3 ALEMANNO’S SURPRISING VICTORY IN ROME Giovanni Di Franco Gianni Alemanno’s 2008 victory in Rome caused great surprise, given that up until a few hours before the election it seemed certain that he would become a minister in the new Berlusconi government, as it was generally assumed that the results of the battle for the Campidoglio were a foregone conclusion. For the first time, a politician belonging to a party originating from the old Movimento Sociale Italiano (MSI, Italian Social Movement) took on the role of mayor of Rome. In 1993, Gianfranco Fini, then leader of the MSI, ran for mayor but was defeated in the second ballot by Francesco Rutelli himself. For the 15 years since then, the capital had been a stronghold of the center-left, which remained in power primarily due to the success of its mayors, Rutelli and Walter Veltroni (two terms each, even though the second term of the latter lasted only two years). In 2006, Alemanno was roundly defeated in the first round by Veltroni, winning barely 37.1 percent of the votes. How was such a reversal of support among the Roman elec- torate possible in little over two years? Betrayal or Demobilization of the Center-Left Roman Electorate? Many political commentators1 have interpreted Alemanno’s election as a defeat for Veltroni and the Partito Democratico (PD, Democratic Party), which paid dearly for the decision to run alone in the general Notes for this chapter begin on page 114. 100 Giovanni Di Franco elections without the support of the radical left. From the point of view of the latter, it was Rutelli himself who, as a prominent member of the PD, paid the price for his choices and political relations, above all his personal relationship with the Catholic world. For these rea- sons, radical left voters allegedly punished him at the polls by voting for his adversary, Alemanno, whereas in the second ballot for the pro- vincial elections, they voted “loyally” for Nicola Zingaretti. For others, what made the difference was the electoral agenda. In this case, the center-right candidate was better at interpreting the needs of the voters, who expressed a strong desire to break with previous gov- ernments, which Rutelli certainly could not guarantee, being directly involved with the previous four local governments. The methods used to select Rutelli as the PD’s candidate also came under scrutiny. As the PD was the party of the primary elections, why did it not resort to this tool of direct democracy, instead of allowing the decision to be made by party leaders? Perhaps it was taken for granted that Rutelli offered the best chance to succeed, since his previous two terms had met with the approval of a large part of public opinion. On the other hand, it was exactly Rutelli’s long-term experience that should have set off some alarms with the leaders of the PD at a time when the public had shown strong signs of anti-politics and aversion to the political “caste.” In order to interpret the results of the Rome local elections, which with their discordant results—Zingaretti’s victory in the province and Rutelli’s defeat in the local council elections—caused great surprise and controversy, the following sections will introduce two interpre- tations. The first hypothesis is that the super-election day (i.e., the concurrence of general and local government elections) prevented the center-left candidates from winning the first round because the turn- out in the local government elections was unusually high. It is worth remembering that in the previous local elections in Rome, which took place a month after the general election in 2006, there was a turnout of 66 percent of the electorate. In 2008, in concurrence with the gen- eral elections, voting increased by 8.1 percentage points.2 The second hypothesis regards the interpretation of the voting results: our own empirical studies3 support our belief that Alemanno’s victory, and, more generally, the success of all the center-right can- didates in the second ballots, was due primarily, if not entirely, to the increase in abstentions registered between the first and second rounds. On this occasion, the center-left voters, demoralized by the results of the general election, abstained. By contrast, the center-right voters, including voters of parties that in the first round were not aligned with any coalitions supporting the candidates of the Popolo della Libertà (PdL, People of Freedom), were galvanized by the results Alemanno’s Surprising Victory in Rome 101 of the general elections, thereby generating further impetus to put a center-right representative in the Campidoglio and Palazzo Valentini, headquarters of the Rome provincial council. The “Rome Model” It is not possible to understand the upheaval caused by the election of Alemanno without taking into account the previous 15 years of local government. The linking thread through this long period is the leadership of Goffredo Bettini, éminence grise and main organizer of the center-left councils in Rome, who, along with mayors Rutelli and Veltroni, created the so-called Rome model. In order to explain the nature of the “Rome model,” it is useful to refer to economic data covering the years of administration.4 From 2000 to 2006, the city council granted planning permission for build- ings equal to 50 million square meters. In the same period, 19 bil- lion euros were made available for building investment, involving the employment of 275,000 workers. In 2004, the gross domestic product (GDP) of the capital rose three times more than the rest of the country (4.1 percent compared to 1.3 percent nationally). From 2001 to 2006, the rapid growth of the Roman economy coincided with the longest period of zero growth in the national GDP. Rome’s success was under- pinned by growth in services and industry. Employment rates also grew: between 2001 and 2004, they rose by +10.3 percent (with the national average at +3.8 percent). The GDP in Rome continued to grow more than the national average in 2007 as well. The essence of the “Rome model” is a system of alliances and coop- eration between institutions, entrepreneurs, and other civil society actors. The values that underpin the alliance are social cohesion and tolerance, which in turn promote practices of widespread participation and direct democracy. Thanks to this system, the capital underwent a process of deep economic restructuring, aiming above all at con- solidating its tertiary sector. The merit of this process is evidenced not only in the positive results obtained in the long run, but also in the fact that they were achieved in stark contrast to an economic and political climate deeply marked by the specter of an economic reces- sion. Economic, demographic, and social data demonstrate that Rome is anything but a city in decline. On the contrary, it has increased its resident population, not only as a result of migration, but also due to a positive natural increase, and it has closed the gap in rank and prestige with other major cities, which are historically better equipped with services, industrial networks, and infrastructures. 102 Giovanni Di Franco An analysis of the make-up of Rome businesses reveals two strengths: first, economic activities run by women have increased at an average annual rate of 2.6 percent since 2000; second, the directors and shareholders of foreign companies5 today number over 23,600, with an average annual increase since 2000 of 12.5 percent. Com- mercial activities have accompanied, and sometimes preceded, the development of the city, thus reinforcing the image of an expanding metropolis that attracts as much new production activities as it does new citizens. Urban and economic planning is guaranteed by the new town planning scheme for Rome. Approved at the start of 2008, after decades of debate, it allows each of the 19 wards6 to develop resi- dential estates, rail links, and services. The vitality of Rome can also be measured by a massive and constant growth in tourism; indeed, the culture-tourism binomial is an oft-cited “best practice” of the local economy. In 2006, the culture on offer attracted over 23 million tourists, equivalent to a daily average of 63,000 visitors. To the positive results of industrial and commercial activity, we should add the even more flattering results of cultural activity, which have made Rome the new international center for shows and exhibi- tions. Expansion within the last few years has been startling. From 2001 to 2007, tourism increased at a constant rate of 12 percent annu- ally. Shows and concerts grew by 90 percent. The Auditorium Parco della Musica, which opened in 2002 amid thousands of complaints questioning its worth, within five years had attracted more spectators than any other cultural institution in Europe. Tourism resulting from conferences and trade fairs doubled in those same years. Veltroni was fundamental in achieving these results. The “Veltroni phenomenon” has at least two aspects—the local and the national, or even the international, given his popularity abroad, as shown by the covers of foreign weekly news magazines.7 At a local level, he was credited with making the city’s outskirts safer and more attractive to live in. Veltroni was seen as a man of order, without having to resort to the shows of strength put on by other mayors (as was the case, e.g., with Sergio Cofferati in Bologna). During the Veltroni years, Rome was seen by visitors and residents as the safest capital in Europe, along with Lisbon.8 At an international level, Veltroni took on the role of master of ceremonies in countless cultural displays put on by the city.