible tendency therepresent Eastand the West–to Europeanization, Nationalism,and Bulgaria’s Historical Experience casestudies. in of these context the discussed be will developments Subsequent begin. studies case two the of stories the when focus onlyontheemergence the andconsolidationparadigm endthe of at of 1990s, the inintellectual ‘baggage’ of andthedecision-makers public,the I the elite, Bulgaria. conceptual ideaand the fit between Europeanization the project andexamines the impingedinhow Balkanism Europeanization analyzesthis on the late1990s.It project grand examines of Bulgaria’s emergence chapter the The remainderof this The Ascent of Bulgaria’s Europeanization Paradigm to economic development. identity and linked europeanization transformation clearly thus problems of transition. It deal andpolitical europeanizationwith economic the way to suggested that best was the apply Europeanization hand, the alsowilling inBalkans.On other the perspective to the was community international the that approach policy a as Balkans the for perspective importance of Europeanization the bythegrowing This wasstrengthened effect attempts at, and demonstrations of,identity transformation. active itencouraged Bulgaria on – effect ithad enabling apolitically was exclusionary, th century. wasmarked The period byfundamental change brought about 42 CEU eTD Collection about the relationship between Bulgaria and Europe. The westernization process in the process westernization The andEurope. between Bulgaria relationshipabout the cohabit with another staple ideology – nationalism – that, too, has had a great deal say to Throughout Bulgaria’s modern history, theeuropeanization however, idea has had to 142). 1997, Ottoman (Daskalov backward the Empire perceivedsuperiority opposition andto by virtue ofits intellectual elite was in Bulgarian the of Europe elevated discourse the progressive Partly, therefore, state. Bulgarian a sovereign of creating project nationalist the to central was and identity national Bulgarian stable and a distinct creating of of Islam and the Orient as irreconcilablyidentification The in general. Asia different and Islam towards and from Bulgariain particular, culture wasOttoman part of the process was Admiration forcomplemented by Europe a strongly towards attitude disparaging modelsEuropean asBulgaria’s only viable path towards progress. desired end. determined both chainofsuccessiveof the stages modernization the and its process Large 3; Dimitrov and Krasteva European 1998,129).The developmental trajectory parts of institutional industrialization andborrowing (Daskalov western templates 1997, 141- of the politicalwhich encouraged Europe, of Western development toreplicate the expected and lawof and representative democracy (Daskalov 1997,142,1994b,2-5). Bulgaria was cultural rule the civic rights, development, political was of progressive epitome the It education. elite and science modern with and development, industrial and posited progress technological the europeanization modernizationwas synonymous with and civilization, with emulation minds large of sections of elite Bulgarian (andthe especially politicalthe of elite), of During this period of (Dimitrov and Krasteva 1998, 124). social transformation, andEurope Bulgaria between difference of the and elimination aimedeuropeanization at Europe accordingly was andcultural social transformation and country’s the character European was the model andun- backwardness of Bulgaria’s bya awareness painful wascharacterized Europe of progress. In theexample, KitromilidesFrom beginning, very 1994). Bulgaria’s the relationship to forDaskalov Dimitrova astudy see, 1996; 1994; covering theBalkansingeneral for values (Dimitrov andKrasteva 1998,124-9;Daskalov 1997, 1994;Elenkov and 43 CEU eTD Collection and was reinvigoratedsocialist Europeanization period. socialism asanideological was perceived to antidote post- inreemerged the but socialism during was stifled debate The europeanization after[1925] 1994). the regime[1942] 1994, [1933]1994, 228-9; Shejtanov 342-3; Galabov [1934] 1994, [1933] 1994, change. consolidation nationalof identity (Dimitrova 1996,70-83;Elenkov 1994, 25;Janev It fittedunique development unlikethat, Bulgarian of way the europeanization, guarantee would well a focused andpropagated traditions onnational reclaimed national the project cause, into the 1996, 70-86).Having endof the announcedof epoch the newintellectual emulation, the post-socialist social and development, of projectthe europeanization (Elenkov 1994, 24;Dimitrova more nationalist. modernization,It clearly opposed liberal conceptionsindividual of and became gainedThe Dimitrovaand discourse 1996,48). anti-modernization strength The sense of paths achieving andnocredible of (Elenkov promises blueprints European crisis1994, 14). intensifiedclear future no while offering of was erodingtradition old the certainties that change in the insecurity by reflected asense profound social the It engendered of Bulgarian society. period between in crisis perceived the and to modernization of difficulties the to inemerged reaction the two An Bulgarian society 1997, 148-63). trend culture(Daskalov andanti-modernization World Wars Cultural( elites splitin their opinion on the desirability of European influences on of backwardness Europe. Bulgaria’s symbolicthe provincialism and power disrupted Disillusionmentwith painful slow of europeanization processes the andand with deemed to befragile ( deemed still to was identity collective whose people, the of consciousness national and morals the to fears superficial that the imitation modelsIt reflected wouldbeof European detrimental social and cultural change,yet was carried out atthe cost of rejecting national traditions. degradingimitation appearances of ledof nogenuine outward the civilization that to and shallow the opposed The counter-discourse counter-discourse. traditionalist superficial alterations in traditionalthe life.ways frustrationof Such engendered a little more than utterly brought society of Bulgarian europeanization thatthe observation intellectuals by promises werefrustrated Many and local the europeanization. to of 19 th century provoked sobering experiences and critical reactions to the ideal of the ideal of Europe provokedsoberingexperiences reactions and critical to century Ibid ., 143-4,1994b, 13). Ibid ., 23; 44 CEU eTD Collection already been extensively treated in Western scholarship before they started to be to started they before scholarship Western in treated extensively been already issue of and conflicts the and ethnic issue nationalism of Balkan the interpretation: of center this the levelcivilizational, and un-Balkanizingof effects of europeanization. Two key issues were insocio-economic the in the whichcultural, process Bulgaria interpretation of emphasized europeanization the a particular of totheemergence and acceptance contributed work analysis andacademic policy local of part large a development aresult, As positions. institutional intellectuals’ strengthen old delegitimized from onesinherited could,communism andthat probably,also of the Balkans. the could that replace frameworks analytical new authoritative of in search general were long forced in up foreager toopen after ideas a scholarly Western of and closure Both period issues apparently intellectuals were Bulgarian be andwhich rejected. would local context, had Balkansbe unconditionally, would be accepted which oradapted to the would diffused Balkans and to ‘decide’growing which partsa to react had to elite intellectual and domestic the transition, of stages early the During and assumptions influential of the Western discourse Europeanization, and Balkanism the Domestic Intellectual Environment body on the of Western scholarshipwith socialism andwas notdelegitimized together with it (Stamatov 2000, 563). nationalism remained related to history the of Bulgarianthe Itwasnotequated‘nation’. and Bulgarians ordinary for but legitimacy gain to analysis attempts its in nation Bulgarian dealingcame out of ideology well and had communist with nationalism with cohabited Unlike Europeanization, socialism the intact,leading post-socialist political ideology. too.becomeIt wassuited tothe 130). 1998, Krasteva and (Dimitrov for Bulgaria orientation The socialist developmental foreign and policy a new proposed andpriorities; suitable geopolitical state in order values,right put and wrong about theefficiency, confusion eliminated had utilized model couldthat claimproven developmentBulgaria.offered analternative It of the post-socialist of qualms most addressedthe idea pressing Europeanization addition, the symbol of its In popularity acceptance. and wide to and contributed europeanization project the the legitimized communism of delegitimization The environment. ideological 45 CEU eTD Collection “a mandatory introduction” to the subject of Balkan politics because “current Balkan “current because of subject the introduction” Balkan mandatory to politics “a be to said was history Balkan Medieval and ancient of A survey history. with obsession and located analysts roots Other the instability of in nations’conflict ethnic Balkan patriarchal” local (Mihajlov culture 1996, 15). and chauvinistic “authoritarian, the and democracy between western-style contradictions and ideology, democratic liberal the and ideology Marxist-socialist the between country “splitin discord”, the reasons for which were religious diversity, contradictions becivilizationsIn civilizational a Bulgariawasdeemed to (Georgievaterms, 1992,46). zone of contact the characterized model that ‘crossroads’ unstable inherently political system, and even“social –weresaidpsychology” be to products of the A number of Balkan “specificities” – patterns of organization of everyday life, the 1996, 9-15). “civilizationalthe its(Hinkova of determination” parts 1998,16;Mihajlov constituent Proceedings and 38; Orthodox, 1995, Islamicthe (Lalkov civilizations Slavic the of zone Western, the in contact the located were they because potential high conflict a had Balkans the that assumed analysts Bulgarian some drew, analyses Western many which on framework ‘clash-of-civilizations’ if controversial, influential, savage nationalism and religious intolerance (Genchev 1995, 41-2).Inline with the responsible for spiritual the backwardness of region the its and for susceptibility to Cultural hybridity, and in particular the Oriental elements of Balkan culture, were held neglected. in weregenerally Balkans the developments Balkans. Potential factors explanatory related tothe underlying political and economic in the of ethnic conflict explaining nationalism and therecurrence Balkan factors potentially Civilizationdangerous. identifiedwere often and culture key as two the and uncontrollable, tobe unpredictable, was assumed nationalism Bulgarian, particular of Bulgarian culture that madeincompatible it with culture.European Balkan, and in element integral an as nationalism identified analysts local many 1990s, the Throughout civilization. and culture asissues to pertaining of approached Both them were local scholars. analyzed by 1995, 58-9). The breakup of Yugoslavia was accordingly accordingly Yugoslaviaexplained with The was breakupof 1995,58-9). Conference on the onthe Balkans Conference 46 CEU eTD Collection aspirations, [and] monstrous oppressionof ethnic minorities within country”the (Georgiev 1995,1). proportionto the country’s potentials, hatred to anything non-Bulgarian, pathological territorial and ethnic 15 tragedy strong passion” wouldnot be open again to turn Balkansthe into peninsula the of past full of “the bottle toassume that unwarranted deemed itwas as were common, brutal conflicts that overwhelmed the region (Georgieva 1992, 44). Pessimistic scenarios forhostility andaccounted uncontrollable therecurrent instability, chaos, that dramatic itview, into was reproduction the Balkans’of continuous the Balkans’ the presentpast in this (Ivanov On context” 1996, 13). the historical politicsrooted deeply [was]always ( religion,history, ethnicity, and remained and chauvinistic closed, andconfrontational (Mihajlovunforgotten ancestors” where cultures weredefined 1996, 17) only through putative was Balkanite as “overpopulated with depicted a world shadowsof the The world too. of inthe scholarship, wereoccasionally Bulgarian accounts reproduced journalistic and Western scholarship andbylesssophisticated disseminated created irrationality to attributed culture. and The linked to againindirectly thus stereotypical imagesof explicitly Balkans the or implicitly was part, its on past, the with Obsession ( more context-sensitive explanation of the irrational Balkan nationalism. Balkan irrational the of explanation context-sensitive more chainthe global oneof of knowledge production providingas abetter-informed and axiom rather than as a thesis. It rarely tested the thesis. It rather asan nationalism irrationality Balkan of the the of thesis treated conflicts ethnic Balkan perceived its position in Pantev In deal fact, agreat local1995, 11). focused social of that scientific on work megalomaniac national/territorial (Ivanov aspirations 1996, 21-2, 151; Popov 1999; P. consciousness of historical obsessions and weresusceptible tohistorical myth and to people in irrational intheregion they that incapable were ridding their were of that suggested Balkans ‘tribal nevertheless attribute irrationality’ tothe accounts to into extremes ( under theimputation mental of and inferiority, spiritual lacked moderation, and went and imbalanced, and fully ruled by emotions. They allegedly neglected reasoning, acted Ibid Ibid At the extreme, Bulgarians were absurdly accused of “mad nationalism,… megalomania in triple reverse triple in megalomania nationalism,… “mad of accused absurdly were Bulgarians extreme, the At ., 18). Neither attempts nor abilities for cultural synthesis were found in the Balkans ., 19). The Balkanites were considered to be immature, be deficient psychologically ., 19).The wereconsidered Balkanites to 15 (A. Pantev1995,190). Ibid ., 18). Even scholars that did not endorse the tendency of Western of tendency the endorse not did that scholars Even 18). ., 47 CEU eTD Collection ( looked irrational,incomprehensible in a typical ‘Balkan way’, and very suspicious Macedonia was said For example, 6).towards 1999, attitude Bulgaria’s large-scale (Popov aggression” to be possible of forms “latent confusingas them interpreted and inexplicable conflicts ethnic Balkan for Western politiciansprimitive by and theWesternworldaroused found drives passions emotions”, the and imagefree having of because, international damaged “shaken[itself] Bulgaria’s analysts,nationalism interpretation, this In attitude. to unwelcoming and whom distrustful countries’ it Western provoke because it held also was to nationalism was renounced Bulgarian usually not excluded ordifferentiated from ‘Balkan’ the prototype. was nationalism Bulgarian Balkans. nationalist the and West civilized the between superiority over countries, neighboring to and perceive other ethnicities as a threat(Georgiev assert to 2000, 43-59) grandeur, past exaggerate to propensity and Powers, Great of Europe’s patronage the secure alliances, fixationon history, proclivity forauthoritarianism, anxiety overun-Europeanness, desire to 16 civilizational of Balkans.development the is Oneline inexplanation theof grounded The peculiar ‘Balkan problems’ were also often explainedby lowthe stage of social and ( rules” civilized 133) and Balkan ethnic that“were conflicts afar from cry mostthe broadly-definedeven affirmed betweenin “ethnic adistinction conflict world” (Ivanov civilized the 1996, and accepted scholars local nationalism, Balkan of irrationality the presuming By relations ethnic intotranslate political principles thatcontinuously patternsthe reproduce of conflictual conditionsOn view,this irrational the cultureBalkan determines politics, asinherited psychological (such as cultures, a survival zone of different contact the of volatility by the another andstimulated to generation complex,Baruh Deep-seatedpsychological from 2000, 116). conditions, transmitted one inferiorityand other Balkan peoples, was identified as a cause Bulgarians of of perpetual DNA” in the hostility set complex, (Rajchev “irreversibly and was allegedly which Ethnocentrism, 43). a complex11; nationalism 1994, andMateva 2000, Bulgarian (Georgiev ethnic1997, 78, conflict of the explaining asfactors treated were too, characteristics, psychological engrained Deeply past) Ibid These political principles allegedly are self-help culture, propensity to form unstable short-term ., 3-4) were held to explain Balkan 1993,63). particularitieswere held (Georgiev to of politics the 16 (Georgiev 1993, 2000, 59-112, 90-3). Ibid ., 22). Thus, they ultimately accepted and affirmed a hierarchy andaffirmed accepted Thus, they ultimately 22). ., 48 CEU eTD Collection is between Asiatica hybrid is mode of an and bananacapitalism.production It capitalism Balkan view, this On capitalism. Balkan of form specific the on focused has Another way explaining of ‘Balkan problems’ low stage bythe of Balkan development 1991; 1994, 74).Zagorov model of social (for alternativedevelopment views see 1995; Mutafchieva Ivanova any hybrid to culturally issuperior inherently West of the characteristic modernization 91). Such upon,analyses restandin confirm,assumption turn model the of the that 2000, Baruh 539-41; Rajchev and 1999, Dunov 2000; AlexandrovSemov 1995, 6-7; blamed itsoften legaciesbeen on adverse (e.g.see pagan, Ottoman and communist Bulgaria’s hybridity cultural and of low stage cultural and social havedevelopment and of unknown”the (Mateva 1994, 46-7). patriarchal inflexibility,… in exhilaration one’s backwardness,…own fearof foreign the narrow-mindedness, egotism, isolationism, Balkan attitudes, anti-civilizational by “stubborn characterized nationalism of Balkan a typical the for emergence accounts supposedly of character society the archaicthe 58). InBulgaria in1991, particular, givenationalistmanipulation and to into (Georgieva passions 1992,45-6;Orachev friends andMarxist they dogmas, allegedly ethnic relationsunderstand only relationsas between enemies, frequentlycomprehendto reality in simplepolarizedvs.only terms evil). (e.g.good by Constricted confuse evil for good, and are prone to fall prey to Balkan societies ( ethnic conflicts,‘Balkan specialties’, such as ‘archaicinstability, nationalism’, Balkanization, and violent are then explained category asepitomes( latter of the treated are primitivism”, by the alleged to bearchaism additionally burdened by “communist, Islamist, and Orthodox andChristian underdevelopmentconsciousness community tothe Balkan (Orachev 1991, 56-7). whichsocieties, are said socially They lack amorphous. stratification individual and complexity and bind of hand,are other the on -societies, –archaic The undeveloped (community). collective sufficient to allow for the deemed formation is of individual differentiation social of consciousnesslevel the independentsocieties, developed of the culturally and socially economically, In societies. underdeveloped and developed between differentiation Ibid ., 55; Georgieva 1992, 45). The immature Balkan societies are said Ibid ., 55). 49 CEU eTD Collection historical bond with Europe see Georgieva 1995. 1994; Zagorov Iordanovand 2000. For anapproachfocused proving on Balkans’the uninterrupted 17 Balkans and nationalist backward Westthe developed democratic the on discourse Balkansthe byaccepting reaffirming thesymbolic hierarchybetween and the external to scholarshipBulgarian reacted thebulk of 1990s All inthe all, during government. in with turn associated between neighboringconflicts countries and of autocratic forms linkage between 1996,21-3).Thisandproduction science(Mihajlov hybrid capitalism is and innovation lacking and resources, natural basedon etatist, traditionalist, extensive, the 1990s. The issue of europeanization/Westernization and of NATO andEU and of europeanization/Westernization 1990s.Theissueof the Bulgaria’s civilization inputative problem in emerged debates public of beginning the Bulgaria’s Civilization Choice predispositions was for propitious the political elites’ Europeanization project. ideological andof ideas, This attitudes, structure civilizational transformation. – way of the Bulgaria’s life-sustainingstructures the European way towards the was crisis economic grave and malady national of condition decrepit the of out way In the opinion of both (Kosev culture” absorb… of fluids 1993, 23). were ablerevitalizing the [European] “to the political elite if country the this happenonly could thatconvinced butappeared inway” acivilized and problems national its the solve could Bulgaria bulk that hope “still was there that ofbelieve did elite the intellectual elite,hybrid Balkan culture, society seemedand economy unimaginable. Thelocal intellectual the only the boundarieswithin of production” Satisfactory development (Mihajlov the 1996, 25). of mode andAsiatic Asia, be “slowsureIslamization, but to wasbelieved alternative modelsand imperative emulation European appearedof (Rajchev 86). The [1990] 2000, engines of Bulgarian history [were] outside Bulgaria” (Rajchev and Baruh 2000, 91), inhistory 1994,151; the“[t]he developedwritten Mihajlov world (Shopov 1996, 19), many Bulgarian intellectuals, of Balkan politics and culture that emerged inthisprocess was frustrating:in view the of Bulgaria was not a subject of history, at least not of the For rejection of this hierarchy from anationalist, pro-Slavic, and anti-neoliberal viewpoint, see Zagorov 17 . The conception 50 CEU eTD Collection Europeanization in became marginalized ( Europeanization political party’s the discourse and nationalism Both power. political theparty’s restore suited to better appeared time that at which inequality, economic and crime against resistance and egalitarianism newleadersof theparty’s generation oriented ideology leftwingtraditional towards (DajnovIn 1993,a regain 1996, 2-3). support public ideological to designed position discord and lossinternal After elections, be the effort. ideas asuperfluous to appeared Europeanization of political influencein itssuccess electoral enough1990 secure proved to compelled control resourcesover and state asuccessful conducted relations campaign.public This the BSP to adoptfairmetamorphosisallegeddegree of a BSPpreserved 1998,174-9).The (Dimitrova a more nationalistwas to rename itselfsoon marginalized.allAbout dohad party the in to improveto order its image public (from Bulgarianperspective appeared tosome extentconsequential for BSP’s the politicalit identity,was Communist European AlthoughinitiallySocial Democracy Europeanization (Dajnov 1996, 2). the Party into BSP) with itself identified and party the of Europeanization and legitimization, modernization, and to publicizeandidentified BSPasa the radical left for factionparty; other the rapid strived its One divisions. faction party focusedthe of of unity leadershippreserving and position internal reflected that discourse BSPupheldpolitical regime adual change, the Europeanization After inmarginal ideological the was of position the BSP,too. the (Kolarova 1996; Dajnov 1996, 5). tradition political rightwing pre-socialist the from and anti-communism from legitimacy Havingnohistory protestlegitimize of dissident toit, SDSsought derive the to SDS’s identity in theearly stages of its but existence influence quickly theirwaned. of the were constitutive Europe’ ‘return to Bulgaria’s and of Westernization of ideas powerful political ideology because it was not adopted by a powerful political actor. The Minchev [1992] 1993b, 142). At however, this stage, Europeanization a was not civilization [1991]1997b, 70;see [1992] 1997b; (Zhelev Zhelev also [1991] 1997c,88, to wasfrequently andnations”,equated andeuropeanization “Europe the civilized be as to leading frequently a road membershipunderstood to inthecommunity of started transformation political and economic Bulgaria’s choice. civilization Bulgaria’s of symbolically inchargedbe terms framed the frequently to started membership ( Ibid ., 167-71). Resort to 167-71). ., Ibid ., 2-5). 51 CEU eTD Collection address to the nation, 1999). By representing European integration aunique as European By nation,representing the 1999). address to as “a chancemore for abetterlife choice than Bulgarians for meant –itopportunities was represented to leave civilization Bulgaria’s of realization the ODS, the For paradigm. Europeanization the the twilightof integral part thesecond became world, the restof to the transformation identity this zone… This of ‘europeanizing’ project and identity, ‘civilizing’ Bulgarian demonstrating of and [and] board the time machine” (Kostov, 1997): (Government country” European normal “a into Bulgaria turn to promised program executive Its of in center of public andpolitical civilization choice the debates. the idea the placed and ‘civilization’ with europeanization equated also however, The ODS, fastEU integration.on theidea depended region’s development the propagated that Balkans, the which towards approach Europeanization community’s international of the basic propositions bythe encouraged was also that be apresumption appeared to prosperity. integration equation about bring livingstandardswould and improve The living social was no andbetter clear European how welfare standards. There vision developmental aid. Importantly, economic developmentwas invariably melded with structural necessaryreforms fordevelopment, economicand bybringing in national into theeconomic rightreforms policy priorities, and bypropelling the todoby was so expected installing model aworking by lockingof economic policy, It prosperity. andguarantee decline economic the reverse would integration European that of generalassumption was the base project development of Europeanization the the At governments. previous of policies economic the failure of the to was areaction It paradigm. Europeanization the of integral parts two the of one thus was development project The of economic economic development. future Bulgaria’s guarantee andits domesticupheld policy. It Europeanization as the policy couldparadigm that 1996. The ODS let Euro-Atlantic the integration itsagenda both dominate foreign policy of end atthe erupted that crisis political and economic devastating of the aftermath the power of Thingsin changed with rightwingthe comingthe in to ODSgovernment 1997 waste the opportunity that the people have given us with their vote. ( conferred upon us is unique and will be given only once.civilized European This country. We know ishow difficultwhy this will be.Wewe know the that trustare determined not to The end goal of our program is to ensure that Bulgaria would enter the new millennium as a Ibid .) 52 CEU eTD Collection refashioning, the ODS went on animage create ODSwenton the awilling student of the of to Bulgariarefashioning, as and civilizational cultural as athoroughgoing europeanization Having defined and prosperity: peace of paradise towardsthe European proceed and Balkan violence away from to turn (Bokova 2002, 26) and as a junction on the line of Balkan history that allowed the region a new was represented as historical It policy vision. a “challenge of proportions” legitimize to seemed It reconstruction. civilizational and cultural political, encompassing adoption itlegislation: valuesof EU necessary the provided and guidelinesforan all- for Europeanization something stood thus much larger justmembership than EU or embodied by, synonymous and with, Europe. fully were norms international and rights human basic leadership, Bulgarian the For andEurope: Balkan between ethnic conflicts humanincompatibility referhe buttothe didnot to pleadedpeace, rights ethnic for [European] standards” (SDS 2002). For example, when President Stoyanov (of the ODS) ‘Balkan’ or‘Orthodox’ against thearguments introduction and application of it asidehad “any that for aduty theODS,whichbelievedthrust to staple rhetorical tool The and(civilized) symbolic between Balkans became states. opposition Europe a the as an attempt tohaul Bulgaria out of the Balkans into the community of European was defined It project. integration politics of the of European the adaptation a process to culturally Balkans.ambiguous The of process europeanization simplywas defined not as by inAnxiety location provoked credentials.Bulgaria’s was and unstable the politically anxiety European involveddeal Bulgaria’s over agreat of europeanization that of interpretation an on based was agenda policy foreign government’s ODS The governmental policy agenda wasdominatedthat by foreign policy issues. profound bringopportunity positiveto justified a social about change, ODS the values. (Stoyanov 2001b) European the to subscribe does not that today Balkans the in country no is There region. future on the Thisbasis part of the world has, neverbefore inits history, had betterprospects forbuilding of its common goals, aspirations and values shared by the countries in the (2001b) violence. and terror of threat the by interests political imposing for lines, ethnic along separatism and disintegration for belong, to claim weall where Europe, in place no is There 53 CEU eTD Collection NATO membershipon and centered insisted on exclusively was retaining that security a close Bulgarian of relationship conception a with Russia. BSPrejected The smooth. but nothing 18 wasEuropeanization ideologicalthe environmentthan for influential less even was membership NATO transition post-socialist of stages early unenthusiastic public outward opinion in oppositionand the thealliance, BSP’s to the byinfluentialpromoted figures such political due as PresidentZhelev 246), (1995b, to was representation this Although values. democratic on based union a as NATO of representation was the enframing this Thekey to choice. civilization Bulgaria’s be started to At framed endof the 1990s,NATOmembership,the of intheterms too, development. identifying asan Europeanization model overarching economic,of political, andcultural in elite’s success the indicative of was referent asan authoritative of adoption ‘Europe’ The 1999,127-8). local (Boyadjieva politicians than needs better real Bulgarians’ aware of, not knew and Bulgariansallegedly were even that Europe sawthings ‘did’ -itthings ‘saw’, ‘wanted’, ‘watched’, ‘hated’,‘grumbled’, her ‘knitted brows’. In the press and body ‘Europe’. of personalized tothe political wereimputed guidewere politics Bulgarian to that principles social and political basic the commentaries, of Some sphere. public and media domestic the Europe underway of in‘Europe’ of encouraged by idea of the a peculiar process personalization was often represented way was theEuropean ‘learning’ Bulgaria images of childlike the of The currency as a body that choice. civilization Bulgaria’s of irreversibility the europeanize andguarantee Bulgaria authority to it itselfpresented hadsphere the only that as moral actor credibility the political and an in‘infantile’ while the vis-à-vis domestic identity Yet, ODSadopted Europe, the SDSpledgedthe to member, EU full-fledged become a to expected was Bulgaria before Afewyears West. represented as two sides of the same coin; both were understood as expressions of asexpressions understood were both coin; thesame sides of astwo represented be ODSgovernment,the however,membership to NATO andEuropeanization started While parliament declared that Bulgaria was ready to initiate cooperation with NATO, the process was process the NATO, with cooperation initiate to ready was Bulgaria that declared parliament While and Europeanand values in the region.(SDS 2002) they grow up asEuropean-minded citizens… and inthe affirmationof Christian-democratic fromask help like-minded parties [from EU educatingmemberstates] in young people so that 18 . With the coming to power of 54 CEU eTD Collection the new aspiring democracy in its quest for adopting the proper value system. support West to appeal the responsibility of the image improveto and to Bulgaria’s to ‘western’ values and with “common roots” (Stoyanovcivilizational 2001c) wasintended membership theadoption of with of NATO equation sphere,the In international the policy: social and economic domestic over policy foreign emphasize to tendency controversial membership legitimized inturn the governmental agenda ODS,withthe of its NATO of legitimacy The goal. foreign policy important andstrategically legitimate strong political Domestically, impact. such upheld asmembership enframing NATO a in The renderingmembership values of hada of choice andcivilization NATO terms provided another narrativefor the ( post-socialist period haveYugoslavia whichwassaid backto “further way toEurope” delayed [Bulgaria’s] drawn at Yalta”Bulgaria’s belonging the Euro-Atlantic to system value was a natural one. “The borders that proved providednarratives These past. the in Europe and Bulgaria between links natural the of severing onetemporary but forceful the of such narratives were interpretation this to Integral narrative for the period of socialism;the basis of: the war inBulgaria’s civilization choice. Bulgaria’s for NATOmembershipdesire wasjustified on opportunities such solidarity creates forcountries like ours. (Stoyanov 2002) dependent onBulgariashowing European Atlantic and solidarity using on the and are markets old and new to access for and unemployment, decreasing for pensions, and Atlantic solidarity that ourcountry demonstrated at that time… All promises for highersalaries Euro- the to due much very –were regime visa restrictive of the the removal and negotiations of EUaccession start the both – that after successes Bulgarian major all Because crisis. forachieving this strategic goalduring the greatestfor trial ourforeignpolicy Kosovo– the application for membership in NATOI [am] proud that Iwasand the head of state whosein who mandate Bulgariadid officially submittednot its allow the country to waste its chances (Stoyanov 1997) values. general same these protecting and ofdefending risks the share and security general the Bulgaria’s belonging to the same value system [as NATO] and [its] readiness to contribute to Ibid .). 55 CEU eTD Collection Communist Party leadership decided to reverse the assimilatory policies in order to gain to reverse inorder policies assimilatory the to leadershipParty Communist decided regime Turkey. change, the the Immediately triggeredafter to awaveof emigration scale it,campaign againstassimilatory which met with was andinresistance 1989 sizable ethnic Turkish minority and the legacy communistthe of regime’s large-1984 was behindfactor the discourse important this of importance the an 1989. Initially, sphere in since Bulgaria’s public of has beenincirculation national The discourse unity based local on traditions unimaginable (Minchev 1995, 258-9). arrangements political and social rendered has time same the at and context, national social due consideration withoutand arrangements political in viability thetheirof values, of it ideas, and uncriticalwestern inimport led counterproductive that has to and futile as West the of imitation elite-driven the view identity national of Bulgaria’s historical (Semov development 1999, 642-3; Minchev 1995, 255).Defenders marks of spans long that atradition follows critics, to according tendency that, downon perceived look ‘foreign’ ‘national’ worshipthe and –a the tendency to nationalparadigm’s Europeanization the identity has beena defenseagainst of reaction The unity. national of defense the and identity national of defense the is element One of elements approach. this identify key several to justifiable is itanalytically cases. Still, in concrete engendered it that discourses particular the through best studied is therefore It policy problems. certain to responses actors’ political structured that framework ideological abroad It was itEuropeanization,could not modeloffer aclear-cut politicalof andsocial development. As a policy nationalismapproach, was much less coherent than Europeanization. Unlike nationalism. was rival ideological a propagated non-nationalist vision Unsurprisingly, future. itsof Bulgaria’s most notable Europeanization it ideologicalwas not framework around. the only belong. However, toEuropeandrelated the Euro-Atlantic towhich to structures it institutional to aspired end the At of 1990sthe Europeanizationway the paradigm Bulgaria dominated The Nationalism/Sovereignty Discourse 56 CEU eTD Collection the DPS. the 19 of ethnic rights collective the regarding by beEU conditionality unity destroyed would wouldbe crushed undersupranational inthe pressures EU, and Bulgarianthat national national traditions Bulgaria’s that community, multicultural byEurope’s threatened be would identity national Bulgarian that fears to vent gave unity national of discourse politicalin the be present to continued elements discourseNationalist Forum. Democratic Bulgarian the and of (VMRO) Organization the Revolutionary BSP,Macedonian Internal the as such actors too. Nationalism‘ethnic was Turkish’ losing factor salience. Itwas promoted by nationalist political also had supportersThe of discourse national inunity continued toexist followingthe years, although the in academia. couldbe feltamongThe ethnic Turksaround 1990, but itquickly ( waned politics inBulgarian player amajor been (even of if and existence DPSwhichhassince tolerated the elite the grudgingly) and ethnic intolerance. Nationalism didnot political motivate Both decisions. publicthe Bulgarians as a whole, promptly branded asbetrayal interestof national the (Dajnov 1996,2-3).Yet,among nationalist attitudes for party the –theMovement ethnicthe of Rights and which Turks it Freedoms (DPS), were not strongalliances with nationalist parties and attacked the SDS on account of andits cooperation with there wassignedformal internal It confusion. and external challenges in to discourse response no religious Duringkey 1990and1991,oneof two the political players –theBSPemployed this the discourse of national unity ( 60). The ethno-nationalist of protests 1990 madevisible, andlentsomelegitimacy, to Communist Party elites defiant of the decisions coalition of ethnic Bulgarians livingin mixed ethnically communities and local of the Party Center in Sofia ( return of soldemigrationproperty to prior 2000, 553-61).Itinvolved(Stamatov a the andagainst practices assimilatory againstof reversal the protests nationalistpopular in question,stance ‘Turkish’ on the elites’ wasawave anti-nationalist 1990 there of Despite the political influence 1996,9). tothese (Dajnov contributed political groups’ infact which ethnic Turks’rights, in of defense astancetoo, had dissidentgroups, taken international 2000,553-5).Anti-communist legitimacy and domestic (Stamatov Some tension was caused by the perception that the overall balance in the political sphere depended on depended sphere political the in balance overall the that perception the by caused was tension Some Ibid ., 560-4). 19 . Certain bitterness towards ethnic. Certain bitterness towards Bulgarians Ibid ., 10). Ibid ., 557- ., 57 CEU eTD Collection Bulgaria’s Europeanization project in 1990s– between andBulgaria’s late project the period the Europeanization 1989 This broad sources examinedideologicalof two chapter impinged influence that upon Summary process. EUenlargement the into inbuilt by asymmetry power the was accentuated This element country’s the West, the of part the on rightattitude humiliating and condescending a to for bepretext treated as a partnerposition its of candidacythat todemand to forright the EU andcountry’s NATOthe membershipWestinterests, vital and should rights rather not sovereign be abusedcountry’s the to or used as a than as a subordinate, counter foreignleadership’sthe reject threats ability confidence andability to dictates, self- etc.leadership’s asthe such issues sensitive of politicization the involved element This dignity. national of defense the was discourse nationalism the of element key last The NATO stance until 2000 of the BSP’s bid to build an attractive new image of a European social democratic party. victory of the social democratic faction within the party (led byfuture Bulgarian president Parvanov) and 21 integration(Mitev 1999, 77-8). It had a very limited electorate. 20 integration reject European openly and not scholars did political actors Nationalist minoritiesand Zagorov 1994, 24). (Mitev religious 1999, 78-9;Boyadjieva 1999,187-8; in independent diplomacy, andforeign policy free NATO’sinfluenceof (Parvanov, quoted army, national large a of favor in was BSP The sovereignty. emphasized clearly whose visionlate 1990s,interests. most political actor policy BSPwasthe Inthe the of national sovereignty, the defense of national security, and the defense of national were ofthenationalist defense the closely three The approach interlinked elements other processes within nations (MitevEuropean 1999, 78-9; Zagorov 1994,16-23). uncontrollable disintegrative provoke itwas feared,could that, of regions” the “Europe the vision of “Europe of the Fatherlands”, as opposed to the allegedly dangerous pleaded for European the spiritto remain faithful to ‘nationalthe idea’ andpropagated In 2000, the BSP endorsed The newly established BulgarianCommunist Party was the only political actorthat openly opposed EU NATO membership. The ideological shift was the result of the ultimate OMDA Press Review 21 9.4.1999). It supported EUmembershipbut Itsupported retained an anti- 9.4.1999). . 20 but 58 CEU eTD Collection This clash is the subject of the next chapter. forair air NATO’s corridor waragainst duringKosovo conflictin Yugoslavia the 1999. ideological rivals followed the ODSgovernment’s controversial provide to decision an majorstay. wasThe first1990s, this apparently between to discourse clash two the there in late the paradigm Europeanization match of the power the unableto While itwas ideological rival of Europeanization – anationalist discourse focused on sovereignty. alsonurtured Bulgarians’ their anxiety mostthe compelling about inEurope place perspective focused on internalizing and‘socializing’ into European values and norms. from idealist andrather an but benefits, focusedcosts on perspective materialist from a not europeanization of process the approach to Bulgaria encourage to and in strengthenlate 1990s environment theidentity-transformation tended to the project ideological the Yet, development/prosperity. economic and transformation identity Bulgaria’s Europeanization paradigm was constructed as a simultaneous project of andparadigm fast in of relatively acceptance 1990s. Europeanization the late the the devastating political and economic crisis of 1997, that accounts for the wide, smooth, environment, together with the perceived need for a new direction of development after uphold politicalabsenceitto is actor of it. ideological a strong thispropitious However, becoming1997was leading from Europeanization to paradigm policy prior the a Whatprevented for theelite’s environmentpropitious project. Europeanization whole, both of thethese sources adoptionencouraged modelsof a European andcreated As a public. the and community elite, scholarly the political by sharedthe andattitudes structure of beliefs andthedomesticWestern predispositions, on theBalkans discourses 59 CEU eTD Collection use the Bulgarian airspace for military operations against Yugoslavia. use theBulgarian for military airspace against operations to Alliance the authorized NATOand and ODSgovernment the between agreement the governmentKosovo policy its pushed Inearly May 1999,parliamentthrough. ratified youth and social environmental, TheODS and other organizations. agricultural, environmentalistmovement Ekoglasnost, the Social Democratic Union, the Green Party, brought together that thousands by people of wassupported and BSP,thethe decision to open an air corridor for NATO was followed by an anti-war protest in Sofia 20.4.1999; Kornezov, quoted in Kornezov,20.4.1999; quoted be taken open an for NATO’sairon military corridor operations and such demanded that a decision the basispeaceful ofsolution a referendum for preserving neutrality forand concentratingto Bulgaria’s diplomatic onfinding efforts a the crisis. It disputed The BSPcalled theconstitution. violated national and security, Yugoslavia, endangered (Parvanov,the legalityargued such that a policy ininvolved effect Bulgaria in a military againstconflict of the government’s quotedPress Review OMDA decision into economic, political and military aspects of national security quoted in(Mihajlova, demandpledged to NATO’son fullthe guarantees issues relatedto of range the home,At thegovernment’s response Although contested. wasbitterly governmentthe Bulgarian responded positivelygovernmentNATO’s to demands. The campaign. military the during airspace Bulgarian the use to authorization for Kosovo crisis, an air started NATO waragainst Yugoslavia. Inlate April itasked1999, the topeacefully resolve efforts failurediplomatic of following the 1999, In lateMarch Europeanization Paradigm during Bulgaria’s Involvement intheKosovoCrisis Europeanization ParadigmduringBulgaria’s ‘We WillNotBeHostagetotheBalkans’:Identity Politicsandthe 21.4.1999), the leftwing the decision. 21.4.1999), opposition the BSP rejected It OMDA Press Review Press OMDA Chapter 3: 21.4.1999). The government’s 21.4.1999). OMDA Press Review Press OMDA 60 CEU eTD Collection 23 (MBMD opinion poll, quoted in 22 Left by theDemocratic a week(declaration an entry in one of the darkest pages of Bulgaria’s modern history, and left parliament for indicativethe isAlready “Bulgaria War”, title at May concluded that 1999would4th, be BSPissueddampenthe notwith thevote, adeclaration thecontroversy. In to response one of principalthe The camps. parliamentary majority ratified the agreementbutcould essentially between the ruling ODS and the opposition BSP, with smallerdramatic parties joining most the of one was NATO clashesand government the between agreement of the ratification thattemporary MPs,removal of 8-hourlong the parliamentary precedingdebate the the Bulgarianfights, sexist andotherdisparaging remarksaimed atgovernment officials, and parliament physical loud with Complete quarrels, was earsplitting. political controversy Indeed, the has witnessedthings worse. to date.unemployment and poverty of The clashduring 1998in response tocontinuously livingdeteriorating levels rising and standards was popularity ODSwasinthe of Supportfor governmentthe decline. had beenwaning entailedRegardless potentially of the Kosovonominally policy through parliament with relative ease.its push to able therefore was government The ODS. the for strong majority parliamentary position significant hadand alsohad BSP.It andthe delegitimized securedacomfortable weakened of the ruling ODS the legitimacy to hadlentunprecedented crisis party, The devastating 1996/1997crisis. the Kosovopolitical had failureled which ofitsgovernment tothe memories of Videnov spectacular the dilemma BSP wasin aweak political andelectoral largely still position, tothe vividdue costs.In 1999, the balance of power in Bulgarian politics was clearly in favor of the ODS. The It emergedPolitical Costs at a momentDomestic Repercussions Conflict of the Kosovo when the The Democratic Left was the parliamentary coalition led by the BSP. by the led coalition parliamentary the was Left Democratic The Public support for ODSthe government was 65%in1997. By October1998, ithad dropped to44% OMDA Press Reviews 22 . The Kosovo crisis seemed more than likely to make 23 , quoted in, quoted 22.5.1999). OMDA Press Review Press OMDA 5.5.1999). 61 CEU eTD Collection Bulgarians immediate wanted endtothemilitary campaign International,(Gallup quoted link (Medianapollingin agency, quoted see sucha not become conflict;39%did hadineffect aside inthe Bulgaria corridor, Review Press OMDA polling agency, quoted in polling agency,quoted 36%-37% (Mediana between rose levelto support to 38% and54%,whilepublic the of month bombing of Kosovo public opposition government’s policy againstthe declined second the situation,the during to andthepublic’saccommodation security threats, lack serious demonstrated of the campaign, communication improved government’s quoted inquoted involved in military the (Medianaconflict polling agency and Gallup International, if Bulgaria Aroundin of 66%of Bulgarians were favor preserving neutrality and 72%believedthat were to openYugoslavia. Onlybetween NATO’s 16% and24%of Bulgarian supported demands. an air against military action for air space use national the to NATO authorizing against corridor foror reject NATO’s request for an air corridor –between 63% andNATO 69% of Bulgarians were airplanes,first month bombingof – i.e. at the time when the ODS had decideto whether supportto endof the the express at According opinion polls, insecuritytheir to and peak. were at it would risk feelingsuncertainty of when campaign, bombing weeksof the inthefirst pronounced getting especially were attitudes Anti-war government. ODS the of with thepolicy than rather manya great opinion leftwingthe opposition of concurredwith that the Bulgarians The airpolarizedsociety. suggested YugoslaviaBulgarian waragainst polls Opinion camps. protest the between clashes non-violent occasional were There demonstrations. Macedonia. 24 asnationalist aswell pro-government, competedpro-NATO, with anti-war protests supported by marchesthe protest andpeacemarathons, organized or demonstrations, government BSP and otherpolitical disputewas raging on backgroundof the anti-NATO,anti-war anti- and parties thatBulgaria opposed the issue in itparliamenta declaration Upon return, advance thatstating demanded official would Kosovonot openpolicy. a landThe corridor for NATO troops across its territory. The The nationalist VMRO took an aggressive anti-Serbian stance as a corollary to its ardent support for OMDA Press Review Press OMDA 17.5.1999). 49% of by believed an air openingBulgarians 17.5.1999). still that OMDA Press Review Press OMDA 20.4.1999). For several reasons, including severalreasons, the For 20.4.1999). OMDA Press Review OMDA 3.5.1999; in Gallup 3.5.1999; International, quoted 3.5.1999). Around 75% of 3.5.1999). 62 24 , CEU eTD Collection of the region alreadyreconstruction thepost-conflict concerning declare demands to Bulgarian The plan was before the end of crisis war. subsequent the theKosovo incurredduring and economicandindirect losses the military conflict,The ODS government did look aheadwhile to economic and political compensationsBulgaria’s for direct position Bulgaria’s Questfor Compensations political position of the ODS. compensations seriously the secure adequate waslikely to destabilize policy,failure to the high political costs at stake in the domestic controversy over Bulgaria’s Kosovo Dueto sensitive. crisis was asa resultespecially Kosovo incurred of the losses economic (major polling agencies, quoted in(major polling agencies,quoted problems, such low economic living standards,as and unemployment poor prospects concernedair predominantly public remained domestic with economic war,the OMDA Press Reviews respondents were forNATO membership, 44%were against it)(MBMD other polls,poll quoted and in found out that Bulgarians were completely on split the issue of NATOBulgaria’s membership (44% of of month second of the end the bombing at (Gallup International, 32% quotedto in 20%, around of level pre-war a from grew 38%. was however, it bombing, of Opposition, month second the of end By the 31%. to dropped support of level the bombing, 26 quoted in economic losses during the incurred war; only were28% optimistic pointonthis (Mediana agency, polling 29.4.1999).of 53%respondents didnotbelievethe Bulgaria that would receive compensations for International, quoted in to allow NATO’s land troops to use Bulgarian territory for military operations against Yugoslavia (Gallup 25 in voicing demands to this effectsupporting NATO’smilitary campaign. Tradeunions andbusiness associations were ( by risks took warandfor the economic the incurredduring the Bulgaria losses ensure compensations for adequate was underheavypressureto The ODSgovernment Pressure forAdequate Compensations opposition to NATO Prior crisis, tothe 40-43% of supportedBulgarians NATO membership.By end ofthe first the monthof According to different opinionpolls, between 62%88% and of Bulgarians would support adecision not OMDA Press Review Press OMDA OMDA Press Reviews OMDA Press 8.6.1999). OMDA Press Reviews 26 . 17.5.1999) 3.5.1999). OMDA Press Review OMDA OMDA Press Reviews OMDA Press Review Press OMDA 25 17.5.1999; Market Test,quoted in . In war bred. In addition, theKosovo popular 2.4.1999). Even in 2.4.1999). heatthe of the 17.5.1999). In June 17.5.1999).InJune 1999,polls opinion 8.6.1999). The issue The 8.6.1999). of the OMDA Press Reviews 63 CEU eTD Collection 10/14/25/27.5.1999, 9/24.6.1999, 3/23.11.1999, 3.12.1999. as a ‘carrot’ and as a source of moral pressure to compel Bulgaria to assumeits of share compelto Bulgaria to moral pressure of and asource as as a‘carrot’ partly touse by toattempts governments Western compensations both a response some stance was financial compensations.This demand did direct The not ODS government its questintegrationfor EU in(Bozhkov, quoted also included adoption of principlethe ‘individual of of treatment’ country in each SEE investments, and commencement of EU accession negotiations with Bulgaria and Bulgaria with in Romania (quoted negotiations accession EU of commencement and investments, for development infrastructure support inencourage foreignmeasures to region,the financial the conflict, hadincurreddueto neighbors the losses proportional they to recovery postwar the Balkansthe shouldof include for debtrelief Yugoslavia’s for assisting strategy international the community’s Stoyanov argued that war, President Balkans, as well as support forpolitical EU and NATOmembership in the development infrastructure and recovery for economic assistance financial andbilateral talksit with governments, European energetically negotiate to tried postwar forums international At campaign. military the to due incurring was Bulgaria that losses point The leadershipBulgarian to used every enormousout economic the opportunity economy. national the upon war Kosovo the of impact negative inevitable The government7.4.1999). developeddeal program management acrisis to with the the war were to last if as fundsmembership, both organizations, financing of from well pre-accession as the longer than onethe WarYugoslavia in month (Vasilev, in quoted (Kraus, military the campaign quoted in war, the governmentpledged todemand compensations economic losses for by caused 27 Radev,9.4.1999; in quoted inhost thefundBulgaria (Mihajlova,special wouldquoted werethat affectedhopes countries; compensate special fund to funds and bycreating a pre-accession EU’s the conflictby increasing Kosovo the of consequences the deal with in(Stoyanov, quoted was still beingstrengthened byits supportivein role theconflict resolution efforts See Mihajlova, Kostov or Stoyanov, quoted in quoted Stoyanov, or Kostov Mihajlova, See OMDA Press Review Press OMDA OMDA Press Review Press OMDA 31.3.1999). It pledged to demandpledgedfull and NATO to It EU 31.3.1999). OMDA Press Review OMDA OMDA Information ontheEconomicImpactof OMDA Information 13.5.1999). This list of Thislist 13.5.1999). welcome of measures 22.5.1999). Shortly startof 22.5.1999). the after airthe OMDA PressReviews: OMDA Press Review OMDA 29.6.1999). 29.6.1999). In themidst of Kosovothe 17.3.1999, 2/6/21.4.1999, OMDA Press Review OMDA Press Review Press OMDA 13.5.1999). 27 . It proposed . to 64 CEU eTD Collection projects, and a “massive investment program” “similar to the Marshall totheMarshall Plan”: program” “similar investment anda“massive projects, infrastructure form rescheduling,relief,Balkans,debtof debt trans-regional inthe in the development infrastructure and reconstruction, recovery, economic conflict foraid Balkans. forthe earmarked Itcalled acomprehensive for post- long-term plan and reconstruction from recovery the benefits maximal economic expected Bulgaria also reward for ourEuropean addresssolidarity” nation (Kostov, tothe 1999). isIt a SEE. of security and pacification the to its contribution becauseof Bulgaria needs EU showsthat the “Theinvitation strategy: its foreign policy success of spectacular celebrated not only Bulgaria’s invitation to start EU accession negotiations but also thewhat it asked for Press Review OMDA interview for Deutsche Wellefor Radiointerview for Deutsche 1999, (Kostov, zone Schengen the within traveling citizens Bulgarian for requirements visa the also removal the of requested It applicants. of second wave with 1999together the late in negotiations accession start EU to beinvited to expected Bulgaria modest. were not NATO membership,compensations inform the speedy integration,of forEU ‘political EUand support’ and minimal associationclear toall players. In exchange for Euro-Atlantic solidarity,Bulgaria requested political with By middle of the gist of 1999, the by strategy otherthe pursued Bulgariangovernmentthe was SEE countries.compensations. The demands material one-off than substantial more was that demandassistance to position good in quoted standing” (Radev, international confident that “Bulgaria [had come] out of the Kosovo crisis with an improved Bulgariancitizens were lifted in spring 2001. 29 of refugees and by the threat of political destabilization associated withsuch awave. accept on itsterritory. The move was justified by the lack of economic resources to deal with a huge wave 28 recovery economic offor the assistance post-conflict long-term flow of prospective into the to tap SEE (Stoyanov, Review Press quotedmore refugees and accept responsibility in The visa issue continued to disrupt relations between Bulgaria and the EU. The visa requirements for requirements visa The EU. the and Bulgaria between relations disrupt to continued issue visa The To the dissatisfactionof the EU the and US, Bulgaria put a limit on the numberof refugees itwould 6.4.1999). More importantly, however, the Bulgarian leadership preferred theBulgarian however, More importantly, 6.4.1999). 29 . On the eve of the Helsinki Summit of the EU, the ODS government ODS the EU, the of Summit Helsinki the of eve the On . 12.5.1999, 3.6.1999).All 12.5.1999, quite considered, itthings got alot of 28 OMDA Press Review Press OMDA (see Kostov in (seeand Kostov Mihajlova,quoted OMDA Press Review Le Figaro 1999; Mihajlova, quoted in 1999; Mihajlova, quoted 29.6.1999) and 29.6.1999) wasin a 27.4.1999). It appeared 27.4.1999). OMDA 65 CEU eTD Collection interview for interview situation BNTinterview (seeKostov, isolation political of interview 1999a, 1999b, BNT have in countries such would region already ina the put Bulgaria a stance onboard, option of duringturningfor down NATO’s support request air the With war. all havethe real Neither in did Bulgaria meant trouble Bulgaria. necessarily Balkans the in trouble so and economically, and politically both marginalized increasingly becoming prolonged political in instability former Yugoslavia,the whole the SEEregion was due tothe another, For losses. economic direct was causing conflict the one, For policy dilemmas. Bulgaria simply had foreign no real option any with of stayinggovernment ODS aloofthe frompresent not the did Kosovo war the war. notwithstanding, theirideological Theunderpinnings. buildupof tensions in domestic politics on but actions foreign policy concrete on not war was Kosovo impactof the greatest the Bulgaria, itsto proximity geographic and scale conflict the of Despite theunprecedented Ideological Underpinning oftheODS Government’s KosovoCrisis Policy Bulgaria. and Romania between Danube the on bridge second the of construction the was of recovery Balkans economic the post-conflict for plans sponsored internationally in the participation realize through planned to ODSgovernment the projectthat infrastructure on OMDA Information Losses andCompensations in for 1999b,projectseconomic post-conflict(Kostov Stoyanov, quoted 1999a; recovery itsmaximize economic gains projects and allby above ininfrastructure participating plannedfor to assistance,Bulgaria long-term frameworkWithin such a post-conflict Review 23/27.4.1999). Press Review 16.4.1999; OMDA Press Review 22.4.1999; Stoyanov,OMDA Press quoted in 1999; see also Mihajlova, quoted in OMDA Press Review 14.4.1999;(Stoyanov Radev, quoted region. whole in the OMDA of recovery economic the for plan sound a need We security. their guarantee to order in countries SEE the of accession NATO fast a and commitment clear a need We war. the beyond look to We have solutions… regional purely for search to possible Nowadays every Balkanproblem has Europeandimensions, and this means that it is no longer Demokratsija 1999). 1.7.1999). 1.7.1999). The most important 66 CEU eTD Collection Lindstrom Lindstrom Todorova 2002; 1997, 58). Atlantic integration (Baki Euro- for contest in the advantage an Slovenia and Croatia Western-like the give to and Balkans.the has It served tojustify breakup the of Yugoslavia, tolegitimize nationalism, asdesignated from,different Europe and inferior to, has been more even conspicuous in have been thatthemselves degrees theregions within of Europeanness according to hierarchies The internal of construction 1999, 146-52). West European (Neumann one a of in search but identity European Central a of in search performed been not has that project has that beenappeal intendedWestern to for to inclusionEurope andsupport and with Central Europe. identity-buildingisEurope’s project thus a profoundly political affinities demonstrate to Europe wayfor Central agood was Russia from differentiation from Europe its ‘Easts’,one of which was Russia 2,3), (Neumann 1999, chapters 60). Since identity hasown Europe’s by been constructed means of differentiating ‘barbarous’the and ‘backward’ Russia (Neumann 1999,chapter 5; Todorova 1997,140- Europe’s identity-buildingfor example, project, has been built from upon differentiation (Weldes recognized socially have become that differences Identity is always constituted through differentiation from andothers in relation to day, was becomingincreasingly this component uncomfortable. choice’ profound the reorientation, and‘civilization cultural were winning refashioning, Yet, as ideas of Bulgaria’s geopolitical the 1997,57;Krasteva1996,18-20). (Todorova Being part of the Balkans has always been a key component of Bulgarian identity BalkanPredicamentBulgaria’s ( country stable and asapolitically financially Bulgaria aimed atrepresenting campaign launchYugoslaviaagainstitmade anaggressive plansto began, publicrelations image. The ODS governmentdidmiss not As opportunity.the soon as airthe campaign Bulgaria’s for NATO’sfor efforts trade support peacemaking animprovedinternational outofnecessity tomakevirtue foreign and policy. a warprovidedopportunity an The of Bulgaria’s enframing ideological the war concerned Kosovo of impact the The crucial OMDA Press Review OMDA 9.4.1999). ü -Hayden and -Hayden Hayden 1992; Baki ü -Hayden -Hayden 1995; Razsa and et al et . 1999, 11). Central 11). . 1999, 67 CEU eTD Collection campaign. However, once it was introduced into political and public discourse, the declarationswould never wakeupagain” (Zhelev [1991] 1997a,68).In all probability, such were region ensure “ghostsand to that the of national in and ethnic conflicts Balkans the not consciousits national interests; to the contrary, Bulgaria pledged to contribute to the stability of the advance in advantage to oftheinstability Yugoslavia intentionhad totake Bulgaria no attemptsthat declared President the address, national a In non-intervention. of declarations to launch beginningthe intheformer conflicts of ethnic the Yugoslavia in form the of predictable after immediately any emerged Balkans in the stability’ of island ‘an as thought-out Bulgaria of idea The unobtrusively. and implicitly image building butdid so refashioning, and civilizational cultural andWestern states Bulgaria’s President’s invoked framework Bulgaria’sdiscursive loyalty to communitythe of intointegration European ([1990] institutionaland structures 1997,39-40). global The international image indispensablewas if improveBulgaria was for itsto prospects relations withestablish closer out setto Zhelev President non-communist As the elections. free the US and thein thepower first oftheoldcommunist elites were undermined West, return to bythe EU the of in eyes in the that, 1990, credentials democratic Bulgaria’s of community he international put forward theany significantimageway.At this buildingstage, convincing wasconfinedto the view that in Balkans a tothe related conceived as image wasnot international Bulgaria’s changereemerged, of of innot instability yetpolitical theBalkansand theold Balkanism had discourse inevitable. In the early stages of post-socialist transition, whenRepresentingfrom Bulgariaasfundamentally different Balkans wasnot putative the there were no overt signs strategy.if a proactive through identity-building emphasized commonly recognized in the West, but that, the elite believed, theelite butthat, West, in the recognized commonly Bulgariaimagenewcontradict Bulgaria’s of country. Balkans thatseemed to a Europeanized attempteddifferentiation to constructBalkans. In late1990s,Bulgarianthe identity thereforepolitics focused on Europe, its Bulgariafrom has had no feasible option of completelyidentity dissociating itselfthose from the Unlike thecountries Central Europe or located onthe geographic periphery of Southeast elements in relation of Balkan to differences politics andthat from were those not areas of the could become recognized 68 CEU eTD Collection conclude that to moral outrage hissense of apparentlyputaside commentator one 1993a, 78), [cannot] “some Europeans that effectthe comment to abitter following example, For Bulgaria. befor strategy aviable appearedto foreign examplenevertheless Visegrad policy the following tactics dissociation however, commentators, some For Balkans. the of isolation international of cost the deepening integration at the for EU in contest the improving theVisegradposition identity-building group’s was project Central European not but be an ambiguouscould strategy Visegrad the towards attitude Bulgaria’s Europe. Russia Eastern and to one because, membershipby buildingidentity in prospects apositive ‘Central European’ opposition while improvingEU theirsuccessful strategy of from andtheir Visegradcountries the it was a luringearly and phasesefficient of post-socialist only applicableconceivableBulgarian framework discursive to foreign policy in these tactics,the not was it favor, President’s the enjoyed framework stability’ of the‘island the While transition. Some foreignrhetoric. policy analystsA patent took inspiration strategy of differentiation from the Balkans electorate the promised President wasthe speech, Ina election-campaign typical threat. serious was never fact, under of matter already itself, asa stability Bulgarian which, than important be more appeared enframing the to at time, the of Most work policy. foreign country’s the of enframing discursive in the element in such became akey in quickly Balkans the stability island of asan of Bulgaria representation opportunities… [B]efore we could prove that we are as much Europeans as the West asthe Europeans asmuch we are that prove wecould [B]efore opportunities… substantial no us gives that region the from course, of metaphorically escape, to Europeanstates than it withhas its neighbors. If this potential is realized…, we have a chance [e]specially economic the in sphere,Bulgaria has much common inmore with theCentral Zhelev [1991] 1997e, 96) peaceful,dignified, democratic, and prosperous state. (Zhelev [1991] 1997d, 93-4; see also of continuouslya increasing value. Itwould affirm our country’s international reputation of a location… and the tragic developments inYugoslavia and other neighboring countries, will be political stability the in Balkans – aquality that, given Bulgaria’s peculiargeopolitical bestto do [his] topreserve internationalthe reputationof Bulgaria anisland as of social and a priory announce themselves truer Europeans than others” (E. Minchev (E. thanothers” Europeans truer announce themselves [1992] 69 CEU eTD Collection Europeunstable parts of the Balkans. At the base of this representation was the dichotomyvs. from the different as fundamentally Bulgaria of representation was the tenet The first Balkans simple tenets. three on based was It abroad. and home at policy foreign government’s the legitimizing and presenting of style a as and borrowed making decision for guide practical a as both handy was doctrine policy doctrine thatfocused on active efforts at differentiation from the Balkans.from The from the Balkans was rationalized, reinforced, and expanded into an efficient foreign thestrategy newimage building process, In the of Bulgaria’s campaign. differentiation the Balkanismstructure war and to Kosovo the during andpolicy legitimize representBulgaria’s used framework to interpretivethis It framework. from in a coherent Balkans the The ODS government organized the existingdiscourse. elements of the discourse of differentiation The Doctrine of Differentiation fromthe Balkans The cornerstone strategyof its foreigna into policy.it turn to and Balkans the from differentiation of strategy the up polish to ODS damages conflict thatinflicted the upon Bulgaria’s international image compelled the the minimize to need acute ofthe crisis, Kosovo the During before. ever than pertinent initbecame more of 1997, ODS government the power coming to the after agenda foreign Bulgaria’s policy todominate started andintegration fastEU quest for NATO to allow this strategyThroughout the first half 1990s,Bulgaria’sEuro-Atlanticthe of slow integration was too to have a decisive Instead, astrategy differentiationof from was Balkans the graduallygaining strength. impact upon actual foreignidentity, dissociation didget not established asa dominantideological framework. Balkan policy.if uncomfortable, strong, Bulgarians’ of because But partly and infeasibility its as the due to Partly intheBalkanswere escalating. conflicts as ethnic increasingly unattainable becoming was strategy The of Balkans. the in center the located of was world, the rest Yet, dissociation could notbe pursued with any ease by a country that, in the view of the 79-80) ( achievements. and mentality both –in Europeans Central become to we have Europeans, Ibid ., 70 CEU eTD Collection important security security important 2000b) Bulgariaproblem 2001a, faced(Government that inquoted PoliticalBTA 16.4.1999). in instability the Balkansidentified was asthemost (Stoyanov, interests” of these as“thechampion depicted while NATO was world”, “those weredefinedWestern of to freethe asidentical interests national Bulgarian interests in line with the interests of the Euro-Atlantic community: confirming thatBulgaria Euro-Atlantic had adopted valuesand defined its national deal Euro-AtlanticA the image community.great of was devoted building effort to of interests the and interests Bulgaria’s between harmony the was point nodal Another 248): incountry’s civilized successsolving problems“inavery way” ethnic (Tafrov 1995, One nodal point was Bulgaria’s cultural and political ‘health’, by bestdemonstrated the points. nodal two around clustered These model representations byYugoslavia. epitomized the to viable alternative model’ asa and political of ‘European the exemplary case painsA really took todo.host of depictrepresentations wereemployedBulgaria to as an which theODSgovernment character, was affirmstep European The nextto Bulgaria’s region: in the coexisting models political of European positeddiametrically aclashparts Balkans.the It two between opposite un- culturally the from European culturally the separating to down boiled differentiation 2000b) Euro-Atlantic values made it imperative that Bulgaria take anactive position. (Government positioned our country among the most reliable partners and allies [of NATO]. The adoptionof Bulgaria’s fast determined and response to NATO’s nationalaccessfor requestairspace tothe Deutsche Welle Radio 1999; see also Mihajlova, quoted in OMDA Press Review 17.3.1999) the country that could serve as a successful modelfor allSEE countries. (Kostov, interview for country, but also to solve our ethnic disagreements with our neighbors. At the moment, we are We have demonstrated that we are able not only to sustaina successful ethnic model withinthe (Kostov, interview forDeutsche Welle Radio 1999) citizens. their of security and freedoms, rights, the jeopardize to dare do not governments where and freedoms, and rights individual defend tolerance, religious and peace ethnic sustain that –states alternative European viable the is other The country. each of territory the is completely impossible considering the distributionof ethnic and religious communities on One [model is marked by] theefforts of ‘great nations’ to create ethnically cleanstates, which and active 71 CEU eTD Collection unstable and uncontrollable region and itself of background an againstthe position to was improve its international reputation to affirm its could own imageBulgaria way only the that of a countryassumption the on based was thatBalkans the from was “a differentiation of doctrine policy foreign The campaign. building image international becamein – Balkans the of an agenteuropeanization as and of Bulgaria security,a generator ideological as Bulgaria of stability, asasource –Bulgaria representations popularized Three widely Press Review OMDA staples in2001; Kostov, quoted Annual Report 2000 Security 2001a; conference onthe press of 2000b, 2000a, see Government of one(e.g. security’ ‘generator active the towards the ODS representation stability’ ‘islandof from passive the shift the spectacularly completed that government’sIt wasthe ODSgovernment 1993). crisis 49, [1991] potential (Minchev [1992] 1993c, and assist willing in to of europeanization regionthe the in and its liquidation the of foreign butwas also inonly of able indispensable was not Balkan crises, periods partner their Bulgaria that states Western and European convince to then was policy foreign national policy generated security and stability [1992] 1997a, (Zhelev 97). 1995b, 243, The goal of the rhetoricitself as a country that not simply provided portraying region.and inthe Bulgaria started force asastabilizing representation Bulgaria of an example – the forone active othersexplicitly more a of to favor in follow abandoned but gradually was activelymetaphor, The passivebetween foreign Bulgarian policy see andinterests97). European [1992] 1997a, (e.g. elementinterventionist vis-à-vis policy former Yugoslaviaas of proof existingthe harmony non- Bulgaria’s of advertised Zhelev President transition this post-socialist of years representation,influence and upontheunruly europeanizing of region.the Already parts in first the Western in interests astabilizingBulgaria Balkansand the in promoted this way exerted as embodied claim was the that of differentiation foreign policy doctrine of the The secondtenet in post-conflictregulate regional thereconstruction”2000b). (Government ‘island“joining the efforts of the international communityof to resolve the conflicts andstability’ to in interest asan was articulated It interest. ‘Bulgarian’ particular articulated asany not It2001a, 2000a). is indicative thatBulgaria’s vital in national interest Balkansthe was regional involvementwas recognized as a vital national interest (Government2000b, 26.5.1999). 72 CEU eTD Collection the the Euro-Atlantic world by beginning to act 2002b). NDSV, The likethe ODS before announcedit, that Bulgaria would belonging demonstrate its to that promoted Euro-AtlanticAllies” interests reliable and both in “loyal the West’s turbulent the of one as Balkans and in the represented was war againstBulgaria terrorism2003a). (Pasi Government see also anotherproof ofBulgaria’s “responsiblerole of a partner that respects principles” democratic (Pasi 2003; commonthe values of democracy EU”defended by NATOthe (Saxkoburggotski and 2003) asyetand represented its support forthe US-led anti-terrorist coalition as “yet anotherexpression of solidarity with 30 crisis Kosovo the during Demonstrations becameof Euro-Atlantic image solidarity building key the technique as a full member: Atlantic solidarity beforeeven it hadbeen invited tojoin institutionalWestern structures by definepromising to its foreign inpolicy stance accordance with principlethe of Euro- The solidarity. West of the ally a trustworthy as credentials Bulgaria’s leadership established Bulgarian Euro-Atlantic unconditional of demonstrations and declarations Bulgaria’s europeanizing andstabilizing function in regionthe was affirmed by integration: European of imperatives the with line in region the transforming international2001a).(Government Bulgaria declareditself able andwillingsupport to the source of stability” andwas “notpartof problemsthe thus of butanagenttheir solution” community’s peacebuilding efforts in the Balkans and to assist in Government 2003b). strategic goals –European Euro-Atlanticand integration” (Saxkoburggotski 2003; seequoted Pasi,also in not only to Bulgaria’s “related was contribution faced they to dilemma solving the the that crisis, reminded [but were also to]….Bulgarians its future crisis, success Kosovo the inachieving during like [its] crisis, This discursiveThis technique survived change of the leadership. During the 2002-2003 Iraqi crisis,Bulgaria They They have beengenerating stability in the region. (Tafrov 1995, 248) already members, i.e.implementing into theirforeign policies the democratic Atlantic values. were ifthey as behaving are they but ofNATO members not are countries] [These place. safer [O]nly a behaviorthrough [that like of Bulgaria and Romania]can the region be changed a into the 2000 Annual Security Report 2001; Stoyanov 2001c; CSD 2001) of Europeanits policy. (Mihajlova 2001,7;see also Government 2001a; Press conference on countries go theirway to Europeanintegration. Inthis sense Bulgaria’s regional policy is part the future integrationof wholethe regioninto the EU. Our goal is to help theWesternBalkan [T]he regional policy of Bulgaria is a source of stability is and oriented towards accelerationof 1999) Le Figaro for interview (Kostov, Balkans. the for anchor aregional as we serve again solving theproblems. Itis plainly clear thatwith our strong economy that would soon function We are a pole of stability in a region beset by sore problems. Many count on us to help with (e.g., see Stoyanov 1999) as if it were a NATO member (Pasi 2003). During the Iraqi 30 . 73 CEU eTD Collection Yugoslavia ( of “dictatorshipin and Europe; totalitarianism” wasembodied ‘evil’ Western the the of model “civilized” pluralistic democratic, in the embodied was ‘good’ The evil. and good between clash as a classical in Kosovo war rendered the The ODSgovernment would beimpossible toconstruct aspotless Euro-Atlantic image of Bulgaria. follow the policy internationalthe of incommunity Balkans.the Without thisit link, and promote interests the ledBulgaria to loyalty, that ideological servile or imitation, to argue that it was Itmade itpossible tenets. firsttwo linkbetween doctrine’s ideological the provided the deep-seated moral the government’sconviction effort to delegitimize domestic opposition to its foreignrather policy. It also international image building campaign by organized ODSandthe acrucial element of than ulterior motives,ideological impact extended beyond the Kosovo issue. Itits became but a crucialshallowwar, elementKosovo of thein the involvement country’s the surrounding controversy tothe response asadirect emerged moral certitude of discourse The choice. civilization demonstration of Bulgaria’s readiness to take on the moral obligations entailedin its The third tenet of the foreign policy doctrine of differentiation from the Balkans was the beginning” in (Stoyanov, quoted inintegration not process the European indecisiveness show should inthevery and we isis “The made, forcountry choice choice: our nomoreplace there commendable than civilization of Bulgaria’s if consequence painful, asanatural, framed ideologically Bulgaria’s21.4.1999). for support NATO’s military campaign against Yugoslavia was in neutrality (quoted abstract isolation” and self-inflicted mean or possibilities alliance withNATO, would MilosevicandLukashenko, other the forno openingaptly abridged is alternative dilemma:“there upan toair corridor the Mihajlova Minister Foreign evil. the with complicity to tantamount been have would neutral remain to attempts conflict; Kosovo in the side a take Bulgaria that imperative made it obligations Moral option. bealegitimate not could neutrality and evil, campaign was a matter of defending the right set ofvalues. In the struggle between good Euro-Atlantic ones 2000b),(Government Bulgaria’s for NATO’ssupport military an issue moral valuesinasmuch of obligation: as than Yugoslavia promoted other the Bulgaria’s unconditional support for NATO against a neighboring country was recast as Democratzija , quoted in , quoted 190).ThecontroversialLinden 2002, issue of OMDA Press Review OMDA 21.4.1999) OMDA Press Review Press OMDA 74 CEU eTD Collection anti-NATO slogans, government’swastounderrate response social the groups preventthis imagefrom being covered by up of pictures ordinary Bulgarians waving to Eager Bulgaria. image of Euro-Atlantic a spotless andcreate assert to designed was international ODSgovernment’s the detrimental that campaign relations to public Theattitudes. volatility unavoidable in opinion of public however, was Bulgaria, public would translateBulgarian among the anti-warthe attitudes that nottragic and certainly understandable into temporaryand especially after several stray missiles hit Bulgarian – residentialas areas, it was they of military campaign, the In the heat reputation. international safeguard Bulgaria’s to ultimately provedNATO and anti-war The attitudes. main motivation behind such rhetoric was desirethe to anti- between be separation – artificial anti-NATOa rather maintained and in Bulgaria attitudes NATO When the internationaladdressing government the deniedpublic, the existence of anti- line: policy domestic foreign official the to opposition de-legitimize to and campaign military NATO’s legitimize to both used was in regime Yugoslavia evil the astance against take to moral Bulgaria’s obligation image of a reliable ally Euro-Atlanticthe of community. thatinvoked discourse The for the public supportgovernment’sforeign spoilit policy and threatened to Bulgaria’s situationwhen not only interests, but also morale necessitate[ed] to act, and to act quickly!” (Pasi 2003). controversial decision tosupport the US during 2003the Iraqi crisis; it argued thatBulgaria was “in a 31 war wassuch a crisis by Kosovo instigated the controversy ideologicalthreatens todisruptthe (Doty1996,8).The heightened order domestic that crisis of times at intensify typically judgment moral on rely that Discourses was a conventional This simplified black-and-white Kosovo interpretation policy of ODSgovernment’s the way of presenting the policy in as incontestable terms as possible. The NDSV government used similardiscursive techniques to counterdomestic oppositionto its of Milosevic in Bulgaria. (Kostov, interview forDeutsche Welle Radio 1999) means ‘Milosevic, Come to Stay!’society Bulgarian thisunderstands and there are no friends return to their homes? Who is going to stop the crimes against[But] humanity? ‘NATO, who Go Away!’ is goingdemonstrations to stop organizedthemissiles, and fear of war. Anti-NATO humanitarianattitudes are only bred atthe poorly attended by of the fear the airplanes, of NATO fear is There Bulgaria. former in attitudes anti-NATO no are There communists.catastrophe? There they Who say: is ‘NATO,going Go toAway!’… help the people 31 . Itled plummeting to 75 CEU eTD Collection and was preoccupied with the with preoccupied was and utilitarianist was association Euro-Atlantic proactive of doctrine The benon-nationalist. to and purported of europeanization virtues exhorted the It idealist. was differentiation of be doctrine The incompatible. ideologically parallel to seemed doctrines The two proactive pursuit of Euro-Atlantic association. pursuit and defense of ‘the national interest’ and whose basic policy guideline was the the on was focused that gaverise aforeign doctrine to policy framework interpretative civilization choice unconditional and solidarity.Euro-Atlantic parallel This framework focused on thematerial and politicalinterpretive benefitsa parallel of demonstratingadopt to Bulgaria’sgovernment ODS the led – development socio-economic inbuiltinto the Europeanization paradigm.The parallel project of this paradigm – that of project identity of the anoutgrowth Balkans was from the differentiation of The doctrine The Doctrine ofProactive Euro-Atlantic Association Milosevic’s propaganda (Government2000b; Kostov 1999a). asmarginalinvolved bylocal inanti-NATOprotests confused communistor ones held down Bulgaria and impededits seeMinchevintegration European (e.g. [1992] that trap the bestway Balkan as escaping Balkanshadregarded of the been the always of parts unstable the from differentiation Yugoslavia, former in conflicts ethnic the of NATO integration. The assumption was notan invention of the ODS. Since the outbreak Bulgaria’s europeanizing andstabilizing in role Balkansthe fast entitled itto EUand The doctrine of proactive Euro-Atlantic association was built upon the assumption that would without the holdother. water underlying assumptions bridged andin united thetwodoctrines.effect Neitherthem of self-styledAtlantic values, its fundamental from difference problematicthe parts of Balkans,the its ideological elements of the basic doctrine the upon role of built differentiation and adopted It off. – i.e. left Bulgaria’s adoption differentiation of of doctrine Euro- the where of an from up picked association Euro-Atlantic proactive of The doctrine thancolliding.rather agent of europeanization in the Balkans. The harmony of national interest. Yet, the two doctrines were colluding were doctrines two the Yet, interest. 76 CEU eTD Collection officially did not yet belong would be rewarded: unavoidable, Bulgaria’s cooperativevis-à-vis behavior an whichorganization itto beingin mindedto addition publicthat, skepticanti-warpersuade the servedto Review catchhistoric (Dogan, in opportunity Europe” train lastthe to quoted to “the the seize and NATO” of test the “pass isolation, avoid to wanted Bulgaria if option interpretation supportfor that NATO during thecrisis Kosovo only was the viable policy Atlantic Euro- doctrineof proactive In thesphereof ODSutilized domestic politics, association easier achieve. war made to task the The Kosovo to legitimize speed upEUandits NATOintegration by Kosovomake Itseemed followed government to track. full determined use of opportunity this to ODS The 243). 1995b, (Zhelev orbit Western the into integration for policy.opportunity” inlocation regions as mostunstablethe was of one a “unique andconflict-prone treated Bulgaria’s The dilemmas. moral by be bothered to seem not did leadership Bulgarian The doctrinefuture,nearbe distant anew not or allowed” Balkan war would (Zhelev 1995b, 244). reinforcedin former the Yugoslavia… of territory onthe “whatever happens that as a guarantee Balkansthe and that therefore had tobeincluded ininternational institutional structures the in Westernpromoted interests affirm of common that a country to reputation Bulgaria’s became it one, generator-of-security active the to frame representational stability island-of- ZhelevWith fromthe 1993b, 108-9). passage the passive 144; [1992] 1997b, seriously.(Dogan, quoted OMDAin Press Review 20.4.1999) taken and be noticed to chance a have we also but situation, precarious a in We are return… NATO membership is a priority forBulgaria and if we want it, we have to give something in 16.4.1999) Marshall planfor the economic stabilizationof the Balkans. (Stoyanov, quoted inBTA and political advantages from this. Bulgariaeconomic should gain join and the countries whichneighbour, insist ontroubled anew its around of stability belt a as act should Bulgaria Now 2000a) ensuring [the]country’s individual treatment process inthe of (Governmentintegration.EU reforms andthat makes valuable contribution to securityregional and stability, thereby affirming Bulgaria’s imageof country Balkana leading boasts that vibrant and irreversible 5.5.1999; see also Kostov, quoted in Kostov, quoted 5.5.1999;seealso OMDA Press Review Press OMDA 20.4.1999). It also 20.4.1999). OMDA Press OMDA 77 CEU eTD Collection and for removal of forand removal visa for Bulgarian requirements withincitizens traveling the the of The justification of Bulgarian demands for a speedy start of EU accession negotiations earlier resort to such argumentation, see Tafrov 1995, 248). Europe (Stoyanov, in Europe quoted as the key the alliance’sto strategic successin creating a‘ring of stability’ in Southeast represented Bulgaria, RomaniaandMacedonia was into Balkanstowards the of NATO natural civilizational boundaries” of NATO (Stoyanov 2001c, seealso1997). Extension Bulgaria appealedfor brave political solutions infavorof“enlargementwithin the immediate return” (Stoyanov 2001c): squabblingmundane over political questions and“tightfisted to calculations for success and to the strength of NATO” (Stoyanov 1997), Bulgaria called for an end tothe “[s]olidarity that integration of is core European the the [and]thephilosophy… keyto actually become one ( become one actually NATO’s value system and had behaved as if it were a NATO member even before it had it inasmuch deservehadas itshared NATOmembership Bulgaria proven that claimedto structures, solidarity was expected to make admission possible sooner rather than later. Euro-Atlantic the into admission for conditions provide necessary the to were expected to assume “common its ‘solidarity’.share of While(Stoyanov civilization roots” 2001c) instability crisis. the wereanimplicit Kosovo during West Such reminders appeal tothe Euro-Atlantic demonstrated solidarity inand ofregional commitment the direconditions justifiedBulgaria’s of by framed and reminders were accession speedy Euro-Atlantic well structureas Bulgaria’sto international image building campaign. Demands for enframe Atlantic demandsfor as post-conflict Bulgaria’s association to compensations, Euro- proactive of doctrine the used ODS the politics, international of sphere the In compensations. maximizing the country’s chances for fast Euro-Atlantic integration and fair by interest national served the West, butalso of the andvalues interests served the The policy government’s pro-NATO could thus bejustified a not only as policy that commitment to shared destiny and solidarity. (Stoyanov 1997) political approaches… What ensures unity is theoverall political will, the strategic In times of transitionarguments of material and financial nature should not overshadow Ibid .). Invoking.). theWest’sshare and of responsibility reminding OMDA Press Review 2.4.1999, 26.4.1999, 1999;for 26.4.1999, an 2.4.1999, 78 CEU eTD Collection determined how Bulgaria related to SP: the Bulgaria related determined how ‘healthy’adopted European political models. interpretation, This for example, countries had that Balkanareastowards from conflict-ridden ‘unhealthy’ the instability of spillover contain the need by the to justified homogenization was regional against Bulgaria’s Euro-Atlantic integration Euro-Atlantic Bulgaria’s rejected whenever they perceivedas could ‘packagewere that regional deals’ slow down vehemently were Balkans the of integration Euro-Atlantic the to approaches Regional one (Stoyanov, quoted in BTA 25.4.1999; see also Mihajlova, quoted in approach towards NATO expansionshould be abandoned infavorall-embracing piece” of an comprehensive “by and the that suggested and entirety its in Balkans the treat to failure NATO’s lamented leadership NATO towards membershipprogress Bulgaria’s when 1999, wasin notexample, For appreciated approaches. ‘regional’ as much such of as that of other SEE countries, such as Romania,32 the Bulgarian inquoted (Kostov, theirlead destabilization to this could because Balkans the of stablezone the from candidates with when dealing criteria accession the toadherestrictly not to advised Press Review OMDA in misplacedfighting” “fire asopposed tothe prevention”, policy (Mihajlova, quoted of “fire andasawise stability policy of intoof the SEE asaninvestment was represented Bulgaria, in Balkans, particular the zoneof from stable the of countries the integration Second,3.7.2000). be differently. Bulgaria asked treated to European the Encouraging in military seeKostov, quoted andinsecurity face (e.g. conflict of Bulgaria’s commitment toEuro-Atlantic valueswhich had remainedfirm ineven the appreciate and to wasthe regime, mainof instability Milosevic the recognize source that called uponfrom Bulgaria It beFirst, Balkans. askedto the passage. differentiated was a smooth the EU Itdifferentiated treatment. of to andBulgaria’s entitlement discourse upwith the ended to overcome Balkans from the differentiation of discourse the off with started too, zone, Schengen its prejudices against the Balkans as a whole, to The rejection was not a matter of principle. It apparently depended on the perceived costs and benefits and costs perceived the on depended It apparently of principle. a matter not was rejection The marked Euro-Atlantica orientationforwith countries and without suchorientation, for countries that countries for region…, the in countries unstable the for and stable the for denominator naturethe in and countries participating of the of development of level the in differences socialsubstantial developmentsconflict [The SP] is to some inextent anartificial political frameworkbut that doesthese not isolate the source of in countries…effect placesThere is a ittendency in a wider to use context…a common The Pact does not account for the OMDA Press Review Press OMDA 18.5.1999; Stoyanov, quoted in The Stoyanov, 18.5.1999; quoted BTA EU was 26.4.1999). 3.7.2000). 32 (e.g. see EP 2000, 10; Filipov 2001). The stance 10; Filipov 2001). seeEP2000, (e.g. OMDA Press Reviews OMDA Press Review OMDA 26.4.1999) 79 CEU eTD Collection stance air during national as apolicy the security. war BSP’schief The threatened that interest. One elementnational the and sovereignty, national security, national focused on discourse alternative of this discourse was theThe leftwing enframed opposition its stance on problem Kosovo the through an representation of Bulgaria’s pro-NATO Rival Ideological Positions:TheSovereigntyDiscourse in Bulgaria. 2000s, this linkage was grow ever moreto consequential for ideological the environment the Throughout dignity. national of problem the with integration EU of process the domesticIts wastolink impact problem in the national interests Bulgaria’s defending of Balkanism. of discourse exclusionary the countered it politics, international of level the distinctSuch international had a –an effects enframing one one.At two and domestic country integrate intoto Western in structures dignifiedthe mannerit that deserved: West’s responsibility to reciprocate Bulgaria’s Euro-Atlantic solidarity and toallow the a part of the unstable Balkans,In order to persuade the Westto treatBulgaria according toits own themerits, rather than as image building campaign of the ODS exploited the Europeans. By the way, we do not feel treated as such. (Kostov, interview as be treated to for want Le only Figaro [W]e of people… 1999) movement free thing: one only expects Bulgaria 2000) (Kostov group. ofthe part as unfavorably, country our treat to failures, countries’ other these of because and, countries other with country Bulgaria’s sternefforts cannot be overlooked.would It becompletely to unfair group our EU… the protecting now effectively is border Bulgarian the contrary, the to quite that, but We will continue to do all we can… to show not only that Bulgaria is not a source of instability Review 26.4.1999) country has proved that it is partwithout visas.of What logic canthe then justify the visademocratic regime imposed onour citizens if our world? (Stoyanov,We NATO’s support military operation; NATO’s airplanes our willairspace fly through quoted in OMDA Press 25.4.2001) Mediapool in quoted (Filipov, region. whole of the isolation the and capsulation the for stage the sets even this Sometimes one… slowest the of speed by the determined is countries these association artificial, and we are worried that in this way the speedan such of We deem EU integration not. have of that eachcountries for of and negotiations accession started have 80 CEU eTD Collection Review demonstrative actions emotional issuesnational and of pride rhetoricdignity.aggressive and Through The BSP blendedPress Review OMDA the problem of NATO’s access to the national airspace with the Bulgaria (Parvanov, quoted in Bulgaria quoted (Parvanov, citizens atrisk, NATOhadno tosafeguard the security non-members obligation like of position vis-à-visput NATOandemphasizedthatwhilethe security government the of humiliating and failure shameful of It statesmanship.made much Bulgaria’sof unequal resisted attempts to have him removed from the plenary hall. 34 Reviews of region thatthe wouldBulgaria leave outsideborders the of quoted Europe (Pirinski, in 33 Pirinski,5.5.1999; in quoted in in war(Parvanov,actual the quoted participation NATOwith for equate air was openingthe an of to debate tothe corridor contribution Tomov, quoted inTomov, quoted in guarantees return its that airspacea battlefield, into turn would didprovidenot NATO anyreal security risk the Bulgaria took was thatwhile argument basic The for Bulgaria. consequences fateful and have grave could that policy asareckless was represented It security. the opening of an air corridor was easily associated with looming dangers to national Democratic Left, quoted in quoted Democratic Left, bythe (declaration thecountry” fate of the dictate foreign powers “let to willing and governmentwas branded asineptleadership “incapable of making”sovereign decision Bulgarian ‘people’ ( ‘people’ Bulgarian the of that to identical as Kosovo on position own its presented BSP The interests. policy that compromised the national interest and left Bulgaria hostage to foreign government’s Kosovo policy as irresponsible,anti-national,an and servile, dependent Another elementReview of this oppositional discourse was the representation of the ODS For example, a BSP MP waved a black banner Aprospective military operationwithby NATO’s land troops was associated withthe long-term destabilization slogan “They Sold Bulgaria” and physically 29.5.1999). 5.5.1999, 29.5.1999; BSP, quoted 29.5.1999; inBSP, quoted 5.5.1999, 17.3.1999). OMDA Press Review OMDA 33 Duma 7.6.1999). 34 (declarations by the Democratic Left, quoted in itsought tobrand the leadership’s foreign policy stance as a , quoted in , quoted OMDA Press Review OMDA Press Review OMDA OMDA Press Review OMDA OMDA Press Review Press OMDA 5.5.1999; Parvanov, quoted in quoted Parvanov, 5.5.1999; OMDA Press Review Press OMDA 5.5.1999; in5.5.1999; see also Parvanov,quoted 22.4.1999). Interpreted in 22.4.1999). way,this 5.5.1999). The BSP suggestedthat 5.5.1999). OMDA Press Review Press OMDA 5.5.1999). In contrast, the In contrast, 5.5.1999). 26.4.1999, 5.5.1999; 26.4.1999, OMDA Press OMDA OMDA Press OMDA 20.4.1999, OMDA Press OMDA 81 CEU eTD Collection 35 in quoted modern-day crusade” (Parvanov, Euro-Atlantic the it values.In BSP represented as contrast, partakingbrutal into“a campaign againsta neighboring country as of a matter civilization for and choice respect Kosovo policy.representedin Bulgaria’sThe government involvement amilitary Finally, leftwing challenged the opposition themoral foundations of government’s the 5.5.1999). inof nationalsovereignty and quoted (see Tomov, dignity The5.5.1999). perceived between inequality Bulgaria as and NATOwasinterpreted loss period by (declaration inconflict quoted Left, Democratic the playerhave be insaid to animportant itself of opportunity thethe to post- deprived was Bulgaria country, a neighboring towards is stance by ahostile What more, taking Bulgaria would receivenothing inexchange for its supportfor NATO.unconditional Due to the power inequality between the ODS and the BSP the Balkans” (Parvanov, quoted in quoted (Parvanov, Balkans” the and the “choice [was] notbetween Milosevic and NATO [but] between peace and war in by in means” (declaration Left, Democratic quoted the the justify not [did] end “the BSP, the to According reference. of terms the change leftwing toredraw civilization. Western andto The picture opposition the attempted dilemma a to fairly straightforward choice between violent nationalism and the values of legitimized its policy by a discourse ofmorality reduced Bulgaria’sthat Kosovo financial and structural reforms. of domestic of failure the account on in no government the of confidence avote initiated political demands against the government. In addition,in the heat of the air war, the Left mixed ledleftwingprotests by got with ODS. The the anti-waropposition general street controversy as a way of uniting the leftwing opposition againstparties powerful the in tousethe attempted vehement against governmentthe and opposition general upon policy Inaddition,intermixedoutcomes. BSP the theKosovo debate with control over policymaking and the opposition’s sovereignty discourse had no impact Waning public supportfor ODS the during 1998 did not translate increasinginto support for the BSP. OMDA Press Review Press OMDA OMDA Press Review Press OMDA OMDA Press Review OMDA 3.5.1999). 35 , the ODS had effective had ODS , the OMDA Press Review Press OMDA OMDA Press Review OMDA 5.5.1999). The ODS 5.5.1999). 29.5.1999) 82 CEU eTD Collection The ODS government could thus comfortably veer between an idealist and a rationalist and idealist an between veer comfortably thus could government ODS The across both idealist/utilitarianistthe and ideological Europeanist/nationalistthe divides. stretched doctrines two these combination, In dominance. ideological its solidified further integral itsdoctrines two between collusion time. of The that environment ideological broad the its with congruence to waspartly due ideological power indominated the unmatched late1990s.Its in publicspheres and Bulgaria political the of paradigm Europeanization that the was foreign offshoot two-sidedthe doctrine policy dilemma. the Kosovo This foreign to response structured ODSgovernment’s the policy that framework interpretive sides influential of the two werethe association Atlantic Euro- proactive of doctrine centered national-interest utilitarianist the Balkans and sum To idealist from up, the pro-Europeanization policy of doctrine the differentiation ‘national’ elements in its own foreign policy strategy and rhetoric. ODS governmentwas compelled and tocounteract follow to by suitstrengthening the The sovereignty. national to and interest national the to pertained that dilemma Kosovo heatedness of the debate managed do, however,to wasaccentuate to those aspects of the challenge theexisting WhatBSP’sloud ideological setup. oppositional activities and the wider of sections grow society a intoand to counter-discourse strongenough to persuade problem failedto itsof part of Kosovo Bulgarian interpretation public,the the of large a attitude the with congruent BSP was of the stance theanti-war Thus, although Review confidence vote in vote confidence no- the on debates parliamentary the (see interests party narrow of benefit the to fears “national betrayal” and irresponsiblean divide to attempt thenation and exploitpublic its own, moral credentials. The ODSaffirm to and BSP’s, usedquestion to ODS the allowed economy national the was damaging the opportunity crisis to international dismiss major a when time a at BSP’sconfidence no of motion a actionsinitiate to decision as a war minded Theof stance BSPandaggressive oppositional itsthe public. controversial andpolitical supporters from it effectively prevented sections reaching wider of anti- the oppositional alternativeactivity, but party’s the for the weaknessof was areason mobilization of political This strategy it also reserveddiscourse the party’s onanti-war the Kosovodiscourse to problem.its staunch It lent additional visibility to BSP’s 27.4.1999). OMDA Press Review Press OMDA 6.4.1999; Kostov, quoted in quoted 6.4.1999;Kostov, OMDA Press OMDA 83 CEU eTD Collection Romania (see Map 1). Map (see Romania 36 2007, 1). advantageit involvedlongeras sections of already existing(Gancheva class-I roads an had Calafat and Vidin through route The (Romania). Beket and (Bulgaria) Oryahovo cross the Bulgarian-Romanianborder at Vidin (Bulgaria) and Calafat (Romania), orat side,be for corridor IV afeasibleto Yugoslavia,through theit alternative route to had to Bulgarian the to According Yugoslavia. circumvented that EU tothe route alternative itscorridor territory IVwould pass through European transport pan-it ensured that project because infrastructure be astrategic to bridge the considered in circulation ideasinceThe Danube the Romania has forasecond building Bulgarian over bridge to been the early 1990s,between the two shores butis the bridge between Russe (Bulgaria)was and Giurgiu (Romania). initially only fixedthe however, andRomania, between connection border longBulgaria river not asserted The is betweenbridges average Danube distance Alongalong the 470 21 km. the km- forcefully. Bulgaria ProjectThe DanubeBridge-2 Danube Bridge-2 thus took on a special role in this crisis. crisis. Kosovo the during stance for its pro-Western in return receive would Bulgaria that andcompensations rewards emphasize and political to theeconomic was compelled ODS the more salient, became national sovereignty and interest national As issuesof Danube Bridge-2 and Bulgaria’s Kosovo Crisis Policy foreign policy agenda. the on up further sovereignty national and interest national of issues move to managed yet weak, remained opposition by advanced leftwing the The approaches. discourse rival havecould spacethererival beenavailable for breathing ODS, squeezedwhatever foreign This coupledpolicy conduct. setup, political with strong the position the of legitimizeits capacity yetequally strong, interpretativeframework haddistinct, that to Corridor IV Corridor links Turkey GreeceCentral,and with Western and Northern Europe viaandBulgaria 36 and provided an 84 CEU eTD Collection the Economic Impact of the War inYugoslaviathe EconomicImpact of in side(Kraus,quoted by exertingpressure upon Romanian the and assistance financial providing by both bridge, Danube second a of building the with assist officially askthe EUto governmentthe announcedof plans to NATO’s war, air start the after Several days Bulgaria. for a location of bridgesuitable such a building at campaignstep intended upinternational to upon Romaniapressure toacquiescein the The promptly seizedODS government launched the opportunity. anaggressive It pertinent to the situation. instantly on internationalof top Danubecame the agenda. Bridge-2 seemedespecially Balkans the through route ‘safe’ alternative an of issue The countries. in SEE sectors transport the upon impact devastating a had and Balkans, the through flows transport international halted Asia, and Balkans the with Europe Western connecting route second Danubebridge atimelyin project air1999. The warmadeunusable shortest the however,madeThe Kosovo crisis destabilization andtheensuing the Balkans, the of with engage issue.the principle construction supported the of initiallya secondbridge, actively itnot did proposed by Bulgaria. Traffic along the route was notsubstantial and although the EU in on its own, thebridge finance the to proposal andBulgaria’s negotiations repeated downstream. Despite Romanian sidebridge locate further toprospective the Danube second preferred Romania therefore did not agree Romanian andConstanta, (Ganchevashortened transitto 2007,1-2). territory through a bridge at of from port the anytraffic away spatially, directed marginalized Bucharest It avoid. of the two locationsRouting Vidin IVthrough Romaniadid corridor precisely andCalafat what wantedto traderoutes. from shorter traffic than ontransit from tolls moregain collecting to stood Romania importance. of primary not weretherefore Balkans with Southern trade the of costs andtransportation theEU with trade to compared negligible was and Macedonia Romanian Bulgaria,links with Asia Greece Europe. trade and main between transport addition, it wanted to avoid a corridor route that would leave Bucharest aside from the Constanta, whose development was a major infrastructure priority for the country. In It sought to direct traffic along abranch of corridor IV to its Black Sea port of locations. in atany a bridge two buildingthese interested of not was however, Romania, 30.3.1999). Having30.3.1999). off-handedly OMDA Information on OMDA Information 85 CEU eTD Collection Review Compensations Reviews 38 April 1999 ( 37 Yugoslavia” (Kostov, in quoted development inleaveinterests of infrastructure “ahostage divergentBulgaria let to not Romania’s leadership the pledged “short-sighted”, and was one Romanian the was “far-sighted” project Bridge-2 Danube the on stance Bulgarian the concluded that crisis managementdeveloped Kosovo ODSgovernment the that program in tothe response ( institutions” financial international and NATO, EU, the occasion suitable every “on inLobbying favor of Danube Bridge-2 was one of the key tasks listed in the crisis European corridor IV (Gancheva 2007, 1; IV(Gancheva 2007, corridor European bridgeShortly project. itsigned afterwards, amemorandum on developmentthe of pan- it reconsider position was its the to Yugoslaviaagainstannounced ready on that –it Romania In heat military of resistant. May 1999–in remained the NATO’s campaign indispensable for stability regional was the project that US,andNATO the EU, the convince Greece, to efforts bilateral meetings with major governmentsof the EUmemberIt intensifiedstates. its infor talks (SP)and with Southeastern officials,EU, US, Stability Pact Europe in and forums, international relevant in all project the promoted government The successfully. states that could be interested in the project, e.g. Macedonia e.g. in could project, interested bethe states that the resources to finance the project (quoted in (quoted finance project the to resources the feasiblebecome in than noearlier economically 2015andit declaredthat did havenot such side arguedthat could a bridge Romanian the Initiative, European Cooperative framework Subsequently, of negotiations21.10.1999). the Southeast the during within in would bethat (Basesku, favor clearly inBulgaria’s quoted a location at bridge a secondDanube buildingidea the again of reject toyet a pretext long-lasting obstruction of Romanian electricity exports to Turkey and usedtheissue as later, itrejected project the Around again. the end of 1999, Romania of accused Bulgaria later it thatit iflater project suggested could acquiesceinthe it adequate received For example, see Mihajlova, quoted in Danube Bridge-2 was,for example, the central issue discussed duringavisit by a NATO delegation in 25/27.5.1999, speech EU Helsinkiat the Summit 1999; 13.4.1999, 10/20.5.1999, 13.4.1999, 15.11.1999, 13.9.2000, 22.10.1999; Kostov,in quoted OMDA Press Review Press OMDA OMDA Press Review 1.7.1999; OMDA Information on the Kosovo Crisis 5.4.1999). 9.4.1999). This part of This of out program the part was carried 9.4.1999). OMDA Press Review OMDA 37 , and it also tried to secure the support of secure supportof the , anditBalkan also to tried OMDA Press Review OMDA Press Review OMDA OMDA Press Review OMDA 31.5.1999). 21.5.1999, 24.11.1999; 1.4.1999; OMDA Information onLosses and 38 . Kapital 22.5.1999). A month 22.5.1999). OMDA Press Review Press OMDA 2.12.1999). A day 2.12.1999). May 1999) OMDA Press OMDA OMDA Press 86 CEU eTD Collection have been periodically reconsidered in response to in caused project’s the stagnation, havebeenresponse reconsidered periodically project Bridge-2 of Danube date the completion and the date starting the Since 2000, cooperative. been hasspeed up Romania however, very project’s pressure tothe not realization, (still pending) construction of bridgethe longer asapriority.international No under and have(NDSV), of BSP-ledcoalition topersuade Romaniathe pains taken treat to the II Simeon Movement National the of ODS, the of governments consecutive the day, present the From 1999 till the‘safe route’. urgencyof however, perceived the dampened The end of the military conflict and the subsequent fall of the Milosevic regime, 39 Affairs, quoted in compensations for the unfavorable location of the bridge (Romanian Minister of Foreign Transport Infrastructure Review Press was confidence thatconstruction in would commence in2001 (Hombach, quoted priority ‘Quick Start’ Calafat A). (interview The construction of Danube Bridge-2list wasincludedin thehigh of the SP Vidinlocationbridge at Bulgaria’s the and of and projectpreferred to agreed tothe side Romanian the SP, established newly the of coordinator special the of involvement the personal fromintense andthanksto in Finally,pressure early EU the 2000, under were planning to startwere planningconstruction to in 2001( InvestmentBank wasbeing (EIB) in arranged for project the late 2000,the authorities (Chachev, quoted (Chachev,in quoted itself bridge the than months earlier 6 for exploitation be ready was to infrastructure buildmonths Danube Bridge-2 within after 24 theof construction. start Theadjacent Following the long-awaited agreementwith Romania, ODSgovernment the planned to andof envisages theconstruction a combined road railway bridge. Romania finance its only would the necessary infrastructure territory.on Theproject as the design and construction infrastructureof necessary the on Bulgarian territory. well as bridge, the of construction and design the stages, preparatory project’s own the The project was symbolically important for the SP and became one of its most touted achievements. 5.10.2000). IntheODSgovernment’s 5.10.2000). OMDA Press Review OMDA OMDA Press Review Press OMDA (MTC 2001), 39 . Bulgaria took the responsibility to finance on its 3.12.1999). the project’sthe finalization was planned for 2005. 16.2.2000). As aloan 16.2.2000). from European the MTC News MTC Program fortheDevelopment of 8.11.2000). In the SP,too,there 8.11.2000). OMDA 87 CEU eTD Collection to be readyby 2010. The project EUR would cost 246 million Currently,for 2009 (MT2006,45-6). in bridgethe isexpected event 2006,planned the BSP government’s for development, infrastructure ambitious strategy transport written was to open for exploitation in late 2009(Spasov, quotedin bridge the year; forthcoming the into forward moved habitually was works construction (Vasilev, quoted in(Vasilev, quoted bridgeonly for endof could2005 and at the beopen exploitation the inlate2008 Mediapool Bridge-2 couldbe finished” “almost inand(Saxkoburggotski Vasilev, quoted construction would commence in2005,so in that symbolicthe year2007Danube Mediapool construction of Danube Bridge-2 wasamatter of weeks quoted in (Keremedchiev, the of start the that announced optimistically SP the for coordinator Bulgarian postponed for mid-2004in (Zhiponov,quoted “the first dig” (Petrov, quoted indig” quoted “the first (Petrov, awaiting was andthe Ministry dealtwith supposedly project were DanubeBridge-2the Mediapool budget. KfW and the French Developmental AgencyEUR (AFD).18 The millionrest of the funds would loan be provided40 from by the state the German KfW Entwicklungsbank, and EUR 7 million in grants from the in Busek,16.5.2002; quoted in moved 2007(Evtimov, for quoted forward completion to was accordingly wasmoved2003; bridgeinfrastructure the forwardboth deadline the to and adjacent the In 2002,theproject’s21.10.2001). financingbut start secured, the of was construction of in2006 quoted (Petrov, to deadlineof construction forward the bridge for the late 2001,the Ministry of andTransport Communications (MTC)hadmoved the primarily by land acquisition problems alleged and delays on part the of Romania. By Forthis project, Bulgaria has received aEUR 70 million ISPA grant, a EUR 70 millionEIB loan, a 24.6.2004). By late-2004, however, it was clear that construction could start couldit construction was that however, Bylate-2004, clear 24.6.2004). 11.2.2004). In a few theannounced NDSVgovernment that weeks, 11.12.2002).At end the and of 2002, allprocedures formalities concerning Mediapool Mediapool 1.11.2004, 18.2.2005). At endthe start of 2005,the MTC News MTC 25.9.2002; Ivanov and Zhiponov, quoted in Zhiponov, quoted Ivanov and 25.9.2002; 18.12.2002). In 18.12.2002). 2003, ‘the first dig’ was Mediapool 8.7.2003). In early 8.7.2003). 2004, the Mediapool 40 . 13.11.2005). The 13.11.2005). Mediapool Mediapool 88 CEU eTD Collection Danube Bridge-2 was not taken on the basis of heartening traffic forecasts. Even before Even forecasts. traffic heartening of basis the on taken not was Bridge-2 Danube prioritize in decision to the Green2001).Yet, intensified quoted significantly (Stanchev, madeBridge-2 sense onlyif and trade flows transport along route the of IV corridor Danube observed, rightly (IME) Economics Market for Institute the with analyst an As Traffic Expected back in 1999? feasible economically it was But welcome. is generally in short, project, The towns. betweenis as it norailway There requires and loading two unloading. connection the time travel lengthens it and conditions weather bad to vulnerable is it schedule, fixed no been serviced by a ferry that has has a number of disadvantages.crossing border It has a limited capacity Vidin-Calafat the and at Traffic Sofia. capital Bulgarian the from detour i.e. network, long a300-km Russe-Giurgiu Bridge,transport the pan-European requires the of axis North-South the on Romania and Bulgaria between connection fixed only The route. convenient is a IV corridor Europe, Northern and Southern between traffic functioningsmooth and traffic of IV.For from corridor pan-European forTurkey to and networkpan-European transport on Bulgarianis territory that indispensable for the it is importantelementof Supporters of have rightly arguedthat an the Danube Bridge-2 Importance of Danube Bridge-2 for the National Transport Infrastructure Network project.important infrastructure transport most considerit Bulgaria’s to was justified it criteria of these basis on the whether determine andseekto Bridge-2 Danube of viability and importance economic practical the the analyze sections following The interests. political and economic geopolitical, Bulgaria’s country’sThe ODSsingled government Danube out Bridge-2 among elements other of the transport infrastructureImportance andFeasibility ofthe SecondDanube Bridge as a project that was crucial for the realization of 89 CEU eTD Collection ( updated forecasts aslateno that as were 2007 there inBulgaria reported A leading weekly ferry. economic availableAgain, in even thefast-growth case, such traffic could in behandledprinciple by the neither in the scenario 740according( slowscenario the growth growth or to Ministry of bridgethe for exploitation the fastwould according exceed1083vehiclesper to day Transport (MT)traffic along thebridge would be increasing gradually and five years the opening after of nor in the EIB from Forecasts theinvestment. justify that 2001 usedbytheEIBreportedly suggested As for by prospectivethe additional it generated itself, bridge traffic the couldhardly 2001, 19-20and 9a).Such appendix traffic couldbe handled by easily existingthe ferry. scenario fast-growth the Interview C). This was almost 5 times less than the capacity of the ferry. According to expected to entirelygenerate new railway traffic, albeita moderate one (UMIDBP 2001,22, appendix 9c). 43 countries (5.6%). Bulgaria Romania and (6.8-7.5%), Greece Yugoslavia(4%), former Turkeyand (8-9%), andthe CEE 42 41 priority: IVa madecorridor that Western Europe to Balkans from route the transport provide analternative desirethe to was It geopolitical. economicbut werenot IV of corridor advantages the competition, corridors IVand Yugoslavia) X(through a wereto large extentcompetitive. Inthis pan-European that EIBrecognized the Europe, needs inSoutheast infrastructure basic evaluating Ina report remain state. apariah wereto ifYugoslavia only functions itcould servethese that functions. Theproblem was than economic geopolitical rather ‘alternative’serveEurope intendedBulgaria’s touted was apparently to to route substantial 218vehicles(around per24hours in 2000 the fall of the Milosevic regime traffic using the existing Vidin-Calafat ferry was not bridge was expected to encourage additional traffic of daily vehicles of 55 encourage additional traffic expectedto bridge was reach was vehicles along the dailyby2006,andthe availability 395 to theof route Ibid. Since there was no railway between Vidin and Calafat, the building of the bridge’s railway facility was for period) 2000-2030 the for (average forecasts growth GDP optimistic very on based was forecast The Theferry authorities calculated 316 vehicles per24 hours (UMIDBP 2001,8). terms of security in amedium-term perspective. 2000, (EIB 15) geo-strategic considerations may make the alternative corridor the only feasible or corridor in circumstances political However, X). corridor case this (in route preferred economically an indicate clearly may capacities existing and length… route as such characteristics Physical ). 42 in project’sfeasibility the study in conducted 2001, traffic 41 ) (UMIDBP2001, 8,appendix 3; Kapital February February 2007). 43 (UMIDBP 90 CEU eTD Collection has been expected to attract foreign companies, bring new investments, andinvestments, encourage bring new foreign attract companies, expectedto has been of for and region opportunity’ construction this period hasbeenperceived as‘awindow 005). The 2004BG16PPT Measureeconomies” (ISPAInformation No. Sheet, national and regional local, the to boost a give and employment permanent and temporary bridge generate “help the emphasizes would that project of the presentation in Green2001; 2001; Dimitrova in quotedStanishev, Bulgaria (UMIDBP2001,25-9; Interview A;MTC2000,40-1;mayor of quoted Vidin, in poorest the of one been has which Vidin around region in the unemployment reduce developmentthe of pan-European IVwould corridor economicand encourage growth and construction its that been has Bridge-2 Danube of in support argument additional An Disparities Economic Regional of Reduction joined the TIR system) (Interview B). in (e.g. route increased 2001Yugoslavia corridor-X late the attractiveness the of further time and waiting shortened easier, madetransit exchanges, which transport facilitating Milosevic regime, Yugoslavia joined majorinternational conventions aimed at behind the idea arguments geopolitical undermined the of further Yugoslavia of The democratization building a second economic viability ( to regard as questionable with project Danube Bridge. classified the (EBRD) Development and for Reconstruction Bank European the war, the In addition,A year after feasibility. for project’s ofthe criticism floodgate the opened Bridge-2 and after the fall of region theremoved sense of had urgency that the accompanied construction Danube of the Unsurprisingly, end war and the Kosovothe of the ensuing political stabilization in the Balkans. military inthe on conflicts hooked IVseemed corridor of advantages geopolitical over, most of the road traffic returned to the shorter route along corridor X. The while the Milosevic regime was in place. Once NATO’s air war againstYet, Yugoslavia was corridor IV was not able to divert much road traffic away from corridor X even bpost.bg RFE/RL Newsline 13.5.2007). The 13.5.2007). official 23.5.2000). 91 CEU eTD Collection crowd out orweakenlocal businessescould as it increasesarea competition from the outside inaccessible (T&E 2002, 9). previously a to access improved addition, In question. in area the in production and operation maintain to businesses these for need the remove thus and market local inaccessible previously 45 beset the region (Tsenov has 2007). that migration outward the reverse and unemployment reduce business, boost investment, attract Northwest, Bulgaria’s of recovery economic and social the guarantee would it that belief the in project regionsthe of Calafatand Vidin (Petrov Local2002). inVidinauthorities have invested hopes great inthe constructionworks and astrong positive impact uponlong-term social conditions and unemployment in 26.4.2004). Itexpected aproject designthat would guarantee 1300 job openings in thecourse of the the economicthe development of Bulgaria (e.g.,see Saxkoburggotski, quoted in 44 activities social and business new rather than encourage local and regional economic growth and employment development could infrastructure assumption have arguedthat transport hurt actually lasting regional reduction of haseconomic disparities, Critics been disputed. of this infrastructure investmentand orbetweentransport sustainable development, economic The presumption of investmentan link between automatic infrastructure and transport UMIDBP 2001,7). hollow. rather rung thus have Bridge-2 Danube of in favor arguments boost’ ‘local-economy toeconomiccontributingfactor in growth butcertainly not region this main the one. The infrastructurebusiness Transport development. developmentcould be a only an effectivethrough health, focused social areas such aseducation, on policy and small economic Vidinimpoverished in conditions be around the couldregion achieved only constructionthe of bridge.a single In sustainable improvement general,of social and (Stanchev, quoted in Green 2001). The latter condition, however, requires more than just substantially increase theregion across flows if trade and only traffic expected be could however, employment, and investment upon impact economic A long-term a temporary boost to the local economies and to have short-term positive social effects. toprovide like expected Bridge-2 be could Danube project construction Any large-scale presumed; it has to be supported by be a concrete context-specific cannot therefore analysis.growth economic and investments infrastructure transport between 2002; 2000 Annex vii;1, T&E For example, new or improved transport connections to an area allow businesses to freely access the access freely to businesses allow area an to connections transport improved or new example, For The NDSV government, too, considered Danube Bridge-2 to be a strategic project that was crucial for crucial was that project strategic bea to Bridge-2 Danube considered too, government, NDSV The et al 44 (representatives in institutions, of Bulgarian quoted . 2003, 13-4; . 2003,13-4; ECMT 2002).Afavorable relationship Mediapool 6.4.2002, 45 (T&E 92 CEU eTD Collection to be overly with Greekborderthe weretobeoptimistic. upgradedby (MTC2001).These2008 plans turned out Sofia linking railway the and railway Sofia-Plovdiv the 2005; by completion for planned At the same were and bordersection railway of time, upgrade of Sofia-Vidin the a the Greek/Turkish the futurethe of many otherelectrification vital sections of and reconstruction of the railway Plovdiv - Svilengrad – in simultaneously with shortly Danube Bridge-2 or (MTC2001; afterwards quoted Petrov, development. Plans were tocomplete some ofits key sections by 2008,2005 or i.e. infrastructure for transport strategy in thegovernment’s asapriority IV wasidentified infrastructure alongrelevant IV corridor pan-European on Bulgarian territory. Corridor the of development the for plan a comprehensive without but reasons, geopolitical In 1999,the ODSgovernmentaggressivelybegan Danube to forpromote Bridge-2 Bridge-2 dependsonthe development of alongrailway infrastructure IV. corridor Lyulinmotorway and E-79 through SofiaVidin. to In addition, the feasibility of Danube On Central includesBulgarian motorway,territory the Europe. route this the Struma and Romania towards further and Bulgaria, through isGreece, from route The other Bulgariaand ( fortraffic across respectively 44% 33%of transit from serve headed Turkey traffic transitTurkey, departing towards or whichaccounts to IV because of they are expected corridor elements arecrucial motorways and Trakia Trakiamotorway, and European road No. 79 (E-79) through SofiaVidin. to The Maritza On Central includes Bulgarian Europe. territory route theMaritzathis motorway, the from One route isthe RomaniaBulgaria,Turkey, andfurther through towards and main international link ontwo bridge the isamissing routes. As regardsroad transport, traffic. to to accessandunattractive make newbridgedifficult the on Bulgarian and Romanian infrastructureterritory. Deficient along would corridor the development alongof infrastructure the length the whole pan-European of IV corridor The economic andpractical viability of Danube Bridge –2depends uponthe adequate alongInfrastructure Pan-European Corridor IV Mediapool 21.10.2001; Keremedchiev, quoted Keremedchiev,in 21.10.2001; quoted Mediapool 4.6.2004). For example,For 4.6.2004). Kapital February February 2007). 93 CEU eTD Collection route of corridorIV (discussionB). because they would cost more, would be more difficult to build, and would increase the already too long ( them rejected administration road national The unsatisfactory. allegedly were but developed subsequently were designs Alternative EC. of the intervention the provoke to managed environmentalists Enraged feasibility study designthe and of motorway the considerdid not options route that bypassed gorge. the project consider and should include route options outside Kresna 2000, Gorge. the In however, the environmentalists, rejected two EIA reports onthe motorway, and made it obligatory that the motorway Partners 2007,In thelate 1). 1990s, theMinistry of Environment and Waters backed demands of the parts of the Kresna town and its school,their habitats. and and species In would addition,protected on the motorwayimpact disturb was detrimental planned a to have would pass toothewhich close landscape gorge, to the denselyof the length populated entire residentialthe (Bulgarianthrough Environmental NGO biodiversity protectioninBulgaria. According to the initial plans, the Struma motorway was to pass 46 launched newwas puton hold forand aonewas theproject procedure (EIA) Assessment Impact relevantstate institutions, EuropeanCommission and the theEnvironmental (EC), project (discussion A).yearsB, After involving of controversy environmental groups, Struma protesting the motorway started against Bulgarian organizations environmental late 1990s, In the border. andtheGreek betweenSofia of motorway E-79) (part One such bridgethe for problem, ofthe example,wastheconstruction project. Struma public presentation of Danube Bridge-2, they pertained totheall potential feasibility of from the dissociated problems those in keeping successful largely were authorities Althoughemerging wasstagnating. construction the Bridge-2 while the Danube of developmentinfrastructure The with alongIVweregradually problems corridor unclear. was completely sectionsmotorwaysimportant of corridor theTrakia and Struma and IV,such E-79, as turmoil. Theleftwing labeled opposition it“the most unprofitable and illicit made deal” maketo anyinformation public. the concession regarding The caused greatpolitical deal motorway without apublic tender and -in violation of the Law on Concessions - refused for contract the concession signed a35-year motorway. NDSVgovernment In 2005, the Another major problem of transport infrastructure along corridor IV has been the Trakia makewouldcosts itmeet difficultto deadline. the 2012,but delays the be increased motorway the and the by completed should of end the plans, theauthorities’ latest to According instage. is stillapreparatory project currently normsin environmental compliance with motorway –wasdesigned onlyin 2008.The Ibid The bone of contention was the Kresna Gorge. The gorge is one of the most valuable territories for ., 2-4;CEE Bankwatch Network 2003, 2).Alternative routeoptions were apparently not welcome 46 . An acceptable, though more expensive, route morebed route . An expensive, for though motorway finallyacceptable, the – 94 CEU eTD Collection were criticized by the EC. by the criticized were (Transparency BulgariaInternational 2005, 18-9).Certain clausesthe contract amounted in to and state aid by loans financed of motorways construction of price the than higher times three or twice was contract missing and Romaniainvestment. massive requiredit declaredthat startcould not corridor-IV infrastructure on Romanian territory was in a bad condition or completely In 1999, ODSgovernmentthe prioritized Danubeirrespective Bridge-2 of factthe that only by 2017 (MT2006,Appendix 1). 1.5., finalized be to expected are railway, Sofia-Plovdiv the and railway Sofia-Vidin the as before shortlylinks, of important 2010or upgrade other However,afterwards. the such Plovdivthe border and railway,beshould -Svilengrad -Turkish reconstructed upgraded developmentinfrastructure envisage keysections ofcorridorIV,including thatseveral Bridge-2 inplans for werereally for exploitation railway 2010.Current opened completed onlyby endof the 2012 and create couldtraffic bottlenecks if Danube a sectionbe Appendix should 1).Yet, bridgethe of E-79 2006, 1.6., itself (MT 2009andaround 2010,thatis, with notlong together or after plannedthe construction of be completed should Bridge-2 Danube to relevant projects infrastructure the of bulk the development, infrastructure road for plans official available last the to According best-case scenario, construction may works begineffectively in 2009. announced public tenders on the construction of the key sections of the motorway. In the and subsequently concession contract the canceledMay 2008theBulgarian government early The motorway tobecompleted2008. was by in beginningthe However, of 2011. made in was bythe revised recommendations with EC andfinalizedaccordance was in After almost 3 years of legal fights and political controversy, the concession contract Ivanov, interview for interview Ivanov, private hands, channel into to andresources corruption public opportunities and created opportunities that it was economically thatit buttransparent, dealwasanything the concludedthat Bulgaria International disadvantageous for the Bulgarian state government’s own traffic forecasts, these levels would be reached in more than 20 years ( years 20 than more in be reached would levels these forecasts, traffic own government’s would removedrained illicitly (Transparency International Bulgaria 2005). According to experts, levels the of traffic that thethreatened toburden thestate budget and allowed the for possibility operator, state ofthe that budget part resources the wouldon be results financial need low encouraged This traffic. low and revenues insufficient for compensation47 payments could be reached in 50 years. According to the in (quoted during period post-socialist the The The deal allowed the operator to receive compensationpayments from the state budgetcase in of Mediapool 28.5.2005). The price of construction envisaged by this concession this by envisaged of construction price The 28.5.2005). Mediapool 1.4.2005). Transparency 1.4.2005). Ibid ., 2-7;., 95 47 . CEU eTD Collection quoted in steer it away Bulgarianfromsection the of IV (BulgarianCorridor consultancy group Industry Watch, Central Europe would some divert of cargo trafficthe Bulgarian using the port of Varna to Constanta and 48 pan-European the (such corridors hasled DanubeBridge-2) neglect the of as to transport In general, prioritization the of symbolically effective large infrastructure projects along from international received noattention community. the The however, and project, Bulgaria linkbetween transport widely Europe. used road most and convenient, most shortest, the of part is highway This X. corridor European promoting projectalong of Sofia-Nisthe neglectedpan- the highway the previously of the Balkans.nothing else from the internationally sponsored program for the post-war Followingreconstruction projects from infrastructure the policy agenda. received other Bulgaria out crowded theitstagnate forprioritize almost made it only adecade), (and economicto any to sense fall ofoptions aresidelined.Backin DanubeBridge-2 wasprioritized it before1999, when the MilosevicIn a world regime, of scarce the government Policy Neglected Options resources, started when view. of point economic onean from justify to difficult policy in back 1999was prioritization the project’s infrastructure, condition corridor-IV of option andthe poor forecasts traffic discouraging Given the is sense. and economic practical prioritized, corridor IVon Bulgarian Danubeand territory, Romanian make Bridge-2would little alonginfrastructure substantialwithout adequate pan-European andtraffic without other policysum To importantup, Danubeis Bridge-2 an transport link inthelong run. However, ( condition ingood not is still in Romania anyway shorter corridor-X route the to alternative attractive less even an it made and km 100 than more by length route’s the increased relocation feeblestimulate local economy. The the in to region order it B). In divertaddition,decided route the of to theCarpathiancorridor IV through unless externaldeveloping it infrastructure this financing (Interview adequate received Inaddition, the planned Romanianmotorway connecting theport of Constanta to CorridorIV towards Mediapool 15.2.2006). 48 . The infrastructure across . Theinfrastructure across Carpathianthe Mountains Kapital February 2007). 96 CEU eTD Collection class-I roads was relatively good, class-II and class-III roads remained devastated remained roads and class-III class-II good, wasrelatively roads class-I motorways While and of operational2006, 171). condition the (Government criteria common meetthe not did and condition acceptable merely or in apoor was still in network midAspolicyby 65%of below).2000s, road Bulgaria aresult,the the (see conditionality bias wasBulgaria’s due to onforeigndependence funding, the biasintoEU to inbuilt ( traffic international transit usedby andthesections corridors pan-European of the sections the along network main road primarily the on carried out reconstruction Despite road theidentification and policy the of problem, was planned Bulgariansystem transport (MTC 2000,15). roads, as lower-class state identifiedof the poor ODSgovernmentthe infrastructure, transport well as ofmaintenance.its inadequate At time itwas the when setting in priorities spherethe of more thanmotorways, class-I roads or railways,but the poor physical28% condition of networkthe and of the networkThe biggest hasbeen problem not thelack Bulgarian the transport of of main roads, exception. an been not as a grave 2004; 2000 Annex Watchvi; Group hasFleischer Stability 1, 2002,6-7).BulgariaPact problem of the a large portion of the network, the periodical maintenance scheduled for every 5 to 7 were judged tobe in good condition (MT 2006, 9). 50 inward-looking investment strategies (T&E 2000 Annex 1, vi). have tended toreinforce dominant the ‘international’ focusof donors external rather thanoffset by it more policies. National investment plans have as arule complemented international investment plans. They substantial bothabsolute in terms and relative to fundsthe earmarked forother transport and infrastructure through thePHARE,TACIS, ISPAand CARDSfunding programs, well as Thisfinancingas EIBloans. has been substantial received have projects Such countries. candidate of the territory the on corridors pan-European the along infrastructure of transport improvement and construction the to particular, in and, network transport European the into networks transport countries’ of accession inclusion the to pertaining 49 2005b,2005a,countries (seeCEEBankwatch 3;T&ENetwork CEE all to common been have and networks transport pan-European the into investment massive effectof side been anegative have have that such distortions countries argued in development infrastructure accession Criticstransport oftheEU’sapproach to country. the within networks railway and road the of maintenance and rehabilitation problemsinfrastructure national, atthe andlocal suchasthe levels, regional Roughly 70% of motorways, 50%of class-Iroads, 36% of class-II roads, and27%of class- III roads clauses included countries candidate CEE and EU the between signed Agreements Association The 49 , and to the dominant, and transport focusEuropeanization inBulgaria’s to Ibid et al ., 15-6). This15-6). policy ., . 2003, 8-10; T&E. 2003, 50 . For 97 CEU eTD Collection eliminated additional border-crossing costs, and has given the route acompetitive route and the has given costs, border-crossing additional eliminated transit, has speeded accession EU countries following two between the formalities border-crossingRomania of Bulgaria. Theelimination customs and procedures and traffic projects IVand along would haveincreasedinfrastructure corridor madesense because along corridor other the for less timeline realistic with or inamore accord have been which would constructionbridge been have of the plannedforperiod the could around 2008-2010, IV was to in2001; Green (Stanchev, quoted route bethe along bottlenecks traffic expectedremove to enough been have would crossing, border the only at racketeering and taxation double of practice the discontinue and procedures, customs lengthy the shorten after service, ferry the improve to measures substantially, intensified thehad traffic Before bridge. Danube second the of EU construction the postponing of accessionoption All things considered, it would have made sense for the ODS governmentof toconsider the both day. maintenance of the and Rehabilitation Bridge-2. Danube unusable) practically time that (at was the road and railway infrastructure within leastas urgent networks a priority as country the were atfor sector thetransport remains( a priority until 1990s by since early the has Usage 70% around dropped railnetwork 176). of the the present electrificationthe wereand signalinginfrastructure obsolete (Government2006, 16, speed and capacity limitations. 80% of the engines, 70% of the carriages, and the bulk of 100 limited to km by per hour design. Postponementof repair resulted works in further lines speed was train Onmost track. railway and3%of less secondary the on than track been renewed; repair workhad been carried out onless than 30% of the primary railway By IV (MTC2000,35-7). less 20%of had than Bulgaria’s mid2000s, the tracks railway corridor especially and corridors, pan-European serviced the that railway of sections the infrastructure policy upgrade government’s andprioritized thereconstruction transport the ODS network, with the road yearswere designed ago.As than 50 more condition. too,wasin infrastructure, Railway in ofBulgaria poor railway lines Most the aslongperiods as 15 to20years (MT2006,9; Government2006, 15). for hadbeen work out maintenance carried andno postponed been hadyears repeatedly news.bg 15.9.2007). In 15.9.2007). sum, andmaintenance of rehabilitation and road the railway OMDA Press Review OMDA 7.4.1999). The 7.4.1999). 98 CEU eTD Collection transport and cargo companies have not formed a politically active or publicly visible publicly or active a politically formed not have companies cargo and transport road case.Bulgarian getinvolved Bridge-2 not Danube lobbieswith the didSectoral Press Review Press supportbridgespress theWest in to building the ontheDanube of (quoted two OMDA Bulgarian the government that furtherrecommended and ideas their Euroleftdeveloped failed to instigate widerdebates. example, for 51 in OMDA quoted (Tomov, immediately” built be to] [had bridge Danube a new Danube, the on bridges destroying [were] bombs “when “theand EU,thefinance G-25,thebridge”, IMFand theUSshould helpbecause the Romanians shouldbe commit forced to tobuildingthemselves asecond Danube Bridge” – coalition anti-war the in argued “the that It project.supporter of the an ardent into grew Euroleftthe – even partner leftwing main Its Bridge-2. Danube of prioritization againstnever the Kosovo criticized crisis, orprotested policy BSP the the during Despite all buildupODSgovernment’sthe against ‘anti-national’ and‘irresponsible’ options debatespolitical or public significant no were either there notwithstanding, considerations on above The the feasibility of Danube Bridge-2Role ofStakeholders and SectoralLobbies or on potential alternative policy transit cargo formalities, such as TIR carnets and CEMT permits, remain intact. formalities and Yugoslavia,through whereborder-crossing route over the advantage May 2000, October2000, November 2001; Review its abilityand curbed Bulgaria’s development infrastructure economic inadequate conviction that to attractorganizationsin were favor of Danube Bridge-2, a which generalreflected long-standing foreign prioritization evenof bridgethe project or questioned its feasibility. Business direct investment (see Danev, quoted in OMDA Only specialized media sporadically analyzed the feasibility of the project (for apositive evaluation see, 2.4.1999, in 2.4.1999, 51 . No political social. No in actoror group againstBulgaria protested the Balgarski Transporten Vestnik Transporten Balgarski 27.5.1999). Mediapool 16.1.2006). Balgarski Transporten Vestnik Transporten Balgarski 29.9.2000,1; forcautious orcritical analyses, see Press Review Press 8.12.2000, 1-7).Suchanalyses 5.4.1999). Later on, the Kapital Press 99 CEU eTD Collection ISPA, PHARE, and SAPARDdiscontinued and funding maintenance, for and Bulgaria.construction road for funds ofEU disbursements the froze EC the followedby scandal.a corruption Abitter political controversy whenerupted in response to these scandals (see contracts of public awarding the influenced had lobbies construction road the investigation revealed conflicts of interest within the National Road Infrastructure Fund and suggested that (now called National Road Infrastructure Fund) ( additionalof the resourcesfrom budgetthe surplus channeled through the national road administration account for most of the revenues in the sector ( sector the in revenues the of most for account 53 ( countries two these in than Bulgaria in lower significantly was operated firms inFrance and 10 times the numberof firms in Italy, but the numberof cargo vehicles that they 52 orby public attitudes large-scale possibility the infrastructure that could transport havefeltlobbies These byunfavorable tapping not available into resources. threatened construction lobbies, however, have been focused on seizing business opportunities and small relatively and numerous been have firms cargo and transport Bulgarian road segment. of the internal structure is the factor The second 2006). withstood pressurethe competition (Stanchev of European 1999, 3; competitiveness favorableand toBulgaria’s location,have they geographic successfully liberalizationmarket during andfast.was relatively transition smooth Due to their price efficiently1989, theirto eveninternational adjustment andoperated to prior competition Since to theywereexposed transport. ininternational competitive beenalways relatively isfactor thesegment’sand companies transport cargo competitiveness. Road have thisget business segmentto organizedlobby in Thefirst an efficient structure. such for account thefailure Several of factors couldinterests. their promote that potentially lobby. Until 2008, they were noteven united ina single union businessor association reportedly had reportedly administration apowerful grip national the on road ‘road construction’ lobbies have sustained close ties with political the elite andhave businesstransport has been by dominated a few powerful companies. Asmall number of lobbying,intense has encouraged contracts public attractive for scramble The maintenance. as wellthan half of which hasas been allocated to road construction,corruption, reconstruction, or inmore infrastructure Bulgaria, towards transport directed massiveinvestmentthe into In the pastyears, constructionwithin firms, and especially road construction firms, have tapped influence. political any have this to enough powerful been not have players individual business and action, collective and collusion to conducive been not thus has structure segment. This segment of the In 2007, In there were more than100 Bulgarian road construction companies, butonly five of them sake of Forthe incomparison, the mid-2000s their number exceeded timesfourof the number transport Kapital Kapital October 2007). The same five firms shared the bulk the shared firms five same The 2007). October March 2007b, March2007a). late 2007, March In an Kapital August 2006). Kapital 52 . The segment’s The . Kapital 53 2007b). It was . The road . The August 100 CEU eTD Collection to offer an opportunity to offerfor an Bulgaria,is beingasitopportunity astable zone in Balkans,to the turn instability resulting from Great Power politics. Yet, present-day globalization is believed naturalextraordinary is heldendowment numerous for responsible pastconflicts and a crucial and anatural wealth location as geographic Ithas this strategic alwaysregarded Europe. linkingand Asia routes energy, trade main on and the islocated Bulgaria transport, economic DevelopmentEuropeanization andInfrastructure asset. priority of the national transport infrastructureIn policy. the into turnedan thisthat economic project indisputable obvious argumentation and popularBelow, I argue that it was the ideological enframing of Danube Bridge-2 rather than and society? political actors, anyby stakeholders, acceptance all unconditional its for conceptionaccounts then, What, either. campaigns lobby sectoral by letalone make to itobviousAnd theprojecthas andindisputable. up notbeen propped economicfeasibility of Danube Bridge-2 was too questionablejustify to such a decision, of the that argued sections thepreceding Yet, Balkans. the of reconstruction recovery and nationalsupport within of theframework internationallythe programs sponsored for postwar Bridge-2 of on listtop the for which Bulgaria external of projects financial expected history,politicalnopoliticalpublic deliberation or on possible Therenopublicor policy alternatives. was discussion this political viability debates was Danube Bridge-2. andpractical of on economic the There on Letthe us poseprudence to summarize theof discussion theThe Construction ofBulgaria’s ‘Strategic Bridge’ government’s so far. There were no significant decision infrastructure policy. on public andpolitical transport debates public and andawayfrom kept closed largely have behind Theydoors have operated infrastructure. to place transport influence to onissuespertaining discussions public totry to or into Danube part totake been not compelled have therefore area.They policy neglected become a 101 CEU eTD Collection adopted withoutmajoradopted subsequent by alterations governments. Bulgarian the a crafted framework consensual policy been outlivedthat its governmentand has important for the West and would accelerate its Euro-Atlantic integration. The ODS thus makeif location Bulgaria would geographic was that, cleverly, strategic exploited perception The benefit. economic just than development infrastructure more to was there Yet, conflict. theKosovo of aftermath inthe theBalkans of reconstruction and recovery for earmarked funds foreign into the flow of tap to planned government the because itIn part came in policymaking. on top europeanization ‘turn’ Bulgarian of agendathe became a top priority Europeanization paradigm. infrastructure The developmentlinksWestern of Europe to for the ODS. It was developmentThe infrastructure connectfirmlyODS’s maincontribution was the to to perceived as an integral163-70; Stefanov 1998; Devedjiev 2001; 2002a). Parvanov part of the general166; Mirchev[1995] 1997, 1999, 2001;Ionchev andBaruh 2000, 143-4; Georgiev 1998, seeZhelev (e.g., interest on the national encroachment asimpermissible interpreted of pursuitthis the thatprevented strategy was Anything utilization of advantages. these leadership wascalled developupon to andimplement a strategy for maximal the 166).The location 1997, Bulgarian ([1995] from its crossroad thatstemmed advantages natural the on capitalize could Bulgaria so that else), anywhere than (rather territory East-West andtheNorth-South pan-European corridorstransport crossed on Bulgarian declared that one of the key objectives of Bulgarian foreign policyZhelev was ensureto President that the transition post-socialist of years first the in Already policy. foreign has of beenplacedinthedomain It policy. economic domain of been placedinthe with developmentdo has thusnot it Infrastructure has to economicsgeopolitics. than with do haslessto location geographic country’s of benefits the reaping the economic Bulgaria’s infrastructurepolicy has been predicatedalways upon assumptionthe that ideological by affected conceptions. most have been such national that the economy spheres arethe two of infrastructure andenergy Transport debates. publicof emotional has location beenissue alocus ofBulgaria’sgeographic strategic The position” (2008b). cash crossroad this to hascome time the now] [but location, strategic extremely In the 2000,174). (Petkova advantage an into andpolitical economic this predicament adverse apt words of President Parvanov, “Bulgaria has always suffered from its 102 CEU eTD Collection foreign policy (Parvanov 2002a). (Parvanov policy foreign Bulgarian “economicize” to wish declared President’s the with line in been have actions These agenda. placing infrastructure development in the Balkans on top of the international community’s Balkans 54 eye seen have to eye they development infrastructure of point the on Presidents, consecutive and ruling parties betweenconsecutive differences ideological of the Irrespective rather than later (e.g., see Parvanov 2006c, 2006b). In light of the region’s strategic light region’s the of In see 2006c, 2006b). Parvanov later (e.g., than rather sooner leaders business and Balkan European, to home point the bring to how been transformingand and Balkansa transport into the energy the realissuehas crossroad, to alternative no seen has leadership Bulgarian The Balkans. the for path developmental developmentis asa Infrastructure also represented indisputably natural appropriate and wouldinfrastructure solve the complex problems facing the Balkans. clarify adoptedby leadership framework projects, policy how doesnot the Bulgarian the infrastructure impact of economic from positive the apart asserting Interestingly, region’sguarantee the future place in Europe: thus solve to of a plentitude and problems are widely to believed membership) that likes being others and NATO of the several (the the europeanization panaceas (ParvanovEurope is2005c, 2006b).Infrastructure developmentbe one of assumedto Balkans, as well as of theone main reasons forof the political,the economic, andmain cultural fragmentation reasonsof the Mediapool for the region’s of mostthe fundamental inproblemsEurope (e.g.see Pasi,Southeast in quoted isolation from into Europeanmainstream. the the Thedeficiency isof basic infrastructure identified as one rest of integration for is Balkans’ the development asakeyprerequisite regarded Infrastructure Arguably,President Parvanov has surpassed allBulgarian leaders in his lobbing campaign aimed at 54 meaningful future. (Parvanov 2008a) betweenSofia and Belgrade… Withoutbreakthrough a inthis respect,we do not have a Skopje, and Sofia between a motorway is there unless region this for future European no is There place. in is infrastructure a modern unless our region for future European no is There notorious ‘powderkeg’ into the building site of Europe. (Stoyanov 2001a) infrastructure… [M]oderninfrastructure would transform Balkanthe peninsula from the West, isthat the solutionto the Balkanproblems calls for the development of modern [T]he most important fact, of which there is an increasing awareness in the East and in the . 15.10.2002, 26.11.2001,10.9.2001, 2002a,2005b).It is consideredbe toone 103 CEU eTD Collection transformation was said to require in infrastructure transformation(Stoyanov, quoted development wassaidto Europe” (Stoyanov, quoted in (Stoyanov,Europe” quoted and Europe “between put Milosevic regime the andto of Yugoslavia prosperity around acirclecreate to inorder European-typeinto democracies Balkans of democracies’ the the Milosevic regime,All haveBulgarian governments been tothefall pursuing strategy. occupied this Prior of the EU and the itself. community IFIsinternational were the of interests vital the to urgedidentical as community international the from toassistance help transform in present financial to economicinterests receiving strategy has sought Bulgaria’s the ‘poverty make such an it and to association appearnatural and This discursive undisputable. establish in to an fittingand arguments attempt employed representations repeatedly itdidnotprevent from breakup). The Bulgarian leadership, however, has a violent equation all,(after well transport anddeveloped infrastructure links within Yugoslavia between sides the this immediate, natural,indisputable of relationshiptwo and causal no is There Balkans. the in europeanization and peacebuilding with development infrastructure associate leadership has madespecialefforts The to Bulgarian supplies, has defined the developmental infrastructureand policy of Bulgaria. Balkans turn into the “building site of Europe”, and into a reliable transitroute for has beenthekey this Infrastructure reputation. translation. seeingto pride The of the in international improvement expected of flavor added the with labor, of division in understood cultural crude into of terms) the terms inthe Balkans’the position global old romanticrepresentation bridge Balkans as the of the between West(usually East and the has translated framework policy leadership’s the In line newrequirements, the with Europe: routes fromalone allows SEE to take advantage of its position on the shortestthe trade- and energy-flow isin location, perceivedasinevitable, geopolitical this direction of itthat development Middle East, Asia, and the former Soviet Union towards Western (Stoyanov 2001a; see also Parvanov 2003b) region. the of countries the to requirements new setting is Balkans the for role promising and new This West. the and East the between ofgoods supplies the reliably guarantee to – responsibility economic and historic new oftheir aware increasingly are people Balkan [T]he OMDA Press Reviews Press OMDA 2.5.2000, 27.4.1999).Such 2.5.2000, 104 CEU eTD Collection 2002a, 2002d,quoted in infrastructure policyinfrastructure spanned the idealist/rationalist the and Europeanist/nationalist to transport approach government’s ODS paradigm,like the Thus, Europeanization the itEurope’ before could metaphorically walk onit. It wasapparently Bulgaria based onthe conviction literally paveits that ‘road should to development Europeanization paradigm. tothe infrastructure doctrine also firmly linked the Yet, economy. the and geopolitics, between territory, therelationship of conceptions preexistingideological doctrinereproduced the of andexploited. Thiselement neededbe guarded tocontinuously andeconomic gains that of potential welfare source a was continents two between crossroad the on location strategic that assumption the basic principles theof Europeanization paradigm.It departed from the widely shared widelydevelopment policy accepted existingwas acombination with principles and of infrastructure to policy approach ODSgovernment’s the transport, In the sphereof The PolicyApproachtoTransportInfrastructure Development in quoted (Parvanov 2006b;Filipov, 2006c,seealso and “once and for all send the isolation and disintegration of the Balkans into history” integration, European its forfuture preconditions the crucial provide stabilize theregion, wouldthat historic dampen down frictions, preventfrictions,future durably pacify and Balkans inthe security and peace into investment best the as advertised forcefully been investments have2006a; Infrastructure Pasi 2005a, see Parvanov 2006c, 2005c, 2002c). by conflicts on peacekeeping and resources spending enormous measures (e.g. security of armed consequences the overcome strive to to than infrastructure, and energy in transport and economy in the invest to cheaper and wiser both is it that arguing been has leadership Bulgarian the Balkans, inthe community international the of interests the and infrastructure of sphere in the interests Bulgaria’s between harmony the emphasize (Parvanov In order to political conflict instability 2006c). intoagain and ethnic collapse in developmentinfrastructure couldof SEE intheBalkans causethehotspots tensions to hasinadequate been involvement that warning international in of the community Press Review OMDA 27.4.1999). Since27.4.1999). thefall Milosevic,of leadership Bulgarian the Mediapool 15.10.2002, 26.11.2001 and 10.9.2001). Mediapool 20.6.2002; Pasi 2002c, Pasi 20.6.2002; 105 CEU eTD Collection between1996 and1999 basisthe on ofanalysis an knownas Transport Infrastructure Needs Assessment planned was countries CEE the to TEN-T of the extension The market. single EU’s the within networks Policy (Fleischer 2002), whose principle was to guarantee interconnectionthe Transport of Common national transport 1992 EU’s of the pillar basic a became TEN-T The cohesion. social and economic of reinforcement the and Market Internal of the creation the of element key a as Union European throughout the 1980s. The legal basis forthe development of the TEN-T was provided in the Treaty onthe 56 Europe Northern (Vasilev,and quoted in Southern between and Asia and Europe Western between bridge of a position Bulgaria the transport and infrastructure centerof EuropeSoutheast and to exploit country’sthe make to strategic familiar: been have infrastructure regarding ambitions declared whose BSPgovernments, the 55 safeguard andutilizegeopolitical advantages Bulgaria’s as the way national only to they were perceived wealth; location as a of geographic 2001a; MTC 2001).These wellpolicy resonated priorities popularwith the conception 2000b, 2000a, 2001b, 86-7, Government Bulgarian (see crossed territory corridors that systemEuropean transport of and development strategicthe transport pan-European the into system transport national the of integration naturally: followed development integration NATO(see MTC2001).Theconcretepriorities infrastructure in transport exploit it in Bulgaria’s efforts infrastructure transport policy revive traditionalwas to this important andtofully role to attainnew the of goal The its Europe. foreignNorthern and Southern between and Asia and policyEurope priorities, namely fast hadsocialism Bulgaria lost its traditional bridge’ ofa‘transport Western role between EU and 2000b,(Government seealsoA 1998a). fundamental identified: problem was during center” infrastructure and economic an in SEE, factor political leading a “Bulgaria make thereflected ODSgovernment’s foreign equally ambitious policy goal, which wasto basis,On infrastructurethis ODSsetambitious the for development. goals These goals location. ofits geographic benefits strategic was representedeconomic so development, developmentthe infrastructure of links Western with Europe integrationAnd like just European aswas representedas ensure bestway the national to the best interest. economic i.e. national the priority, ‘national’ the italso served but integration, way to ideologicalensure divides. It served the fundamental foreign policy priority of Euro-Atlanticthat Bulgaria would reap the economic with the trans-European transport network (TEN-T) and the TINA network TINA andthe (TEN-T) network transport trans-European with the plans inaccordance wereinfrastructure developed transport The government’s ODS The concept of transport corridors traversing and connecting Western Europe was being developed being was Europe Western connecting and traversing corridors of transport concept The TheODS government’s visionof transport infrastructure development was adopted by NDSVthe and Mediapool 15.3.2005; MT 2006, 17-8). 55 . 56 . Thefive 106 CEU eTD Collection Council), most of the pan-European corridors are part of the TEN-T. of the part are corridors pan-European of the most Council), of the and Parliament European of the No 884/2004/EC Decision (see TEN-T of the development necessary.althoughCEE countries canFollowinginclude network, additional TINA the of components backbone the into are the TINA networkcountries TINA if they of the deem territory the on corridors ten These 13). the enlargementConferences between 1997( 1991 and of(TINA). pan-European tenThe corridors were developed Pan-European duringthree Transportthe EU in 2004 and the revision of the EU guidelines for the being spenton modest, although in the muchas secretariat bytheTINA was described TINA projects into GDP of national wealthierthe 1.5% Investing EU member investment. national substantial for statesneed the stressed the conditionality EU same share of GDP was In addition, infrastructure. transport fundingfor substantial included countries candidate infrastructure in East-Central Europe. EU support for economic developmentin heavily TheEIBinvested in received byCEEcountries transport 2000,8). (T&E 70% constituted of total the and grants from multilateral loans developmental banks as part and Balkans the in recovery economic post-conflict for of assistance international thethrough EU’s effortsexternal financing infrastructure for development coming from EUandthe IFIs, both to develop was networks understandable. Forone, agendathe largely was setby available the the and projectswithin thepan-European TINA infrastructure The preference transport for TEN-T. Lending forselection. project justification for the government’s be wasdeemednetwork sufficient pan-European priorities the and to transport between the harmony publicized.The officially not were European corridors sector of along fivepan- routes the the for prioritized projects forecasts studies ortraffic were given priority (MTC 2000,28-41,2001;interviews A, B,C).Economic feasibility that projects the determined territory Bulgarian across corridors transport pan-European in adjacent regions, attract investments, encourage business activities, promote regional promote businessactivities, encourage investments, regions, attract in adjacent constructionlinks major of pan-European wouldtransport economicboost development the that assumption an was there one, For network. pan-European the within projects to givepreference to leadership ledBulgarian the that considerations other also There were infrastructure policies ( policies infrastructure favored the pan-European corridors rather than other elements of the developmentgovernment’s infrastructure EU’splans ‘followed the andEuros’, the Euros transport and all investment in the transport sector ( Ibid ., 19). Pan-European Transport Corridors andAreas Status Report Ibid ., Annex 1, i). The ODS 2006, 107 CEU eTD Collection priorities within the pan-European network itself, geopolitical criteria carried the day. the carried criteria geopolitical itself, network pan-European the within priorities policy approachin There was alsoa ‘Balkan’part ODSgovernment’s the Europeanization-inspired construction. in the involved regions inthe togrowth economic encourage and transportbenefits economic and tangible fast bring would such projects that been perception the infrastructureprojects andtheir ability bring fastandpoliticalto dividends.A tangible reasonhas third reason for policymakers’ large-scale fixation on hasbeen projects visibility the of such development. When the ODS had to set infrastructure maintenance andupgrade (T&E infrastructure construction of new infrastructure to the neglect of economically feasible projects for perceived problems oflow density infrastructure has thus and encouraged the constraints and overall economic decline. The TINA process, for example, focused upon ability attractexternalto funding – advantagea crucial in conditionsfinancial of agendaduetoitslarge-scale the has dominated new To alargeconstruction extent, improvement. management or infrastructure existing of reconstruction and maintenance into smaller-scale investment over andnewof projects infrastructure construction the The ODS government, aswell subsequentgovernments, favoredlargeas infrastructure economy and upon the socio-economic conditions of affected regions. national the upon impact potential theprojects’ of estimations concrete or return, projects by estimateddata, rates forecastof infrastructure economic prioritized providing key of the feasibility the prove andto beyondstatements go general to attempt infrastructuremake –thoseof government(MT 2006)– Bulgaria’s no transport BSP the Even and latest, arguably mostthe plans ambitious todate, for development the of usually the result of the prioritization of a particular project, rather than the reason forit. andfor few projects couldbereserved thus the preliminary were depth selected studies yetrequire didcompelling, In- research. not andtime-consuming expensive preliminary and thatappearedambitious strategies for policy drafting werehandy guidelines a widely networks and pan-European/TINA the undisputableguideline, accepted policy madeeuropeanization ideological environment compliance with pan-European the wholethe (Stanishev of Since the pro- post-socialist period 2006). transition projectinfrastructure been design and havestudies throughout inadequate preliminary economic growth, and lower regional unemployment. For another, funds earmarked for et al . 2003, 10; T&E 2002,25).Another. 2003, 108 CEU eTD Collection and the development of pan-European corridor VIII in general, because it has prioritized the development the prioritized has it because ingeneral, VIII corridor of pan-European development the and prioritized Via-Ignatia motorway.Macedonia hasdelayed construction the of Skopje-Sofia the railway, development of corridors VIII and IX in order tosafeguard competitivethe the advantages of obstructed its highly has Greece of Constanta. port Sea Black ofits importance strategic the boost to order 57 16.1.2006). from Bulgarian territory away routes transport international the steer might they that in damaging potentially plansas areseen infrastructure whosecompetitive countries, neighboring from emanate geopolitical its of use make to advantagesability its upon and location, territorial strategic its of benefits economic the reap to to ability its upon wealth, improvenatural its over nation the of right its policy. uponthesovereigninfrastructure encroachments perceived have invoked They international transport Bulgaria’s of part integral an been always have danger of Representations standing.priorities onlyafter fallthe Milosevicthe of (see regime MTC 2001). differentiation from Projects alongXwereincluded Balkans. the corridor inthelist of Most suchcorridor X and the preference forthreats corridor IV were obvious upshots of the strategy of bridge are on thebelieved Danube,neighboringProjectsincluding countries(MTC2000,44). corridor along IV, second the were ranked to made the vulnerablecountry tounfavorable developments,such as instability in highest accordingsecurity’route be‘Transport dependence requiredtransport avoided that onone it as to this criterion.‘transport The neglect of criterion general the to reference with indirectly wererationalized They justified. of security’not were preferences These missingpolicy 2000). altogether (MTC Yugoslavia) was corridorthatimportant IVwasconspicuously privileged, X(through whilecorridor was thesymbolically development, infrastructure for transport strategy In thenational said to haveReview guidedin quoted (Kostov, nodemocratic regime was there where of Yugoslavia, reconstruction thethe over priority have should development their selectionthat argued and corridors provide development infrastructure It urgedthe along two fundsthese for EU to 28-37). of priority thatcircumvented Yugoslav(MTC 2000, Europe namely IVand corridors VIII territory, projects.Prior tothe fall of Milosevic, the government prioritized those transport linksWestern to Romania has resisted the development ofbetter infrastructure links across the Danube withBulgaria in 9.6.1999). 57 (Government 2001a; Stanishev, quoted in2001a; Stanishev, (Government quoted OMDA Press OMDA Mediapool 109 CEU eTD Collection Bulgaria from ‘cashing’ its geopolitical advantages: (Sokolov, quoted in from Europe off cut spatially they were because crisis by affected the worst countries Constanta ( Constanta Burgas and Varna charged of ports was The Bulgarian Transportation expensive. Sea 1999, 3). Black the through (Stanchev fees times delivery and three transportation of cost the both increased timessubstantially higher than thoseAlternative atways of thetransportation Romanian were difficult to find. Railway halted. was trafficBulgaria through Almost all blocked.transitrailway Danube was port routes across ofRomania The losses. economic andcauseddirect exports, Bulgarian of competitiveness the whichCentral mademore trading Europe, expensive andtime undermined consuming, and Western with Balkans the connecting routes road shortest the along flows transport deterred military war. The operations air duringthe materialized The scenarios dire and security: government identify to Yugoslavia asalooming toBulgaria’s interest threat national Vasilev,quoted in formerin the conflict of cases earlier the in because unprecedented was crisis Kosovo the during shock Yugoslavia, trade The pertained to trade with EU and CEFTA countries.EFTA countries received 12%ofBulgarian exports. the share58 respectiveof border regions (BIRN 2007;CSEES 2002). trade becausehas tried tolimitBulgarianit Albanian and influencewith among population and the inthe living Yugoslavia, and Greece – SEE in partners trading important more its the with connections transport of EU and CEFTA had been smaller (Stanchev 1999, 2; Yugoslavia passed andwar, someBulgarian imports 45% of exports through Bulgarian 50%of airthe to Prior advantages. geopolitical Bulgaria’s to threat greatest the pose to held was itBack in 1990s, however,was former unstableregion late of the the Yugoslavia that Prior to the outbreak of the crisis, around 55% of Bulgarian exports and 50% of Bulgarian imports ofBulgarian 50% and exports ofBulgarian 55% around crisis, ofthe outbreak the to Prior 2000b) vulnerability minimizes the effects of Bulgaria’s strategic geographic position. (Government This infrastructure. transport existing ofthe vulnerability the proved Europe Western and The Kosovo andcrisis the severing of exchangestransport through Bulgaria towards Central support the peacemaking operations. (Kostov, quoted inOMDA Press Review 17.3.1999) to refuse we cannot Therefore, conflict. Kosovo the to hostages remain Bulgarians let cannot that, in case of an embargo, becomes aninsurmountable barrier to Bulgarian trade flows… We BetweenEurope Bulgariaand now stands the Yugoslav political, economic, and cultural wall 58 Ibid ( OMDA PressReview OMDA OMDA Press Reviews OMDA Press ., 3). According to the ODS, Bulgaria and Macedonia were the two OMDA Press Review 7.4.1999). 10.5.1999). This ODS the dependency 10.5.1999). prompted 3.5.1999). Yugoslavia 3.5.1999). had all butprevented 110 CEU eTD Collection be an ordinary bridge; it was to be a ‘ of keystone imagesupposed to Danubebecause building this wasnot strategy Bridge-2 appreciate. The DanubeBridge-2 the domesticpromotion wasthe to project of public demonstrate forBalkansinvulnerability andthis both andto for restof the the Europe from invulnerability necessary in ensure Western instability the the Bulgaria’s to identity, center infrastructure and its and importance as an was bridge. akey It transport and characteristics European its Balkans, the from difference country’s the stress longerwas no to enough It were imperative. imagecampaign in building Bulgaria’s changes left leadership that convinced war Bulgarian the TheKosovo from Balkans. the well of differentiation strategy inserved zones the and Yugoslavia conflict former the Danube Bridge-2 stood outKosovo crisis, and whyfor it was readily accepted as suchits by the public. ability towould that Bulgaria compensate for economicthe losses ithad during incurred the symbolically disengageinfrastructure policy transport foreign and whyitpolicy, as was represented projectthe Bulgaria frompolicy how this thatexplains doctrine couldproject emergeasakeypriority in both the its Danubeforeign realization of dominant Bridge-2 asaconcrete persuasively represent to ability ODS’s the is It policy. foreign Bulgaria’s for importance symbolic strong its Nominally, Danube Bridge-2 was not a colossal infrastructure project butit stood out for Ideological EnframingofDanube Bridge-2 meaningless. altogether region inthe policy andEuropean European interests promote able to actor role of an its self-designated for nowCentral heldheld “thehostage” (Kostov,interview onlykey “Bulgaria Europe”, to Milosevic, In Minister’s vividwords, linkbetween Primethe who Europe. Bulgaria and spatial important symbolically the severed had war Kosovo the that was perception The Lastleast,notbut emanating thethreats from hadasymbolic Yugoslavia dimension. Spiegel involve direct economic benefits, but also serve important political and strategic functions. transport corridors, pan-European ofthe sections ofthe development the that again once showed and crisis Kosovo The especially the building of the second bridge on the Danube, not only 1999). By taking Bulgaria hostage, the unstable part of Balkans rendered partof the theunstable hostage, By Bulgaria 1999).taking strategic bridge ’: 111 CEU eTD Collection of the War inYugoslaviaof in andproblemsNikolov,OMDA (Kostov quoted these forward asthesolution to put was The of anewDanube Bridge construction market. European tothe routes transport alternative of availability the with specifically, and, its proveconflict thatBulgaria had to infrastructure problem with a serious The figuresKosovo thedisturbing incurredODS cited losses economic the of during interest. economic national the defend to ability its for out stood also Bridge-2 Danube an indispensable EUand NATO ally. advantage of politicalthe augmentin instability Balkansto Bulgaria’s the reputation of quoted inquoted (Filipov, flank European Southern NATO’s and center European NATO’s between link wouldthat fulfill allow a Bulgaria function in tonamely key guarantee NATO, to the be asaproject presented to started Bridge-2 Danube tothe new was adapted situation. presentation Danube the Afterinof Bridge-2 regime Yugoslavia, 3.12.1999). the change in quoted (Mihajlova, Yugoslavia in former the new crises potential to hostage become not would region the that guarantee to need the invokedand reasoning this followed justification project’s the regime, Milosevic the of fall the Until andfactor atrustworthy [of partner in West]the Europe”Southeast (Evtimov 2001, 2). andEurope Bulgaria. Thebridge would affirm Bulgaria’s “aposition of stabilizing route across the task tovolatile provide, together with the only other EU accession country Balkansin the region, a safe Euro-Atlantic and association. to If the bridgeprotect were built, Bulgaria of would strategy proactive well served the thus integration. Euro-Atlantic for It contest the be entrustedthe with thevital geopolitical in which Bulgariaearnedpoints through additional project Danube was also a Bridge-2 interests ofimpaired. both government deployed during the Kosovo war and its aftermath would have been ODS the that structure ideological whole the acquiesce init), to press Romania and to Had this keystone beenremovedactively (i.e. hadtheEUrefused to project the support possible to circumvent the conflict zones of former Yugoslavia. (Government 2000b) (Government Yugoslavia. of former zones conflict the circumvent to possible it make they and states EUmember and the region between connections easier enable They Mediapool 9.9.2002). Danube Bridge-2 was treated as an opportunity as take Danubean opportunity was Bridge-2to treated 9.9.2002). 29.3.1999). The second to Danube wasexpected bridge 29.3.1999). Information ontheEconomic Impact Information OMDA Press Review Press OMDA 112 CEU eTD Collection could compete with it. with compete could due to divergent economic or political interests, no alternative project or policy option of sectoralpolitical actors, lobbies orsocialwho its wouldgroups prioritization oppose absence the In interests. national Bulgaria’s serve to perceived widely was that and time an urgent project that was in complete harmony with the powerful policy doctrines of its option fulfill asfunctions all listed above.DanubeBridge-2could the wasconstructed policy infrastructure project andnoalternative transport noother 1990s, In late the be would servedwell. interests andgeopolitical economic national and wouldbe offset costs the assured that rest could citizens however, the Bridge-2, be values, theDanube costly. tocompensations out hadturned to such as Thanks Euro-Atlanticdemonstrate Bulgaria’s adherence to need to constructions, namely the Atlantic Europeanization in interest national paradigm definedand both the asaninterest Euro- –the ideological constructs key ODS’s the stabilized Danube thus Bridge-2 integration national Bulgaria’s interests. anywayinevitable for Euro-Atlanticinternational for solidarity the support community’s and Bulgaria’s buthad infact‘traded’ and dignity, sovereignty impaired the country’s not had and economic unconditionally demands NATO’s accepted not had ODS the that prove favor of bridgethe wasinvoked tolegitimize thegovernment’s Kosovo policy and to in campaign the of success The development.priority. urgent be an to considered not otherwise have they tofinancewould that international aproject press donors andto otherwise, accepted Kosovo The warBulgaria of hadtakenadvantage exceptional situation the the international during to identitypressBridge, its defending ODS the commitmentto demonstrated interest. national the Romaniapoints for policy legitimization. to By promoting the ‘Bulgarian’elementsfinally idea for a second Danube Yugoslavia, this project offered powerful symbols thattheODScould useasfocal accept stancewith in popular pro-NATO Amidst discontent Bulgaria’s waragainst the a proposalof these upon Bulgaria’s ability reap to economicthe benefits ofits strategic geographic location. thatfuture encroachment and prevent Europe to Western to thus route provide analternative it would have not 113 CEU eTD Collection clash is analyzed in the next two chapters. clashed rivals two the however, again subsided, crisis Kosovo the ideological after key Shortly its – with nationalism. – thisrival clash major first time the in won clearly over paradigm theEuropeanization fortunesThe opposition. leftwing the by upheld ofsecurity national Bulgaria’sand sovereignty of nuclearandideological the Europeanist/nationalist and overwhelmeddivides the rival discourse energy. This secondIn combination, the two parts of the doctrine stretched across both the idealist/materialist anditappeared tosafeguard national the interest. economic its of position factor and in a stabilizing atrustworthy West of partner the region; the Bulgaria’sdemonstrated invulnerability from andthus crises Balkan appeared toaffirm it Balkans; in the zones conflict the from Bulgaria disengaged symbolically andthus Yugoslavia circumvented that Western Europe to route an alternative andpart parcel of of deploymentthe two-sidedthis foreignprovided It policy doctrine. The prioritizationDanube. the on bridge asecond of building the for assistance economic and integration of Euro-Atlantic the fast of form in the bridgeinterest’ national ‘the of pursuit the to identity project, whosein moral solidarity its its of European entailed willingness assume the obligations and economic feasibility ‘interest’linkedYugoslavia. part Its Bulgaria’sEuro-Atlantic demonstration of was dubious,Bulgaria showEuro-Atlantic solidarity during military the campaign againstneighboring was that –necessitated Balkans the Bulgaria from differentiating strategy atthe aimed paradigm, the ODS constructedguided policymaking in the course of the Kosovo controversy. By a deployingcoherent this interpretive that as framework served The Europeanization paradigm dominant the foreign policy doctrine. Its ‘identity’Summary part – 114 CEU eTD Collection 61 constraints. 60 59 due tolack offinancing The construction of a second NPPatBelene in started butwas 1987 abandoned in 1990 Duringaverage 40%. last around decade,this the share wasevenhigher(seeTable1). share in1990, the ofthe NPP’sproduction has overall been electricity on production Since generation 1992). (Curtis power nuclear inper capita intheworld ranked third Bulgaria in 1989, unit sixth the of installment the Following electricity. Bulgaria’s Bulgaria’s so far only NPP at Kozloduy has traditionally produced a large share of swallowed USD1.2billion mass protests by people living in adjacent regions. Up to that point, construction had another IAEA review concluded that the fourin small IAEA review were another the units that concluded extremely poor safety andproblems several serious at incidents NPP( the mission a when 1990, in scrutiny ofinternational under came the first NPP Kozloduy the of International safety The Atomic(NEK). Energy Company Electric National the - Agency utilities Bulgarian the by run been has and state-owned (IAEA) documentedbigger230s. The two has of unitsare1000-MW a newerdesign.TheNPP VVERs been a number of (PWRs) reactors –VVER440- water first-generation pressurized down were 440-MW The had NPP six Soviet-design small Thefourunits. units havenowbeen that shut International for Pressure the Early of Decommissioning Kozloduy’s Units1-4 The conservation of the unfinished reactor and turbine hall on the site has required additional financing. additional required has site the on hall turbine and reactor unfinished of the conservation The financial severe faced and payments debt foreign on a moratorium declared Bulgaria time, the At Local businessman from Kozloduy, quoted in ‘We Didn’tNeedThisEurope’ the EU-ImposedClosureofOldUnits KozloduyNPP 60 61 , poor economic feasibility, and environmentally-motivated and feasibility, economic poor , . 59 : SetbacksofEuropeanization intheCaseof Chapter 4 TOL 18.4.2007. ENS 2003).A year later 115 CEU eTD Collection Research website). Research problems (Myers 1993,5-6; design serious and vessels, pressure reactor of the embrittlement aging, to due unsafe generally are the high-powerchannel Still,reactors. experts have converged opinion aroundthe thatVVER 440-230s 63 public contracts of ( awarding the in decisions non-transparent and operations, financial illegal of a series Westinghouse, 1990s, inspections of Kozloduy’s finances registered a major irregular damaging and contract with commission reported serious flaws inthe operationof the Kozloduy NPP (Curtis 2002). Later inthe 62 closuremet. deadlines The not NSA funds,were by foreign complemented additional the sector, the andprojects investment restructure complete the failed to As Bulgaria measures aimed atrestructuring and energy the increasingsector energy efficiency. thatwould wellason investment ofsupply, for alternative provide projects as sources (NSA) set Account special from the Safety Nuclear an for inmillion grant exchange ECU 24 up by the close Kozloduy’sBulgariaG-7.in and 3-4by endof units1998, 1-2 agreedto 1997 units the The closure In 1993,underAccount Nuclear the Agreement(NSAA) Safety signed with EBRD, the dates world’sthe most nuclear dangerous installations. This view was by also adopted EU. the were dependentinto the environment. on straightwas thelack leakbeing of a radiation shelltoprevent from emitted a protective Thethe US Departmentcompletion mostproblematicwhich of the structural defects, due to a reasonable cost upgradeable at of Energy listed of Thus, four the VVER440-230units atKozloduy were declared unsafe theandnon- Kozloduy NPP among discontinuedsafety on pendingimprovementsgrounds, statement, the IAEA recommended strong that the unusually units’ an In operation standards. safety be immediatelybasic meet to failed and condition physical emergency safety emergencyimprovements safety at and closure earliest the premature date conceivable small-scale for down marked and accident), Chernobyl in the involved type (the reactors high-powerchannel next graphite-moderated obsolete the to upgradeable’ group, ‘upgradeable’ and ‘non-upgradeable’. VVER440-230s were included inthe ‘non- groups – two Soviet-builtintowere divided reactors Europe. safety in Eastern The 1992 G-7Economicin formulated Summit Munich a improvingforstrategy nuclear again in 1992. in andput foreign financialassistance operation Theywereupgradedwith for upgrade. The VVER 440-230s are similar to PWRs built in the West and do not exhibit the inherent instability of Local inspections reached troubling conclusions,safety too.1991, a In review by a governmental Active Elements Nuclearin Safetyand Central Eastern Europe 2004). 62 . Units 1and2wereshutdown 2001; Nordic Nuclear Safety Nuclear Nordic 2001; 116 63 . CEU eTD Collection than inthe maximal scenario of NEK’s the forecast for samethe year published in 2004 (NEK 2004b, 15). 64 based on implausibly high forecasts of energy consumption by therequest justified a fabricated andforpairs the 2008/2010 two 1999b, The ODSgovernment respectively 41). (EC 2004 after until i.e. life’, justified economically their of end the ‘till operation in remain Bulgaria respondedbyasking arevision for NSAA the of allowto allfour units to 2001 andclosurepairs deadlines 2002for two to the of respectivelyunits 1997,67). (EC between disagreement InAgenda Bulgaria andtheEU. ECextended 2000,the the The bidfor keeping theunits’ operational made the Kozloduy NPP aconstant source of 2010 respectively Bankwatch 1998; (CEE Network Government until would be3 and endof the and unit4 until endof the operated unit2004, and 2008 international units the that alreadyconformed unitssafety 1-2 to standards andthat units a NEK program adopted for further upgradesandplannedinvestments in further the the made. it Instead, had least investments tothe due not close theunits, to reluctant increasingly Bulgaria wasgrowing From mid-1990sonwards, the units. upgrade the funding investmentand anECU million itself,by Bulgarian60 state the wereusedto conflict recovery in ( recovery Balkans the conflict post- regarding commitments its fulfill to failure its of reminded was EU the time, integration country infor (interview same Reuters1999).At the its European efforts the assist to reluctance EU’s the reflected that and competitiveness economic Bulgaria’s demands for earlycompetitiveness. closure of be itswas said crucial energy energy anddemand cheap to nuclear for economic the units as “an1999,for Reuters 1999). The units were said be to indispensableabsurd if BulgariaIn was tomeet a dictate”notorious duringdemonstrated crisis the Kosovo seeKostov, interviews(e.g., for BBC Radio that was invokedinterview,set to damage issue. Itstarted framing the dispute in terms of Bulgaria’ssensitive national interest extremely an andinto implicitlytheit Prime turned and problem the of escalation the to contributed EU’sMinister responsibilityApparently strengthen to seeking Bulgaria’s bargaining ODSgovernment position, the Kostov characterized to EU reciprocate Bulgaria’s Euro-Atlantic solidarity For an illustration, Foran the forecasted energy consumptionfor strategy this 2010 in was higher 1.5times (Bakardjiev 1999; RFE/RL Newsline Ibid .). National Energy Strategy 21.6.1999). The government took theposition The government took 21.6.1999). 64 . 1998b). (Government 1998b) (Government 117 CEU eTD Collection that the defense of the NPP was a matter of defending the national interest, it argued that argued it interest, national the defending of matter a was NPP the of defense the that view the retained it While enlargement. EU of wave forthcoming in the place Bulgaria’s view of securing a with units Kozloduy the closure of early on the compromise a negotiate to amandate requested ODS government In November1999,the would haveamounted toa total failure its of government. negotiations start accession to aninvitation ECandreceive the adealwith negotiate emphasisdisproportionate foreign upon Euro-Atlanticpolicy and integration. Failureto Review Press Kozloduy for simply units the sake integrationEuropean of quoted (Kostov, in itintenddeclaredeasily did not that to interestsacrifice thenational bysacrificing the in domestic politics. Ithad identified the NPP as anindispensable economic asset. It had Bulgaria’s bargaining vis-à-vis position theEUandin tostabilizeorder its own position strengthen to inorder both interest national the defending of terms emotional the between a rock and ahard place. The ODS had started framing Kozloduythe problem in ODS governmentthe Thenegotiations Kozloduy but anythingsmooth. put dilemma was EU accession invitation to to from controversy itself, passage the In Bulgaria From Kozloduy to Belene: Domestic Nuclear Politicization ofthe Energy Issue negotiations. accession ( planned The ECdemanded bytheBulgarian government. bythe closure end of 2006 precede those to weresupposed dates latter EC.The the inwith consultation units 3-4 further of determineclosureclose dates to 2002, and the itself 1-2bytheendof to units negotiations several days EUHelsinki prior tothe inSummit 1999.Bulgaria obliged 39, 1998a,30).A 1999a, 1999b, unnervingcompromise wasreachedafter 40-1, negotiations accession start to Kozloduy of (EC oldthe units closure the agreementon was madeupon conditional invitation Bulgaria’s conditionality. - leverage strongest toits underinternational Agenda 2000,andresorted commitments NSAA and the in line its not with found request Bulgaria’s consumption, electricity forecasted of levels high unrealistically the with disagreed It unmoved. remained EC The Memorandum 25.10.1999). During 25.10.1999). its termin it however,office, had also placed a 1999). At the Helsinki Summit, Bulgaria was invited to start EU invited to was BulgariaSummit, At Helsinki the 1999). OMDA 118 CEU eTD Collection key players in Bulgarian politics already in this very early phase of the controversy. strategies the of and electoral struggles with partisan dilemma the become entangled did strengthen Whilereally Left. Kozloduy it havethe the not did desiredthe effect, unite and to was expected that mobilization for political it, becameafocal beforepoint Review Press in quoted (Parvanov, people the of interests the of in defense stance oppositional would all terminate atbuilding attempts apolitical andwouldconsensus aradical take used Kozloduy the squabbles dramatizeits to stance.oppositional it Itannounced that culmination of the BSP’ssustainedthe against opposition ODS government. The BSP symbolic a and problem Kosovo the over clash parties’ the of continuation symbolic The clash5.11.1999). theODSover between andBSP the Kozloduy the was a problem without an NPP and without EUmembership (Ovcharov,in quoted both Bulgaria in leave would case Kozloduy interestthe todefend national the failure Press Reviews OMDA in in inherent inequality Bulgaria between the and negotiations EU (BSP,quoted the Kozloduy the sovereignty againsttreated national linked the problem andas protested to integration. Instead, like in the case of Bulgaria’s support for NATO’s Kosovo war, it OMDA Press Review earlyunits’ closure see (e.g.Confederation of Independent UnionsTrade inBulgaria (KNSB), quoted in 65 continueto until 2004 had remain to inleastuntil operation at negotiations2004-2005 and that onunits 3-4had unitsargued 1-2 afirmIt any that The BSP,however, took compromise. against stance 5.11.1999). favorable of conditions closuredeal the in ODS,quoted (e.g. see foreignimportant policy by priority compensationsdemanding and bynegotiating all- andinterest Bulgaria’s economic national Bulgaria’s between imminent clash the cushion planned integration. to ODSgovernment Bulgaria’sEU ultimate priority The – endanger not would only viable the that therefore option acompromiseaccepting was andthat units closurethe on of early bythe 1993agreement trapped Bulgaria was Other stakeholders in the debate, such as workers unions, too, started voicing their opposition to the 5.11.1999). The sensitive 5.11.1999). Kozloduy likeproblem, theKosovo problem 4.11.1999). 65 3/4/5.11.1999). Ittookthe stance ODSgovernment’s thatthe 3/4/5.11.1999). . The BSP rejected the tendency to link the units’ closure to EU OMDA Press Review Press OMDA OMDA Press Review Press OMDA OMDA 119 CEU eTD Collection such as the Bulgarian Atomic Forum (better known as Bulatom), the Bulgarian Union of unions attheKozloduy NPP; nuclearlobby,and the by energy organizations represented Committee for Resumption of the Construction of the Belene NPP (CCRCB), workers’ Civic a Kozloduy NPP (CCDK); of the Defense the for Committee Civic called organization civic an active especially (BDUR); Union ‘Radicals’ Democratic Bulgarian the and Movement Gergyovden the VMRO, – parties political nationalist rightwing several NDSV), the to elections hadlost the ODS (which coalition parliamentary included themainstream opposition – parties BSPandthe the rightwing SDSwith its lobbyand groupsrepresenting nuclear the energy industry.membersprominent Its of supporters Kozloduy of political the NPP united disparate civic actors, organizations Aninvolved The unfoldedinformal widespreadprotests. quicklyandconflict coalition conflict. of 3-4,however,units negotiation seemedstill ledopen a majorto and to political itmost butturmoil was stakeholders closure The wereawarethat largely predetermined. lot of 1-2causeda fate of political units in The of Bulgaria. pointpolitical controversy As Kozloduy the 2002closurethe deadlineissuebecame amajor wasapproaching, crisis. for agenuine political stage By 15.12.1999). itwas endof the 1999, clear the Kozloduy that hadsetdilemma the (Ovcharov, Parvanov, or BSP, quoted in quoted BSP, or Parvanov, (Ovcharov, victory’ as‘a invitation Pyrrhic Helsinki Summit the it interest; characterized national humiliatingly accepting all conditions imposedby EC the failingand for defendto the Predictably,30.11.1999). BSPdidmiss the not chancescold to the government the for enter the EU with negotiationsPress Review OMDA in quoted (Mihajlova, interest” national the of like elements vital the of any thiscompromising one” (Kostov, quoteditdeclaredhad that “solved the problem with [Helsinkithe invitation Summit] without in The ODSgovernment process. accession its hadfulfilled primary whilegoal but, it of stages the in very early the already integration for EU high price an unexpectedly feeling was Bulgaria little hadpaid metwith however, general that wasenthusiasm. The mandate tonegotiate a compromise agreement with the EC. The compromise agreement, a the received ODS government longdebate, parliamentary 7-hour heated After a 9.12.1999), italso 9.12.1999), thatBulgaria reckoned benot “would able to OMDA Press Reviews OMDA OMDA Press Review Press OMDA 3/8/30.11.1999, 120 CEU eTD Collection collected over 500 000 signatures in protest against the closure and demanded a againstand demandedin closure the protest overcollected 500000signatures 10.4.2002, 3; demanded Presidentthe veto closure the of in that 1-2(KNSB, quoted units see (e.g. occasions nationalistrightwing organized relevanton relatively parties conspicuous protests a stance. The and similarly took stakeholders antagonistic political Other actors in fieldthe interest energy. ofnuclear national the defend to government the of failure the lament to a chance missed never against units’see Danev, the in closure (e.g. quoted in (Kornezov, quoted sector energy verdict’ Bulgarian on the a deathpenalty of against passing ‘the protest in of beingdecommissioning party the support fund Parliament was walked out ratified, a on EBRD the with agreement an When EU). the with confrontation head-on a for 1999compromiseto the itwas virtuallyimpossible agreement reverse (shortof to opting TheloudlyBSP protested 2.12.2002). closurethe of even 1-2,although units againstdue involved mass with rallies, the whetherprotest unofficially openly or (see The ledBSP apro-Kozloduy campaign inopenopposition the rulingwas party.to It units 3-4(Mihajlova 2002). accepted was opposed It butto anearly closureof closurethe 15.10.2002). units 1-2,of decision regarding units 3-4. units regarding decision defended the national interest by postponing closurethe ofunits1-22003 until by and thefinaldelaying 66 in quoted ‘Vazrajdane’, organization ODSgovernmentthe forresponsible NPP’spredicament the hold to NDSV ruling the of tendency unpardonable the at outrage express to opportunity The rightwing government. bloc maintained aconflictual stanceevery and took score politicalto points and eachlaunched ‘Kozloduy’ amajor againstoffensive the In mainstream thepolitics, leftwing andthe rightwing opposition seized theopportunity closure. 2002,thousandsthroughout to against of people streets the took to protest units’ the Nuclear Operators (BUNO) and the Bulgarian Nuclear Society (BNS). In addition, As the ODS had inherited the 1993 agreement for early closure of the four old units, it held that it had Sega 1.8.2002). Some of the key business associations took afirm Some took associations 1.8.2002). keybusiness of the stance 24 Chasa 24 Chasa 29.1.2002, 3). Workers’ unions called for areferendum and 29.3.2002, 4).During 29.3.2002, its time inopposition, BSP the Mediapool 2.2.2002). The CCDK claimed to have The to claimedCCDK 2.2.2002). Trud 10.4.2002, 3; 10.4.2002, business 66 (e.g.,quotedin Mediapool Trud Sega 121 CEU eTD Collection units operational long enough to prevent longunitsa time gapbetween their operational enoughto closure the and for Kozloduy’s 3-4wouldunits be abandoned.The declaredintentionkeep was to the gave the impression that the construction of a second NPP did notmean that the struggle new NPP at Belene and the partialThe madeNDSV government an ambiguous betweenconnection launchingthe of the closure of the Kozloduy NPP. Althoughbe financed. its position restarting the construction was offered. It was not specified how the gianteveryone elsebutSaxkoburggotski and his circle.closest Noeconomic justification for project would almost for shocking and unexpected thus was NPP the finish and project the re-launch to year same the of spring the in decision government’s The NPP. Belene the mention in notevengovernment’s Strategy 2002)produced Energy early 2002 did (MEER quoted inquoted Reviews energy lobby andsome in political Euroleft the such parties as (quoted 1998b).(Government Although by projectthe hadbeeneagerly promoted nuclear the analysis further extensive upon conditional made been had plans concrete but Belene includedat nuclear3500 MWinThesehad 2006-2010period. unit a600-MW the foreseen newof with construction an the facilities combined capacity of astonishing had which Strategy, Energy government’s ODS in the forecasts demand electricity overblown tothe 1990sin off late brieflyresponse in dusted the The hadbeen project of secondthe Bulgarian inNPP a wayatthefoundingdramatic his assembly of party. In re-launch plans2002, PrimeMinister announced to Saxkoburggotski construction the 68 disappeared. 67 in speech, quoted vaguewas Saxkoburggotski’s (see generally justifiable legally Communities, early EC’s claimingthat the demandfor closure of unitsthe was not filed a World Council (WCNW),of Nuclear Workers tookthe initiative in hands their own and complaintreferendum against the EC in the Court of First Instance of the European The Court refused to initiate a case since there was no decision to this effect adopted by the EC. by the adopted effect to this decision no was there since case a initiate to refused Court The Parliament neverreacted onthe demand. It was announcedthat the lists of signatures had mysteriously 4/5.11.1999), been 4/5.11.1999), ODShadthe itnot (e.g. seeKostov, enthusiastic about Sega 67 ( Sega 14.11.2000). 14.11.2000). In 2002itappeared have to been shelved again.TheNDSV 68 . 15.4.2005; 25.4.2005). Workers 15.4.2005; unions NPP,togetherthe with at the Mediapool OMDA Press 6.4.2002), it 6.4.2002), 122 CEU eTD Collection date of Bulgaria’s forthcoming EU accession (quoted in forthcoming date of (quoted Bulgaria’s EUaccession as the decommissioning inasmuch date, as 1January 2007 was officially the declared as government, however,confirming 2006 welcomed the31December vote composedly policy. The with government’s the The decision conflicted EU. the acceding to adecisiondecommissionBulgaria adopted not would 3-4before actually units that Parliament and Parliament. in government arift between relations the This created the safety standards of the two reactors (the review was referred toas ‘EU peer review’). mission end visit of condition 2006, on aEUexpert Kozloduy that the NPP and review at the 3-4 units andEU demands close to concede theEU, with negotiations accession The NDSV governmentThe Kozloduy controversy was yet to unfold. Late 2002took was a crucial phase of the crisis. a decision that it would close the Energy chapter of the Saxkoburggotski, interview for interest, the BSP supported interest, BSPsupported Right’sthe the motion quotedin (Kornezov, national the anddefend save units” the to in devil order the makewith adeal “ready to was it that announced Having government. the in confidence no of motions Parliament Mediapool inParvanov, quoted see closingof (e.g. possibilities for renegotiation the all dates decommissioning To Constitution’, etc. NPP’snumerousthe supporters, closing meantchapter the Energy ‘national betrayal’, ‘betrayal of the national interest’,it ‘a crime’,labeled ‘arrogant forces, violation political of the nationalist radical as the well as opposition, rightwing chapter proved beto this most government’s move. unpopular Theleftwing andthe At that point the controversy safety. units’ of the peer review reached dramatic a for request Bulgaria’s accepted EC In turn,the for 2006. set date decommissioning proportions. andthe wasclosed Energy chapter receive the roadmap, membership to a expected The closing of the was Bulgaria inDecember 2002,where SummitEnergy crucialEU the Copenhagen of In what was an unprecedented political event, the rightwing faction duly returned the returned duly faction rightwing the event, political unprecedented an was what In launching of the new nuclear facility (Bliznakov, interview for interview (Bliznakov, facility nuclear new the of launching 18.11.2002). Bothopposition 18.11.2002). blocs by accordingly reacted before putting Sega 20.11.2002; 20.11.2002; Nuclear Regulatory Agency in (NRA), quoted Trud 8.4.2002, 2). Sega 3.10.2002).Shortly before Mediapool Sega 25.11.2002). 8.4.2002; 123 CEU eTD Collection ( 69 favor safe and were to remain operational (Parvanov 2002b, quoted inremain safe 2002b, wereto quoted (Parvanov and operational and, following agreement with the EU, put in operation again. Units 3-4 were considered vision old the Inhisfate. about were be units’ view,units 1-2 modernizedto shutdown, Presidentandwas unavoidable. had the governmentaltogether hisown ThePresident The amongdiscord institutions the major state growing. kept Open betweenconflict the closed units end 1-2atthe of 2002. on Kozloduy the problem. very Bulgaria reluctantly honored 1999agreementthe and the position of the EC. The EU showedAll through the Kozloduy no crisis, intention EU conditionality remained clearto and firm,negotiate, and so did let alone of followed.change policy back down, No wasunimpressed. government theturmoil, Despite for resignations. asking kept protesting, throwing accusationsfailure of to defend the national and interest, lobby energy BSPandthe The invalid. deadlineaccept the2006closure was decision to tried to initiate a referendum on the units’ closure. The SACunsuccessfully It EU. tothe accession ruled of Bulgaria’s date tothe date decommissioning that the government’s linkedthat vote an parliamentary the earlier contradicted decision government’s (SAC)the that claiming Court Administrative issue Supreme the referred the to “useless, if“useless, not harmful,improvisation” in (Pasi, quoted initiatives onthe Kozloduy problem as President’s the scandalously characterized onits part, The government, confrontational government. stance againstthe inbargaining negotiations power When with a EU. the hopes dashed,hethese were took increase in to Kozloduy order country’s the Bulgarian position’ on the problem a intendedbroker compromise to institutions between mainstate the and form a ‘united President the demands, EU resist jointly to unite would elite Bulgarian the that Hoping to close the units in case of a negative peer review, so it was a matter of national pride to ofnational itwas amatter so peer review, negative a in of close units the case to pledged as Bulgaria just EU: the with in relations idea reciprocity of the on was centered date should be determined solely on the basis1.11.2002, 4).The President’s position EU conditionalityregarding was thethat closure of the conclusions of the safety review. It Sega The ODS did not hesitate to also back the leftwing President inthe latter’s conflict withthe government 31.10.2002). 69 . The government survived both survived. The governmentnoconfidence both votes.Inresponse, BSP the Sega 30.10.2002, in 30.10.2002, Sega 13.4.2002). 24 Chasa 124 CEU eTD Collection their design, which had been declared unsafe on numerous occasions. onnumerous unsafe declared been had which design, their 71 Kozloduy forunits the period 2000-2009. 70 assistance use appeared inclined a positive to morepress for peerreviewonly financial to Kozloduy down backed By late2003theIt on governmenthadcompletely the problem. incomprehensible. becamealtogether the situation observers, external most To position’. Bulgarian ‘the present to claimed Parvanov EC the with Although26.9.2002). this government’s from the diverged position line,inpolicy talks demand that the EU back down in case of a positive review (e.g. quoted in could safely operate them 2006 operate until safely could 3-4and for reactors mission hadfulfilledrecommendations was thatBulgaria safety the of inthis (Pasi, review quoted government scandalously announced that closure was unlikely beto delayed on the basis launched, the event was long-awaited Asas the soon agreedpeerreview. the An21.12.2003). missionexpert auspicesunder the of European the Council out carried 24 Chasa Bulgaria’s EU accession process (Ferheugen, quoted in quoted (Ferheugen, process Bulgaria’s EU accession andnon-compliance openlylinked on Kozloduy the issue with in delaysprospective EU and schedule areferendum membership. on EU The ECstuck to firm conditionality suggested that Bulgaria andfinally citizens’ mountreferendum ontheunits’ closure, to threatened protests, should made a of to initiate renegotiation Energy attemptthe unsuccessful another chapter, postpone ratificationagainst the units’ closure remainedintense. The pro-Kozloduy coalition forpressed Protests politics. ofin domestic and EU the with the relations inBulgaria’s both Treatyproblems of Accession2004 andThroughout fate of 2005,the 3-4remainedunits important oneof most the to the lobby and thelargely pro-Kozloduy public. fury. The governmentmet the full wrath of the opposition, the media, the nuclear energy earlier in than 2006.Thepointless peerreviewunleashed a flowof astonishment and even down them shut to necessary not was it whether but longer, and lifespan design been intended todetermine notwhether theunits couldbe until operated endthe of their The EC announced that the peer review’s mandate was to evaluate the units’ operational safety but not but safety operational units’ the evaluate to was mandate review’s peer the that announced EC The Bulgaria is eligible for EUR 550 million of financialEU assistance for decommissioning the of the 9.6.2004, 12). 70 but not but todispute itself in closurethe quoted (Saxkoburggotski, Trud 18.11.2003, 8). 18.11.2003, The official of conclusion expertthe 71 . It appeared that, ironically, the peer review had peerreview the appeared that,ironically, . It Sega 8/9.6.2004, interview 8/9.6.2004, for Mediapool Sega 125 CEU eTD Collection (Bliznakov, quoted in(Bliznakov, quoted by “significantly” lowered thealreadysupplied equipment (15-yearusing old) such would beprojects normally for higher,constructioncosts Belenethe NPPwould be ( Sega withcounted reduction in the existingonly a negligibledue to cost equipment(quoted 2.7EUR 2.6- billion at set was price the and 2000 MW to increased was NPP thenew of capacity planned 2010 ( forward to moved launchingdate billon; the between2.7 billion and EUR EUR 1.6 fluctuated 72 inquoted 1600MW),launchingor in (Kovachev foresaw adate and 2008-2009 and Bliznakov, billion, EUR 1.7-2.5 on MW installedthe raised depending capacity (1000 to price the ( only 1000-MWunitone was envisaged); construction beginwas expected in to 2003 deterioration. Theinitially billion oftheNPPwasEUR announced (apparently, price 1.1 fashionrandom with years, the throughout an though towards overall tendency in arather change to tended NPP Belene the about predictions and price cost In addition, inquiries. urgent nor outcry public neither was there whole, the on but, accountability were lackcommentators informationupset by of comprehensive the official and public media Some media. in the quoted officials individual of statements from be obtained –couldonly date andlaunching NPP, the the at electricity produced price of the cost the indicators – 2006, information project’s cost the the keyeconomic of about construction, late Until financing. eventual its clarify to or project the of feasibility economic the government’sthe public relations campaign. 2004,noattemptwas made Until toprove In the meantime, the Belene NPP was hailed as a priority investment and duly utilized in government’s initial plans were to have the Belene NPP produce electricity electricity a pricehaveproduce no initial wereto at theBeleneNPP government’s plans The its futurecompetitivenesssimilar regards transformations. – underwent as element – acrucial newthe NPP at priceproduced of electricity cost forecasted The Sega Trud Other sources from the same year forecasted a modest EUR 1.5 - 2 billion ( 8.1.2005). In 2.5billion 8.1.2005). be2006, EUR to “themostdeclared was optimistic price” 19.4.2006). 8.4.2002, 2;Kovachev, in quoted Mediapool Sega 72 4.5.2004, 5.7.2004). In early 2005, without any the In 5.7.2004). 4.5.2004, early debate, public 2005, without 30.9.2003, 11.6.2003). Throughout 2004, price 11.6.2003). Throughout assessments 30.9.2003, ( news.bg Sega 8.1.2005).The authorities claimedwhile that of the price 7.1.2005). The project consultants, otherhand,the 7.1.2005). on Mediapool 6.4.2002).Subsequentassessments Sega 15.6.2005) 126 CEU eTD Collection Darik Radio2006, BNR2006b; in Parvanov, quoted Government News interview interests” national (Ovcharov, in for BTV 2005; Stanishev,see also quoted meddled with EU integration was dismissed as a policy that “meddled with the country’s wouldjeopardize the strategic goal of EU membership. A pro-Kozloduy policy that commitments international Bulgaria’s fulfill to failure since passed, had renegotiation for time the ratified, Accession already with of Treaty the declared that, It units 3-4. of closure the on position its changed radically BSP the however, government, in Once demonstrated commitment to stand in defense of the Kozloduy NPP. however, welcomedlasting conflict with EUandstill the of survived politically.Large parts electorate, the the tough stance.was unsustainable, asitis imaginedifficultto party howthe could have upheld along- The BSP won BSP’sthe elections, demonstratively partly thanksdefiant to stanceits was the outgrowth of pre-election populism and the BSP’s stance and antagonized the sides in the debate (e.g. see BSP’s inthedebate(e.g. the andantagonized the sides stance win electionsthe forthcomingin 2005. Thepre-election struggle additionally toughened set andlooked member to – wasgainingpopularity its BSPtime –the prominent when a governmentat the pressureThe its against coalition up pro-Kozloduy was ratcheting most electricity expensive in Bulgaria. the be producing would NPP Belene the that mean would eurocents 2.8 above price any eurocents was said to be a realistic one (NEK, quoted in quoted one(NEK, be arealistic wassaid to eurocents andA between3.7 4.7 price be competitive. could considered price of 5 eurocents closing the construction tender, the NEK suggested that, if matters were revisited, even a in (quoted eurocents for 2.5 3.7 to3.2– eurocents. narrowed itThis MEERstated wouldtime that the round, strive external financing thatfinancialsubstantial the project require project’sthe suggested wouldconsultant or state guarantees aprice inleaned (quoted of towards 3.5 eurocents and the betweenfluctuation 2.4 and 4 eurocents.spread located Subsequent5.7.2004, 4.5.2004). estimates in price indeterminately the the range of theThe Ministrycost theprice oftender Energy was procedure,and Energy Resources however, (MEER) was for a cost price between 3 and 4 eurocents ( higher than 2.5 eurocents per kWh (quoted in perkWh (quoted higher than 2.5 eurocents 7.6.2006; interviews 7.6.2006; forOvcharov, BNR 2006a, Nova TV2006b, Sega 13.5.2005, in 13.5.2005, Sega Sega Trud 11.5.2005). The set in requirement 11.5.2005). Mediapool 8.1.2005). A 8.1.2005). few months later, 11.5.2005, 8). Shortly before 11.5.2005, Sega 19.4.2006). At any At 19.4.2006). rate, 12.5.2005). The BSP Sega 19.4.2005). The 19.4.2005). Sega 127 CEU eTD Collection of of units 1-2 closed the the closure of units 3-4, the general intensity of the debate, and delays in the dismantling postponingmanagement. ideasThe reopeningcirculation 1-2andabout about units of state. Such proposals by wereboosted patriotic-sounding public of statements NPP’s the position as a member EU,when bargaining accession tothe Bulgaria’s after theunitsthat bereopened could state would leaderMinister, andthepopular(unofficial)of GERB,openly the entertained the idea be strongerChasa than its current position of a candidate EC concluded that Bulgaria failed to fulfill regardingfailed EC concluded its thatBulgaria units 1-2(EC commitments to conditionality. its andmonitoring2006 regular In ina report the special note, warning inenergy asimprudentharmful quoted and (Ovcharov, extremely cheap thatgenerated andsafefacilities of branded closure the facing Europe quoted inquoted simply simply be shut down, but taken downaltogether. 74 4. 73 in quoted EC, tothe letter official (Ovcharov’s interrupted were exports electricity Bulgarian if supply energy with difficulties severe experience would Balkans the that EU the warned cardand ‘Balkan’ the postponing closure officialsmembers of and (MEPs) tosupport Parliament European the idea the of persuade pro-nuclear EU to attempts made strenuous forces EU.Thepro-Kozloduy the The issue of Kozloduy remained a sore one until the very day of Bulgaria’s accession impossibleto for the BSP to close the Kozloduy chapter in Bulgarian politics. issue of akeyelementtheir and electoral relations strategies.Itwas thus public surprisinglythe successful far-right ‘Ataka’, party both madeof which Kozloduy the and Developmentof (GERB) Bulgaria European for Citizens populist party center-right the by joined now opposition, rightwing the by criticism relentless with and lobby, nuclear energy with an active stance), pre-election radical shaped bythe BSP’s own largely were Kozloduy problem tothe attitudes (whose general of discontent the public just it,foundlikegovernment, NDSVgovernment the before itself the grapplingwith Apparently anxious to prevent speculations about reopening units 1-2, the EU demanded that they not they that demanded EU the 1-2, units reopening about speculations prevent to anxious Apparently On several occasions, a group of MEPs promoted the idea of a more flexible approach towards units 3- 24.11.2006, 12).Prominentincludingpolitical figures,24.11.2006, the President,theEnergy Mediapool 73 . A few months prior to the closure deadline the government played 14.6.2006). It bashed It 14.6.2006). the ECfor neglecting the energy problems 74 irritated the EC and provoked yet another demonstration of firm of demonstration another yet provoked ECand the irritated Government News Government Mediapool 1.11.2006; officials, 1.11.2006; 23.11.2006, in 23.11.2006, 128 24 CEU eTD Collection approach’ to the Kozloduy units. In early 2008, Bulgaria temporarily restricted the Bulgaria restricted temporarily 2008, Kozloduy Inearly units. approach’ tothe Bulgaria’ssupported MEPscontinued Individual call fordemands. a‘flexible to neighboring countriestounite in jointagainsta protest closure. Four the of them persuade Bulgaria to demands. tried summarilyresponse, Bulgarian In dismissed difficulties in a particular economic sector up until three years upuntil accession three after sector economic inaparticular difficulties adjustment of persistent and serious incase protective measures take Bulgaria to regional He stability,called for a new peerclosure Kozloduy’s Albania unitsof and that introduced hada blackout even schedule. review and of thefor of the because units’ electricity shortages suffering was already theregion that He stressed invoking safety, for reevaluation session (EP) celebratingParliament European the of Bulgaria’s EU accession (2007a). art. of 36the theissueinParvanov raised wayinhis dramatic speech special President arather atthe threatsof the to Act of Accession, which enabled interview for interview (Ovcharov, Kosovo areaof vulnerable including the whole the region, destabilize energy andshortages economic crisis in of some parts Balkansthatcouldthe potentially Balkan, rather justthan aBulgarian, upon rested problem. It predictions oflooming outside the EU (Albania) were technically irrelevant to the ActofAccession. the to irrelevant technically were (Albania) EU the outside remotely close to serious and persistent adjustment difficulties, while difficulties experienced by a state 75 inquoted Kovachev, and (Ovcharov Balkans the in prices energy and supply energy of stability The justifieddemands were damaging by impact of the units’the closure upon the action forplan reopening units 3-4. developednational an Thegovernment Kozloduy make for‘battle’ a one. continuing the News for aunified in Bulgarian position of (quotedindefense NPP the Kozloduy initiated demandsforcoalition reopening the PresidentParvanov units. called hoursseveral conditionality, EU with in accordance down shut priorwere 3-4 units Kozloduy’s to Bulgaria’sand toconfirm the irreversibility of the units’ closure. 2006a, 29).Theattempted governmentcool to pro-Kozloduy down resilientthe coalition accession to the EU. Just days after the event, the pro- Invoking Invoking ideawasart. inasmuch 36 abizarre Bulgarianenergy asthe sectorexperienced nothing 2.2.2007). The rightwing The 2.2.2007). SDS called for all joinpolitical forces parties andto Mediapool Politika 12.3.2007). The underlying strategy was to present closure asa the Theunderlyingstrategy was to 12.3.2007). 2007; Parvanov, quoted in 2007; Parvanov, quoted Bulgarian President News Bulgarian President Bulgarian 2.2.2007). 75 . The EC 129 CEU eTD Collection expirein only 2010 though they Bulgaria’swere dueto gas supplycontracts, extension revision of and discuss to the invited Gazprom being Bulgaria was selected, NPP’s construction EU” in the horse Trojan as “Russia’s technologies and could, in the candid words of the Russian ambassador importantto the forEU, Atomstrojexport,serve asis it NPP provides Belene The entry into obvious. been the has EU market project for Belene nuclear the of case in the leverage Russia’s of the revised contracts to Russian participation in large infrastructure projects in projects infrastructure inlarge Russian participation to of revised contracts the price of supplies European gas countries.to The Russianside overtly linked thecontent Bulgarian pipelines because Gazprom could direct transit to the recently opened Blue Stream pipeline. Stream Blue opened recently to the transit direct could Gazprom because pipelines Bulgarian supplies directly. Bulgaria feared that this would to lead a drop inthe amount of gas transited through pipelines. Gazprom’s position was that it should be terminated and Bulgaria should pay for gas all 77 supplierof fresh nuclear fuel,Skoda Alliance allowedan for alternative American supplier. OMZ, in which Gazprom had a controlling stake. While the Russian bidder tied the new NPP to Russiana participant inthe Skoda consortium –Skoda JSwasentirely owned engineeringby Russian the company 76 (e.g. seeDSB 2007,quoted in Russian rightwing opposition and triggered apredictably bitterpolitical controversy anti- the angered choice The Atomstroyexport. by won was tender the 2006, of end the larger orsmaller extent related toRussia’s state-controlled gas monopoly Gazprom Alliance.Atomstroyexport Russianthe and biddersa the Czech Both wereSkoda to business interest in the NPP, only two consortiumsstrong bid in the about tender onitsclaims construction – government’s the Despite expected. initially than slower somewhat In themeantime, Belene the has project been moving forward, though ata pace Project The Belene a powerful Western company could lobbythat then EUfor theirthe reopening. to units decommissioned lease two the idea to as 36,aswell the invokingart. at attempts organized the by lobby,nuclear government, energy the media, the featured and and justify The was fora renewedcampaign was used to units 3-4. campaign reopening extremely cold weather) could leadelectricity to shortages within the country. The event by (caused fears consumption increased domestic the that electricity due to of export One One of contractsthe envisaged gas supplies in exchange for the transit of Russian gas throughBulgarian leading The Atomstroyexport. in shares of package controlling the had Gazprombank Gazprom-owned 77 . The request was related to Gazprom’s attempts to increase the to attempts Gazprom’s to was related request . The Mediapool (Cijov 2006). Justfor asthe 2006). mainsupplier(Cijov the 8.11.2006). 76 . At 130 CEU eTD Collection participation in the new NPP. new in the participation 80 beunits connected (third-generation by gridVVER-1000s) wereto tothe 2013 and 2014 The two electric was3.7eurocents. power price Belene-produced indicated of cost the In the construction contract,has been nothing even remotely closean to investorthe stampede. price of the Belene thereinvestors, be to would attractive project the that appeared confident government NPP was set at EUR 4 billion and with Gazprom for anewlong-term contract mainwas traded supplier of choice The decisions. political been havepurely to appeared NPP thus new for the The choice of Russiannuclear technology and theselection mainof a Russian supplier (quoted in project the finance the used be could necessary, if and, budget state Russia’s in aside set were NPP 79 supplies. ofgas price the in rise sharp, a than rather agradual, and 78 bytheBelene electricity NPP atfixedpreferential produced prices As an additional guarantee, the NEK would sign a long-term contract for the purchase of market capital onthe raised loans forbe The restwould financedby project. – wouldthe political support secure the EU’s European financial institution (probably the Euratom facility),loan which – itis believed The should shareof strategic investors. be state the financed partly by from a loan a The would Bulgarian state hold a51%share inthe NPP; rest wouldthe be leftto negligible. be to out turned options two the between difference price the two brand new units, rather than for the completion of the half-built old reactor, because 2006, for NovaTV2006a).Atthe end, NEKoptedforthe however, theconstruction of equipmentin order to lower construction limitation was officially justifiedby needthe use to alreadythe supplied Soviet-design firms proposing alternativeineligible technology automatically bid to inthe tender. The madeconstruction 1000 type, which a choicea VVER of type reducedto was reactor for standleverageGazprom inhad interview upto no to of sphere the gas transit(Ovcharov, issues Bulgaria negotiations because other on linkgas to negotiations on to but choice including Bulgaria,itThe Bulgarian Belene leadership the hadnothat NPP. admitted The NEK was downrated by Standard & Poor’s from ‘developing’ to ‘negative’ due to its majority its to due ‘negative’ to ‘developing’ from & Poor’s by Standard downrated was NEK The Russian President Putin announced that the financial resources needed for the construction of the Belene of the construction the for needed resources financial the that announced Putin President Russian pipelines, of new construction gas, transited of quantities the in increase an foresaw contract new The Dnevnik Mediapool 2006). 18.1.2008). 79 . State guarantees for the loans would be necessary. be would loans the for guarantees State . costs (Ovcharovcosts interviews2006, for 78 80 . The choice of choice . The . Although the Although . Duma 131 CEU eTD Collection Commissioner, quoted in (EC, 3-4 long of closure the energyinunits asBulgariansputupwith as Bulgaria, projects quoted for key has provided financial assistance BeleneNPPandthe bargain. supported It In reality, 13.11.2006). however, EUappears30.5.2002, the tohave tacitly accepted the in The EU hasnotinfluenced thepolicy-making process the Beleneregarding NPP conformedsafety to in (EC,quoted requirements and that the EU would NPP, Kozloduy the of that be to unrelated to NPP issue Belene the the itregards of that not interfere clarify to with pains special taken It hastherefore matters. energy ‘national’ into intervention the construction intrusive fears EU of Bulgarian toassuage has wanted also NPP and, probably, of a new NPP as long linking attempts atlaunchingdateof closureto the date theKozloduy Belene the asunits’ it national preferences” basedonits own makewill choices “MemberState each energy nuclear sphere of had little leverage to do so, inasmuch as its Green Paper on Energy states that in the for the other (e.g. see inter-ministerial workingNPP group, one quoted inbargain to is idea The built. been have units nuclear replacement before units focused complaints on repeated about high the involved costs in theKozloduy closing preferably in theform maximalof financial and institutional support. The strategy has for Beleneproject, the EU’sblessing the extract to efforts madehas special Bulgaria ( guarantees state for additional asked and least 5billion EUR at cost NPPwould the that sensitive issues like nuclear energy. nuclear like issues sensitive 82 81 and ( 2016respectively was A few respectively.again moved launchingdate to2015 monthslater, the forward Mediapool The stance reflects the intolerance of several member states towards supranational interference with interference supranational towards states member ofseveral intolerance the reflects stance The project. the finance institutions financial European if be expected could influence EU Some 8.8.2008). Mediapool 82 (EC 2006b, 17). The EC has been anxious to preemptany to been anxious has (EC2006b,17).The EC Mediapool Mediapool 25.5.2007, 17.1.2008; 25.5.2007, spokesman of Energy the 9.7.2007). In NEK mid-2008,the 9.7.2007). officially admitted 15.7.2008). Sega 19.11.2003, in 19.11.2003, Sega 16.7.2003). Mediapool 81 . It has 132 CEU eTD Collection energy lobby, apparently linked to Russian interests in the energy sector and to certain to and sector energy inthe interests Russian to linked apparently lobby, energy nuclear well-connected politically and powerful economically Bulgaria’s of involvement the been has NPPs Belene and Kozloduy the of case in the factor important An The NuclearEnergyLobby perceptible and bears on the political controversy over the Belene NPP project. the Kozloduy problemWhile impactof political the strategies. andelectoral relations public campaigns parties’ was of greatestpoint focal important an into turned ultimately It agenda. media in and political the on the years preceding ‘demand’the forissue Kozloduy the up wasrapidly rising andthe drama growing the units’ closure,media appeal, visibility, andpopular coverage secure greater to Kozloduy the problem it is still snowball effect was andmobilizingforeffective strategy creatingA image. voters political an attractive at work. As more political Takingenvironment. symbolic of issue upthe sore became units’the closure an actors andimportant often discussions. The overshadowed other crisisevolved inapartisan social groups weredominated political It andThe Kozloduy debates sphere. thepolitical problem polarized utilizing conditionality in Bulgaria have so high political costs been at stake for the ruling elite. public andagainst an adamant nuclear energy lobby. no caseother In ofinternational opposition,political adisappointed against institutions, united anextraordinarily against virtuallyKozloduy governments stood key opposition. alone against Both other state Kozloduy the involvedandhigh units meant losingpolitical costs votes to pro- the of EU conditionality. On the other hand, concessions EU demandsto for early closure of inensure progress quick EUintegration, which inentailed makingconcessions the face office between 2002 and 2007in a precarious position in domestic politics. They had to held that governments two the put conditionality safety nuclear EU with Compliance Political Costs FactorsKey inthe Kozloduy Crisis 133 CEU eTD Collection public tender procedure. a without NPP Belene ofthe architect-engineers as selected were Parsons and Engineering Risk NPP. Belene ofthe of anEIA conduct the e.g. services, consultant and TPPs, major in works reconstruction 84 2004). of construction the in and process a new NPP (Ekoglasnost, quoted in decommissioning the in both abound that opportunities professional and business ofthe advantage take to lobby the enable thus to and capacities nuclear new without do not could Kozloduy units is only a propaganda campaign intended to sway the public into believing that Bulgaria 83 the construction of a second NPP have naturally dominatedand its NPP activities Kozloduy the for struggle the industry, in the players key the for opportunities business secure abundant to and economy of the sector priority a energy nuclear parts of the Bulgarian political establishment. Since the lobby’s goals are to make objective public opinion regarding nuclear energy” ( energy” nuclear regarding opinion public objective “influence (Manchev Bulatom’s is declaredgoal 2006, 3). theformation of to other dealings with both Bulgarianinstitutionsthe state andtheEuropean institutions” declared“defendis of goal to the interests Bulgarian nuclear the in energy industry Engineering Risk – sector in the companies powerful most the of one of director is executive Manchev chairman Bulatom’s etc. Atomenergoexport, Siemens, Westinghouse, Engineering, Risk Energy, Nuclear and Research for Nuclear Institute the Atomstroyexport, NPP, Kozloduy including sector, the in nuclear energy Bulgarian the awarded key contracts main construction, engineering, equipment-supplyingthathave and companies been Sega withothers “proven supportiveauthority”, of Kozloduy the inNPP (A. Semov, quoted and opinion-makers, scholars, of association non-governmental a is CCDK The (WNA). Association WCNW and World Nuclear such as the the organizations international managers NEK of the and has the Kozloduy NPP. The from lobby received support former and officials, former energy, nuclear on experts individual also includes Bulgarian Atomic several professional scientific tothe industry,and related organizations the such as Association,lobbyThe nuclear is power formed Bulatom around CCDK.Itbrings and the together the Bulgarian Energy Forum, BUNO and the BNS. It Risk been Engineering has awarded key public contracts, i.e.theupgradeof 5-6,Kozloduy’s units Some of the lobby’s critics, however, argue that the lobby’s loud campaign against the closure of the 27.7.2002). Bulatom 27.7.2002). Bulatom is a non-governmental organization brings that together the 84 . The group has openly recognized itself as a lobby group. Its asa lobby group. has itself recognized . The openly group Mediapool 31.7.2006; Stanchev 2004c; Minchev, quoted in Ibid ., 3). 83 . ENS 134 CEU eTD Collection Sega (opinion poll by commissioned quoted government, the in believed(11%) it wasbetter to give unitsinup the in toenter2006 order EU the asmall percentage Only of EU membership. costthe at even units the should keep 2002, between 63% andin 73%of opinion respondents pollsBulgaria that declared In government. the for news bad was issue the with involvement public of extent The 11). membership. 85 units’the closure ranged between 70% and 82% Bulgarians whoopposed of The percentage 5). 2004, Research organized(Alpha crime as the mostclose NPPwas the In opinion unitsunprecedented. decision was the to polls, 3-4 ranked important fate of the about agitation public crisis, the At peakof the thegovernment. on pressure event Nextto industrialthe lobby, general the major wasanother public of source political in domestic politics,Public Attitudes surpassing evenlost their national identity” 2002). (Kutsarov the sore“thelobbyists’ opinions unlikethat judgmentof experts [theare politicians] not have issue of whom in according to Kozloduy participants the debate, as‘patriotic’) (self-labeled pressure. Many haveto Bulgarians subscribed interpretation the nationalist-minded of haslobby localreplaced in politicians nationalinterest defendingthe againstforeign energy most the In Bulgarians, mindsthe of interest. with national the as interchangeable have The lobby’s interests beenperceived but interest. the interests as one public serving economic been particular regardedasone reflecting has not industry nuclearthe energy opinion and interests of the Bulgarian the of nation. The fervent representative and pro-Kozloduy objective as regarded stance widely been taken indeed by has lobby energy generally thisunsurprising, caseis surprising opinion inthatthe of nuclear Bulgarian the lobby’s is totheAlthough effectthethat ‘objective’ opinion are opinion statements The level of support for the NPP did not vary significantly according to age, gender, education, or party 28.11.2002; Alphain was 28.11.2002; 2003and picture Research2002).The samethe roughly 85 ( Sega 2.12.2002; Mediapool 24 Chasa 27.11.2002, in 13.4.2002, 135 CEU eTD Collection precedence over Bulgaria’s all-important priority – European integration. Bulgaria’s integration. priority – European all-important Bulgaria’s precedence over valueeconomic public andbroad the Kozloduy support, have said to NPP was no great its Despite integration. againstEuropean for or as a choice Kozloduy dilemma the interpreted ODS units the 1-4, closureof early on the agreement compromise as ithadKosovo crisis. doneduring amandate the Whenitrequested tonegotiate a Europeanization counteractpoliticalparadigm to and its public opposition to policy just In the earliest phases of the Kozloduy controversy,The EuropeanizationParadigm the ODS government deployed the Ideological Enframing of the Nuclear Energy Issue ( was resultthe Bulgarian inability of governments’ to defend thenational interest Kozloduy madeproblem under outsideoverwas stated 30% pressure; thisthat policy Bulgaria’s thought that the the closurestill units; ofthe over50% policy on opposed 50%of Bulgarians In2005,over negotiations. accession the of survived thecompletion ( anddefense agriculture like areas sensitive in toceding sovereignty were who opposed those sharethe larger of than share was decisions regarding integration 54% (Alpha Research stated 2004, 43). should government the that be taking the energy identifieddownside the closure of 3-4as units important most the of European sector independently hullabaloo. In2003,47%of BulgariansEuroskepticism Kozloduy thrived onthe of other ( negotiations accession EU danger of derailing EU member or the international of commitments such asBulgaria’s key europeanization aspects states. This respondents thought that the government’s Kozloduy intoaccountpolicy should take Eurobulletin more important thanEU integration; a stunning 24% could not answerthe question( 86 2004 closure was already larger ( wasalready closure Evroskeptik 64% of respondents said that units 3-4 should be preserved atany price; 46%said that units 3-4 were 86 , although according to some, although opinion according share to who the polls of agreed to those 2003). 2005). Bulgarian Eurobulletin Ibid Bulgarian Eurobulletin ., 45). These trends., inpublicopinion 2003; ENS 2004). Only2004). some 15%of 2003). Bulgarian 136 CEU eTD Collection quoted inquoted andmemberpartner future aresponsiblefamily of European the (Saxkoburggotski, unpopular decision to yield (quotedfor association in Bulgaria’s with Europe to EU demands was presented paying Kozloduy worth NPP wasaprice by arguingprotesting the that VMROactivists as the position confronted Minister Saxkoburggotski Prime discourse. Europeanization the to resorted of a reliable When the in NDSV too, controversy 2000s,the theearly government, resurfaced the Kozloduy NPP relatively well. over controversy of outburst first this manage to government the allowed – negotiations start accession invitation its coveted –namely cooperative for to behavior the ‘rewards’ immediate obtained Bulgaria that fact the and power political great still nominally Review would secure “the future of country] away “the of [the children” quickly“lead would would future and our secure that integration a stable putBulgariaon track EU as neededto sacrifice rationalized a (Agov Abadzjiev, inand quoted opposition compromisethe to was interpreted as sabotage agreement of EU membership interest (official fromstatement government quoted in8.12.1999, Pasi 2002g).BSP’s endangeredthat Bulgaria’svital EUmembership Bulgaria’s national and contradicted and asinterests of activities, suchas repudiated activitieslobby, energy the those were and interests Pro-Kozloduy wererenounced. positions political Alternative else’. everything above integration in interest‘European asan was articulated interest national (Abadzjiev, quoted in(Abadzjiev, quoted BSP wasaccused destabilize of attempting to the country in togainorder political power The interests. narrow-party anti-national with position BSP’s associated preemptively field ODS nuclear the in energy, of interests the thatdefended Bulgaria’s one itspreventfrom justifying In to BSP the stance as oppositional representingorder and renounced as a stance that sacrificed the national interest in name the of populism: interest national the sacrificed as that a stance renounced Review Press OMDA is a nationalThis betrayal. (Radev, quotednegotiations]. in accession starting [for invitation the sabotage however, forces, and groups If Bulgaria’s first priority is EU accession, we have to do all we can to achieve it. Certain 5.11.1999). This coupled 5.11.1999). the ideological ODSgovernment’s with framework, Sega 3.10.2002). The government’s acquiescence in EU conditionality in government’s The acquiescence EUconditionality was 3.10.2002). 5.11.1999; Kostov, interview for BBC Radio 1999). It, too, was for too, interview BBC Kostov, 1999). It, Radio5.11.1999; OMDA Press Review OMDA OMDA Press Review OMDA Press Review Press OMDA 4.11.1999; Kostov, quoted in quoted 4.11.1999;Kostov, 10.11.1999) 8.11.1999; Bozhkov, quoted in Bozhkov, quoted 8.11.1999; 24 Chasa 29.1.2002, 2). The 2). 29.1.2002, OMDA Press OMDA 137 CEU eTD Collection new national energy [for Europeanization]” (a NDSV MP, quoted in MP,quoted (aNDSV Europeanization]” newnational [for energy and“crushthe integration course” European toreverse Bulgaria’s as“attempts scorned against governmentwere the (Velikov No-confidence votes united2004). Europe” morenuclear “giving units for units sake or the lifeliving uptwo of better in acivilized with isolated living two between choice as occasion geopolitical a fundamental depicted on the Kozloduy have take not did approach dilemma. arelevant Europeanization It isnot identity-focused the that It had. The choicefirst half 2000s. the of for or against andmembership tosecureNATO reinforcedwas accentuated in byBulgaria’s quest the closing the whose Bulgaria’s issues pertainingapparent preoccupation with with to NATO relations units was on appointment as Foreign Minister. 87 values and urged them to earn their place in Western civilization by putting the common Atlantic hinged structures onthedemonstration of civilizational fitness and proper choice Bulgarians membership Hereproached period. that for forgotten having in Euro- civilization Bulgaria’s of memories revived even Minister Prime Bulgarian A former Pasi Foreign Minister NDSVgovernment’s of the stance pro-NATO enthusiastic on problems and away instead Europe ofculture it valuesfrom relationship to and focused problems of economic Bulgaria’s thatstructured discourse the whichshifted negotiations, accession inevitablethe integration problematic concretization of EU the of following the start the developmentgeneral, and in the context of the Kozloduy debates in particular.and in Thisapproach elementsof down these Europeanization the toned NDSV and BSP) the was partly due to welfare. the (both leadership The post-ODS debate. inthe Kozloduy inconsequential rather It was appeared paradigm identity Europeanization of the the elements However, prosperity. alsoand development economic to integration EU fast link to and integration EU partly fast due inwas thusdeployeddefine as Europeanization interest national to an Bulgaria’s attempt to the standards of livingfor nextthe generation” (Pasi 2002f). with the ODSEU before as it,“a the intoLand the 2005a).Like PromisedEU”(Pasi from seealso poverty the of the 2002f, vote NDSV presented ‘for’ the voteor ‘for’‘against’ or ‘against’ striking Europe a compromise and ‘for’ or ‘against’ European Pasi had been campaigning in favor of Bulgaria’s NATO membership for more than a decade before his before a decade than more for membership NATO of Bulgaria’s favor in campaigning been had Pasi Sega 30.11.2002). 138 87 , CEU eTD Collection 29.2.2004; Tsonev29.2.2004; 2004; Saxkoburggotski,in quoted keeping the units in foryear anotheroperation two or (Kovachev, in quoted of those to incomparable benefits bring could integration because EU interests Bulgarian resisting it would slow down thebe, accession might process conditionality and EU would ultimatelyunjustifiable however damageis that perspective this of gist The in Bulgaria’s EU integration, when the opposition typically stepped up itsin the EUintegration, when Bulgaria’s opposition steppedup adversarial typically for2006b, BNT2006a).Such discursive intensified importantpractices events prior to in quoted seePasi, (e.g. membership –i.e.EU to‘ruinthenational cause’ attempts as which wereadmonished movescounteractpopulist of it bythe supporters by to NPP, the opposition or other controversy. NDSVgovernmentthe Both and subsequent the government BSP-led used theKozloduy suppress potentially Europeanization could approach The interest-focused accession: EU hard-earned Bulgaria’s guarantee to need the and EU vis-à-vis the position bargaining and such weak Bulgaria’s as matters interests, bypractical overshadowed were matters identity which in approach Europeanization the of version a to way gave It mobilization. contestation and ineffective wasgrowing increasingly asa for political tool political to bitter was becoming subject approach Europeanization identity-focused focused on defending the national As economic interests. crisisthe was the unfolding, by defuse led even ODSto paradigm a discourse the the then Europeanization powerful had problem the of sensitivity all,the After issue. Kozloduy sensitive the accommodate The problem with identity-focusedthe approach was itthat could neither suppress nor 2005). (Dimitrov self-interest narrow their above conditionality) Western by be embodied to assumed were apparently (which civilization this of values also also Dogan, quoted in put at put at risk the results of these (Sevlievski,efforts. interview for they because dangerous, are supporters] NPP’s the [of activities current The Treaty. the signing of Accessionsigning… of the most importantto treaty Bulgarianin history forthe lastthe 126 years – the Treaty EU… We have Theto figure out what Bulgaria’s priorities are. In my valuecountry system, [the priority] is the has strived for eight years to come to the point of Mediapool Sega 8.6.2004; Ovcharov, interviewsfor for BNR 8.6.2004;Ovcharov, BTV 2006c, 1.10.2002; Saxkoburggotski, quoted in Sega 13.12.2003). 24 Chasa Sega 21.4.2005, 13;see 20.12.2003). Mediapool 139 CEU eTD Collection that I would label ‘nuclear nationalism’. ‘nuclear label would I that hasinform this deployed been effect to nationalism grounded a particular economic of has it framework interpretive The interest. national Bulgaria’s on debate big the industry from place sphere of Kozloduy the disconnect NPP and to center of itat the Indeed, the broad powerful pro-Kozloduy coalition has managed to symbolically legal cause, it is the fate of Bulgaria” (Kornezov, quoted in quoted (Kornezov, itisfate of Bulgaria” cause, legal the aptly summarized byan of ardent opponent units’the closure:just is “‘Kozloduy’ not a is in most Bulgarians of minds the predicament Kozloduy placeof the The perceived The Discourse ofNuclearNationalism integration. too,but interest, didnational that as an definenot in interest interest fast this European a policy onBulgaria’s thatfocused discourse to losingwas steadily ground approach Europeanization theinterest-focused however,As the unfolding, even crisis was sentiments in society insentiments insociety quoted (Ekoglasnost forlobby impeding and Bulgaria’s forEU integration provoking anti-European nuclearcondemn energy the to discourse Europeanization interest-focused employed an activities political 31.7.2002; Kaschiev,31.7.2002; in quoted for interview it (Gjurkovski, sue than to EUrather the accede to to strive conditional upon early closure of Kozloduy the andunits, Bulgaria suggested that hadto financial forreception the of support upgrade of facilities, itnuclear although was orpetitioned againstthe had protested thatnoone Bulgarians obligations, reminded its international membercommunity andas keep of European the a trustworthy Sega delay2002; seeBozhkov (e.g. accession to Bulgaria’s EUwith apretext provide the not would apragmatic policy that vis-à-vis EUandadvocated the unequal position NPP Campaign 2005).The pro-Europeanization forcamp recognizing Bulgaria’s called 20.6.2002, 26.9.2002,19.11.2003,23.4.2005).It stressedactBulgaria 20.6.2002, that hadto (e.g. see (e.g. Sega Mediapool 26.11.2002, 25.4.2005). Anti-nuclear activists,too, 25.4.2005). 26.11.2002, 17.11.2002). Mediapool 31.7.2006; No to the Belene the Noto 31.7.2006; Lex News Lex 12.5.2005). Sega 140 CEU eTD Collection the stakeholders involved appeared to imagine beinvolved that could appearedto there stakeholdersthe possibly anything of their design lifespan (e.g. into approaching units investingquestion appropriateness the end scarceresources of the see any unjustifiable spending of moneythe impoverishedBulgaria’s of taxpayers – did not this( risk” take to ready [was] entirety, in its people, “the Bulgarian that believed simply He argumentation. economic any other or calculations cost/benefit with proposal the complement to bother not did President in The be (Parvanov2002b). operation again put persuadingcould EUthatthe they into their upgrade,and resources financial own investing units, the Bulgaria’s for example, President’s the plan forwhich savingunits 1-2, envisagedshutting down perceived as ‘national’ wealth. It has become the quintessentialbeen has It national asset. cause. Consider, economic an merely as perceived been not has NPP Kozloduy The topreventorder shutting four old down nuclear units. in shouldbedown bysuggestions outraged surprised thatdemocratic shut debate or be to appeared public, general the nor elite, political the nor media, mainstream Neither 28.1.2002, 5). For similar reasons, a referendum on the issue was deemed redundant: in “weaken would (quoted Bulgarian internal heated the position” discussion end disputesontheKozloduy political issue andrally aunitedaround position, because uponto All forces werecalled of a basicdebate. political aspectdemocracy – political the Kozloduy units so vital for the ‘national cause’ that he even denied Bulgarian society as itself has presented pro-Kozloduy hasposition the appropriated symbolically powerful label ‘national’ and The hasbeen obscured. interest industry public defendersof the and the self-appointed of energy nuclear the interests particular the between connection The intimate 2002b). Parvanov see (e.g. ‘speculations’ as discarded been have views Dissenting development. presupposition thatnuclear economic energyisindispensablefor Bulgaria’s The pro-Kozloduy coalition has articulated the national interest on the basis of the 11.4.2002) is obvious consensus. (Parvanov 2002b; see Gerdjikov,also quoted in there which on subject a on society Bulgarian in debate needless anacrimonious, to lead could It is clear whose obligationit is to hold the Bulgarian– the national – ground. Areferendum… the ‘national’ position. President Parvanov apparently considered apparently Parvanov President position. ‘national’ Mediapool Ibid 9.4.2002; .). The media – otherwise oversensitive to 24 Chasa 10.4.2002, 8).None 10.4.2002, of Mediapool 11.2.2002, Trud 141 CEU eTD Collection 20.12.2003). BSP’s attempts20.12.2003). toinitiate areferendum on of future the Kozloduy the NPP, inquoted (Ovcharov, interests” national the defend to inability state’s the light to brings that policy foreign Bulgarian of failure “a historical as policy Kozloduy government’s NDSV the characterized The BSP this end. to wasdeployed representations set of coherent the consistent efforts of the political opposition tocraft a‘national’image ofthe NPP. A by werereinforced structure of this effects the crisis, Kozloduy the of stages In the later on national dignity. and interest national the on centered dilemma of Kozloduy the interpretation particular toa conducive was Kozloduy controversy in of the was formed early phases the in NPP as the “pride of Bulgaria” (Kostov, interview for interview (Kostov, “prideof as the Bulgaria” NPP itselfgovernment introduced this interpretive framework by representing theKozloduy ODS The controversy. Kozloduy of the phases inthe earliest already interest The Kozloduy problem nation? the of fate the with enterprise an equating of point started to be enframedthe didBulgaria means to available. come withHow byall wrong defendingtheunits in terms of the defense of the national and inloudly (BSP,quoted criticized frustrating especially was Lithuania and Slovakia by negotiated ones the than conditions Review in quoted (Kostov, candidate accession asafuture country’s dignity the for test critical asa perceived were negotiations Kozloduy the because onealso sensitive assistance forinternational that byperceptions further undermined was stance anti-Kozloduy post-conflict EC’s the of legitimacy The assets. itseconomic key sacrifice oneof to its consent upon recovery EU’s of decision condition to Bulgaria’s hard-earnedinvitation for accession negotiations the Balkans for the little there be understanding wouldGiven these was expectations, rewarded. was insufficient.government’s foreign policy Bulgaria’s expected that doctrine, Euro-Atlantic solidarity The issueeconomically enfeeblingwas Kosovo crisis and,a under the influence of the ODS frustration. elitethe Both the country publicperceivedthe from as and emerging the negotiations disillusionment totheHelsinki with ECprior the Summitprovoked and OMDA Press Review Press OMDA 29.11.1999). The government’sin much acquiescence less 29.11.1999). acceptable closure Mediapool 23.11.2006; see also BSP, quoted in quoted see 23.11.2006; also BSP, 3.11.1999). The structure The 3.11.1999). of public political and attitudes that OMDA Press Review Spiegel 8.11.1999; Ovcharov, 8.11.1999; quoted Sega 1999).Theunnerving 2.11.2002, 11.1.2003, 2.11.2002, OMDA Press 142 CEU eTD Collection has become a question nationalof dignity (A. Semov, quoted in Kozloduy has being longquestion even stopped technical, economic, or and political, a campaign in defense of the national and national the of defense in a campaign The nuclear lobby energy has its presented campaign in defense of Kozloduy the NPP as also see 2004; (Ovcharov nation” Bulgarian the force needthe defend governmentthe to “the to part position shared byanenormous of as well as the initiatedno-confidence by votes BSPandthe theSDS,were justified by (quoted in(quoted betrayal” and“national “treason” as negotiations of accession the chapter Energy the close to decision the characterized have VMRO and BDUR nationalist rightwing the Bulgarian National Alliance (BNA) website; Karamfilov 2007). In a similar vein, the on statement 2006, acrimetheir (Siderov people against andhaveperpetrated interests negotiations with the EU as leaderstraitors out carried political who andthe nuclear energy of opponents has brandedlocal of the nation who have units’ It the has closure. supported everyone who hasdenigrated Ataka party far-right ‘sold their souls’ to foreign The nationalism. of nuclear discourse the havereinforced parties nationalist The radical Kozloduy problem. mainstream has opposition shaped theBulgarians waymost have approached the image promoted by framework interpretive building, the sensationalized pre-election the Whether 8.6.2006, 2). of product authentic the or of engagement artificially in (quoted as“criminals” for early agreementsigned the decommissioning who people the branded closure, units’ the of opponents vocal most the of one became quickly leader GERB’s popular who Borisov, GERB–followed BSP’strack. the inthe government. In the latest stage of the Kozloduy crisis, the new major opposition party – the national interest and out of opposition to a self-interested EU and a timid Bulgarian trying tomake political capital out of demonstrations of firmnessin the face of threats to was especially regarding the Kozloduy in anexceptionally NPP BSP’sstance environment. partisan harsh making decision placed and opinion, public andradicalized problem,during polarized the the of interpretation pro-Kozloduy the popularized media attention, pre-election attracted debates Mediapool campaign, as the party was consciously Sega 3.12.2002, 18.11.2002). Although these initiatives 3.12.2002,18.11.2002). Although these failed,the accompanying 25/26.9.2002; Karakachanov, interview for public Sega interest. It has argued that the that argued has It interest. 8.4.2002, 20.11.2002, 4.12.2002; 8.4.2002, 20.11.2002, Trud Sega 12.4.2002,31). 27.7.2002; BUNO, 27.7.2002; Telegraf 143 CEU eTD Collection relied upon a relatively coherent set of effective media-friendly symbols, media-friendly effective of set coherent arelatively upon relied The framing of BeleneandKozloduy the issues in terms interest’of ‘national the has interest. The government itself has represented the construction of new NPPasa the of the construction itself has represented government The interest. national the to energy nuclear links that framework interpretive an around structured is theBelene debate like Kozloduy debate, the Just nationalism. nuclear of discourse the to their campaign haveadapted of smoothly NPP Belene the The supporters 11.4.2002, 10;Terziev 2008). ensure the welfare of the citizens (e.g. see national and guarantee security interests, safeguardeconomic national the duties -to have with overflowed at outrage government’s the failure perform its to most basic conditionality (e.g. see Terziev 2008). Opinion columns in high-circulation newspapers Western local towards orwith of environmentalists perceivedservitude the 23.12.2003) ( officials” EC were if they as “talk to tendency politicians’ Bulgarian with The of discourse nuclear nationalism has alsobeen taken up byjournalists dissatisfied Semov, quoted in tragedy tragedy forBulgaria (WNA, quoted in a “real treasure, generating environmentally clean energy at competitive prices”, whose loss would be a 88 show: evidentin the proposal to mark entry intothe EU by a nation-wideexample, New for Year’swas, Eve light effect This symbolism. lofty and significance national with industry energy controlled foreign-capital largely in fact, and, profit-driven mundane, the representations, and demonstrative action. Theserepresentational ‘tools’ invested have energy: in of national sphere interest the the safeguard itsto determination demonstration of lofty national “arousingterms feelings national this of -Kozloduy”about wealth inquoted International lobby groups have backedBulgariancounterpartstheir presenting in the Kozloduy NPP as quoted in (Saxkoburggotski, NPP. Belene ofthe construction the resume We will interest… national the Bulgaria can illuminate the dark Balkans… evenunits after 3and 4 at Kozloduy beenhave that self-confidence found a newly with EU the entering us show would pictures Satellite Bulgaria is and will be one of the main providers of energy in the Balkans. We will not betray Sega 24 Chasa 28.9.2002). Thelobby’s has 28.9.2002). mission in been accordingly presented the Sega 7.4.2002, 1) 27.7.2002). Sega 8.4.2004). Trud 19.11.2003, 1, 20.11.2003, 1, 11; 19.11.2003, 24 Chasa 88 Sega (A. 144 CEU eTD Collection European European lobby energy ( of the interests theeconomic serving beenlabeledas“racketeering” has conditionality session celebrating Bulgaria’s accession to the EU: tothe accession Bulgaria’s celebrating session cool parliamentary hechoseto the Euro-enthusiasm aspirations, European down during lossby chargedmove:indefianceof of ideological a symbolically the power Bulgaria’s future membership”, “servitudefuture EUandNATO”the to ( for guarantees “humiliating without of conditions acceptance unconditional surrender”, and “complete damning: been have media nationalist in the Representations ( violation “crude ofthe Constitution” sector”, energy in by the compensated concessions “weakness, negotiations”,carry accession serious inability out to “demonstrated interest”, national the of “betrayal like themes around hovered have policy Bulgaria’s symbol the troubledtransition.Kozloduy of Representations elite’s the of Public supportfor thenuclear energyindustry has been bymakinggarnered ‘Kozloduy’ leadership. failures of Bulgarian are aflagrantexamplethe statesmanship the of sector eventually instilled into public opinion – theidea the that troubles in nuclearenergythe conveyed–and have tools discursive media-friendly symbolically Various charged (BSP, quoted in 89 Sega Luckily (forglobal climate anyway) the authorities ultimately opted fora more modest light show. to reneging on our national interests. (Parvanov 2007b) closure of the ‘Energy’ chapterwith resolutions detrimental to Bulgaria, have beentantamount integrationcontingent the uponfuture energy ofournuclear of part the production, and hasty European our of process the Making teams. negotiating and governments successive small units of the Kozloduy NPP has so far been the biggestcompromise allowed by I amgoing to say it again, despite the uttersolemnity of the moment: the shutting downof the minutes shut down… If we want to be the energy center of the Balkans, we have to light up for five 20.11.2002), passing of passing“a 20.11.2002), onBulgaria’s of verdict” deathpenalty nuclear energy 89 . (Prokopiev 2006) Sega 25.9.2002, 11.1.2003; 11.1.2003; in 25.9.2002, Ibid .). Evenplayed.). President the upthe greatness units’the of 24 Chasa Nova Zora 29.3.2002, 4), etc. 4), 29.3.2002, 2003). EU 2003). 145 CEU eTD Collection production(Ovcharov, quoted in 91 gas consumption have made the problem especially sensitive. Bulgaria depends on depends sensitive. Bulgaria haveespecially the problem made gas consumption in increase expected the and gas Russian on dependency extreme Bulgaria, In option. energy nuclear the reconsider to countries European some and prompting sources energy top the of policy the agenda everywherein intensifyingEurope, todiversify efforts has to ascended on Russia dependency energy decreasing issue of nuclear The energy. interruptionsvulnerable to fuel of supply less onceayearandaretherefore fuel fresh only refill need capacities price. Nuclear petrol and gas by – enabling large-scale electricity production at astable predictable of hypothetical fluctuations in pricesprimarythe imported of notably energy – most of issee impact It heldcapable Harsev (e.g. negative 2004). offsetting the independence of for itsNuclear energy boostBulgaria’s ability islong-term touted energy and security to thein terms ofits accession an determining equal par conceding to all conditions and renouncing Bulgaria’s sovereign right to participate on and of the negotiations, of accession in conduct the general lack of of the transparency accession, tendency of terms EU beneficial tonegotiate inability of example government’s the a blatant to rush been invoked as has typically predicament Kozloduy lossThe of Bulgaria’s sovereignty. throughdecommissioning of the Kozloduy units have been accessionthe most visible showcase of demands EU for process. early ininvolvedsovereignty EUaccession the negotiation haveloss by exploited who of beenshocked theanxiety Bulgarians the ordinary of unwittingly or wittingly have problem Kozloduy the on debates media and Political chapters at the cost of see e.g. 90 2002; seeBliznakov (e.g. security national and sovereignty, national independence, energy of a guarantee is energy nuclear that assumption isthe nationalism of nuclear discourse first of the The tenet Security National and Sovereignty Basic Tenets ofNuclear Nationalism There have been ideas to further strengthen energy self-sufficiency by reviving local uranium local by reviving self-sufficiency energy strengthen further to ideas been have There Forexample, see Stanishev 2004; Ovcharov,quoted 2004, in Sega 9.10.2002, 19.11.2003; Mediapool Mediapool Mediapool 1.11.2006). 20.11.2002, 9.12.2002; 91 . This has been a crucial argument in favor of 28.1.2002, 29.11.2002; 28.1.2002, 90 Sega . 25.9.2002; for criticism in the media 24 Chasa 20.11.2002,11. Sega 21.6.2003). 146 CEU eTD Collection Economic Importance of Energy of Nuclear Importance Economic not increase dependency this (Dilov 2006; interviewOvcharov, for BNT2006a). Russia.on dependent itself Itis has sub-sector energy nuclear argued the that fact the over that unperturbed been replacing the four Kozloduy units with two long-would for asavital theoldKozloduy presented that units guarantee replacement new onesis NPP Belene wouldThe NPP. Belene the of construction the on debates in prominently featured has also discourse nationalism nuclear of the element The ‘security’ interview for interview Mediapool 93 92 calculations. economic from exempt largely is itwhere debate, interest national of the center the at beenplaced has and analysis, where most forthe partitwould havebeen subject toexpert-dominated cost-and-benefit discourse, economic of domain the from elevated been has energy nuclear time, same At the policy options. marginalized alternative andhas further sector energy nuclear the The Kozloduy 11.4.2002). hascrisis theperceived dramatically increased of importance in and nucleareducation see of specialists (e.g. Kovachev, quoted infrastructure prideBulgaria –that make intends to full andof use availablenuclearthe energy specialized development.energy Ithas significant declared–with tosector non-nuclear approaches skilledcontemplated never has leadership Bulgarian workforce, The sector. energy the of development the asfor basis the as wellis conceived power nuclear coal, lignite local asusing power thermal with of theTogether tradition economy. national the of asset key a as energy nuclear of identification is the of training issues Kozloduy and Belene tothe nationalist approach nuclear the of The second tenet security sovereignty,term and independence, energy and for 100% of its gas imports Russia for around90%ofits primary energy supplies, for 94%of its gas consumption See Saxkoburggotski, quoted in Forcomparison, only 25% of the gas consumed in the EU is imported from Russia. 3.5.2004; business organization‘Vazrajdane’, quoted in Mediapool 8.4.2002; Ovcharov,quoted in Mediapool 92 . 6/8.4.2002, in Mediapool 24 Chasa 93 1.11.2006; Tsigularov 2002c. . The pro-nuclear coalition has coalition pro-nuclear The . 7.4.2002, 1;Kovachev,quoted in Mediapool 2.2.2002; Bliznakov, Mediapool 147 CEU eTD Collection exploited until longer in2008 or (quoted safety characteristics in units 1-2, USD which 70 million were could invested, havebeen losses economic isinvolve Closure closure. great heldto of grave premature their consequences the has been conveyed byaccentuating oftheKozloduy units importance The economic Mediapool end of Bulgaria’s nuclear energy and the financial collapse of most of the energy sector of most energy the of collapse financial the and nuclearenergy endBulgaria’s of Some supporters of the NPP have ominously undermine competitiveness NPPand the the wouldof its ultimately bankruptcy. cause argued that the end of units 1-4 means would isthe additional costs these feared that and It decommissioning. fuel storage, burden of repaying all upgrades,remaining related to costs nuclear disposal, waste spent fundsresultthese 5-6would would Units bearthe severefinancial inadequate. remain funds management and asa waste decommissioningandradioactive to the contribute potential revenues and allinvestment into upgrades were lost. The units nolonger 2011 andlicenses 2013respectively.early the of 3-4ran units to closure, all Dueto for 13.4.2002,16). independent evaluations (see forexample Foratom 2007, 2; Kostadinov, quoted in 95 ( of misery” –center NPP the Without center; energy have featured slogans such as “Poor94 – Poorer – Without a NPP – Without a state” and “With the NPP – energy industry’, etc of the part profitable ‘themost assets’, economic competitive few Bulgaria’s ‘one of GDP’, ‘a crucial factor for the country’s economic development and social prosperity’, contributors Bulgarian to the biggest of ‘one of producer the electricity’, ‘the biggest NPP has been asrepresented ‘absolutely safe’, ‘runby highly qualified professionals’, economic advantages(Kostadinov 2007; 2006; Dilov TheMEER 2004b, 31). Kozloduy situation, and that turns the available know-how and qualified workforce into major economic grim generally the despite country developed a technologically Bulgaria Standart for interview (e.g.seeOvcharov, all at costs ispreserving worth that economy national of the section’ has‘powerful asthe be regarded cometo sector energy The nuclear Assessments of losses have differed widely. As a rule, Bulgarian forecasts have been much graver than graver much been have forecasts Bulgarian rule, a As widely. differed have losses of Assessments closure units’ the against protests Popular public. general by the accepted been has representation This Spiegel 2006). It is celebrated as 2006).Itis makesindustry a technologically sophisticatedcelebrated that 9.4.2006). 1999; 95 . According to representatives of the nuclear energy lobby, given their given lobby, energy nuclear the of representatives to According . Trud 94 . (e.g. see 11.4.2002, 12; Borisov, quoted in 12;Borisov,quoted 11.4.2002, Sega 13.4.2002; 13.4.2002; interviewsKostov, 1999, for Reuters Trud Sega 28.1.2002, 5; 28.1.2002, 12.4.2002, 28.1.2002). The operating 24 Chasa Mediapool 29.1.2002, 3). Sega 3.6.2004; 3.12.2006; Trud 148 CEU eTD Collection quoted inquoted prevent lossthe of capacity export and potential revenues (e.g.seeDilov 2006; Genov, in to time thenewNPP build late to is already ittoo actually arguethat supporters critics, to Contrary units. whoKozloduy the of closure the argueafter electricity export to inability that it isdevelopment. is It expected to minimizetoo the losses Bulgaria wouldincur as a result its of early isThe held beindispensableBelene NPP,too, for to Bulgaria’s future economic to build another large nuclear capacity, the project’s energy consumption in order to determine the need for new units. While in all new While inall three need for units. the in todetermine consumption energy order gross uses scenarios about three madeby NEK forecasts (2004), the (2004b), basedon MEER the by analysis An time. of period significant any for demand energy growing meetBulgaria’s to insufficient be allegedly would capacities generating power existing The Belene NPP is held to be indispensable for the stability of energy supply. Without it, assumption was unsubstantiated (MEER2004b, 31). the that clear made it offers bidders’ the NPPuntil new the of competitiveness the price guarantee to wereheld facilities Theconserved costs. lower construction which 15-year almost the old equipmentcould beused much,andif how itat all, would to extent the of analysis prior without discarded apparently was money bad after money for Belene TV2006a).Thepossibility the Nova endgood upthrowing could that project on the Belene site ( conserved equipment partially-built invested inthe already resources the dissipation of The construction (quoted inexports NPP wouldinto translate USD2billion in losses from annual electricityunrealized of the new NPP was also justified by the desire to prevent the 2007, 3; Ivanov,interview for (Foratom agreements international other with and requirements Kyoto with comply to makefor Bulgariamore andto toincreasegasemissions it difficult expected greenhouse is generation power with thermal capacities nuclear emission-free of closed replacement The unemployment. high with in aregion lost be would jobs as consequences, social grave have to and exports electricity from revenues lost to due balance trade todisrupt 2002).Theunits’ is 13.4.2002, country’s 16;Kutsarov the closure expected (quoted in(quoted Sega Sega 21.1.2008). The CCRCB 21.1.2008). has failure calculated thatlaunch to new the 12.4.2002, 21.6.2003, 29.3.2002,19.6.2003; 21.6.2003, 16.10.2003, in 12.4.2002, Sega Ibid .; Kovachev, quoted in 13.4.2002). The methodbeen of hasnot publicized. 13.4.2002). calculation Standart 23.1.2006). Mediapool 7.4.2002;Ovcharov,interview Trud 149 CEU eTD Collection Energy as a Key Export Sector Bulgaria’s 2008-2012 emission quota. reduce led change EU’s the fighting policy ECto climate that on the toughened Stanishev, quoted inStanishev, quoted 12; MEER 2004b, 25-8;Ovcharov andKovachev, in quoted 2011 onwards this wouldbe impossible without anewfacility nuclear 2004a,(MEER from that maintained has government the in Bulgaria, issue an been not has emissions Report somedropped to 50 year basis% of level( the earlythe years of by transition, midthe Bulgaria’s 2000s greenhouse gas emissions in Due industrial basisyear the to restructuring (1988). emissions to by8%compared agreement,reduce greenhouseKyoto Under by gas hasto the2008-2012Bulgaria Environmental in have been invoked arguments supportof readily Belenethe NPP. developmental path. possibility of andless electricity exports out a opting energy choosing extensive of discarded of least uporatpostponinggiving of were apparently a secondunit construction the economic disaster (e.g. see Ovcharov, interview for interview see Ovcharov, (e.g. disaster economic losspotential expected as an inof has beeninterpreted period post-Kozloduy export the the while aseconomic strength, has electricity been export represented ability to Bulgaria’s economic relationshipthe between energy development. and production interpretation particular into one of been locked debateshave The Kozloduy and Belene necessary at least till the end of the studied period(i.e. 2020) ( scenario (which is also the scenario with minimal exports), a second unit is not justifies launching asecond in 2004b,unit already 2013(MEER 26).In minimal the unitis necessary only in themedium and maximal scenarios. Only maximal the scenario scenarios thefirst new is1000-MW necessary unitalready in 2010,asecond1000-MW 2007, 8).Although meeting benchmarks international ongreenhouse gas prior to any policy or public debates. Also rejected prior to debate was the Mediapool 25.5.2007). Sucharguments 25.5.2007). have been strengthened by Bulgaria Greenhouse Inventory Gas Standart 2006). This interpretation Ibid Mediapool ., 26). Yet, the options the Yet, 12.3.2007; 150 CEU eTD Collection Foreign Interests Economic Foreign andproportions asa perceived impotence.sign of economic are andlivinglow imports asa standards, electricity regarded catastrophe of national prices higher with associated Typically strength. economic and self-esteem, sovereignty, victimfallen have They option. apolicy as rejected intuitively been tohave – economy open theany for alternative losing necessarily romanticnot and standard otherwise an – imports Electricity representation export. through ‘hardcurrency’ capableearning of sectors of feweconomic the The publichas notbeen hard to sway. To the average Bulgarian, the energy sector is one of theenergy supplies 2004b,(MEER 16-9). key energythe and consumption electricity of centers the between location geographic strategic sector asin 2010 Balkans after the a symbol arebased of majordeficit onexpectations aelectricity forecasts optimistic2004b). The of nationalBulgaria’s Belene NPP assert anexporter of potential electricityas 2004a,2005, (MEER foreign competition in the attempt to expose Bulgarian politicians’ shameful timidity shameful politicians’ Bulgarian expose to attempt inthe competition foreign of unsympathetic haveeagerly and specter the on taken newspapers some popular forces, political nationalist the lobby, energy nuclear The sector. energy Bulgarian the representations foreign economicof interests andfinancial competing ruthlessly against The persuasivenuclear powerof has nationalism been builtup through a host of hostile in (Ovcharov, quoted NPP Belene the of construction the justifying argument important an been has closure closure prevent of the the need units, loss Kozloduy the capacity to export of the after the after immediately period in the project Belene the of irrelevance obvious the Despite interest. defenseof the national the has been at the heart of the argument that the defense of the units is part and parcel of Sega and are believed tobe additionally substantiated by Bulgaria’s 12.11.2005; Harsev 2008).Thefeasibility 12.11.2005;Harsev studies of the 151 CEU eTD Collection fact hasdiscipline managed, largely stifle and to attitudes, public internal dissent, citizensembittered foreign (Rajchevtowards wrongdoers is2002). It intended,in and ruling the by upheld actively been has NPPs elite Bulgarian the against pressure external of story itself in attempts to retain or regain public trust by directing the rage of Telegraf Kutsarov 2002; Siderov, statement on the BNA website; Karamfilov 2007; Nikolov, interview for 96 duringsectors transition anditbenefits from, andin turn nurtures, public’sthe devotion economic major of decline the and hardship economic the from appeal mass draws efficient element of the representational toolkit employed by the pro-nuclear coalition. It be an to proved has nuclearenergy Bulgarian the against a conspiracy of The narrative makes evidence irrelevant. 2004). Like most hasanintuitively publicscares,thenarrative appealinglogic that see (e.g. Harsev oninvestments high return would guarantee sector nuclear energy the nuclearfacilities whom for in powergenerating diminution of prospective the Bulgaria, A 27.7.2002). fourth camp ofadversaries isbring saidto investors in together non- who, in the scrambleindustries, such as industry. coal the A thirdof group rivals is allegedly formed by those rival to links of also but for principle of matter a new predominantly) even not (and just be not to energy markets, stanceissaid anti-nuclear whose energy, tonuclear opposed movements environmental lobby against market. Theare the industry leave perceivedenergy enemy – theother SEE Soviet technology nuclear –the Bulgarian competitor its biggest inseeing interested iscamp allegedly ( industry, isin involved which theconstruction Romanianthe Chernavoda NPP.of This nuclear investors and namely energy Canadian the campEuropean competitors, of insector Bulgaria. groups broad Four interestsof haverival identified. been One is the as are depicted upagainstrival Balkanganging the market energy nuclear the energy up take to of trying electricity Foreign producers effective. but isshallow The narrative grounds that they contravene the on the debate putative policy the nationalfrom them bans interest. virtually and betrayal national of acts as views ontheKozloduy issues. views renounces anddelegitimize It dissenting such Belene interests rival economic against economy the national defend to and inability See Karakachanov 2002, interview for 18.1.2006, 13; 24 Chasa 11.4.2002, 10, 9.4.2002, 9, 20.11.2002,11; Trud 12.4.2002, 31; Harsev 2004; Trud Sega 11.4.2002, 12. 27.7.2002, 22.2.2002; 96 . The . Sega 152 CEU eTD Collection directed against the development of nuclear energy in Bulgaria (see Bulgaria in energy of nuclear development the against directed campaign purposeful of a part were statements these that counter-argued government the controversy the During safety. nuclear compromised thus has and one of fresh instead fuel nuclear recycled 98 Ovcharov, interviews for BTV 2006a, for Nova TV 2006b, for BNR 2006c, for 2006c, BNR for 2006b, TV Nova for 2006a, BTV for interviews Ovcharov, opponents of the NPP as servile cheerleaders of the Westerners (Dilov, quoted in quoted (Dilov, Westerners ofthe cheerleaders servile as NPP ofthe opponents local renounced They Bulgaria. in capacity nuclear competitive new ofa construction the obstruct to and energy nuclear Bulgaria’s of image the tarnish to Renaissance’, ‘nuclear the back hold to circles financial and economic unspecified) by (‘certain’ attempt an as incident the around commotion the interpreted They energy. ofnuclear dangers the with obsessions of Western victim a as NPP Kozloduy the represented public outcry. critics’It branded arguments asattempts to demonize Bulgaria’sa nuclear energy avoided and successfully however, coalition, pro-nuclear The website). campaign NPP’ Belene the to ‘No from and citizens the from theinformation withholding of IAEA environmentalists and critics for outraged by accused were the sake of preserving97 the Kozloduy NPP’s image of a ‘safe’ NPP (Kaschiev 2006a; the stabilitythe statesmanship, to of contribution apraiseworthy and and as power good of national economic for asproof is areason pride, Balkans. the perceived as This role predicated should remain upon assumption isandthe thecenter of energy Bulgaria that possibility for preserve Bulgaria’s ability to this position. Thenational energy is policy of condition be the to is regarded energy nuclear and interest national Bulgaria’s be market acentral Balkanthe on of element isregardedto Leadership position energy Leadership Position on the Balkan Energy Market 7.4.2002, 1;Tsigularov 2002c). in their (e.g.seeSaxkoburggotski, defense quoted to NPP Kozloduy embattled the of specter the andreadily called sector energy national advertised itas againstattemptsa barrier to impose foreign-made plans upon the campaign ininitial the phases of The Belenethe too.supporters project, of newNPP the during acorruption scandal in 2008 strategy avoidhelped to public outcry Kozloduy anincidentat after inunit5 2006 This sector. energy nuclear ‘national’ the tocriticize illegitimate itbecomes until blended with problem sore the foreignof againstBulgaria’s pressure industrial power, are energy nuclear of downsides the discourse: nationalist nuclear the to and industry energy nuclear the to challenges counter to deployed hasIt been power. economic nation’s the upon foreign resist encroachment nuclear to and determination to energy A former Kozloduy Aformer NPP employee that argued as a result of deal NPP an illicit the beenburninghas The authorities first kept the incident under wraps and then downplayed its significance. In turn, they turn, In significance. its downplayed then and wraps under incident the kept first authorities The 98 . This strategy worked well as a public relations Mediapool Mediapool 6/8.4.2002, in 6/8.4.2002, 17.7.2008). Duma Mediapool 2006). 24 Chasa 26.4.2006; 97 and 153 CEU eTD Collection interpretive framework that has equated the Kozloduy and the Belene NPPs with the with NPPs Belene the and Kozloduy the equated has that framework interpretive causalmajor nuclear hasbeen of element energy.purported a The the relationship of development the necessitate to held is turn in which electricity, export to ability is its market depend on held leadership on regional position the Secondly,to Bulgaria’s prerequisite for Balkan stability. This representation employs images of imagespotential of employs This representation stability. Balkan prerequisite for a key as represented been has energy nuclear Bulgarian consumption, international For quoted in substantial parts of the electricity deficit inSEE (Kasidova, quoted in developed energy infrastructure, wellperforming energy highly sector, abilityqualified laborand to cover framework of the SP was supported with reference to the country’s strategic geographic position, well- 99 Pact Bulgaria’s in developmental (Saxkoburggotski,priorities quoted in listof included the hasbeen capacities newofficially nuclear of construction Bliznakov,3.5.2004; in quoted in 29.11.2002, 6/7.4.2002, inyears 25 another quoted (Saxkoburggotski, for of electricity remain aleading to exporter Bulgaria andenable competitiveness, sector’s the preserve units, Kozloduy for closurethe the of compensate to expected is which NPP, Belene the of presentation the in crucial is especially It interest. national for2006b, BNR2006d; inParvanov quoted 2008b; Stanishev, interviews forfor Radio Darik 2006, diversification 2002, of energy (MEER 4; resources Government2004, 1-2; Ovcharov, providefor industry the andto increase opportunities of the competitiveness energy the energy transmission in of location the center the liein its geographic to strategic areassumed advantages routes the developmentcrossing of the energy sector has two major tenets. Firstly, the thecountry’s for national strategy the energy resources, possess not primary Bulgaria does that Given Balkans. The strategicpolitics. domestic positionintended totickle nationalstabilize Bulgarians’ andto pride wobbly in its position ishas elite believedruling the leader, energy Balkan a of status Bulgaria’s maintain to resolve to region For example, Bulgaria’s application for hosting a SEE energy center envisaged by a project in the on Bulgaria’s Social Developmenton Bulgaria’s Economic and 99 (e.g.see Parvanov 2002a, 2008b, 2006a;MEER2002,30).By demonstrating Mediapool 9.9.2002). Government News Mediapool Dnevnik 7.4.2002, Since 13.11.2003). 2003,the 4.9.2006; Kovachev, quoted in 4.9.2006;Kovachev, quoted Sega 2006, for Nova TV2006b;for 2006, BNT 21.9.2004,4.5.2004;in 2006, 9). Mediapool Mediapool Mediapool 21.6.2002; Filipov, 21.6.2002; 21.1.2008). 15.1.2003; Mediapool Mediapool 154 CEU eTD Collection quoted inquoted (Stanishev, EU the of policy energy common the of development the in role constructive and Belene(Parvanov is expectedtoimprove2007c). It international towards Kozloduy the attitudes NPPs and transitan important of country, power” andaleadingregional supplier electric partner, reliable “a to of reputation international affirm country’s the boost to intended is region Bulgaria’s 23.1.2006; Foratom 2007, 2-3). The Bulgaria’sevocation of stabilizingmission in the image of a EU member-state playing a region ( to political and economic stability in the Balkans by covering the electricity contributes still deficitinBulgaria the that admit to fails it subsided, have conflicts ethnic as now, but regional instability it Bulgaria’s of appreciated rolea ‘factor ofstability’ in theBalkans theperiod has maintaining of been standards: throughout Europe accused of double of leaders:Balkan secure the support changeEU officials to and mindsof the to been expected apparently have they where forums, international at 3-4 units of defense the in prominently The of specter Balkan instability and the theme ‘stabilizingof the Balkans’ have figured irrelevant. are apparently considered feasibility economic anditsa policy such of economicandenvironmental consequences missionary in the seeStanishev,role (e.g. quoted itsto strategic geopolitical location, Bulgaria isheld tobe particularly of capable playing entireregion,the irrespective of SEE of fate the the Kozloduy (Marin Due units 2007). build determined the to facilities itguarantee security supply in all energy the takes of to is Bulgaria that hasdeclared leadership The in energy theBalkans. future crises prevent mission to andmore asa less asapolicy has beenarticulated energy policy in (Ovcharov, quoted imagesthese with potentially the stabilizing of role a strong Bulgarian industry energy regional tensions and instability associated with the closure of units 3-4, and contrasts unyielding stanceunits against 3-4. Bulgaria’s narrow national interests. (Marin2007) beyond goes that problem a] created has [It Balkans… Western the in especially and SEE, of whole the in supplies energy of security the affected negatively already has closure units’] [The Ibid Government NewsGovernment .). This representational tactic has aimed at delegitimizing the EU’s the delegitimizing at aimed has tactic representational This .). Government News Government 25.5.2007). In line with Inline Bulgaria’s representation, this 25.5.2007). 1.11.2006; Ivanov 2005, interview 1.11.2006;Ivanov 2005, for Government News 25.5.2007). The 25.5.2007). Standart 155 CEU eTD Collection in for interview Bliznakov, 100 initial investmentscapital had been largely paidA sharp off. priceincrease was said to by was low exceptionally becausethe electricity smallKozloduy the produced units price basedcost the assumption of the that was on crisis Kozloduy peak periods of the of the scarecharacteristic ‘rising The prices’ NPP. Kozloduy the of in campaign defense the of elements ‘welfare’ the nurtured systematically has coalition pro-Kozloduy The of and price of power. the increase electric adangerof a rapid shortages electricity representationthe of units’the closure asadangertocitizens’ welfare: adangerof of Atby forces core discursiveframework hasbeen deployed the the pro-Kozloduy the Welfare Energy Social and Nuclear financingEuropean for Belenethe NPP. secure and Belene the to project, to andpotential preemptEU opposition prevent This has goal been press threefold –to EUintothe accepting Kozloduy’s 3-4, to units image. international country’s the to less much and benefits economic to explicitly more security and stability. missionary isenergy distinguishpolicy intended Bulgaria to asa guarantor of Balkan current the policy, Kosovo morality-driven ostensibly the This Like crisis. Kosovo time the by during successfully round,employed ODS the that strategy representational same the the ultimate loomingBalkans has from reenact been a poorly energy troubles attempt to goalconcealed of the strategysave The portrayal Bulgariaof the as an altruistically leader struggling to energy relates muchtime, to strengthen the domestic campaign in its favor. been EU’s tosecurethe blessing forfinancial and the support new NPPand, same atthe aim has Its stability. economic vital safeforwere both Balkan and that units nuclear of have closure mightoverthe theEU conscience guilty stirintended any to pressure moral and advertisement combination of upona relies strategy This representational energy supply inthe Balkans and as forcrucial regional stability and development of security for the guarantee asapotential has been represented too, project, The Belene See Ovcharov’s official letter to the EC, quoted in quoted EC, the to letter official SeeOvcharov’s Government News 25.5.2007; Parvanov 2008a; Hinkovski, quoted in Mediapool 8.4.2002; Ovcharov, interview forNova 2006a;Stanishev, TV quoted Government News Mediapool 1.11.2006; Kovachev 2005; 24.4.2003. 156 100 . CEU eTD Collection nation (Kutsarov 2002). of the wellbeing assaulton the as a flagrant interpreted was safeunits four perfectly interview for also Karakachanov, developmentand expensive electricity imported (quoted in economic between units asachoice the againstpreserving for or choice the presented characteristically VMRO the NPP, the of in support mass rally a At etc. profits, impediment to economic development and export growth, a forfeit of potentialan prices, exportin consumer rise for across-the-board and electricity of price the of increase for asharp closureeconomy, asaheavyblow the tothe VMRO presented atrigger be lossescould byfinancial that notcompensated funds. moderate EU Therelatively risingwarnings imminentbankruptcy about poverty, Kozloduy the NPP andof massive closely framework of forces useda political representations Nationalist black-and-white simple related to Bulgarian relationship tothe energy nuclear lobby.the campaign of the nuclear energy lobby. Its basic tenets were the WCNW,the see presidentof the ‘experts’ (e.g. byforeign panic The blackouts wasencouraged 2006). productioncosts following the closure of units 3-4 (Nikolov,quoted in 102 100% increase, and warned of potential blackouts (quoted in electricity 2001-2006the during period resultof was closure 1-2, of the the predictedunits an additional 28.1.2002). lobby’s The outgrowth civic– CCDKthe –concluded 100% the that increase intheprice of the price of electricity would rise by 200% if Bulgaria closedin the units(quoted prematurely calculation (quotedthe in in included components price the lowerthan that of the powerproduced inthermal powerplants. Characteristically, they failed to specify 101 at Kozloduy in warned of electricity shortages case of technical problems units inthe two remaining 3-4and units priceclosurethe electricity suggested that of would double after of apocalyptic to wereclose lobby energy by Forecasts nuclearthe substantiate (Kaschiev 2006b). demands the to calculations (SEWRC) suggested of adjustment upwardprice none20% to30%; of them presented Commission Regulatory Water Energy and State the NEKand the Both higher cost. a at producing by alternative capacities bereplaced wereto if units the be unavoidable Later on, the NPP management came up with a more moderate calculation, namely a 40% increase of increase 40% a namely calculation, moderate a more with up came management NPP the on, Later Bulatom members argued that the costof electricity produced by units 1-2 was three to four times 102 (Ivanov, interview for interview (Ivanov, Mediapool 2.5.2004), who could only with great difficulty hide difficulty onlytheir whocould with great 2.5.2004), Trud 12.4.2002, 31).Western close pressure the to Standart 101 . The management of the Kozloduy NPP Mediapool Sega 23.1.2006; inGenov,23.1.2006; quoted BIRN 25.4.2005, 15.4.2005; Semov 2006). Expert.bg 2.12.2002). The BNS warned that Mediapool 2.2.2007). 11.4.2002; see 11.4.2002; Sega 157 CEU eTD Collection target for sensational media coverage. As a result, ordinary dependent on AsBulgarians for sensational ordinary media a coverage. target result, worse, lack issues of To makematters a on key madethe Kozloduy case clarity prime was noteven clear which price, price element, orperiod of time the forecasts referred to. it Oftentimes, sensationally. vaguely and publicized weretypically Dramatic predictions within institutions or changes in institutional the positions held by key political figures. themselves. Forecasts by the same source often varied in time as a result of staff changes shortages andalleged regarding prices argumentation has iton which capacity relied.Forecasts and forecasts in the contradictions unintended) (probably by the damaged, varied have than rather been appears to campaign The impact of pro-Kozloduy the augmented, widely across sources, even within the pro-Kozloduy circles bleak future with expensive imported bleak with electricity future see expensive imported (e.g. supply of collapse power system the and a and, acomplete occasion, prophesized on electricity of Bulgaria’s transformation from a regional energy center into an importer of bytheprospect outraged andwere an crisis energy to lead would capacities generating Mediapool Labor Confederation ‘Podkrepa’, quoted in quoted ‘Podkrepa’, Labor Confederation 2006; Borisov, quoted in 2005; Parvanov, quoted in 2005; Parvanov, quoted unsupported by unsupported data warnings weretypically though in appeared mainstream debates, occasionally political adjustment of the price of too of electricity, price of the adjustment 105 3.10.2002). generating capacities would be insufficient evenfor the summerperiod (‘Podkrepa’, quoted in 104 103 in that early closure of the units would make electricity prices “unaffordable” (SDS, quoted instrumental vote. The largershare in suggested opposition a of rightwing securing the standards living declining and collapse economic impending of narrative Kozloduy elements ‘welfare’ the accentuated media coverage mainstream and competition Routine political of the discourse of nuclear nationalism. The opposition parties found the See,forexample, Nikolov, quoted in Workers’ unions argued incredibly BNR 2006c). that even for interview if only one (Ovcharov, of estimates unitsthe were shocking off the shut down, BSPcalled the Bulgaria’sgovernment, in power Once Sega 30.1.2002). The BSP and the President predicted considerable upward predicted President The BSP the and 30.1.2002). 105 3.11.2006). Importantpolitical warned figures shortagethe that of power . High-circulation media took up the story impending disaster up media welfare of story the took . High-circulation Mediapool 104 (e.g. see KNSB, quoted in Mediapool 3.12.2006; an MP, quoted in Mediapool 20.11.2002). The specter of blackout schedules blackout The specter of 20.11.2002). 103 (e.g.seeOvcharov interviewfor BTV 2004, 26.4.2004; Kornezov, quoted in Sega 3.10.2002; Borisov, quoted in 3.10.2002; quoted Borisov, OMDA Press Review Press OMDA Sega 24 Chasa 15.6.2004. 11.4.2002,10). Mediapool 4.11.1999; 1.12. Sega 158 CEU eTD Collection relatively poor and has a high unemployment rate unemployment high a has and poor relatively beneficial for the economic development of Bulgaria’s northwestern regiondevelopment which economic is general boost to 29.11.2006; 29.11.2006; Sevlievski Kovachev, in2005; quoted 107 costs. project of the 20% least at represent should share this 106 NPP Kozloduy the citizens’ to contributes that asset economic anational as been regarded addition, traditionally has In incomes. monthly exceeded often have bills electricity months, winter During heating. for electricity on dependent been have households Bulgarian nonexistent, virtually steadilyup. With gasification go has tendedto and average EU the half around only was electricity of price the while EU, in the than Bulgarians. Duringfor ordinary issue hasbeen anoverly sensitive electricity of price The affordable prices. most of the poverty,has publictransition the beeneasily persuaded by of threats prices of andpromises rising period, In discourse. oflowanda period nuclearnationalism increasing standards living wages in Bulgaria been in insuccessful structure shapingthis remarkably underlying with accordance the have they turn, In society. were Bulgarian in beliefs and attitudes of muchstructure pre-existing the lower well have framework fitted interpretive of nationalist nuclear the elements The ‘welfare’ ( power shortages and expensivefollowing powerimports the loss of 3-4 units avoid help would that and Balkans in the source energy other any than price lower Bulgaria’s futurethatwould abundantandaffordable provide a significantly energy at into investment as indispensable NPPisrepresented Belene nuclearan The energy. its develop to continues Bulgaria unless isimminent disaster welfare that narrative heavily hasdistressing in of too, on the project, Belene reliedThe campaignthe support outlook. a more realistic propagate successfully impossible pessimistic andnextto to againstexaggerated scenarios arguments find convincing to asit was difficult public lives.were dramatic, opinion on effects The truthful, a alone let pictureclear, a of get the probablehardly impact of thecould units’ closure media on the economy mainstream or on their the own from information Government News The new NPP is expected to lead to a 50% drop in regional unemployment and to increase wage levels. wage increase to and unemployment inregional drop a50% to lead to expected is NPP new The The main supplier is obliged to allocate to local subcontractors 30% of the project-related activities and 29.11.2006; officials, quoted in officials, 29.11.2006; quoted 106 andhas been advertised as especially Mediapool Mediapool 107 (e.g. see 7.4.2002). 30.9.2003). It is expected 30.9.2003). Government News 159 CEU eTD Collection enough to improve the country’s political and economic standing. Its developmenthas improve Its andeconomic standing. theenough political country’s to has energy astheonly been isregarded widely of sector economy the competitive that through which policymakers have approached theKozloduy and Belene issues.Nuclear The interpretive hasof nuclear dominantdiscourse nationalism provided framework the Summary VMRO, quoted inVMRO, quoted business would be interview for damaged” (Ivanov, have pay moreliving andtheir for to their electricity, that standards would deteriorate sector by relating “the intoBulgarians getting more actively involved indefending the nuclear country’s energy closure of the units to to the prosperity each individual.of forces pro-Kozloduy and haveshocked The scared their families, to theby discursivefact tactics designed relateto the dangers posed thatby the loss of the units directly they would The impact of the ‘welfare’ elements of the pro-Kozloduy campaign has been boosted NPP would cause the system to collapse again. lossat the the capacity that were easily of persuaded Most crisis. 1991energy for the bombardedpeople looming supply by of warnings reasonscutoffs knew the electricity ( system Soviet-design megalomaniac the of ineffectiveness NPP Kozloduy the failuresat technical operation, repeated Project Team 2004). asin roughly as much capacity and couldthe 2000s(OSF intheory electricity produce At the time, the problems schedulesdistressing blackout of in1991. Back 1991, Bulgaria hadsurplus generation with electricityrememberedalso who effective the inwinningoverBulgarians,especially those supply wereimminentWarnings about electricity shortages following the closure of inefficientunits 1-4were priceof electricity. alow consumer guarantee cheapest source allegedly for the asasubstitute NPP theBelene perceive Bulgarians Since ordinary of Bulgarian electricity – the Kozloduy NPP – it, too, is expected to months. 108 interview for welfare by (Nikolov, cheapelectricity providing The 1991 crisis The followedextensive after turbine damage caused 5to unit be downforshut several Sega 5.4.2002; Karakachanov 5.4.2002; 2002). Standart Ibid Telegraf .). Yet, very few of the 108 23.1.2006; 23.1.2006; see also and the general 18.1.2006, 13). 160 CEU eTD Collection this sphere. in policymaking for framework interpretive influential an provide to failed has paradigm Europeanization dominant previously the Incontrast, attitudes. public pro-nuclear markedly of emergence the ledto has which citizens’ welfare, to related as one directly framed been has question energy nuclear The interest. national avital as identified been 161 CEU eTD Collection energy imports. According to the BSP, Bulgaria According BSP, simply to the imports. energy towards attitude problemBulgaria’sthe extremeof dependency on Russian primary Belene NPP – especially the BSP-led government2000s, theinvolved inKozloduy crisisandingovernments the of theresurrection the – have the demonstrated during However, security. national a ratherboost and dependency relaxed energy reduce to energy deal nuclear makesof alleged ability agreat the of nationalism of nuclear The discourse Nuclear Energy and NationalSecurity proposition. Ievaluatethis Below, interest. national indeeda vital isnuclear and energy that substantiated are energy nuclear of significance ‘national’ the about claims its be that One possible explanation of why nuclear nationalism won the Kozloduy debate would Is Nuclear Energy aVital National Interest? issues. Belene and Kozloduy the on policymaking influence to approach Europeanization the of failure concomitant the andfor discourse nationalist of for nuclear accountthe thepower factors that identifies the andanalyzes This chapter (Ovcharov, interviews(Ovcharov, for Darik Radiofor 2006, locationstrategic and flowsbetween crossingvarious pointat the of energy Europe Asia country’s by the boosted naturally is independence energy its because dependency energy worry much downby Bulgariabeen about have need not that toned argument the diversify Thesearching sources. such astrategy forwaysto obvious energy pitfalls of itstarts before Russia with relationship a harmonious secure therefore and should Understanding the Decline of the Europeanization Paradigmduringthe Understanding theDeclineofEuropeanization Kozloduy Crisis Chapter 5 Dnevnik is 2006,for Nova TV 2006b,for dependent on Russian dependenton energy 162 CEU eTD Collection government after 1997. with themurder of Multigroup’s chief in 2003. Topenergy’s was influence check putin by ODS the Topenergy’s executive board Lukanov. Itisassociated with Lukanov’s mysterious murder in1996 and MinisterPrime between of contention bone the became Topenergy sphere. political Bulgarian the influence Videnovmanaged to control of Topenergy, market. Russianownership was only the50% but throughthe Bulgarianco-owner – Multigroup –Gazprom use BSPit as a tool togovernment promote110 its contract. interests aninterstate into venture market in the Balkan energyandBulgaria would be forced to build the NPP markets,in any event and that the projectBSP might be transformed fromand a Kaschiev 2006d, 2006c). Inaddition,member, Russia’s offerto fully finance the project prompted has fears that former109 Prime Minister, and member of elite political the among money’ ‘energy of beneficiaries the and counterpart, local its business, undermines national sovereignty by serving the economic interests of the Russian energy energy policy government’s In their view,the in sector. energy national the interference Bulgaria’s energy on dependency Russia andbyfacilitating continuing Russian have claimed that theRussian Belene of choice the of nature political project the by nuclear heightened been has controversy The posesnationalism. technologya threat to nationalThe Belene project has beenand a prime target for critics of the ‘security’securityof element of nuclear a Russian by reinforcing maindecidedly Russia-friendly environment. supplier a sector Bulgarian tomakethe peculiarities Theseenergy combine two counterpart. for the Russian its to connected newtightly is which industry energy NPP. Bulgarian the of influence Critics is political the other The countries. two the between cooperation economic neutral ideologically on focused mostly years has inrecent of BSPthat the pro-Russian stance Oneisthetraditionally sector. energy the over dominance Russian of acceptance tacit for BNT 2006b, peculiaritiesfor the Bulgarian of BNR2006d). Two account politics environmental for haveargued government’senvironmental the exclusive organizations that preference In achieve itsaddition, political goals. to energy of inthe sphere its leverage 1995 in backin ininterfere Bulgarian politics its to byGazprom supplies attempts were used could be used influenceto and manipulatepolitical incircles much Bulgaria, like gas in project the concentrated resources massive financial the fearthat Critics of EU. the entry into firms by market nuclear the Russia’s ‘energy’ energy Russian allowing power further boost wouldthat energysector dominancea tool Bulgarian in Russian of the In 1994, the company Topenergy was established to mediate Russian gas supplies to the Bulgarian the to supplies gas Russian mediate to was established Topenergy company the 1994, In Critics renounce the tenderprocedure for NPP’sthe supplier main as manipulative (discussionB; 110 . Suchfears by have been willingnessaccentuated use Russia’s demonstrated to 109 (e.g. see Dimov 2007). The Belene NPP isheld tobe both a product and 163 CEU eTD Collection management funds, the root of funds,management the rootof is loss problem the notthe oldthe of units’ contributions Chorbadjijski BIRN 2006).Asfor2007; the decommissioning and nuclear waste Grigorov 2006a; Stanchev 2006a; for interview Kostov, Bogdanov 2002; Kaschiev 2004, 2006d; K. Dimitrov, interviews forBTV 2007, forRadio Fokus 2007; 111 ( ineffective liberalization,coupledmarketmade slow with have electricity production cost- forneed substituting In nuclearovercapacity units. and reality, its underutilization, closure of Kozloduy old and unitslook like ateconomicthe an dramatized disaster the made tactics the lobbying major that wasa capacities non-nuclear of underutilization NPP. Some for the share production guarantee adecent in atto very low be capacity order operated of the TPPs most of non-nuclearthe thermal facilities,plants includingmajor had power (TPPs), to were virtuallyMediapool in higha global as84% (Kaschiev, of as quoted unused.capacity compareduse average rate to Accordingshut down, the Kozloduy its Before disputable. economic were small is wouldunits consequences havedisastrous NPPto was typicallycritics, operatedThe representation at of less the Kozloduythe NPPthan as a vital economic 60% deliberateassetof whoseits partial capacity,closure upgradeandconstruction generatingthe of ( capacities power for money taxpayers’ swallowed has sector the addition, In energy. of costs high with in the energy industry has thusbeen achieved atthe priceofburdening industries other driven price adjustments and maintaining for high bigprices consumers. industrial Profit competition- preventing of way by rent monopoly a of extraction the from resulted The NEK’s by (Stanchevhas largely profit 2002). supported anddata Bogdanov actual not are such claims critics, to According debate. another sparkled have economy national the for sector energy nuclear the of significance great the about Claims of Significance theNuclearEnergySector Economic energy independence, namely hydroenergy and other renewables than rather complete, partial, policy guarantee that sidelines those nuclearoptions energy On the ‘security’ Onthe debate, seeDSB 2006a;IME 2002,Stanchev 5; Dimitrov and Stanchev2002, 6; and 17.11.2002). Due to the excess of power generating capacities inBulgaria, generating capacities Due power excessof to the 17.11.2002). Ibid .; Ganev, quoted in OSF Project Team in in Team 2004, OSF Project .; Ganev, quoted 24 Chasa 2007; M. Dimitrov 2007a; Panajotova 2007;Toshev 2007; Minchev 2006; Protest Declaration 2005; CCEEPSR 2005; Varbanov 2004. Ibid 111 .). . TOL 18.4.2007; 164 CEU eTD Collection and doubts about its economic feasibility and had subsequently ceased to been a topic of been ceasedto a topic subsequently andhad its feasibility economic about and doubts This was abizarreposition projectgiven the that hadbeenabandoned protests amidst add practically nothing to it (Vasilev, to in quoted Dimitrov and Bogdanov2002,2). tothedecision prior debatethe yearsby arguing had started that ten agoandthere was Council on National Security.justified The NDSVgovernment the lack of public debate the NEK – without approval from Parliament or prior discussions in the Consultative concerns voice their to channels providedwith official not were Critics name. of worthy the In the early stages of satisfactory. the remotely Belene even been not has project Belene the of handling project government’s the however, there was noit. Inthisrespect, to onpossible alternatives magnitude, as well investment as such of public debate on in informed adequately partake on to feasibility an economic and the debates of the new NPP 114 engineer. architect an selecting and EIA an procuring into invested been already had resources substantial date that 113 2007 (Kaschiev 2006b). 112 public debate. andavigorous economicvigorous justification bya the project bepreceded resurrect to that plans necessitated apparently studies feasibility discouraging history all.of The at new werenecessary capacities that argument the They disputed priceproduction. of highof initial investments lengthy the capital with period cost a thehigh payback and nuclearsafety compromised Belene project inin thatand2004; the Earth later Forthe (quoted suggested Stanchev 1997 2004a) studies by public conducted in discussion.Feasibility Bulgarian experts 1990s early the ( environmentalist news bad nor news, unlessoneis relatedtothe nuclear energy industry isor ahard-line construction of The debates. bitter a to beensubject has NPP Belene the newof feasibility The economic NPP, as one journalist operational since the 1970s, fundsthe launched only were in 2000 has aptly put it, but is authorities’the irresponsible funds.these policy towards Although NPPhasbeen the by itself neither good Among other problems, regional seismic conditions were found to endanger the NPP’s safe operation. safe NPP’s the endanger to found were conditions seismic regional problems, other Among The first public discussionof the project’s environmental impact, forexample, was held in 2005. Until Although thefunds stillare nearly Kozloduyempty,the NPP’s contributionwas reduced asof by a half 113 . The decisionresuming by about construction was taken a single company – Mediapool 8.4.2002). The rest of the society has the right to be 114 and was economically unfeasible because unfeasible economically and was 112 . 165 CEU eTD Collection the form of state participation, and the scale of state guarantees of state scale the and participation, form state the of scheme, financing the cost of suchas construction, ultimate the basic andparameters, feasibility economic project’s of the a analysis reliable presentall at to and necessary prove thatanewitsisfor failure NPP to the government Critics harshly have criticized priorities. could these squarewith power) purchasefor electric the of long-term agreement a require even would (which project Belene mammoth the how imagine to is difficult It 2007a, 2005b, 11;PanajotovaBozhkov 2007; 2007; 115 was legitimized byinvoking the 2002 projectthe resurrect to decision non-transparent The priorities. incontestable presumably Itwas 6.5.2004). notspecifiedhow, and who, whenhad such proven claims setthe and in locationis forBelene” quoted (Saxkoburggotski, at anewNPP appropriate is and a important is it priority”because NPP, Belene the build shall “We as: such statements featured (N.been made proveits economic to feasibility.of The public presentation newventurethe Vasilev,had attempt any before wasresumed The project NPP. Belene the regarding decisions quoted in stage ofmaking process the center not have taken economic calculations Yet, in Stanchev 2006a); “It is proven that the most states that states purchase of electric of long-term and partnerships, public-private for the discontinuation agreements liberalization, power.market sources, energy renewable of development It intensity, makesenergy of no reference reduction as such and countermeasures stresses imports energy dependency on primary to worrying a Bulgaria’s newon focuses It policy. Belene nuclear government’s the to legitimacy lends facility. In isit energy ifitfrom and approach to clear far policy different an promotes altogether fact, it Onhowever,32). document this (MEER2002, whole, forthe need suchcapacities the proved forecasts incaseNEK generating capacities new power of bless construction the few weeks tothisprior decision later approvedand by and which Parliament, didindeed See IME 2004, 1-2, 2002; Stanchev and Dimitrov 2002; Dimitrov and Angelov 2005, 11; M. Dimitrov investments ( same time preserve Bulgaria’s key role in the region through apolicy that does not require big the at and projects, large-scale defer to strive shall government the ofdemand, projections due to the dynamically changing electricity market and the unreliability of long-term Ibid ., 32) Energy StrategyofBulgaria Protest Declaration 2005; Sega , which was issued a 115 6.5.2004, 1.3.2004; . These basic Sega 166 CEU eTD Collection electricity is between5.3 and 6 eurocents per KWh (Kaschiev 2007, 4). 116 prices would damage free competition (Dimitrov Angelovand 2005, 13; Angelov 2005, 2). addition, along-term contract forpurchase the electricity of the produced Beleneby the fixedNPP at competitive industries, not to prop upthecompetitiveness of businessBulgarian (IME 2002,5-6). In 119 Vasilev,quoted in 118 Bank). ratios were 16%and 20% respectively calculation,(my basedstatistics onby BulgarianNational the 117 quoted in Brunwasser2004; Stanchev 2006b, 2;Minchev 2006; CCEEPSR 2005, 2;I. Vasilev and Kashamov, efficiency energy improving for measures capacities, new small other facilities, energy Potential alternatives – suchasflexible easierto optimize and mixes ofnew renewable- interests. national serves Bulgaria’s that option only is the energy nuclear that presume studies these energy of options, different anddisadvantages analyzing theadvantages of Instead persuade. fail to they justification, apost-factum as Even been re-launched. had project years the after two NPP appeared Belene the of studies The newfeasibility and Dimitrov 2002, 6). competitiveness economic Bulgaria’s improve to fail and market energy economy feeble investments. The NPP wouldincrease foreign anda hugedebt put strain on Bulgaria’s economy national size of the the relative to project of the scale cost and enormous light of inthe problematic are doubly viability economic NPP’s the of analysis athorough of and accountability of lack The newNPP atthe generated price of electricity between EUR billion5 and EURbillion. 9 The additional costs would also raise the cost spent fuel storage, and nuclearwaste protection, future environmental electricity decommissioning, grid, consultant services,financing, and pertaininglinkages to infrastructure of tothe adjacent construction etc. Critics’officially price contract announced asitwould include such costs additional as those predictions of the involved. of NPPislikely costs exceed the the actual underestimate the price The to finalto tends priceinformation official critics, to According range unclear. remain parameters Ekoglasnost, quotedEkoglasnost, in Mihajlova 2007; 2005b, 12; 2007,7;M.Dimitrov 2007a, Bankwatch Network According to local critics, as well as IMF and WB estimates, the realistic cost price ofBelene-produced price cost the realistic WBestimates, and IMF as well as critics, to local According According to liberal economists, the low price of electricity would primarily serve to subsidize the least See Angelov 2006,2005, 2;Dimitrov Angelov and 2005, 12-3;Kaschiev 2004; V. Dimitrov 2007, 2;I. In2004 EURthe project4-billion equaled20%of GDP 31% ofand debt.gross foreignIn 2006, the Mediapool Mediapool 118 7.11.2006; Maneva, quoted in . At the same time, liberal economists argue that it would distort the news.bg 7.11.2006; Stanchev 2002; ‘No to the Belene NPP’ campaign website. campaign NPP’ Belene the ‘No to 2002; Stanchev 7.11.2006; 20.6.2007; V. Dimitrov 20.6.2007; 2007, 2;Vasilkov 2007). 117 and the lengthy and of lengthy the payback period initial the news.bg 116 (Kaschiev 2007, 3-4; Ganev CEE 2008; 7.1.2005; Grigorov 2006b. 119 (Stanchev 167 CEU eTD Collection NPP, namely rehabilitation, upgrade, and more optimal utilization of existing facilitates, existing of utilization optimal more and upgrade, rehabilitation, namely NPP, than other increasedby measures a new electricity construction of the supply be could At sametime, the (seeTable 2). consumption in final electricity increase substantial inlead Indeed,a need Bulgaria12.5.2005). statistics GDPgrowth to not suggest that quoted inRadio Bulgaria 29.1.2008). (Genov, 3-4 of units reopening the to or NPP Belene the to alternative an as be perceived not should power generatingadditional each since that concluded capacity characteristically has lobby energy is nuclear The beneficial units. Kozloduy for the economy, lobby’s energy new nuclear the Kozloduyinterestssecuring in devastation, more ratherthan less business opportunities, and,probably,unitseconomic of the of hopesreopening shouldspirit old the over be builttaking anywayof construction spirit new and Kozloduy units,elite’s desire to discourage perceptions thatthe the new construction islinked to desire 2004), the liquidationof (Kaschiev the old incident an of this optioncase in is not considereddamages in the tofeasibility eventual studies of utilizeagainst the Belene NPP. This couldof insurance be explained by provision the the nor grid, to the linkages and theinfrastructure of adjacent symbolic construction the neither necessitate would it because faster and power of the Belene120 project as a manifestation of the inquoted population andBogdanovdecline (Stanchev 2004a;Ganev, 2002; Stanchev 2006a, owners of the private new transmission the by efforts system, energy European networkthe into inclusion to following limitreserve energy loss during transmission, power Bulgaria’s electric reduction of and price adjustments, and market energy the related steady ones (e.g. services, tourism, agriculture), decreasing consumption intensive due toliberalization energy less of of in favor in GDP industry) heavy (e.g. sectors intensive energy of investmentinto saving energy bybig measures consumers of electricity, declining share efficiencyincreasing suchasdown demand growth, economy,the of energy foradequately severaldomestic thatslow fornot electricity do account trends demand increasing ofa rapidly NEK’s forecasts argueall. neededCritics that at capacities are nuclear additional that prove to fail project Belene the of studies feasibility The sphere of logic.energy,by anddriven a bigger-is-better dismissivelargely in of economic calculations, uninterested actual the priorities in the energy options is indicative of the overall approach to the Belene project – one alternative This 11-2). to approach Angelov M.Dimitrov 2005a, 2005b, 2005, 11; (Stanchev import isprofitable whereas Dimitrov and necessarily disadvantageous 2004a; isnecessarily export that misplaced understanding thealtogether which reflects not compare the NPP option to the option of certain amount of electricity imports either, and rehabilitation of existing capacities – are not considered Althoughbuilding the new existing atthe units Kozloduy ratherBelenesite thanat would becheaper TOL 18.4.2007; M. Dimitrov 18.4.2007; 11-2; Kaschiev2005b, 2004, 2006d; 120 . The feasibility studies do Sega 168 CEU eTD Collection becomes almost identical to NEK’sthe minimal scenario (WB 2001, 36; MEER 2004b,15). account for the NEK’s more optimistic GDP growthassumption, the realistic scenario inthe WB report 122 by 2015 (MEEand EEA 2005, 5). The EU’s policy aims at increasing this share to 20% by 2020. 121 the section 2007 of measures to improve could and capacities even latter the by furtherthat bepostponed of introduction the energy efficiency priority sectoral reforms shouldcostly be to intopreferred investment large new and to cut WB rehabilitation of 2020. The facilities andcarryingout analysis existing argues that down on energy minimalwaste. Thescenario, energyforecasts be realistic the to likely are forecasts demand scenario you will remember,unsubstantiated. A World Bank (WB) analysis from 2001 suggests NEK’s that minimal- a second is new build 1000-MW units two new rush to the suggestthat forecasts Alternative demand unit is unnecessary adequately suchmeasures. analyze at least until (Kaschiev 2004; 2006a). The feasibility Stanchev of studies Belenethe NPPfail to as developmentwell of as sourcesinline renewable energy EUrequirements with ( includingcountry’s energy until alimited demand, of amount export, as late2020 planned TPPs,andfull wouldhydropower, utilization of be sufficientto meet the rehabilitation andalready andof suggest that upgradeof construction facilities, existing scenario minimal NEK’s the than lower even are forecasts consumption energy BAS’s efficiency. focusenergy onimproving and development to sector energy extensive by abandon governments. The Bulgarian consecutive is recommendation to of policy the imported energy resources on dependency callheavy and for policy efficiency prioritiesenergy low economy’s the that are that differentsuggests (BAS), from those pursued Economics by 2007) written froma team experts of Academy Bulgarian the Sciencesof scenarios they use, about the evaluated policy options, or about the amount of of electricity amount about the or policy options, evaluated the about they use, scenarios emissions in check. They provide no details about the methodology and the growth justificationprovide no forof NPP’sindispensability the keepinggreenhouse gas Finally, the feasibility studies of the Belene NPP exploit environmental arguments but Ibid If we correct the realistic growth rate of overall energy consumption envisaged by the WB report to WBreport by the envisaged consumption energy ofoverall rate growth realistic the wecorrect If production energy overall in sources ofrenewable share a 9% reaching envisaged has government The ., 101-2). Strategy for the Dynamic Development of Bulgaria theDynamic Developmentof Strategy for 122 . According to NEK’s (BAS Institute of 169 121 CEU eTD Collection electricity exports, average annual revenues from electricity exports were more than 6 than more were exports electricity from revenues annual average exports, electricity issector disputable.which successful 2001-2006period,forthe In was especially The pro-nuclear coalition’s proposition that the energy sector is the country’s key export Exports Nuclear EnergyandElectricity environmental environmental NGOs has been by accompanied continuous protests by Bulgarian and international controversy bitter project and the to is subject impact of BeleneNPP the environmental cleanrelatively its cash to Bulgaria allow would energy nuclear that claims groups’ nuclear Kyotoinvalidated pro- the but hasall gas emissions on greenhouse quotas reduce Bulgaria’s recordsubstantially discussion theEC’sdecision long-term addition, In to on these problems. by meet environmental standards. official presentation The Beleneof the project sidelines sellingBulgaria’s low energy efficiency and the failure of many generatingpower facilities to notaddress intensity,gases but of maincauses namely would high the gas greenhouse emissionemit somelarge of amounts that generatinggreenhouse overtake power capacities the of bewould reduced simply not by increasing or share.preserving this Anew NPP would quotas.been highdespite thehigh share ofnuclear energyin overall energy andproduction, so fora reason At concern Agency(European Environment However, sofar2006, 29). it has the high Bulgaria’s greenhouse gasintensity than (more 2.5 times is EUaverage)the indeed same officials. responsible time,other environmental problems hasand maximalexports never been by discussed MEER or the the overall 2007; NPP campaignwebsite; Haverkamp 2005; Varbanov 2004; Kaschiev 2004; CCEEPSR 2005; Belene Maneva the to (No project the against battle legal unsuccessful yetultimately aprolonged fought groups address the problem long-term of the storage of waste spentnuclear nuclear and fuel.Environmental geological characteristics, forbeing insufficiently protected against terrorist attacks, and forfailing to 124 in. factored are efficiency feasibility studiesthe ofin the Beleneevaluated NPP.not are It is also however, unclear if imports, and how electricity prospective with and improvementsexports in electricity energy no with options The keeping greenhouse gas emissions within limits only scenarioin the with maximal exports (WB 2001, 53). 123 factoredin forecasts the exports The The project iscriticized forposing environmental threats related to the area’s seismic and hydro- The 2001 WB analysis,which does not consider a nuclearfacility at all, forecasts problems with EIA Report on the Belene NPP Belene the on 124 . 2004, 127-8; Dimitrov Angelovand 2005, 11; discussion B). 123 (MEER2004a, 12, 2004b,25-8). The linkbetween 170 CEU eTD Collection revenues during period this was 3% (MEE only export in total revenues export electricity of share average The sector. ‘priority’ asa hasbeentreated energy sector only the sectors, mentioned Among the cosmetics. andmedicinesfrom exports, and higher exportof food the only revenues slightly than 1.5 from timestimes from lower lower than those than and shoesexports, apparel those power generating capacities across the region and by neighboring countries’ efforts to of bycompetitive construction the affected be adversely also could electricity Bulgarian margin. regional squeeze further Future profitfor anyway the demand unimpressive it altogether,would probably exports Bulgarian crowd not out does liberalized market interconnectivity for intense typical the competition price a (Angelov 2003). If andincreasing system, energy into European the its inclusion market, of regional the liberalization the as such potential, export Bulgaria’s threaten that factors neglect They either. persuasive are not market electricity Balkan the for forecasts NEK’s demand of nuclear waste management are neglected (MEER 2005, 11). havecouldnot fullyin been 2004, factored The(IME 1-2). costsandinherentproblems new NPP itself but, given that these costs were unknown at the time isof unconvincing.specifiedif It not for forecaststhe account constructionthe publication, of costs the they deterioratingmarketmakes imperviousvery position.them tocriticism but This also of Bulgaria’s professed ability either to reinexplanation inno marginal provide They costs data. or of and the competitors’methodology unrevealed on rely however, increase 2004b,30). These electricity 2004a,24-5, to studies,are expected (MEER of Balkan of exporters marginalother while stagnate aftercosts 2010, the to expected of costs marginal The Bulgarian exports. electricity for capacity electricitydeveloped it if position market production, its regional Bulgaria would preserve which of electricity andarguethat production Bulgarian are currentlycrucial. close Thefeasibility studies of thebe Belene would NPP assertthat to market the long-termthe European the competitiveness on electricity region’s Bulgarian of competitiveness the average, are Bulgaria’scould position future is alone aleading guarantee of as exporter electricity. It in region the deficit aprospective nor electricity location geographic neither strategic market, into European the integrated is and liberalized that market fully In a regional 2006; see also Stanchev and Bogdanov2002). Foreign Trade Statistics 2001through 171 CEU eTD Collection energy hub is the wholly redundant EUR 27-million second transmission line to Turkey to line transmission second 27-million EUR redundant wholly the is hub energy capabilities. The pricing, fragility the potential,onlyBulgaria’sof export andtheforecasting limits of NEK’s of legacy importance central the demonstrates Turkey to of electricity this Bulgarian of export the particular Bulgarian attempt to become a regional higherthan theaverage selling price in the region (quoted in reason for callingTurkish firms in infrastructure projectsBulgaria.However, in pricing appeared tobe most the important the agreementjustificationwas Bulgaria’s failure to fulfill itspart of the agreement concerningoff. the participationof The 2008). (Ganev NEK Balkans 126 the in projects interconnection admitted energy oflarge-scale help the with supply energy that the units. Turkeyimport may resume its longstanding plans forNPP construction. Greece aims at stabilizingprice its set 125 in the agreement was levels of electricity exports and to become an energy hub (Angelov 2003). to build generatingfacilities tomakeit in manypower sustain high order to possible itis necessary that assumes vision itself. This in anend as of electricity export the treats and logic this reverses that vision apolicy of outgrowth is the however, policy, energy Mediapool in suchin ascoalminingunemployment sensitive (Kaschiev sub-sectors 2004, quoted of a rise prevented have and sector energy the stabilizing been have exports way, this In utilization. sub-optimal their with problem the resolve (partially) to and production butmaximallyby need the otherwisethe to exploit capacities superfluous electricity Bulgarian of competitiveness by the not driven been have exports electricity productionFinally, would Bulgaria what gain bysustaining highlevels of nuclear energy investment. risky very isa and electricity of amounts electricity nuclearhigh-capacity inflexible units supply and demand could change radically (Kaschiev The construction 2004). of two exports returns are only gradual. During the lengthypaybackperiod of investmentsregional the Belenethe NPP.NPPconstruction involves highinitial whileinvestments, capital for built‘theby Bulgarian the side next 25 years’? Accordingstabilize their energy own supply to critics, SDS, quoted in criticized Left the the and government Right the precisely both for occasion its the inabilityOn to policy. turn the energy country expansive into a regionalof Bulgaria’s energy hub (e.g.reconsideration see prompt effectiveness of electricity production(Vasilkov 2007; BAS, Institute of Economics 2007, 103). 127 In 2003, Turkey one-sidedly terminated the agreement halfway into the 10-year term. The official The term. 10-year the into halfway agreement the terminated one-sidedly Turkey 2003, In five have probably would NPP Cernavoda Romanian the online, goes NPP Belene the time the By Two 1000-MW couldunits lead to underutilization of other capacities, whichwould the reduce 17.11.2002;BAS of Institute 2007,103).Bulgaria’sEconomics expansive Mediapool 23.4.2003). 126 . These problems are particularly important in caseof the important areparticularly problems . These 125 . The example of the failed bilateral for agreement bilateral failed exampleof . The the 127 based primarily on plans to export large Mediapool 9.3.2004). caseThe did not 172 CEU eTD Collection business deals within the narrow circle of playersmajor in the nuclear energy industry. ( engineer architect obligation tocarry out publictenders when selecting subcontractors.the Subcontractorsfrom are approvedexempt by been the have NPP Belene the for supplier main the and NEK The 2004). (Kaschiev procedures such regarding rules clear no were there because partly was This manipulated. were EIA the region ( suspicions that it was not based on any on-the-ground study constructionof the site and the adjacent was carried out without prior specification of the type of reactor about to be installed and there were Kaschiev 2004; Kovatchev 2005). The EIA itself wasbranded by experts ascompletelymany useless. It private companies inthe energy nuclear sector– Parsons and Risk Engineering ( powerful most of the two by won were contracts lucrative These EIA. of an conduct the for contract 129 (quoted in certainduring months and that importing the countries themselves preferred with totrade intermediaries 128 (Kaschievcontracts 2006; 2006c; Ekoglasnost industry viciousand of struggle the key between lucrativeplayers scrambling for political establishment that critics saw as indicative of the illicitbusiness going on in the it was developing amidst corruption scandals in the energy sector and the related 12; (NEK 2004, traders respectivelyfor example, although NEKenjoyed amonopoly over electricity the exports, 80% because private interests.In2004and primarilypreposterous benefits such export 2005, and 90%are interest national putative with the energy of export the associate to attempts critics, ofto According economy. these national the for exports electricity of benefits real the calculate exports At samethe time,isnopublicly there availablemake couldthat data itpossible to were realized by external intermediary has had its share of controversy as regards transparency as regards controversy its of share had has too, TheBeleneproject, power. Belene-produced marketability of prospective the about NEK’s inability to market its electricity without the use of external transparency in of the industry dealings traders energy the inApartfrom the general. that, raises doubts amajorThe issuefueled provoked further controversy, by perceivedlackof the 2006; Brunwasser 2004;Kaschiev2006c; Pashev, Djulgerov Kaschiev and 2006, 51). private (Ekoglasnost hands to public resources astunnelingbranded practice of the and in sector firms the private tothebiggest related were external the traders alleged that profit annual declared NEK’s the than more i.e. profit, million in NEKof the EUR 35 hadstripped in traders calculated that 2005 external There were no bidding procedures for selecting the NPP’s architect engineer and for awarding the awarding for and engineer architect NPP’s the selecting for procedures bidding no were There The NEK counter-argued that intermediaries helped sell the excess quantities of electricity generated electricity of quantities excess the sell helped intermediaries that counter-argued NEK The Mediapool Mediapool 5.6.2007). Environmentalists alleged that procedures the public for holding hearings on Kapital 27.7.2006,Kaschiev in 2006c). 10.11.2006). Sucha setup is unlikely the to alter routines of closed-door Combating Corruption Committee Standart 129 11.5.2007; Brunwasser 11.5.2007; 2004; 128 . Throughout 2006 and2007, . Throughout 2006). One2006). prominentcritic (Kaschiev 2006c). Critics (Kaschiev 2006c). Kapital November2006; 173 CEU eTD Collection Dimitrov Angelovand 2005, 11. Bachvarov, quotedValchev in 2006; OSF Project2004; Team Bogdanov, quoted in 130 abundant the that argued have organizations Environmental contested. been also have BulgarianClaims have that electricity exports hadastabilizingimpact upon Balkans the an energy center (‘No to the Belene NPP’ campaignthan website; rather see colony” also Kaschiev “energy an 2006d). into country the turning for instrument an as policy this Bulgaria’s expansivenuclear energy policy,environmental have branded wryly groups isproduction an environmental and hazard.Reflecting health onthese pitfalls of meaningful strategy for the promotion of the high-tech sector. In addition, electricity shouldbe madefor altogether differentreasons and certainly qualifynot do a as they but respect in this impact positive some have might energy nuclear in investments promotes nuclearof energy development the that effect the to swaying thepublic,professions (Chorbadjijskiexports Angelov Ganev 2007; theirsuccess in2007; 2008). Despite the tackle theproblem of industrial of Bulgaria’s and lowthe value-added production developmentelectricity is not a product of high technological sophistication and does nothing to relativelythe high pricecost of bringproduction, only a tiny profit exporting its asmall portion total of energy production competitiveat dueto prices that, of high makes little country sense.The ends up Such a economic however, specialization, technologies primary for purpose energy the of producing electricity. specialize inprocessing only could therefore disposal.Bulgaria and waste nuclear fuel, nuclear on for Nuclear technology, dependent Russia is energy spare parts. totally betweenare 70% and rather80%one of Bulgaria’s vital national interests is altogether groundless. Bulgaria imports of its primaryThe assumptionenergy thatmaintaining a leadership positionresources, on themisplaced. Balkan energy marketis as well as all Colony Energy Centervs. Energy equipment and Massive1). in Minchev 2005, 2006; Maznev, quoted Brunwasser 2004;VarbanovCCEEPSR See Kaschiev 2004, quoted in Mediapool 17.11.2002; BAS of Institute Economics 2007,103; Mediapool 130 . In addition, In . 6.12.2002; 174 CEU eTD Collection Kaschiev, quoted inKaschiev, quoted to make up for thein order market local priceonthe the of upward adjustment NEK didunitsdemand 3-4, imminent loss ofelectricity export profit. exports in expected drop the that argument coalition’s pro-nuclear the countered Critics have It claimed necessitates that it hada rise been in sellingthe price of electricity. Prior to the closure of reserve capacity (study commissioned by the EC, quoted in quoted EC, by the commissioned reserve capacity (study annual electricity consumption up by as much as2%,Bulgaria would still ample retain These critics’ support andeven 3-4shutdown with claimsthat developments units section). ‘News’ very (Kozloduy NPP website successful 25% compared tothe 2006) capacity, Kozloduy the NPP retained ahighlevel of production by (production dropped exportthe of electricity halvedwas butcontinued. Bymorefully theutilizing remaining of electricity has suffered not significantly even theclosureafter of units 3-4.In 2007, exporter a netof position Bulgaria’s NPP. Kozloduy fate of the to the unrelated and was (IMF) Fund Monetary International the with consultations and prices energy regarding values. marketprices inline wastheoutcomeof Thisschedule with EU conditionality electricity bring regulated to intended schedule adjustment an followed Pricing Table 3). was electricity of Import surpassednecessary.levels not exports By 2005,electricity production and (see 2002 groundless. proved scenarios dire all 1-2, units of closure the units’ closure upon electricity the supply system haveinterpretation. affirmed this After quoted inquoted (Kaschiev, NPP Belene the of construction the justify to and industry energy nuclear for garner public the artificiallyin order hasbeen to electricity created prices support andpower shortages panic imminentCritics the have arguedthat skyrocketing about Nuclear EnergyandSocialWelfare Region from gridsimproving 2007,7-8; andenergy efficiency (CEE Bankwatch Network from investing intheir generating own power facilities,from upgrading their electricity electricity of importers discouraging by solving allegedly now is it that problems energy inexpensive electricity hasimport tothe available contributed Bulgarian partly for January 2007, 5;Angelov 2003). Mediapool Mediapool 3.11.2006; Ganev, in BIRN2006).The quoted actual of effects the 3.11.2006; BIRN 2006). 3.11.2006; Mediapool 6.10.2006; The 175 CEU eTD Collection NPP were determined by the single buyer (i.e. the NEK) rather than by the commodity’s market value. market commodity’s by the than rather NEK) the (i.e. buyer single by the determined were NPP applied intheregulated energy quantitiesmarket, the and price of electricity Kozloduyproducedthe at of Kozloduy-produced electricity was set artificially during transition, too. Under the‘single buyer’ model abundance of power generating capacities. Czech electricity exports to neighboring Temelin ledto of NPPat a second construction controversial the Republic, where supply orlocal(import The ispoint production). in demonstrated casethe of Czechthe consumer price of electricity and the cost price of its production or the source of its addition, in even an market isnounregulated there direct relationship between the normally factored low ispower in Large-scale farfrom newincontestable, investments too. capacities are in the cost of electric prices would keep capacities new energy nuclear that The popular argument price of electricity and drive the consumer price up. In for the Soviet Union for reprocessing ( reprocessing for Union Soviet the Sovietthe with agreement Union special the on was energy the nuclear cheap supplyof producing ‘secret’ of Bulgarian The nuclear functions. fuel at non-market prices and on the shipment132 ( oftoo spentcontested, been have fuel ofelectricity, price onthe back pressure additional to total electricity production. The announced highmaintenance costs oftheclosed units, whichallegedly put a 30%price increase was also deemed indefensibleas units inasmuch 3-4accounted foronly 12-14% of for17% of electricitytotal broughtsales 18%and of company’sthe revenues (2006b). NEK’sdemand for 131 overall insales. NEK’srevenues export of share the that condition overall on only justified be could argument an Such This revenues condition significantlyelectricity on exceededwasthe localnot themarket metshare at of a exportloss that sales had inbeen NEK’s compensated by export profits. admitted the problem, e.g. Georgiev, quoted in andBogdanov on Varbanovoccasion, officials Stanchev Lakov2002; 2002; 2005; costs were factored in the price, the myth of cheap nuclear energy would collapse If of these periods consumption. duringpeak regulate electricity supply to capacities incidentsagainst anddamage, andof construction emergency generatingpower spent fuel decommissioning, upgrades, and storage disposal, nuclearwaste insurance and ofconstruction i.e.those costs, of anumber for account not does this price critics,of calculation the According to TPPs aredisputable, too. at electricity produced Claims that the cost price of Kozloduy-produced electricity was much lower than thatclosure justified a price increase nohigherof than (Kaschiev 3% 2006b; Stanchev 2004b). Themyth isalegacy of the socialist past, when the energy sector was intended to fulfill social Referring toNEK’s 2004 and2005 financial reports,Kaschiev arguedhas that export sales accounted Sega 9.5.2002). Nucleon consulting agency, quoted in 131 . Critics counter-argued that the units’ the that counter-argued Critics . Mediapool 9.3.2004; Iordanov, interview 9.3.2004;Iordanov, Ibid Active Elements .) 2004). The price The 2004). 132 (see 176 CEU eTD Collection be interpreted as a prospective drop in the rate of regional unemployment. If If we in unemployment. of regional rate the drop asaprospective interpreted be job andhigh-qualificationdisadvantaged of openingsunemployed, prospect cannot the of socially the of emergeout group the likely to are specialists few nuclear As impact. social miraculous have a to be expected should NPP Belene why the unclear Bulgaria northwestern in cohesion social and standards living higher to led dubious. As havenoted,if critics many operating years of theKozloduy not NPP have are Bulgaria northwestern NPP upon Belene the of effects welfare and social long-term Butin be would because the local positive engaged impactwork. workforce construction During the course of the NPP’s construction, the project is likely to have a short-term national average (National Employment Agency statistics). 133 production, and tourism ( and food such regions wine by of sectors, asagriculture, adjacent traditional damaging harm development justmightas well NPPeconomic the the fact, criticsarguethat it. In NPP project sit uneasily with such a policy, but it also diverts publicfinances away from business development, public health Notonly and education. a does single mammoth small as such spheres on focus ideally should and rate, unemployment high with regions Social should policy ideally sustainable developmental pursue many projects across policy. social with do to less much and priorities economic setting when investments Belene the like investments NPP of effects welfare and has social the emphasize to had tendency The level. a lot to do with local the mucheconomicat contribute development thepromoting generaltaskof to the need to legitimizeFinally, despite claims massiveto opposite,the investmentsnuclear into energy not do the prioritizationproduction. of such importing electricity, bearing while with the environmental associated electricity risks power, electric of abundance the from benefiting of instead Thus, this. doing from Czech CEZ the consumersprevent market, on thereislocal too.In a liberalizedprice nothing rates market, the to introduced high the the(CEZ) Czechutility company market, electricity regional the on endsituation Bulgarian up the with payingare obvious). However, as increased the raised demand similarities the sellingprice of Czech (the increased deficit electricity with thecountries same price as consumers in countries In the last decade, even in the Kozloduy county itself unemployment levels have been higher than the Protest Declaration 2005). 133 , it is it , 177 CEU eTD Collection 25.2.2008). billion, i.e. 65% of the costof all infrastructure projects underway in Bulgaria ( 134 by (WBUkraine been Bulgaria surpassedonly haseconomies in of one energy intensive most the Europe, for interview Sevlievski, Tsigularov 2002a; and Angelov (e.g. seeLakov 2005, 11; Dimitrov storage 2002; and distribution, and the lack of sustainable solutions for spentfuel nuclearand waste inefficiency massive economy,of lossthe of the energy during production,transmission energy’ priority has fundamental overshadowed problems such as notoriousthe energy ‘nuclear list. The of bethe top on not NPPshould Belene critics, the to According compete prioritieswith iseach easy of energybut ( in otherreality, due sources streamliningefficiency andutilizing prioritiesto other renewable such energy as toand the scarcity some of Bulgaria’s Infrastructure resources, of them suchgovernment’s the of prioritiessection are tendinvariably to ‘Energy’ campaign website). The 2007;‘No BeleneNPP’ to the Bankwatch Network forfor interviews Fokus Botev 2007; CEE Radio BTV2007, 2007; Ganev 2007; prioritized15; Stanchev 2004b; VasilevI. Stanchev2006; and Dimitrov 2002, 5;Dimitrov, overprogram in investment especially lightof already Bulgaria’s overstretched spheres, economic other in others. efficiently more invested be could that resources financial warned have they that IMF, the with Together the needs. pressing Belene most sector’s energy the among NPPnot would crowd out more are and competitiveness vital for economic not NPP are a second of beneficialand construction the projects years for acouple longer andlet3-4 work of units struggle the have to that Critics argued gulp down Priorities Other vs. Energy Nuclear investment. 5-billion a EUR for unimpressive is still impact the specialists, optimistically assume that there wouldbe 2000permanentjob openings for non-nuclear As of 2008, projects underway in the energy sector (including the Belene NPP) are worth over EUR 7,2 over worth are NPP) Belene the (including sector energy the in underway projects of 2008, As Government News 2001, 19). Between Between 1991 and thecountry’s 2001, 19). 2005, energy consumption 24 Chasa specifies the construction of the Belene NPP as a priority, next 4.9.2006). Listing 4.9.2006). anumberof outcomes policy desired as National Strategy for theIntegratedNational Strategy Development for of 21.4.2005,13). Government News 134 (IMF2004, 178 CEU eTD Collection condition and the environmental standards of many thermal and hydro power plants, still governments were being preoccupied with Kozloduy the and Belene physical NPPs, the been comparable to electricitythe by produced Kozloduy’s units 3-4.While intothan energy-saving measures (Angelov 2007), although lossesdistribution have rather new capacities of construction the goneinto has years investment bulk of past the CEECs inthe other and than 15EUmemberstates higher the was more than during lost percentage of electric distribution ashighin power twice increasing, 1990s.Accordingin the official throughout to estimates, early the 2000s grid, efficiency the supplyBulgaria’s of power system was insteaddecreasing, of transmission maintained poorly and old the of condition physical decrepit the and thefts of Kozloduy the and units curb lossenergy productionduring and transmission. Dueto inby caused closure capacity the drop for the could Itcompensate generating facilities. power the upgrade of and rehabilitation is the sector in energy the priority Another satisfactory implementation 2005, (EC 51-2, 2006a, 29). ensure to insufficient been have capacity administrative and resources financial pertaining energyefficiency to hasbeen as of butadopted part EU conditionality, see have2007, 7).Legislation CEEBankwatch efficiency Network beenmeager(e.g. increasing energy at intomeasuresaimed invested the resources sector, energy Yet, BIRN 2006). in 18.4.2007; massive to the investments intonuclearcomparison the (Kaschiev (Kaschiev 2004; Angelov 2007; Dimitrov 2005b, 11). 135 newwithout Belene in units (Lakov 2002; Ganev,quoted of timeperiod allowa significant for and competitiveness, Bulgaria overall economy’s the boost significantly to meet its energy energyimproveaccount deficit, imported thecurrent dependency resources, on demand without efficiency Itwould and discouraging energy reduce thewaste. country’sexcessive the old Kozloduy units is sector increasing policy developmentof the therefore energy aimed at a vigorous and MEER 2002,13;Stanchev priority and2002). The Bogdanov most patent in energy the also see 4; Table (see Romania in than higher times 1.3 and Republic, Czech in the than higher 2 times Hungary, in than higher 3 times Croatia, in than higher times 4.5 average per GDPunitwas between 12 and8.5times higherthan EU-15average.the Itwason According to critics, actual distributionlosses have been twice higherthan officially announced Active Elements 135 (see Table 5). In the 2004,in TOL 179 CEU eTD Collection wind and biomass energy (Black &Veatch Corporation 2003, Table 1-4). 136 asanideological hasbeen nuclear discourse of nuclear power nationalism energy. The a moretowards attitude critical encourage the public adopt orto to a widedebate social Numerous criticisms of nuclearthe nationalist position, however, have failed instigateto Nuclear Nationalism vs. Europeanization:Ideological Power isenergy dubious. Nuclear andis nationalism contested contestable. both nuclear impact of welfare The and is questionable. insufficient electricity generation feasibility economic the evidence about Yet, welfare. social and development economic Bulgaria’s for is crucial sector energy nuclear the of development expansive that conviction the of reinforces, in turn and on, based is nationalism nuclear Bulgaria’sof discourse the sum, In 2006, Network 8-9). electricityand drain financial the resources available for suchinvestments investrenewableenergy saving measures, into and energy to removetypes incentives to be equally with SEEelitepopular the exports isnuclearenergy.of Both infrastructure these such involve infrastructure fossil-fuel as The oil pipelines. only alternative thatappears and dependency on fossilof fuels,limit most to of the tendency energyglobal the infrastructure to the contradiction projectsIn countries. underway SEE to in common SEE trend country’ssidelined infavor nuclearof energy. Bulgaria Inthis respect, is part of a general policy been has option the whole the on sources, energy renewable on line policy EU’s specializationfollow hadBulgaria Although the has to and energy dependency. environment decrease the would preserve which energy, of sources renewable using generating capacities of ispower thedevelopment energy sector priority Bulgaria’s of another neglected Yet in sector in line with EU requirements, the situation is still far from pleasing. wouldnetwork limit andthefts energyloss, anddespite continuous tobring efforts the transmission power the of privatization recent the Although were rundown. utilities heating Many remaineddistrict equipment, poor. Soviet-produced operating with According to the EBRD Renewable Development Initiative, Bulgaria iswell positioned to develop 136 (CEE Bankwatch (CEE 180 CEU eTD Collection irrelevant for the interpretive frameworks that guided policymaking. However, as its guided as However, for that policymaking. frameworks irrelevant interpretive the ‘identity’ of elements Europeanizationthe making discourse, them increasingly edgeoff the the itcertainly Europe, took mapof its symbolic the on anxiety place over Bulgaria’s eliminate completely not did change discursive and political this While asawhole: Balkans of the Europeanness increasingly Theleadership Bulgarian redundant. even startedtodefy un- imputed the identity becoming was Proving this Pasi2002e). also2006a; (Parvanov 2005a,see culture” “one of Bulgarian of pillars the European as represented culture country. It aBalkan, than rather European, a of identity civilizational Bulgaria’s asserting in was losingIt inBulgaria, ground leadership The post-ODS too. wasmore self-confident of region.the Balkanism waslosing ground. rest the for than Bulgaria for relevant less even discourse exclusionary the made Balkans from strategy and Balkans. Thesuccessof Bulgaria’s differentiation of own the the Europe between symbolicon overt separation less dependent was and exclusionary less ontheBalkans grew Western discourse and European The approach. Europeanization and focused ethnic by wasgradually legacies their conflicts on overwhelmed the approach The Balkans. in the involvement Western guided that approaches policy the in a prompted change conflicts ethnic integration. endof The Bulgaria’s Euro-Atlantic The early political2000s brought instabilization the Balkans and visiblein progress Decline ofBalkanism shift. this ideological to have contributed that factors key belowidentifies the The section nationalismbeenhas backin1999, allbut outof onnucleardriven energy. debate the which tosubduenuclearhaddiscourse, managed Europeanization emergent the sufficient to obscure its weakness as a policy discourse. At the same time, the 2006b) They ofEuropeanculturalpart space. the are (Parvanov2005b, seealso2005a, 2006a, 2006c, processes… current of of view point the from nor developments, historical of ofview point the from neither periphery, Europe’s not are They Europe. other the not are Balkans… The 181 CEU eTD Collection integration. of in EU process the developments important influence of several the evolved under One of‘Europe’ has to society’s relationship 2000s, Bulgarian early decline.the the Since them was wason late 1990s of the period choice’ ‘civilization Bulgaria’sof the characteristic europeanization In the course of the Kozloduytortuous crisis, the broad and unconditional public support for effort to secure Emergence of Euroskepticism the lifting of Ideas and Underlying Structure Attitudes inBulgarianof Society visa issuesidentity towards of developmentand security. of issues from away moved have to appears Balkans the from differentiation of doctrine The towards 2006c; EU”(Parvanovthe also2006a, Pasi 2005b,2002d). 2006b, see Balkans, Western the especially and countries, Balkan haul could that development regional of engines the of “one of function its of specifically and Europe Southeast of rest the to of stability andexporter generator function a of self-appointed Bulgaria’s asserting on but identity, of terms in Balkans Western the from difference Bulgaria’s stayed putthroughout 2000s.the however,has The longerstress, no been on proving therefore have Balkans the from dissociation of doctrine the of elements basic The 2004, 2005b). futurePasi 2006c,2006b,see Parvanov 2005b; conflicts tendencies(e.g. prevent and disintegrative the neutralize permanently could region, the of europeanization all, above It has suggested that only engagement EUand of the international the community, and, – Europeanintegration and disintegration destructive (Parvanov 2006c, 2006b,2005b). of development courses alternative two between vacillating anddangerously as unstable represent Balkans the continued to has Bulgarian elite needs, the region’sand problems Nevertheless, motivate theWest eagerremain to involved to with apparently the choices. policy legitimizing and controversies effective in enabling political mobilization, appeasing dampening voters, political ‘identity’ was element weaker, Europeanizationthe growing less paradigm was growing 182 CEU eTD Collection (MBMD 2005, 11) would be treated as equal to other EU memberstates was 43%, as opposed to 41% who were optimistic 137 member EU become asecond-rate that Bulgaria wouldThe new phasehasbeen marked by perceptions inequality and growingof acute fears not be treated on a par withphase, which I wouldcall suggest to ‘apprehensionthe stage’. the rest of Europeidyllic but would stage at best of immigrantexperiences issue, and Kozloduy the visathe an brought endcrisis the to Bulgarian society’s with together Yet, negotiations). accession start to (invitation received Bulgaria relationshipandandEC, by betweenthegovernment that tangible bargain the the struck rewards to ‘Europe’ of were Kozloduy the by stifledstrong Europeanizationunits ODS’s the by rhetoric, the ( Kozloduy controversy itself. In the late 1990s, the first signs of public furor over the loss injustice of the affluent European societies ( social the and towards grudge disillusionment with euro-attitudes burdened public immigrants Themember labor experiences emigration affluentEU states. of returning to 2004-2006). Another important development hasbeen massivethe legal and illegal labor EU(Dimitrova the vis-à-vis unequalposition country’s of society the acutely aware Bulgarian left successfully, ultimately though which, zone Schengen the to restrictions to the Balkans complicates Bulgaria’s claims to a European identity ( identity a European to claims Bulgaria’s complicates Balkans to the belonging that awareness the andof culture in European Bulgaria’s place about anxiety falling living standards.Perceptionsinequality of havebeen also an outgrowth of social underminedby evenfurther continuingthe economic deprivation and continuously has frail. been always it the‘apprehension’ has been During stage perceptibly also Novkov2002). see by unjust (Dimitrovaagainst 2004-2006; powerful wealthy and treatmentthe EU bred euroskepticism and havefrequently callsprovoked for defending national dignity euro-enthusiasm andself-criticism, provoked they stage the apprehension have during Bulgaria’s inferior position and not anxiety beingabout bred by fully accepted Europe awareness Europe idyllic relationship toof WhereasBulgaria’s stageof duringthe inof however, perceptibly 2000s. The impact these has changed social the attitudes, According to polls, in2005 thepercentageopinion ofBulgarians who believedid not Bulgaria that 137 . Bulgaria’s confidence about its status inits . Bulgaria’s status confidence about Europe Ibid .). A third key development has been the Ibid .). They in ushered a MBMD 2005,11). 183 CEU eTD Collection despite the stunning degree of public involvement with the Kozloduy Kozloduy the average with involvementcase, the public degree of despite the stunning sociological studiesmore of public as attitudesa much of Ithasbeeninterpreted industry asasource labor(Rajcheva 2002). cheap or question during heatedwhether theEUasacountry Bulgaria as aquestion with enter would a developed about momentsof dignityof the crisisThe question notwhether or tokeepKozloduy’s units has operational interpreted been reveal than that as ruin country’sthe among status EUmembers other 2005,11). (MBMD a questionnational of economyutilitarian has been inrooted fears thattheunits’ loss wouldfurther undermine the ability the of to withstand thethe economic problems competitionof transition,calculation. popular opposition to ‘Kozloduy’ conditionality Sharpenedabout placeandbya anxiety byanxiety Bulgaria’s EU in related about the of powerful EU economiesbroughtIn fact, and about wouldproblem also became the focus byof citizens’ reluctance theto tolerate concrete problems economic Kozloduy the mobilization, for political atool became it Once EU accession process. effectseuropeanization marked and itdown as significant most the political controversyin the of EU conditionality Kozloduy the which problems coalition singled out pro-nuclear other the NPP among of look athas to discursive the mobilization and political practices the strategies through than any other issue in the EU accession process, that has provoked public upheaval, one issue,nuclear it has been rather energy understand europeanization? the why To towards isWhat placeof the Kozloduy the indilemma this seeminglyschizophrenic attitude effects of EU membership (Alpha Research2005) Thefears support. by group primarily economic expressed the latter the concerned for Bulgarians EUmembership expressedsupport firm 30%expressedmoderate and Eurobulletin largereven an integration, EU of cost the at even preserved be should share units Kozloduy’s that (80 topeak of Kozloduy the crisis. Although a large of share Bulgarians in stated opinion polls 88%) supportedthe during even very positive Europeanization were towards attitudes dilemma, public EU from When (Dimitrova 2004-2006). Kozloduy the apprehension decoupled stage accession integrationforlevel, European At abstractthe hassupport remainedhigh the during in general ( 2003; Alpha Research2002,2004,40,2005).In 2005, for example, 52%of (Alpha Research 2005). Research (Alpha ENS 2004; Bulgarian 184 CEU eTD Collection energy energy and promises of remaining a regional nuclear of energy cause center, furtherbuttress public ‘national’ opinion.the around cohesion social of images by complemented investments, scale Parvanov, quoted in quoted Parvanov, see (e.g. nation Bulgarian the of wishes expressed the to a response as development energy nuclear This2004a, overwhelming 38). public invoked thensupport is tojustify favortop-downdecisions in of development (78%) and developmentthe of the high-techindustry (71%) (opinionpoll, quoted in as opposed toonly 5% who oppose most of it –and them believe itwould that upeconomic prop nuclear energy. According to the MEER, 72% of Bulgarians support the construction of the Belenestrengthened public support forNPPenergy. nuclear – Between 70%and80% of Bulgarians inare assiduously favor has of campaign pro-Belene the Bulgaria, nuclear-free a hypothetical in disaster welfare perspective)of public attitudes. Throughpromises one’s ofeconomic development on andwarnings ofimminent an depending one, vicious a (or circle virtuous own its motion in set has project Belene The sector. energy ofthe development ofexpansive policy a for support their and efficiency energy on stance their between contradiction no saw apparently them of most Thus, 2002). Research (Alpha efficiency energy increase to measures for called and inefficient energy 2002). Interestingly, and 67% 42%of citizens ofbusinessthe considered the national economy be to in Rajcheva quoted (Gallup, energy nuclear of use the of consequences environmental the were what the EU nuclear safety conditionality was, how much electricity was produced at the Kozloduy NPP,or government, quoted in benefits of EU membership would outweigh the costs of early closure (opinion poll commissioned by the respondents believedoperationof Kozloduy’s units was; only less than 4% indicatedthat the correct amount. Only if8% of Bulgariathe correct amount. More than 78% of respondents closed said they did not know what the annual profit the fromfinancial the support Bulgariaunits would receive from the EU afteraccession; ultimately,at less 2% than theindicated end of 2006138 and joined the EU this of mood in 2007,anti-nuclear The discourse. the anti-nuclear the of strength short-lived early on developmentthe of heavyindustry,the accounted werethe for that mainfactors the Bulgaria’s environmental grave problems causedby communistthe regime’s emphasis and forces, political anti-communist emerged newly the of agenda environmentalist disaster of general inparticular. Memories Chernobyl Kozloduy and the of the and BeleneNPPs and issues werehigh political on the agenda. The public was wary nuclearof in energy of itssteadily losingin ground Bulgarian society. Inthe first years of transition, environmental disastrousinauspicious ideological the1990s, Throughout environment. environmentalism was in hasnationalism, nuclearbeen conducted and countered discourse Europeanization handlingThe environmentalists’ campaign, whichhave could boosted potentially the by the Environmentalism of Decline Bulgariandilemma communistKozloduy the in involved benefits and costs real the about little knew Bulgarian regime, the In 2002,of 75% In inastudy respondents of opinionpublic admitted they that know did not how much 138 . Mediapool Mediapool 10.12.2002; Kovachev, quoted in 27.11.2002). Most of the respondents inanotherpoll did not know what Mediapool 7.4.2002).turn, In large- MEER 185 CEU eTD Collection economic transformation and a pervasive crisis in virtually every social sphere, it blurs it sphere, social every virtually in crisis a pervasive and transformation economic economy.both an of, Being and a outgrowth aresponse to, thoroughgoing socio- national of and downfall the structures the ofvital collapse of the social awareness painful society’s the reflects rather but nations other against directed overtly not is It nationalism’. ‘transition non-violent as describe I would that nationalism of form aparticular landscapeinnurtured redefined the ideological Bulgarian society. Theyhave during cohesion have social erosion Economic transition of declineandtherelated Nationalism The Riseof Transition Bulgaria. of history post-socialist Ibid. in quoted (Bozhkov, treasure” a national into catastrophe national a turn to “managed years orso,thelobby transformedthoroughly theimage of Kozloduy the NPP and influencespecifically designedpublic thebroad to ( environmentally-conscious of lobby’s the sections society, campaign was pro-nuclear management.Unlike the anti-nuclear campaigns thatmostly addressed the already industry compelledsecure to was its futuresurvival by long-term imageconsistent in Faced memories, the with byChernobyl gloomy a society prospects traumatized society Bulgarian of outlook anti-nuclear the fact, In in industry. the of thefavor in opinion public turn early years of lobby nuclear was hard trying the As theanti-nuclear energy to declining, was discourse transition contributedpolitics became mostly the domain of small, typically foreign-funded, NGOs. to theconsumption transition,in environmental importance.during problems decreased Green future success2002). With collapse the heavyindustry of the in and the drop overall energy of the lobby. Environmental issues were missing inthe agendaspolicy of majorthe parties (Lakov ‘green’ Ultimately,however,strong no party political2002). the on emerged scene. to abandon decision the to massresistanceKozloduy contributed Environmentally-motivated units. the constructionperiod contributed of the second to NPPthe atinitial Belene acceptance(Kovatchev 2005;of IAEA’s Lakov demands to close the small ). Ithad completed oneof mostthe successful public campaigns relations inthe Active Elements 2004). For some ten 186 CEU eTD Collection development: social and economic Bulgaria’s to inimical conditions set and policies impose that etc.) WB, IMF, (EU, institutions Western as well as dignity, people’s the trample and nation the betray protectors, foreign of interests the serve allegedly who politicians, includewags afingerresponsible latter local those Bulgaria’s for downfall. The at a discourse on and social change (Georgiev 2005, 10). These novel have social nationalattitudes into coalesced identitypolitics by from abstaining mostelections, of whothose forvoted wanted Ataka political with disillusionment their thatexpressed passively who those Unlike is discontent. active no longer focused of was avote far for the right The vote forces. mainstream political againstthe vote on self-criticism.crisis of democratic representation and mobilized the electorate’s ‘negative vote’, i.e. the Instead, it ( units, and toachieve other similar goals,including putting ‘traitors of the nation’ on trial conditions, cancelnegotiatingbetter ofKozloduy’s to on closure the theagreement IMF and the WB, to reopen the closed EU accession negotiation chapterscancel toend membership, on the Bulgaria’s pledgeddependence NATO to Bulgaria’s with a view of EU integration, did but notexplicitly Ataka reject aspectacularsuccess. electoral scored when the far-right political party Ataka – an atypical phenomenon in Bulgarian politics – change. The new attitudes were cumulatingbutfound nopolitical expression until 2005, about bring to desire and discontent active into transformed often more and more rather Passiveattitudes. differentandwas bringing disillusionmentsocial gradually out Yet, continuingthe economic deprivation frayingand of socialthe fabric werebreeding paradigm. self-critical andpredominantly wasfor auspicious influence the Europeanization the of was nation Bulgarian the of misfortunes the on concentration the transition, of phases earlier the In identity. national of realm the and conditions socio-economic of realm the between separation the rejects and spheres social different among distinction the The concealed behind righteous incantations like “rule of law”, “IMF requirements” and “EU and requirements” “IMF of law”, “rule like incantations righteous behind concealed outside and implanted into our fatherland. [It] is a form of political and economic the violence, from imported been has governance, as masked looting, of Mechanism A treacherous Twenty Tasks of Ataka Twenty of Tasks , see the party’s website). Ataka capitalized on the deep the on capitalized Ataka website). party’s , seethe 187 CEU eTD Collection has lent moral authority to the nuclear energy lobby’s pursuit of its particular economic its particular of pursuit lobby’s energy nuclear the moralto authority lent has It people. of Bulgarian the interests and rights sovereign the of invocations nationalist authority to hasexpert well. lent It sides all has served inargumentation concurrence foreign deindustrializationeconomic interests, and decliningstandardsliving. of The of dominance policy, economic over sovereignty of loss – politics Bulgarian in elements nationalist the of base the at been have that issues salient same the around campaign its The success pro-nuclearof the coalition has been largely in rooted its ability structure to frames. cast the Kozloduy debate in ideological and populist, as opposed to economic or expert, discourse of nuclear nationalism. They have turned the the Kozloduywith NPP intocolluded a symbol have and too, discourse, political mainstream of elements nationalist their way intomainstream andpolitics public debates.Like the newnationalism, the made have versions, milder in significantly albeit nationalism, transition of tenets basic The actors. political major the of most of platforms in the change subtle, if matching, a hasalsoprovoked discourse nationalist new the has nurtured that discontent The social 2004). Kozloduy has come to mean shutting down Bulgaria” (Ganev, quoted in Bulgaria. Asonecritic has described it,“in aptly publicthe mind, shutting down as The embattledKozloduy a minimized NPP hasbeen represented version of embattled in forfor nation. vital the active the makingpublic’s of decisions participation desire nuclear energy issue within spherethe national of pride anddignity igniteand to the the place to tried actively have movement) Gergjovden the and (VMRO coalition nationalism. The prominent rightwingnationalist transition of ‘members’ discourse the of for the case pro-Kozloduy emblematic an been has NPP Kozloduy The problem economicof declineis rearticulated as a problem losingof national dignity. to social causingrelations, social killing erosion and spiritthe of people.the The over spilling as seen are misfortunes Economic is rejected. spheres social of separation The sovereignty. and self-esteem national of invocations with in Bulgaria developments The new nationalist discourse blends criticism of the political and economic calculators, desperately struggling forbare physicalsurvival. (Kutsarov 2002) standards”, thatturns us - the occupants of leftoversthe ofBulgaria -into walking talking Active Elements 188 CEU eTD Collection 4.10.2002; interview4.10.2002; Iordanov, for for interview (Parvanov, concerns safety real to than rather states, European in attitudes andtotheanti-nuclearsome of disaster of a repetition Chernobyl the fear Europeans’ to has beenattributed Europe Eastern across units older elimination of reactors.nuclear Soviet-built about phobia European victima general asa of has beendepicted The EU’s decision to use enlargement conditionality as a tool for the Siderov, statement on the BNA website). The arguments of the pro-Kozloduy coalition in 9.6.2004, 2007a;NRA, quoted units (e.g. see Ovcharov, quoted in see Ovcharov, quoted units (e.g. Kozloduy of the safety the prove and contrary the allegedly argueto that Operators, analyses, Worldincludingby IAEA andAssociation Nuclear safety thereviews the of by have in resilience beenoutraged the of this presumption face of the expert respectful of typeThe supporters Kozloduy the NPP (Adam2002). problematic Chernobyl reactor in the with although common have little bea reasonablecost, they cannot upgradedat presumptionrigid and outdated olderthat VVER units Soviet areinherently unsafe and infor the beingstuck Ithas EU the admonished legitimately refer to. coulddemands 1990s, subsequent upgrades have removed alltechnical safety deficienciesandEU that has argued that while the safety of the It oldproblems. safety in objective lacking grounding andas motivated and economically units might have caused concern in the earlyThe pro-Kozloduy coalition has dismissed EU nuclear safety conditionality as politically early closure of the Kozloduy units. Europeanization has been by curtailed perceivedthe illegitimacy of for EU demands conditionality has underminedEU the Europeanizationnationalism, nuclear up discourse.propped has The strength nationalism of transition emergent the While Conditionality EU of Deficit Legitimacy competition by allowing them representto themselves as defenders of publicthe interest. in political issue Kozloduy the utilized have that forces political the to legitimacy lent has It nation. the of interests the to identical appear interests these making by interests Sega Sega Sega 11.5.2004; Semov 11.5.2004;Semov The Kozloduy 2002b, 9). NPP 9.5.2002; Ovcharov, interview 9.5.2002;Ovcharov, for BNR2006b; 31.5.2002, 2004; Parvanov, quoted in 2004; Parvanov, 31.5.2002, quoted Sega Sega 189 CEU eTD Collection a major source of frustration. beenLithuania,be afterhavehad accession,whose unitsproblematic only shut todown 12.12.2002; quoted inquoted Standart for interviews (Ovcharov, accession EU before units nuclear close to had that country accession wastheonly Bulgaria is that Thecruxoftheargument states. candidate of treatment equal contravene principleof the held areto demands Bulgaria. These demands closure for argument of 3-4areaplain against that units of case discrimination The nuclearchallenge safety has EU been against conditionality groundedin the 19.11.2003). wouldneed and whatitshould it” dowith ( their “suspicious tendency to already now preach about how much electricity Bulgaria regarded asintrusive andillegitimate, andand asarrogant EUofficials patronizing in be to started conditionality EU peerreview, the After conditions. real safety for the thattheEUsimply Kozloduy’s supporters the unitsdown with littlewanted shutregard their continued operation –remained. operation continued their ( deficiencies besatisfactory to inbuiltfound in the was basic safety design of the units – i.e. the operational primary while reasonfor the EU’s Moreover, opposition 1). to 2002, Mission Expert period before theirpremature closure, but not to make them eligible forlong-term exploitation(IAEA emergency whichupgrades, were intended to make the units safe forexploitation during the transition making as be interpreted claims regarding theunits’ not long-term exploitation.could They concerned theIAEA’s initial demands for standards safety high NPP’s Kozloduy the of proof as cited reviews the However, constraints. financial to due largely chosen was and units upgradeable the for financing scale large- to reserve intended indeed was – closure premature for pressure concomitant a and enhancements 139 see Semov 2002, 9; miscommunication on the part of Bulgaria misconceptionand on the part of the EU (e.g. matter of demands werea EU that waspresumed stance. It largely pro-European Kozloduy of maintainedsupporters crisis. NPP the Initially, anon-conflictual and The challenges against well. perfectly worked have they however, EUconsumption, conditionality ringwere steadily escalatingtrue in the courseon of somethe counts but are rather problematic on others The G-7 strategy towards non-upgradeable reactors – i.e. assistance for low-cost short-term safety 2006, for Darik in RadioMihajlova,2006; quoted Sega Nova Zora 10.7.2002; Bliznakov, quoted in Bliznakov, 10.7.2002; quoted Sega 2003; 28.1.2002). The pointless peer review, however,The pointless review, convinced peer 28.1.2002). 24 Chasa 4.6.2002, 10). The 10). examples 4.6.2002, of and Slovakia 24 Chasa Sega 4.6.2002, 10; 4.6.2002, see also 10.5.2005; Sega 3.10.2002; Kovachev, 3.10.2002; 139 Sega . For domestic For . 30.3.2004, Ibid ., 3), the Sega 190 CEU eTD Collection Nuclear Safety 2011) (Uranium Information Center 2007; Greenpeace website; problems) that are running wellpast their original design lifespan due and are to be closed by 2009 and reactors at Oldbury Wylfaand Magnox the Britain and in (the shroud); world’s core of the oldestcracking operating report to reactors, reactor such with a first history the of Reactor, safetyWater Boiling older even (an Switzerland in Mühleberg resisted; successfully been has closure whose incident), major 141 containment (Rippon 1999). Kozloduy units, the Finnish units are by design complete with traditional western-style reactor inoperation213s that are in Eastern Europe (Hungary,Republic,Czech Slovakia).Importantly, the unlike 140 isbeingrediscovered a nuclearenergy at time when power of electric cheap source ruined during transition. has It been blamed depriving for Bulgaria andtheBalkans of a been lost or havenot that assets feweconomic of the one of for thedestruction blamed has been nuclearconditionality EU safety of Bulgarians. average welfare declining against tothe contributes Bulgaria allegedthe arguing discriminatory treatment that The pro-Kozloduy coalition has boosted the persuasive power of its campaign by persuasive effective argumentation. proved and persuasive even without of pro-Kozloduy the campaign, however, complaintsdouble about EUstandards have Karakachanov 2002; characteristics are not superior to those of Kozloduy’s units (Ivanov 2005; shut memberdown safety to whose units hasEU states pressure been puton by nosimilar in that issue status second-rate out sore pointing of Bulgaria’s Europe has the exploited Thepublic campaign of coalition pro-Kozloduy relations states. the member of treatment equal of principle the contravene to held also is conditionality EU history of safety problems have received scant attention in Bulgaria in attention scant received have problems safety of history examples of West withrunning European reactors dubious safety characteristics and a Interestingly,between more and‘non-upgradeable’‘upgradeable’ units. relevant, other, remarkable safety is misleading reactors standards does nuclear European of infavor West positive discrimination demonstrates case Finnish demonstrate the closurepremature of Bulgaria’s Adam (Ivanov units 2005; The argument the that 2002). general arbitrarinesslicenses prolonged of theoperate beyonddivision their designSoviet-builtBNA A website).frequently cited example has been Finland.Finland issaid tosafely lifespan at the same time unitsas the EU demanded similar to those at Kozloduy. The Finnish units had their Examples include Biblis-A inGermany (anold PWR with a history of safety problems, including one fact, Finnishthe are In reactors not VVER 440-230s, but “upgradeable” aresimilar tothe VVER 440- 1998, 58; Sega Sega 140 , although the fact that the Finnish Soviet-built reactors boast reactors Soviet-built Finnish the that fact the although , 13.3.2002; Wikipedia). 23.12.2003; Semov 23.12.2003; 2002a, 10;Siderov, statementthe on First Swiss Report: Convention on 141 . For the purposes For the . 191 CEU eTD Collection Bulgaria’s acquiescence in the units’ early closure for the EU’s toleration of of Bulgaria’s for the EU’stoleration in closure units’ early the acquiescence Bulgaria’s and In ithis view, accession the process. has to beenimmoral illegitimate and trade issues nuclearenergy between linkage very the of legitimacy democratic the contested Mediapool genuine europeanization (e.g. see (e.g. genuine europeanization and breedsimpedessentiments undemocratic conditionality anti-European Bulgaria’s (Minchev, in quoted crude bargaining to“straightforwarddown handbrutal to andor rather twisting” stateshavestripped been candidate the EUand between negotiations complained that have others Yet againsttheir will. impose decisions free to andare Bulgarian the people democratic politiesits ofits member-states, officials vis-à-vis enjoy unchecked power inthose while Others have that retorted EU(Adam 2002). the thepride EUtakes inthe areinferior to inEastern Europe procedures and regulatory standards nuclear safety that its presumption have underlying attacked Some commentators character. undemocratic ofits perceived account on contested been has also conditionality safety EU nuclear quoted inquoted energy supply, functioning effective and of electricity SEE the market(Ovcharov, Energy Community signed between the EU and SEE, namely solidarity, security of the establishing Treaty the of principles founding hasclosure breachedthe argued that supply experienced in Balkansthe the after closure of units Bulgarianside3-4, the has have the duty, rather than just the right, toassert. Pointing out the difficulties with power claimsto now Bulgaria region,which SEE of the as well prerogatives as the are based, beeninclude widenedto thebasicprinciples on which internal withinrelations the EU has legitimacy arguments of repertoire EU,the the to accession Following Bulgaria’s Semov 2006; agriculturesee to economicand (e.g. theregion and tourism development confining turningEurope’s periphery Balkansthe intoconducive bystifling robust sectors to has been the gapbetween blamedwidening It EU andBulgaria. economic the for even blamedhas for as been It crisis. energy impendinga solutiontothe Europe across Government News 18.7.2002; Sega 22.2.2002). Sega OMDA Press Review Press OMDA 19.11.2003, 23.12.2003,5.6.2002).President Parvanov has 11.4.2007). 24 Chasa 29.11.1999). They have 29.11.1999). warned that 1.11.2002, 11;Stanishev, in quoted 192 CEU eTD Collection European European states vigilantlyfor themselves.guard West that energy nuclear over control of rights sovereign same the states European units’the toughEUnuclear closure, safety conditionality todenyingamounts East (Adam 2002; ‘non-upgradeable’ reactors European East dealingwith to itcomes when concord international remarkable hasbeen there contrast, In interference. tosupranational are opposed and sovereignty ofnational matter energy. Most states with NPPs consider regulation of the nuclear energy sector to be a nuclear to related onbasic issues member states EU among is little agreement There make special efforts to integrate Bulgaria (Parvanov, quoted in quoted (Parvanov, Bulgaria tointegrate efforts special make that just as Bulgaria had made sacrificessafety conditionality back in atthe EU. the The President face thus twisted his earlierof moral arguments“unjust” and suggested European demands,142 so the EU now had to Kozloduy units ( the against demands justify legally could that safety nuclear on standards EU common Finally, has legitimacy of by been the underminedEU conditionality lackof the threatened by units’closurethe – dimover the prospects of EU membership. allegedly were which of both – self-sufficiency energy and development economic perceptions, the majority of Bulgarians camefavor to policies with a short-term focus on relationship men’s between needy rich the such andthe club candidate. Dueto the inequality of the demonstrate to wastaken date, enlargement a definitive to commit requireditselfa definitive while to commit date, to itself closure theEUdidnot moods. Bulgaria The observation fueled that these was perceptions anti-europeanization ofmembership, the prospects about uncertain with intoa corner.forced Coupled anxiety wasbeing thatBulgaria perceptions public intensified local and encouraged resistance inquoted preferred tostress Bulgaria’s position unequal bargaining (see forexample Ferheugen, and problem the with unconcerned EC appeared the crisis, Kozloduy of the In theheat The EU has had its share of responsibility for the legitimacy deficit of its conditionality. (Semov 2002a, 10). legal proper without criteria andendorsement Maastricht Copenhagen enlargement demands for closure illegal as they have allegedly added another criterion to the in spheresfailures other When faced with a prospective delay of Bulgaria’s accession, the NPP’s supporters pointed nuclear pointed supporters NPP’s the accession, Bulgaria’s of delay prospective a with faced When Sega 9.6.2004). This stance did clarify the state This of itstate 9.6.2004). stance didaffairs,also the but clarify Mediapool 142 (interview for (interview 20.11.2002; Sega Sega 1.6.2002; Semov 1.6.2002; 4.10.2002). TheCCDK has declared the Sega Sega 24.9.2006; see also 12.12.2002). To opponents of 12.12.2002). 2002b, 9, 2002a, 10). 2002b, 9, Sega 7.5.2005). 193 CEU eTD Collection Kozloduy policy: indeterminacy and promotion of the Belene NPP. quitefor differentloweringfor two involved strategies political thehigh costs inits instead and opted tied-hands strategy out of a itopted considered, However, all things (e.g. see Pasi, quoted in quoted seePasi, (e.g. losses bringfinancial would integration of a slowdown andEU that process, accession Bulgaria toughened its stance on Kozloduy the problem EUcouldthe delay the if that warned leadership the Occasionally, was not. It controversy. political the down tone be to could deployed discourse Europeanization the strategy, a tied-hands Through wave. enlargement especially weak given country’s desirethe tosecure aplace in forthcoming the was position bargaining approaching, Bulgaria’s EU the of Summitcritical Copenhagen negligible.With the for renegotiatingwere anyway prospects theKozloduy the deal for example, haveleft would country’sthe prospects for EUmembership bleak,while negotiations, of accession chapter closethe Energy the A to refusal for maneuver. room position usea to ‘tied-hands’ argumentation because in itreality hadvery iflimited, any, good wasinextremely leadership Bulgarian In the Kozloduy case, the discontent. unpopular thus minimize and uponthe policy decisions to voters’ EU and costs political of rigid EU conditionality could allow the ruling elite to offload responsibility for ofits and potential discourse existence power Europeanization political The expediency. stripnecessarily have to the above didnot described The ideological shifts Impact ofPolitical Mobilization inauspicious ideological environment. Europeanization environmentalist perspective have increasingly with grappled pro- potentially and the discourse the Europeanization Incontrast, attitudes. strengthened byits highdegreewith of synchronization alteredthe structure of social hasbeen nationalism of nuclear discourse The conditionality. safety nuclear increasingly resistance hasbeen markedgrown byagainstEU and unromantic strong All inin all, courseof the Kozloduy the crisis ‘Europe’ Bulgaria’s relationshiphas to Sega 7.10.2002; Draganov, quoted in quoted Draganov, 7.10.2002; Mediapool 18.11.2002). 194 CEU eTD Collection 20.11.2002). thanunits Bulgaria hadinitially 1999the at forhoped negotiations (officials, quoted in the for life operational longer even an negotiate to opportunity unprecedented an provided review peer 20.11.2002; NRA,in quoted in quoted (Parvanov, agreements these renegotiate or revise to not agreements, closure the fulfilling 143 insee Bliznakov and quoted Valchev, to use closurethe commitments as a bargaining chipin negotiations with EU(e.g. the it– was only units, attimesimpression it the gave that tryingtreasured –unsuccessfully ambiguous. Whileit typically demonstrated firm determination preventto were the goals loss of the policy its contradictory; often were intentions its of Statements policy. In in phase first the its Kozloduy NDSVof crisis,the wasinconsistent the government unpopular decisions. paying of atleasttime, measure high postpone, avoid, costs infull or political the them to succumb to EU conditionality discursive framing of theirKozloduy andpolicies ambivalentThis incoherent. allowed in the name of EU membershipmaintainingindeterminate and open-ended policy on problemthe by and keeping the and, at the same between domesticmaneuver by situation theirEU pressure and political precarious Both governments involved in Kozloduy the sincecrisis theearly2000s to attempted Inconsistency chapter; Pasi, quoted in possibility renegotiatingof the issue after Bulgaria’s EU accession (see previous demands.negotiations EU this in and hadconcededto In hopes wereinvested phase, the of accession the Energy chapter the had closed Bulgaria though even and reversible toberepresented asopen-endedpeer review),official Kozloduy the policy continued Mediapool inquoted safety review the of conclusions technical basisthe the on of dates closure wouldbe temporarily closed negotiatesubsequently and newreopened to -‘objective’ - government’s Kozloduy as policy interest: defendedthe national one that chapter the theforthcomingadvertisetowards made the it which to possible peerreview, Local and EU officials warned thatthepeer review’s was mandate toinspect Bulgaria’s progress in 18/19.11.2002). In the second phase of the crisis (i.e. following the notorious In following the 18/19.11.2002). crisis(i.e.the secondphaseof the Sega 25.9.2002, 3.10.2002, 3.12.2003; in 25.9.2002, Sega Mediapool 8.6.2004; 8.6.2004; Ovcharov, interview for BNT2006a). 19.5.2003, 15.7.2003). government,The however, argued thatthe Sega 31.5.2002). Public attention was directed was Public attention 31.5.2002). 24 Chasa 25.9.2002, 4;in 25.9.2002, Sega 143 (officials, 26.9.2002, Sega 195 CEU eTD Collection 17.11.2002). Even if we assume that it was correct, the units could still not be regarded not still it theunits could Evenif was correct, we assume that 17.11.2002). in lower (Kaschiev, quoted figurethe Critics arguedthat even was from from operation the of 3-4was units 70EUR 50million to ( profit annual mediain2002,the inthe floated government the data that According to manipulative interpretations thatthrived uponpublic fears and discontent. altogether or of biased,exaggerated the circulation closure andfacilitated units’ early the of impact economic likely the judge to media the and public the for difficult it made in of futureon the functioning authorities energy the aliberalizedmarket, the sector financialinformation asunbiasedanalysisNPP, aswell on oftheKozloduy situation the closure authorities systematically solidified the nuclearnationalist by position representing the of relevant the the line, communication and policy official the upholding unitsformally While as a grave coalition. pro-nuclear economicdifferentpositions in and debate the perceivedstrengthened the moral authority the of the between lines the blurred argumentation pro-nuclear into slippage setback.occasional Officials’ non-transparent. were and in time varied electricity of price the upon By failingproblem. toStatements provide discursive government’s the characteristicof Kozloduy inconsistency framing of the from the authorities of by undermined units’the effects the was closure of welfare interpretation the official access regarding to the expected effects of the closure 2006b; in SEWRC, quoted in 23.9.2002,Ovcharov, 29.2.2004; quoted according to a preset schedule (Dogan, quoted in 144 attempts atearning populist dividends as dismissed supply of andcollapse increases system were often power drasticthe price conditionality,for undermine could support public government.the Predictions about EU to concede to of decision in lightthe and, voters impactupon strong immediate to counter andfrom upholding analternative interpretation of Kozloduy the Itdiddilemma. attempt the welfare of NPP’ssupporters the nationalist discourse nuclear the from refrainedovertly rejecting element amongthe general markedlyFacedattitudes theleadership with pro-Kozloduy public, of the nuclear nationalism discourse, which had an Itwas stressed that evenwith all Kozloduy units inoperation, the price of electricity would rise Mediapool 144 14.6.2006). Yet, the persuasive power of Yet, thepersuasiveof the 14.6.2006). power Mediapool (Kovachev, quoted in (Kovachev, quoted Mediapool 19.11.2002) 7.4.2006, interview for interview NovaTV 7.4.2006, Mediapool Mediapool 18/27.11.2002). 11.2.2002, Mediapool 196 CEU eTD Collection leadership’s political position, and to appease the embittered public that, over the course over publicappease theembittered that, to position, and political leadership’s stabilize institutions,in public state the to Kozloduy with torestore trust the units, together lost was that dignity national some of the restore to suited was well The project quoted nuclearsee industry inTodorov, energy (e.g. was to focus dampen Kozloduy the surrender over to public andpolitical of idea The furor the units. publicThe construction of the Belene NPP was the ruling elite’s other majorattention strategy employed on the Project The Belene presumably bright – the Belene NPP. long-termfull use of the opportunity. They seemed believeto that they have prospectsanother ace in the hole Kozloduy governments involved Yet,both units. in Kozloduy the failed make to crisis of over the integration be should prioritized EU thatthe convince Bulgarians campaign to economic calculations could have been a basis for a successful public relations Thesesimple membership. EU torisk sense whatsoever no Itmade aid. accession negotiations anddeprive thecountry EURthe of increase 150-million in annual pre- riskadelay in accession made senseto economic case,itno In the latter longer.years allowing respectivelyhowever, whole units clamor the operate about was for the 4 2and 2006.Accordingafter tothegovernment’s position inofficial negotiations with EU, the was keepingabout units 3-4operational and profit-makingfor arelatively long period defending Thepro-Kozloduy gave struggle units. the the coalition the impression that At sameit investment). the was unclearwhatgoals time, werebeing by pursued foreign in increase (e.g. membership after and before both integration, EU of benefits economic overall the by is dwarfed aid accession and pre-accession then And 2006). fundingever(Brunwasser accession percapita and –the highest economy infrastructure The has EUR EU 4.6 billioncommitted 2009for improvements in through Bulgaria’s year. million per 150 additional EUR brought negotiations accession of the Completion membership. from aid EUwasEUR300million.2002, annual In pre-accession the EU to letalone alternative economic asadecent asset, economic as anindispensable Mediapool 20.11.2002, 4.10.2002). 20.11.2002, 197 CEU eTD Collection interest (Mihajlova, quoted in interest quoted (Mihajlova, national the contravening as initiative the dismissed summarily opposition rightwing quoted inquoted units (e.g. see units (e.g. keep Kozloduy ideastrugglethe to urgent for the new of abstract the a NPP substitute manipulate public to as and interpreted opinion a badly attempt concealed initially Kozloduy front. Thus, instead of boosting the ruling elite’s popularity, they were domestic stakeholders, plans to build anew NPP signaled a defeatist position on the The Belene project, however, failed to dampen the Kozloduy controversy. To most quoted inquoted abandon nuclearto actually Bulgaria’s it energybut strengthen (Saxkoburggotski, intenddidnot to the government that todemonstrate was expected center, energy role of a regional Bulgaria’s and reaffirming in energy sphere, the strength economic newfrom gianttaking modern nuclear over preserving Bulgaria’s Kozloduy the NPP, NPP the Bulgarian wouldenergy sector stay strong and reliable.lulling The vision of a Belene the with that consolation the offered were economy national the on blow heavy Chasa big thatwillmobilize projects the (Saxkoburggotski,interviewwhole country” for rejuvenating the unity and creative energy of the nation: “[The Belene NPP is one of] the downfall offeredduringan Beleneproject ambitious goal transition, the of capable economic the accompanied that fabric social the of erosion by troubled the To those reconstruction: of vision long-awaited the offered project Belene important symbolically economic recovery. To those embittered by the spiritof economic destruction, the faststrategy overwhelming public plansandpromisesof the of with over-ambitious The NDSV’s promotion aggressive of projectitsthe wasinline with election-winning sectors. economic of transition, wasgrowing increasingly anxious with steady the decline ofvirtually all (Sevlievski, interview for intellectualand potential of thousandsthe of people who have worked inthe Kozloduy NPP. us in the ambitionto preserve Bulgaria as a ‘nuclearenergy’ state and utilize the qualification unites it Today, wastefulness. economic of symbol a was project Belene the ago, year Fifteen 8.4.2002, 9).Finally, 8.4.2002, whoperceived those the closure of Kozloduy the asa units Mediapool Mediapool Sega 6.5.2004; Tsigularov 6.5.2004;Tsigularov 2002c; Tafrov and Chobanov 2002; Minchev, 21.12.2003, 12.12.2003). 9.4.2006;articles in 24 Chasa Mediapool 21.4.2005, 13) 9.4.2002; Maznev, quoted in Maznev, 9.4.2002; quoted Mediapool 11.4.2002).Themainstream Mediapool 198 24 CEU eTD Collection Energy Committee (PEC) Bliznakov announced that the Belene NPP would be built would NPP Belene the that announced Bliznakov (PEC) Committee Energy Parliamentary the of chairman and Kovachev Minster Energy in 2003, lobby energy the AtaseminarBulgaria’s by nuclear itself concurred. organized ruling energy, elite the inevitability demonstrate its commitment Kozloduy the of andto to closure units’ 2002b, quoted in 2002b, quoted excuse for giving uptheKozloduy totheir norberelated units fate (e.g. Parvanov serve asan moving neither should project Belene on the with insistedthat forces have The pro-Kozloduy moreBulgaria is ‘nuclear’ better. becomes, the presumption thatthe the power, economic with associated is energy nuclear As NPPs. both wanted always has inBulgaria else almost everyone critics, other of camp small arelatively and parties from mainstream rightwing Apartthe successful. been nothas The swap particularly goals. achieving these towards as themeans for Kozloduy NPP the swaps BeleneNPP the that Balkans.layerthe Thepro-Belenecampaign has onlyaddedanother of representations leading in of preserve Bulgaria’s a cheap electricity andposition to exporter electricity supposed toserve the provide functions astheKozloduy i.e.same NPP, to abundant nuclearnationalism thathas enframed the pro-Kozloduyof campaign. discourse same the on The Belene NPPdependency is its by undermined been has units Kozloduy the The abilitydampen pro-Belenethe campaignto of discontentpublic with closurethe of its favor(see Ovcharov,interview for Nova TV2006a). Kozloduy up embraced units, Belenethe idea,and publicthe took in relations campaign of the that closure itsthe putupwith energylobby had takenpower afteronly the BSP leadership’s act of betrayal” (Karakachanov, interview for interview (Karakachanov, betrayal” actof leadership’s launched asacoverNPP was intended upthe and branded Beleneproject “to trick the units Bulgaria wouldhaveits position lost on the electricity marketby timethe thenew The rightwing9.3.2004). withoutnationalist retorted Kozloduy that the political forces quoted inquoted dissatisfaction Kozloduy “a crisis diffuse bubble”and“apre-election populist intended public trick” to with the of themidst in the it launch to idea the leadership’s labeled but in principle project the embraced inability24 Chasa to defend the Kozloduy NPP (Ovcharov, 11.4.2002,10). While in opposition, the BSP, joinedParvanov,by While BSP, 11.4.2002,10). President inopposition,the Sega 10.6.2004; see also Stanishev, quoted in see quoted 10.6.2004; also Stanishev, Sega 23.4.2004, in 23.4.2004, Trud 10.4.2002, 3). Keen to avoid Keen 3). to the admitting 10.4.2002, Mediapool Trud 12.4.2002, 31;see also 12.4.2002, 8.6.2002). It was 8.6.2002). 199 CEU eTD Collection The Anti-nuclear andAnti-Belene Campaigns such frameworks interpretive alternative as Europeanization. nationalism in allgeneral and to butremove the political expediency takingof up nuclear strengthen hasbeen to campaign pro-Belene effect of the Theultimate NPP. andhave rather ultimately boosted, thus forpopular than theKozloduy support stifled, solidify the argument together to campaignhaveThe pro-Belene campaign andthe worked pro-Kozloduy that nuclear energy of government’sthe post-EU-accession campaign for reopening units 3-4. is central to Bulgaria’s economic prosperity relationship as one of national security. In this alternative conception, (nuclear) energy boostto The rightwing overall economic development. has redefined opposition this held tobe one of the most competitive sectors of the economy, whose development is set is sector nuclear energy one: the asaneconomic primarily this relationship understands is interest(nuclear) energy position and the national redefined.The pro-nuclear case lofty callingforfeelings of national Second, relationshipthe pride. between asaspecial ratherthan sector, of energy the sub-sector asaregular isconceived energy nuclear First, it. changed perceptibly have they rhetoric, interest national the abandoned have DSB the nor SDS the neither Although dependency. energy of problem the tackle foreign Russian and energy policy interests,to energy and government’sthe inability to Bulgaria’s of thesubordination Russian dictates, towards tolerance unpardonable elite’s demonstrate the isof to policyin said energy, the field to other unfortunate decisions (successor) SDS and the Democrats for Strong Bulgaria (DSB). The Belene project, next rightwing mainstreamby two ‘europeanizing’ hasbeentaken the energy up policy Bulgaria’s parties regainedlost it some ground of the during Kozloduy the idea crisis. The of Yet,formed in the course of the debates on the Belene NPP, the asEuropeanization a discourseresult has of the internal split in the SDS/ODS – the Bliznakov, in quoted in (quoted Kozloduy units of the fate the regardless of Mediapool 13.11.2003). The same assumption has been at the base Mediapool 30.9.2003; see also 30.9.2003; 200 CEU eTD Collection interviews for Info Radio 2007, for BTV 2007; Kostov, interview for interview Kostov, 2007; BTV for 2007, Radio Info for interviews 145 Russian energy dominance common in EU energy front witha united and present policy Europe against battle the follow the EU, itself the attach to is to with Russia, in dealings leverage its andincrease security, national its guarantee interest, national its defend to Bulgaria for way only the industry.in be view,Russiandesigns could Onthis only keptbyeuropeanization: check energy Bulgarian the with interfere to allowed be not should that actor menacing securityBulgaria’s national to isas a conceivedboth threat Russian dominance.threat The and as a energy Russian with insecurity associated the against project Europeanization the pitted threat toof itsBulgaria’s ‘identity’ some ofsecurity and is projects ‘national’ with the coupled project Europeanization the elements interest, national the and energy between identity. relationship the of are re-articulation the broughtThrough to bear onRussia policy.national security see VasilevI. (e.g. 2007). The isrightwing represented guarantee incapacity to its capacity or of byvirtue interest for national the matters opposition has as a powerful anti-Russian political stance, nottoprovide afull-fledged policy alternative. broader parties’ the accentuate to been has role primary Its SDS. the and DSB by the adopted framework interpretive the within an itself position auxiliary occupies discourse potentially influential coalition with environmental The groups. Europeanization persuasiveness anti-Belene Right’s the of campaign the have restricted andscope of its if not populist, These political arguments. ‘double standards’compromised have the firmdemonstrated for the Kozloduy support NPP, conveyed inthe language of popular, in liberal have language sametime, Atthe theexpert-dominated they economics. of conveyed NPP, Belene the to opposition vehement demonstrated have They nationalism. opposition SDS inand DSBhavebeenincoherent their vis-à-vis nuclear stance Despite their insuccess partial the Europeanizationreviving rightwing the paradigm, world. Russia is notpart of the free world”. of and free become “part the EU joined has has the it has madeits choice: Bulgaria Europeanization/civilization Inthewords of choice. Agov DSB co-founder (2007), also held to have a strong symbolic dimension. It is represented as a threat to Bulgaria’s See M.Dimitrov 2007a; Toshev 2007; Stoyanov 2007b,2007a; DSB 2006a, 2006b;Dimitrov, K. 145 . But Russian interference in the national energy sector is sector energy national in the interference Russian But . 24 Chasa 2007. 201 CEU eTD Collection and schedule a referendum on EU membership (Ovcharov, quoted in (Ovcharov,membership quoted andscheduleon EU areferendum Accession of Treaty Bulgaria’s of ratification postpone to demands including Europe, to integration seem process and have didnot sendingto qualms about signals ‘disturbing’ example, popularmuchthe Kozloduy promoted forcause without European concern the for BSP, the While in opposition, doctrine. apolicy as Europeanization hasand rejected in The defenseof hasurgeddefiance Kozloduy the campaign of units EU conditionality discourse. Europeanization Bulgarians,argumentation designed to exploit the subjective fears and beliefs of ordinary campaign. Thesuccessof in its rooted campaign isits simple but effective media askillful with complete strategy, mobilization as political long-term consistent wellhas not only upheld a coherentasnuclear nationalist discourse but has also followedin a maintained low-key and ambivalentits ideological positions, the pro-Kozloduy coalition Whileelite therulingin the pro-Europeanization and have the Kozloduy skillfuldebate camp handlingThe Pro-Kozloduy Campaign of theposition in the Kozloduy controversy. challengesideological power of the Europeanization discourse in order to occupy a more visible influenceto policy whichprobably explainsthemselves, deploy theirfailure to the effectiveness have feltlittle of EU conditionality, environmentalists apparently pressure posedurgency in the environmentalist Kozloduy the campaignagainst Duetothesheer units. by thebeen little has relatively unlike sense of energetic inthe campaign,there anti-Belene energy. In addition, onnuclear upon general debates the impact haveand hadalimited society of sections environmentally-conscious already reach specific been to only able havebuthave predominantly argumentation.environmentalist thus They upon relied launched byenvironmental NGOs have selectively Europeanizationutilized arguments campaigns happened. anti-nuclear not has The This discourse. Europeanization the wouldenvironmental on rely that groups haveissue, would expected one safety nuclear Inasmuch as EU demands for early closure of the Kozloduy units have been framed as a Sega 22.4.2005). 202 CEU eTD Collection ratification on closure of 3-4wasnot areferendumthe membershipagainstunits or againstEU of Bulgaria’ssimilar vein, the CCDK and the VMRO declared that the unofficial citizens’Treaty referendum of Accession to the EU (quoted in Mediapool in (quoted were preserved units Kozloduy EUmembership the that support condition on propaganda all allegationsitis that an anti-European party andhas declared that itwould as branded has Ataka far-right Even the government. by bethe respected wereto results although in had reality would ifratification have tobe negative referendum postponed (unidentified)forces of advantage situation would anti-Kozloduy ( take the by ifdanger problem stance Bulgaria’s onthe anti-Europeanism,were tainted that 24 Chasa in timethe anyway)(quoted (at inBulgaria parties anti-European nobecause therewere be needed tocompletely accusations of anti-Europeanism taken off Kozloduy debate the stated that not, what and President desirabledebate the andpermitted constituted what society definefor Bulgarian to several attempts of In one apart. phenomena integration. PresidentParvanov has been a keyfigure topulling committed the two EU abattle is against not for Kozloduy’ ‘battle the that ithas stressed contrary, the to explicitly; euroskepticism advocated rarely has NPP Kozloduy the of defense The with in have associated nuclearanti-Europeanism general. avoided beingopenly groups pro- the political doctrine, and policy Europeanization as a have rejected Although they and the turned Kozloduy problem intoa major obstacle toBulgaria’s integration.EU lesscontributed It were notfor of growth that. profoundpopularto the euroskepticism pro-Kozloduy coalition was largely resultpre-electionof the butitspopulism effects inBulgaria’sagainst interests (quoted ran institutions of these interests the because institutions, from European pressure and itsunder backdown sector” “EUthe moststrike economic competitive down Parvanov made the ideological U-turn explicit by arguing that Bulgaria should not let interest’. ‘national the and integration between European link the rejected Such stances from taking anshun not figure – did pro-Europeanization moderate a Parvanov –otherwise President anti-Europeanization stance, too, when it came to the Kozloduy NPP. 3.12.2002, 4). Restrictions on freedom of Restrictions onfreedom were legitimized by 4). debate of the 3.12.2002, 17.5.2006). Mediapool 9.4.2002). The radical stance of The the radical 9.4.2002). stance of Sega Ibid. 25.4.2005), , 7). In a 203 CEU eTD Collection euroskeptic amongst attitudes public. the the on and pro-European the on both capitalize to able been actually has campaign europeanization, towards path the providesuperior By claiming apurportedly to becausecampaign ititfrom has sheltered vestiges the of Europeanization paradigm. the its success of tothe contributed greatly hasthus from anti-Europeanism itself dissociate Bulgaria remains generally The abilitypro-European. pro-nuclearthe of coalition to As discussed above, when decoupled from Kozloduy the publicdilemma, in opinion down” (Ovcharov, quoted down” (Ovcharov,in quoted forinstance, was represented as defense of national dignity and refusal to “keep our head own pro-Kozloduy policy. The reopening of the Kozloduy question after EU accession, advertiseits itby to The employing the ‘dignity’ argument hasaffirmed ruling13). elite (Georgiev, letter letter to (Georgiev, wealth preserving thegreatest its country of people,– our their skills and their dignity” “entering head upand isBulatom’s 3-4 units secretary,theEUwith about our saving 2004; citizens’ referendum organizers, quoted in quoted 2004; organizers, referendum citizens’ in EU(Ovcharov andthe status dignity as Bulgaria’s equal defense of been represented (SDS, quoted in (SDS, quoted why Bulgaria should be forced to choose between its nuclear energy industry and the EU ishave lobby, thatthere no argued (while inthereason nuclearenergy and opposition), development, economic national assisting by and, integration EU to danger no poses energy actually that has nuclear policy The pro-Kozloduy coalition the asserted of Bulgaria’s protecting improves European community. memberof the position tothe of asecond-rate beingrelegated Bulgaria’sinvocation of national and pride exploitation of widespreadthe fears thatBulgaria is framing: key discursive of has appliedtwo itthistechniques end, europeanization. To prospects actual way towards as abetter approach nationalistnuclear the bypresenting discourse in the EU. to engulf Europeanization the attempted has coalition In fact, the pro-Kozloduy The SDS, the BSP Mediapool Sega 15.11.2003; see alsointerview Nikolov, for 3.12.2002; Ovcharov 2004). The defense of has units the defenseof 2004). The 3.12.2002; Ovcharov Mediapool 15.2.2007). Sega 15.4.2005). In the words of In the words 15.4.2005). Telegraf 18.1.2006, 204 CEU eTD Collection Kaschiev 2006, and 35-6). Djulgerov (Pashev, charts profit the in high very rank typically sector the in contracts public winning NEK is on the very top of the list and the Kozloduy NPP146 is in the top five. Private firms with a record of In businessKaschiev and Djulgerov (Pashev, Russianenergy to the 2006, 38-9). related circles politico-economic of formation the encouraged has and influence political dependency monopolizedon primary energy which imports, has opened itup tooutside delegitimized held and further back it criticism.of top On isall theenergy sector’s privileged position nuclear of energy in and political discourse public opinion has of grounds national ( security functioningsector’s andtopreventevaluationindependent by on external experts control has been system the inspectionsof (Pashev,and Djulgerov Kaschiev Democratic 2006, 36). underminedin flaws and policies, anti-corruption in deficiencies privatization, by ongoing thecompetition, tendency to lack large of investmentprojects, involvement, limit of state ahigh coupleddegree with access to as been have a whole sector energy flows in informationthe capital massive The investments. aboutof thethe sizelabeled the‘theholy cow’ Bulgarian of the industry lightenergy (Brunwasser 2004).In been has it upgrades, ofinto investment and maintenance, the and production for expenditures Bulgarianfinancing, it projectpublicincirculate through form that contracts, of the revenues, economy, ofcapital amounts large of the Onaccount in Bulgaria. enterprises biggest of the one theand controlled by a small number of powerfulBelene companies foodit highly production), inis sectors Bulgaria (e.g.textiles, tourism,centralizedor project,economic important other Unlike itsstrength. economic for stands out sector The energy too, involves awareness lobbyism inof Bulgaria. authority, by its political expediency and arguments, of by the weakpublic the mammothwith politicalthe elite, andhas been additionallyby boosted its perceived expert shape Kozloduy the has debates from derived economicits strength andlinks its close the political isOne contributingdiscourse dominance factors the tonationalist nuclear of of the and economic power of the nuclear Forces Pro-nuclear of the Position Political and Socio-economic energy lobby. The lobby’s ability to Among the Bulgarianfirms withthe highest turnover,at least half are energy companies. As a rule, the Ibid ., 40-1;., Stanchev 2002, 5).Theand Dimitrov 146 . The Kozloduy NPP itself is 205 CEU eTD Collection 147 dissimilar, political actors (e.g. the BSP, GERB, the VMRO, the Gergjovden Movement, very otherwise of efforts several, the to been has central drama Kozloduy it. The the way the issue has been rendered in the political sphere, but has altogether determined major political actors. In many cases, the lobby’s position has not simply concurred with between congruence onthe lobby’s stance Kozloduy the problem of strategies and the the by strengthened been has industry energy nuclear the of influence political The Mediapool and (e.g.see lobby’sthe have arguments demands nuclear supported energy and organized bylobby other key groups, havepolitical figures,too, in spoken favor of nuclearlobby the energy to related organizations ofinternational meetingsand with representatives NPP, through inparticipation forums, conferences and through visits and supportive speeches at the through lobby energy nuclear the backed openly has Parvanov President BNS. the BrunwasserPrior tobecoming 2004). thePEC,Bliznakov chairman of was chairman of companies private (Nenova inthe sector energy 2007; leading the with contacts close kept have – Bliznakov PEC the of chairman the and Kovachev Minister Energy government’s NDSV the e.g. – NDSV the of ranks the from officials key as well as Ovcharov, that argued have Critics industry. energy nuclear the employee of the Kozloduy NPP and the NEK, and has not tried to deny his connection to a Russiana former university and at nuclear is educated Economy. physicist a He and was much morebetween 2005and2007 often referredsectoral lobby. The BSP’s deputy leader Ovcharov – Minister of Economy toand Energy as by resist political the to pressure exerted state forhas the the position, madeitdifficult Minister of economicEnergy strength, coupled with the perceivedmoral power thanof the pro-Kozloduy whileits establishment, political the companies and private between of network asties Minister has of ofan development the facilitated effective structure centralized The industry’s the closed-door deals and policymaking by unfettered democratic and checks balances. lobbyism, to susceptible industry energy makethe characteristics these combination, Following corruption scandals in the energy sector, Ovcharov resigned his post in 2007. in post his resigned Ovcharov sector, energy the in scandals corruption Following 30.9.2003). 147 ( – was one of the most vocal opponents of the units’ closure Sega 3.6.2004, 19.6.2003; 3.6.2004, Mediapool Mediapool 9.4.2002). Atforums 9.4.2002). 10.7.2003; 206 CEU eTD Collection ability ability industrialthe of lobby as to operate a lobby without being recognized as such. in degree beenrooted the has of a significant to nuclearthe power discourse nationalism more regard pro-nuclear critically. persuasive ordinary activities Bulgarians The to prompt appealthe in to of lobby’sthe of stance defense firm Kozloduy the NPP or diminish to insufficient been has this but establishment, political the with relationship nuclearreferred to‘the lobby’ energy occasionand hason its harmonious exposed ( groups pro-nuclear of activities behind the interests political and economic particular identify to impossible altogether or difficult it found has public.public thus The broad the amongst this awareness of phenomenon lacklegal regulatingof framework lobbyism has toageneralcontributed lack of The issues. environmental to confined mostly and limited been has energy of sphere the foreign interests. The participation of civilother society ingroups makingdecision in lackingforauthority for allegedly disqualified expert reflecting necessary the and/or limitedcommunity viewshaveand Alternative hasseverely been public debate. expert whole the of views objective the reflects interpretation lobby’s the that belief the fundingdevelopment (Pashev,Djulgerov and Kaschiev 2006, 41-2). This has nurtured and research through or employment through either industry the with involved professionally are in Bulgaria experts energy nuclear of majority vast The Bulgaria. knowledgeexpert forlegal framework lack andby in regulation lobbyism of the the of over monopoly ostensible its by strengthened been also has clout political lobby’s The moral legitimacy and of nuclearpower the lobby. energy ‘national’ the affirmed has it time, same the At interest. national perceived the in Bulgarian andhave forces of the popularity political the politics of that stood defense benefited both sides. has It has boostedsymbiosis The the importance effect. this to of the Kozloduy utilized widely been problem has It in positions. ‘national’ such argumentation hashandy been for providing necessary the technical underpinning of uphold the legitimacy of such a stance. Thelobby’s clear, simple andeffective ‘expert’ ‘national’having stance Kozloduy onthe without problem knowledge anytechnical to nationalthe put that actors political of reputation a build to Ataka) and Parvanov, President interests above all else. These efforts have typically entailed taking a firm Active Elements 2004). The media hasoften The 2004). 207 CEU eTD Collection integration. society haswhich been gradually the unromantic sidesof discovering Euro-Atlantic external ideological environment and by the changing ideological outlook of Bulgarian it Unlike in by been has dilemma Europeanization, strengthened changing the particular. in discourse policy the onnuclear debate energy in generaland on Kozloduy the duringframework, policy-making ithas the2000s thedefeated Europeanization a as disputable and disputed both been has discourse nationalist nuclear the Although Summary elite. political the and media the over influence exerting to comes it when so less even and powerful industry energy itcomeswhen public to relations and information campaigns, competebeen policymaking with unableto in ofenergy. sphere Theyhavethe the intoinput official channels for providing have restricted on rather relied the alternatives. Asfor environmental due groups, to theirlimited financial resources they undermined byfailurepresenta unitedtheir to frontagainst the rightwingother additionally been has standing political parties’ two The question. energy nuclear the on position and hasstance DSB’sambiguous thussidelinedthe SDS’s the problem on Kozloduy by leader.NPP, effectively party’s the performed popular GERB’spopulist of forthe media-friendly support attention-grabbingappeal by demonstrations repeated its has in boosted GERB particular Ataka. forGERB thefar-right or center-right for the either opt voters many as marginalized conservative increasingly parties havebeen two Europeanizationput the has to theircurbed ability DSB weak electoral SDSandthe the position of paradigm Therelatively dilemma. nuclearthe energy views on alternative and of other discourse back on the policy impactof Europeanization the has curbedthe nationalism nuclear of of critics the agenda relatedAt the other side of the debate, the relatively weak political and socio-economic position to the Belene NPP. The Socio-economic and Political Position of the Anti-Belene and Anti-nuclear Forces 208 CEU eTD Collection power and power perceivedmoral the of authority nuclearthe lobby. energy political the by up backed been has that campaign pro-nuclear effective and coherent the on been Kozloduy by the perspective has Europeanization outperformed dilemma thus either. The discourse Europeanization the efficiently havedeployed and not ideological haveposition retained alow-key forces evenTheanti-nuclear higher. stakes has contributed tothe dramatic of debatesandhas atmosphere raisedthe political the intended tolower the political costs involved in the crisis,it has achieved the opposite. It performative and ideological inconsistency officialof the Kozloduy policy has been defend Europeanization to Although discourse particularpolicy the choices. reproducing of the discourse nuclearnationalism andpicking upelementsof the forth between hasswayedbackand counterproductively crisis.elite ruling The inhas by mobilizationKozloduy instigated It political processthe of also won out the 209 CEU eTD Collection the key factors explaining state action, and hence, outcomes in international relations. international in outcomes hence, and action, state explaining factors key the Relations during the Cold War – international anarchy, state power, and state interestInternational of field are the dominated that perspectives the – Neorealism and Realism For Realism Neorealism Realism and politics. comparative and Relations International of fields in the evolved it empirical material casestudies, bythe provided Ibrieflytwo the review itself debate as identify the main issuesmove I on Before to debate. long-standing theoretical andextensive to been subject that emerge out of thishas andidentity suchas approaches policy factors ideational of power The explanatory debate and to rethink on that basis the Rival Views ontheExplanatory Power ofIdeas Explanatory Power of Ideas extent? what to and how yes, if and, studies case in the observed outcomes and behavior the questions would then be: Do we needtheoretical the ideationalbasic The factorsframeworks. at all? Dointerpretive they and account for discourses policy relevant the such material and andideational factors as interaction between opportunities constraints considerit inisunderstandto necessary the Bulgaria, europeanization in that to order suggests material empirical The analysis. in this stake at issues theoretical the consider Europeanization policy paradigm on policymaking in Bulgaria. First, however, I pose to of the theimpact of mechanism more general a tooutline inorder case studies two the attempts tojoinThis chapterand reconsider by empirical the material together provided Conclusions: AnotherStoryofBulgaria’sEuropeanization Chapter 6 210 CEU eTD Collection see Wallerstein 1996; Skocpol 1977). 148 reduciblebe the not underlying relativelyof,deemed independent distribution and to, to Katzenstein areRegimes andinstitutions embody)2-7; 1996b, 19). (Keohane 1989, regimesinternational and institutions (and rules, the norms and procedures they that KeohaneKrasner 1982a,1982b; effects 1982)–the of anarchy by can bemitigated approachesregime institutionalism to 1989)andliberalist (e.g.Keohane theory (e.g. interdependence developed in late 1970s(Keohanethe and Nye 2001),neoliberal complex of theory the namely – theorizing Realist to alternatives liberal to According their self-interest (Katzenstein 1996b, 17). would in of strategically pursuit cultural factors actors best ideational employ or the at and structures material by provided are behavior for incentives The power. explanatory utilityexpected (Goldstein and Keohane1993,4).Ideational are factors allowed no and their actsoastomaximize pursuetheir self-interest actors way rational; either behave rational or areeitheractors that assume They approaches. arerationalist inforeign analysis policy approaches choice gametheoretic and rational Realism, 25). 1996b, (Katzenstein identity and interests states’ affecting without content ideational no have to is believed act states in system which The international and interest. from, serve, power and they derived are Rather, factors. explanatory be independent to considered arenot factors institutional distribution of relative among (Waltz capabilities states 1979).Ideational, social, and in the changes the are politics international of determinants main the and help, is self- behavior of states’ pattern essential the is survival, states of interest primary the stability 13).Neorealism [1948]1985, (Morgenthau thatin posits contextof the anarchy “morally indefensible” international butalso potentially detrimental peaceto and interests of powerful moral by couldonly belegitimateclaims motivated and theparticulardesire to advance states. Mixing universal useof the by and tainted international that discourses andpower was politics ideology with politicsbutclaimed only suggestthat validity, relationshipthe moral universal to between that those wasespecially deemed discourses, ethical and normative and norms, to ideologies, as besuch not only didEarly factors scholars andCarr suchMorgenthau ideational issue as realist with take World-systems analysis, too, conceptualizes the international system inpurely materialist terms (e.g. 148 . It influences policy directly policy influences It . as if they were 211 CEU eTD Collection and and interaction (March andOlsen 1984, 737). 149 between theirgoals and alternative strategies of inachieving them conditions of understand to causal relationships define the or preferences theirto enable actors own ( rationally behave individuals as principled and beliefs heldcausal explain byindividuals –help to policy outcomes even to institutionalism rationalist of study the foreign of policy, Keohane Goldstein and arguethatideas – primarily application influential an In rationality. of assumptions institutionalism ideas introduces into its research program, preserving while these basic Rationalist 4). 1993, andKeohane face (Goldstein actors that constraints the ( theory andrational choice institutionalism in choice part of ‘ideational turn’ the rational it indevelopedevolved1990s. Therationalist intheearly the same as approach period 18). The historical shape approach in took of framework the historical institutionalism as 2002, (Blyth approach andarationalist approach historical a politics: andcomparative economy field of political ideasinthe study the of to basic approaches two There are Institutionalisms New The face, define states that 6). autonomously interests as states 1989, even their (Keohane institutions: norms and institutions change theincentives and(constraints opportunities) 1982; Katzenstein 1996b,The 25). focus is on regulatorythe effectsnorms of and (powerand andcausal factors interests) outcomes policy 1982a;Keohane (Krasner andideationalfixed as and factors intervening usually betweenthebasic variables treat states pursuing maximization. utility Theystates’ identities treat and interests as given self-interested sovereign of domain the as relations international of view rationalist of power and material capabilities among states. Yet, liberal theories preserve the beliefs are exogenously defined and given andgiven a priori beliefs aredefined exogenously causal and constraints. Theirto preferences utility, subject and theirmaximize expected areself-interested actors microeconomics: of assumptions basic the adopts Rationalism Ibid It is assumed that preference formation precedes and is independent of the process of decision-making of process of the independent is and precedes formation preference that assumed is It ., 18). Ibid ., 3-5). First, ideas can provide roadmaps that 149 , so research focuses on variation in 212 CEU eTD Collection 150 ( that define cooperative solutions, facilitate coalition building or promote group cohesion amongcould to actors focalideasoutcomes them,points choose contribute byproviding outcomes superior several When are there contracting. andincomplete action, collective coordination, to the status quo and no established criteria on theuncertainty basis of which by causal ideasorby shaped institutional arrangementsare (Goldsteinbehavior andKeohane 1993, 13). certain of consequences likely the about expectations conditions, such Under action. ( of their andinterests, by structuring the among distribution political of power actors definition actors’ shaping by policy, constraining by outcomes political on imprint own arenotexplain theonly theyleave procedures) theirthat causal factors outcomes, policy maintains institutions although formalthat institutions(both and informal rules and of Historical stressesand character policymaking institutionalism path-dependent the 1992, 9). maximizeto and why they certain overothersprioritize (Thelengoals and Steinmo based analysis that could allow the researcher tounderstand what utility actors are trying consideration contextin the of made which are decisions ahistorically and without self-interestedassumptions about utility-maximizingbehavior areempty without maintains that It 1984,739). and Olsen institutions (March experience political and political tointeraction, exogenous fixednor neither they because are presumed, It sociology. from derives than be analyzed,rather has to that assomething andpreferences actors’interests treats debate, the of side other the at institutionalism, Historical ( changed have they can constrain longpolicy underlying the after configurations ofinterests and power ( action for motivations numberthe by conceivable forcompelling of alternatives ethical action providingor focuses selected; it only ability ideason the of behavior toconstrain selected bylimiting between them and actual policy outcomes. It traces the processes through whichcertain through the processes traces It outcomes. policy and actual them between relationship between policy ideas and theinstitutional configuration mediatesthat Ibid Ibid In conditions of uncertainty, rational actors act on the basis of the ., 17-20). Finally,if ideas become institutionalized in form the of rules and norms, ., 2-9). Concerning thestudy ideas, of historical institutionalisminterestedin is the 150 . This specifyhow mechanismdoesnot in theideascausal question are Ibid ., 20-1). Ibid ., 13-6).Second, ideas can alleviate problems relatedto expected consequences of of their consequences 213 CEU eTD Collection 151 constructivismbe of which as broadly scholarship, can designated sociology in search of alternative theoretical frameworks. The result was a growing body in some Relations and politics prompted to world scholars International toturn field a ideas,encouraged ofthe rolemorality of rethinking norms, and ideology, ethics in the environment intellectual changing The too. Relations, in International perspectives The end of the Cold War( challenged better institutional structures fit orparticular to translated policymakingthe process are they as be altered can ideas policy new of content the which in way the and ideas, given facilitatepolity orimpede introductionthe and theinstitutionalization theof new dominant structure of domestic institutions, theinstitutional setupor institutionalthe in dynamics a dominate wayin political the ideas to andcome which discourse, win over others materialist and rationalist Social Social Constructivism 1996, 33-4). national security policies (Katzenstein 1996b, andKatzensteinJepperson, Wendt, 1996a; transnational friendship discourses,political – patterns determineof andenmity,that etc. law, international of norms and rules institutions, formal – environments institutional cultural- anddomestic in international assituated states sees policies security national of account a constructivist example, For interaction. through constituted in embeddedideas, knowledge structures of inter-subjective and andas norms, interaction and behavior than material are (WendtActors areconceivedones 1999). as from ideational propositionthe are that factors more pertinentto explaining human Constructivism relies on an ideational (as opposed to materialist) ontology; it departs topostmodernism as subscribing necessarily a philosophical doctrine). poststructuralism/postmodernism amethodologicalas for tool analysis, without utilizes (which version radical its and methods) scientific positivist faithful to remains version (which itsbetween conventional theoretical differences Ibid For general overviews of constructivism see, for example, Finnemore and Sikkink 2001; Hopf 1998. Hopf 2001; Sikkink and Finnemore example, for see, constructivism of overviews general For ., 23-6). 151 despite substantial despite 214 CEU eTD Collection factors, and only to the extent that they account for outcomes that cannot be accounted be cannot that outcomes for account they that extent the to only and factors, rationalism recognizes only the i.e. Ideas are Goldstein Keohaneas causal intervening 1993,3). variables, treated and or embedded and which can shapeindividuals’ interests and identities ( by individualsconstitute anda donotwider intowhichstructure individuals are because‘held’ individuals. theyare They matter preferencesof the Ideas arereducible to 239). 1997, utility (Blyth maximize to their expected try who serveactors that products The view ideas isinstrumentalistrationalist andon ‘thin’: ideas areinstrumental Do IdeasInfluence How Policy Outcomes? andpower interest. Ideas thus Wendt1996b,1999, 24). 2; problems and (Katzenstein policy situations of interpretations particular by actors’ and attach to them actors that meanings bythe mediated always behavior are on factors material of effects the arguethat they andcauses; only factors discardmaterial not ( for action’ a‘blueprint offers and thus and concepts beliefs, traditions collective changes that understanding collective as rather but outcomes, of explanation an as nor justification as neither conceived can have substantial ‘real’ (Adlereffects and independent Ideology is 1987). thus and material developments reducible to of are not become part they that understandings ideologies and (inter-subjective) always collective the areinfact situations interpreted, since that ‘real’ posit ontology ideational adopting an approaches In contrast, power. andhavenoexplanatory arematerial reducible to developments factors ideational is factors; world materialistthe bymaterial Accordingapproaches, explainable to vs. Factors Factors Ideational Material The Impactof Ideason Policy: KeyTheoretical Issues Ibid causal ., 16-7).., Constructivist (sociological) do approaches , regulative, and constraining impact of ideational of impact and constraining , regulative, constitute ostensibly material causes such such as causes material ostensibly Ibid ., 239; ., 215 CEU eTD Collection ( modes ofbeing andthinking whiledisqualifying and evenmaking impossible” others permissibleimagined andactedupon”“a andhow produces certain order of discourse andindelibly become is dominant shape waysin representations the which reality relations (Weldes and subjects, objects, situations, elite administration, society define and the state the which through memories, collective of reproduction and narratives of construction representation, of of a process out all emerge etc., insecurities, interests, Identities, affect by Second, ideationalidentities interests, factors and behavior. constituting (Weldes others marginalize they and dominant as arguments causal and concepts certain establish they sense: interpretation by structure of boundaries the accepted knowledge andcommon defining knowledge) are productive, and discourses (such asrepresentations, factors ideational view of constructivists, In the i.e. they have social effects.1996b, 22-5). First, they enframe reality and prescriptions rather than others ( others than rather prescriptions afield establishes of by particular and knowledge developmental theories promoting discourse argues thatthis (1995) Escobar ofdevelopment, the consolidationdiscourse of enable actors to act in a situation and at the same time constrain their behavior by interpretation(D. Campbell1998, 1-2; Weldes a phenomenon or an actor would be designated as dangerous is contingent and152 entirely dependent on identities their i.e. ‘properties’, ( and interests actors’ constituting by indirectly behavior influence also expectations about the proper behavior for the given identity. Butideational factors can institutions and interests, power, suchas factors material ostensibly upon factors ideational the emphasizes perspective constructivist the In contrast, 93). for bypower,interest, andinstitutions and Keohane1993,3-11;Wendt(Goldstein 1999, ideational factors (especially norms and rules) can rules) and norms (especially factors ideational Ibid Forexample, constructivism would suggest that althougha numberof potential dangers exist, whether ., 5). 152 (Wendt 1999, chapter 3).Whenchapter 1999, are (Wendt identities constituted, already actors’ Ibid ., 20-1;Jepperson, Wendt, andKatzenstein 1996, 34-5; Katzenstein et al . 1999, 14). These constructions. 1999, interests, (identities, etc.) then et al . 1999, 17). For example, For . 1999,17). analyzing and the emergence Ibid ., 10). Escobar’s analysis shows “how certain “how shows analysis Escobar’s 10). ., et al. et 1999, 12-3). regulate behavior by generating by behavior constitutive effects of 216 CEU eTD Collection can also directly follow from, or enact, identity politics ( institutions andorganizations (Jepperson, andKatzenstein Wendt, Policies1996, 61). state into acertain identity by binding willingly behavior membership its through into Katzenstein 1996, 60;Price andTannenwald Elites could 1996). lock the alsoattempt to ( community international the of members ‘civilized’ of theidentity defining discourse of broader the has part become taboo nuclear the because strong been have norm the to commitment and Adherence identities. effectively states’behavioritslargely regulated constitutive upon due to effects states’ nuclear use thatthe internationalthe has norm example,prohibiting of shows weapons for (1999), behavior.Tannenwald of certain norms patterns or to adherence reinforces could develop aninterest in sustaining andaffirming particularidentities, which States interests. actors’ andshaping by primarily generating policy Identity determines to recognize‘convincing’ themselves 10). underdevelopedactors as developed or (1995, outcomes. The discourse of developmentin Escobar’s analysis, for example, ‘works’ by areembedded policy inwhich and actors environments ideational the (cultural) linkbetween acrucial are actors) relevant andother governments states, (of Identities et al Weldes be discarded any that (Weldes 1996, 285; can defiedand ultimately construction meanscausal arguments whichItalso arebased, becontinuously on they reproduced. and discourses representations, the aswell as etc., insecurities, identities, interests, of constructions particular that necessitates contestation of possibility The contestation. to is open it arbitrary, and is contingent interpretation each Since permanent. be neednot effect stabilizing the interpretation, fixlegitimize aparticular and interest’) constructivismsuccessful suggeststhat constructionssocial (e.g.of ‘national the fall outside this range as illogical or illegitimate ( illegitimate or illogical as range this outside fall that actions by actions, and designating of andlegitimate acceptable range the delimiting . 1999, 16; Doty 1996, 6-9). Ibid ., 437; see also Jepperson, Wendt, and Jepperson, Wendt, ., 437;seealso Ibid ., 17; Doty Although 1996, 4-5). Ibid ., 61). 217 CEU eTD Collection that attach particular identities (e.g. global leader, regional leader, pariah state, rich pariah regional state, leader, global leader, (e.g. attach identities particular that representations state employ officials interest, national of the constructing In theprocess interpretations. wide of range Notwithstanding certain ‘reality constraints’, situations are always open to a more or less have intheir torespond at disposal situationsthese order 1996,276-9). (Weldes situations, defineand interpret the policy policy andproblems, evaluatethe they options particular interpret elites policymakers and state whereby inaprocess emerges actors’response identity to 1996b,(Katzenstein The construct 2). of nationalthe interest interpretation, and thus a response to ideational cultural factors; mostand notably,itis a of ismatter a interest) national to the threats or threats suchassecurity constructs social (aswell as related interest’ national as‘the designated The social construct interestis a socially constructed category ( economic power asthe means of ensuring survival(Weldes 1996, 278). 153 international politics of character self-help anarchic the from interest national the infers example, for Realism, Whereas interest. national the of is in conceptualization the perspectives theoretical with materialist parts foreign policy choices andsupport (1996,276).Where public garner constructivism legitimize their elites useto that device a rhetorical functions as it In addition, pursue. itthrough policymakersthat define should andunderstand policies thatthestate the is it because action is of state basis thevery concept the that Weldes argues contrary, the To actin arena. world the states how for understanding interest of national the concept – andConstructivistnot– reject needusefulness do usually the not of approaches the interaction. of social process in the asconstituted interests treat hasto It ‘discover’. simply to objective, exogenously defined andfixed categories utility-maximizingthat need actors social constructivism interests, then by If identity influences or reconstructing actors’ generating outcomes obviously Interest National the Constructing cannot treat interests in the rationalist manner - as Hence, the national interest is survival and security, and, by implication, the pursuit of military and Ibid 153 ., 277). , constructivists argue that the national 218 CEU eTD Collection Representations, Discourses, and (Soft) Power and (Soft) Discourses, Representations, ( subjectswhile questioning,disqualifying delegitimizing, or They others. certainalso designate or phenomena morepolicy moraljustified, reasonable, appear persuasive, legitimate,responses or as developments.worthy Their role is to make particular descriptions of the situation and particular ofrole of issuch arguments nottocorrectly reality represent future topredictor protection, while designating others as threats analogy, the Vietnam analogy, the powder keg metaphor, etc. metaphor, keg powder the analogy, Vietnam the analogy, 154 controlling by only not power exercise which Development International for Agency andinstitutions likethe IMF WB,the academic institutions or key developmental US the Weldes power relations1981; (Foucaultcreate andalways and discourses knowledge discourses, power and discourse: power always involves the constitution of a field of knowledge and Constructivism its(especially more radical versions) stresses inherentthe link between other. each imply power and discourses that view the share institutionalism historical constructivism Sociological and suchas of power. perspectives function a source and a both is its interpretation andstructure enframe reality to The a discourse of ability into these positions ( identification positionsof subject and the interpellation of individualsgroups) certain (or indispensableFinally,of an partprocessthe national interestisof constructing the the ( valid objectively and incontestable interest’ ‘national the of content the and make successful, andunquestionably theseelementsappear naturally connected, would if makeconstruction, that upthis elements different of the articulation repeated ( defined been has interest national state’s the then identified, been been andifthe defined, causalkey which arguments on basedpolicies should be have arguments semi-causal or causal byadvancing subjects these between relations the depict then Policymakers actors. non-state or organizations, international states, men’s club, alliance of democratic states) to relevant actors, such as the state itself, other Ibid Examples of semi-causal arguments are historical analogies and metaphors, such asthe Munich ., 282). If a situation has beeninterpreted, ifrepresented and identities actors’ have et al . 1999, 17). Escobar’s analysis,for example, underscores the (soft) power of Ibid ., 287). Ibid ., 282). The ., Ibid 154 ., 285). ., . The . 219 CEU eTD Collection explanatory factors during periods of crisis because they reduce uncertainty by reduce uncertainty because duringcrisis they of periods factors explanatory Due to their role interpretiveof frameworks, ideas arebelieved beto important undesirable, and when a socially viable alternative idea exists (2000,254). arevery consequences when these expectations, from deviate social actual events of likely more is much consequences ideational the when change argues that Legro politics, in world role America’s on ideas policy foreign US of evolution the of account perceptions of nationaltheir interests (Ikenberry In 1993, 59-60). a constructivist governments’ British and US the shape to and issues policy complex such on influence with provided situation of debates experts to postwar that the opportunity the fluidity characteristic itand was a large uncertainty the to that extent suggests analysis construction of the open world economic order in the aftermath of World War II. This overcoming thepolitical between stalemate Britain and USandthe inthusenabling the by promoted of a transatlantic andinmonetary group economists policy experts, (1992, 1993)has analyzedby Keynesianism rolepolicy of ideasinspired the and 280). accumulating failures(1993, Ikenberry paradigms canbe a response topolicy policy failuresideational are conducive to Hall change. shiftsargues that inpolicy byinstitutional periodsthat characterized and conspicuous and political destabilization ideas of uponpolicy agree recognize the impact that theoretical approaches Different Crisis of in Periods Ideas Policy of Role The authority over policy ideas and political discourse. shape of powerishollowitincludes framework the policymaking, political unless ideasWhilst needpolitical/institutional to dominateauthority political discourseand (Weldes behalfto speak state/nation on the individuals entrusted of the of authority the as reflecting perceived usually and represented are because they but discourses, alternative do reality than of representation better a offer because they upheldby statearelikely Discourses ofthe be institutions discourse. the powerful not to with (Peet Hartwick Institutional contributes 1999,146). tothestrength power of a ideas,butalsofinancial by creating dominantrepresentations resources, theories and et al . 1999,17-8). 220 CEU eTD Collection insecurities are implicated in areimplicated insecurities cultural the identity.of production Thepractices actors’ insecuritiesmutual as constitution of and social culturally actors constructions: produced its Campbell creation (D. Weldes1998, 197). mechanism identity, thanthe of be rather state aresponse toastableto and preexisting through various foreign though policy, of practices even such havepurport practices to (Weldes interests in,of, ofidentity implicated process the emergeout actor’s and the definingand they are both a threat; present which they actorto the external to arenot insecurities and view, threats Onthis threats. objective external to could response enable a rational that identity possessesa preexisting state the theideathat constructivism rejects In contrast, system (Weldes international of nature the properties appear to be stable, and they are taken for granted as facts that derive from the Weldes Campbell(D. 36; economic 1998, threat ideological or military, andobjective external an to state the of response rational and mediated internally the involve that phenomena realist/rationalist view, foreign policy and security the policy areOn (usually) state-centric policy. foreign of understanding realist/rationalist the contests Constructivism Foreign Policy and Representations of Danger within (1993,59, 1992,governments 315-8). and between coalitions political large new of building the enabled they interest, common contentious alternatives laissez-faireof interventionism. and By identifying areas of example above, new the monetary policy ideas defined amiddle ground between old the barriers to collective action and enable coalition building ( uncertainty,interests, reconstituting orbridging political ideas divisions, the narrow andinterests redefine their policy by theirof Thus, goals. perceptions desirable reducing interpretwhichthrough uncertainthe to induce environment. They to also actors with narratives actors ideasIn such alternative (Blyth provide periods, 2002, 37). narrowinginterpretations down possiblethe of crisisthe and the viablepolicy responses et al et . 1999, 9-10). Both states and security their arenaturalized, andBoth states security threats 9-10). . 1999, et al. 1999, 11-2). A state’s identity identity 1999,11-2). A isstate’s ‘performatively’ constituted et al. 1999, 9-10). et al et . (1999)describe as process this a Ibid ., 38). In Ikenberry’s38). ., 221 CEU eTD Collection rights. Developing countries are constructed as having limitedactors (negative) Developing only areconstructed rights. countries human important developmentpoliciesor such as define make decisions about to and Developed the42-6). authority asfullysovereign and countries are given aredesignated differentkinds with of actors degrees different of agency in global (Doty politics 1996, (infantile),ideology, susceptible to grippedetc.,construct and bychaos disorder, immature developing asirrational, world of or colonial Representations the 6). democracy promotion human and(Escobar 1995;Doty promotion, 1996, chapter rights considered illegitimate. Discursivelegitimized framing hasalso development aid, includingWest, practices of domination and suppression wouldthat have otherwise been of the part the on power economic and military of political, exercise the legitimized theWorld Third way world the represented argues that Doty developed the (1996) in Analyzing the Kosovo conflict. fourcases of colonization and counterinsurgency, non-intervention and intervention both justified opponents and supporters congressional Paris (2002)traces how through proper discursive framing the USadministration andits and military foraction. USand legitimized identity the thus Iraq, negative aconcomitant President inBush, quoted a Campbell positive 1993, 21)–constructed moral identity for instance of“selflessly confronting evilfor thesake in of good alandfar so away” (US that dominant(1993) argues the representation moral the –asan just war as of and strategies employed to justify military action against Iraq during the Gulf War, Campbell Discourses are powerful tools for legitimizing policy. In an analysis of the discursive possibility” of condition its is it ( existence: or identity state’s a to a threat not is… policy and ( behavior identities nonconformist marginalizes and society, disciplines threatened, isbeing that The invocation increases 1998, 50). of thecohesion community political the danger of control state andstate indispensable (D.Campbell domain renderover thedomestic legitimize the intended to identity are state’s of a constitution enact performative the that Discourses and Policy Legitimization Ibid ., 13). Ibid ., 73). Thus, “the constant articulation of danger through foreign 222 CEU eTD Collection process conditionality isinteraction asa 1999b).Compliance with conceptualized (Checkel of ‘socialization’. social of process in the as determined preferences and identities, interests, actors’ treats compliance, whichIt of (sociological) understanding the constructivist The logicdepicts appropriateness of focusesis not on thethe social2005, 10-7). outcome Sedelmeier and structures (Schimmelfennig small are costs adoption if and few, are conditionality) in whichof actorspoliticaldomestic are embedded stakeholders players’ (i.e. if‘veto andconsistent; iscredible and sufficiently if rewards; conditionality pressure thatcome in theincur form of determinate, substantial,but and quicklywelfare disbursed conditions for of Europeanization is driven by socialorEU conditionality. Itis more likelypower to occur when EU rules lossesinduce incentives 2000). institutions (Checkel compliance to the right creating due to compliance1999b,In understanding,this 2000). is conditionality amatter international of with EU fixed (Checkel and identities, preferences)areexogenously defined (interests, properties whose utility-maximizers asself-interested actors treats It norms. international with understanding of compliance rationalist the reflects logic The of consequences (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2005,9). appropriateness logic of and of consequences the logic the europeanization – of “logics” alternative stories two to two these haslinked enlargement eastern of EU’s countriesthe inthecontext European inand Eastern Central europeanization on research Recent ideas. based one one (constructivist) and asociological interests particular, one would again need to consider two stories – a rationalist one based on in EU accession with conditionality and compliance understand europeanization and to domestically, andinternalized implemented and internationally are diffused To understand themechanism throughwhich ideas, norms, and external models policy Compliance and Conditionality, Norms, ( them implementing of process in the sovereignty that shouldhave these policies designed for them and that shouldbe guided Ibid ., especially., 6,7; chapters Escobar 1995, 30). 223 CEU eTD Collection of a material matrix of constraints and opportunities, their adoption, implementation and implementation adoption, their opportunities, and constraints of matrix material a of andArgentina, Sikkink (1991)arguesthatalthough modelsdevelopmental are products 2002, 20). In an analysis divergentthe of reception of developmentalist policies inBrazil 379-80). Existing institutions and policy legacies filter through new ideas policy (Blyth country’s historical experience (Sikkink 1991, 25-41; Blyth 2002, 19;J. Campbell 1998, policy instruments,from existing and and predispositions attitudes with resulting the compatible with with ideological existing the institutions environment, existing state and likely if be influential ideas are they thataremore suggest to Sociological approaches mobilization. and dynamics operate of the political discourses policy in which environment ideological broad the outcomes: policy on impact their and influence keyfactors strength condition that of the policy There aretwo discourses norms ( external the with inaccordance identities and interests their toredefine lead actors that persuasion argumentative and interaction Ideological Environments, Domestic Politics, and Political Mobilization Political and Politics, Domestic Environments, Ideological 1999a, 85-7;Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2005,20). be (Checkel internalized to thathave norms the with arecongruent or delegitimized) ismatch traditional missingvalues when are and (e.g. norms, domestic practices present A match’. cultural can be asa‘cultural that summarized factors on domestic depends strong identification pro-European ( have state a andsociety andwhentheelites legitimate of perceived europeanizing as the and Sedelmeier normslegitimate (Schimmelfennig and perceived2005,adoption as thatare of appropriate, 9-20). It isiswith behavior as that as perceived about compliance persuasion, of a result more likely to andnorms, andcomes identities, values of European asinternalization conceptualized occur when EU rules very is not (Checkelpoliticized 1999b).Inthisunderstanding, is Europeanization and norms are of dialogue andequality imposition; than rather and when of process the norm adoption belong, is which to aspires asense there when memberis thenorm-taker a group to of a best when the norm-taker is in an uncertain environment, when the promoter of the norm Ibid ., 18-20).., The social learningmodel also Ibid .). The model is towork expected 224 CEU eTD Collection (SikkinkThe 1991,26). process ideationalof accordingHall,change, to is a sociological morelikely beinfluential to if they are adopted by and capable institutions powerful are thus Ideas ideas. particular of dominance ensurethe to power political/institutional over ideas and a contest –acontest over major two contests involves ideas dominant policybetween the that relationshipand suggest anddiscourses policymaking of theemergence underlie that conflicts power emphasize the approaches Sociological Weldes 2003,17). 237; J.Campbelland agenda(Blyth legitimize, 1997, thus their1998, 380-1; policy which elitesin way the as well and as constructions, discursive resist or accept other publics how rivalries, actors political and in institutional drawimplicated are discourses how on outcomes, policy thespecific symbolicof favor in coalitions of mobilization political and poweraction collective to, guide a and of, of ideas to frame, package, ideasis analyzeit ideas,ameans become waysin of the these to policy necessary which to trace enablingfunctionsthe In order J.Campbell1998,380). action 1997, 237; (Blyth rather political justconstrain, than facilitate, policy insociety andhow ideas acceptance mobilization, which is central for understanding how policy paradigms acquire broad of political process about the little tells us asa‘blackhowever, box”, state the set of interests (for an illustration, see Wendt 1999). Studying the ‘elite’ story or treating they with –as by are conceptualized unitary realists a singleactors and identity asingle way inthe arena international in the states evenconceptualize accounts constructivist are elites political and bureaucratic insulatedthat assume analyses frominstitutionalist societyhistorical Some and, when analyzed,goals of foreignneed policy ( not be viewedin national role proper andaboutthe about proper the economy government of the the in relationviews public mainstream with compatible was it to because largely it.favorably so received Some Warwas ‘new’ thinking IIeconomic Similarly,(1992) arguesthat post-World Ikenberry mannerin whichthenew ideas and introduced ( were institutionalized developmentalism depended ontheexistingthus ideological conditions and on the policymakers’is understanding of what desirable andpossible. The power of anddevelopmental strategies structure that by frameworks interpretive the consolidation bestare explained by ideasthatthe social hold groups about Ibid ., 292). ., Ibid ., 22-5). ., 225 CEU eTD Collection dissertation’sApplying casestudies. theoretical I aconstructivist outline framework, the In remainderthe of Ire-examine chapter, this theempirical material provided bythe economy. political and Relations International of fields inthe literature constructivist tothe andcan contribute thus Europe in Southeast study europeanization of the isit to constructivism in anapplication of also Bulgaria, europeanization the process of dynamics the analyzing at primarily aims dissertation the Although sphere. political in in mobilization domestic of the havepolitical process been the employed discourses rival these of base the at arguments and constructions, ideological representations, have interpretivethese produced and frameworks, mannerthe inwhich symbols,the that discourses rival policy the issues of europeanization, approach to policymakers’ the have structured that frameworks interpretative the analyzed have therefore Europeanizationthe inparadigm rationalist policymaking thanbyanarrow approach.I of deployment contentious of the account by a constructivist better arecaptured Bulgaria in dynamics of the thateuropeanization end Iargue the of at 1990s. policy the paradigm of workingsthe of thatemerged Europeanizationthe approach Bulgaria’s as dominant inresearch also analysis needs to include andthat of dynamics Bulgaria europeanization focusing materialsolely on power factors, and interests wouldnot help us understand the that andfivesuggests four, three, in case studies chapters two the The analysis of Account The Policy Impact Paradigm: ofBulgaria’sEuropeanization AConstructivist 280). athand(Hall 1993, issues the over authority by for accompaniedpreceded and a contest is change paradigm views, expert competing among choose ultimately that authority and Campbell AsSikkinkis1998, 379; it 1991,25-7). thosewith superior political power J. the policymaking (Hall1993,280; well access process ontheirdifferential to as as factions, competing the among authority institutional and power of distribution the it is is only by that extentinfluencedby factions.the accepted to Theprocess competing it for matters opinion Expert one. scientific merely a than rather process, political and 226 CEU eTD Collection the worn-out ideological rivalry between socialism and anti-communism with a more a with a as emerged paradigm Europeanization the process, In agenda. the anti-communism political consensual and socialism between rivalry ideological worn-out the replace to and failed policies, past with enacta dramatic break to political organization, formulate a set of policy to guidelines government for ODS Bulgaria’sthe enabled future that economicframework developmentinterpretive andcomprehensive a as adopted was approach Europeanization the distress, political and of economic In conditions by approach. utilitarianist be anarrow understood adequately adopting mostmajor socio-economic crises, this was an extremely ideological period that cannot Like necessary. as absolutely development of for anewdirection need perceived the idealentunprecedentedEuropeanization legitimacy by was and support a society that Upheldby the setup of Bulgaria’s political powerful ODS, andpublicthe spheres. ideological andreshuffledthe favor of in Right, clearly the balance of power political virtually BSP,the economic crisiswhich devastated tilted the social of 1996/1997 and severepolitical, the in of aftermath the ascended paradigm The Europeanization socialism. turnedfrequently BSP the to addition, In movement. nationalism dissident in a originate not did they although which hadidentity legitimate a toobtain forces political democratic the of desire the due to emerged as anotherelites and of communist old the topower return the dueto of time long period relatively salient ideologycentral after one in thethe earliestendmobilizeandThis ideological anti-communism to rivalry emerged asa public support. of stages of post-socialistpolitics – the BSP and the SDS – continued torely on the ideological power of socialism transitionposition before thelate1990s.In twokey the initial this period players inBulgarian a dominant achieve to andfailed it why explain that remained mobilization political of dynamics central for a The idea ever around the of fallwas since Europeanization isitcommunism of the and The Ascentof Europeanization Bulgaria’s Paradigm policymaking in Bulgaria in lastthe decade. mechanism which Europeanization the through policy approach has influenced 227 CEU eTD Collection It was indeed used to represent the government’s policy policy represent terms It wasindeed government’s inasincontestable the choice usedto costs. political domestic minimize to and policy, pro-NATO controversial its legitimize domestic in to tooutperform opposition, purposefully employed order strategically and designed government ODS the that tool ideological an not was – doctrine policy implication, ideological the underpinning of policy this – i.e. foreign government’s the By calculations. benefitand cost pure of theoutcome nor threat security an objective arational to neither government’sthe response policy the crisis was I arguethat during secured the construction of a second Danube bridge between Bulgaria and Romania. and ultimately Bulgaria aggressively economicpromoted regards compensations, As Bulgaria. with negotiations accession EUtoopen of decision the to the contributed projects.infrastructure Thedemonstration of Euro-Atlantic solidarity during crisis the in for Balkans, major the participation mainly reconstruction earmarked aid through from recovery and benefits the economic EU and maximal integration and NATO exchange for Bulgaria’sfor NATO’ssupport military Itdemandedcampaign. speedier nationalrequested political in economic and compensations Thegovernment dignity. compromising national security, the disregarding interest, national and trampling down ODS’sthe main rival political accusedthe – the BSP–that governmentof elite duetothe public’s anti-warstrong and attitude shrill the oppositional campaign of for theruling costs high political potentially entailed crisis The domestic controversy. for NATO’s military neighboringcampaign Yugoslaviaagainst despite heightened Bulgaria’s decision demonstrate Euro-Atlantic byairto solidarity corridor providing an government’s by ODS the instigated was crisis The domestic conflict. Kosovo the in involvement Bulgaria’s was situation such first The situations. crisis two in paradigm Europeanization the of deployment andfour, the five three, examined Chapters Deployment andDeclineof Bulgaria’sEuropeanizationParadigm welfare. Bulgariannecessarily imply each other. Oneidentity. was the project of ‘europeanizing’ and ‘civilizing’ ideological joined two-pronged distinctthat construction two grand projects thatdid not The other was the project of economic development and social 228 CEU eTD Collection was articulated in the process of interpreting the crisis situation, not independently of it. of independently not situation, crisis the interpreting of process the in articulated was europeanizingforeign in policy This stabilizing and two-sided Balkans. doctrine the role fastintegration Euro-Atlantic and assistance inforeconomic Bulgaria’s return demonstration identity the pursuitof European itto of ‘the national interest’, requested developmental of aspects Bulgaria’s paradigm.Europeanization choice the Linking and the deployed doctrine policy foreign the of part interest-centered The neighbor). its NATO’ssupportcampaign against military case identity –to concrete (in European the on the region,influence a europeanizing stabilizing exerted that a country Balkans,conflict-ridden as and that was ready to take on the moral obligations entailed in its attempted to present Bulgaria as a country was that as acountry present Bulgaria to attempted structure. The identity-centered part– doctrinethe of differentiation from Balkansthe – Europeanization doctrine foreignthe paradigm, identity/interest policy had adual the of structure identity/development dual the Reflecting policy. Kosovo its guided doctrine that a coherent foreign policy ODSconstructed the political and publicspheres By deploying theother Europeanization discoursesparadigm and in circulating the sovereignty. clearlyit and crisis this of course in the policymaking influenced that framework interpretive won againstEuro-Atlanticappreciate. world to TheEuropeanization paradigm dominantwas the the for identity itsEuro-Atlantic Bulgaria’s out acted choice policy the turn, keyIn choice. policy the ideologicaljustified and determined ultimately and interest, national the contradicting or immoral as options policy other discarded options, policy defensible rivalmorally – theEU and NATO sooner rather than later. Thisinterest delineated the join thenationalist to range of prudentbe allowed and to order in nationalism violent of opponent an and values Atlantic discourseKosovo crisis: identity Balkan) and, with a view of determined identity,this Bulgaria’s interest in the focused namely situation. it of basis the On paradigm Bulgaria’s this affirmed to (as opposed European on to andmanageinterpret thecrisis to in order paradigm Europeanization back the on be widelyMy analysisrecognized has suggestedspecifically for this purpose. asthat a in committedthe itlegitimizebut designednot and it, instrumentally towas in as order possible course of the Kosovo supporter controversy the ofODS fellEuro- in the Balkans but not but Balkans the of the volatile the 229 CEU eTD Collection as a guarantee and economy the of sectors competitive few the of one as energy nuclear of perceived who low prices of electricity.compliance with these demands was resisted by the majority of ordinary Bulgarians,It wasconditioned EUmembership future Bulgaria’s their upon closure. Yet, premature resisted by thefor ruling the elite. The EU considered the units unsafe andnon-upgradeable andfirmly powerful and costs political great entailed crisis Kozloduy crisis, the active theKosovo Like NPP. Kozloduy the nuclear at units Soviet-builtfour old of decommissioning required premature that EU accession conditionality against resistance by Bulgaria’s was caused approach The second in situation crisis which traced I have theof deployment Europeanizationthe every sense of the word. It was never judged on the basis of economic feasibility. in as‘strategic’ represented project wasthus regions. TheDanubeBridge-2 adjacent of its strategic geographicbenefits locationeconomic the andreap by to giving ability boost country’s to the the upon local economiesencroachment infuture preventing by interest economic national the safeguard to itappeared same Atthe time, continents. center infrastructure ‘bridge’Bulgaria’s anda role an of key between transport andstabilizingfactor atrustworthy in West of partner strengthenedthe region.the It invulnerability from its appearedtoaffirm and Balkan crises positionof a thus Bulgaria’s demonstrated It intheBalkans. zones conflict the from disengaged Bulgaria symbolically andcircumvented thus Yugoslavia Western that Europe to alternative route providedan around doctrine which waswoven. It the arguments imageries causal and deploymentof Danube ODS’sforeign the enactedall policy Bridge-2 doctrine. key the was part andparcel too, of of the Bridge-2, prioritization Danube argued that the the second project – asked for aninfrastructure It ask for compensations. not direct did government bridge on thedemanded by canonly be understood employing a constructivist The perspective. Danube – incurred duetothe conflict,whoseform the of thatcompensations ODSgovernment the economiclosses economic by wasprompted the compensations of economic While pursuit the feasibility presented. situation the that was dubious. and theperceived threats opportunities contextof decision-making andin process the the of course in the framework I interpretive havea coherent into together joined were they The key representations and used arguments inits articulation had before, existed but 230 CEU eTD Collection the currentthe and potential benefits relatedtoEUmembership; utilitarian calculations in much to related knowledge losses units’ that the than were closure reality the smaller with full has the leadership acted the interests, economic Bulgaria’s upon encroachment Kozloduy’s as hasbeen of early represented units the example,old although closure focused would such only factors on explain fail to many of aspects crisis.the For account apurely rationalist case.Yet, factors in Kozloduy/Belene the important been vis-à-vis the EU,Calculations andof economic losses, domesticthe political costs,interests Bulgaria’s bargaining position industry. energy nuclear the with equated been have andwhich the activitiessovereignty, of the interests, national on focused nuclearhas nationalism’, ‘nuclear labeled Ihave which energy lobbynational lobby. joinedby Kozloduy have nuclearenergy supportive of the This discourse, NPP, the dignity,upheldby a broad informal andcoalition of actors political civic organizations elitethe andthe andhasbeen public by outperformed pro-nucleara coherent discourse and economicDuring this has crisis, Europeanization the influence failed approach behaviorto the of development crisis. Kosovo the from substantially differs crisis Kozloduy the outcomes of In terms and developmentof future nuclearthe energy industry. social intentionandguarantee the Belene second forgotten to NPPatwith almost declared the welfare,the second all pair ofof units. leadership TheBulgarian accession. has continuously in favorof campaigned reopening It has also restarted of cost the EU at nuclear even units fouron keeping old intent Bulgarian appeared the construction forindustry Kozloduy in the and particular,NPP wasremarkablyhigh. average The of Bulgaria’sthe unfinishedEU and were extremely from pressure made unrelenting under however, were inBoth decisions, accession 2007. unpopularclosure of unitsin 3-4 beorder ableto complete to negotiationsthe in secure to EU time at home. Publicitalsoagreed tothestart EUaccession tobeable1-2 in negotiations. In2002, order to support for Prior tothecrucial EU Helsinkiin summitthe 1999, Bulgaria agreedto closurethe of units nuclear energy aggressive political campaignagainst government. the political opposition which saw issuethe as vital enough to serve as a basis of a sustained by stake. Andit wereat the was resisted interests economic lobby, whose energy nuclear 231 CEU eTD Collection the different impact of impact in differentthe of Europeanization crisis the approach two the situations map EU accession? in I Below Bulgaria’s myfor coveted that factors the view account derail to threatened it if and conditionality safety nuclear EU unrelenting and clear the simply ifassumptionsin disputeor it wasopen conflict to with unconvincing, if couldnationalism nuclearon nuclear out its How win of energy? underlying each policy end at the Why of 1990s? the subsequently fail in Europeanization did the debate infrastructure andtransport foreign Bulgaria’s policy on paradigm Europeanization question into several accounts fordown questions: What influence strong the of the incrisis impact of Europeanization the Wecan approach break two the situations? this different for the accounts What is: case studies pose two the that question The basic with EU nuclear safety conditionality as a policy option that contradicts this interest. compliance andhave sector designated of nuclear energy the development extensive through development in economic interest an as interest national the articulated identity.Balkans thisbasis, andits havede-emphasized European On they emphasized Bulgaria’sof the discourse of identitynuclear nationalism, the key stakeholdersof a issue. influence Underthe energy nuclear the of interpretation an influential innuclearalternative the Kozloduy crisis have energy powerprovide to paradigm Europeanization of the the failure reflected have also crisis. They and an energy centerhas policy that dominated discourse pro-nuclear during Kozloduy and public the debates of the support for nuclearthe energy industry in Bulgaria have by beennurtured powerful the I have argued that the resistance against EUnuclear safety conditionality and the staunch pursued regardless factthe itsof that feasibility has been disputed. hasbeen and feasibility economic its of analysis aprior economic without was launched lowering these costs (such as a ‘tied hands strategy’); the mammothdomesticinvolved political costs inthe crisis Beleneand disregarded strategiespossible for NPP project high for thatwasresponsible the very discourse the nationalistnuclear nurtured, attemptcounter, andnot even leadershipto oftentimes indicates Bulgarian did that the analysis empirical my enterprise; single a of sake the for Europe with association sacrifice thelonged-for publicreadiness to explain of Bulgarian the apparent cannot the 232 CEU eTD Collection the verythe beginning,in 1990s late the strength the of Balkanism andits frequent social welfare. Although issues of social and economic development were relevantfrom of ‘europeanizing’ Bulgarian identity project the withjoined the that project of construction economic atwo-sided developmentnamely – and crisis) economic and political internal structure (which had been shapedin aftermaththe devastatingthe of 1996/1997 fitted its also Europeanization paradigm. They encouraged Bulgaria’s emergent sources all three 1990s, late in the whole, the On development. social and economic of models importance functions of cultural the europeanization adopting European andof the too,affirmedboth Europe, towards ideas andattitudes of structure shared The domestic and social change in Balkansthe in line with EU developmental models. political inducing on all above focused it Yet, Balkanism. of assumptions basic the of prerequisite Balkan fast for European integration,countries’ and some even itpreserved ‘europeanization’ of Balkan identity intoand European ‘socialization’ values be a key to the too,considered It, as‘Europeanization’. approach policy labeledthis have transition.manage I the of process as way to association best the with Europe developmentencouraged andfast integration. security EU depended on their It main countries’ assumption approach Balkan reliantwas that on a policy whose increasingly was hand, other the on policy, Balkans community’s international The at‘europeanizing’ Bulgarian identity.encouraged active attempts unsettled‘Balkanism’. It Bulgaria’sself-identification as a country European and this as Ihave discourse violentethnic referredto susceptibleunstable, conflicts. and to politically un-European, civilizationally and culturally as region the represented that discourse outside a powerful main There was sources. of three influence was underthe ideologicalstructure of society. in and attitudes predispositions Bulgarian Thisstructure existing the into well fitted it because largely society and elites both by paradigm policy asahegemonic endwas embraced the Atparadigm Europeanization of 1990s,the the Compatibility with theExisting Ideological Environment Understanding thePower and Weakness of Bulgaria’s Europeanization Paradigm 233 CEU eTD Collection over the domain of its traditionalstretched thus It rival – the discoursedevelopment. economic of of nationalism. project a as also It offered but its own transformation identity of aproject only not as wasarticulated paradigm Europeanization 1990s,the In thelate Position vis-à-visthe Rival Nationalist Discourse standards ofliving. –loss discourse sovereignty of over economic policy, de-industrialization and declining engage nationalist broader central withissues tendencyto its to this strengthened by was nationalism Nuclear transition. post-socialist Bulgaria’s accompanied that distress economic and social the by nurtured discourse political nationalist mild a of emergence by markedmember.the EU The period wasalso as a second-rate bewould treated Bulgariafears that EU,andto the Bulgaria and between inequality perceptions of to a growinglate 1990swas givingwayto grudgeagainst the downsides EU accession, of unconditionalbroad for europeanization support public characteristic of periodthe of the The nationalism. nuclear of discourse the – crisis Kozloduy the during rival ideological news and forThey wereits main Europeanization good approach badnewsfor the ideasChanges inof too. domestic the structure 2000smattered, duringthe and attitudes mobilization. and political for policylegitimization as less effective a tool paradigm the grew interpretiveframeworks its With ‘identity’ guidedthat weakened, policymaking. project elements of the Europeanization‘identity’ paradigm, the weaken making to combined them increasinglyBalkans, the and irrelevant Europe between for the differentiation general decline of the discourse of Balkanism, and the waning relevance of the symbolic inprogress Euro-Atlantic integration, Bulgaria’s improved European credentials, the Bulgaria’s Balkans, in the stabilization political 2000s early the In environments. case wasits incompatibilitygrowing with theexternal and ideological domestic for thewaningOne factor of importance Europeanization inthe Kozloduy paradigm the andidentity-transforming elementsof Europeanizationthe paradigm. reproduction by localthe intellectual in and boosted elites political particular the cultural 234 CEU eTD Collection ‘Europeanist’ legitimacy.is challenges againsttheirWhat ‘Europeanist’ the more, they presented withopenly ingeneral successfully avoidedanti-Europeanism associated and any being avoided pro-nuclear groups the doctrine, and policy as apolitical Europeanization challengesthe posedby Europeanizationthe discourse. Although they rejected nationalism. coalitionhandled The soughtto turn pro-nuclear actively tables.the It well nuclear of rival the discourse to coupled and approach Europeanization the from During thecrisis, Kozloduy development/prosperity the wasallbutdecoupled project contestation. to vulnerable project of development/prosperity left the Europeanization paradigm particularly and the identity transformation projectkeep of the together to elite failure of ruling the seem increasingly unrelated to,and evenincompatibleits development with, part. The a introduced fissure within paradigm Europeanization the and made its identity part already living indistress low livingdue to The Kozloduy standards. thus crisis linked to the cost of energy and thus concerned the welfare of ordinary citizens that were EUdemandsbe directly to costs. seemed entailed and welfare economic substantial crisis Kozloduy the illusionary), (however gains economic of delivery and promise the by be madetolerable thatcould security threats moderate entailed which crisis, Kosovo during the Kosovo crisis,itbecame a liability the Kozloduy during crisis. Unlike the advantage wasan structure internal dual paradigm’s Europeanization the Whereas discourse. nationalist of the itself national vision It presented of as asuperior occupiedniche the thus development. presumedparadigm Europeanization this sustained link and causal convincingly integration would gradually lead toeconomic During development. the Kosovo crisis the European assumption that the upon waspredicated structure This dual development. upon its articulation as a dual project of identity transformation and economic precisely rested initially internal ideological coherence paradigm’sThus, the appeal and discourses. nationalist of ground breeding the been traditionally have that countries developed economically the tackled to even equality it and autonomy of economy, issues the sensitive with preoccupation its to Due security. and orientation geopolitical development, economic of in terms development, ‘national’ of vision 235 CEU eTD Collection effective media campaign. It fully utilized powerful symbols such as the narrative of narrative the as such symbols powerful utilized fully It campaign. media effective an with complete strategy, mobilization political persistent and a consistent followed unattractive publicimage. During the Kozloduy crisis, pro-Kozloduy coalition the party’s the to victim fall discourse anti-war party’s the let that mobilization political foreign acoherent around builtwas that mobilization political of policy strategy ODS’s the success of doctrine, paradigm wasstrengthenedDuringcrisis, Europeanization bythe the Kosovo as well‘speak’ aboutthe policy issues atstake. as by and moral the stakeholders’authority to perceived with policy favored the discourse, their line in interest concomitant national the of construction hegemonic a produce to ability stakeholders’ the conditions, and demands external with compliance of issues enframe failure to discourses of mobilization strategies,BSP’s the way stakeholders drew on the symbolic power of rival policy strategy political stakeholders’ of in coherence the battles: important these especially of have appearto factors been Four mobilization. and political ideological enframing of werebattles crises Both mobilization. for political as tools resources symbolic its employ effectively to actors of political ability by the has beenmediated discourse Europeanization the impact of policy the analyzed, thatIhave situations crisisIn both Political Mobilization stretched andoccupied over discourse domain the of Europeanization the discourse. symbol Bulgaria’sof questfor adignified EU accession. This time round, the nationalist the as emerged Kozloduy NPP of the defense country. The an economically developed as enter wasto states European other the to equalpartner an as EU the enter to Bulgaria To the this majority causalargument. Bulgarians itof appeared thatthe only way for in Widespread publicperceptions status of to Bulgaria’s EUaddedweightthe unequal integration,successfulnot theotherway European wouldaround. lead to dignified) (and Europeanization itis thatitparadigm:suggested national economic developmentthat the by advanced one the of opposite the was that development and europeanization between relationship the about argument advanced acausal discourse nationalist nuclear The europeanization. way actual towards better a as nationalistnuclear approach 236 CEU eTD Collection wanted to sustainwanted to identity.a Euro-Atlantic further advanced the It argumentthat compliance as the only suitable and morally defensible policy option for a country that the strong identity elements of the Europeanization paradigm and to represent compliance or non-compliance. During the Kosovo crisis, the ODS was able todraw on infavor or‘materialist’ of arguments ‘identity’ arguments advance socially recognized to and conditionality) than of (rather compliance issues of enframe to policy approaches cases was the way impact important of the Europeanization the morefactor in paradigm. that both Isuggest in which politicalnotweaken policy butdidby many the Bulgarians illegitimate wasshared ordinary were actorsKosovo utilized crisis theduring the However, approach. Europeanization the of weakness to the contributed symbolic the perception power conditionality nuclear safety EU’s of the illegitimacy perceived the crisis Kozloduy of dominant thatsuch the support Duringa conclusion. case donot studies compliance. two The NATO’s for precondition important an as norms and conditions external of militarylegitimacy perceived campaign The conditionality andconstructivist approach to adoption emphasizes norm the and NATO’sand benefits. demands nationalism was thus fought on the turf of nuclear nationalism – i.e. andnuclear Europeanization mobilization between struggle Thepolitical process. over issues of costs europeanization approach tothe identity-centered) to the (as opposed instrumental the theelite ruling primacy of the conceded project, Europeanization the aspects of the material benefits of EU accession. By forfeiting the symbolic power of the identity stress strategy was to the instead, identity values; and Euro-Atlantic hadto little relation discourse the of content the and employment its of manner the justification, policy and In addition, when it did employ the Europeanization discourse as a tool for mobilization of favor nuclear nationalism, and generally takingavoided aclear in position debate. the in completely it abandoned often incoherently, discourse Europeanization the employed upon national sovereignty and the welfare of the people. In contrast, the ruling elite encroachment asan theproblem Kozloduy singled pro-nuclearoutrageous out coalition to do with the effectiveness and persistency of the discursive practices through which the of a wide coalition. pro-nuclear for Popular support oldthe Kozloduy hasunits had alot encourage the building standardsto living impending declining collapse and economic 237 CEU eTD Collection pursuit of pursuitand of economic development prosperity. as integration or of as pursuitbe European either interest defined could national the integration did not lead to economicfell If everything its interest two-pronged national construct of apart. else’, European the development above integration ‘European as defined time but this interest, rather national the invoking seemed set to stall it, thenby with again EU the agreement thecompromise when heODSrationalized However, nationalist thatwas promptlyin by BSP. checkthe up picked opposition the discourse of strategydefending Bulgaria’snationalThis economic interest. was agood of keeping stages of crisisinstartedthe framing 1999.It the defense of Kozloduy the in terms NPP in theinitial fail ODSgovernment wasthe to Thefirst sector. energy nuclear large economic benefits of EU integration compared to the economic benefits of preserving a leadwould and tothe latter) stabilize by toconstruction stressing greater the this former the assumption that the (on development and integration economic fast European leadershipthe convincingly failed the to interestarticulate national in as a dualinterest because was largely sidelined approach During theKozloduy crisis Europeanization the the BSP. out solidarity), interest’ niche ODSsuccessfully ‘national the occupied and crowded the gaining maximalpolitical and by benefits economic demonstrating Euro-Atlantic states) and the ‘interest’ part of its vision of the national interest (i.e. an interestBulgaria’s in joiningEuro-Atlantic identity communityand the ‘normal’of European in demonstrating interest an (i.e. interest national the of vision its of part ‘identity’ preserving national dignity. However, by theemphasizing direct causal link between the and sovereignty, security, as defined it which interest, national the of defense as position anti-NATO its framed BSP The battle. the won government ODS the crisis, Kosovo the During interest. national of Bulgaria’s definition overthe alsobattles were crises Both and welfare people). of the the interests harm economic would national the (compliance power) and an even stronger materialist argument in favor of non-compliance energy nuclear asa status Bulgaria’s ruin would (compliance non-compliance of favor dominantnuclear nationalist strong ‘identity’ hasadvancedin discourse aargument the case, Kozloduy Inthe benefits. political and material guarantee would compliance 238 CEU eTD Collection 155 fighting. without Europeanization 1990s, the won struggle Its paradigm this late the In ideas. policy of authoritativeness the over and policy formulate to authority over struggles involved also have examined have I that situations crisis two The prosperity and should thus be considered tobe a vital national interest. economic Bulgaria’s to key is the energy nuclear that argument nationalist nuclear dampenbut failedsolidified theKozloduy the– hasnotonly controversy, hasalso to Finally, the aggressive promotion of the Belene NPP –in defiance of economic rationale sector. energy nuclear the of significance economic the confirmed leader, which energy a Balkan of reputation preserve Bulgaria’s to theircommitment avowed governments both addition, In disaster. economic an was units the of loss the that perception their own efforts Eagertoaccentuate harmedeconomicEU integration development. perceptions that to save the NPP,discourage itfailedto economicthe units and comparedpreserving benefitsthe old of to both governmentsintegration of benefits economicEU stress thefar itfailed greater to Yet, everything’. failed to counterby units defining national interest the in as interest ‘European an integration above the widespread strategy much further. After 2005, BSPgovernmentthe justified the close decision to the representational this develop not did It negotiations. accession the of chapter Energy the of completion the following turmoil political of face the in only pride national of symbol a marvel and NPPasan the of economic representation romantic for the calculation dispassionate substitute The NDSV tried sector. to energy nuclear vital allegedly interest as an interestpracticesin up propped effect nuclearthe nationalist definition Bulgaria’sof national in discursive economic and policy leadership’s the of ambiguity the because failed development discourse The through extensiveundermined that Europeanization the interest’ discourse. development to it frequent‘national resort the is the not inits policy. But actual europeanization turn of the a made it as even rhetoric interest’ ‘national the abandon not did government interest itnational of as defense the itself presented NDSVgovernment the interest, national the of betrayal flagrant as policy Kozloduy official the branded critics The NDSV and the BSP governments often played the ‘national interest’ card. Whilst 25/28.9.2002, in See forexample See Kuneva andKovachev,MEER quoted in 2003; officials, quoted in 24 Chasa 25.9.2002, 4, in Mediapool 19.11.2002. Sega 155 . The BSP 3.12.2003, 239 CEU eTD Collection moral authority nationalenergy moral to ‘speak’about the nuclear sector. authority it had the that perceptions upbywidespread emergedbacked thus nationalistdiscourse legitimacy totheviews nuclear and moral power of energylobby. nuclear the The backingcoalition and for expert‘national’ the provided position conferred ‘national’ The between of the‘national’ symbiosis and theparts ‘expert’ pro-Kozloduy the knowledge. becausemonopoly itexpert over community wholehad anostensible expert viewsreadily asalobbyits presentas andrecognized could of views objectivethe the butwas not interests its economic particular pursued lobby that energy nuclear the although they had no technical knowledge problem touphold the legitimacyenergy nuclear of such the a stance,on and stance ‘national’ firm a took that and interest national the propitious collusionbetween politicalthat identified themselves actors as of defenders nationalist discourse. The key to the success of the nuclear nationalist nuclear to the lost paradigm nuclear the ‘speak’ energy, about andto right authority discourse was the Europeanization had largely paradigm been In ensuingthe exhausted. struggle overthe By the time the Kozloduy crisis developed, the initial legitimacy conferred upon the ideological)than of terms ostensiblythe expert-dominated language of policymaking. it into policy the neutral the and rendered institutionalized technique paradigm (rather This 3). chapter havein thatI discussed sector infrastructure transport for the developed ones the to (similar sectors economic and areas policy concrete for guidelines policy into paradigm theEuropeanization wastotranslate other ideas.The of Europeanization Europeanization rhetoric,andwhich civilization-choice solidified the ideological power flood publicthe and sphere the political (indeedsphere bystrong often exaggerated) pro- it tovirtually used todeploy was technique that paradigm. mainthe One techniques of with help two the the discourse of Europeanization the authoritativeness the sustained paradigm Europeanization the ideology, socialist/nationalist BSP’s the of total delegitimization did not Duetothe governments. failures previous crisisthe with the spectacular of policy and even facelent a tostrong the ‘new’ Bulgarian society legitimacy that byunprecedented guaranteed the was authoritativeness policy rival ideas employedpolicy by the discourse.ODS to deal with the unsettling The ODS, 1997 on its part, 240 CEU eTD Collection analysts have excluded the quickly europeanizing countries analysts the likeRomania have quickly Bulgaria andexcluded europeanizing hasnotinBulgaria –indeed, beentheworst‘ghettoizing’ manlypolicy group tensions. ethnic of hotspots as simply than rather criminalization, and devastation invicious of economic circle locked a ghetto Europe’s as moreperceived often international on discourse Balkans.the Since theearly 2000s, the Balkans been have marginalizing the of elements main the as identity civilizational and cultural deficient of representations gradually representationseconomic ofdeficient developmentovertook emigration wealthyto the states). EthnicEuropean conflicts in subsided Balkans the and failed economic andlow (thatfrequently transition living standards laborencouraged of notbeing interms itbeingreframed Bulgaria was was reversed; only the Balkans and Although Balkanism declining 2000s, the marginalizationwas throughout the of integration. Euro-Atlantic country’s the up speeding of means a as Balkans the from ‘difference’ ability elaborateto such a strategy and tolink it its to strategic plans toutilize Bulgaria’s Kosovo its crisisdeploying Europeanization due to the waslargely paradigm during strategy of from Thedifferentiation Balkans. the in ODS success government’s a enabling and transformation identity complete prescribing by well marginalization of Europeanization battling borders Europe, the function civilizational performed of with conflict-ridden the commonlyBalkans that were perceived aslyingbeyond the association was its marginalization of main Bulgaria’s 1990s,when In thelate source internationally. was marginalized Bulgaria that factby the werecompounded effects devastating insecurity. Its personal erosion of the social order, mass emigrationinternational arena. Thedomestic crisis brought poverty, undignified living standards, and displacement, and a pervasive senseprolonged and severe domestic socio-economic crisis andby marginalization in the of by both trampled been has self-esteem collective of sense Bulgarians’ transition some sense Thisof purpose. collective isbecause throughout periodthe of post-socialist development has beenOne of keyfunctionsthe of guideany intended to paradigm policy Bulgarian to improve the country’s status in Combating Marginalization world politics and to recover 241 CEU eTD Collection perception of thisaverage Bulgarian citizen the country’s economicaverage transition was nota success story. The citizen tothe Simply put, 2002, 17). majorities” (Krastev “emergence angered of cynical and was that the weregoverning the emergence eliteto reverse economiclivingthe Additional factors decline andthe declineof standards. was of unableendemic to publicfenddowith failure weakness ofpolicy or muchto hadthus discourses their perceivedability for and perceptionsstrength The choices. identity different the by prescribed development economic of pervasive crisisvalues and theand related Strugglesidentity in over the courseof twocrisesthe struggles werenotonly over cultural ordinary traits;Bulgarians’ dissatisfaction with the social and economic conditions in Bulgaria.they avictim issue became also of nuclear energy onthe perspective The Europeanization were also won discourse it that publicthe it thatenjoyed. support struggles the of imageries key the –were of Balkans the center andan energy power energy betweennuclear a – country developed a technologically into Bulgaria turn to ability perceived the divergentits and energy sector nuclear of the significance economic alleged The marginalization. visionsnational promised ofnationalism nuclear of discourse the contrast, In marginalization. Bulgaria’s economiccombat to suited longer appeared no Europeanization unimpressed. EU wassimply development 3-4,the units closure of electricity export the after inability to by Bulgaria’s endangered beregional that toexploitstability would argumentthe BSP governmentattempted and seemedimproveinvoke When ‘Balkan’ Bulgaria’s inEurope. possible position the to dangers to welldevelopmentis guaranteed by integration.European Inaddition,itlonger no was suitedeconomic that namely – development regarding proposition basic its sustain to addressDuring the Kozloduy crisis, however, the Europeanization paradigmthe could no longer problemeconomic recovery and its role of an engine of regional development. of Balkansthe in ofidentity,terms butonasserting Bulgaria’s better prospects for from difference Bulgaria’s demonstrating on not put been since has stress the Therefore, itbehad redefined. in to changedideological this remainenvironment, was effective to about its second-rate status in Europe. If the strategy of differentiationbe has sensitive itself appearedto Importantly, society periphery Bulgarian Europe. of from the Balkans the on located as depicted been nevertheless has it but – representation this from 242 CEU eTD Collection keeps consumer prices of electricity low.is The Belene NPP believed tobe and profit, economic brings sector, energy whole the sustains that economy Bulgarian has TheKozloduy of asset as conflict. been widely during the the NPP regarded a great public The as ifinterest. projectthe accepted itlossescould the really incurred offset economic national of the as pursuit Bridge-2 Danube of construction the represented economic growth and even of social welfare. During the Kosovo crisis, the ODS of functions ideological manythe have of projects overtaken appearto Infrastructure perceived asnolonger conducive totransport and energy infrastructure development. be to itstarted when more contestable grew soit economic development, to conducive longer be asno perceived to itstarted more when contestable grew like Europeanization And development. just infrastructure form has taken development of particular on the economic Bulgaria’s of vision the is that intertwined become have domains two the why reason The infrastructure. and energy transport large-scale to related intricately been has Bulgaria’s Europeanization that case studies suggest two the together When examined The Importanceof Infrastructure expression of their dissatisfaction with the outcomes of Bulgaria’s transition. Bulgarians, opposing EUdemandsfor Kozloduy the closure of was asymbolicunits symbol summary ofa became it theeconomy, the of sphere in the economic making decision over sovereignty troubles of loss the and energy cheap of loss the of ofsimultaneously symbol a Bulgaria’s– as perceived transition. ( process For policymaking the the over control no had majoritythey that perceptions citizens’ strengthening was of ordinary livingwhilst falling) standardsremained low (or during the 2000s, conditionality EU because, problem the exacerbated conditionality EU representation. democratic crisis of waningthe for the public reform support agendas of elitesthe and resulted in a pervasive The elusiveness economicof developmentand social cohesion behindwas akeyfactor problems of social dislocation, loss of dignity and feelings of personal insecurity. tackleand living to decline of arrest thestandards, continuous to welfare, citizens’ Ibid ., 29).As theKozloduy be started representedto –and predicament 243 CEU eTD Collection Bulgarians to defend the last vestiges of the country’s economic prowess. defiance of crucial EU accession conditionality) has thus reflected the desire of its insufficient forto the European (innuclearcredentials. Publicsupport sector energy than situation socio-economic dire country’s the to marginalization Bulgaria’s attributed acceptanceWith bythepublic. declineof Balkanism the publichas morethe often behind –wasfactor its important regime Bulgaria’s an Milosevic on the dependency Bulgaria’s severed(temporarily) spatial Europe and connection to toterminate reestablish namely of to – effects Bridge-2 Danube Theexpected symbolic and purpose. functionssymbolic important serve projects that such policies, and reforms befitmundane unlike that, is the public’s desire projects support large-scaleinfrastructure for reason thepublic’s to Another willingness to recover some senseparticipants in policymakingthe process. of collective relevant as feel to citizens allow to sufficient been have self-esteemimportance and scale struggles and, asservingthepublic hence, national interest;and same atthe time, their largelylocal independentpolitical of (always neutral, shady)the as ideologically economicpolitics; and perceptions thatcitizensleft are out of policymakingthe Unlike process. with disappointment agendas; reform in their and reforms institutions, in state politicians, developments with associated as particularly crisis this distruststand out in important: and policies, key Several representation. democratic of is crisis the reason One preferences. My case rather puzzling of tworeasonsforstudies suggests two these reading public the singleargument. the ‘buy’ to tendency public’s the of explanation a sufficient not is ‘grand’ prosperity future to key the as and path developmental natural Bulgaria’s as development infrastructure infrastructure have forcefully represented local policymakers failure. factthat The strategic a been has development infrastructure energy and transport for demands with welfare has been more dignified living standards, replacing demands for developmentand social projectsincreased is unsubstantiated.if social Thus, welfare altogether public’schief concern the is in its oflarge-scalefactdubious infrastructure and significance association that with are seenI have economic the arguedthat leadership. retain regional energy and affordable, as indispensable ifBulgaria its isguarantee futureto economic keepprices development, of 244 CEU eTD Collection rivals. Yet, my analysis suggests that the impact of these constraints upon the strength of andits approach Europeanization the of impact ofthe policy determinants transition as economic Bulgaria’s failing relatedto constraints structural of (material) the importance the underscore factor and ‘infrastructure’ the factor ‘marginalization’ the Both solutions toeconomic and social problems. large-scale asvisible, infrastructure turning consensual,andto easily deliverable of Bulgarian democracy has urged rulingthe elites totackle the domestic malaise by crisis the accompanied has that self-esteem collective of loss and disillusionment, crisis, sense of pervasive The development. economic deliver to failing been has as theelite economy as a whole and could continue to be associatedin the with national development developments the evenon dependent immediately not are they that been has projects mobilize thepositivewouldfeature of energy of mostsignificant The nation. the these that projects andDanubeBridge-2 suchas asprojects BeleneNPP the infrastructure ‘big’ helisted popularity his of peek the At malaise. social and decline economic of trends distressing the couldreverse by untainted politics Bulgarian theretofore someone duetowidespread power thathopes came to crisis. Saxkoburggotski too, is understanding central to the waythe elite approached andhandled the Kozloduy of The symbolicKozloduy ‘national’the assets, and BeleneNPPsas‘great’ importance image.Balkan government’s effort to formulate a foreign policy doctrine that could combat Bulgaria’s its symboliccompensations.inhave large TheODSappears due to thisproject been to part drawn to power.important The bridge’s viability economicwas dubious and elitealthough survival,undoubtedly selection for the purely nor for instrumental economic purely reasons, reasons elite survival.The of ODS, of couldDanubeanalyze the role of ideational factors. The ODS chose Danubehave Bridge-2 neither for bridge-2 to is necessary it place, in first the others) than (rather projects these selected elite the been assured understand why In order to approach. rationalist, a narrow as opposed to constructivist, was partalso garner andby otherparcel public and andpurposefully exploitedaccentuated other to stakeholders bytheelite inorder forms of supportthe have projects been ofbiginfrastructure features symbolic In many the resects, of economic for these projects. However, even the elite story calls for a 245 CEU eTD Collection always worked not have projects ‘national’ other These welfare. social of projects and development, other ‘national’ projects – projects of nation building, projects of economic cohabitwith hadhas to iteverywhere also But Europe. EastCentral across everywhere Thisisenlargement. fair Theideaenough. hasbeen Europeanization powerful EU of process in the EU the of involvement benevolent the and idea Europeanization of power the soft the around mostly is woven approach The Europeanization might benefitfrom opening up to the story of local politics. discardsuggest wishit but Idonot ‘miracle’, this tothat approach europeanization to Bulgaria’s story about adifferent By have. telling we currently region the to approach policy best community’s is international the approach Europeanization the serve as a model for the Balkans. It is not to miracle isexpected dowith europeanization by Bulgaria’s more because Balkans to the chance that I started with it. I believe by is think thathaslessdowith tank. This a leadingEuropean astory to Bulgaria and that miracleas perceived europeanization Bulgaria’s of story the this with analysis I started Lessons for the PeripheryEuropeanization on ofEurope sector). energy nuclear national the of development the through or Balkans the of reconstruction economic in post-conflict and participation EUaccession (through boosted their power by offering strategies for encouraging economic development during the Kosovo crisis nucleardiscoursenationalistand during the Kozloduy the crisis of Europeanization foreach Both thestrength paradigm crucial policy approach. has been Bulgaria’s decline economic problem tothe respond of to theiragenda policy appropriate the project of national development. The way in which they have enframed of Europeanizationthe itsapproach nationalistand rival of struggled discourses to proponents the situations, crisis both In legitimization. policy and mobilization political public’sthe interpretation of these and, constraints onthe hand,other of bytheprocess by hand, one on the it has mediated, been Rather, been hasnot direct. policy approaches suggest dynamics the that of domestic political made competition have projects these Central examining andeuropeanization inEast thetransition Europe of politics reforms with Europeanization; often they haveoften Europeanization; worked they against it. Studies 246 CEU eTD Collection since the link between Europeanization and national identity since thelink theexclusionary identity and national between was Europeanization itsencouraged influence onpolicy on foreign (e.g. policy policy).and transport But of period timelinked it theEuropeanization identity paradigm to politics and thus it. TheBalkanism forwas amixeddiscourse Bulgaria’s blessing a For europeanization. likely work for to Europeanization butin run longer the are very likely work againstto isghetto formed. being My suggests analysis marginalizingthat very discourses are not as theplace marginalization biggestended of the BalkanswhereEurope’s upwith the where cultures arenot European and isdominated by politics ethnicity and I conflict. place volatile a as Balkans the of marginalization the with analysis this started also I (seeeuropeanizing Greskovits, states forthcoming 2009,9;Krastev 2002). in process political local the of analysis an with influence and conditionality EU of analysis the complement to need they interactions, such of dynamics the understand ifobservers, analyses would policy drawisthat Europeanization-inspired are to other with together I, lesson that The project. withEuropeanization the interact to likely are they and region; in the important be to likely are projects ‘national’ the all crises, social economic, andand democratic pervasive the nation-building projects incomplete Balkansthe thantheyareanswer. able Two things to be seem clear: to dueto the Such studies, aswellquestions my analysis, more as own in europeanization pose about support for reforms (Bohle and Greskovits 2007; Greskovits forthcoming 2008). ensure pubic to necessary project welfare social strong a battle with and coexist to had ofnational identity; has in Europeanization the a setup ‘europeanization’ such approach the with associated less been have and issue an of less been have politics forthcoming 2009).Incontrast, in such cases as Hungary,nation-building andidentity forthcoming2008, 2007;Greskovits (Bohle andGreskovits social economic distress and leastandfor at temporarily secured public such brought support reforms even they when models) for convergence with andEU reforms necessary (including reforms economic projects; ‘nationhood’ this‘national encouraged radicalindependence’ or setup political with ascompatible was articulated project Europeanization the Slovakia, post-Meciar like or Estonia cases, Insome mobilization. process of indetachingpolitical them the or together projects these of attaching patterns been different i.e. have there countries, ‘mobile’ rather ideological the within environmentsof broad europeanizing the 247 CEU eTD Collection democratic deficit of its conditionality and on the way in which it communicates its communicates it Balkans. the to which messages in way the on and conditionality its of deficit democratic and legitimacy the on focus to needs it that believe also I Balkans, in the development Europeanization that the EU needs tofocus on assisting structural reforms and economic worldof Europe’s of while of and Thus, Iagreewith peace proponents prosperity. represents Balkansthe as of part likely developingthe worldmake isnot very itto part that Adiscourse Europeanization. than rather nationalism economic encouraging national corner, itis likely accentuateto issues of autonomy,equality to the developed states, and underdeveloped BalkansasEurope’s marginalizescurrently the that discourse As for the the desire of Bulgarians to recover their sense of collective self-esteem. by easily of national and development weakened competing welfareandby the project discourse of Balkanism, the link was as contestable as the discourse itself. It was thus economic development. As Bulgaria’s Kozloduy drama shows, it might endmight it shows, up Kozloduy drama AsBulgaria’s development. economic 248 CEU eTD Collection Alpha Research. 2001. “ Research. 2001. Alpha Allcock, John, Allcock, Alexandrov, Evgeni,1995. ed. Agov, Asen.“ Agov, 2007. Adler, Emanuel. 1987. Adam, Gordon. 2002.“ Adam, Gordon. References Active Elements. Active available. ɧɨɜɨɬɨ not Paging (accessed 2001) December URL:http://www.aresearch.org 6 August. ɧɚ ɢɡɥɴɱɜɚɧɟ ɫɥɟɞ Negotiations?”] ofAccession Process Alter the NewGovernment of the Election ȿɋ ɫ ɩɪɟɝɨɜɨɪɢɬɟ ɩɪɚɜɢɬɟɥɫɬɜɨ ɧɚ ɯɨɞɚ ɥɢ ɩɪɨɦɟɧɢ Travellers in the Balkans Travellers inthe International Studies. France Countries: Germany,England, USA, ɋȺɓ available. Radio. 17June. URL: http://www.dsb.bg (accessed June 2007) Pagingnot National for theBulgarian World.”] Interview Free a Partof the Not Russia Is Give In to Manipulations on the Problem of the Kozloduy NPP.”] California Press. 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URL: http://ime.bg/bg/pr_bg/ 207: 11-2.URL: http://ime.bg/bg/pr_bg/ Economic Policy Review Policy Economic “ SDS Latest News Ȼɟɥɟɧɟ Ɂɚ Economic Policy Review ‘ Ȼɟɥɟɧɟ : ȼɟɥɢɤɞɟɧɫɤɢɫɤɚɡɤɢ .” [“The Lies about the Belene ɪɜɬɥɬɨɨ ɟ ɡɚɳɢɬɚɜɚ ɧɟ ɉɪɚɜɢɬɟɥɫɬɜɨɬɨ .” [“The Unnecessary Nuclear Unnecessary .” [“The “ ’ Ȼɟɥɟɧɟ ɢɹɞɪɟɧɢɬɟɢɥɸɡɢɢ ɨɫɚɬɧ Ⱦɢɦɢɬɪɨɜ Ʉɨɧɫɬɚɧɬɢɧ . 29April. URL: ” ɜɫɟɨɳɟɥɢɩɫɜɚɬ 212: 11-3. URL: 212:11-3. 73: 1-3. URL: 73:1-3. Mediapool ex cathedra.” .” [“The .” [“On . 15 258 .” .” : CEU eTD Collection Djordjevich, Dušan.2003.“Clio Predecessors Yugoslaviaamid the and Ruins: in Its Dimov, Neno 2007.“ Dimitrova, Nina. 1996.“ Dimitrova, Desislava. 2001. “ Dimitrova, Boryana. 2004-2006 (exact publication date not specified).publication not (exact date “ Boryana.Dimitrova, 2004-2006 Dimitrova, Anelia. 1998. “From Dimitrova,“From Anelia.People: 1998. Proletariat to PublicRelations Metamorphosis Stanford University Press. Balkan Wars the 1990s of Historiography.”RecentIn available. not Paging Interview for [“Neno Dimov: Cabinet Is Not Standing in Defense of the Low Profit Tax.”] maltzinstvatai kulturnite vzaimodejstvija. na problemite po tzentar Mezhdunaroden Sofia: Katzarski. Ivan and Bogomiova National inBulgarianCulture ɤɭɥɬɭɪɚ ɛɴɥɝɚɪɫɤɚɬɚ ɜ ɧɚɰɢɨɧɚɥɧɨ ɢ ɍɧɢɜɟɪɫɚɥɧɨ In Perspectives.”] Philosophical and Historical Bulgaria: in Self-Identification http://www.jptactis.com (accessed 2002)Paging notavailable. 9. Railwayand URL: Transport Infrastructure.”] Transport Danube ɢɧɮɪɚɫɬɪɭɤɬɭɪɚɬɚ ɢ ɩɪɟɜɨɡɢ ɢɧɬɟɪɦɨɞɚɥɧɢɬɟ ɧɚ Bridgeɪɚɡɜɢɬɢɟɬɨ at Vidin-Calafatavailable. not Paging and (accessed 2006) December Studies Association. URL:http://www.becsa.org the Development Bulgaria’s Community MembershipintheEU.”]Bulgarian towards European of Intermodal Freight ɛɴɥɝɚɪɢɧɚ ɛɟɬɟɢɟ ɚɥɫɤɦ ɥɧɬɨɨ ɚ ɴɝɪɹ ȿɪɩɣɤɹ ɫɴɸɡ ȿɜɪɨɩɟɣɫɤɢɹ ɢɥɢ ɜ Ȼɴɥɝɚɪɢɹ ɧɚ ɱɥɟɧɫɬɜɨɬɨ ɤɴɦ ɧɚɝɥɚɫɢ ɨɛɳɟɫɬɜɟɧɢɬɟ Multi-Party Multi-Party in Elections 1990.” of the Bulgarian Communist Party and Its Political Tribune before the First Free „ ɚɫɜɬɧɟɜɪɨɫɤɟɩɬɢɰɢɡɦɚ ɧɚ ɲɚɧɫɨɜɟɬɟ ( ɢɫɬɨɪɢɤɨɮɢɥɨɫɨɮɫɤɢ ɩɨɝɥɟɞ Sega ɟɨ Ⱦɢɦɨɜ ɇɟɧɨ . 4April. http://www.dsb.bg URL: (accessedJune2007) ɩɬɡɧɰɨɚɧɤɥɭɧɫɦɢɟɬɮɤɰɹ ɧɚ ɫɚɦɨɢɞɟɧɬɢɮɢɤɚɰɢɹ ɧɚɰɢɨɧɚɥɧɨɤɭɥɬɭɪɧɚ ɡɚ Ɉɩɢɬɢ ɇɨɜɢɹɬɦɨɫɬɧɚɞɪɟɤɚȾɭɧɚɜɩɪɢȼɢɞɢɧɄɚɥɚɮɚɬɢ . eds. Norman Naimark and Holly Case. Stanford: and Holly Norman Naimark . eds. Yugoslavia and Its Historians:Yugoslavia Understanding and Its the : ɚɢɟɴɧɛɚɢ ɢɤɹ ɚɴɩɟɱɚɥɛɚ ɞɚɧɴɤ ɧɢɫɤɢɹ ɛɪɚɧɢ ɧɟ Ʉɚɛɢɧɟɬɴɬ .] eds. 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December Accession.” 15 Union.” Strasbourg. July. DOC/97/6.(COM/97/2000 final vol. I) - http://europa.eu.int/comm/dg10/epo/aceb_en.html (accessed 2002) http://europa.eu.int/comm/dg10/epo/aceb_en.html [ URL: (accessed http://www.dsb.bg March 2007) Pagingnotavailable. [“Declaration by Russia’s DSBon the Increasing Aggressiveness.”]12February. Paging not available. not Paging (accessed December2006) December.Russia”.] URL:http://www.dsb.bg/ Ɋɭɫɢɹ available. not 2006)Paging (accessedDecember http://www.dsb.bg/ November. URL: Government’sɩɪɨɟɤɬɚɧɬɢɢɡɩɴɥɧɢɬɟɥɧɚȺȿɐ Choice of a Designer and MainNorth-South Relations. Supplier of the Belene NPP.”] Civilizationthe and Bulgarian Ethno-National Destiny .” [“DSB Declaration Regarding Bulgaria’s Energy Dependency Energy on Bulgaria’s Regarding .” [“DSB Declaration ȾɟɤɥɚɪɚɰɢɹɧɚȾɋȻɩɨɩɨɜɨɞɡɚɫɢɥɜɚɳɚɬɚɫɟɚɝɪɟɫɢɜɧɨɫɬɧɚɊɭɫɢɹ ȾɟɤɥɚɪɚɰɢɹɧɚȾɋȻɨɬɧɨɫɧɨɟɧɟɪɝɢɣɧɚɬɚɡɚɜɢɫɢɦɨɫɬɧɚȻɴɥɝɚɪɢɹɨɬ ɉɨɡɢɰɢɹɧɚȾɋȻɨɬɧɨɫɧɨɪɟɲɟɧɢɟɬɨɧɚɩɪɚɜɢɬɟɥɫɬɜɨɬɨɡɚɢɡɛɨɪɧɚ ɢɢɢɚɢɬɢ ɴɝɪɤɬɟɧɧɰɨɚɧɫɴɞɛɚ ɟɬɧɨɧɚɰɢɨɧɚɥɧɚ ɛɴɥɝɚɪɫɤɚɬɚ ɢ ɐɢɜɢɥɢɡɚɰɢɹɬɚ Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. Minnesota of University Minneapolis: Imperial Encounters: ThePolitics ofRepresentation in ‘ Ȼɟɥɟɧɟ ’.” [“Position of DSB Regarding the Eurobarometer.” URL: Eurobarometer.” ]. Sofia: Bulgarika. 260 .” . CEU eTD Collection Elenkov, Ivan. 1994. “ Elenkov, Ivan, andRoumen eds.1994. Daskalov, Ekoglasnost. 2006. “ 2006. Ekoglasnost. EIB. 2000. “Basic Infrastructure Investments in South- Eastern Europe: Regional Project ReportontheBeleneNPP EIA and“Transport Economic Ministers). 2002. of Transport Conference ECMT (European EC. 2006b.“Green A Paper: Sustainable,Strategy for European Secure Competitive and CommissionEC. 2006a.“Bulgaria: May 2006 Monitoring Report.” WorkingStaff 2005.EC. “Bulgaria:Brussels, Monitoring 25October. 2005Comprehensive Report.” Elenkov and Roumen Daskalov. Sofia: Svetlostruj. [ In ɟɩɨɯɚ Culturalof Bulgaria’s Identity ɛɴɥɝɚɪɫɤɚɬɚɤɭɥɬɭɪɧɚɢɞɟɧɬɢɱɧɨɫɬ 2006) Documents. 31July. December (accessed http://www.bluelink.net/belene/ URL: from the National Movement Ekoglasnost.”] ‘No to the Belene NPP’ Campaign 30 March. (accessed URL:http://www.seerecon.org 2001) Review.” Brussles: Regional Funding Conference for South-Eastern Europe. 29- technical Summary”]. Parsons E&C Bulgaria Ltd. Non- NPP. Belene the of Construction the for Proposal Investment the on Ⱥȿɐ ɧɚ µȻɟɥɟɧɟ ɢɡɝɪɚɠɞɚɧɟ ɡɚ ɩɪɟɞɥɨɠɟɧɢɟ ɢɧɜɟɫɬɢɰɢɨɧɧɨ ɧɚ ɫɪɟɞɚ Rɤɨɥɧɚɬɚ OECD. Centre, Economic Research of Round Table119”.Paris: – Report Development Energy.” 317) (SEC(2006) Brussels. Document. (COM (2006) 214final). (COM (2005)534 final) Why We Are What We Are? In Search of Bulgaria’s CulturalWhy ofBulgaria’s What WeAre? Identity We Are InSearch ɚɨ ɦɬɚɤɢɜɚ ɫɦɟ Ɂɚɳɨ .“ [“Introduction of .“ Identity 1. Narratives in[“Introduction Age.”] Modern the Bulgarian ’. ɇɟɬɟɯɧɢɱɟɫɤɨɪɟɡɸɦɟ ɢɧɥ ɬ ɚɢɧɥɨ ɞɜɢɠɟɧɢɟ ɇɚɰɢɨɧɚɥɧɨ ɨɬ ɋɢɝɧɚɥ ȼɴɜɟɞɟɧɢɟ ? ɬɪɟɟ ɚ ɴɝɪɤɬɤɥɭɧɢɞɟɧɬɢɱɧɨɫɬ ɤɭɥɬɭɪɧɚ ɛɴɥɝɚɪɫɤɚɬɚ ɧɚ ɬɴɪɫɟɧɟ ȼ . 2004. “ . 2004. 1. ȼɟɪɫɢɢɡɚɛɴɥɝɚɪɫɤɚɬɚɢɞɟɧɬɢɱɧɨɫɬɜɦɨɞɟɪɧɚɬɚ .] Sofia: Svetlostruj. .” [“Environmental Report Assessment Impact .” [“Environmental ɨɥɞ ɚ ɰɧɚ ɚ ɴɞɣɬɢɬɜɴɪɯɭ ɜɴɡɞɟɣɫɬɜɢɟɬɨ ɧɚ ɨɰɟɧɤɚ ɡɚ Ⱦɨɤɥɚɞ . [ Why We Are What We Are? InSearch Ɂ ɳɫɟ ɬɚɤɢɜɚ ɫɦɟ ɚɳɨ ‘ ȿɤɨɝɥɚɫɧɨɫɬ ? ɬɪɟɟ ɧɚ ɬɴɪɫɟɧɟ ȼ ’.” [“Warning .] eds. Ivan 261 . 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URL: . 2005. “ . 2005. .” [“Bulgarians Want toEnter in the EU, but Oppose the Closure of the .” [“Simeon Evtimov, director of the Unit for the Management and Management for the of Unitthe director Evtimov, .” [“Simeon ɴɝɪɬɢɤɬ ȿɋ ɜ ɢɫɤɚɬ Ȼɴɥɝɚɪɢɬɟ ɂɧɠ . ɢɟɧ ȿɜɬɢɦɨɜ ɋɢɦɟɨɧ , ɨ ɚ ɪɬɜ ɚɜɪɧɬɧȺȿɐ ɧɚ ɡɚɬɜɚɪɹɧɟɬɨ ɩɪɨɬɢɜ ɫɚ ɧɨ – ɴɨɨɢɟɧɡɟɨɨ ɡɚ ɡɜɟɧɨɬɨ ɧɚ ɪɴɤɨɜɨɞɢɬɟɥ 263 II. CEU eTD Collection Gancheva, Yordanka. 2007.“The SecondDanubeGancheva, WhereIs Problem Yordanka. the Bridge: Fleischer, Tamás.Fleischer, Networks in 2002. “Infrastructure and Central the EU Europe Galabov,Konstantin.1994. “ [1934] Foucault, Michel.Lectures.""Two In 1981. Foratom. 2007.“Country Profile: Bulgaria.” URL:http://www.foratom.org/ (accessed First SwissReport:Convention onNuclear Safety “TakingThe Constructivist andMartha 2001. Kathryn Stock: Finnemore,Sikkink. Filipov, Vladimir. 2001. Interview for the Bulgarian National Television. 25 April. For the Earth (Za Zemiata). 2004. “ 2004. Zemiata). (Za Earth the For Actually?” IME Paper. URL:http://ime.bg/en/ January (accessed 2008) Identity ɢɞɟɧɬɢɱɧɨɫɬ Bulgarians.”] In (accessedDecemberhttp://www.vki.hu/ 2006) the Polish and Hungarianby organized forworkshop thePolish-Hungarian prepared Paper Enlargement.” Academies of Sciences. Warsaw, 7-8 October.(accessed 2006) URL: York: Pantheon York: Books. and OtherWritings Foucault 1972-1977 byMichel December 2001) 2006) (accessedDecember http://www.bluelink.net/belene/ URL: in Bulgaria.”] Facilities Nuclear New of Construction Research Program in International Relations and Comparative Politics.“ Political Science Review of Comparative and Relations International in Program Research Vestnik Implementation of the Danube Bridge-2 Project, for ɦɨɳɧɨɫɬɢɜȻɴɥɝɚɪɢɹ .] .] eds. Ivan Elenkov and Roumen Daskalov. Sofia: Svetlostruj. Balgarski Transporten Vestnik . [ Why We Are WhatWe Are?InSearchBulgarian Cultural of ɚɨ ɦɬɚɤɢɜɚ ɫɦɟ Ɂɚɳɨ – ɢɫɬɨɪɢɹɬɚ 4: 391-416. Ⱥȿɐ ɫɯɥɝɹ ɚ ɛɴɥɝɚɪɢɧɚ ɧɚ ɉɫɢɯɨɥɨɝɢɹ ‘ .” [“The Hisory of the Belene NPP and the Ȼɟɥɟɧɟ ? Power andKnowledge: SelectedInterviews ɬɪɟɟ ɚ ɴɝɪɤɬɤɭɥɬɭɪɧɚ ɛɴɥɝɚɪɫɤɚɬɚ ɧɚ ɬɴɪɫɟɧɟ ȼ . 5April: 2. ’ ɢɝɚɞɧɬɧɧɜɹɞɪɟɧɢ ɧɨɜɢ ɧɚ ɢɡɝɪɚɠɞɚɧɟɬɨ ɢ . 1998.URL: http://www.hsk.ch . ed. Colin Gordon. New Balgarski Transporten .”[“Psychology the of Annual 264 CEU eTD Collection Georgiev, Zhivko. 2005. “ 2005. Georgiev, Zhivko. Genchev, Nikolai. 1995. “Conference In Contribution.” Genchev, Nikolai. 1995. Georgiev,Ljudmil. 2000. Georgiev, Ljudmil. 1997. Georgiev,Konstantin Ganev,“Bulgaria’s Hope.” Venelin. 1997. Symphony of [“MarketGuide”]. navigator” “Pazaren for TV, Nova Presentation Ganev, 2008. Georgi. Ganev, Georgi.“ 2007. Georgiev, Ljudmil. 1993. Georgiev, Ljuben. 1998. Who Opted for ‘Ataka’.”] Opted Who New Order. New World Perspectives. 125-39. Ȼɴɥɝɚɪɢɹɜȿɜɪɨɩɟɣɫɤɢɹɫɴɸɡ Between Conflict andPeace. Between Conflict ɩɟɪɫɩɟɤɬɢɜɢ Proceedings1995. 31-April2 March Sofia, Balkans Today. Balkans. TheCarnegieReportandthe 26 January. 2007) Pagingavailable. not Transcript of http://www.sds.bgdiscussions. 27February.URL: June (accessed at roundtableView by Statement organized EU Membership.”] SDS. of the izsledvane nademokratzijata. izsledvane i choveka grazhdanina. Great-Bulgaria Chauvinism ɲɨɜɢɧɢɡɴɦ ɜɟɥɢɤɨɛɴɥɝɚɪɫɤɢɹɬ ] Sofia: Izdatelska kashta “Evroma“. . [ ȿɧɟɪɝɢɣɧɚɩɨɥɢɬɢɤɚɢɫɢɝɭɪɧɨɫɬɜɭɫɥɨɜɢɹɬɚɧɚɱɥɟɧɫɬɜɨɧɚ ɥ The Future of the Balkans: PsychologicalProblemsand The FutureoftheBalkans: ɋɥɟɞɫɬɭɞɟɧɚɬɚɜɨɣɧɚ 1995. ] Sofia: Filvest. Sofia: ] . Sofia: The FreeandDemocratic Bulgaria Foundation: 39-45. ɇɟɚɭɬɫɚɣɞɟɪɢɬɟɢɡɛɪɚɯɚ ɚɤɧɬɨɢɬ ɫɜɟɬɨɜɟɧɪɟɞ Ȼɚɥɤɚɧɢɬɟɢɧɨɜɢɹɬ ɴɟɟɨ ɚ Ȼɚɥɤɚɧɢɬɟ ɧɚ Ȼɴɞɟɳɟɬɨ ɚɤɧɬɦɠɭ ɨɮɢɬɢ ɦɢɪɚ ɢ ɤɨɧɮɥɢɤɬɚ ɦɟɠɞɭ Ȼɚɥɤɚɧɢɬɟ Trud ] Sofia: Filvest. Sofia: ] ]. Sofia: Bulgarska liga na pravata zazashtita Sofia: Bulgarska ]. ɢɟɢɴɢɢ ɩɪɨɤɥɹɬɢɟ ɢɥɢ Ɏɢɥɟɬɢɡɴɦ . 27June: 10,14. .” [“Energy Policy and Energy Security with a . 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[“ The Case of Yugoslavia: Ethnic Conflicts inSoutheastern Europe Ethnic Conflicts Yugoslavia: The Caseof Vol. 2 of the National Human Development Report – Bulgaria. ɪɛɩɨɨɧɤɨɦɩɥɟɤɫɢ Ɍɪɴɛɨɩɪɨɜɨɞɧɢ ɘɝɨɫɥɚɜɫɤɢɹɬɫɥɭɱɚɣ The Clash of CivilizationsThe Clash of and theRemakingofWorld 23(1): 171-85. . 1999. “ExecutiveSummary.”. 1999. In Critical theLooking Anthropology Through Glass: Journal ofSouthernEuropeandtheBalkans Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. : ȿɬɧɢɱɟɫɤɢɤɨɧɮɥɢɤɬɢɜɸɝɨɢɡɬɨɱɧɚ .” [“Pipeline Anxieties.”] .” [“Pipeline Journal of Democracy Journal of Bulgarian People’s Current History Current 2(2): 12- 2(2): Sega . 21 269 .”] CEU eTD Collection IMF (International Monetary for aStand-By –Request Fund). 2004.“Bulgaria Monetary IMF (International IME (Institute forEconomics).IME (Institute Market 2002.“ Ikenberry,“Creating John. 1993. NewWorld Yesterday’s Order:Keynesian ‘New IME. 2004. “ IME. 2004. 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URL: . 2007.“ .” [“Ivan Kostov: The BSP Engineered the Engineered BSP The [“Ivan Kostov: .” Ɉɛɪɴɳɟɧɢɟɧɚɦɢɧɢɫɬɴɪɩɪɟɞɫɟɞɚɬɟɥɹ ɜɧ Ʉɨɫɬɨɜ ɂɜɚɧ .” [“Speech Openingthe at of the “ ɝɢɬɱɚ ȿɜɪɨɩɚ ɘɝɨɢɡɬɨɱɧɚ : ɋɢɪɛɬɦɢɬɚ ɢɡɪɚɛɨɬɢ Ȼɋɉ 274 – .” CEU eTD Collection Krasner, Stephen. 1982b. “Regimes and the Limits of Realism: Regimes as Autonomous Krasner, Stephen. 1982a. “Structural Regimes Causes andRegimeas Consequences: Krasner, 1982a.“Structural Stephen. 2006.” (accessed URL:Kozloduy 2006. “AnnualReport http://www.kznpp.org/ NPP. Kovatchev, Petko. 2005. “Bulgaria:Lines.” 2005. NuclearFault Kovatchev, Petko. Kostov, Ivan. Interview for Interview Ivan. Kostov, for Interview Ivan. Kostov, Kostov, Ivan.12 May. Interviewfor Deutsche 1999. Radio. Welle InBulgarian. URL: Kostov, Ivan. Interview for Kovachev, Milko. 2005. “ 2005. Kovachev, Milko. 11 December. EUHelsinkiSummit.1999. Bulgarian. Kostov, atthe In Ivan. Speech for Interview Ivan. Kostov, 1999.1March.forKostov, Reuters. Ivan. 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In BulgarianURL: In . 1999.11November. , ɦɢɧɢɫɬɴɪɧɚɢɤɨɧɨɦɢɤɚɬɚ . 1999. 19 April.In Bulgarian.URL: . 1999. 36(2): 497-510. Standart . 1999. 11 November. In . 1999. 36(2): 185-205. Transitions Online . 4 March. URL: : Ɋɢɫɤɨɜɟɬɟɧɟ . 14 April. 275 CEU eTD Collection Lalkov, Milcho. 1995. “ConferenceLalkov, Milcho. 1995. Contribution.” In Lakov, Krasimir. 2002. “ Linden, Ronald. 2002. “Security and Identity in Southeast Europe: Bulgaria, NATO, and Internationalism.” American “Whence 2000. Jeffrey. Legro, Laj Laj Kutsarov, Vladimir. 2002.“ Krasteva, Anna.“ 1996. Krastev, Ivan. 2002. “The Inflexibility Trap: Frustrated Societies, Weak States and þ þ ak, Miroslav. 2008. “Address of “Address UNSecurity of tothe 2008. Representative High the ak, Miroslav. ak, Miroslav. 2007. “Speechak, Miroslav. 2007. by RepresentativeHigh and EUSpecialRepresentative 1995. Proceedings.1995. 31-April2 March Sofia, Balkans Today. Balkans. 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Ɂɚɩɨɪɟɞɟɧɩɴɬɩɪɟɡɩɨɫɥɟɞɧɢɬɟɧɹɤɨɥɤɨɝɨɞɢɧɢɩɪɨɛɥɟɦɴɬ ɜɟ ɱɭɠɞɨ ɢ ɋɜɨɟ Sofia: The FreeandDemocratic Bulgaria Foundation: 30-8. Ʉɨɣɧɢɢɡɛɪɚɰɢɜɢɥɢɡɚɰɢɧɨɧɧɢɹɢɡɛɨɪ Norms and Nannies: The Impact of International The Impactof Norms andNannies: Novo Vreme : ɍɧɢɜɟɪɫɚɥɧɨɢɧɚɰɢɨɧɚɥɧɨɜɛɴɥɝɚɪɫɤɚɬɚ ɴɝɪɤɩɪɨɱɢɬ ɛɴɥɝɚɪɫɤɢ 2. URL: http://nezavisim.net (accessed URL: http://nezavisim.net 2. Media Times Review International Conference onthe International Organization .” [“The Ownandthe . October. URL: ?” [“WhoChose .” [“The NPP ] eds.Anna 276 CEU eTD Collection MEE (Ministry of Economy andEnergy) (MinistryofEconomy ForeignMEE TradeStatistics TheEffects Europe: inEastCentral Societies “Building Civil 2001. McMahon, Patrice. MBMD. 2005.“4 Marin, Angel. 2007. “ Angel.2007. Marin, March, andJohan James Olsen. 1984.“The NewInstitutionalism: Organizational Mateva, Milena. 1994. “ 1994. Mateva, Milena. Maneva, Evdokia. 2007. “ 2007. Evdokia. Maneva, Manchev, Bogomil. 2006. “ Manchev, Bogomil. 2006. 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[ .” [“National Program The BalkanClash of Energy Strategyof . College Station: . College Habits ofthe . New 278 ?” .” CEU eTD Collection Minchev, Emil.“ [1992]1993b. Minchev, Emil. [1992] 1993c. “ Minchev, 1993c. Emil. [1992] Minchev, Emil.1993a.“ [1992] Minchev, Emil. [1991] 1993. “ Minchev, Emil. 1993. [1991] Mihajlova, Vera.2007. “ Mihajlova, Nadezhda. 2002. “ 2002. Nadezhda. Mihajlova, at “Bulgaria’s Lecture Geopolitical Roleand Perspectives”. Mihajlova, 2001. Nadezhda. Minchev. Sofia: Voennoizdatelski compleks “Sv. Georgi Pobedonosetz”: 78-80. World.Bulgaria ina DeutscheWelle New PoliticalEssays Radio Aired on Essays Aired on Deutsche WelleRadio. on Deutsche Essays Aired [“We Should Say Goodbye to Our Inferiority[“We Should Say GoodbyeAugust In to Complex 1992).”] (30 142-5. Georgi Pobedonosetz”: ȿɜɪɨɩɟɣɫɤɚɬɚɨɛɳɧɨɫɬ ɡɴɟɢ ɨ Ɋɚɞɢɨ ɩɨ ɢɡɥɴɱɟɧɢ (17 May In 1992).”] ɨɫɜɹɬ ɧɨɜ In 1992).”] [“Bulgaria VisegradThree(13April and the Voennoizdatelski compleks “Sv. 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Transcript. . 24April. http://www.segabg.com URL: June (accessed 2008) Paging not . ɨɢɢɟɤɟɟɚ ɡɴɟɢ ɨ Ɋɚɞɢɨ ɩɨ ɢɡɥɴɱɟɧɢ ɟɫɟɬɚ ɉɨɥɢɬɢɱɟɫɤɢ ȿɧɟɪɝɢɣɧɚɩɨɥɢɬɢɤɚɢɫɢɝɭɪɧɨɫɬɜɭɫɥɨɜɢɹɬɚɧɚɱɥɟɧɫɬɜɨ “ ɨɚ ɴɝɪɹ ɟɢɧɜ ɫɜɹɬ ɧɨɜ ɟɞɢɧ ɜ Ȼɴɥɝɚɪɢɹ ɇɨɜɚ ɨɱȼɟɥɟ Ⱦɨɣɱɟ ɇɚɞɟɠɞɚɆɢɯɚɣɥɨɜɚ ȻɴɥɝɚɪɢɹɢȻɚɥɤɚɧɢɬɟ (17.5.1992).” [Bulgaria’s EU Association Negotiations [Bulgaria’sEU Association (17.5.1992).” Ⱦɚɤɚɠɟɦɫɛɨɝɨɦɧɚɤɨɦɩɥɟɤɫɢɬɟɫɢ ɴɝɪɹ ȼɲɝɚɫɚɚ ɬɪɨɣɤɚ ȼɢɲɟɝɪɚɞɫɤɚɬɚ ɢ Ȼɴɥɝɚɪɢɹ “ ɪɝɜɪɬɡɚɨɢɪɧɧȻɥɚɢɫ Ȼɴɥɝɚɪɢɹ ɧɚ ɚɫɨɰɢɢɪɚɧɟ ɡɚ ɉɪɟɝɨɜɨɪɢɬɟ ɨɚ ɴɝɪɹ ɟɢɧɜ ɫɜɹɬ ɧɨɜ ɟɞɢɧ ɜ Ȼɴɥɝɚɪɢɹ ɇɨɜɚ ɨɱȼɟɥɟ Ⱦɨɣɱɟ ” .” [“Nadezhda Mihajlova: It Depends onthe It Mihajlova: .” [“Nadezhda .” [“Energy Policy and Security View a with and Security .” [“Energy Policy . [ New Politicalin aNewWorld. Bulgaria ] Sofia: Voennoizdatelski compleks “Sv. compleks ] Sofia: Voennoizdatelski ”. [ : Ɉɬɤɚɛɢɧɟɬɚɡɚɜɢɫɢɳɟɩɨɥɭɱɢɦ New World. Bulgaria inaNew (2. 7. 1991).” [“Bulgaria (2.7. andthe ] Emil Minchev. Sofia: Minchev. Emil ] “ . ɇɨɜɚȻɴɥɝɚɪɢɹɜɟɞɢɧ ɨɢɢɟɤɟɫɟɬɚ ɉɨɥɢɬɢɱɟɫɤɢ ɨɱȼɟɥɟ Ⱦɨɣɱɟ (13.4.1992).” (30. 8.1992).” . ɉɨɥɢɬɢɱɟɫɤɢ ”. [ ] Emil New 279 CEU eTD Collection Moore-Gilbert, Bart, Gareth Gareth Bart, 1997b.Willy Maley,Moore-Gilbert, and Stanton, eds. “Introduction.” In and Maley.1997a. Bart,Gareth Stanton, Willy Moore-Gilbert, Mitev, Petar-Emil. 1999. “The European Orientation in Political and State Documents of Mirchev, I Mirchev, Mirchev, Iordan. 2001. “ 2001. Mirchev, Iordan. Minchev, Ognyan. 2006.“ Minchev,“Conference Ognyan. Contribution”. 1995. In Bridges of Strategy”]. of Transport Bridges the Criticism Maley. London and New York: Longman. Postcolonial Criticism Relations. Intercultural and Studies Minority for Centre International 1997.” In Paging not available. not Paging (accessed June 2002) URL:http://members.tripod.com/~NIE_MONTHLY/ ɫɬɪɚɬɟɝɢɹ not available. not Day”. (accessedhttp://news.bnt.bg URL: 1November. 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[1948] June 2007)Paging available.not Corruption Pie.”] Corruption Costs for Costs Shortened 2004-2020Period. the Report.”]Sofia. [“Development Plan for Bulgaria’s Electric Power Sector Based on Minimum ɢɢɚɧɪɡɨɢ ɚ ɩɟɪɢɨɞɚ ɡɚ ɪɚɡɯɨɞɢ ɦɢɧɢɦɚɥɧɢ Report.”] Sofia.Report.”] http://www.nek.bg URL: (accessedJanuary 2006) psd.pwgsc.gc.ca/Collection-R/LoPBdP/BP-e/bp357-e.pdf (accessed 2007) psd.pwgsc.gc.ca/Collection-R/LoPBdP/BP-e/bp357-e.pdf Science andTechnology Division. paper(BP-357E).URL: Background dsp- Government Depository Services Program. Parliamentary Research Branch. Foundation: 69-74. April 21995.Proceedings. the Balkans.TheCarnegie Report andtheBalkans March31- Today.Sofia, untilInfrastructure 2005”]. February.available. not Paging Ȼɴɥɝɚɪɢɹɜɩɟɪɢɨɞɚɞɨ 7ɪɚɧɫɩɨɪɬɟɧɨɬɪɚɫɴɥ 2015.”] June. URL:http://www.mt.government.bg/ (accessed January 2007) Development of the Transport Infrastructure of the Republic of Bulgaria by ɧɪɫɪɤɭɚ ɚ ɟɭɥɤȻɥɚɢɞɨ Ȼɴɥɝɚɪɢɹ Ɋɟɩɭɛɥɢɤɚ ɧɚ ɢɧɮɪɚɫɬɪɭɤɬɭɪɚ Peace . 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(Open Society OSF Bosnia-Herzegovina Society Fund Project Team). 2004. “ Orachev, Atanas. 1991. “‘H Atanas. 1991. Orachev, Eastern Europe and Nuclear SafetyinCentral Novkov, Mitko. 2002.“ Novkov, Mitko. No to the Belene NPP Campaign. 2005. “ Campaign.2005. Belene NPP No tothe Norris, David. 1999. Neumann, 1999. Iver. Paging not available. not Paging Review Media Times Ɇɢɬɨɥɨɝɢɹɡɚɬɴɦɧɢɧɚɬɚ http://www.soros.org.ba/en/dokumenti/ostali/book/001.pdf (accessed 2002). Bosnia-Herzegovina International Support Policies toSEECountries- Lessons (Not) Learned in Iztok-Iztok ɨɛɳɟɫɬɜɨ Battle for Kozloduy – the Bulgarians’ ‘men’s’ fight.”] pa.int/ (accessed 2006) pa.int/ NATOAssembly. Parliamentary (AU 224STC(01)10)URL:http://www.nato- Science andTechnology. Report, Committee Europe.” andEastern Central (accessed December2002)Pagingavailable.nothttp://www.segabg.com available. URL: http://www.bluelink.net/belene/ (accessedJune 2006)Paging not Provocations by Nuclear Lobbyists with Ties to the Government.”] 20 October. ɞɟɢ ɥɨɛɢɫɬɢ ɹɞɪɟɧɢ ɟɢɟ ɚ ɨɚ ɫɥɟɞ ɬɨɤɚ ɧɚ ɰɟɧɢɬɟ Modernity. Press. Minnesota University Minneapolis: of .” [“The ‘National’ and the ‘Ethnic’ in Bulgaria’s Archaic Archaic Society.”] inBulgaria’s ‘Ethnic’ andthe .” [“The ‘National’ 2:55-62. Houndmills and New York: Macmillan Press and St. Martin’s Press. Uses of the Other: "The East" inEuropeanIdentityFormation Uses Other: ofthe "TheEast" In theWakeIdentityand the BalkanMyth:Questions of of .” [“Claims about Skyrocketing Prices of Electricity are Electricity of Prices Skyrocketing about .” [“Claims ɢɤɬɡȺȿɐ ɡɚ Ȼɢɬɤɚɬɚ . Sarajevo: OSF BiH. URL: ɚɰɢɨɧɚɥɧɨɬɨ 2006 . URL: http://mediatimesreview.com/ (accessed 2006) (accessed . 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Interview for BTV.2006b.“ Interview Ovcharov, Rumen. Ovcharov,2006a. “ for Rumen.BTV. Interview “ forOvcharov, BTV.2005. Rumen. Interview Ovcharov,2006b. Interview Rumen. for BNT.“ Ovcharov, Bulgarian Rumen. for Interview BNT(the National Television). 2006a. ɧɪɢɧ ɟɬɪ ɜɨɳɛɥɚɫɚɚ ɤɧɦɤɤɬɰɥɟ ɰɹɥɨ ɤɚɬɨ Become Have Whole a as Economy ɢɤɨɧɨɦɢɤɚ Bulgarian the and Sector Energy Bulgarian ɛɴɥɝɚɪɫɤɚɬɚ ɜɴɨɛɳɟ ɢɡɤɥɸɱɢɬɟɥɧɨɚɬɪɚɤɬɢɜɧɚɩɪɟɡɩɨɫɥɟɞɧɢɬɟɦɟɫɟɰɢ ɢ ɫɟɤɬɨɪ ɟɧɟɪɝɢɟɧ http://www.government.bg/ (accessed 2006).Paging October available. not with ɢɤɨɧɨɦɢɤɚ ɫɟ ɪɚɡɜɢɜɚɳɚ a ɞɨɛɪɟ Well Developing Economy.”] BTV, “On Target”. 11 June. URL: available. not http://www.government.bg4 May. 2006).Paging URL: (accessed October ȿ ɰɟɥɢɹ ɜ Morning”. “This BTV, in EU.”] the Are Lowest the Prices Electricity Bulgarian ɟɥɟɤɬɪɨɟɧɟɪɝɢɹɬɚ ɧɚ ɰɟɧɢ ɧɢɫɤɢɬɟ available. URL:October. http://www.government.bg/ 2006).Paging (accessed not October “This 12 Morning”. Ovcharov.”] BTV, [“InterviewMinister Rumen with 18 October. 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URL: National Radio, .” [“Rumen Ovcharov: Bulgaria IsaCountry .” [“Rumen Bulgaria Ovcharov: ɊɚɡɝɨɜɨɪɫɦɢɧɢɫɬɴɪɊɭɦɟɧɈɜɱɚɪɨɜ ɊɭɦɟɧɈɜɱɚɪɨɜ ɭɟɈɜɱɚɪɨɜ Ɋɭɦɟɧ ɪɞɟɧɝɞɧɧɟ ɨɛɹɜɢɯɦɟ ɧɢɟ ɝɨɞɢɧɚ ɟɞɧɚ ɉɪɟɞɢ ɭɟɈɜɱɚɪɨɜɊɭɦɟɧ .” [“Rumen Ovcharov: Talk .” [“Rumen Ovcharov: The Ovcharov: .” [“Rumen C.” [“Rumen Ovcharov: C.” [“Rumen : : Ȼɴɥɝɚɪɢɹɟɫɬɪɚɧɚɫ ɴɝɪɹ ɦɧɚɣ ɢɦɚ Ȼɴɥɝɚɪɢɹ : Ȼɴɥɝɚɪɫɤɢɹɬ .” [“Rumen .” 284 .” - CEU eTD Collection Ovcharov, Rumen. Interview for Interview Rumen. Ovcharov, Ovcharov, Rumen. Interview for Interview Rumen. Ovcharov, Ovcharov, Rumen. Interview for Nova TV. 2006b. “ Ovcharov, Rumen. Interview for Nova TV. 2006a. “ 2006a. TV. Nova for Interview Ovcharov, Rumen. Ovcharov, Rumen. Interview for Interview Rumen. Ovcharov, Ovcharov, Rumen. Interview for Interview Rumen. Ovcharov, ɧɚɣɦɧɨɝɨɡɚȿɋ 2007). Pagingavailable. not EC.”] ɬɨɹɝɚɬɚ http://www.mi.government.bg (accessed April Paging available.2007). not Gazprom to Use the Carrot Rather than the Stick.”] 16 February. URL: ɢɤɨɧɨɦɢɤɚɬɚɢɟɧɟɪɝɟɬɢɤɚɬɚ http://www.government.bg (accessedOctober2006).Paging available. not Sector ɞɜɨɪ [“Rumen ɪɚɡɝɪɚɞɟɧ Ovcharov: ɤɚɬɨ It Is ɟɧɟɪɝɟɬɢɤɚ High Time ɛɴɥɝɚɪɫɤɚɬɚ to Stop ɦɢɫɥɢ Perceiving ɫɟ Where ɞɚ the Energy ɩɪɟɫɬɚɧɟ ɫɟ Industryɞɚ as a Anything Goes.”] Nova TV, “In Private”. 7 May. URL: October 2006).Paging notavailable. (accessed http://www.government.bg/ URL: 15January. “InTV, Private”. Nova NPP.”] Belene the of Necessity Objective the Prove Facts The Ovcharov: ɨɥɞɚɨ ɚɬɬɩɤɡɚɧɨɯɞɦɫɬɨȺȿɐ ɨɬ ɧɟɨɛɯɨɞɢɦɨɫɬɬɚ ɩɨɤɚɡɜɚɬ ɮɚɤɬɢɬɟ ɩɨɝɥɟɞɧɚɬɨ ɧɚɩɪɟɞ ɜɴɪɜɢ Duma (accessed October 2006). Paging not available. Paging 2006). not (accessed October ɞɚɫɟɢɡɩɪɚɜɢɫɪɟɳɭ up to Gazprom.”] up to not available. not Paging 2006). October (accessed http://www.government.bg 18 February. URL: DarikRadio, “The DuringWeek”. 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" ɊɭɦɟɧɈɜɱɚɪɨɜ Ƚɚɡɩɪɨɦ ɭɟɈɜɱɚɪɨɜ Ɋɭɦɟɧ ɭɟɈɜɱɚɪɨɜ Ɋɭɦɟɧ ɊɭɦɟɧɈɜɱɚɪɨɜ ɭɟɈɜɱɚɪɨɜ Ɋɭɦɟɧ ɭɟɈɜɱɚɪɨɜ Ɋɭɦɟɧ " ɞɚɧɢɞɚɞɟɦɨɪɤɨɜɚ ‘ : : Ȼɟɥɟɧɟ Ȼɴɥɝɚɪɢɹɧɟɦɨɠɟ : ɤɧɦɤɬɧɢ ɂɤɨɧɨɦɢɤɚɬɚ : ɴɝɪɹ ɩɥɚɬɢ Ȼɴɥɝɚɪɢɹ , ɤɪɚɣɧɨɜɪɟɦɟɟ ɢɢɬɪ ɧɚ ɦɢɧɢɫɬɴɪ : ’.” [“Rumen Ɉɛɟɤɬɢɜɧɨ , ɚɧɟ 285 .” CEU eTD Collection Paris, Roland. 2002. “Kosovo andParis, War.” Roland. the Metaphor 2002. Internationalism.” Liberal of Limits the and “Peacebuilding 1997. Roland. Paris, 1999. Albert. Paolini, Pantev, Plamen. 1995. Pantev, Andrej.Pantev, In Contribution.” 1995.“Conference Pan-European TransportCorridors Status andAreas Report Parvanov, Georgi. 2002a.“ Panajotova, Ljubov. 2007. “ Pact on Bulgaria’sEconomic and Social Development. February February 2004). Pagingnot available. Atlanticthe (accessed Club.”] 31January.URL:http://www.president.bg ɤɥɭɛ Ⱥɬɥɚɧɬɢɱɟɫɤɢɹ ɩɪɟɞ International Security International Relations Sofia: St. Kliment Ohridski University Press. 91. Proceedings.1995. 31-April2 March Sofia, Balkans Today. Balkans. TheCarnegieReportandthe Technical Research Centre of of Centre Finland. Research Technical November HB-Verkehrsconsult 2005.Hamburg andGmbH Espoo: andVTT prepared Activities until 2003/Forecast 1994 and between Report 2010.” Transport Corridors and Areas Status Report. Final Report. Developments and http://www.sds.bg Bulgaria.”]Ȼɴɥɝɚɪɢɹ SDS Candidates for the European Parliament. 12 May. URL: 117(3): 423-50.117(3): Bulgarian employers’Government, associations andthetrade unions. Economic and Social untilDevelopment 2009.”] Tripartite pactsigned bythe ɫɨɰɢɚɥɧɨɪɚɡɜɢɬɢɟɧɚɊɟɩɭɛɥɢɤɚȻɴɥɝɚɪɢɹɞɨ .” [“Ljubov Panajotova: The SDS Is the Idea that Transformed Idea that Is the SDS The Panajotova: [“Ljubov .” Coping with Conflicts in theCentral and Southern Balkans. Navigating Modernity: Postcolonialism, Identity,and ȼɴɧɲɧɨɩɨɥɢɬɢɱɟɫɤɢɬɟɩɪɢɨɪɢɬɟɬɢɧɚȻɴɥɝɚɪɢɹ Sofia: TheFree Foundation: Bulgaria and 185- Democratic 22(2):54-89. ɸɨɉɚɧɚɣɨɬɨɜɚ Ʌɸɛɨɜ . Boulder, Colo.: L. Rienner. .” [“Bulgaria’s Foreign Policy Priorities. Lecture at Lecture Priorities. Policy Foreign .” [“Bulgaria’s : Ⱦɟ ɢɞɟɹɬɚ ɟ ɋȾɋ International Conference on the 2006. “ 2009 Political ScienceQuarterly ɉɚɤɬɡɚɢɤɨɧɨɦɢɱɟɫɤɨɢ ɝ . 2006. “Pan-European . 2006. .” [“Pact on Bulgaria’s , ɨɬɩɪɨɦɟɧɢ ɤɨɹɬɨ . Ʌɟɤɰɢɹ 286 CEU eTD Collection Parvanov,“ Georgi. 2005b. “ Parvanov, Georgi. 2005a. Parvanov, Georgi. 2003b “‘ Parvanov, 2003b Georgi. Parvanov, Georgi. 2003b. “ Parvanov, Georgi. 2003a. “ Parvanov, Georgi. 2003a. Parvanov, Georgi. 2002b. “ Parvanov to the Forum ‘Bulgaria - A Stabilizing Factor in the Balkans’ at the ɬɚɟɢɟɤɢ ɟɞɧɪɞɢ ɢɡɫɥɟɞɜɚɧɢɹ ɦɟɠɞɭɧɚɪɨɞɧɢ ɢ ɫɬɪɚɬɟɝɢɱɟɫɤɢ http://www.president.bg (accessed February Paging available.not http://www.president.bg 2006) to Europe.”] Speech Businessat in Forum Vienna. 20April. URL: June 2006).Pagingavailable. not (accessed http://www.president.bg 20 March. URL: Parliament.”] Members of President of the Republic of Bulgaria Georgi Parvanov to the Nation and to µȻɴɥɝɚɪɢɹ ɉɴɪɜɚɧɨɜɤɴɦɧɚɰɢɹɬɚɢɧɚɪɨɞɧɢɬɟɩɪɟɞɫɬɚɜɢɬɟɥɢ Ʉɚɩɭɞɢɫɬɪɢɟɜ ɢ ɧɚɰɢɨɧɚɥɟɧ ɭɧɢɜɟɪɫɢɬɟɬ Ⱥɬɢɧɫɤɢɹ ɜ ɉɴɪɜɚɧɨɜ Ƚɟɨɪɝɢ ɩɪɟɡɢɞɟɧɬɚ http://www.president.bg (accessedhttp://www.president.bg February Pagingavailable.2006). not for MilitarySupport 5February. AgainstActions Iraq.”] URL: [“Statement of President Georgi Parvanov on US Demands for Bulgarian February February 2006). Pagingnot available. of University (accessed (NKUA).” 6November.Athens URL: http://www.president.bg Kapodistrian and National the at Parvanov Georgi President ɫɚɟɨ ɚ Ⱥɡɩɞɪɩɜɜ ɨɧɢ ɟɫɜɹ ɪɳɂɪɚɤ ɫɪɟɳɭ ɞɟɣɫɬɜɢɹ ɜɨɟɧɧɢ ɜɴɜ ɩɨɞɤɪɟɩɚ ɡɚ ɋȺɓ ɧɚ ɢɫɤɚɧɟɬɨ (accessedhttp://www.president.bg February Pagingavailable.2006). not ParvanovPosition on the Fate of the Kozloduy NPP – Statement of President Georgi during His Visit to the NPP.”] 9 April. Kozloduy. 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Parvanov, Georgi. of Parvanov,“Speech of byGeorgi President Parvanov, Republic the 2007b. Georgi. Parvanov, Georgi. 2007a. “Address by President Georgi Parvanov to the Members of the Parvanov, Georgi. 2006c. “ “ 2006b. Parvanov, Georgi. Parvanov, Georgi. 2006a. “ Parvanov, 2006a. Georgi. http://www.president.bg (accessedhttp://www.president.bg June Paging2008). available. not Meeting (accessed February Pagingavailable.not 2008). Energy Europe URL: 24June.Zagreb. http://www.president.bg Summit.] of ɧɚ ɜɴɩɪɨɫɢɬɟ ɟɧɟɪɝɟɬɢɤɚɬɚ ɩɨ Heads ȿɜɪɨɩɚ ɘɝɨɢɡɬɨɱɧɚ ɨɬ ɫɬɪɚɧɢɬɟ ɧɚ ɝɥɚɜɢ ɞɴɪɠɚɜɧɢɬɟ of (accessedURL:2007). Paging February notavailable. http://www.president.bg State Union.” 11January. aFullMember European the Accession as of Bulgaria’s Bulgaria atthe Celebratory Session of the National Assembly on the Occasion of of Central (accessed February Pagingavailable.not 2007). http://www.president.bg URL: February. 1 Brussels. Parliament.” European Europe.”2006). 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URL: .” [“Address by President Georgi Parvanov to the South East South the to Parvanov Georgi President by [“Address .” ȿɜɪɨɩɟɣɫɤɚɬɚɩɟɪɫɩɟɤɬɢɜɚɧɚȻɚɥɤɚɧɢɬɟ ɂɡɤɚɡɜɚɧɟɧɚɩɪɟɡɢɞɟɧɬɚȽɟɨɪɝɢɉɴɪɜɚɧɨɜɧɚɫɪɟɳɚɬɚɧɚ Ȼɴɥɝɚɪɢɹ ɴɝɪɹ ɚ ɪɝɧȿɪɩɣɤɹ ɫɴɸɡ ȿɜɪɨɩɟɣɫɤɢɹ ɧɚ ɩɪɚɝɚ ɧɚ Ȼɴɥɝɚɪɢɹ - ɫɬɚɛɢɥɢɡɢɪɚɳɮɚɤɬɨɪɜɘɝɨɢɡɬɨɱɧɚȿɜɪɨɩɚ .” [“The European .” [“Bulgaria at 288 .” CEU eTD Collection Pasi, Solomon. 2002e.“ Pasi, Solomon. 2002d. “ Pasi,“Our Solomon. 2002c. Challenge Today: Making Balkanisation Equal Integration.” Pasi, Solomon. 2002b. ‘Security intheConference participants the “Message to 2002a. Pasi, Solomon. “NATO Enlargement: America’s Best Move in The Fight Pashev, Konstantin, AsenDjulgerov and Kaschiev. Georgi “ 2006. Parvanov, Georgi. 2008b “ Parvanov, Georgi. 2008b ɫɢɝɭɪɧɨɫɬɬɚɧɚɨɛɟɞɢɧɟɧɚȿɜɪɨɩɚ ɫɴɸɡ ȿɜɪɨɩɟɣɫɤɢ ɚɢ ɚ ɬɟɦɚ ɧɚ ɉɚɫɢ 2008). Pagingavailable. not February (accessedSofia. URL:http://www.mfa.government.bg/ 29October. 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President Georgi Parvanov at the Opening Ceremony of the Year of Russia in ɚ ɤɨɧɰɟɪɬɚ ɧɚ , ɨɜɬɧ ɚ ɨɢɚɚ ɚ ɭɢɜ Ȼɴɥɝɚɪɢɹ ɜ Ɋɭɫɢɹ ɧɚ Ƚɨɞɢɧɚɬɚ ɧɚ ɩɨɫɜɟɬɟɧ ‘ ɂɡɤɚɡɜɚɧɟɧɚɦɢɧɢɫɬɴɪɋɨɥɨɦɨɧɉɚɫɢɧɚɌɪɟɬɚɬɚɝɨɞɢɲɧɚ ɟɰɹ ɚ ɢɢɬɪɧɜɧɧɬɪɛɬɞɪ ɋɨɥɨɦɨɧ ɞɪ ɪɚɛɨɬɢ ɜɴɧɲɧɢɬɟ ɧɚ ɦɢɧɢɫɬɴɪɚ ɧɚ Ʌɟɤɰɢɹ ɥɧɬɨɨ ɚ ɴɝɪɹ ȿɋ ɜ Ȼɴɥɝɚɪɢɹ ɧɚ ɑɥɟɧɫɬɜɨɬɨ ’.” [“Speech by Minister Solomon Pasi at the Third Annual Third the by Solomon Pasi at ’.” [“Speech Minister ɋɥɨɜɨɧɚɩɪɟɡɢɞɟɧɬɚȽɟɨɪɝɢɉɴɪɜɚɧɨɜɩɪɢɨɬɤɪɢɜɚɧɟɬɨ : ɪɢɫɤɨɜɟɢɩɪɨɬɢɜɨɞɟɣɫɬɜɢɟ ’ ɩɪɟɞȿɜɪɨɩɟɣɫɤɢɹɩɨɥɢɬɢɱɟɫɤɢɰɟɧɬɴɪɜ .”] Sofia: Center for the Study of ‘ ɴɟɟɨ ɧɚɪɚɡɲɢɪɟɧɢɹ Ȼɴɞɟɳɟɬɨ - .” [“ ɪɧɫ ɴɦɪɢ ɦɢɪɚ ɤɴɦ ɩɪɢɧɨɫ Corruption inPublic ɨɭɰɹɚ ɩɪɢ Ʉɨɪɭɩɰɢɹɬɚ .” [“Speech of .” [“Speech 289 CEU eTD Collection Pasi, Solomon. 2005b. “ 2005b. Solomon. Pasi, Pasi, Solomon. 2005a. “ 2005a. Pasi, Solomon. Pasi, Solomon. 2002g. “ Pasi, Solomon. 2002f. “ Pasi, Solomon. 2004.“ “ 2003. Solomon. Pasi, ȿɜɪɨɩɚ April. http://www.segabg.com URL: (accessed April 2005). Pagingnot available. 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[“Speech .” [“Statement .” .” [“Second Sega . 25 290 ’.” CEU eTD Collection Pirjevec, Jože.1995.“TheLevantand in Europe Central Former History the of Petrov, Plamen. 2002. “ Plamen. Petrov, 2002. Petkova, Diana. 2000. Petkova, Perica, Vjekoslav. 2002. Peet, Richard,Peet, with Elaine Hartwick. 1999. Relations, External for Commissioner EU Patten, Chris by “Speech 2002. Chris. Patten, Patten, Chris.“Speech 2001b. byThe Hon Rt Patten.”SPEECH/01/489 Chris - Regional Patten, Chris (EUCommissionerfor External Relations). 2001a.“EU in Policy the ɨɬ ɚȾɧɜ ɪȼɢɞɢɧɄɚɥɚɮɚɬ ɩɪɢ ɦɟɠɞɭɧɚɪɨɞɧɢɹ Ⱦɭɧɚɜ ɧɚɞ ɦɨɫɬ ɫ ɩɪɨɟɤɬ ɞɨɝɨɜɨɪɚ ɧɚ ɭɩɪɚɜɥɟɧɢɟ ɢ ɧɚ ɢɧɠɟɧɟɪɢɧɝ ɩɨ ɤɨɧɫɭɥɬɚɧɬ ɩɨɞɩɢɫɜɚɧɟ ɩɨɜɨɞ ɩɨ ɰɟɪɟɦɨɧɢɹɬɚ Security? Yugoslavia.” In (accessed February Pagingavailable.not 2008). http://www.mtc.government.bg/ Vidin 27November. URL: andCalafat.” ManagementCeremony on Signingwith aContract Internationalthe and Engineering Consultant of the Project ‘Building a Second Danube Bride at and Globalization Oxford,New York: Oxford University Press. London: The Guilford Press. Europa South-EastMonitor Western to the Balkans Democracy Thessaloniki, Forum, April 2002.” 12 Paging(accessedavailable. 2002) not http://europa.eu.int Conference Bucharest,25 OctoberEastern Europe, for South 2001.URL: CEPS EuropaSouth-East Monitor Balkans. Speech International the to Groupby Crisis July Patten,Chris 10 2002.” (accessed February Pagingavailable.not 2006). Sofia.Southeastern Europe. 18May.URL: http://www.mfa.government.bg/ theAddress Stability or May 2005.”] Southeastern Sofia,to Pact Europe, 18 eds. Stefano Bianchini and Paul Shoup. 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URL: http://www.cls-sofia.org/ (accessed 2002) URL: http://www.cls-sofia.org/ Liberal Strategies. , . Ȼɚɥɤɚɧɢɬɟ . [ . 2005. “ . 2005. Ȼɴɥɝɚɪɢɹ .” [“Macedonia. Conflicting Perspectives”]. Sofia: Centre for Sofia: Centre Perspectives”]. Conflicting .” [“Macedonia. Beyond theUtopias.Bulgaria,Balkans,Europe –Visions for ɟɟɨɬɨ ɟɞɢɧɨɦɢɫɥɢɟ ɇɟɜɟɪɨɹɬɧɨ ɚɟɚɢɧɇɰɨɚɧɹ ɨɢɟɡɨɛɥɡɚɟ ɧɚ ɨɬɛɟɥɹɡɜɚɧɟ ɡɚ ɤɨɦɢɬɟɬ ɇɚɰɢɨɧɚɥɧɢɹ ɧɚ Ɂɚɫɟɞɚɧɢɟ .” [“Incredible Unanimity – 77% of .” [“Incredible of Unanimity Bulgarians Opposedto – 77% .] ed. Emi Baruh. Sofia: Bulgarska redaktzija na Bulgarska radioredaktzija .] ed.Emi Baruh. Sofia: , , ȿɜɪɨɩɚ ɟɥɪɰɹ ɪɬɜ ɟɟɢɬɧɛɴɥɝɚɪɫɤɨɬɨ ɧɚ ɪɟɲɟɧɢɟɬɨ ɩɪɨɬɢɜ Ⱦɟɤɥɚɪɚɰɢɹ Ȼɚɥɤɚɧɢɬɟ ɜɛɞɧ ɢɡɛɨɪ ɋɜɨɛɨɞɟɧ - ɜɢɡɢɢɡɚɫɥɟɞɜɚɳɨɬɨɞɟɫɟɬɢɥɟɬɢɟ ɊɚɡɝɨɜɨɪɧɚȿɦɢȻɚɪɭɯɫȺɧɞɪɟɣɊɚɣɱɟɜ , ȿɜɪɨɩɚ -77% ?” [“Free Choice?.”] In - ‘ Ɇɚɤɟɞɨɧɢɹ ɬ ɴɝɪɬɫɩɪɨɬɢɜ ɫɚ ɛɴɥɝɚɪɢɬɟ ɨɬ ɢɢɡɫɥɟɞɜɚɳɨɬɨ ɡɚ ɜɢɡɢɢ Ȼɟɥɟɧɟ ɬɴɭɬɨɩɢɢɬɟ Ɉɬɜɴɞ ’.” [“Declaration : ɤɨɧɮɥɢɤɬɧɢ . [ Beyond Ɉɬɜɴɞ 292 .” .” .] . CEU eTD Collection Semov, Atanas. 2006. “ Atanas. 2006. Semov, Semov, Atanas. 2002b. “ 2002b. Semov, Atanas. Semov, Atanas. 2002a. “ SDS. 2002. “ Schöpflin, 1999. “Defining George. Europe.” South-Eastern Schimmelfennig, Frank and Ulrich “Introduction:Sedelmeier. 2005. Conceptualizing the Saxkoburggotski,“ Simeon. 2003. Sampson, Steven. 1996. “The Social Life of Projects: Importing Civil Society to Said, 1979. Edward. Rippon, Simon. 1999. “Doing It Right: The Loviisa Way.” IV Ferheugen.”] NPP Has to Be Brought to Court.”] URL: (accessed http://www.sds.bg March 2003).Pagingnotavailable. February. Integration]. and Affairs Foreign on Commission the of [“Resolution Ithaka andIthaka London: Cornell University. Central andEasternEurope Europeanization Central of In and Eastern Europe.” available. URL: February http://www.government.bg not (accessed 2003). Paging Crisis Remains fora Priority Bulgaria.”] in Speech Parliament. 07February. ɦɢɪɟɧɢɡɯɨɞɨɬɂɪɚɤɫɤɚɬɚɤɪɢɡɚ Elizabeth Dunn. 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Chris Hann and Hann Chris eds. . 42(11): 29-35. 42(11): 3(2):67-72. III III 293 ”. ɢ CEU eTD Collection Shopov, Kiril. 1994.“ Shejtanov,1994. “ Najden. [1942] Shejtanov,1994. “ Najden. [1933] Shejtanov, Najden. [1925] 1994. “ Shejtanov,1994. Najden. [1925] Sevlievski, Miroslav. 2005. “‘ 2005. Sevlievski, Miroslav. Semov, Marko. 1999. Semov, Marko. of papers from the of papers from Conference Philosophical School“Science, Civilizations,Values” ɢɨɨɫɚ ɲɤɨɥɚ ɮɢɥɨɫɨɮɫɤɚ In Crisis.”] the Ending for Strategy Possible ɤɪɢɡɚɬɚ ɨɬ ɢɡɯɨɞ ɡɚ ɫɬɪɚɬɟɝɢɹ Elenkov and Roumen Daskalov. Sofia: Svetlostruj. We InSearchAre WhatWeBulgarianCulturalIdentity of Are? Ɂɚɳɨɫɦɟɬɚɤɢɜɚ Svetlostruj. 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Ivan Elenkov and Roumen Daskalov. Sofia: .] Varna: IPKU ‘Dr. Petar Beron’: 151-6. ɭɴɧɨɪɰɧɟ ɛɴɥɝɚɪɢɧɚ ɭ ɨɬɪɢɰɚɧɢɟ ɧɚ Ⱦɭɯɴɬ ’ - , ɪɨɪɠɧɟ ɚ Ȼɴɥɝɚɪɢɹ ɧɚ ɉɪɟɨɛɪɚɠɟɧɢɟ .” [“Bulgaria’s Post-totalitarian One Problems: .” [“Bulgaria’s Post-totalitarian ɰɢɜɢɥɢɡɚɰɢɢ ɴɜɬɫɴɤɤɦ ɨɨɨ ɢɥɧɡɚ ɦɢɫɥɟɧɟ ɧɨɜɨɬɨ ɤɴɦ ɫɬɴɩɤɚ ɩɴɪɜɚɬɚ Dnevnik ]. Sofia: Universitetsko Izdatelstvo “Sv. . [ ? ȼɬɴɪɫɟɧɟɧɚɛɴɥɝɚɪɫɤɚɬɚɤɭɥɬɭɪɧɚ Why We Are What We Are? InSearch ɚɨ ɦɬɚɤɢɜɚ ɫɦɟ Ɂɚɳɨ . . 10 May. URL: http://www.doe.bg Ɋɚɡɦɢɫɥɢɜɴɪɯɭɬɨɜɚɤɚɤɜɢɫɦɟ , .” [“BulgarianWorldview.”] In ɟɞɧɪɞɚ ȼɚɪɧɟɧɫɤɚ Ɇɟɠɞɭɧɚɪɨɞɧɚ ɰɟɧɧɨɫɬɢ – Varna,1994 ” ? . . [ ɞɚ ɜɴɡɦɨɠɧɚ ȿɞɧɚ .” [“Bulgaria’s ɬɪɟɟ ɧɚ ɬɴɪɫɟɧɟ ȼ International .] eds. Ivan . Collection .” [“The . [ Why 294 CEU eTD Collection Stanchev, Krasen. 2006a. “ Stanchev, Krasen. 2004b. “ Stanchev, Krasen. 2004a. “ Krasen. 2004a. Stanchev, Sikkink, Stanchev, Krasen.Stanchev,“Impacts Krasen. 1999. of War Yugoslav Bulgaria”. on Draft. 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Ithaca: Cornell University ɢɟɴɧɚ Ʌɢɞɟɪɴɬ ɋɬɨɩɚɧɫɤɚɬɚɧɟɹɫɧɨɬɚɡɚȺȿɐ Ideas and Institutions: Developmentalism inBraziland Ideas andInstitutions: ɫɛɧɫɢ ɚ ɨɚ ɚ ɟɢɨɢɬɧȺȿɐ ɧɚ ɬɟɪɢɬɨɪɢɹɬɚ ɧɚ ɥɨɜɚ ɧɚ Ɉɫɨɛɟɧɨɫɬɢ American Journal ofSociology ɞɛɬɡȺɐ ɢɫɚɢɨɨɢɟɤɬɚɪɝɭɦɟɧɬɢ ɢɤɨɧɨɦɢɱɟɫɤɢɬɟ ɥɢɩɫɜɚɬ Ⱥȿɐ ɡɚ ɞɟɛɚɬɚ ȼ ȿɞɧɚɝɨɞɢɧɚɭɩɪɚɜɥɟɧɢɟɧɚɤɚɛɢɧɟɬɚ Theory and Society ‘ Ⱥɬɚɤɚ .” [“The Cabinet’s First Year in Power: Results in Year Power: First .” [“TheCabinet’s ’ ɨɟɋɞɪɜ ɫɭɢɬɧɚ ɫɬɭɞɢɨɬɨ ɜ ɋɢɞɟɪɨɜ ȼɨɥɟɧ 29(4):549-72. Mediapool Mediapool ‘ 82(4): 1075-1090. Mediapool Ȼɟɥɟɧɟ ’” [“Lack of of Clarity ’” [“Lack . 28July. URL: . 30April. URL: . 9 June. URL: : ɪɟɡɭɥɬɚɬɢɬɟɜ Mediapool ‘ Ȼɟɥɟɧɟ ‘ Ⱦɟɧɹɬ . 26 295 ’.” .” CEU eTD Collection Stoyanov, Petar. 1999. “Address to the Washington News “Address the Washington Summit.”(Bulgarian BTA 1999. Stoyanov, to Petar. Stoyanov, Petar. 1997. “Statement to the North Atlantic Council.” URL: Stefanov, Nikola. 1998. “ Stefanov, Nikola. 1998. 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Jutta Weldes, Mark Laffey, Cultures ofInsecurity: States, Cultures ofInsecurity: States, Colonial Discourse and Post- European Journal of uropean Journal of Cambridge: CEPS 302 CEU eTD Collection Zhelev, Zhelju. [1991] 1997a. “ 1997a. Zhelev, Zhelju. [1991] Zhelev, Zhelju. [1990] 1997. “ 1997. Zhelev, Zhelju.[1990] Zhelev, Zhelju. “ 1995[1997]. Zhelev, Zhelju. [1992]1997a. “ Zagorov, Orlin. 1994. Zagorov, Orlin, Nikolaj and 2000. Iordanov. Young, Robert. 1990. Young, Robert. Susan.Woodward, 1995. Solutions with Address Tanks. Nation,to the In 4July 1991”.] ɬɚɧɤɨɜɟ Citizens andParliament. ɩɪɟɡɢɞɟɧɬɚɤɴɦɧɚɪɨɞɚɢɩɚɪɥɚɦɟɧɬɚ Our Country. in Speech 11 NovemberParliament, 1990.”]In ɧɚɪɨɞɧɨɫɴɛɪɚɧɢɟ ȼɟɥɢɤɨɬɨ Addresses totheCitizens and Parliament. ɛɴɟɢɧɩɟɢɟɬɤɦ ɚɨɚ ɩɚɪɥɚɦɟɧɬɚ ɢ ɧɚɪɨɞɚ ɤɴɦ ɩɪɟɡɢɞɟɧɬɚ ɧɚ Ɉɛɪɴɳɟɧɢɹ was Signedin York. AddressNew totheNation, 1995.”In 26October Corridor Transport 1995.” [“The ‘East-West’ the Building Declaration of the on ɪɧɩɬɢɤɨɪɢɞɨɪ ɬɪɚɧɫɩɨɬɧɢɹ Citizens andParliament. ɩɪɟɡɢɞɟɧɬɚɤɴɦɧɚɪɨɞɚɢɩɚɪɥɚɦɟɧɬɚ 1992.”]In Nation, the Address to 15January Macedonia. [“Bulgaria Bosnia and andHerzegovina, 1. 1992.” Croatia, RecognizesSlovenia, ɏɴɪɜɚɬɫɤɚ Bulgarian NationalIdea:Current Issues. PhilosophySustainable Development of ɢɨɨɢɬɧɭɬɣɢɨɨ ɪɚɡɜɢɬɢɟ ɭɫɬɨɣɱɢɜɨɬɨ ɧɚ ɮɢɥɨɫɨɮɢɹɬɚ Routledge. New York: Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press . Ɉɛɪɴɳɟɧɢɟɤɴɦɧɚɪɨɞɚ , ȻRɫɧɚɢɏɟɪɰɟɝɨɜɢɧɚɢɆɚɤɟɞɨɧɢɹ While Mythologies: Writing History and theWest ɴɝɪɤɬɧɰɨɚɧɢɞɟɹ ɧɚɰɢɨɧɚɥɧɚ Ȼɴɥɝɚɪɫɤɚɬɚ Balkan Tragedy:Chaos and Dissolution afterthe Cold War. ‘ ȼɇɸɃɨɪɤɟɩɨɞɩɢɫɚɧɚɞɟɤɥɚɪɚɰɢɹɡɚɢɡɝɪɚɠɞɚɧɟɧɚ ] Zhelju Zhelev. Plovdiv: ChristoG. Danov: 39-52. ] Zhelju Zhelev. Plovdiv: ChristoG. Danov: 97. ɘɝɨɫɥɚɜɫɤɚɬɚɚɪɦɢɹɧɚɥɚɝɚɩɨɥɢɬɢɱɟɫɤɢɪɟɲɟɧɢɹɫ ɪɦɧɦɩɟɫɚɚɚ ɚ ɚɚɚ ɫɬɪɚɧɚ ɧɚɲɚɬɚ ɡɚ ɩɪɟɞɫɬɚɜɚɬɚ ɉɪɨɦɟɧɹɦɟ ɂɡɬɨɤ ɴɝɪɹ ɪɡɚɚ ɟɚɢɢɨɬɚ ɚ ɋɥɨɜɟɧɢɹ ɧɚ ɧɟɡɚɜɢɫɢɦɨɫɬɬɚ ɩɪɢɡɧɚɜɚ Ȼɴɥɝɚɪɢɹ , 11.10. 1990.” [“WeWill Change of Image the – , 4. 7. 1991.” [“The Yugoslav Army 7.Imposes Army [“The 1991.” , 4. Yugoslav Ɂɚɩɚɞ .] Sofia: Bulgarika. ] Stara Zagora: Znanie. Zagora: ] Stara ] Zhelju Zhelev. Zhelju ] . . ’. [ [ President’s PublicAddressestothe President’s PublicAddressestothe ɛɴɟɢɤɦ ɧɚɪɨɞɚ ɤɴɦ Ɉɛɪɴɳɟɧɢɟ . [ ɢɢɢɚɢɧɟɢɡɛɨɪ ɐɢɜɢɥɢɡɚɰɢɨɧɧɟɧ Civilization Choice: Towards a . . Ɉɛɪɴɳɟɧɢɟɤɴɦɧɚɪɨɞɚ ɤɭɥɢ ɩɪɨɛɥɟɦɢ Ⱥɤɬɭɚɥɧɢ . [ President’s Public ɛɴɟɢɧɚ Ɉɛɪɴɳɟɧɢɹ  ɛɴɟɢɧɚ Ɉɛɪɴɳɟɧɢɹ  Ɉɛɪɴɳɟɧɢɹɧɚ . London and London . . , 26.10. ɟɜɴɜ Ɋɟɱ : . [ , 15. ɤɴɦ The 303 , CEU eTD Collection Zhelev, Zhelju. 1997b.“ [1992] 1997e. “ [1991] Zhelev, Zhelju. Zhelev, Zhelju. [1991] 1997d. “ Zhelev, Zhelju.[1991]1997d. Zhelev, Zhelju. [1991] 1997c. “ 1997c. Zhelev, Zhelju.[1991] Zhelev, Zhelju. [1991] 1997b. “ 1997b. Zhelev, Zhelju.[1991] Ɉɛɪɴɳɟɧɢɟɤɴɦɧɚɪɨɞɚ ɥɜɤɦ ɴɝɪɤɬɢɡɛɢɪɚɬɟɥɢ ɛɴɥɝɚɪɫɤɢɬɟ ɤɴɦ ɋɥɨɜɨ ɚ ɪɡɞɧɚ ɴɧɪɞɢ ɩɚɪɥɚɦɟɧɬɚ ɢ ɧɚɪɨɞɚ ɤɴɦ ɩɪɟɡɢɞɟɧɬɚ ɧɚ to Bulgarian PresidentialVoters, 29DecemberElections, In 1991.”] Ȼɴɥɝɚɪɢɹ the Citizens and Parliament. G.Christo Danov: 91-94. Public Addresses totheCitizens and Parliament. 1991”.] In AddressCandidate. Bulgarian to PresidentialVoters, 18DecemberElections, [“History Gives Us anUnique Chance. My Responsibilities asaPresidential ɢɡɛɢɪɚɬɟɥɢ ɧɚɢɟɬɤɬɤɧɢɚɡɩɪɟɡɢɞɟɧɬ ɡɚ ɤɚɧɞɢɞɚɬ ɤɚɬɨ ɚɧɝɚɠɢɦɟɧɬɢ Citizens and Parliament.] Plovdiv: Christo G. Danov: 84-8. ɧɚɩɪɟɡɢɞɟɧɬɚɤɴɦɧɚɪɨɞɚɢɩɚɪɥɚɦɟɧɬɚ In 1991.”] Nation, the Address 27October Constitutional Order. to in with the Full Compliance Will Proceed Power of Political [“The Transfer ɴɧɫɚɜɧɧɤɨɧɫɬɢɬɭɰɢɹɬɚ ɧɚ ɫɩɚɡɜɚɧɟ ɩɴɥɧɨ the CitizensandParliament ɩɚɪɥɚɦɟɧɬɚ ɢ ɧɚɪɨɞɚ ɤɴɦ ɩɪɟɡɢɞɟɧɬɚ ɧɚ AddressDemocratic Nation, Now. tothe Process In 11July 1991.”] [“Civil Peace Through Forthcoming Elections –This Is the Formula of the ɮɨɪɦɭɥɚɬɚɧɚɞɟɦɨɤɪɚɬɢɱɧɢɹɩɪɨɰɟɫ Citizens andParliament. ɩɪɟɡɢɞɟɧɬɚɤɴɦɧɚɪɨɞɚɢɩɚɪɥɚɦɟɧɬɚ , 29.12.1991.”[“The Whole Society Can Judge AddressMy Actions. Ɉɛɪɴɳɟɧɢɹɧɚɩɪɟɡɢɞɟɧɬɚɤɴɦɧɚɪɨɞɚɢɩɚɪɥɚɦɟɧɬɚ , ɡɨɢ ɚ ɪɡɞɧɧɊɩɛɢɚ Ȼɴɥɝɚɪɢɹ Ɋɟɩɭɛɥɢɤɚ ɧɚ ɩɪɟɡɢɞɟɧɬ ɡɚ ɢɡɛɨɪɢ ɂɫɬɨɪɢɹɬɚɧɢɩɪɟɞɥɚɝɚɭɧɢɤɚɥɧɚɜɴɡɦɨɠɧɨɫɬ Ƚɪɚɠɞɚɧɫɤɢɦɢɪɱɪɟɡɫɤɨɪɨɲɧɢɢɡɛɨɪɢ ] Zhelju Zhelev. Plovdiv: ChristoG. 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URL: http://www.setimes.com. Paging notavailable. Press Releases . URL: http://www.bankwatch.org/. Paging http://www.bankwatch.org/. not . URL: Bulgarian version. URL: version. Bulgarian 308 CEU eTD Collection Interview C: Darev,Interview Senior B:Official Head of “Roads” inand Sofia. Communications. inA:Krastev, Ministry of Expert Interview Transport the the Department Roads Executiveat AEBTRI Communications Personal and Interviews - the AgencyBulgarian (REA). International Sofia. Discussion B: Kovatchev, Center for Environmental Information and Education, and Information Environmental for Center Kovatchev, B: Discussion A: Discussion the representative of Medarova, Bulgarian environmental the NGO ‘For mladih savezHrvatske of KovacevicNacionalni Curin, E:and Interview representatives Society) Zagreb. DecemberSociety) 2002. Zagreb. (Healthy Drustvo Zdravo NGO Croatian the of representative D:Maric, Interview Bulgaria; Member.CEE Bankwatch Network September 2002. December 2001. Carriers’ Association. Sofia. December 2001. December 2001. Earth’. SeptemberEarth’. 2002. (Croatian National Council).Youth December 2002. 309 CEU eTD Collection Map 1: Pan-European Corridors CrossingMap 1:Pan-EuropeanCorridors Bulgaria Source: Ministry of Transport 2006, Appendix I.1. Maps andFigures 310 CEU eTD Collection Figure 1:Publicfor EUmembership support in Bulgaria 100 25 50 75 0 Sources 9619 9819 002001 2000 1999 1998 1997 1996 : EC 1998b, 2001; Alpha Research 2001 311 Source: Eurostatdatabase of crisis economic severe the and 1996-1997. oftransition years early the in restructuring industrial of intensity the to due excluded is period pre-1997 the from Data Note: (*) my calculation (in thousands tons of oil equivalent) Final Energy Consumption (in thousands tons of oil equivalent) Final Electricity Consumption (percentage change on previous period) Growth ofFinal Electricity Consumption (*) (percentage change on previous period) GDP Growth Table 2: Annual GDP Growth vs. Growth of Final Electricity Consumption in Bulgaria Sources: NEK 2004a: 6; Kozloduy NPP 2006: 2 (*) Unofficial data (deputy directorof the NEK’s National Dispatching Center, quoted in Share Year (percentage) Table 1: Share of the Kozloduy NPP in overall electricity production in Bulgaria 6 5 373 41.6 33.7 42.4 40.4 38 43.6 47.3 42.2 35 42.7 41 42.6 41.5 46 34* 36 42.4 50 1990 1991 1992 CEU eTD Collection 1993 1994 1995 1996 9904 8814857886118695936590269506 2224 2040207521092067215921392208 -0.9 4.5 3.2 -2.9 -8.3 -2 1.6 1.7 4.1 4.5 5.4 5.0 2.3 6.6 6.2 4.0 1998 1997 1999 1998 2000 Tables 1999 2001 2000 actualno.com 2002 2001 2003 2002 30.1.2008) 2004 2003 2005 2004 2005 2006 2007 312 Source: Eurostatdatabase states) EU (25 Croatia Romania Hungary Republic Czech Bulgaria states) EU (15 (kilogram of oil per GDPunitequivalent of EUR 1000) intensity of economy the Table 4. Energy Sources: Eurostat database; UCTE 2006 Electricity exports Total gross electricity generation (gigawatt hours) Table 3: Electricity inandProduction Exports Bulgaria - - 2011.24 543.58 533.64 566.61 579.58 642.04 600.51588.64 661.91 700.49 747.46 758.84 730.61740.62 747.99 802.51 1160.46 2142.05 184.85 187.65 189.48 188.42 195.69 190.53191.35 201.03 202.71 209.35 211.85 206.10205.38 211.33 215.42 1991 19921993199419951996199719981999200020012002 2003 20042005 - - 2134.27 1924.06 1174.52 CEU eTD Collection 239.89 231.34 230.39 234.98 227.58 224.16 214.94 208.76 209.71 206.51 207.56 204.89 - 204.89 206.51 207.56 209.71 214.94 208.76 224.16 234.98 227.58 230.39 239.89 231.34 - 1896.47 1134.12 2305.57 8017 8875 8335 5125 6620 8380 2001 2006 2002 2003 2004 2005 43968 - 1724.26 1071.96 2192.13 42679 680.43 407.97 390.74 386.93 488.33 442.27 450.01 441.03 452.67 436.79 - 441.03 452.67436.79 450.01 442.27 488.33 407.97 390.74386.93 680.43 1738.25 823.38 875.79 891.18874.42 883.88 888.39 868.41 952.09 969.47946.52 965.76 2326.00 42600 1793.32 2543.79 41621 1717.10 2392.23 44366 1638.27 2250.66 43934 1481.46 1986.60 1457.22 1931.10 1368.64 1930.01 1316.48 1804.30 1353.68 1769.19 1226.89 1595.28 1164.89 1582.41 313 Source: Eurostatdatabase (*) my calculation Bulgaria 10 New Member States EU (15 countries) electricity of generation) total gross (percentage (*) power of losses electric Table 5: Distribution

CEU eTD Collection 13.4 16.9 15.4 13.9 14.5 14.1 12.2 13.1 11 14 10.5 13.7 13.9 12.6 12.4 13 7.9 9 6.3 6.5 6.3 6.3 6.2 6.3 6.6 6.2 6.3 5.9 6.4 6.4 6.2 6.2 6.1 1990 6.3 1991 . 11.5 11.6 9 9.6 11.7 9.3 11.5 10.9 10.2 10 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 8.7 8.6 8.3 8.3 8.6 8.3 8.7 2002 2003 2004 2005 314