The Birth of the Democratic Party

Marc Lazar

On 14 October 2007, primaries took place to elect the representatives and political secretary of the Democratic Party (PD). According to official figures provided by the organizers of the election, 3,554,169 people voted, with 75.79 percent choosing Walter Veltroni as secretary. He, along with Romano Prodi and their friends, celebrated the results in Rome on the same evening. The PD seemed to see the light of day under the best possible conditions, but it also did so under peculiar conditions. The electors who chose the leaders of the party were not necessarily its future members, and they knew almost nothing about the party’s status, organization, program, or strategy. The PD primaries thus reflect a deep-seated trend that affects Western parties, yet they also diverge from this trend. Although there is an increasing ten- dency for primaries to be organized, they are usually held by parties already in existence and, in the vast majority of cases, involve only the members of that party.1 In Italy, the PD primaries were open to everyone and represented a decisive step in the creation of a new party through the merger of the Left Democrats (DS) and the Margherita-Democracy Is Liberty (Margherita). Such a merger is a risky and relatively rare undertaking in party systems that are characterized by division and fragmentation. The PD aims to rationalize the Italian political system by consolidat- ing bipolarism or, according to some of its creators, by eventually establishing a two-party system that would not only enable Italy to

Notes for this chapter begin on page 66. 52 Marc Lazar be governable, as public opinion desires, but also provide a response to the profound sense of malaise about contemporary democracy. Finally, for the left, the PD is part of a specifically Italian logic in that it aims to consolidate moderate forces and thereby prevent the reconstitution of a powerful political center. But it also claims to serve as an example to the whole of the European left. Piero Fassino, the DS party secretary from 2001 to 2007, explains it as follows: “The old tripolar framework, with the right, left, and center all trying to defeat each other, no longer works.”2 It is therefore important to retrace the gestation of this new, intriguing political party.

The Gestation of the Project and Its Acceleration at the Turn of 2006–2007

The origins of the PD can be traced back to the Olive Tree coalition (Ulivo), which emerged in February 1995 and gathered momentum in 2005–2006.3 The Ulivo was conceived as an adaptation to the new electoral law of 1993, which encouraged the formation of coalitions, and as an attempt to banish the ghosts of the 1994 defeat of the Progressive Alliance and the centrists of the Pact for Italy. On the one hand, the Ulivo expected electoral success by bringing together heterogeneous forces, with the risk, in case of victory, of encountering greater dif- ficulties in governing. On the other hand, it wanted to construct an original edifice with the former Christian Democrats and ex-Commu- nists, as well as with the socialists and Greens. The Ulivo had electoral successes (in the 1996 political elections, ambivalently in the 2002 administrative elections but more clearly in 2003 and 2004, in the 2004 European elections, and the 2005 regional elections), setbacks (in 1998 with the fall of the Prodi government), and outright failures (in the 2000 regional elections and 2001 political elections) due to recurrent internal splits. However, many actors worked for increased unity. From the DS, Michele Salvati proposed the creation of a democratic party, as did Giuliano Amato and Arturo Parisi, as early as 2003. In the summer, Prodi pushed for this to be in place for the European elections. In these elections in 2004, the United in the Olive Tree list—an alliance of the DS, the Margherita, the Italian Democratic Socialists (SDI), and the European Republicans Movement (MRE)—won 31.1 percent of the votes. The march toward unity continually came up against obstacles as the DS and the majority of the Margherita preferred a federation of parties. On 11 October 2004, Prodi proposed the formation of a Grand Democratic Alliance, which would present joint candidates in the 2005 regional elections. Within this alliance, the DS, the Margherita, the SDI, The Birth of the Democratic Party 53 and the MRE launched the Olive Tree Federation with its own president (Prodi), a presidential advisory group, and a federal council of 60 members. However, the parties remained hesitant. In April 2005, unitary lists of the Unione (the new name for Prodi’s alliance) were present in only 9 out of 14 regions holding elections. They were victorious, but this had a pernicious effect as results were positive both with and without unitary lists.4 The parties wanted to negotiate with a view to victory in 2006. Thus, the overwhelming majority of delegates from the Margherita lined up behind Francesco Rutelli to defend the autonomy of their organization against the advice of Parisi and the “Ulivisti.” The DS was more favorable to the idea of a merger but was nonethe- less very cautious. Moreover, there were striking divisions within the federation, for example, over the referendum on medically assisted procreation, which revealed the scale of conflict over secularism and led the socialists to withdraw from the move toward unity. To overcome these conflicts, Prodi suggested holding primaries to designate the candidate to stand against Silvio Berlusconi. A favorable ballot result on 16 October 2005 encouraged him to increase the pressure for unity for the 2006 elections. The Margherita and the DS were forced to follow. Prodi’s victory in the 2006 political elections, in which the unitary lists of the Unione won 31.3 percent of the votes for the lower house—more than the total of votes for the DS and the Margherita in the Senate—and the formation of united groups of representatives in the two houses led Prodi to increase the pressure in favor of a single party. His position was approved by the DS and the Margherita in July 2006. Some organizations from “civil society” were created in order to participate in the formation of the new party and joined it. On the instigation of Prodi, and with the approval of the leaders of the DS and the Margherita, a meeting was held on 6 and 7 October in Orvieto with the leaders of the Ulivo, who were now ready to form a new party. The meeting was boycotted by the left of the DS, while the former members of the Italian Popular Party (PPI) within the Margherita remained reticent. Introductory reports were presented by three academics from the three main factions of the future party and from three different generations. The Catholic historian Pietro Scop- pola dealt with the theme, “Why we need a new party”; the historian Roberto Gualtieri, the deputy director of the Gramsci Institute and a member of the DS, spoke of the new party’s “cultural and programmatic profile”; and Salvatore Vassallo, a professor of political science with Ulivista leanings, spoke about “party organization.” Vassallo’s proposals—in particular, on the use of primaries to designate the members of the constituent assembly of the new party—were criticized, mainly by the DS, whose leaders, especially Fassino, opposed 54 Marc Lazar what they called a “light party” several times over the months that followed. They defended the existing parties and the procedure of designating the candidates for the constituent assembly themselves. In other words, they wanted to preserve their roles and promote their own party officials.5 Following this, Prodi, who managed to reach an agreement with the leaders of the DS and the Margherita, named a committee of 13 (later reduced to 12) “wise men,” chosen because of their reputation and skills. Given the task of writing the manifesto of the Democratic Party, the committee members were also carefully chosen to represent the different political tendencies present. Published on 12 February 2007, the manifesto begins with the words, “We, the Democrats, love Italy.” In it, the center-left defends a vision of the nation that is open to Europe and the world and tolerant of immi- grants. The PD sees itself as a response to the risk of the decline threaten- ing Italy, the challenge of globalization, and the crisis of the left in both Italy and Europe. It claims to renovate not only Italian but also European political life, “giving life, with the PES [Party of European Socialists] and other reformists, to a new structure of political forces that will overcome the lack of political direction at the Continental level.” The fundamental values of the party are liberty, equality, peace, and the dignity of the person—core principles that “inspired the Republican Constitution” and are considered to be “the common patrimony of the whole country.” These values are the result of the convergence of several traditions—liberal, socialist, democratic Catholic—and the integration of proposals from the ecological, feminist, and civil rights lobbies. In setting out its vision of European, international, and domestic politics, the manifesto aims to encourage individual initiative while ensuring social justice, which requires welfare reform. It also defends secularism, “not as an anti-reli- gious ideology, nor even as the site of a presumed but illusory neutrality, but as the way in which respect and honor are given to the pluralism of cultural orientations and moral convictions; and as the recognition of the full citizenship … of all religions.” Finally, the manifesto announces that the open and federal PD will organize primaries to choose its leaders (with its national leader being the candidate to run the country) and its various candidates for the highest offices (as had become habitual for the center-left in the choice of its candidates in the regional and administrative elections or for the office of prime minister). This text, which was later criticized, ratified a compromise among the different tendencies but developed a clearly reformist orientation. Whoever approved it was already part of this compromise. Further- more, whoever paid a sum of money, the amount of which would be decided subsequently, would be able to participate in the designation of its governing bodies. The Birth of the Democratic Party 55

The Springtime of the Democratic Party

The next step in the constitution of the new party took place in the spring with the quasi-simultaneous congresses of the DS and the Margherita. The fourth DS congress took place in Florence from 19 to 21 April, with 543,907 registered voters, of whom 250,000 voted. Three motions confronted each other, crystallizing long-standing internal divisions. The first, presented by Fassino and entitled “For the Democratic Party,” was in favor of the dissolution of the DS and the birth of the PD and proposed the re-election of Fassino as political secretary. The second motion, “The Left for European Socialism,” which was tabled, among others, by Fabio Mussi, defended anchor- ing the DS to the socialist left and argued for a simple alliance with the Margherita, with Mussi as its candidate for political secretary. Lastly, the third motion, “For a New Democratic and Socialist Party,” which was presented by Gavino Angius and Mauro Zani, argued for a federation with the Margherita but insisted on the necessity of the PD remaining anchored to the left, in particular through affiliation with the PES. This final motion presented no candidate for political secretary. In his speech, Fassino explained that the PD would be “progressive, reformist, and reforming. A party that makes the historical values for which the left was born and lived—liberty, democracy, justice, equality, solidarity, work—meet up with the vocabulary of the new century: citizenship, rights, laicity, innovation, integration, merit, multiculturalism, equal opportunities, security, sustainability, and supranationalism.”6 He also sought to avoid a split in the party, but most of the signatories of the second motion decided to leave.7 The third motion demanded a revision of the manifesto and the DS’s membership in the PES, something that Fassino said he was in favor of, while cultivating a certain ambiguity over the matter in order not to create tensions with the Margherita, which opposed this move, from the very beginning. The DS emerged from the congress more resolute, as far as its project was concerned, yet it was weakened at the same time. Fassino, who won 75.6 percent of the votes, was comfortably re-elected as political secretary. Nevertheless, the Mussi motion won 15.0 percent of the ballot, while that of Angius and Zani won 9.3 percent. Once again, the DS was not able to prevent the departure of a minority, which, with Mussi, formed the Democratic Left (SD), taking with them 18 deputies, 10 senators, and 4 MEPs. In addition, three days after the end of the congress, Angius, claiming that he had received no assurances over the place of secularism in the PD or its affiliation with the PES, announced that he would not join the new party.8 56 Marc Lazar

The second federal congress of the Margherita took place from 20 to 22 April in Rome. Among the delegates, it is estimated that 60–62 percent were ex-PPI members, 28–30 percent were “Rutelliani,” and the “Parisiani” and “Diniani” accounted for the remaining 10 percent between them. Alone among the major personalities, Gerardo Bianco, the ex-general secretary of the PPI, came out against the PD and announced plans to reconstitute a political center with the goal of defending Catholic identity. Later, in September, Lamberto Dini and Willer Bordon refused to join the PD. The motion of Rutelli in favor of the PD was comfortably approved, but the power of the political secretary, a bone of contention, was somewhat reduced. Parisi and Bordon were beaten when they requested a secret ballot to elect the 98 members of the federal assembly of the party and the 118 members of the regional congresses, a measure permitted in the statutes that would allow factions to be dismantled. In addition, Bordon repeated his accusations over irregularities, especially over membership cards, a recurrent problem for the Margherita.9 In protest, they did not vote. When Fassino arrived at the Margherita congress to a standing ova- tion, Rutelli greeted him, saying, “We are already the same party. We share the same language, projects, and aims.” The two closed the congress with a final embrace.10 The two congresses accelerated the formation of the PD: originally planned for the 2009 European elections, it was now planned for sometime close to the end of 2007 and the beginning of 2008. The decision of the DS and the Margherita to merge and opinion polls favorable to the new party cannot hide the questions raised by the formation of the PD, which the congresses have come nowhere near to resolving. First, there are ideological and programmatic issues. How can the future unity of the party be achieved on essential social matters, such as the relationship between the laicity and the Church, the DICO (see Ceccarini’s chapter in this volume), the family, assisted fecundity, and, more generally, the relationship between science and ethics? Then there are questions of domestic, European, and international strategy. Which alliances should the new party forge in order to avoid the construction of too heterogeneous a coalition? Will it privilege links with moderate forces or the radical left, or will it prefer to stand alone? Should the PD position itself within the PES or the Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe (ALDE)? On this last point, during his party’s congress, Rutelli clearly stated that “joining the PES is impossible for the Margherita and would reduce rather than increase opportunities, even for the Democratic Party.” At the same time, however, he indicated his willingness to ally with the PES, stating that “with the PES … I would like to carry the European reformist and The Birth of the Democratic Party 57 innovative forces toward a new horizon.”11 For its part, the DS declared itself in favor of joining the PES and the Socialist International, while wanting these organizations to open themselves up to other currents, a change that Prodi also sought to encourage. There are also questions of organization. How should the PD be structured when the DS has great organizational experience and is essentially geographically con- centrated in central Italy, while within the Margherita diverse factions and practices co-exist, particularly those inherited from the Christian Democratic Party (DC) in the South, with its local notables and clien- telistic networks? How should the positions of party officials, a major preoccupation of the staff of the two party apparatuses, be distributed? How will party membership be organized? How will political tasks be assigned? Then there are questions of partisan cultures that remain very different between the DS, with its origins in part in the ex-PCI, and the Margherita, which is more heterogeneous but in which the weight of social Catholicism can be felt. How can a common past, shared references for the present, and future projects be constructed when the DS and the Margherita hold some similar values but also contrastive ones to which they remain strongly attached?12 Last but not least, who should be the leader of the PD when its manifesto clearly states that the political secretary of the party must be ready to fill the highest institutional positions in the country? Although these questions remain unanswered, the forward march of the PD continued, but not without controversy, notably over the date of the future birth of the party. On 23 May 2007, Prodi, along with the leaders of the DS and the Margherita, announced the creation of an “action committee,” which was named the 14 October Committee to reflect the date planned for the PD primaries. It was made up of 45 carefully chosen members, including the main leaders of the parties and ministers who represented the different viewpoints within the DS and the Margherita. Alongside them sat personalities from other political formations, such as ex-UDC Marco Follini and the ex-socialist Ottaviano Del Turco, and representatives from civil society, including the journalist and talk show host, Gad Lerner, the founder of the Slow Food movement, Carlo Petrini, and the former president of the Union of Italian Jewish Communities, Tullia Zevi. The work of the committee was influenced by the opposing strategies of its members and also by external circumstances. On 27 and 28 May, and then on 15 and 16 June, administrative elections were held with poor results for the parliamentary majority. Against this backdrop, Prodi outlined his plan once again during the committee’s meeting on 30 May. First, a constituent assembly would be elected, which would draw up the statutes and the manifesto of the new party, with a congress to follow in the 58 Marc Lazar spring of 2008. The president of the assembly would be the founder of the party—that is, Prodi himself—supported by a secretariat. Prodi also pressed his idea of nominating a coordinator of the PD, or even a “speaker,” which, in his eyes, would afford him the dual advan- tage of continuing in his functions as prime minister while exercising authority over the new party and thus avoiding a diarchy that could destabilize him. At the meeting, Prodi was subjected to a barrage of criticism. Rutelli and Fassino were in favor of immediately naming a true party leader: the former demanded that this leader be elected in parallel with the constituent assembly, while the latter preferred the nomina- tion to be made by the future constituent assembly, as did most party elites.13 At a meeting on 18 June, three days after the center-left’s poor showing in the second round of administrative elections, Prodi changed his position, and the 14 October Committee decided that the political secretary of the PD would be elected by the citizens. In linking the election of the members of the constituent assembly to the designation of the political secretary, the committee gave a political response to the discontent that was being expressed in the country. It also took note of a deep-seated trend, in both Italy and elsewhere, toward the personalization of politics. Calling on electors to choose both a constituent assembly and the new party leader was undoubtedly more likely to mobilize them than calling on them to choose just the former. The major infrastructure was in place. On 14 October 2007, exactly two years after the primaries that established Prodi as the candidate for the position of prime minister, the election of the constituent assembly of the PD would be based on lists linked to candidates for the post of political secretary. This system did not find favor with Veltroni or Rosy Bindi, who feared a confrontation between factions from the former parties. Nor did it find favor with personalities from civil society and local leaders such as Massimo Cacciari, the mayor of Venice, who feared that the parties would control the operation. Italy would be divided into 475 electoral colleges, and 100 signatures would be necessary to present a list of candidates.14 On 19 June, Dario Franceschini, the leader of the Margherita and the Olive Tree parliamentary group, declared that if Veltroni was a candidate for political secretary (opinion polls were extremely favorable to him), he would vote for him. This was a means, on the one hand, of posi- tioning himself in the forthcoming competition and, on the other, of symbolizing a wish to unite the different tendencies of the Margherita and the DS within the PD. On 10 July, the action committee explained the rules for the 14 Octo- ber election. The electorate would be composed of all Italian citizens The Birth of the Democratic Party 59 aged 16 or over, European citizens resident in Italy, and foreigners holding a residence permit who wished to participate in the process of forming the Democratic Party. The electors would have to pay a contribution of 5 euros or 1 euro for the under-25s (on 9 September, the committee, fearing a low turnout, lowered the contribution to 1 euro for all). The voters would be called upon to choose “members of the national assembly and, linked to that, the national political secretary of the PD” and “the members of the regional assemblies and, linked to that, the regional party secretaries.” For the Trentino-Alto Adige region, the “members of the provincial assemblies of Trento and Bolzano and their respective provincial secretaries” would be elected, and the two provincial assemblies would form the regional assembly that would then elect a co-coordinator. A national assembly of the party was con- voked to take place on 27 October, during which the president of the party, Prodi, would declare the political secretary of the party to be elected if he or she had obtained a majority of the votes. Otherwise, Prodi would organize a run-off between the first two candidates. The distribution of seats in the assembly would take place via existing electoral districts. Despite protests from the Ulivisti, the committee decided that several lists could support the same candidate. This could be interpreted as a means of ensuring representation in the constituent assembly for the different currents within the party apparatuses and—undoubtedly in a more marginal fashion—for those outside of these apparatuses. Such a decision seemed to confirm the analysis of the political scientist, Angelo Panebianco, who claimed that the PD was setting itself up as a “feudal party,” with each baron from the DS and the Margherita mobilizing his or her vassals.15 In order to be a candidate for the position of political secretary, between 2,000 and 3,000 signatures were needed, with at least 100 in five different regions.

The Candidates and the Campaign

On 27 June, Veltroni officially declared himself a candidate, with Fran- ceschini as his running mate for the position of vice-secretary. Vel- troni, who at the time was the mayor of Rome, visited Lingotto in Turin, an emblematic site in the North of Italy and a symbol of both the metalworking industry and its renewal. There he spoke of a peace- ful democracy without attacking his opponents; thus, he recognized the merits of the center-right government and defended Marco Biagi’s legacy.16 He denounced the conservatism of the left and pleaded for liberal reforms, and he also strongly emphasized the themes of the environment and the place of women and the young in society. 60 Marc Lazar

The candidature of Veltroni and Franceschini was originally supported by the majority of leadership groups within the DS and the Margherita in order to take control of the future party. The DS leaders did all they could to prevent a rival candidacy, particularly that of Pier Luigi Bersani, who declared his intention to run on 3 May. He recon- sidered after having been subjected to intense pressure and fell in behind Veltroni, but with his own program.17 The ex-PPI members and the Rutelliani from the Margherita also tried to dissuade other candidates from standing. In the Corriere della Sera of 12 July, the president of the Senate, Franco Marini, claimed that the Veltroni-Franceschini candidature was the idea of D’Alema and himself, a declaration that created some controversy. It is not too far-fetched to think that the leaderships were also using this to prepare for a rapid replacement of Prodi, who was considered to have run out of steam and whose government was unpopular. Such is the logic behind the manifesto of Rutelli, who did not hesitate to renew his criticism of the government and plead for alliances oriented more toward the center.18 Veltroni was not the only candidate. On 15 July, Rosy Bindi, the minister for the family, announced her candidature. She argued for a new, democratic, plural, responsible party, a “mature bipolarism, without ambiguities and clever maneuvers,” a new secularism, sus- tainable development, and a commitment to welfare, while strongly emphasizing the role of women. She was supported by the Ulivisti and Parisi as well as some former socialists. On 18 July, it was the turn of the 36-year-old journalist and blogger, Mario Adinolfi, to declare his candidacy, which he presented as that of an outsider from the new gen- eration. On 24 July, Enrico Letta, undersecretary to the prime minister and a Margherita official, announced that he was standing, not by calling a press conference or giving an interview, but through a video on the Internet. This was his way of portraying himself as a young, modern, dynamic “child of the eighties” (he was 41 years old). Letta and Veltroni both published books during the campaign, not only to set out their ideas, but also to present themselves as distinguished figures.19 Jacopo Gavazzoli Schettini, Enrico Andreoni, Lucio Cangini, and Amerigo Rutigliano also threw their hats into the ring, but in vain. The historical leader of the Radical Party, Marco Pannella, the econo- mist Pier Giorgio Gawronski (who made the fight against corruption and institutional reform his two major hobbyhorses), and Antonio Di Pietro of Italy of Values announced their candidatures at the last min- ute. In a controversial decision, those of Pannella and Di Pietro were rejected by the organizers because their parties had not taken part in the formation of the PD. On the other hand, the candidacy of the former head of the newspaper L’Unità, Furio Colombo, was accepted The Birth of the Democratic Party 61 with reservations as he had obtained the necessary signatures but had not provided the originals of them. Summoned to do so, the DS sena- tor threw in the towel. In the end, five candidates stood: Veltroni, Bindi, Letta, Gawronski, and Adinolfi. Very quickly the first three drew away from the others. Veltroni was the firm favorite, enjoying the support of the two parties and excellent opinion poll showings. The two others sought to position themselves in the PD in order to influence its future direction and, in the case of Letta, to lay down a marker for the future. The presence of Fran- ceschini, Bindi, and Letta demonstrates the scale of divisions among the ex-PPI, with each of the three trying to mobilize Catholics in their favor and to define the place of Catholic identity in the future party.20 The campaign was marked by a crossing of swords between the three main candidates, notably between Veltroni and Bindi. For example, a week before the vote, Bindi declared that people should “be vigilant, because original sin exists,” a statement that she later withdrew, while Letta denounced a “lapse of style” when Veltroni proposed that Berlusconi’s wife, Veronica Lario, should join the PD.21 However, these exchanges did not degenerate further. In this sense, when compared with other coun- tries, the Italian media’s portrayal of a bitter and lively campaign must be put into perspective. The contest never reached the level of violent controversy seen, for example, in the French Socialist Party’s primaries to designate their candidate for the 2006 presidential elections.22 It is true that there were no deep divisions over the direction of the new party, even if there were differing opinions about it. In addition, the firm favorite, Veltroni, followed a two-pronged strategy: on the one hand, he sought to confirm himself as a unifying force for the center- left while asserting his authority; on the other hand, he wanted to raise his profile as a true political leader of the country (“I speak here today not as a party man, nor even as a politician. I speak as an Italian,” he stated in his Lingotto speech). To unite the PD and the center-left, Veltroni almost never took part in polemical exchanges and refused all public debate with his competitors. Such prudence was a consistent feature of his campaign. For instance, when he came out in favor of a French-style voting system, he maintained a certain ambiguity on this deeply divisive subject and remained elusive: on calls for a referendum on electoral law, he declared, on 9 July, “I support it, but I’m not sign- ing”—a position that changed over the summer as he declared himself increasingly in favor of it. Carving out a position for himself, Veltroni criticized the traditional left and, especially toward the end of the summer, tried to distance himself from Prodi in order to demonstrate his originality and to avoid association with the government’s unpopular- ity. Two controversies broke out, first over taxation, which Veltroni 62 Marc Lazar wanted to lower quickly, and then over the reduction of the number of ministers. As a national political leader, Veltroni portrayed himself as the best candidate for dialogue with the center-right. On 29 June, he said about Berlusconi, “He’s made many mistakes, but he’s also done some things that were right.”23 Elsewhere, Veltroni attempted to com- pensate for his strong Roman connections by courting the North with highly symbolic gestures, such as declaring his candidacy in Turin and going to the North-East for his first visit as a candidate at the start of July, where he emphasized the importance of innovation and the fight against crime. In addition, he sought to promote himself as an international statesman, invoking several times the left’s situation in Europe and traveling to Paris on 26 August.

The 14 October Election

Voters were called upon to elect the members of the constituent assembly and the regional constituent assemblies on 14 October. In 457 colleges, 2,271 lists competed against each other, with 1,181 supporting Veltroni under three headings—“Democrats for Veltroni,” supported by the principal leaders of the DS and the Margherita; “With Veltroni: The Environment, Innovation, and Jobs,” which brought together people from various backgrounds under the leadership of Giovanna Melandri; and “The Left for Veltroni”—and other local lists. Supporters of Rosy Bindi united under the “With Rosy Bindi, the Real Democrats” list, which stood in 471 colleges. Supporters of Letta cam- paigned under the “Democrats for Enrico Letta” list.24 The leaders of the PD, like many observers, wondered how many people would cast their votes on 14 October, as the campaign seemed lackluster and opinion polls predicted a low turnout. However, on 14 October, the numbers surpassed all forecasts, and in some cases poll- ing stations were overwhelmed. In total, 3,536,317 people voted, a figure far higher than the number of those registered with the DS and the Margherita, but lower than the turnout for the October 2005 vote to elect the center-left candidate. These 3.5 million voters represented 29.6 percent of the electorate of the Olive Tree list in the political elections of 2006, which means that almost one voter in three turned out. The geographical distribution of voting reveals some important variations. Of the total number of voters, 36.4 percent were in the North, 23.7 percent in Central Italy, and 39.9 percent in the South and the Islands. Compared to the votes in favor of the Olive Tree list, the turnout was weak in the North (20.2 percent). In the “red regions” of Central Italy, it was above 30 percent in Emilia-Romagna and Umbria, The Birth of the Democratic Party 63 but below the national average in Tuscany and in the Marches. In the South, however, the turnout was far above the national average.25 This demonstrates the strength of the DS in Central Italy and of the Margherita in the South; both parties were able to bring their sympathizers and supporters to the polls. On the other hand, it also illustrates the weakness of the party in the North of the country (turnout was lower in Piedmont, Lombardy, Veneto, and Liguria than in Cam- pania, Apulia, or Calabria).26 Opinion polls show that turnout was low among the young: the under-34s accounted for only 19 percent of voters, with 32 percent aged between 34 and 54, and 49 percent over 54 years old, according to ISPO, while 12 percent of voters were under 30 according to Demos-Eurisko.27 Also, 53 percent of voters came from the DS, 29 percent were from the Margherita, and 18 percent came from other parties of the center-left or were undecided or abstainers until then. When questioned on whom they supported politically, 30 percent said they had no precise political preference, and one in five declared themselves to be sympathizers of Beppe Grillo.28 The results were published after much delay and were sometimes challenged. Lists supporting Veltroni were comfortable winners, while those of Bindi and Letta finished neck and neck some ways behind. The other two candidates were totally marginalized, and nobody was elected from their lists. The geographic distribution of votes for the Bindi lists corresponds in part—but only in part—to areas of strength of the ex-DC and the Ulivisti within the Margherita. Fifty-four percent of Bindi’s electors were women.29 Letta, too, performed well in certain constituencies in the North and the South and among Italians abroad. He was also attractive to the young since, according to the ISPO opinion poll published in Corriere della Sera on 16 October, 31 percent of his voters were under 34 years old (the figures were 29 percent for Bindi and 12 percent for Veltroni, all lists combined). Walter Veltroni was comfortably installed as secretary of the PD. The “Democrats for Veltroni” list won 43.66 percent of the vote and 1,483 delegates, with most of those elected having links to the DS and the Margherita. The regional results reveal the strength of the DS, but also that of the ex-PPI current in the Margherita. The results for the “With Veltroni: The Environment, Innovation, and Jobs” list were ambivalent but reasonably well spread across the country. “The Left for Veltroni” achieved good results in Piedmont 1, Lazio 1, Valle d’Aosta, Tuscany, Umbria, and in the Marches, but it was very weak in the few districts in which it stood in the South. On the other hand, it won more delegates than the “With Veltroni: The Environment, Innovation, and Jobs” list—226 as opposed to 172—and will form the left minority within the assembly. The other lists obtained more than 16 percent 64 Marc Lazar of the votes. Remarkable scores in Campania and good showings in Lombardy 1, Lombardy 3 Lazio 2, Sardinia, and overseas can be explained by specific local situations and notably the absence of other lists, for example, “Democrats for Veltroni” in Campania or “The Left for Veltroni” in Lazio 2, Lombardy, Sardinia, and overseas. Thus, it is difficult to predict the tendencies of the 430 elected representatives in the constituent assembly.

Conclusion

In spite of some structural weaknesses (the vote among the young and in the North of Italy), the size of the turnout for the 14 October elections has enabled the PD to announce its arrival on the political scene and eventually, perhaps, to kick-start a positive development. It has also had an effect on the center-right as Berlusconi, in his own manner, has also decided to create a new party. Without doubt, it illustrates the vitality of what we may call participatory democracy.30 The election has relaunched the debate in political science over the evolution of parties as well as that on the current pertinence of Stein Rokkan’s theory of social cleavages. In a way, it may confirm the arguments of Richard Katz and Peter Mair, who contend that primaries marginalize the role of voters and give greater autonomy to leaders. At the same time, it also contradicts them, for it illustrates, once again, the weight of political cultures, organizations, and territories, and the desire for involvement on the part of members and sympathizers.31 The result of the primaries has undoubtedly given legitimacy to Veltroni as political secretary, but it has not resolved all of the problems. The PD has been born. It has a name and an emblem, which was unveiled in November, but everything remains to be decided: its statutes, alliances, positions on delicate issues, organization, conditions of membership, identity, values—even its finances. In the Milan constituent assembly on27 October, Veltroni emphasized his reformist ambitions. He also laid out his concept of a federal, plural party of citizen voters, while Prodi’s supporters argued for a membership party. The PD is a melting pot, as the composition of the constituent assembly demonstrates: 45.8 percent of delegates come from the DS, 27 percent from the Margherita, and 27.2 percent from elsewhere, while 59.2 percent have no previ- ous elected mandate. These representatives, the future party officials, have convergent views on economic and social matters. However, they remain very divided over questions of the PD’s affiliation at the European level, its alliances within Italy, and its stand on ethical matters. The Catholic religion plays a crucial role in framing the values of The Birth of the Democratic Party 65 former DS and Margherita members (57 percent of delegates say they are Catholic, but 47 percent never go to mass).32 As for the political secretary, the moment of truth has arrived. The day after his election, on 15 October, Veltroni spoke of “discontinu- ity” and the necessity for the government to undertake reforms.33 He sought to set out his position on all topical issues, such as crime, in order to show his determination to influence public debate. But his margin for maneuver is narrow. He has assured Prodi of his loyalty and his desire to see Prodi serve out his term of office, for he needs time to build up the PD and prepare it for future elections. But he must also resolve the dilemma faced, in comparable circumstances, by Nicolas Sarkozy with Jacques Chirac and Gordon Brown with Tony Blair. How can Veltroni embody a break with the past while being associated with the policies of Prodi, who never fails to remind everyone that he is still the head of the government and the parliamentary majority, as well as president of the PD? Veltroni was building up an image of a man for the future, someone different from Prodi and an architect of real change, which was, in essence, a strong criticism of the current government. For example, he took the initiative to propose a new electoral law drawn up, notably, by Vassallo, who was seeking an agreement with Berlusconi and who created unrest in both his own party and the opposition.34 Above all, Veltroni was aiming to free himself from his original supporters and to put his own stamp on the party. To do this, he recruited his own team. At the Milan assembly, he created three 100-member working groups on the topics of ethical codes, values, and statues. The first proposals from the last, which aimed to found the party on totally new bases, were immediately highly controversial.35 On 4 November, Veltroni named the 17-member executive board of the PD, pointing out that 9 of the members are women, that they are new to politics and young (the average age is 47), and that most of them come from the North. He failed to mention that 8 of them come from the DS and 7 from the Margherita (only 2 are independents). Veltroni was seeking to sweep away the historical leaders of the DS and the Margherita and to promote fresh talent. But the unanswered question was whether he would be able to do this at every level of the party and whether he would be able to count on the support of the 20 regional secretaries (18 men, 12 ex-DS, 6 from the Margherita, and 2 from elsewhere). Would the DS and Margherita “party barons” allow themselves to be pushed out, even if, like Fassino, who was named the EU’s spe- cial envoy to Burma on 6 November, they were given other political responsibilities in exchange? How could the conservatism of the DS and Margherita functionaries, who sought to preserve their positions 66 Marc Lazar

or to channel their resources into the PD, be challenged? How would Veltroni be able to manage the different tendencies within the party, which, despite denials, reasserted themselves after the Milan assembly?36 How could the representation of minorities be guaranteed when Bindi and Parisi were already denouncing the lack of internal democracy? Would the political secretary and his supporters manage to overcome the historical structures of the DS and the Margherita (which also originally wanted to get rid of factions) and unite the different leanings in order to open the PD up to people from outside the political cultures of the DS and the Margherita? More generally, the PD would have to convince people that it was indeed new and could bring about real improvements in the functioning of democracy, something that Ital- ians were still skeptical about since only 37.3 percent of them thought that the birth of the new party was a positive thing, compared to the nearly 50 percent who thought that it would change nothing.37 Such is the paradox of the PD: this newcomer, the result of an innovative and totally new gestation, has the characteristics of both the old and the new, yet no one knows which of the two will triumph over the other.

— Translated by Nicholas Parsons

Notes

1. See R. Katz and P. Mair, “Changing Models of Party Organization and Party Democracy: The Emergence of the Cartel Party,” Party Politics 1, no. 1 (1995): 5–28. 2. P. Fassino, Le Monde, 23 May 2007. 3. See J. Hopkin, “Dalla Federazione all’Unione alle primarie: Il cammino del centro- sinistra,” in Politica in Italia: Edizione 2006, ed. G. Amyot and L. Verzichelli (Bologna: Il Mulino, 2006), 87–107. 4. S. Vassallo, “Le elezioni regionali: Quando vincere troppo può essere dannoso,” in Amyot and Verzichelli, Politica in Italia, 65–86. 5. See, for example, the interview with Fassino by N. Andriolo, L’Unità, 9 Octo- ber 2006; G. Amato and P. Fassino, Caffè Europa, 26 October 2006. 6. P. Fassino, “Relazione introduttiva al 4° Congresso nazionale dei Democratici di Sinistra: Firenze, 19–21 aprile 2007,” http://www.dsonline.it. 7. F. Mussi, L’Unità, 19 April 2007. 8. G. Luzi, La Repubblica, 25 April 2007. 9. See C. Baccetti, I postdemocristiani (Bologna: Il Mulino, 2007). 10. C. Fusani, La Repubblica, 22 April 2007; F. Martini, La Stampa, 23 April 2007. 11. F. Rutelli, Corriere della Sera, 20 April 2007. The Birth of the Democratic Party 67

12. On all of these questions, see, notably, Baccetti, I postdemocristiani; L. Bardi, P. Ignazi, and O. Massari, I partiti italiani (Milan: Ed. Egea, 2007); R. Mulé, Dentro i DS (Bologna: Il Mulino, 2007); G. Pasquino, “Italy: A Tale of Two Parties,” in When Parties Prosper: The Uses of Electoral Success, ed. K. Law- son and P. H. Merkl (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2007), 275–294; F. Ramella, Cuore rosso? Viaggio politico nell’Italia di mezzo (Rome: Donzelli, 2005). See also I. Diamanti, La Repubblica, 22 April 2007. 13. M. Guerzoni, Corriere della Sera, 31 May 2007. 14. G. Luzi, La Repubblica, 19 June 2007. 15. A. Panebianco, Corriere della Sera, 3 July 2007. 16. Marco Biagi, a government consultant on labor market reform, was assassi- nated by the Red Brigades in 2002. 17. See La Repubblica, 23 June 2007; G. De Marchis, La Repubblica, 4 July 2007; C. Tito, La Repubblica, 10 July 2007. 18. F. Rutelli, Europa, 13 July 2007. 19. E. Letta, In questo momento sta nascendo un bambino (Milan: Rizzoli, 2007); W. Veltroni, La nouva stagione: Contro tutti i conservatorismi (Milan: Rizzoli, 2007). 20. See F. Garelli, “Questione cattolica e Partito democratico,” Il Mulino, no. 5 (2007): 805–813. 21. G. De Marchis, La Repubblica, 9 October 2007. 22. B. Dolez and A. Laurent, “Une primaire à la française: La désignation de Ségolène Royal par le parti socialiste,” Revue française de science politique 57, no. 2 (2007): 133–161. 23. G. Luzi, La Repubblica, 30 June 2007. 24. Tables C1 and C2 of the documentary appendix in this volume provide the details of the votes obtained by the various lists presented on the occasion of the Democratic Party’s primary elections. 25. I. Diamanti, La Repubblica, 18 October 2007. 26. G. De Rita, Corriere della Sera, 23 October 2007. 27. I. Diamanti, La Repubblica, 28 October 2007. 28. R. Mannheimer, Corriere della Sera, 16 October 2007. 29. ISPO, Corriere della Sera, 16 October 2007. 30. I. Diamanti, “La democrazia degli interstizi: Società e partiti in Europa dopo la caduta del Muro,” Rassegna italiana di sociologia, no. 3 (2007): 387–411. 31. L. Bardi and M. Tarchi, eds., Partiti e caso italiano (Bologna: Il Mulino, 2006). 32. L. Fusano, P. Natale, N. Pasini, P. Segatti, and C. Vezzosi, “Ricerca sui delegati all’Assemblea Costituente Nazionale del PD,” survey conducted by the Depart- ment of Social and Political Studies, University of the South of Milan, to which 822 delegates responded. I would like to thank Nicola Pasini for communicat- ing the preliminary results of the research to me. 33. R. Mannheimer, Corriere della Sera, 16 October 2007. 34. On this question, see the chapter by Gianfranco Baldini in this volume. 35. G. De Marchis, La Repubblica, 18 December 2007. 36. U. Rosso, La Repubblica, 27 October 2007. 37. Demos-La Repubblica report in Il Venerdì di Repubblica, 14 December 2007.