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World Bank Document Document of The World Bank Public Disclosure Authorized Report No: 29806-BR IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION REPORT (SCL-3916A CPL-39160) ON A LOAN Public Disclosure Authorized IN THE AMOUNT OF US$99 MILLION TO THE FEDERATIVE REPUBLIC OF BRAZIL FOR A BELO HORIZONTE METROPOLITAN TRANSPORT DECENTRALIZATION TRANSPORT Public Disclosure Authorized December 21, 2004 Finance, Private Sector and Infrastructure Department Public Disclosure Authorized Brazil Country Management Unit Latin America and the Caribbean Regional Office CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS (Exchange Rate Effective October 28, 2004) Currency Unit = Brazilian Reais (R$) R$ 2.88 = US$ 1 US$ 0.35 = 1 R$ FISCAL YEAR January 1 December 31 ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS AMBEL Metropolitan Assembly of the Belo Horizonte Metropolitan Region BHMR Belo Horizonte Metropolitan Region BHBUS Plan to restructure the municipal bus system BHTRANS Belo Horizonte Municipal Transport And Transit Company (Empresa de Transporte e de Trânsito de Belo Horizonte) CAS Country Assistance Strategy CBTU Brazilian Urban Railway Company (Companhia Brasileira de Trens Urbanos) CMU Country Management Unit CTC Centralized Traffic Control DER-MG Transport Directorate (Direção de Transportes) responsible for state roads and intermunicipal bus services EIRR Economic Internal Rate of Return EMU Electric Multiple Unit GOB Government of Brazil ICR Implementation Completion Report IMF International Monetary Fund NPV Net Present Value METROMINAS Company expected to take over STU-BH (formerly called TMBH) PIU Project Implementation Unit RAP Resettlement Action Plan PSR Project Supervision Report RTCC Regional Transportation Coordination Commission SAR Staff Appraisal Report SEAIN State Secretariat for Foreign Affairs STU-BH Belo Horizonte Subdivision of CBTU TMBH Trem Metropolitano de Belo Horizonte S.A. TOR Terms of Reference TRANSCON Bus operator of the Municipality of Contagem Vice President: David de Ferranti Country Director Vinod Thomas Sector Manager Jose Luis Irigoyen Task Team Leader/Task Manager: Jorge Rebelo BRAZIL BELO HORIZONTE METROPOLITAN TRANSPORT DECENTRALIZATION PROJECT CONTENTS Page No. 1. Project Data 1 2. Principal Performance Ratings 1 3. Assessment of Development Objective and Design, and of Quality at Entry 3 4. Achievement of Objective and Outputs 5 5. Major Factors Affecting Implementation and Outcome 14 6. Sustainability 16 7. Bank and Borrower Performance 17 8. Lessons Learned 21 9. Partner Comments 23 10. Additional Information 29 Annex 1. Key Performance Indicators/Log Frame Matrix 31 Annex 2. Project Costs and Financing 32 Annex 3. Economic Costs and Benefits 34 Annex 4. Bank Inputs 38 Annex 5. Ratings for Achievement of Objectives/Outputs of Components 40 Annex 6. Ratings of Bank and Borrower Performance 41 Annex 7. List of Supporting Documents 42 Project ID: P006564 Project Name: BELO H M.TSP Team Leader: Jorge M. Rebelo TL Unit: LCSFT ICR Type: Core ICR Report Date: December 21, 2004 1. Project Data Name: BELO H M.TSP L/C/TF Number: SCL-3916A; CPL-39160 Country/Department: BRAZIL Region: Latin America and the Caribbean Region Sector/subsector: Roads and highways (47%); Railways (46%); Central government administration (7%) Theme: Access to urban services for the poor (P); Decentralization (P); Pollution management and environmental health (S) KEY DATES Original Revised/Actual PCD: 10/26/1994 Effective: 04/19/1996 04/19/1996 Appraisal: 04/24/1995 MTR: 04/19/1998 07/18/2002 Approval: 06/29/1995 Closing: 12/31/2001 06/30/2004 Borrower/Implementing Agency: FED REPUBLIC/BRAZIL/CBTU Other Partners: STAFF Current At Appraisal Vice President: David de Ferranti Shahid J. Burki Country Director: Vinod Thomas Gobind T. Nankani Sector Manager: Jose Luis Irigoyen Asif Faiz Team Leader at ICR: Jorge M. Rebelo Jorge M. Rebelo ICR Primary Author: Jorge M. Rebelo; Elisabeth Goller 2. Principal Performance Ratings (HS=Highly Satisfactory, S=Satisfactory, U=Unsatisfactory, HL=Highly Likely, L=Likely, UN=Unlikely, HUN=Highly Unlikely, HU=Highly Unsatisfactory, H=High, SU=Substantial, M=Modest, N=Negligible) Outcome: S Sustainability: L Institutional Development Impact: SU Bank Performance: S Borrower Performance: S QAG (if available) ICR Quality at Entry: S Project at Risk at Any Time: Yes 3. Assessment of Development Objective and Design, and of Quality at Entry 3.1 Original Objective: 3. Assessment of Development Objective and Design, and of Quality at Entry 3.1 Original Objective: The broad objectives of the Belo Horizonte Metropolitan Transport Decentralization Project (Ln.3916-BR) were: (a) the development of an integrated urban transport system for the Belo Horizonte Metropolitan Region (BHMR) under a Regional Transportation Coordination Commission (RTCC) established to coordinate and recommend common policies on pricing, regulation, financing, project evaluation and selection; (b) the completion and decentralization of the Belo Horizonte Subdivision of the Brazilian Urban Rail Company (STU-BH) from the Federal to the State and municipal levels; (c) the reduction of the environmental (mainly air quality and noise) impacts on the BHMR due to motor vehicles and the promotion of non-motorized transport modes; and (d) the development of special strategies and actions to improve the accessibility of the low-income population to employment centers, health and education facilities. These objectives reflected essential priorities of the urban transport sector in Brazil and were consistent with the Bank’s 1993 Country Assistance Strategy (CAS) which put emphasis on efficient resource allocation, increased efficiency in the public sector and the appropriate targeting and delivery of support systems to the poor. Of particular importance is that those objectives were realistic, even if slightly complex and somewhat risky, given the institutional changes required. 3.2 Revised Objective: The objectives remained the same until loan closing and no revision took place. However, the new Federal Government, that took office in January 2003, reviewed the original decentralization model because of the delays in the completion of the works and in the full modal integration, which in turn slowed down the expected rise in ridership and, consequently, increased the operating subsidy requirements. Since the State and the Municipality of Belo Horizonte were not willing to pay such subsidies without the completion of the works and most of the delays were due to the lack of adequate budgets to the project by the Federal Government, the latter proposed a gradual decentralization model to mitigate those problems. The inadequate budgetary resources were mainly the consequence of a lack of fiscal space, causing budget restrictions in all investment projects in light of the macroeconomic crisis that affected the country and the State after the Argentine crisis. For more information see Section 5.1. The Bank also encouraged a broader private sector participation in the project through a study which evaluated the options of concessioning the system. As both the new decentralization model and broader private sector participation in the system were consistent with the relatively broad project objectives, and with the objectives of the CAS, no restructuring was deemed necessary. 3.3 Original Components: The project comprised three inter-related components: (a) an Infrastructure and Equipment component to help build (i) the rail extension of STU-BH and the additional stations required to enhance modal integration; (ii) the transfer terminals and physical accesses required for the actual integration between buses, rail, pedestrians, automobiles and bicycles; and (iii) a centralized road traffic signal control system to improve traffic management and control at about 250 road intersections in Belo Horizonte; (b) an Environmental and Traffic Safety component to support (i) the design of an inspection and maintenance (I/M) program for vehicle emissions and noise; and (ii) a traffic management and safety program; and (c) an Institutional and Policy Development component to help in (i) strengthening the RTCC for the BHMR; (ii) preparing an integrated Transport Policy, Land Use and Air Quality Management strategy for - 2 - the BHMR to meet both transport and air quality targets and to introduce sound cost-recovery, tariff, regulatory and subsidy policies; (iii) implementing a cost-based financial management system in the STU-BH; (iv) developing and enabling environment and financial instruments for more substantial participation of the private sector in the investment and operation of the operating agencies; and (v) strengthening air-quality planning and monitoring of vehicle based emissions. Part A - The Infrastructure and Equipment Component This component was designed to improve the infrastructure and equipment of STU-BH to a level which would allow it to meet the operational and financial performance targets set for the project and specified in Annex 1. The component can be summarized as follows: The Civil Works Program consisted of: (a) intermodal integration works including: (i) the construction of three integrated bus-to-rail terminals; (ii) improvements to road accesses to STU-BH stations; (iii) the construction of sidewalks and pedestrian over/underpasses; and (iv) the provision of a centralized road traffic signal control system and bus locator; (b) passenger station works for the construction of nine new stations and enlargement/improvements of the São Paulo station; (c) bridges, road viaducts, and pedestrian over/underpasses, which included
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