FUTURE OF AFRICAN CITIES PROJECT

SPECIAL REPORT – JANUARY 2020 Where the Rubber Hits the Road Olusegun Obasanjo, Juan Carlos Pinzón, Greg Mills, Ray Hartley, Nchimunya Hamukoma, Sarah Calburn, Nicola Doyle, Dianna Games, Archimedes Muzenda, Emily van der Merwe, David Kilcullen, Dickie Davis

Strengthening ’s economic performance Where the Rubber Hits the Road

Contents

Forewords ...... 3 Olusegun Obasanjo ...... 3 Juan Carlos Pinzón ...... 5 About the Contributors ...... 7 Preface and Acknowledgements ...... 9 Introduction: The Rise and Rise of the African City ...... 11 Section One: International Comparisons ...... 22 .. The Asian Experience ...... 24 The Story ...... 24 Indonesia: Infrastructure and Iconography ...... 31 Latin America ...... 36 Security in – Pact for Life ...... 36 The Security Challenges of Rio ...... 38 and the Bus Rapid Transport ...... 41 The Transformation of Medellín ...... 44 Honduras: Urban Overstretch in San Pedro Sula ...... 52 Summary of Observations ...... 58 Section Two: African City Case-Studies ...... 60 Lagos: The Relentless City ...... 60 Hargeisa: Invisible City ...... 74 Buffalo City: From Lifeless Economy to Lifestyle Opportunity ...... 88 Mombasa: Gateway City ...... 99 Town: A Tale of Two Transitions ...... 116 Rabat and Salé: Bridging the Gap ...... 133 Conclusion: Between Wakanda and Dystopia ...... 145 Endnotes ...... 155 .. ..

Published in January 2020 by The Brenthurst Foundation

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Layout and design by Sheaf Publishing, Benoni. WHERE THE RUBBER HITS THE ROAD

Forewords

Olusegun Obasanjo

Africa’s cities are on the rise. By 2100, Lagos organic growth is to make living there more is expected to be the world’s largest metrop- expensive than it needs to be. olis with a population touching 90 million In the case of and Buffalo City people. Not far behind will be Kinshasa and in South Africa, the spatial problems are the Dar es Salaam. result of deliberate planning to keep races Already some 500 million people live in apart during the era, resulting in Africa’s cities. Another 800 million are pro- long distances between places of residence jected to join them by 2050 as the continent and work, which add to the transport burden. shifts to an urban majority. In most of the cities studied, high How these cities develop, grow and transport costs are contributing to the provide a liveable home for their swell- impoverishment of residents and, along with ing populations is the key to Africa’s future poor regulation and property regimes, make success or despair. the cost of doing business too high. If cities fail to provide jobs, water, elec- Mombasa and Rabat-Salé have tackled tricity, sanitation and transport, they will their legacy of uneven development aggres- become places of conflict and insecurity. If sively, improving housing stock and they grow and develop their infrastructure, showing that a concentrated effort by moti- they will become places where there is a vated authorities can make a big difference. better life for Africans. The world is looking to Africa with its The Brenthurst Foundation’s Future of youthful population as the continent that African Cities project set out to explore how will provide economic growth, markets and six African cities were facing the challenges investment opportunities in an otherwise of providing for their growing citizenry, and stagnant global economy. the policy options they require to meet their It is up to the governments of Africa – people’s needs. The cities – Lagos, Rabat-Salé, national, regional and local – to channel Cape Town, Mombasa, Hargeisa and Buffalo investment into making cities better places City – are very different from one another. to live where there are more opportunities. Yet they face many of the same The key to this, as we outlined in detail in challenges. our book Democracy Works, is , account- What they have in common is an absence able, democratic governance. of rational spatial planning. They have The pyramid, which places national gov- not been designed to provide services and ernment at the and local government at opportunities in the most efficient and the bottom, needs to be inverted. National cost-effective way to their ever-growing government is vitally important in setting populations. the agenda, but it is at local government level The reasons for this are very different in that the biggest difference can be made most each case. rapidly to the lives of ordinary people. This Lagos has grown rapidly, outpacing urban requires leadership, strong project manage- planning with the result that it does not ment and engineering skills and the ability have an efficient transport, water and elec- to rapidly roll out services as cities expand. tricity grid. The effect of this unchecked

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Local government that is connected to It is our hope that this volume will make a regional and national government, sharing modest contribution to increasing the under- resources and skills, will make an immediate standing of how our cities are developing difference to the lives of Africa’s people. and how we can make them better. Conversely, a failure to build effective, accountable local government and failure to meet citizens’ expectations will open the way Olusegun Obasanjo for increased crime and insecurity, leading President of the Federal Republic of , to mass migration away from Africa’s cities, 1999–2007 to Europe and beyond. Chairman: The Brenthurst Foundation

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Juan Carlos Pinzón

Providing security, safety and democratic The effect was dramatic. Homicides accountability to all citizens was a central halved; kidnappings plummeted by 90%; and aspect of Colombia’s fight against guerrillas car theft more than halved. The reduction in and paramilitaries in the first part of the 21st kidnappings, in particular, brought a sense century. Cities were central to this effort, of relief and progress to all Colombians. none more so than in Medellín, which had Security improvements helped Medellín’s been beset by violence, organised crime, economy develop, creating a virtuous cycle and illegal armed groups across the political of governance, growth and stability. Foreign spectrum. direct investment rose, enabling further A close partnership between the govern- spending on security. Economic growth ment, the city government, and local civil across Colombia averaged 5% during the ten society and community groups was the key years from 2002, enabling fresh investment to our effort to stabilise and secure Medellín. in infrastructure, and funding improvements Our approach was to turn the guerrillas’ in public safety. A positive cycle was estab- strategy – the ‘combination of all forms of lished. Security begat economic prosperity, struggle’ that treated armed action, agitation and prosperity, in turn, security. and propaganda, economic action and politi- During my tenure as Minister of Defence, cal negotiation simply as facets of a unified we partnered closely with then Mayor of struggle – against them through our concept Medellín, Anibal Gaviria (recently elected of ‘democratic security’. as Governor of Antioquia), to take meas- Under our government, and a series of ures to reduce violence in the city, and to talented and capable mayors of Medellín, stop a worrisome deterioration in security. the city went from widespread insecurity to We increased the police force by 2 000 and expanding normality. As in earlier periods of directed specific interventions in the most our history, international assistance helped difficult neighbourhoods still influenced by – but the talent, energy and leadership that the ghosts of the Cartel era. The mayor did drove success were all Colombian, and the his part by enhancing security infrastructure outcome in Medellín was a direct result of (stations), mobility, communications, and a engaging local leaders and communities very effective effort in education and sports directly in solving their own problems. programs with youth in fragile communities. The initial success of this pro- We also created a working committee gramme of Democratic Security was in with the Attorney General’s office to enhance generating a dramatic fall in crime, initially Intelligence gathering. Finally, we estab- by the government occupying and patrol- lished an innovative hot spots program that ling the municipalities – and, in Medellín, included data scientists, information gather- by incorporating better infrastructure and ing and police deployment. The results were governance tools to bring outlying neigh- clear and concrete, a reduction in homicide bourhoods and districts that had been rate to the lowest in recorded history for the controlled by illegal armed groups, into a city of Medellín by the end of year 2014; we more inclusive relationship with the city. struck hard by capturing and in some cases We also promoted demobilisation and extraditing the main drug lords ‘Mi Sangre’, reintegration of guerrillas, infrastructure ‘Sebastian’, and ‘Carlos Pesebre’ among oth- improvement and popular dialogue through- ers. Most importantly, Medellín was declared out the countryside, and in marginalized the most innovative city in the world, and areas of Medellín and other major cities. several major international conferences and events made Medellín known worldwide

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as a city that supports technology, social for cities across Africa. It illustrates clearly advancement, and industrial progress. My how the combination of social, economic, perspective is that you have to keep working security, infrastructure and public engage- even after you have had success. ment processes that we put in place could The role of the successful policy maker have similar positive effects for those African is to quickly identify what works, plan cities facing many of the same challenges. solutions, and operationalise them in collab- oration with local and international partners. Learning and acting on lessons, good and Juan-Carlos Pinzón bad, is thus critical. This important special Minister of Defence of Colombia, 2011–2015 report shows how many of the lessons we Member: Advisory Board, The Brenthurst learned in Colombia are also very relevant Foundation

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About the Contributors

Dr Greg Mills heads the Johannesburg-based Nchimunya Hamukoma is based at Brenthurst Foundation, established in 2005 the School of Collective Intelligence by the Oppenheimer family to strengthen at Mohammed VI Polytechnic University African economic performance. He holds in . She previously worked at The degrees from the Universities of Cape Town Brenthurst Foundation on its Future of African and Lancaster and was the National Director Cities project and was an Assistant Lecturer of the SA Institute of International Affairs at the Nelson Mandela School of Governance from 1996 to 2005. He has directed numer- at the where she ous reform projects in more than a dozen supported the creation of the MPhil in African governments, sat on the Danish Development Policy & Practice. Africa Commission and on the African Development Bank’s high-level panel on frag- Nicola Doyle is a graduate of the University ile states, and has served four deployments of Cape Town and was a Machel-Mandela to Afghanistan with NATO. A member of the Fellow at The Brenthurst Foundation. She advisory board of the Royal United Services is currently studying towards a Master’s in Institute, he is the author, inter alia, of the Development Studies at the University of the bestselling books Why Africa Is Poor, Africa’s Witwatersrand. Third Liberation (with Jeffrey Herbst), and with the chairman of the Foundation, President Archimedes Muzenda was The Brenthurst Olusegun Obasanjo, Dr Herbst and Major Foundation’s Machel-Mandela Fellow for General Dickie Davis, Making Africa Work: 2018. He is a Zimbabwean scholar and urban A Handbook for Economic Success. His most planner who authored Dystopia, a book that recent book is Democracy Works authored with criticises the rise of specialist town plan- Obasanjo, Herbst and Tendai Biti, the former ning and the destruction it is causing to the finance minister of . liveability of cities in Africa. Archimedes is a senior research associate at the African Ray Hartley is the Research Director of Urban Institute. He holds a Master’s in Public The Brenthurst Foundation. Before that he Administration from Central University and worked as a journalist from 1993, serving as is studying for a PhD in Urban Management editor of BusinessLIVE, and of South Africa’s at the University of the Witwatersrand. largest circulation newspaper, The Sunday Times. Prior to journalism, Ray was an anti- Sarah Calburn runs an architectural prac- apartheid activist in the United Democratic tice in Johannesburg. A graduate of Wits Front and worked as an administrator in University and the Melbourne Institute the constitutional negotiations that ended of Technology, she has also worked as an apartheid. He covered the Nelson Mandela architect in Paris, Hong Kong, Sydney and presidency, travelling the world with him and Melbourne. Sarah is responsible for several witnessed the birth of the new, democratic iconic South African buildings and is a prize South Africa. Ray is the author of Ragged winner in the Zurich Urbaninform Design Glory: The rainbow nation in black and white, Contest for her joint work on social housing. which tells the story of the first two decades of democracy in South Africa, The Big Fix: Dianna Games is the Chief Executive of How South Africa stole the 2010 World Cup, and the business advisory consultancy Africa Ramaphosa: The Man Who Would be King. @ Work, and is a leading commentator on business issues, trends and developments in Africa. She has contributed many published

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reports and book chapters on African busi- well-regarded books on urbanisation, con- ness issues and is the author of Doing flict, guerrilla warfare and terrorism. With Business in Africa: Corporate Insights (Penguin: Greg Mills, Dickie Davis and David , 2013). She is also a columnist for Business he co-authored A Great Perhaps: Colombia, Day newspaper in South Africa and African Conflict and Convergence, a detailed study of Business magazine and a director of the Colombia and its transition from insurgency SA–Nigeria Business Chamber run out of to post-conflict reconstruction, drawing on Johannesburg. Dianna also works with sev- The Brenthurst Foundation’s research on eral of South Africa’s leading business lessons for Africa from Latin America. schools. Dickie Davis is the Managing Director of Emily van der Merwe is an Environmental Nant Enterprises Ltd and Chairman of Water and Development Economist at The to Go Ltd. Since leaving the British Army in Brenthurst Foundation. Emily completed 2015, where he served for 32 years, reaching an MSc in Environmental Economics and the rank of Major General, he has worked Climate Change at the London School of as a special advisor to The Brenthurst Economics. Prior to this, she graduated from Foundation, mainly in sub-Saharan Africa. Stellenbosch University with an under- During his military career he served graduate degree in Law, and an Honours in extensively on operations in the Balkans Economics as a Mandela Rhodes Scholar. (1995–2002) and in Afghanistan (2003–2010). Before joining The Brenthurst Foundation, In the UK he served as Director Plans, Land she worked for the Hoffmann Centre for Forces (2007–2009), Director General, Army Sustainable Resource Economy at Chatham Recruiting and Training (2011–2013) and House in London. Director General, Personnel (2013–14). He is a Vice President of the Institution of Royal Dr David Kilcullen is a Professor in the Engineers, Chairman of the Royal Engineers’ School of Humanities and Social Sciences Museum, and is Honorary Colonel of the at the University of New South Wales Royal Monmouthshire Royal Engineers. in Canberra, Australia. He is CEO of the He holds a first degree in civil engineer- research firm Cordillera Applications ing, a Master’s in Defence Technology, and Group, and has been an associate of The is a Fellow of the Chartered Management Brenthurst Foundation since 2012. He is a Institute. He is the co-author, with, Greg former Australian Army officer, intelligence Mills, Jeffrey Herbst and Olusegun Obasanjo officer and diplomat, who served as senior of Making Africa Work (Tafelberg 2017), and counter-insurgency advisor to US command- with David Kilcullen, Greg Mills and David ers in Iraq and Afghanistan, and has served Spencer of A Great Perhaps? Colombia: Conflict in Somalia, Libya and several countries in and Convergence (Hurst, 2015), both of which North-West and East Africa as a counterter- are based on extensive fieldwork in sub- rorism official. He is the author of several Saharan Africa and Latin America.

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Preface and Acknowledgements

The statistics are astounding. Africa’s urban › The quality of governance; areas are already home to almost 500 mil- › The extent to which inclusive economic lion people and will more than double in size growth can be generated, ensuring that a in the next 25 years, with the most popu- ‘constituency of losers’ does not become lous cities growing annually by 4%.1 By 2030, the dominant group; most Africans will live in cities. By 2050, the › Improvements to infrastructure, planning number of people living in Africa’s cities is and service provision; and expected to top 1.3 billion, the same popula- › The harnessing of new technology and tion as that in the entire continent in 2020. innovation. To give you an idea of how African cities are at the forefront of global urban growth, Success or failure is, however, not preor- consider the fact that by 2100, it is projected dained. The international case studies in that the world’s three largest cities will be this volume illustrate how seemingly desper- in Africa. Lagos will be the globe’s largest ate situations of crisis can be quickly turned metropolis with a population of 88.3 million, around with clear and decisive leadership, followed by Kinshasa and Dar es Salaam planning and directed execution. The rapid with 83.5 and 73.7 million residents respec- growth of the African city will, if properly tively.2 As such, the future of African cities is managed, ensure the reality of the ‘Africa really the future of global cities. Rising’ narrative; if not, it will be a lost oppor- This is not bad news, far from it. Cities tunity and a source of chronic instability. have been the engines of economic growth Enabling sustainable and equitable throughout modern history, and this is growth in African cities hinges on ensur- increasingly so in today’s industrialised and ing that economic development at the very globalised world because higher density least maintains, or preferably surpasses, and greater connectivity allows for econo- population growth and urbanisation rates, mies of scale in infrastructure and social something that has failed to occur for much services, and concentrations of workers for of the period since independence. More than industry and other economic purposes. Most that, it requires careful and intelligent long- of the world’s population, by 2019 some term planning, innovative use of technology 55%, lives in urban areas. Such agglomera- and skills, new forms of governance, and tions also however amplify risks around action on key sectors such as infrastructure, health, sanitation, poverty, human insecu- housing and the provision of public services. rity and inequality, and create enormous In short, it needs a new approach. bureaucratic and resource burdens for local If governments fail to act, the prospect authorities. of African cities as centres of prosperity will Nowhere is this contradiction more visible fade against the grinding reality of slums, than in Africa’s exploding urban areas. The disease, crime, chronic and burgeoning three main drivers of African urbanisation unemployment, populism and even violent – organic population growth, rural-to-urban radicalism, where those left out and behind migration and modern information flow – are easy prey for political prophets. This is have dramatic consequences for African the lesson of the Arab Spring. societies. If there is no plan to manage these Building on its work with governments at changes, the outcome could be developmen- the national, sub-national and local level, in tally and politically disastrous. Success or 2015 The Brenthurst Foundation launched failure will hinge on four main factors: its Future of African Cities research and media

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project, which planned to identify how the of then Governor Akinwunmi Ambode; in African city can become a node of develop- East London, Mayor Xola Pakati; in Rabat- ment rather than a site of despair. The aim of Salé, the Policy Center for the New South; in the project was to identify the policy options Mombasa the office of Governor Hassan Ali and path for a positive outcome of the demo- Joho; in Cape Town, then Premier ; graphic spike Africa will experience over the and in Hargeisa the government of President next generation, especially in its cities. It Muse Bihi Abdi. Any project of this scope asked several key questions: hinges on collaboration, in this case between researchers, both internal and external to › What needs to be done to ensure Africa the Foundation, participants at the two experiences a demographic dividend? major conferences at which this research › What can be done to transform a city in was presented at Tswalu in the Kalahari and terms of governance, infrastructure, and in Mombasa, and many research institutions, security? in African elsewhere. Special appreciation › What is the role of technology, skills, lead- is expressed to Ambassador Barry Desker ership, values, media, youth, and policy? for his role in facilitating interviews in › What is the balance between tools Singapore, the Embassy of the Republic of (the ‘what’), organisational theory Indonesia to South Africa, former Defence (the ‘how’), and will (the ‘why’)? Minister Juan-Carlos Pinzón in Colombia, and Lyal White for his assistance in Curitiba, The project aimed to outline where, why and Salvador and Recife in . how the city has been a central part of the None of this would have been possi- development story in developing countries, ble without the leadership role of Jonathan and where it has been a brake on progress. Oppenheimer along with the backroom Finally, the projected aimed to conclude with staff of the Foundation who enabled the a series of policy recommendations for gov- research visits and events, including Leila ernments and citizens. Jack, Ghairoon Hajad, Mariam Cassoojee, and The Future of African Cities project has three of the Foundation’s Machel-Mandela both synced with and spawned a number of Fellows, Wendy Trott, Marie-Noelle Nwokolo, other long-term studies at the Foundation, and Luveshni Odayar. including those which resulted in the book- Finally, in assessing the prospects of posi- length publications of A Great Perhaps? tive growth and change in African cities, (Hurst: 2016), Making Africa Work (Tafelberg: and the role of the citizen, it is important 2017), Democracy Works (Picador: 2019) and to restate the words of Jane Jacobs, author the forthcoming Asian Aspiration (2020). of The Death and Life of Great American Cities: Over four years between 2015 and 2019, the ‘Cities have the capability of providing some- Foundation conducted in-depth research thing for everybody, only because, and only with over 500 qualitative interviews and when, they are created by everybody.’ polled 2 500 respondents. In each of these case studies, the Ray Hartley and Greg Mills Foundation has worked with local part- Johannesburg ners and policymakers. In Lagos the office November 2019

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Introduction: The Rise and Rise of the African City

Africa’s cities are growing fast – by some should be able to access a wider market of measures, too fast. The creation of jobs, inputs and buyers, with reduced production and the provision of housing, electricity, costs thanks to scale economies.’5 water and security is not keeping pace with But they don’t. As a result, there is a the volume of people streaming in from the chance that Africans may miss out on the countryside. many benefits of urbanisation. The scale of the challenge is therefore enormous. Cities will need to provide homes, Population Growth roads, water, power and, perhaps most Of the additional 2.4 billion people estimated importantly, employment, for hundreds of by the United Nations to be added to the millions of new city dwellers over the next global population by 2050, about 1.3 billion few decades.3 will be born in Africa.6 As the statistician The development of the continent’s Hans Rosling observed, ‘The reason the metropoles will be pushed by the mega- population is growing in Africa is the same trends of population growth and rapid reason that [saw] population growth first in urbanisation, together with global connectiv- Europe, then in the Americas, then in Asia. ity and information flow. It’s when the population goes from a phase Cities ought to be places of rapid where you have many children born and development and growth because of the many who are dying. Then the death rate ‘agglomeration effect’4 –the economies of goes down and [some time later] the birth scale they offer. It is much less expensive rate follows.’7 This notion – encapsulated in to build and maintain infrastructure for a the idea of a ‘demographic transition’ where dense neighbourhood than it is for scattered increasing per capita GDP correlates with a dwellings and it is much more efficient to declining birth rate in industrialising coun- conduct business if suppliers are close by tries – is key to understanding the future than far away. The concentration of labour growth of African cities. also offers opportunities for mass employ- To illustrate the disruptive nature of the ment in a way that is impossible in the rural population growth that Africa will expe- setting. However, many African cities have rience, the following table* displays the developed organically with limited planning growth of three countries: Burundi (relatively and intervention. They miss out on many small), (a medium-sized country), of the associated benefits of agglomeration and Nigeria (the continent’s behemoth).8 because they were not designed for scale. According to a recent World Bank report National Population in Selected Years (millions of people) on African cities, the consequences of poorly planned development are largely economic. Country 1950 2015 2025 2050 Burundi 2.3 10.8 14.4 26.7 It notes that ‘African cities are not economi- Ghana 5.0 27.0 32.5 45.7 cally dense or efficient enough to promote Nigeria 37.9 183.5 240.0 440.0 scale economies and attract capital invest- ment. In principle, cities should benefit businesses and people through increased * Unattributed photographs, tables and graphics economic density. Firms clustered in cities are the authors’ own or were provided with permission.

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Each have grown by an order of magni- populous country, behind India and China. tude between 1950 and 2015 – Burundi by As a result, Nigeria’s fate will become intrin- 370%, Ghana by 440% and Nigeria by 384%. sically linked to the world’s as it increasingly In the relatively short period (by demo- represents one of the largest concentrations graphic standards) between 2015 and 2025, of people. they will grow between 20% (Ghana) and Since high birth rates are closely 33% (Burundi) and 31% (Nigeria). Even with correlated with extreme poverty, such rapid growth rates slowing, the continent will be population growth can create a vicious cycle radically different in ten or 20 years’ time that feeds into further disadvantages of from what it is today. poor education, limited access to contracep- As the table, below, illustrates, all African tion and health care, and the suppression countries except for some island nations and of reproductive, political and civil rights of a few Southern African countries will grow women. But this picture can change quickly, by at least 37% in the next 20 years.9 as it has done in a few places in Africa and All of the major African countries will large parts of Southeast Asia, where the experience significant population growth demographic tide has been turned into a over this timeframe, except South Africa.10 dividend by improving skills and providing While South Africa has already lost its the policy and infrastructure necessary for standing as one of the largest African coun- inclusive economic growth and employment. tries demographically, Tanzania – currently In its April 2015 Sub-Saharan Regional one of Africa’s more populous states but not Outlook, the IMF estimated that in order thought of as a giant – will become a nota- to maximise this population dividend, the ble player on the continent by 2035 because region will need to produce an average of of its high fertility rate, even when its birth 18 million high-productivity jobs per year rate is only the 12th highest on the continent until 2035. This would represent an unprec- (and simultaneously in the world). At the edented rate of employment growth. The same time, Nigeria’s large population and IMF also noted that over this period policies significant growth means that it will become will be required that can gradually transi- one of the most demographically significant tion jobs from the informal sector, which nations globally. By 2050, Nigeria will sur- accounts for about 90% of the 400 million pass both the United States and Indonesia in jobs in low income sub-Saharan African population, making it the world’s third most

Projected Increase in Population, 2015 to 2035 (%) Niger 116 Burkina Faso 67 Mayotte 57 Sierra Leone 37 87 Senegal 63 Guinea 55 Namibia 35 86 Congo 63 Togo 54 Djibouti 25 Uganda 81 DRC 63 Ethiopia 52 Swaziland 24 Gambia 77 Eritrea 62 Guinea Bissau 52 19 Chad 75 61 Mauritania 52 19 Tanzania 73 58 Comoros 52 Réunion 18 Angola 73 58 CÔte d’Ivoire 51 Cabo Verde 17 Somalia 73 Benin 58 São Tomé 51 St. Helena 12 Burundi 72 Kenya 58 Gabon 49 South Africa 11 70 Equatorial Guinea 57 Zimbabwe 45 Seychelles 06 Nigeria 69 South 57 CAR 43 Mauritius 02 Madagascar 67 Cameroon 57 Ghana 41

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countries, to the non-agricultural formal to equally low productivity jobs in peri-urban sector, another extremely challenging goal.11 slums or in lower-income urban areas. To date, job creation has not kept up with This means they have not been able to existing birth rates. The African Economic benefit from the economic and political Outlook 2019 projects that Africa’s labour opportunities afforded by urban agglomera- force will grow by 40% by 2030. But, if cur- tions. In part, this is because of the colonial rent trends continue, only half of new labour legacy of ‘warehousing’ workers in socially, force entrants will find jobs and most of economically (and, historically, racially) seg- these will be in the informal sector. That regated townships from where they serve as would leave 100 million young people with- a captive labour force for the larger urban out jobs.12 environment; in part also it is because pat- terns of rural-to-urban migration in Africa Where People will Live are at least as heavily driven by negative In addition to the sheer increase in popu- ‘push factors’ that force people from the lation numbers, Africa is projected to be rural environment (such as conflict, climate the most rapidly urbanising region on the change and resource scarcity) as by positive planet, with the percentage of people living ‘pull factors’ (such as access to jobs, health in its cities rising by 16% to reach a level of care, education and connectivity) that draw 56% by 2050.13 Over this period, an expected them into the urban space. 2.5 billion people will be added to the urban Taking a global view, it is predicted that population worldwide, with almost all of this cities will account for 80% of future eco- increase occurring in Asia and Africa. India, nomic growth. Realising such growth will, China and Nigeria are expected to account however, require suitable housing, water and for more than a third of the projected growth, sanitation, electricity, public transport, sus- with India alone adding 404 million urban tainable urban environments, and absorptive dwellers, China 292 million and Nigeria and adaptive capacity to enable cities to another 212 million.14 thrive and prosper as a result of (rather than Lagos’s population will more than double being overwhelmed by) this enlargement. to 50 million by 2030, surpassing Cairo as These factors demand, in turn, government Africa’s most populous city. The city’s popu- planning and delivery of infrastructure, ser- lation was just 1.4 million in 1970 and five vices and the expansion of the mortgage million in 1991. Africa’s urbanisation will far market beyond the current African level of outpace the historical urbanisation of devel- just 3%.17 oped regions. While the population of London There are also political and security grew at 2% annually from 1800 to 1910, dou- implications stemming from such rapid bling every 25 years, Kigali grew at rate of 7% urban growth, including urban unrest, crime, annually from 1950 to 2010, doubling every urban no-go and no-see areas (where govern- 10 years.15 Even the rapid expansion of Asia’s ments have limited visibility and presence) population pales in comparison: during its and conflict. City dwellers can physically ‘century of growth’ between 1950 and 2050, threaten the state more directly than those it will have grown by a factor of 3.7, while on the rural outskirts, because urbanisation Africa’s equivalent rate is predicted to be (plus the spread of technology) facilitates 5.18 from 2000 to 2100.16 more easily the mobilisation of mass move- So far, African urbanisation has not ments, a feature largely absent in Africa’s corresponded to industrialisation on a com- post-colonial history. More directly, the pop- parable scale to that experienced in Europe ulations of peri-urban slums can apply a or Asia. Migrants have largely moved from chokehold effect, interdicting vital flows of low productivity jobs in rural communities people, resources and commodities from the

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outside world and ultimately preventing a Africa, the coastal cities of Cape Town and city from functioning. Buffalo City, one an international travel However, while significant urbanisa- destination, the other, a city of almosts and tion is inevitable, it need not be inherently not quites. The project aimed to uncover the negative. Urbanisation, indeed, is generally essential building blocks of a thriving African correlated with significant improvements city and the mechanisms needed to create in human wellbeing and in environmental the conditions for economic development. and economic sustainability, and thus can The project aimed to balance the need be extraordinarily positive. Cities – espe- for analytical insights with actionable solu- cially in Africa, where national borders were tions that would be useful to policy makers established by distant colonial powers or by across the continent. This led to the format the expansion and attenuation of govern- of six individual city chapters that would ment control from urban centres – represent allow policy makers to gain insight into cit- the localities where the power of the state is ies they otherwise may not have come strongest and, at least in some countries, are across. These were then collated into a com- the only places where it exists. pendium to provide an overview of some of Thus, over the next 20 years many people the continent’s most pressing urbanisation will be moving to where the state is strong- challenges. est, in the city. Perhaps the greatest irony The first question we needed to answer of politics in Africa is that the most power- was on the definition of a city. ful force strengthening states has nothing to do with the actions of governments but is What is the City? caused by the independent decisions of mil- It’s appropriate to begin with an understand- lions of individuals and their families. Even ing of the project’s unit of analysis – the city in as weak a state as Malawi, people will be itself. flooding the cities and there could be more For a word with a Latin origin that has people in urban areas in 2050 than in the journeyed through French to arrive in the entire country in 2016. English language, the definition of ‘city’ is surprisingly imprecise. It is generally taken Questions that Need Answering to mean a large or important town. Many African cities are at a critical juncture The classical ‘demographic’ defini- in their rapid growth; perhaps even a tip- tion of cities suggested in 1938 by Louis ping point. With this in mind, The Brenthurst Wirth defined a city as a human settlement Foundation launched the Future of African with four characteristics: permanence, large Cities Project in 2016. The project has focused population size, high population density and on six cities across five African countries. social heterogeneity.18 Wirth’s definition is use- There was a deliberate choice to look beyond ful in that it is measurable using observable Africa’s largest or even fastest-growing cit- indicators, but it has also been critiqued by ies to some of the cities that wouldn’t make advocates of ‘geographical-functional’ defi- a top-10 list but, whose trajectories would nitions, which define a city as a settlement help to map the breadth of urban develop- that performs urban functions beyond its own ment across the continent. We chose the boundaries – as an economic centre serving rapidly growing Lagos in Nigeria, Hargeisa, a wider hinterland, as the seat of govern- the capital of pastoral , Mombasa ment for a larger political entity, or through as Kenya’s key trading port and the gateway a religious/cultural role. In this sense, a city to the East Africa Community and beyond, exercises urban functions with regional, Rabat-Salé as a cluster whose trajectory has national or global impact.19 The definition been shaped by a long history, and in South thus needed to be updated.

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The Organisation for Economic Military doctrine defines cities as contigu- Co-operation and Development (OECD) and ous zones of urbanised terrain or ‘built-up the European Community produced a short areas’. US Joint Doctrine, JP 3-06 Joint Urban paper in 2012 that attempted to resolve the Operations (2013) describes cities as ‘an urban issue of the definition of cities. Focusing triad consisting of complex man-made physi- on cities in Europe they concentrated cal terrain, a population of significant size and on the concept of an ‘urban centre’ sup- density and varying sociocultural groupings, and ported by commuting zones (together called an infrastructure.’ 22 This combines elements larger urban zones). A city was defined as a of Wirth’s classic definition, while recogniz- contiguous geographical area with a popu- ing that socio-cultural groupings vary within lation density of greater than 1.500 people agglomerations, and adding the element of per km2, where the total population exceeds human-made (anthropogenic) terrain and 50 000 and which is matched with an exist- infrastructure. ing municipal boundary. A commuting area Other studies have broadened this anal- was defined as an area in which more than ysis. David Kilcullen’s work on the ‘city 15% of the employed population commuted as a system’ takes a systems-modelling to the city. Applying this methodology across approach, adding connectedness (especially the whole of the EU results in a finding that electronic connectivity, which is far greater 40% of EU residents live in cities and 20% live in urban than in rural areas, enabling urban in commuting zones. agglomerations to develop a dense, com- Of course, this definition also does not plex informational terrain alongside their take account of the history, location, func- physical and human terrain), and treating tion, or cultural significance of such a urban centres as subsystems within broader settlement. These factors are important for complex adaptive systems that behave like cities as they are often regarded as the high- biological systems. est form of social organisation, combining By this definition, urban agglomera- economic, political and cultural develop- tions nest in a networked pattern of flows, ment, and are viewed as drivers of growth. interactions and interdependencies across The United Nations uses the concept of a rural, peri-urban and urban continuum.23 urban agglomeration, defined as a concen- Urbanisation, in this context, is a process tration of population in a given urbanised of ‘connection’: where population, land use, area (similar to the geographical ‘metro- and economic activity become part of a politan area’ as distinct from ‘city limits’).20 greater whole, with information, goods and This is more useful for analysts consid- service flowing freely between individuals. ering urban issues and systems that are wider than the more restrictive political- What is the pattern of African administrative construct of the ‘city’. For Urbanisation? example, Washington DC metropolitan area The second question relates to historical (population 5.95 million) covers portions of dynamics that have shaped Africa’s cities. Northern Virginia and Maryland in a contigu- In the immediate pre-colonial and ous urbanised zone encapsulating the much colonial periods, between the mid-17th smaller District of Columbia – the ‘city’ of and late-19th centuries (as far as can be Washington – with a population of only determined, given the limits of data and 659 000 in 2014.21 This area, though compris- modelling) it appears that the population ing several political units known as ‘cities’, of sub-Saharan Africa was broadly stable at is a single urban agglomeration. The same is between 90 and 100 million, and it was only true for Manila, among other cities. in the 1920s that Africa saw a sharp resump- tion of population growth.24 It’s worth noting

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that – given that the entire population of the of cities on coastlines paralleled the appear- planet before the beginning of the indus- ance of colonial powers in Africa from the trial revolution in Europe (circa 1750) was late 15th Century. only about 750 million people – Africa in From the 16th Century, the frequency of the pre-colonial period represented a size- visits by Europeans and Arabs increased, able portion (roughly 12%) of the global as did their influence and impact. Early population. foreign settlements were generally small By 1950, it is estimated that the popu- defensible sites, located on coastlines, hill- lation of sub-Saharan Africa had reached tops or riverbanks, and of a military, trading 177 million, out of a total global population or religious nature. But by the time of the of almost three billion (only about 6% of the Berlin Conference of 1884, the colonisation of global total, indicating how Africa had fallen the continent was in full swing. Colonisation behind). In the period since decolonisation had a huge impact on African cities, result- (which occurred across most of the conti- ing in the expansion of old cities, and the nent around 1960, with the last remaining creation of new settlements according to the European colonies in Africa disappearing by urban planning practices of the colonisers. 1980), population growth accelerated expo- According to Carlos Nunes Silva, ‘In the nentially, with the population reaching first decades of the 20th Century, the garden 504 million in 1990 and 657 million (or 21% city model became an influential urban refer- of the global total) in 2000. Africa’s popula- ence across Africa, being gradually replaced tion is projected to increase to two billion by towards the end of the colonial period by the 2040 and four billion by 2090, respectively [modernist] CIAM26 discourse on urbanism.’27 22% and 36% of the global population.25 Based on an analysis of 33 cities, CIAM Early inland cities were based around proposed that the social problems faced by agriculture (market towns) or political cen- cities could be resolved by strict functional tres (feudal or royal towns and, later, colonial segregation, and the distribution of the pop- and national government centres) and grew ulation into tall apartment blocks at widely or declined in accordance with the fortunes spaced intervals. This view influenced the of political leaders and the availability of rebuilding of Europe following the Second natural resources, particularly wood, water World War and was influential in India and and productive land. Coastal cities, includ- Latin America after 1945. Colonial plan- ing those located on sea or lakeshores and ning included a significant focus on health within littoral river deltas, tend to have and sanitation, and this was often used as longer, more established roots, with eco- the reason for physical segregation of com- nomic activity based around trade. Indeed, munities by ethnic or cultural groups. This for most of human history, cities have policy has left its mark on many African cit- formed trading and transportation hubs, and ies, with the creation of informal settlements since transport of heavy trade goods and (i.e. slums) populated by social underclasses commodities has historically been easier on or ethnic minorities, which tended to cluster water than by land, such hubs have tended in the peri-urban and transitional zones of to grow on coastlines. In Africa this heritage cities. Such settlements often housed a very is clearly visible today with coastal towns large proportion of a city’s population on a representing a large proportion of the most very small portion of its land area. developed urban areas on the continent. Following independence, colonial Further, since Arab and European colonial planning laws continued to be applied for rel- powers arrived largely by sea or (in the case atively long periods of time in many African of the Muslim Arabs in North Africa) by con- states despite their increasing inappropriate- quest of the narrow coastal strip, the growth ness for dealing with the challenges faced by

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African cities. For example, in Guinea-Bissau, regulatory and fiscal tools to do the job. Once the colonial building code, adopted in 1956 elected, the governing party on a city council and revised in 1971, was only replaced in seeks to compete with other cities to attract 2006.28 Urban planning tended to be regarded economic benefit and there is a real incen- – in an echo of its colonial origins, but by tive to engage citizens in the urban planning no means uniquely to Africa – as a techni- process. In other words, to be successful, a cal activity which required little input from city needs to be competitive, both with its citizens and was, generally, both highly near neighbours and internationally, and centralised and under-resourced. In the post- responsive to its population. independence environment, shortages of Some economists have questioned local, technically competent, planners often whether the term ‘competitiveness’ can led to the provision of external technical really be applied to anything other than assistance. private firms. But for businesses to be But this solution had two major limita- competitive their operating environment tions; first it often tried to apply western matters, and local governments can choose solutions to African problems and, second, to improve that environment thorough the the plans devised were often, at best, par- adoption of policies that provide a competi- tially resourced. Only since the start of the tive advantage and encourage innovation. 21st Century has Africa started to break This, in turn, enhances tax revenue and pro- with its colonial urban planning past and vides increased employment opportunities. introduce new ideas, concepts and planning But what happens when democracy is methods aimed at solving the challenges only in its infancy and there is a weak culture faced by its cities. of the payment of taxes and the expecta- But, arguably, the vast majority of African tion of the delivery of services; where the countries do not yet have a credible national prevailing culture is more one of patronage set of urban policies to provide the guid- and payment? What happens when cultural ance needed by both the central and local norms of impunity, exclusivity and clan- or government authorities. tribe-based power structures collide with modern state-based rule-of-law systems in a A Theoretical Framework rapidly modernising society? What happens It’s not just urban planning in practice that when elites within an urban environment has followed western models for most of the establish patron-client relationships with last two centuries, but also theories of urban special interest groups (including, in some development and the related academic dis- cases, criminal groups) whose interests may cipline in its entirety. The third and final diverge from those of the city as a whole? unanswered question was, ‘Could we find This pattern, known as clientelism in or design a framework that accurately many urban contexts, is one of the chal- describes African cities?’ lenges many African cities face. It also One strand of western urban develop- renders the ‘competitive’ model of urban ment theory has at its heart the concepts of development ill-suited to the African con- democracy, delegation and competitiveness.29 text. If it is just the city government and the This includes the notion that the population business elite who call the shots, or if these of a city elects a mayor and councillors based elites have exclusive client relationships on what these representatives aim to deliver with key sub-groups of the urban popula- for the population in terms of services and tion, how can they be persuaded to adopt a economic development, in return for their more inclusive approach? Faced with rapid taxes; and the notion that a national govern- population growth and urbanisation, many ment devolves to the city government the governments tend to adopt a more directed,

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top down approach, but this must take commercial and civil law (and the general account of the need to motivate city lead- regulatory environment for private industry) ers and managers to improve the city for the are strongly correlated with successful urban benefit of all. These top-down approaches growth. The ability of an individual to start also often fail for the simple reason that a business, obtain relevant licences, establish planning and implementation of citywide land title and employ workers is key. solutions – even with the best will in the Studies have found that the lower the world – takes time, and solutions to the barriers to business entry, the faster under- problems of a rapidly-growing urban area developed urban and peri-urban areas are may often (even repeatedly) be overtaken able to develop and to catch up to more by events as the pace of growth renders ini- prosperous areas. Individuals and families tiatives impracticable before they can be who can see a pathway to prosperity and implemented. improved social standing within the frame- The Brenthurst Foundation project team’s work of the city and the state are much less initial analysis of challenges facing African likely to seek to undermine or destroy it, cities over the next 35 years involved an thereby reducing the risk of unrest and vio- assessment of the elements needed for suc- lence. Cities with sound governance have cessful urban growth. Success is measured also often been successful because there has by whether growth can improve the standard been a development vision, a plan and the of living for inhabitants, lifting marginal- leadership ability and management skills to ised and at-risk populations out of poverty, deliver on that plan. This is a huge area in its enabling inclusive political and economic own right; this study focuses slightly more participation, and allowing vulnerable and narrowly on answering the following ques- excluded groups to become productive tions: what are the underlying principles members of a broader, more integrated soci- for effective urban governance? Where are ety. Some of the elements needed for such the quick wins likely to be for African cities growth include: an inclusive historical narra- in the 21st Century? Where is long-term tive or political legacy, natural endowments, investment needed? urban infrastructure (both physical and non- physical), essential services, human capital, Security: Many African cities suffer from effective governance, responsive institutions, reputations for violence and insecurity, real a regulatory environment conducive to or perceived, which discourage investors, business growth, and security – both for indi- impose costs on doing business, hamper viduals (human security) and for the city government penetration and regulation of and the state (public safety and national society, and reduce the quality of life for security). inhabitants. In 2015 the Mexico Citizens Of this range of factors, four key mech- Council for Public Security, for example, anisms stand out as being of primary rated Cape Town, Durban, Nelson Mandela importance: quality governance which cre- Bay Municipality and Johannesburg as ates an enabling environment, security, being among the 50 most violent cities in infrastructure and service delivery, and the world.30 Improving security – especially, harnessing technology and innovation. human security for individuals and public safety for cities themselves – is therefore, Governance. The quality of city, provin- an essential element for successful urban cial and national governance has often growth and one that often needs to be tack- been highlighted as critical because it sets led up front to signal a change in direction much of the microclimate for economic, and establish positive momentum. What political and social development. Aspects of economists recognize as the ‘shadow of the

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future’ – the tendency for individual and Infrastructure and Service Delivery .. There group economic behaviours in the present to is widespread agreement that the physical be influenced by perceived likely future risks infrastructure (roads, bridges, markets, ports, and opportunities – as well as the human and airports) and essential services (water, tendency to overstate risks in highly volatile sewage, electricity, and sanitation) are key environments, means that creating a percep- urban development enablers. Likewise, tion of improving security and safety can non-physical infrastructure, such as elec- unlock hitherto unrealised economic and tronic connectivity and financial flows, are political potential. increasingly recognised as being crucial for Of course, for such perceptions to take successful urban growth. But the provision root, there must be evidence of changes in of infrastructure and services can be very the real security situation on the ground or costly in terms of start-up resources, creating else they will be seen as empty claims. hurdles to infrastructure development that The temptation for such security measure put solutions out of reach of many African to focus on ‘ on the ground’ – increas- cities. The challenge is, therefore, to find ing the number and frequency of police infrastructure solutions that have low barri- interventions or – in the case of Cape Town ers to entry, and are scale-able, cost effective – introducing the military into a neighbour- and deliverable via appropriate technology in front of the TV cameras, is strong. in (initially) low-connectivity and limited- But more considered interventions that resource environments. Curitiba’s Bus Rapid involve community participation and the Transit (BRT) system, or the emerging num- creation of greater, open communication ber of micro-solutions such as car and bike between authorities and citizens might lead sharing as answers to city mobility problems, to more lasting changes that will inspire are examples. greater confidence. As one of the authors of this work, David Harnessing Technology and Innovation. Kilcullen, has argued, there are three distinct Digitisation offers the promise of smoother ‘systems of violence and order’: and faster delivery of services, as well as the provision of security and better management 1. ‘Order from above’ when government of traffic. But the biggest short-term gain for imposes control through coercive, admin- African cities is probably in e-government, istrative or persuasive means; through expediting permit applications along 2. ‘Order from below’ when non-state groups with revenue collection. This is linked with (usually armed) establish control by creat- politics inevitably, since managing the inter- ing predictability and reduce transaction net space to maintain political control would costs; and seem to fly in the face of attempts to expe- 3. ‘Order from within’ when city systems dite faster information flows. It also demands ‘embody characteristics that enable and opening up on bandwidth and improving the encourage cooperative or collaborative digitised services on offer through private order’.31 sector money and technology. Politics and prosperity, as ever, are interlinked. While it is no doubt vital that the police and The challenge for this project is to identify government are seen to act, it is the last of and highlight best practices in the realm of these three options which has the best pros- urban development, and to identify ways in pect of generating a sustainable change that which technologies, techniques and insights will alter perceptions. from outsiders (along with ownership and leadership from communities themselves) can help to achieve success.

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In the urban development context, suc- The initial thesis was that for a city to cess hinges on a combination of the personal thrive and grow economically, it would need abilities of policy makers, the context in a healthy balance of the factors above. The which those energies are funnelled and real challenge was in finding out which fac- organised, and the application of financial tors were the most influential for economic resources. In this regard, a set of concepts growth and prosperity. that originates from a completely separate field of research may be of use in under- Mobilising capital. It goes without saying standing the importance of these key that the best laid plans have no chance of drivers of successful urban growth. Martin succeeding if the financial and technical Van Creveld, an Israeli military historian and resources needed to execute them are una- theorist, studied the relative performance of vailable in sufficient quantity. This is all the the United States and German armies in the more important in Africa, where low revenue Second World War32 in an attempt to deduce collection and, in many cases, the inability of what made armies effective when fight- users of services to pay for them, means that ing. His thesis (outlined in his book Fighting government has to find ways to bring private Power) has influenced the doctrine of sev- capital into infrastructure development. eral western militaries. Van Creveld defined What is concerning is that investment ‘fighting power’ across three components: rates in productive assets in Africa have physical (the resources with which to fight), fallen since the global financial crisis conceptual (the ideas on how to fight) and Exactly how private money – and in many moral (the will to fight). His studies of military cases financial aid from external state actors forces – engaged, like cities, in a competitive – is managed to produce the best and most endeavour for success in a highly dynamic cost-effective result is critical. The danger is environment – suggested that to be effective, that loans from foreign countries may cre- a fighting force needed all three components; ate long-term debt and dependency and a a serious deficit in any one component could default may even result in the forfeiture of lead to disaster. Clearly, cities are not armies, the asset. and urbanists draw on a different set of con- In addition to this, cities need to under- ceptual tools from those used by military stand that private capital will only flow theorists. Nevertheless, because of the simi- where the return is competitive and the larities between the circumstances of a city risks are known and manageable. Legal and experiencing rapid growth and overstretch regulatory certainty are as important as with those of a military force in combat, Van incentives and tax breaks in this battle to Creveld’s model might be readily adapted attract capital. and applied to the development of cities, especially those in the African context. Conclusion: Differentiation but Our own attempt at an ‘African theo- Common Lessons? retical framework’ for looking at cities and The combination of a rigorous research urban development looks at ‘hardware’ methodology, a multi-year research time- and ‘software’. Our research focused on line (allowing, in rapidly-changing urban the components of urbanisation including environments, for the project team to Governance, Economic Growth and Security, directly observe changes and trends in which we identified as ‘software’, as well Africa’s urbanisation) and a comprehensive as Electricity, Housing, Transportation and approach to desktop, fieldwork and opinion Waste Management which we would call survey data, has produced a thorough and ‘hardware’. well-documented set of analytical insights.

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Africa’s cities are growing rapidly, but Mombasa, Cape Town and Rabat-Salé. each city we examined is managing this Despite different histories, endowments, growth in very different ways. From the cha- size and geographies, these cities speak to otic and sometimes anarchic sprawl of Lagos issues common across other African (and to the regimented and controlled urbani- some international) locales: Lagos shows the sation of Rabat-Salé, there are important consequences of unchecked migration and lessons to be learned. unplanned urbanisation; Hargeisa’s story But, as this introductory chapter aims to highlights the cost of isolation; South Africa’s illustrate, such insights are not enough, in Buffalo City shows the need to match hard- themselves, to make a practical difference ware with software, without which the to the way African governments and people former has much less value; Mombasa is manage the unprecedented pace and scale of an example of a city that can exploit its urbanisation on the continent. prime location – as the logistics gateway to East Africa – principally through policy and This study is divided into three sections. The technology; Cape Town shows the need to first is a series of international case studies address spatial and wealth opportunities from Latin America and Asia, which illus- to create an inclusive city; and Rabat-Salé trate how others have responded to similar flags the powerful development possibili- challenges, whether these be in security or ties presented by a healthy dose of foresight, development. proper planning and urgent execution. Six African case studies form the second Finally, the conclusion offers policy section: Lagos, Hargeisa, East London, observations and suggestions.

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Section One International Comparisons

The 16th Battalion of Brazil’s Military Police or $800,** a ‘more steady’ income than that is based at a former bus station in Recife in from his previous job as a driving instructor. the north-east region. The 490 officers under He was studying law at night school, aspir- the command of Colonel Cruz work four ing to become a member of the Civil Police, shifts, thinly stretched over 14km2 of some of the investigative branch of the police force. the most dangerous areas of the city.33 Such ambition was expected from a Armed with shotguns, side-arms and squad which, while tough and a little macho, Tasers, the eight-man section of the elite was professional, avoiding displays of unnec- anti-drug unit Grupo Tactico, were menacing essary force. Cruz proudly explained that in their black , the ‘GATI’ stencilled was rated third among the across the front of their confirming Brazil’s 32 states for killing the fewest people. their affiliation to any doubters. They were ‘If you do not display respect and courtesy joined by the yellow-capped Guarda Municipal, towards citizens,’ he says, ‘they won’t trust known as GTO, the unit’s badge an unlikely you.’ Darth Vader mask. The unit put up a temporary roadblock The Colonel briefed us on the likely patrol at the Santa Amaro intersection, under- circuit. neath the Metro rail-line, between two pillars A vehicle movement through the ‘dealer bedecked with gaudy graffiti. At our backs spots’ would be followed by a foot-patrol was a favela urban slum, the inhabitants around the bus station. Mounted up, as we just faint smudges in the deepening dusk. turned into the barrio of San Jose, the doors With flashing lights and unfurled collapsible in the leading were flung open, the traffic cones advertising our fresh presence, GATI bundled out, handguns at the ready. suddenly a bus hissed to a stop, the inhab- A group of men, drinking, were instantly up itants yelling and waving from the windows. against the wall, patted down, hands behind ‘Two men got up when they saw the road- their necks. ‘Just looking for drugs, guns …,’ block,’ explained the interpreter, Charles, explained our driver, Tiago. ‘leapt through the windows, and ran off.’ And on we bumped, through the tight The GATI set off in pursuit, only to return alleyways of Coelhos, passing mounds of gar- ten minutes later empty handed. The Colonel bage, food barrows, small kids, and staring pointed in the general direction of the sub- young men lounging about, off, crude urb of Juana Bezerra from whence we had tattoos on display. The lead vehicle came to come. ‘There is no way we can find them in a sudden stop again, two GATI policemen, there,’ he shrugged. guns in their hands, fingers on the trigger Brazil suffers an estimated 52 000 mur- guard, moving quickly down an alleyway. ders a year, ‘more than most wars’ admits ‘A dealer spot’ said the Colonel walking over. Pernambuco’s Secretary for Public Security More men patted down. Rodrigo Bastos. Indeed, the US lost 58 000 Tiago admitted that he had never been service personnel in Vietnam. This trans- to these areas. ‘Too dangerous’ he said. lates into an annual rate of 29 murders per He had been in the force for just a month, following three months of training, attracted * The $ symbol denotes United States dol- by the regular monthly income of R$3 000, lars throughout this volume unless otherwise indicated.

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100 000 people. At 90.4/100 000, Honduras is The aim of this section is to highlight both ranked as the world’s worst; at 31/100 000, the good practices and the challenges faced South Africa ranks 11th34. Brazil also, accord- by others as they have wrestled with the ing to the Mexican Citizens Council for challenges of increasingly large popula- Public Safety 2018 report, contains 14 of the tions, rapid urbanisation, and the need to 50 most violent cities in the world.35 achieve matching economic growth. It is Brazil’s woes with crime, unemployment not intended to be a comprehensive review and social dislocation do not augur well for of all that has been learnt in this area, but Africa, on the cusp of a massive increase in it offers keen observations from a range of its urban population. If a country as sophisti- studies conducted and commissioned by The cated as Brazil is struggling, how will African Brenthurst Foundation in the course of this countries fare with comparatively less diver- project. These were presented at the first cit- sified economies and educated populations? ies’ conference convened at Tswalu Kalahari Reserve in May 2016, based on field-work in Latin America and Asia.

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The Asian Experience

The Singapore Story

Liu Thai Ker returned from his studies in slums, most without water-borne sewer- Sydney and at Yale and a stint working age, and many without employment, on under the renowned architect IM Pei36 to a tiny island-state of just 580km2. Fast serve, first, as the Deputy CEO then CEO of forward 50 years, 83% of the 5.5 million pop- Singapore’s Housing Development Board ulation lives in publicly-supplied Housing (HDB) for 20 years from 1969 and, then, Development Board (HDB) apartments, 90% the Chief Planner and CEO of the Urban own their own homes, the rivers are clean, Redevelopment Authority (URA). In 2008 the island is 15% larger as a result of land he was appointed as the Chairman of the reclamation, and despite the population Centre for Liveable Cities within the Ministry increase, green cover has increased to 47% of of National Development. the territory. His career has provided a unique window Thai Ker observes that this extraordinary on Singapore’s transformation: from a city transition has hinged on the government’s where, at independence in 1965, two-thirds credibility among its population. And that, in of its 1.6 million people lived in overcrowded turn, has depended on delivery and, ‘behind

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that’, he says, ‘is its record of transparency, 121 foreign banks and 7 000 multinational frugality and the absence of corruption’. companies, two-thirds of which had their The pace and scale of Singapore’s tran- Asian headquarters on the island. sition from urban slum to global city has At US$64 581, Singapore’s GDP per - probably been unparalleled. Despite the ita is at least 150 times more than it was common narrative of critics and wannabe (in nominal terms) in 1960,39 and higher autocrats that this action was down to today than its former colonial master, authoritarianism, the ability to get things Britain. done, as Thai Ker argues, has relied prin- Employing the benefits of its geography cipally on the government’s record and has always been at the heart of modern commitment to popular welfare. Success Singapore, and so has its people’s industri- has depended, too, not on a few big or iconic ousness. The founder of modern Singapore, infrastructure projects or even the provi- Sir Stamford Raffles, commented that sion of necessary funding, housing and land, ‘it is impossible to conceive of a place com- even though all these were all necessary bining more advantages’ referring to its aspects, but fundamentally on ensuring a proximity to China and its positioning in complete cycle of economic growth, govern- the Malay Archipelago. Or as Lee noted in ance and job creation within an overarching 2012, ‘We became a hub because of the con- ‘can do’ political framework. In this regard, venience. For shipping, you have to pass reflects the URA’s CEO Peter Ho, Singapore’s Singapore, it’s the southernmost point urban success ‘all boils down to pragmatic [of continental Asia] … we were poor and leadership’ led at the outset by Lee Kuan we were underdeveloped, so we had to work Yew, citing Lee’s comment to him personally hard.’ (paraphrasing George Bernard Shaw) that Following its birthing in 1819 by Raffles ‘Reasonable men adapt, unreasonable men and Major William Farquhar as a free change the world’.37 port which Raffles declared would be ‘open to ships and vessels of every nation The Immutable Value of Location free of duty’, the towkays (Chinese mer- Contemporary Singapore is a metaphor for chants) quickly came to dominate regional world-class best practice. commerce. The city-state’s skyline reflects a con- As the British Empire flourished, so did tinuous, driving reinvention and fast-paced Singapore, its growth powered by trade and expansion; one year an idea, the next a its role, not unlike today, as an international Singapore Flyer, Marina Bay Sands, Art financial centre. The front page of the first Science Museum, 42 million tonnes of under- issue of The Straits Times on 15 July 1845, for ground oil bunkering, a US$1 billion Gardens example, is filled with notices on shipping by the Bay, and so on. ‘It is because we don’t activity, lists of foreign goods for sale, market want to fail,’ one official reflected. ‘We also reports from around the world and ware- have no natural resources to fall back on’ houses to let.40 she added. It is the epitome of globalisa- With prosperity, Singapore’s population tion, possessing the world’s second busiest grew quickly. From just 5 000 inhabitants in container port, which handles more than 1819, it had doubled in size by 1825 by which 34 million containers annually, a ship arriv- times trade had reached US$22 million, more ing or leaving every 2 to 3 minutes. Changi than the established port of Penang. By the Airport is consistently ranked as the world’s turn of the 19th Century Singapore housed best airport,38 handling 150 000 passengers an estimated 225 000, more than 550 000 by and 6 700 flights daily. This is more than 1930, and touching a million by 1950. This logistics. By 2017, Singapore was home to reflected the growth in commerce. The US

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Treasury estimated the trade of Singapore themselves in control of – policy tools, tax at US$210 million in 1898, more than Japan revenue and execution. and the Dutch East Indies. Between 1873 and The challenges at independence seemed 1913, Singapore’s volume of trade increased formidable: high levels of poverty and eightfold, at the time making it the world’s inequality, limited infrastructure, limited second busiest port after Liverpool.41 literacy (just 60%) and widespread squalor Jewel of the British Empire it may have with half a million living in slums, and high been, it was a site of great hardship, of unemployment. Goh Keng Swee, regarded as callous division, a world of European tuans the father of Singapore’s modern economy, and coolies, bumboats and memsahibs, two learnt from the 1952 Social Survey that of cities and societies: one driven by interna- the 1 814 people who lived in Upper Nanking tional finance, steam and the telegraph that Street close to his own home, just three enjoyed lifestyles of leisure; the other a rick- households had their own toilet, bath and shaw society, marginalised, violent, poor, kitchen. The others shared open-bucket toi- disease- and drug-ridden, and for whom laws lets and open coal fires to cook. As a result, and justice did not equally apply. ‘[H]e decided that his priority should be to Those rickshaw pullers, often Chinese provide jobs. And the best way to do this migrants, would work up to 12-hour shifts was to encourage capitalism and private for as little as 60 cents a day, much of enterprise.’44 which would, invariably given the levels of The government’s response was to align addiction among pullers, be consumed on the economic, social, international and legal chandu, opium. As the National Museum of context to the nation’s needs: land, housing, Singapore notes, ‘Because of the physical toll jobs and investment were the priorities. on their bodies, coolies usually worked for five to seven years before returning to China’. Land, Housing, Jobs and Investment This hardship occasionally flared into vio- To support the priority of urban renewal, lence, such as the Post Office Riots of 1876 or Lee’s government enacted the Land the Verandah/five-foot-way riots of 188842. In Acquisition Act in 1966 which granted the 1896 Dr Lim Boon Keng led an enquiry into power to acquire land quickly and at rea- the ‘four social evils’: gambling, alcoholism, sonable rates of compensation. This was prostitution, and ‘chasing the dragon’ (opium followed, later, by an amendment of the smoking). After the Second World War these Foreshores Act of 1964, which enabled the frustrations found voice in the expressions government to embark both on reclamation of Merdeka (‘freedom’ in Malay) and the and to build the East Coast Parkway linking pan-Malayan independence movement. Changi Airport, in particular, with the city Still, after its departure from the short- centre. By 1979, 80% of land belonged to the lived Malaysian Federation in August 1965, government to be sold on long-term (usually independent Singapore was faced with fewer 99-year) leases to developers. ‘Without land,’ resources in meeting the aspirations of its says Cheng Tong Fatt, Permanent Secretary people. To do so, Lee’s team of ‘founding in the Ministry of National Development in fathers’43 and subsequent governments the 1970s, and later Ambassador to China, relied on gathering and deploying efficiently ‘you can’t talk about planning’. the scarce resources available. Their suc- Today 12% of Singapore’s land is allocated cess exactly illustrates the value of decisive to roads, and just 17% to residential areas. domestic leadership concerned less with Land acquisition was sometimes only grand visions, governance frameworks and grudgingly accepted. ‘Government had a mobilising aid, than the things they were vision,’ reminds Peter Ho, ‘and knew what had to be done, even if unpopular, for the

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greater good of the people.’ But it was more not prepared me for this’ he laughs. ‘We had palatable with the payment of compensation nowhere to turn to for ideas, since there was and promise of resettlement. no internet, no-one had done public hous- The resulting resettlement of those liv- ing on this scale, and since in those days a ing in the Central Business District (CBD) trip to Sentosa,’ a ten-minute cab ride from required alternative housing from the the city centre today, ‘let alone overseas, Housing Development Board (HDB). At was regarded as a long journey. To take the end of the HDBs first decade in 1970, on a job like this you have to have a brave one-third of the population lived in pub- and dynamic leader, as we had.’ The team lic housing, and it had built 120 669 units, learned to bring down costs by using louvre compared to the 23 019 constructed by its rather than casement windows and having predecessor, the Singapore Improvement lifts stopping at every fifth floor. ‘We required Trust (SIT), in 32 years. Now apartments are a political solution to the problem. If you funded through a combination of home- had people who were aesthetically inclined owner grants and loans, the latter both then you would never solve the housing commercial and from the Central Provident problem, except perhaps only for the elite.’ Fund (CPF), a mandatory savings scheme in Cheaper building techniques were developed, which employers and employees contrib- the byword being ‘no frills’. ute (a maximum of) 16% and 20% of salary After Queenstown the next major project respectively. CPF loans, in 2016, were at 2.6%, was Toa Payoh, situated on 600 hectares in repayable over 30 years, with the aim now, as the central part of the island. ‘The land was in the 1960s’, says the HDB’s chairman, ‘to full of squatters with their thatch and tin- provide affordable housing’. roofed shacks, and infested with gangsters, Home ownership, emphasises the HDB’s who unofficially provided different services Sng Cheng Keh, gave the population a ‘stake to the community. It was dangerous to go in in their society, building a strong work and to try to remove them, and there was a ethic, a store of value to be monetised, and lot of resistance. To achieve this,’ he recalls, a sense of belonging’.45 Effectively, it turned ‘we needed to resettle the residents to other, a radical discontented society into one with nearby flats. Changing the culture of the conservative values and suspicious of pop- people used to living in such kampongs, ulist solutions as they saw themselves as with animals out the back and fruit trees, owners. into a high-rise was also challenging.’ Aside The son of a ‘mother who survived as a from the compensation paid under the hawker and taught me the value of multi- Land Acquisition Act, ‘our most formidable tasking and hard work’, Alan Choe, 85 in weapon was that this was for the good of 2016, was the first architect-planner of the nation, and no one could challenge the the HDB and the founder of the Urban order.’ Renewable Authority. Having returned with By 1963, having completed ‘about a town planning degree from Melbourne 20 000 units, ‘Lee Kuan Yew realised that University in 1959, he was quickly recruited just rehousing squatters was not enough, into the nascent HDB. After the failure of the and shifted focus to the city centre. I was SIT to deliver more than 1 000 units a year asked to shadow a UNDP (UN Development due to, he says, a lack of empathy with local Programme) expert to learn about how culture and needs, the HDB was tasked with we should go about this. Additionally, delivering 50 000 units in five years. I took study-tours organised by the Ford ‘My first job was to finish off [the devel- Foundation to the US, the British Council to opment of] Queenstown. My Master’s the UK, and to Germany and Japan to under- thesis on small scale industrial cities had stand urban renewal. In all cases, with the

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exception of only the US, it was urban recon- the island. With continuous reviews and struction that they were involved with. And adjustments, this remains the basis of devel- in the US, urban renewal was a dirty word, opment in Singapore today,’ he notes. seen as corrupt.’ The plan was intended to ensure the opti- The resulting four-year ‘Urban mal use of limited land resources to meet Development and Renewal Project’, started the residential, economic and recreational in 1967 cost around Sing$15 million needs of a population projected to reach four (US$11 million at today’s exchange rate), of million by 1992. It provided for the location which a third was contributed by the UN. of the airport at Changi, the construction of The concept envisioned a circle of high-den- the Mass Rapid Transit (MRT) system and the sity development around three sides of the network of expressways.46 central water catchment area, as well as a In all of this, Cheng recalls, Lee Kuan Yew southern development that ran from was ‘in absolute control. He was always send- the industrial area of Jurong to the airport at ing me notes. Although he learnt from other Changi. cities, he formed in his own mind a vision Cheng Tong Fatt joined government in what Singapore should be, and he imple- 1957 fresh from his veterinarian studies at mented this step-by-step, throughout his life, Glasgow University. ‘Then the city was just learning all the time as he went along.’ 15km2 under the City Council, the rest of the This was not without its tense moments. territory being under the control of the Rural ‘In the mid-1970s we were working on what Board. Nothing much,’ he recalled of nearly has become the Marina Sands area. Lee Kuan 60 years ago, ‘was going on. There were no big Yew wanted to know why we had narrowed buildings and very limited authority. Things the entrance to the River with the reclama- changed when the People’s Action Party tion, when he believed that a wider mouth came in in 1959, merging the two boards into was necessary to remove the pollution. When a single administration.’ In the run-up to the I explained to him why, he went very quiet Federation in 1963 he spent a lot of time in for a while. He was thinking. He then came the company of Lee Kuan Yew canvassing up with a solution, which was to clean the support in the rural areas. ‘I bought a new river up at the source of the problem, rather car with a government loan on my return,’ than try to deal with the consequences of he smiles. ‘Within three years it was gone pollution. That is where his clean-up pro- already, destroyed by the poor rural roads gramme for the rivers came from.’ As Lee and the demands of getting things done.’ put it publicly at the time, ‘It should be a way After the merger with Malaysia ‘things of life to keep the water clean, to keep every were still very poor, very haphazard, with stream, every culvert, every rivulet, free from very few resources, with most develop- unnecessary pollution. In ten years let us ment still within a 30km2 area around the have fishing in the Singapore River and in the city centre.’ His record in turning Singapore Kallang River. It can be done.’ into a self-sufficient food producer led to Frugality required taking a long view. his appointment in 1971 as the Permanent Although Marina Sands reclamation was Secretary in the Ministry of National completed by 1980, the building develop- Development. ‘There were eight new PS’s ment only took off 20 years later. appointed at the same time. I inherited a Under Lim Kim San, known as ‘Mr HDB’, more-or-less complete five-year masterplan a Public Utilities Board was set up in 1965 to which the UNDP had assisted in drafting, oversee the provision of water, electricity and which provided for different types of land gas, ensuring better sanitation and ameni- usage – residential, defence, commercial, ties. This included the ‘Clean and Green’ recreational, industrial, transport – across Singapore programme, and the clean-up of

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the Kallang River Basin and Singapore River, other doctors, the nurses, they will never which took ten years from Lee’s statement in respect you’. 1977 that he wanted fishing on both water- › The establishment of priorities. ways.47 It was a signal, also, of Singapore’s Singapore’s growth centred on the need economic transition from the lightermen to create jobs, ensure economic growth who plied their trade on the creek to a and provide housing, all with the aim new stage of development, from a heavily of building a harmonious multi-racial, polluted port to a fashionable commercial multi-religious society. and residential neighbourhood. › The importance of a whole of govern- This was not the only major water initia- ment approach, where compromise and tive. In addition to securing its potable water co-operation is expected as a matter provision from Malaysia through a treaty, of course, and where there is constant Singapore focused on developing its own communication ‘up and down’ between resources including converting more than politicians and civil servants. one-third of the island into a water catch- › Employing the sense of desperation and ment area for desalination and reclamation. crisis in driving Singaporeans to action. The HDB and URA were not the only › The necessity of matching execution ‘action-oriented agencies’ set up to get things with ideas. ‘Policy is implementation and moving. The Economic Development Board implementation is policy’. (EDB) was established in 1961 to attract › The alignment of the regulatory and investors and sustain competitiveness. legal environment, such as with the Land Acquisition Act and Foreshores Act. Leadership, Application and Context › The need to pick an appropriate solution In the foyer of the Urban Renewal Authority to your particular circumstances, and not is a display outlining ‘ten qualities of a to reach for ‘first world’ answers. good city: Good transport, good amenities, › Spending frugally. clean and green, good governance, of › Establishing an overall plan and design. business, liveable, people-centric, 24-hour › The necessity of action-oriented activity, vibrant and unique.’ This display institutions and agencies. forms part of an attempt to engage the pub- › Aiming to be ‘as good as your competitors, lic, reflecting the long road travelled since the or the money will go elsewhere’. more draconian days of the 1960s. Achieving › Don’t aim for incremental improvements, these qualities is more complex. Throughout but for whatever radical step-change the interviews with the politicians, planners and situation demands. doers (an unusually inseparable bunch in Singapore’s case) of the 1960s, the following Overall, Singapore’s continuous trans- issues came up time and time again: formation and development speak to the importance of matching deeds with › The centrality of leadership, political words and of careful planning. It illus- will, and the integrity of government. trates the necessity of rooting actions in As Ngiam Tong Tow said: ‘Investors are the population’s principal needs. Jobs and attracted by the integrity of government.’ housing were the priorities in the 1960s, and › The importance of leading from the better infrastructure and urban renewal front and attending to the detail. Again, those of the 1970s. It has required security, in Ngiam’s words: ‘If you are the Chief achieved through local capacity and interna- Surgeon, then you must operate on tional diplomacy. the most difficult cases, otherwise the

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More than anything Singapore’s transfor- big infrastructure without building an econ- mation illustrates the necessity of getting omy, and you can’t do that without security, the overall environment right. You can’t do savings, both local and foreign, and skills.

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Indonesia: Infrastructure and Iconography

The name ‘Bandung’ is up there in interna- Sukarno himself was gone in ten years, tional political iconography. The Indonesian removed in a coup d’etat by the stubby city was the site of the 1955 Asia-Africa General Suharto, but not before he had Conference, a symbol of the heady days of brought his country to the economic preci- struggle and promise. pice. Just like the colonialists had gone in for There, leaders of 29 developing coun- grandiose architecture to make a statement, tries met under President Sukarno’s Sukarno did much the same in an attempt to chairmanship in the former Dutch Concordia make up for his lack of economic substance. recreation hall, renamed for the occasion of Despite misty-eyed retro mythology, the Gedung Merdeka (or ‘independence build- Sukarno’s rule was neither democratic and ing’), to accelerate the national liberation nor did it deliver development. Instead, as struggles under way across their continents. corruption and inefficiency throttled growth, Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru of India, he relied on a combination of personal cha- who attended along with Ho Chi Minh from risma, anti-western gesturing including the Vietnam, Pakistan’s Mohammad Ali Bogra, expulsion of 50 000 Dutch settlers in the Egypt’s Lt-Colonel Gamal Abdel Nasser late-1950s and the oxymoronic purchase and Chou en Lai from China among others, of East bloc weaponry while birthing the described Bandung as the ‘focal centre and Non-Aligned Movement at Bandung, with its capital of Asia and Africa’.48 grand-scale heroic architecture. By the time In the ‘Paris of Java’, as Bandung was he was put under house arrest, inflation was known in the colonial era given its café at 1 000% and the country’s functional infra- lifestyle away from the oppressive coastal structure was wobbling. tropical heat, the presidents and prime min- Jakarta is a monument to his follies. isters walked the 100 metres down Jalan At one end of the Jalan Thamrin thorough- Asia-Afrika to the conference centre from fare, along Jalan Veteran, is Merdeka Square the luxurious Savoy Homann Hotel, with its featuring the Monumen Nasional, or Monas, wacky LSD interior and curvaceous art deco a 132-metre tall statue with a carved flame balconies. on top, dubbed impertinently ‘Sukarno’s

VIETNAM THAILAND PHILIPPINES Gulf of Philippine Andaman Thailand Sea South China Sea NORTH Sea Sea of Pulau PACIFIC Malacca Ligitan MALAYSIA Medan Pulau Celebes OCEAN MALAYSIA Sipadan Sea Sunfaipakning SINGAPORE Borneo Pekanbaru Pontianak Equator Equator M Biak Padang Kalimantan Sulawesi O Sumatra Banjarmasin (Celebes) Palembang L Irian Jaya U Ambon Mt. Puncak C Jaya Makassar New Guinea JAKARTA C Ciwandan A Bandung Semarang S PAPUA Java NEW Denpasar EAST TIMOR Arafura GUINEA Sea INDIAN Kupang INDONESIA Timor OCEAN Sea AUSTRALIA

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final erection’. Nearby is a 120 000-capacity At independence in 1945, the population was national mosque, Mesjid Istiqlal, the largest in just 70 million. South-East Asia on which Sukarno was the technical chief supervisor; and the Senayan Mayor Emil to Ground Control? sports complex, host to the 1962 Asian Numbers aside, Indonesia’s infrastructure is Games. weak as a result of its dispersed geography, Along the way are myriad other simi- mountainous topography, funding, govern- larly unsuppressed nationalistic urges, ance and politics, among other things. In the including the swish glass and aluminium capital, Jakarta, these challenges are com- Hotel Indonesia (now the Kempinski) whose pounded by the size of its population, the roundabout on Jalan Sudirman features sheer volume of commuters, and frequent the Welcome Statue, the Sarinah depart- flooding. ment store (promoted as ‘The Indonesian Indonesia’s urban dwellers comprise 53% Emporium’), the Semanggi clover-leaf bridge of the population, with the rate of migra- interchange, and various other monuments. tion to the capital estimated at about 4%.50 Such eccentricities alone were not the Still, the government has been caught, source of the economic problem. It was constantly, in a number of infrastructure that Sukarno lacked a plan for the devel- investment binds: between investing in opment of Indonesia. His attempt at a transport between the innumerable islands ‘development’ bank was illustrative of this and on them, the result being unsatisfac- failing. It did not promote exports or, for tory in both respects; and between plans and that matter, any industries. Rather it lent to projects by both the central government and traders. At the same time the government the 34 provinces and 502 city and regency pursued an affirmative action programme authorities countrywide. known as Benteng – or ‘fortress’ – to encour- Dr Oswar Mungkasa is the Deputy age indigenous merchants. Governor of the State of Jakarta with respon- Trading was – and is – not however an sibility for spatial and environmental investment in making things to sell and affairs.51 He identifies three major challenges thus a route to prosperity. As Joe Studwell49 in the capital city. put it, by the early 1960s, with ramping The first is the provision of public trans- political pressures caused by the worsen- portation. Current actions to redress this ing economic situation, Indonesia ‘became challenge, he says, are ‘five years too late’. a zero-discipline fiscal environment’ with This shortfall is epitomised by the antics of the central bank ‘feeding the beast of credit ancient, smoking trucks and elderly white- demand unquestioningly’. The issue is not green Kopaja buses, and some 80 million that nation-building was unimportant; motor bebek (literally, ‘ducks-bike’) – the ever- it’s whether it was best achieved through present snorting, tooting motorcycle. growth or architecture; architecture or With four million daily commuters, infrastructure. transport requires extensive co-ordination Java, the most prosperous and popu- between the local and central government lated of Indonesia’s 13 500 islands, is home both for funding and planning. Currently to 60% of Indonesians, living on just 7% of there are four plans under way for improv- the land mass. The country’s average den- ing the network: the US$1.5 billion Jakarta sity of nearly 130 people per km2 – nearly MRT (Mass Rapid Transport, the under- three times the global average and five times ground) funded by the local government, that of sub-Saharan Africa’s – highlights with the first line due for completion in Indonesia’s status as the world’s fourth most 2018; the US$900 million Jakarta Light Rapid populous nation with 260 million people. Transport (LRT) Monorail, with one aspect

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of construction now under way funded by West Java region, with Bandung being vari- central government, another in the plan- ously known as a ‘Smart City’, ‘Culinary City’ ning stages by the local government; and the (given the variety of specialist restaurants), proposed LRT airport link to be funded by a ‘Factory Outlet City’ (for the throngs of private consortium.52 Malaysian budget shoppers looking for labels The provision of public housing is the sec- and bargains) and, with 78 higher learn- ond major challenge. ing institutions including the prestigious Jakarta currently has a backlog of 40 000 Institute for Technology (attended by presi- public housing units. The current strategy dents Sukarno and BJ Habibie among other is to build 50 000 new units, or 38 new high- grandees), ‘Students City’. density towers, by 2017. These will be let at Indonesia’s third-largest city is seen as a a subsidised price of Rp10 000 ($80c) per day model in incubating small- and medium- to poor families. However, land is expensive sized industries, with more than 500 and scarce. ‘Even though this is the govern- successfully scaling their operations in areas ment’s number one priority,’ he states, ‘and from clothing to gaming, as well as app and funding is not a problem, we cannot find the web design. land.’ He speaks wistfully of Singapore’s early Averaging nearly 9% during the 2000s, 50% land appropriation strategy, and Indonesia’s more than the national average, Bandung’s attempts now to try to introduce a land economic growth has compounded its bank. ‘The difference is that while 95% of the infrastructure deficit, pollution and traf- land there is owned by the government, the fic congestion. There has historically been reverse is true here in Jakarta.’ Regardless, he no shortage of plans to undo the gridlock, considers Singapore’s history of development including a metro, monorail, cable-car, and as a model to be emulated. Bus Rapid Transit-type system. Shelters The third challenge is to sync short-term were even built for the latter, but this stalled expediencies with longer-term needs, and due to resistance from the angkot (minibus) equally, ‘to try to put spatial and develop- drivers. ment issues into one single plan’. Not only do Under Mayor Ridwan Kamil, widely known these plans require careful integration with as ‘Emil’, there was a plan to build a new the existing networks if they are to be suc- satellite city, Teknopolis, on an 800-hectare cessful, but careful co-ordination. ‘We need site about 12kms from Bandung’s city cen- to have one single system to run Jakarta and tre. Elected mayor of the city in June 2013, the surrounding areas, where there are cur- in 2004 he co-founded the architectural rently nine municipalities, three provinces, practice Urbane Indonesia, which has worked and one central government.’ His comments on a number of signature projects worldwide hint at a tension between the pull of central including Singapore’s Marina Bay Gardens.53 government and the effectiveness of decen- In 2018 Emil successfully ran for governor of tralised systems of governance. West Java Province instead of seeking a sec- To the south-east, Bandung is, too, ond mayoral term, though he still aims to clogged, with 2.7 million inhabitants (or deliver his dream. more than eight million if one includes On the surface the Teknopolis plans the wider metro) packed at 14 000 per are impressive, as is the high-tech city km2 (Jakarta is at 9 000, and by compari- ‘Command Centre’ which uses a wall of son London 4 000 and New York 2 000 per monitors to track progress with projects km2) and with an infrastructure that is lit- and monitor traffic and other incidents, tle improved than from the Dutch colonial integrating 100 CCTVs with social media period. There is no shortage of economic feeds. The aim is to have 4 000 cameras dynamism and growth in the capital of the across the city.

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Despite his ambitions, Emil apparently How Jokowi did all this, however, was found running a city tougher than design- more important than simply the statement ing one. He planned Singapore-style laws of his ambitions. In part he won support banning street vendors to reduce the traf- through his blusukan culture, his impromptu fic chaos, showing he meant business. He walkabouts to gather the views of citizens. wanted to create a ‘transport legacy’ with No carefully staged and staggered imbizo, a monorail integrated with an urban cable these frequent visits were key to his popu- car system in the style of Medellín, a Hong lar support and, he claimed, policies.55 His Kong-modelled elevated pedestrian skywalk personal punya gaye (’can-do’) style strength- and the expansion of the number of bikes in ened his public bond. Setting a personal city’s bike rental scheme from 75 to 15 000, example on corruption, he also forbade his plus 100 new parks and playgrounds. Yet family to bid on public projects. delivery of this vision proved much more Jokowi continued with this outgoing challenging, as progress stumbled on a com- style as Governor of Jakarta from October bination on local die-hard habits (which his 2012, again backing it up with delivery. To staff refer to as ‘local culture’), politicking assist poorer students with the payment of and Jakarta’s funding intransigence. Budget essentials including books and uniforms, issues mean his high-tech Command Centre he introduced the ‘Smart Jakarta Card’ in is not staffed round the clock. He referred to 2012. The following year, he inaugurated the the ‘low morality of the bureaucracy’ as one construction of the much-delayed Jakarta of his biggest frustrations.54 MRT, and a week later restarted the stalled construction of the capital’s LRT.56 From Heroic to Practical This was matched by actions on govern- If Sukarno was big on gestures, the current ance. During his time as Governor, Jokowi crop of politicians is more inclined to the managed to double the region’s tax-take, practical, but imperfectly so. encouraging greater transparency through Emil represents a new generation of publicising his monthly salary and pro- Indonesian politician, not from the military vincial budget, and through e-purchasing. or the traditional elites. But he is not the first. Street vendors were rehoused, helping traffic Indonesia’s President Joko Widodo, popularly flows, while he initiated major new dredg- known as Jokowi, is from humble origins. His ing projects aimed at reducing Jakarta’s father was a furniture maker, the sector in omnipresent danger of regular flooding. which the future president made his busi- And despite his political origins in the Partai ness career. Jokowi’s politics were shaped by Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan (Indonesian his family’s three evictions from their home. Democratic Party of Struggle – PDI-P) of While still at school, at 12, he started in his former president Megawati Sukarnoputri, father’s workshop. daughter of the founding father, he has During his seven years as the Mayor of tried to reign in the subsidy culture, which, Solo (2005–2012), Jokowi set what is now a while politically popular, constrains capital familiar agenda for action. He became known projects, not least by increasing fuel prices. for delivery of new infrastructure including the building of markets and walkways, the The ‘express’ rail service from Bandung to revitalisation of public parks, the promotion Jakarta winds its way through the Tangkuban of the city as an exhibition centre, improved Parahu (‘upside down boat’) volcanic range, public transportation, the establishment of over lime-green rice terraces and muddy a techno-park, and the promotion of health brown rivers, pocked with the red roofs of care insurance. Emil, it seems, is not alone. countless settlements. There were signifi- cant improvements in the national Kereta Api

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railways during the tenure of its CEO Ignasius and execution against such plans. This began Jonan, later appointed by Jokowi as the coun- with the Suharto government (for all of its try’s transport minister. But the journey still ills) reducing inflation at the start and stead- takes more than three-and-a-half hours. ily improving and extending governance. The basic rail infrastructure is still much The Indonesian plan for prosperity has been the same as it was during the Dutch colo- focused on providing the general framework nial period, hence ambitious schemes for a for prosperity to occur, in this case through high-speed national network, and the com- what is termed in Indonesia as MSMEs mencement of the construction of Jakarta’s – Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises – underground and light-rail systems in 2014. responsible for more than half of GDP. This experience contrasts with the group The plan also centred on agricultural of Chinese dignitaries waiting outside the growth, which was disappointing during the museum to the historic Gerdang Merdeka colonial sector. Under Suharto, the focus was in January 2016. They were in Bandung to on improving agricultural yields, thereby break ground for a US$5.5 billion high-speed increasing demand for services and goods railway connecting to Jakarta, which it is and enabling the division of labour. Indonesia envisaged will reduce the harrowing road produced its first rice surplus in 1983. This journey from three hours to just 40 minutes. went hand in hand with the gradual lib- Bandung’s cable-car project was supposed to eralisation and internationalisation of the have been kicked off at the same time, but economy to secure international investment as the mayor’s office explained, ‘there is a in setting-up export-oriented manufactur- problem with land’. ing industries. As a result, by the late 1980s, Yet while Indonesia’s infrastructure is Indonesia had not only become an agricul- ropey, and along with all the other above- tural exporter, but also exported textiles, mentioned constraints, may discount growth , apparel and consumer goods. by as much as two to three percentage points Indonesia thus teaches us that just as annually, it has not derailed the economy. infrastructure is no silver bullet for success, Growth has been driven by a combination and vanity projects should be avoided, it is of continuous plans for improved prosperity, seldom the sole reason for failure.

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Latin America

Security in Recife – Pact for Life

Faced with a mounting murder rate in officials, were created to focus on specific Recife that, by the beginning of 2007, had issues such as violence against women and reached nearly 400 deaths per month, the impact of drugs. This forum gave rise to the Pernambuco State Governor Eduardo over 100 projects which were then organised Campos put together Pacto Pela Vida, a ‘Pact into a plan that contained six lines of action. for Life’, which was the first public safety Considerable emphasis was placed on moni- plan in the state’s history. A two-term gov- toring and evaluation mechanisms that were ernor, Campos was killed in an aircraft incorporated into the plan at all levels to accident in August 2014 while campaigning drive progress. for president. The result was a significant decline in vio- Encompassing all government agen- lent and other crimes. Recife’s murder rate, cies, the aim of the Pacto Pela Vida was to which at 73.6/100 000 ranked alongside the reduce violent deaths by improving cross peak experienced by Colombia’s Bogota in government co-ordination, increasing polic- the 1990s, declined by 54% between 2007 and ing numbers, deploying technology (mainly 2014 to 34/100 000. The state of Pernambuco’s CCTV), extending community outreach, shrank by 30% from 56/100 000 to 39/100 000 engaging more actively in drug prevention, over the same period. and paying bonuses to police officers linked Not only was this decline impressive, but to targets for crime reduction. At its heart it occurred at a time when the crime rate was the realisation that violence was not just increased nationally by 10%. However, there a police problem nor one to be solved only by were significant regional variations. For the federal government or by the state; all example, further south, in the state of , levels, including municipalities, had to have the murder rate rose by 347% over the period a role. Normally, ‘mayors in Brazil avoid the 2000 to 2014 and, in Bahia’s capital Salvador, issue of violence like the plague’, reflected by 370%.57 one municipal official, because it is the state The improvement in Recife occurred government that has the lead. despite a police force thinly spread and To kick start the initiative, the Governor structurally divided. The complex split of created a Public Security Special Advisory security responsibilities between military, Office in January 2007 which was given civil and municipal police, forensic special- just five months to produce an analysis of ists and the paramilitary fire department the state’s security problems and a plan to reflects Brazil’s history and federal make- tackle the issues identified. While the plan up, and shapes both decision-making and was being developed, the military and civil- funding. ian police were tasked with confronting Despite the obvious downsides of such the gangs responsible for large numbers of an arrangement there are positive, empow- violent crimes. ering, aspects. Because the state – and not A State Public Security Forum was created the federal government in Brasilia – is prin- to engage the public in debate and a series cipally responsible for funding security of technical groups, comprising a range of and development among other administra- experts, civil society leaders and government tive activities, there is considerable policy

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á Rio de Vitória n São Janeiro PARAGUAY ra CHILE a Paulo P Sepetiba Curitiba Santos Terminal SOUTH PACIFIC Porto SOUTH ATLANTIC OCEAN Alegre ARGENTINA OCEAN

URUGUAY

latitude. Ultimately the reasons Pact for Life a robust monitoring system. Thus, there was made such progress in reducing crime were a transparent and common understanding of because of strong leadership from the state both progress and setbacks, which enabled governor and a sound, widely consulted and the parties to continuously improve the way co-ordinated plan which was underpinned by they tackled Recife’s security challenges.

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The Security Challenges of Rio

Whilst Recife and the state of Pernambuco to Robert Muggah of Instituto Igarapé, one have made progress, other cities in Brazil in 38 arrests in Brazil ends in a killing. are still struggling. We spoke to Pedro The comparable figure in New York is one in Strozenberg, Ombudsman of 37 000. and previous executive secretary of the ‘Rocinha is under the control of the drug Instituto de Estudos da Religiáo (Institute for dealers,’ says a local guide called Edson. ‘The the Study of Religion, ISER), which was estab- UPPs, the pacification police’, he laments, lished during the period of military rule as a ‘don’t do much at all.’ The number of UPPs to pursue social issues. ‘The problem is in the favelas has more than doubled in structural,’ he says. ‘We need much more of a four years, from 18 areas in 2011 to 42 by solid strategic response to address the prob- the end of 2015, while UPP officers deployed lem that opportunities in society are deeply has increased fourfold since 2010, now unequal.’ Across the 21 municipalities that numbering 9 000. make up the Rio metropolitan area, there are The UPPs, or Unidade de Polícia Pacificadora, great variances in murder rates. For example, were deliberately established with an eye whereas the state of Rio suffered 39 murders on the 2014 World Cup as a response to fac- per 100 000 people in 201858, in the munici- tional gang and police violence. This had pality of Paracambi it was 68/100 000.59 This steadily worsened since the 1980s with the aspect correlates with differences in access arrival of the cocaine trade. The favelas pro- to basic services, from transport to health- vided perfect operating and hiding places care, education and sanitation. ISER’s Inés for the gangs, given their poor layout, access Gotari notes that more than a quarter of challenges and the availability of potential Rio’s inhabitants spend more than an hour recruits. Three major drug gangs – Comando travelling to work, and in some municipali- Vermelho (Red Command), Teceiro Comando ties, it is as high as half their population. (Third Command), and ADA (Amigos dos It is little surprise then that insecurity Amigos, Friends of Friends) – were able to remains a problem in many of the favelas, seize control of these areas where the state of which there are an estimated 785 in Rio. had no presence, policing or services. Together, they house one in five of the wider Despite high levels of ongoing violence, Rio metro’s 12 million residents, being fed by the statistics showed an overall improve- a continuous stream of migrants, especially ment across Rio, particularly in the number from Brazil’s poor northeast. With space of killings by the police. Between 2008 and to expand outwards constrained, existing 2015, for example, there was a 78% reduc- dwellings instead simply build up. tion in the number of intentional homicides Deep inside the favela Rocinha, where in the areas that hosted pacification units, access is poor, and the environment is both more than 40% fewer murders, and a 76% dark and very hot, rental rates are perhaps reduction in gang shootings. as low as US$80 a month. Down the hill By 2018, however, the overall murder rate where there are wider streets and better was back up from a low of 17.7/100 000 in shops, favela prices can be ten times as high. 2015 to 39/100 000, chasing its 1994 peak of The favelas have become metaphors for 72.8/100 000. drug trafficking and murder. The relationship Whilst policing is important, it is not an between the police, drug gangs and delin- end in itself. In this regard, the parallels from quent politicians remains a core civil society Rio with some African and other cities are concern, as is the level of violence displayed clear. Government lacks legitimacy, despite by both police and criminals. According democracy, in the poorest communities. It is

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seen as an unreliable and often antagonis- Infrastructure: The Limits of Big tic partner where governance is fraught with Projects institutional and economic instability. One Brazil has tended to seek answers through lesson is that small steps can help a great silver bullets and big schemes, which have deal, including improving the training and usually only compounded existing problems. accountability of the police, the judges and Vargas’ Estado Novo, or ‘New State’, the prisons. Brazil’s prisons house 812 000 sought to transform Brazil from a planta- inmates, the third largest prison population tion-based agricultural economy into an in the world.60 industrial powerhouse through government The government in Brazil recognises the intervention, both by the creation of state- importance of extending governance and financed and run monopolies, for example, service provision into the favelas; but deliv- in oil (Petrobras), mining (Vale), steelmaking ering these much-needed improvements (Companhia Siderúrgica Nacional), aviation is challenging. To address strategic discon- (Embraer) and cars (National Motors Factory) tinuities and to improve co-ordination, a and by offering protection and preferential Metropolitan Chamber for Development contracting to domestic industries. was established in 2015. Its four initial goals Brazil’s fascination with big development were: first, to devise a way to manage the schemes and its propensity for political mel- conflict between the need for longer-term odrama did not die, however, with Vargas. planning and budgeting matched against a Cue President Juscelino Kubitschek who short-term, four-year political cycle; second, started building a new capital at Brasilia the to introduce private sector expertise and year after Vargas’ demise as a symbol of the funding in the infrastructure and manage- country’s ambition and determination. ment processes; third, to better integrate the Brazil’s first republican constitution, of actions of government agencies; and finally, 1891, contained an article that stated that the establishment of a development plan the capital should be moved from Rio de with clearly prioritised actions. Janeiro to ‘a place closer to the centre of the Improving sanitation has already been country’, giving official weight to an idea identified as the most important area of first suggested by José Bonifácio in 1827. But action: just 30% of waste is treated and 70% it took until 1956 for Kubitschek to order its goes into Guanabara Bay. The past failure to construction. Designed by Lúcio Costa and link unused, new treatment facilities with Oscar Niemeyer, the core of the city was built municipalities is held as an example of bad in 41 months and was officially inaugurated management, which could conceivably be on 21 April 1960. addressed by public private partnerships. From the outset, it was clear that the Improving mobility is the next priority, given growth of Brasília was going to be greater that 75% of metropolitan residents work in than the designers had envisaged. Even dur- the city but only half live there. ing the construction period, Brazilians from Rio has put together a city masterplan to all over the country migrated to the city try to realise the plans outlined above and in search of jobs. At the close of the 20th also better land use. It is sign of their intent Century, Brasília had earned the distinction that Jaime Lerner, the eminence grise town- of becoming the largest city in the world that planner-politician from Curitiba in Brazil’s had not existed at the start of the century south, was part of this team. and, with a growth rate of 2.82% per year, had one of the highest growth rates in Brazil. Designed as a city for government, it now has a burgeoning private sector.

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Forty-five years later it is apparent that city is the issue of land ownership or, more designing a city from scratch with a spe- specifically, illegal occupation. According to cific idea of its function brings its own a leading official within TERRCAP, the body challenges. The original master plan was responsible for the administration of fed- based on a concept of a central core of gov- eral land in the city, a staggering 80% of the ernment buildings surrounded by satellite population lives in ‘illegal areas’, a problem cities where people would live. Vincente Lima that has existed since the city’s inception. Neto, from the State Secretary’s Department ‘Initially the government was disorganised, of Territorial Management, remarks that and this was exploited; now people want it 67% of the jobs are in the central zone but this way.’ The consequences are considerable. just 200 000 of the city’s more than 2.6 mil- Illegal occupants only pay partial taxes as lion people live there. With no subway and they can’t be forced to pay tax on land where a planning assumption that people would the ownership is in dispute, yet local authori- come to work by car, there are now consid- ties remain obliged to provide essential erable mobility problems. The normal mixing services and there are significant environ- of social and economic development that mental issues. Mass legalisation seems the occurs when cities grow is only now starting obvious solution but the sheer numbers, to happen on the outskirts of Brasilia. potential for individual legal actions and Reflecting on what he would do if he had the political toxicity of the issue make this another blank piece of paper he remarked: a challenging prospect. This issue is not just ‘Having all the houses on the outside was confined to the poor. A quick look at Google a bad plan. You need to sectorise. Also, we maps shows that a sizeable number of the should not have been so car orientated, we illegally occupied areas have big houses need a much bigger focus on public trans- complete with swimming pools. Wrapped up port. The ideology of the city has accidentally in this is a cultural element. As one official led to more exclusion. They did not realise remarked, ‘Brazilians don’t want to obey the how it would grow.’ law – they think that other people should But perhaps the biggest challenge facing obey the law.’ those trying to regulate the growth of the

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Curitiba and the Bus Rapid Transport

Curitiba is the capital of the southern Brazil fare of just under a dollar regardless of state of Paraná with a population of two mil- the length of the journey. This fee cross- lion. In 2010 Curitiba was awarded the Global subsidises those, mostly the poor, living far Sustainable City Award on account of its from the city centre. excellence in urban development. The city Jaime Lerner has been a pivotal figure deserved it because it really did innovate and in this system. He was part of the original integrate. team which decided on the winning bid for ‘We have many visitors from China, the masterplan and, in 1965, helped create South Africa, Colombia and other countries,’ the Instituto de Pesquisa e Planejamento Urbano says Silvia Ramos of URBS (Urbanuzacao de de Curitiba (Institute of Urban Planning and Curitiba), the transport regulator. Research of Curitiba, IPPUC), a research, It’s little wonder. Curitiba founded a now monitoring and implementation body popular surface transport system known as funded by the municipality. Bus Rapid Transport. The system has become Lerner was elected mayor three times, the an international role model for public trans- first time in 1971. Although he instituted sev- port that others have sought to replicate. eral important changes to the city, including Now more than 250 cities worldwide have building more parks, creating an apprentice- BRTs. ship system for deprived young people, and Getting this to work involves more establishing a successful recycling scheme, than just mobility. Curitiba has success- the BRT remains his greatest achievement, fully used a relatively cheap surface public and Curitiba’s gift to the world. transport system to transform the city, not ‘You need to think of the BRT,’ he says, just in terms of the movement of people, ‘not just as a transport system, but as a but also through the use of land and pub- city design. It has been the engine of the lic spaces. Integration has been achieved city’s growth. We started small, but for each through connecting people, and this has stage to solve each problem, we have used been key to economic progress. innovation.’ Back in 1966, when the city was drawing Not only have the number of lanes and up a masterplan, officials looked at models buses increased exponentially, but the ser- from France and the UK among others. But vices have radically improved. More than the cost of an underground train system was 90% of the fleet is adapted for disabled users. deemed prohibitive for the city, despite its Various feeder lines are fully integrated, relative wealth based on farming. So, it opted with a range of bus types and sizes. Tubular for a surface transport system with dedi- stations have improved the passenger expe- cated bus lanes, at about a tenth of the cost rience. An increasing number of buses use of an underground railway. biofuel, while the electric and ‘Hibribus’ When the system was first implemented is imminent. in 1974 it moved just 50 000 passengers ‘Everything in Brazil is dedicated to the annually. Today the BRT carries over two car,’ says Lerner. ‘For example, there are at million people a year along 81.4km across least five million cars in Sao Paolo alone, six lines in an operating fleet of 1 368 buses, each car taking up 25m² of space on the road some capable of carrying 250 passengers, and in parking. This is the size of a small pausing at 6 500 stops.61 The buses drive housing unit. Even if half this was dedicated 328 066km each day and are supplied and instead to housing, we could house another run by private companies who are paid by 2.5 million people closer to their place of the kilometre.62 Passengers pay a standard work. But to do this, we have to provide

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public transport, to turn the space for cars A key reason for Curitiba’s compara- from private to public.’ tive success is consistency of planning and ‘Back in the 1970s when we did it, it was implementation. said that every city which achieved a popu- Daniele Moraes is an architect at IPPUC. lation of one million should have a subway. She reminds that the 1965 masterplan was As we did not have the money, instead not the first one in Curitiba’s history. The we asked: What is a subway? The answer first city plan was back in 1853, which was was, it is a system that has to be fast and followed 90 years later by the Agache Plan, have a good frequency so you don’t have to which laid out a high-density city centre wait. Since we did not have the resources, with suburbs radiating outwards – the design we asked ‘why not the surface’. So, we took trend of the time – for the population of the existing streets, and linked them to the 180 000. The winning bid for the 1965 plan, structure of growth of the city – where we when the city housed 500 000 inhabitants, linked and integrated living, working, leisure built on the Agache scheme but focused on and mobility. a combination of land use, roads and public ‘This is why Curitiba,’ he notes, ‘is differ- transport to deliver a better environment, ent. It involved the renovation and evolution and social and economic development. Since of the existing system.’ then there have been two further revisions, The BRT has led to about 27 million fewer in 2004 and 2014. car trips annually, and a per capita reduction It has not just been about plans, but conti- in fuel use of about 30% in the city, and its nuity of people. She points out that ‘Curitiba air quality is significantly better that that of has enjoyed six mayoral terms – 24 years – of other similar sized Brazilian cities. It also has mayors from IPPUC. Jaime Lerner, who served the highest rate of garbage recycling separa- for three terms, Rafael Greca, who still works tion in the world, at nearly 70% according to at IPPUC, and Cassio Taniguchi, who served Lerner. two terms. They were all also from the Given such efficiencies, Curitiba’s growth same political group which ran the munici- has been above 7% over the past three dec- pality for 40 years.’ She adds, ‘Jaime Lerner ades, while per capita income is 30% higher was a shrewd politician and diplomat. He than the national average. Ironically, Curitiba taught children about recycling, for example, is now the second largest producer of cars in and in so doing created a whole generation Brazil and has a lively services and high-tech concerned about urban planning and the sector. environment. He created a lot of support for The city has been able to make dramatic change.’ inroads into the perennial challenges fac- And critical mass is important too. ing Brazil’s cities of transport, governance, A municipal-funded institution, IPPUC has a infrastructure and security. Yet remarkably staff of 160, of which half are architects and few Brazilian cities have sought to emu- engineers. late its success. Lerner says the reason for Of course, there are challenges. Local this is, very simply, ‘politics’. The problem, economist Carlos Guimaeres of FESP, a pri- he reflects, is ‘that decisions today are closely vate university with a focus on commerce, tied to having consensus, but democracy observes that there is a difference between is not consensus, but rather conflict wisely the IPPUC team and the ‘professors now managed.’ Rather than attempting a per- in City Hall who are very theoretical about fect solution, the city officials have opted for things, but they don’t know how to make pragmatism. ‘Improvement needs a start,’ he them happen’. His colleague Luis Fernando observes. ‘You need to have a demonstration Ferreira da Costa adds that there are always effect sometimes to get things moving.’ funding shortages since ‘Brazil remains a

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very centralised country. Taxes go from the 250 high-tech companies including multi- cities to the states to the Federal centre, nationals like Motorola, Samsung, Dell and but the amount that comes back depends Sun, generating 7 500 jobs and US$350 mil- partly on politics. It also reflects the size of lion in annual revenues. The pool of talent is the Federal government: everyone in Brazil fed by four public universities. wants to work for the government. We need As a result, between 2007 and 2013, for greater decentralisation and greater auton- example, Pernambuco grew its economy at omy, like the United States, so that the states 4.4% annually, above the national average of can raise and spend their own taxes.’ 3.4%. A final word should go to Lerner: ‘Solving Brazil has been pursuing a cluster problems,’ he says, ‘is not related to scale, approach aimed at encouraging innovation, or the size of the city, or financial resources. entrepreneurship and growth since the 1950s The challenge is in organisation, and in and has used cluster-based development as creating shared responsibility between citi- a tool to reduce well-known regional inequi- zens and government, and the public and ties. Santa Rita do Sapucail, now considered private sectors. Otherwise you won’t get the one of the main hubs for Brazil’s electronics outcome you need.’ industry owes its origin to the establishment of an educational Institute for Electronics Clusters – Encouraging Innovation in 1959 and is now home to more than 150 and Entrepreneurship companies in the sector employing over Recife enjoyed a relatively prosperous past, 14 000 people. São Paulo’s plastic cluster at the centre of the north-east’s economy. was started in 1949 with a single manufac- The warehouses lining the city’s old port turer and has now grown into an industrial along the River Capibaribe hint at its pros- cluster that provides more than 150 000 perity when, as the capital of Holland’s 17th jobs. Dominated by Petrobras and Braskem Century Brazilian empire, Recife’s wealth (a company in which Petrobras has consider- grew quickly along with the state’s sugar able equity), the cluster’s development has exports. not been without challenges, but it has been South of the city is Pernambuco’s main fortunate to benefit from strong growth in industrial area, housing all manner of manu- domestic demand for its products. facturing firms from textiles to electronics. A 2013 Inter-American Development To the north, in Goiana, 70km from Recife, is Bank study of the economic performance a state-of-the-art US$2 billion Fiat-Chrysler of industrial clusters in Brazil concluded auto plant, building the latest Jeep Renegade that ‘Overall, the results suggest that clus- and Fiat pick-ups, drawing together a clus- ters are positively correlated with economic ter of component suppliers, in the process performance.’63 Hardly a surprising conclu- providing jobs for 6 500 workers. sion, but one that bears more than a passing Within Recife’s city limits, the ‘Porto consideration as African cities continue their Digital’, founded in 2000, has attracted rapid rate of growth.

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The Transformation of Medellín

Medellín is Colombia’s second-largest city Medellín itself is a city of roughly 380km2 and the capital of the country’s most pros- and 2.5 million people, but Metro Medellín – perous department, Antioquia. Lying about the greater metropolitan area surrounding it five thousand feet above sea level in the – is a much larger urban agglomeration that Val de Aburrá, an elongated north-south val- includes an additional 1.2 million people ley in the central cordillera of the northern and another nine municipalities. Altogether, Andes ranges, the city has a wonderful cli- Metro Medellín covers about 1 100km2 of mate – the famous ‘eternal spring’ – and is the Aburrá valley floor. The city is divided known for entrepreneurial people, innova- into four more or less equal sectors by the tive culture, lively street life, and prosperous Medellín River, which flows south to north, businesses. and a series of east-west tributary streams. Medellín was also, for a time, the dead- The city – and the identity of its inhabitants liest, most violent city on the planet: – is thus based on very localised neighbour- a murderous streetscape of drug deal- hoods that are relatively self-contained. ers, gangs, urban decay, marginalised Medellín is a key economic hub, one slum-dwellers and crumbling infrastructure of the most important in Colombia. It is – the stomping-ground of Pablo Escobar and an important banking centre, housing the his notorious Medellín drug cartel. headquarters of Bancolombia, one of the In the 1980s and 1990s, the city passed largest banks in Latin America, and sev- through a period of crisis that seemed to eral large industrial and manufacturing take it to the edge of chaos. But in the early firms and financial businesses (syndicated 2000s, a series of security interventions into the Antioquia Enterprise Group, Grupo transformed urban public safety, triggering Empresarial Antioqueño). The city’s products a massive drop in violence. By 2013, a suc- include steel, textiles, cement, processed cession of innovative mayors and engaged food and beverages, financial and insurance publics (assisted by a dynamic national gov- services, chemicals and pharmaceuticals, ernment focused on defeating FARC and ELN and cut flowers (mainly produced for exter- guerrillas and drug lords) had transformed nal distribution). the city. In 2013 the Urban Land Institute Indeed, much of Medellín’s production is selected Medellín as the world’s most inno- for export, with a significant proportion going vative city, and Harvard University awarded to global or inter-American trade, including the city its Verónica Rudge Urbanism Award. manufactured goods from the urban zone In 2014, Medellín hosted the 7th World itself, agricultural commodities (including Urban Forum of the United Nations, and in cash crops like coffee) from the city’s hinter- 2016, the city was awarded the Lee Kuan Yew land, and petroleum products refined from World City Prize. oil extracted in the wider region. The From the edge of chaos, the city trans- industry, airlines and trucking businesses formed itself from a crime-ravaged, failing are also major players in the city’s licit econ- metropolis into a self-renewing, increasingly omy, while the illicit economy – coca and stable and prosperous symbol of the new marijuana cultivation, cocaine and heroin Colombia. That transformation was not with- processing, illegal mining and the regional out its controversies, nor is Medellín today and global export of narcotics – has also without problems. But in the city’s journey of played a key role in the city’s development. renewal, there are many insights for African Medellín is organised into 16 communes cities. (comunas) or municipal districts, each with its own representative council, city manager

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The islands of Malpelo, Puerto Bolivar

a l e Providence and u z e Caribbean Sea San Andrés are en Santa Marta V de not shown Barranquilla Gorro Pico Cartagena Cristóbel Colón

PANAMA VENEZUELA

Turbo Cúcuta

Bucaramanga S Medellín

NORTH E Pereira PACIFIC Ibagué BOGOTÁ D OCEAN Buenaventura

Cali N COLOMBIA

A Mitú Pasto

Equator

ECUADOR BRAZIL

Leticia

. R PERU n z o A m a

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and development board, and five townships edges of the Aburrá valley, the bed of the (corregimientos, outlying self-administered Medellín river and its tributary streams. districts). The town is further sub-divided into 271 barrios (urban sub-districts) while Urban Growth in Medellín the comunas are grouped in turn into six The first area of Medellín to be urbanised urban zones. was el Poblado (‘the village’), a district located Districts and sub-districts differ widely on the northeast edge of today’s city, now in terms of industrial and economic activity part of Commune 14. In the second half levels, socio-economic status, effectiveness of the 17th Century, the main centre of of governance, and degree of security. The settlement shifted west to the area of La comunas also vary in racial makeup: while Candelaria, Commune 10, now in the centre the city’s population is overwhelmingly white of the urban core. Medellín grew throughout or mestizo (in the most recent census, 93.4% the 17th and 18th centuries via a process of of the population identified with no ethnic clearing and development of countryside minority, suggesting they were of European downstream (mainly to the west and north) ancestry) with small Afro-Colombian (6.5%) of the initial settlement, and through the and indigenous (0.1%) communities mainly urbanisation of farming and ranching lands. congregated in slums and squatter shanty Medellín’s history is one of an expanding towns that cluster along the city’s northern, urban core surrounded by transitional zones western and southern extremities. of light industry, agriculture and informal Medellín’s slums are mostly found along a settlements. The city has progressively incor- series of outlying hillside neighbourhoods in porated and gentrified outlying settlements, the communes of Popular, Manrique, Santa absorbing agricultural land and separating Cruz and Villa Hermosa on the city’s north- the urban core from key sources of food, fuel, ern outskirts, in Commune 13 (San Javier) water, and labour. in the city’s far south, on the outer edges In the 19th Century, Medellín emerged as of the communes of 12 de Octubre and a mining centre after the discovery of gold Robledo, and in the unincorporated peri- at Anori in 1851. This accelerated the city’s urban space between Commune 13 and the growth, as did the development of coal mines Corregimiento de San Cristóbal in the south- to the south of the city. The arrival of the west. Because of the city’s mountainous railway in 1875 facilitated export and trade terrain, there are finger-like extensions of the and enabled easier migration to Medellín, urbanised area, running from the Aburrá val- and the construction of hydroelectric plants ley floor up gullies into the hills. Road and in the late 19th Century, which brought elec- rail networks follow valley bottoms, so trans- tricity to the city, enabled rapid development port infrastructure (along with habitation in industries such as textiles. and industry) is concentrated in low-lying In the 20th Century, Medellín became areas surrounded by lightly populated, rural a hub for Colombia’s main export earner, and unserviced high ground. coffee. The cultivation, processing and dis- Further from the urban core (and outside tribution of coffee for Latin America and the city’s municipal boundary) are tran- the rest of the world attracted migrants and sitional districts and exurbs that serve as rural dwellers to the city. On the back of this, dormitory communities for the parent city Medellín grew rapidly in the second half of or as centres for rural production. Some are the 20th Century, with the city’s population beginning to merge with the greater urban tripling between 1905 and 1938 but grow- agglomeration of Metro Medellín, forming a ing by a factor of more than 13 from 1939 to contiguous built-up area constrained mainly 2005. by topography – the eastern and western

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The growth of the city in the 20th Century Antioquia suffered particularly heavily in illustrates the reinforcing effect of push this conflict, in which Colombia’s two domi- factors (negative conditions in rural areas nant political groupings, the Liberals and that drive populations out of the countryside the Conservatives, recruited and unleashed into cities) and pull factors (positive conditions armed political militias on each other’s that draw migrants in from both the coun- supporters in an intense wave of rural mas- tryside and from other parts of Colombia sacres, assassinations and riots. Communist and worldwide) in rural-to-urban migra- militias and paramilitary criminal gangs tion. The combined effect of these two sets emerged on the fringes of the main politi- of factors generated a self-reinforcing flow cal blocs and engaged in serious bloodletting of people from rural to urban environments. of their own. In common with many such Pull factors included industrialisation, the conflicts, the original causes of the conflict lure of relatively well-paying and less labori- became less important over time, and the ous non-agricultural jobs, a better standard violence took on a life of its own, charac- of nutrition, education and public health for terised by score-settling, use of violence as those able to access such benefits, and the a tool in economic rivalry, and the manipu- city’s role as a portal connecting isolated lation of violent actors by local populations areas to the rest of the world. Push factors seeking to improve their position vis-à-vis included rural poverty, poor public health other groups. in remote areas, lack of access to education Intense violence in the countryside drove and employment in the countryside, and farmers and rural workers to the city for rural conflict. safety, where they settled in huge numbers A century of accellerating population in hillside barrios on the upland outskirts. growth in Medellín, 1905–2018 This resulted in rapid unplanned growth on the outskirts of Medellín, which progres- 4 sively filled in the open space between the existing city and neighbouring towns such 3 as Envigado, Bello and Itagüí, creating a con- tiguous metropolitan area much larger than 2 the original city. By the 1960s, these areas had evolved 1 into under-serviced, under-governed, under- resourced and over-crowded slums. Despite 0 the creation of a Medellín Master Plan (MMP)

1905 1912 1918 1928 1938 1951 1964 1973 1985 1993 2005 2018 for urban development in 1950, which led to significant modernisation and infrastructure Conflict has long been a key driver of devel- development in downtown areas during the opment in Colombia – unsurprisingly so, in 1950s and 1960s, this massive influx of peo- a country that has seen endemic conflict ple to the city overstressed the urban fabric, (often reaching surprisingly high levels of invalidated urban planners’ calculations and violence) for almost the entire period since overwhelmed city services. its independence from Spain in 1810. Indeed, People living in these areas experienced one major reason for the dramatic spike high levels of urban poverty and unemploy- in Medellín’s urban growth after 1948 was ment, poor access to education and public La Violencia, a diffuse but extremely violent health, political and social marginalisation, civil conflict that killed more than 200 000 exclusion from the licit economy, and high Colombians, most of them rural civilians, levels of unemployment. This meant that, between 1948 and 1958. despite a formal urban planning mechanism

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and an urban master plan characterised by Pablo Escobar was a transformational event a high degree of rationalism and modernism, in the history of Medellín. in practice, much of Medellín’s development Escobar’s role was not purely a criminal took place in an ad hoc, bottom-up, emer- or economic one: his ability to manipulate gent manner similar to what Edgar Pieterse and mobilise poor urban dwellers through a has described (in the context of African con- combination of coercion and intimidation, text) as ‘rogue urbanism’ and Richard Norton lucrative employment and social welfare and David Kilcullen have explored as ‘urban projects in under-served barrios enabled the ferality’. rapid rise of his drug empire and a collapse Organised crime, violence, involvement of public safety and public morals in the city. in illegal mining, extortion and racketeer- Escobar constructed entire barrios, provided ing, and narcotics trafficking flourished in employment and family assistance, settled the feral, informal settlements of the hill- disputes and played the role of both govern- side barrios. From the middle of the 1960s ment administrator and urban developer in Colombia suffered from multiple insurgen- barrios that had become both ‘no-go areas’ cies – descendants of the Communist militias (where representatives of the government of la Violencia such as the FARC, ELN, EPL and could not go) and ‘no-see areas’ (districts, to M-19. This prompted a spike in recruitment use James C. Scott’s term, that had become by guerrillas and terrorist groups in these illegible to the state). areas. M-19, as an urban terrorist group, was Escobar’s ability to co-opt security particularly active on the urban fringes and services, bribe police, and intimidate or among radicalised urban elites such as uni- control city authorities undermined public versity students and leftist labour activists. confidence in state and city institutions. His Urban fronts, underground cells and subver- rivalry with other narco-trafficking groups, sive networks emerged in all sectors of the and his violent feud with M-19 contributed city as a result. to a spate of kidnappings, assassinations, As in African cities such as Rabat and car-bombings and violent incidents over Nairobi (or European cities such as Brussels a 20-year period from the 1970s until the and Paris) the emergence of a large, mid-1990s, directed by narcos against the under-employed, socially and politically state and among rival cartels (as in the marginalised and economically excluded infamous terror war between Escobar’s population in depressed urban areas made Medellín cartel and the rival Cartel del Valle people highly vulnerable to recruitment by in the mid-1980s, which resulted in a spike in activists offering a utopian ideology of lib- bombings, shootings and kidnappings across eration from poverty and exclusion through the city). Politically motivated groups such as armed struggle against a ‘rigged’ system. the leftist FARC and the right-wing paramili- By the 1970s, a more sophisticated and tary autodefensas, along with rogue elements larger-scale version of the traditional mari- of the Colombian government and security juana business had begun to flourish in services, used coercive violence to control Colombia, responding to increased market the population and the drug trade, forming a demand from the United States and Europe. shifting series of alliances of convenience in By the 1980s, marijuana had been overtaken order to defeat their adversaries. by a new, hugely lucrative illicit cash crop: It was this pattern of drug-fuelled cocaine. The combination of this huge new violence, triggered by the combination of illicit industry with a marginalised urban a charismatic and entrepreneurial leader population and the emergence of drug (Escobar), and a hugely lucrative illicit cartels under entrepreneurial leaders like industry (cocaine) with a city already expe- riencing serious overstretch due to rapid

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unplanned population growth and urbanisa- no-go areas and reduced cartel violence, tion – that hastened Medellín’s descent into Escobar’s dominance had in fact also con- decay. strained criminal activity. Once he was removed, a large number of smaller gangs Medellín’s Recovery and criminal groups began a struggle for Medellín reached its nadir in the 1990s, when dominance over what remained of the drug the murder rate placed the metropolitan trade in a more fragmented conflict eco- area high on the list of the world’s most dan- system within the city and the wider metro gerous cities. In 1991, for example (as shown area. Heavily armed militias took over many below) the city experienced an astoundingly informal districts after Escobar’s death, turn- high murder rate of 381 per 100 000 people, ing Commune 13 into a stronghold, while the highest in its history, a level of urban competing drug gangs (‘La Terraza’ and oth- violence close to the worst ever recorded out- ers) took over much of the drug trade. side a war zone, and quite high even for cities In addition, from 1996 onward, a string of at war (by comparison, the rate of violent FARC victories set the national government death in Baghdad at the height of the Iraq back, brought leftist guerrilla forces into peri- troop surge of 2007 was only 48 per 100 000 urban districts of major cities, and prompted people). An improvement began after 1991 as insurgent violence in outlying comunas of Escobar’s influence declined. It gained pace Medellín along with a series of terrorist after police killed him in 1993. attacks in the urban core. These were con- Medellin Homicides (1975–2018) ducted both by FARC urban fronts and by paramilitary groups – the so-called bloque 400 metro. Similar attacks on other key cities – including the capital, Bogotá, and the city of 300 Cali (hub of the prosperous Cauca region and home of Escobar’s powerful rivals, the Cali 200 drug cartel) triggered a national crisis. After a failed peace process under President Andres 100 Pastrana in the late 1990s, this crisis resulted in a national mobilisation, the election of 0 President Álvaro Uribe, and his introduction

1975 1978 1981 1984 1987 1990 1993 1996 1999 2002 2005 2008 2011 2014 2017 of a new policy of ‘Democratic Security.’ Medellín was one of the first urban cen- Source: Colombia Reports64 tres to experience the benefits of the new This, together with subsequent military and policy. In October 2002, the Colombian Army police efforts, backed by the United States and National Police launched ‘Operation and European countries, to break up the Orion’ to defeat FARC urban militias and Medellín cartel contributed to a continu- force the disbandment and demobilisation ing decline in urban violence. Nevertheless, of right-wing paramilitary autodefensas. The throughout the 1990s violent crime initial goal of the Colombian operation was (including kidnapping, murder and extor- to push the FARC back from the cities, and tion) remained common. The murder rate relieve pressure on the urban, industrialised declined significantly from its peak of the and most heavily populated core of the coun- early 1990s but continued to hover at a still try. By 2005, the combination of enhanced very high 150 per 100 000 people. counterinsurgency measures against FARC In part this reflected the fact that, even and the demobilisation, disarming and rein- though the breakup of the cartel improved tegration (DDR) of autodefensas had reduced government access and control in the city’s violence in Medellín significantly. This set

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the scene for a series of urban interven- programmes. Recognising the cyclic inter- tions driven by Medellín’s new mayor, Sergio action (noted earlier) between the physical Fajardo, elected in 2003. environment and conflict, Social Urbanism Fajardo and his team diagnosed the (and PUI in particular) was designed to use problems of Medellín as being related to improvements in the physical environment five key issues – a ‘systematic crisis of gov- to trigger transformational shifts in the ernability’, high levels of poverty, growing social and economic environment that had inequality, obsolescence of the city’s eco- given rise to violence. nomic and social structure, and insufficient In Medellín, initial PUI programmes integration between Medellín, the rest of focused on two of the most dangerous Colombia and the wider world. Fajardo’s areas of the city – the northwest comunas approach to addressing these problems (Communes 1 and 2, a slum area previously emphasised close and systematic engage- dominated by Escobar’s cartel and subse- ment with local populations, especially in quently a battleground for smaller gangs, the poorest neighbourhoods. He focused on paramilitaries and local militias) and improving inclusion and dignity for mar- Commune 13, which was a key access point ginalised populations by involving them in for weapons and drug smuggling and a – indeed, by letting them take the lead on militia stronghold. PUI in the northwest com- – all key decisions about projects in their munes focused on improving connectivity, districts. This emphasis on local ownership transport access, access to drinking water and leadership proved critical and, combined and education. PUI in Commune 13 included with improved security and the expertise of construction of the Parque-Biblioteca (Library urban planning experts, architects, trans- Park) San Javier, a new school, public green port engineers and specialists in essential spaces, improved transportation through the services engaged by Fajardo as part of his Metrocable project initiated under Mayor team, gave rise to a series of Proyectos Urbanos Perez, along with escalators and stairs to Integral (Integral Urban Projects, PUI). connect Commune 13 to the urban core. PUI projects prioritised three key issues Mayor Fajardo served one term between – inequality, violence and corruption – but 2004 and 2007, and in accordance with left specific planning and operationalisa- Colombian law was not eligible for re-elec- tion of projects to address these issues to tion. However, the integrated development local community leaders, assisted by exter- plan he initiated was subsequently updated nal technical specialists. This bottom-up and continued by successive mayors, up approach, characterised by intensive to the present. Medellín has continued to engagement between citizens and local gov- improve – although improvements have been ernment, and an emphasis on promoting the unequal across areas of the city and at times emergence of small and medium enterprises (as in 2006-2009) there have been setback in within marginalised neighbourhoods, has public safety, linked in part to nationwide become known as Social Urbanism. patterns in the fight against the FARC and The city-owned electricity company the evolution of paramilitary autodefensas (Empresas Publicas de Medellín, EPM) was man- into heavily armed organised crime groups dated to allocate 30% of its revenue to PUI bandas criminales, BACRIM. projects. This model of local revenue gen- BACRIM activities still afflict parts of the eration meant that PUI programmes, unlike city, and squatter settlements, informal those of PRIMED in the 1990s, were able and poorly serviced areas still exist, along to become sustainable over the long term, with the poverty-stricken barrios on the removing any dependence on donations outskirts of Medellín. But across most indi- from external sponsors or national-level cators – poverty, mobility, access to health

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and education, transportation, small and communities feel secure enough to peace- medium business development, infrastruc- fully address their problems and technical ture and political integration – Medellín experts can work safely in key districts. has seen significant improvements since Clearly, sequencing also matters. Security the darkest days of the 1990s. The change seems to be the essential prerequisite for is most evident in violence statistics, with a urban transformation, but security pro- drop of about 80% in homicides across the grammes must be followed up as soon as city from 1991 to 2012. possible with social, economic and physical infrastructure initiatives so that progress in Interpretations and Observations security is not allowed to away. Similarly, The experience of Medellín suggests that economic or transportation programmes three key factors are needed for urban trans- alone will not be effective unless they are formation efforts of this kind. These are local accompanied by security improvements, and ownership and leadership, with communi- unless mechanisms for locally sustainable ties having a decisive say in all programmes funding and long-term government attention affecting their area and being involved from are developed. Anti-corruption measures, the outset in key planning decisions; exter- efforts to reduce inequality and reform gov- nal expertise in which impartial technocratic ernment to offer justice, inclusion and equal specialists can offer local leaders educated access to state services appear to be criti- options and informed choices about the cal. Finally, a focus on enabling small and impact of these decisions; and a foundation medium business enterprises, as a key indi- of security in which communities, police and cator of improving conditions in a given city, security forces work together to generate an seems to be key. atmosphere of public safety within which

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Honduras: Urban Overstretch in San Pedro Sula

Some five hours’ flying time northwest of Covering an area of 840kms2, the city fills Medellín, on the northern coastline of the the floor of the coastal Sula valley Valle( del Republic of Honduras, lies the city of San Sula) and is divided into sectors by several Pedro Sula. With a population of between rivers, flowing south to north. Like Medellín, 800 000 and 1.2 million people in the city the city is bordered by hills and its peri- itself, and nearly 1.5 million in its wider urban slum settlements extend along valleys metro area, San Pedro Sula is the second into the mountains and up onto the hillsides city and business centre of the country – overlooking the town on the city’s western and in this sense analogous to Medellín. It side. Unlike Medellín, San Pedro Sula also accounts for two- thirds of Honduras’ GDP, incorporates numerous streamside shanty and 18% of the country’s total population of towns: informal settlements strung out eight million. But unlike Colombia’s second along the edges of creeks and rivers in the city, which has succeeded in transforming metro area and on its outskirts. itself over the past decade, San Pedro Sula Founded in 1536 by Spanish and mestizo is mired in violence, unflatteringly known as settlers, the city was well established by the ‘the most dangerous city on the planet’.65 late 16th Century as a trading hub for prod- ucts from the hinterland, importing trade

Caribbean Sea Swan BELIZE Islands Islas de la Bahía Gulf of Honduras Puerto Castilla Puerto Cortés

Tela GUATEMALA La Ceiba San Pedro Sula San Lorenzo Puerto Lempira HONDURAS Santa Rosa Juticalpa de Copán TEGUCIGALPA

EL SALVADOR Choluteca

Golfo de Fonseca NICARAGUA

NORTH PACIFIC OCEAN

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goods from Europe and exporting cash crops (neighbourhoods). The northern and west- (including agricultural products, precious ern zones of the city (Sectors 1, 2 and 3) are metals and timber) to Spain. The city’s rural relatively modern, integrated and function- hinterland was originally farming country, ing urban areas, with relatively high levels of producing food for the town and agricultural government presence and adequate urban products for export. In the 1870s, roughly and social services. Sector 1 is the most 50 years after Central America achieved affluent district in the city, while much of independence from Spain in 1821, and under the San Pedro Sula’s professional and busi- the influence of expanding US commercial ness class is concentrated in Sectors 2 and engagement across the region, the area was 3. Further south, Sectors 4, 6 and 8, along transformed into one of the original ‘banana with the western part of Sector 5 (border- republics’ by the arrival of a US-owned ing the mountains and known as Satelité) railway. are transitional areas with limited govern- The railroad, originally intended to trav- ment presence, high levels of gang influence erse the entire country, was a failure in its (described below), variable services and poor original concept as a transoceanic transport infrastructure. Sector 7, along with Rivera corridor (a role filled by the Panama Canal Hernandez (the eastern side of Sector 5 bor- a generation later), but it enabled the open- dering Satelité) is essentially a no-go area, ing up of northern Honduras to American with virtually no government presence, lim- agricultural firms such as the Cuyamel Fruit ited government awareness of conditions in Company, United Fruit and Vaccaro Fruit. the barrios, and what amounts to autono- They negotiated a series of lucrative deals mous self-government by militia groups and with concessions with local governments transnational gangs who provide services and landowners allowing them to grow (along with minimal protection according to bananas on an industrial scale in land bor- a brutal but effective code of conduct) and dering the railway, and then exported the often fight to keep the government and its bananas to the United States. Besides play- agencies out of their areas. ing a dominating role in Honduras’ economy This is a city experiencing severe stress. – and imposing a pseudo-colonial mono- crop, export-driven system on the country, The Tyranny of Rapid Unplanned cementing its dependence on the US market Population Growth – the banana companies involved themselves This stress largely results from inadequate heavily in manipulating Honduran poli- capacity on the part of cities in Honduras tics. By the late 1880s, the international to deal with explosive population growth. fruit companies had expanded to the entire Partly driven by the export economy and northern coast of Honduras, all shipping its attraction effect, which drew popu- fruit to the United States via San Pedro Sula. lation into the cities, Honduras’ urban Roads were constructed to move imported population ballooned in the second half consumer goods from San Pedro Sula across of the 20th Century. The country had the the northern coast of Honduras and west- highest birth rate in Latin America between ward into Guatemala, cementing the city’s 1950 and 1975, with much higher fertility role as an export hub by the 1890s. In the in rural areas than in cities, and far higher 20th Century, the city continued to expand birth rates among poorer populations than and assumed its modern shape. the middle class. As a result, cities like San Politically, San Pedro Sula is organ- Pedro Sula have been swamped by a massive ised into six sectors. As in Medellín, these influx of poor rural migrants, overwhelmed are based on cardinal compass points, by a youth bulge, and unable to provide and divided into colonias, and then barrios health, education, employment or security

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Population growth in Honduras, 1901–2018 to an increasingly marginalised and restive population. In 1993, for example, the total 10 fertility rate (that is, the number of children a woman is likely to have in her lifetime) 8 was running at 8.7 among rural women 6 compared to 5.2 among urban women, and at 8.0 among poorer women compared to 4 5.8 among upper- and middle-class women. The osmotic effect of this fertility differen- 2 tial pushed rural populations into the cities, 0 while employment opportunities in the bur- geoning export industries pulled them in. 1901 1905 1910 1916 1926 1930 1935 1940 1945 1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 2018 Against the background of this rapid Source: The Honduran National Statistics Institute and World Bank population growth at the national level, San Data Files Pedro Sula grew at an even more astounding A succession of national and city govern- and accelerated pace. From a population of ments has simply been unable to respond only 5 000 people in 1900, the city quadru- effectively to the enormous pace and scale of pled to 21 000 in 1950, expanded by a factor unplanned population growth and urbanisa- of seven in just 25 years to reach 150,000 tion in the city. in 1975, more than tripled again, in only 30 Along with the push factors of rural years, to reach 500 000 by 2006, and more overpopulation and the youth bulge, and than doubled to 1.2 million by 2012. the pull factor of San Pedro Sula’s role as

San Pedro Sula: Sectors and presence of violent actors

Sector 1: Where narcos & gang leaders live Sector 2 & 3: Where gang leaders live

Sector 4: Mostly MS13 with one small pocket of Calle 18 and one small area of organised crime Sector 1 Sector 5/Satélite: Split between MS13 & Calle 18 Sector 2 Sector 6: MS13 in some pockets Sector 8: Mostly MS13/1 small area of Calle 18 Sector 6

Sector 7 (Chamélecon): MS13 & Las 18 Sector 3 Sector 5/Rivera Hernandez: Numerous groups Sector 4 Sector 5 including MS13, Las 18, Los Olancheros, Organised Crime, Las Tercera, Las Ponce, & local gangs

Sector 7

Sector 8

Source: Caerus Associates, 2013

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an economic hub, industrialisation (espe- Honduras’s capital, with just under 1 000. cially around the apparel industry serving The vast majority were fleeing violence. In American consumers) triggered massive 2014 ‘Honduras alone had more homicides rural-to-urban migration in the last quarter than the 28 states of the European Union of the 20th Century, attracting immigrants combined’.68 from all over Honduras who lacked other Existing in parallel with the violent employment opportunities, and leaving hun- struggle to feed off the legal economy, the dreds of thousands of people stranded in competition to control illicit trade is even slum settlements around the city’s periphery. more violent. Like the banana trade of the These population flows, along with the city’s 20th Century, or today’s sweatshop economy spatial layout, its geographic location as the of T-shirts, and cheap clothes for country’s main transportation hub, and local the US market, there is a large illicit economy conditions in a series of urban microhabitats in San Pedro Sula also focused on American around the city, account for the huge level of consumers – the export of cocaine. But it is violence in San Pedro Sula.66 not primarily produced inside the country. Both the import of raw materials and Rather, cocaine flows into Honduras from the export of finished clothes rely on ship- Colombia, Bolivia, Venezuela and Ecuador, ping and harbour facilities, making the San by land, air and sea. Mexico’s Sinaloa cartel Pedro Sula-Puerto Cortes corridor – the part and Las Zetas dominate the drug trade, sub- of the metro area between the maquilas and contracting Honduran gangs to move drugs the port – the most valuable economic ter- for them. The Sinaloa cartel largely controls rain in the country. The city itself is shaped ground-based trafficking into Guatemala and like a flattened arrowhead pointing at the on to Mexico, while other groups – including port, with inflows of people, goods, money networks linked to the Venezuelan military and traffic coming from the south-east, and National Guard – dominate sea-based south and south-west, and the major outflow trafficking. to the north towards Puerto Cortes. Anyone From the early 2000s onward, the surge dominating this ‘corner’ has a chokehold on in the cocaine trade has transformed the Honduras’s economy – and, unsurprisingly, a pre-existing pattern of gang and criminal large proportion of violence in the city takes violence in San Pedro Sula, which had pri- place among gangs who are fighting each marily been driven by urban overstretch in other for control of this critical economic the face of Honduras’ massive population terrain. growth. Narco-trafficking gangs displaced traditional street gangs, drawn from margin- The Most Violent City in the World alised unemployed (or unemployable) youth The result of all this is that, for several years from the barrios. running, San Pedro Sula has topped the list The narcos increasingly began to use the of the world’s most violent cities, with an city (with its central location, transportation astonishingly high murder rate of 169 homi- links and excellent access to the US market) cides per 100 000 inhabitants in 2013.67 The as a smuggling hub. The trade and its associ- city was the primary source of children flee- ated violence surged in 2004–2005 as cocaine ing Central America for the United States traffickers responded to counter-narcotics during the horrendous child migrant cri- successes in Colombia (the destruction of sis of 2014–2015. In 2014, the US Border the Medellín and Cali cartels and President Patrol apprehended almost 2 600 children Alvaro Uribe’s successful demobilisation of travelling alone from San Pedro Sula, more the paramilitaries, discussed earlier) along than 2.5 times as many as the next largest with an increase in US coastal and mari- source of child migrants, Tegucigalpa, time interdiction of drug trafficking in the

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Caribbean. In response to these setbacks, Responding to the Violence narco-traffickers opened new land-based In facing the massive upsurge in violence Central American routes through Honduras, over the past decade, the government in El Salvador, Guatemala and Mexico into San Pedro Sula simply has simply lacked the US. In Honduras, the narcos took advan- the capacity to handle the massive influx tage of the existing gang structure, and of thousands of weapons and new gang hired local groups – pandillas – as enforc- combatants per year, along with billions of ers. Transnational cartels paid local gangs dollars in cocaine, while sustaining a city in cocaine, creating a domestic drug market whose population and area are rapidly grow- in San Pedro Sula, and competition to con- ing, but without adequate infrastructure, trol this new domestic market became yet resources and support systems. another driver of violence in the city. City leaders have limited ability to influ- Violence surged from the mid-2000s ence the Honduran criminal justice system, onward, as different groups (local street which is administered by the central gov- gangs, narcos, and deportees linked to North ernment (based in Tegucigalpa, hundreds of American gangs) engaged in a bloody turf miles away, across jungle-covered mountain war across all Honduras’s major cities – ranges). Historically, the central government including San Pedro Sula – as they vied to has operated the justice system in a way control territory and dominate key trans- that its own interests, rather than those port routes and hubs. Controlling territory is of the city. Business leaders in the city, for the key to exploiting the city’s licit economy example, complain that they are required to (the flow of textiles in, and finished clothing pay a security tax to the central government out), taking advantage of the city’s central supposedly to cover the cost of improve- position in the Honduran economy, and also ments in public safety and business security, dominating its illicit economy (the flow of but in fact these funds are often held in cocaine through the city, as well as the local Tegucigalpa and used for national costs or drug smuggling, money laundering and security measures in other parts of the coun- extortion rackets). try, with little of the money ever making its The high level of violence in San Pedro way back to San Pedro Sula. Sula is thus, in effect, a toxic by-product of As another example, the mano dura (‘hard the massive influx of drugs, weapons, money hand’ or ‘iron fist’) policy of 2003–2004, and deportees, on top of existing licit eco- driven by elite-level politics at the central nomic flows driven by the city’s role as a key government level, involved an aggressive littoral and business hub. The city is already military and police-led crackdown on under pressure to deal with governance gangs. This dramatically backfired, actually and infrastructure challenges. The result is increasing violent activity, and driving gangs seen in symptoms such as urban disloca- underground. From operating openly, in the tion, violence, crime and social breakdown. daylight, sporting gang tattoos and identify- Importantly, these effects aren’t evenly ing colours, the gangs tried to blend in. Thus spread: they’re concentrated in at least a mano dura turned the gangs into dark net- dozen micro-habitats, with some city sectors works that were much harder to see and deal relatively peaceful and quiet, and others the with, and created prison fraternities that scene of intensely violent competition for became training and radicalisation engines control among the various non-state groups, for the gangs, so that what had once been some of them in ‘no-go areas’ outside all a disparate collection of competing groups government control. became much more organised and were

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primed for action, just in time to exploit the services. At another level, however, the two influx of drugs when it began to spike in cities’ situations are quite different. The 2005. sheer pace and scale of rapid unplanned Aside from government organisations, urbanisation in Honduras during the 20th the San Pedro Sula Chamber of Commerce is Century, and the massive rate of population influential in responding to the high level of growth both within the city and via rural- violence, in part because of the city’s impor- to-urban migration, dwarf anything seen in tance in the overall economy of Honduras, Colombia. Likewise, the scale of the city’s but also because its co-chairs are commit- youth bulge, the extent of its failure of car- ted to improving the security situation and rying capacity, and the collapse of city and have formed a Security Committee to work state institutions in San Pedro Sula is much with the government. For the business com- worse than what occurred in Medellín even munity in this booming city, extortion and at the height of the drug war. security are major concerns, given the effect Another aspect of the national envi- on their enterprises. Like small business ronment with which local leaders have to owners and transport operators, big busi- contend is lack of control over security tools nesses are forced to pay extortion fees either – policing, the justice system, security spend- directly to gangs, or indirectly via bribes and ing. These are controlled by a distant national kickbacks to corrupt members of the security government that often acts in its own inter- services co-opted by narcos or gang leaders. ests rather than those of the city and tends Even more damagingly, the threat of vio- to ignore the input of local leaders such as lence against a company’s owners, workforce the Chamber of Commerce, local community or facilities forces them to pay high security leaders and local elected officials. Given this costs, which amount to an informal tax on lack of control, it’s scarcely surprising that every kind of enterprise. Honduras’s security-led (as distinct from security-enabled) approach – epitomised by Insights and Observations the mano dura and the deployment of mili- San Pedro Sula is thus clearly not a good tarised police and security services in harsh example of best practice in response to crackdowns in violence-afflicted urban areas urban overstretch and violence – rather, it is – has failed to significantly reduce the vio- offered here as a counterpoint to Medellín, lence, and in some ways made the situation an example of how, given different leader- considerably worse. ship and a different set of national and local Far from the social urbanism of Medellín, circumstances, one city can take a radically with its focus on social inclusion, local own- different direction from another. ership and leadership of initiatives, and At one level, the sources of San Pedro improving the physical space to reduce Sula’s crisis of governance are rather simi- violence in slum settlements and under- lar to the crisis that afflicted Medellín in resourced neighbourhoods, San Pedro Sula’s the 1990s – rampant criminality, weak state top-down, military-led, kinetic approach to institutions, a large marginalised and unem- ‘cleaning up’ the city is perhaps most clearly ployed population living in peri-urban slums, an example of what not to do. a youth bulge and poor social and urban

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Summary of Observations

Governance retrofitting a city metro system. As Indonesia The key observations from this chapter with demonstrates, light, over-ground rail also respect to governance point to the role of offers a cost-effective solution. Such sys- national governments in setting the context, tems, however, need both clever thinking in particularly the economic conditions and their application and design, discipline in legislative framework, needed for positive their operation and the imperative to remain city development. conscious of the huge taxi and minibus sys- Indonesia’s progress over the past tems that have grown up in their absence. 50 years highlights the importance of eco- Brazil has demonstrated a love for grand nomic growth. In 1970 its per capita income schemes and big projects, though its results was US$75, less than Nigeria’s at US$209. have been mixed and expensive. The pro- In the early 1980s it overtook Nigeria and gress of Brasília is thought provoking in since the late-1990s it has grown rapidly. In this respect: a new city designed to a grand 2018, Nigeria’s GDP per capita (measured in plan with the car as the assumed means of constant 2010 terms) was US$2 396 while transport and a city centre light on accom- Indonesia’s stood at US$4 284.69 With growth modation, an approach that is flawed in the has come opportunity and development. light of the realities 60 years later. At the core of this transformation has been Jakarta offers another approach where economic diversification, job creation, and individual architectural follies appear to the leveraging of increasing urbanisation have been substituted for a city plan. Now by business. It is this long-term growth that behind the curve of a growing population, separated Indonesia’s development trajec- the city is trying to catch up. Its triple chal- tory from those of many African countries lenge of lack of both public transport and and without such growth, city development public housing combined with the need to becomes much more challenging. sync short-term expediencies with longer- Brazil likewise points to the need for con- term needs are challenges to which many tinuous reforms. This is highlighted by the African cities can relate. success of the reforms that brought hyperin- flation under control, widened social welfare Human Capital and developed robust institutions, thus sup- The huge progress made by Singapore since porting much of the progress made in recent independence, when its starting point was years. But this also includes those reforms similar to many African countries, is both still required to deal with Brazil’s current thought provoking and thoroughly studied. ‘moral crisis’ and the corruption that lies at The key to Singapore’s success appears to lie its core. in the soft issue of human capital. First, Lee Kuan Yew was a strong leader Infrastructure with a clear vision of what was needed and One of the major challenges for cities as they the leadership qualities to drive change. start to grow rapidly is how to ensure mobil- Second, the people of Singapore bought into ity for their populations: the traffic jams in the concept of ‘national good’ and were pre- Nairobi and Lagos, to name just two African pared to sacrifice personal gain for national cities, are already legendary. Curitiba’s now advancement. The land reform undertaken world famous ‘Bus Rapid Transport’ and to ensure city development clearly dem- Medellín’s system of cable cars illustrates onstrates this aspect. The contrast with how such mobility can be achieved without Brasília’s land ownership difficulties could the need to resort to the huge expense of not be starker. Finally, when the skills

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required for planning and development did problem deeper underground, making it not exist, the government was not afraid to harder to see and thus tackle. bring them in from outside. This is quite the Meanwhile, the relative successes of opposite of an approach, sometimes seen in Medellín and Recife in dealing with their Africa, of technical expertise working on iso- considerable security challenges owe their lated projects in the absence of a plan. origins to an approach that recognised that The success of Curitiba also seems to have the violence was a symptom of deep social stemmed from continuity of both leader- issues, of communities that felt excluded ship and planning. Jaime Lerner’s view bears from and antagonistic towards government. serious consideration: ‘Solving problems is Their approach was to combine a better coor- not related to scale, or the size of the city, dinated and resourced security operation or financial resources. The challenge is in with attempts to tackle the underlying social organisation, and in creating shared respon- issues. Their plans recognised the impor- sibility between citizens and government, tance of local identification and ownership and public and private sectors. Otherwise of both the problems and the solutions. As you won’t get the outcome you need.’ a result, the governments of both Medellín and Recife consulted extensively with the Security local communities in order to develop solu- The Latin American experience has been tions and backed this up with the allocation that when the rate of urban growth outstrips of resources. planning and informal settlements, with lit- Such methods represented a break tle in the way of government presence and with more traditional central planning service delivery, are allowed to spring up approaches used previously. The resultant around the city, security challenges follow. reduction in violence was dramatic and was When this uncontrolled growth is combined only reversed, in the case of Recife, when with the spread of the drugs trade, such the economy deteriorated leading to more security challenges are greatly magnified, economic pressure on the communities and primarily due to corrupting effect of large fewer resources available to government. In amounts of money. both cases, government plans were under- In the case of San Pedro Sula, a heavy- pinned by comprehensive assessment and handed security operation in reaction to monitoring designed to ensure the leadership a surge in violent crime merely drove the was aware of both progress and setbacks.

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Section Two African City Case-Studies

Lagos: The Relentless City

Quick Facts Population: The Lagos population increased from 1.4 million in 1970 to 21 million in 2019, and is predicted to reach 88 million in 2100, making Lagos the world’s largest city. Energy: 45% have access to electricity. Housing: There is a shortage of at least two million housing units. The mortgage rate is 38%. Transport: Lagosians spend nearly 3 billion hours in traffic annually. Revenue: Lagos accounts for 37% of Nigeria’s revenue.

The stilt houses of the Makoko commu- electricity. Fixing these legacy problems will nity on the edge of Lagos lagoon have long not be easy; preparing for future growth been a centrepiece of western poverty porn. magnifies these challenges. Around 100 000 people, most of whom are Attempts to reduce the housing deficit, children, live in appallingly unhealthy con- estimated to be at least two million units, ditions, where malaria and typhoid are rife. are made more difficult by limited mortgage The water is a petrol black, full of faeces options and interest rates of about 38%, a and much else. Yet the community retains reflection both of heavy government bor- a strong attachment to the area and each rowing in the market to fund its own needs other, partly because of its ethnic homo- and high risk. The barriers to ownership are geneity (most are Egun), its shared fishing compounded by the high cost of building dependency, its 100-year history, and materials, legendary difficulties in determin- because of the absence of viable options for ing land title, opaque building regulations improvement. Whatever the promises of gov- and a sedentary legal system. ernment are about new housing and a better An opinion survey commissioned by The life, the inhabitants prefer to hang onto what Brenthurst Foundation in the course of this they have. study showed that just 21% of Lagosians find Africa’s largest city, Lagos70 represents housing in the city affordable. both the promise and the fear of the inter- This has hampered the introduction of section of demography and urbanisation.71 low-cost housing schemes. Upgrades to slum Despite two-thirds of the city’s people areas have been hobbled, too, by a lack of already living in slum conditions, its popu- continuity between governments. A pet pro- lation has more than doubled to around ject for one governor is not necessarily the 21 million over the last 20 years, and it is same for another. estimated that it will double again over the As a result, many people live in extremely next three decades. Unless things change, tough conditions, amidst open sewers and this will increase to a staggering 88 million strewn plastic garbage. Up to 60% of Lagos by 2100. This rapid growth has placed an State experiences floods each year. The city inordinate strain on already faltering infra- produces 210 million litres of water per day structure, especially housing, transport and against a requirement of 794 million litres.

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Nearly 70% of households lack access to amplifies the stresses and strains of urbani- sanitation and a million-plus families do not sation. At the same time, the city offers receive any waste collection services. insights on how cities can create systems Unsurprisingly, some 86% of Lagosians of self-governance in the absence of formal agree that water and sanitation urgently structures and provides a cautionary tale need to be improved. about how necessity has led to the building A poorly integrated transport system, and of informal governance methods that pro- a failure to fully employ the city’s numer- vide more legitimacy than due process. The ous waterways, means that Lagosians spend city encapsulates the continent’s challenges nearly three billion hours in traffic annu- in urban development and presents les- ally, an average of four hours each per day. sons on what drives change. While Lagos is The main port of Apapa has long been ham- Africa’s Everest, understanding how it works strung by work to upgrade the access road, will help to prepare us for the continent’s requiring trucks to queue for up to a month increasingly urban future. to collect containers. Yet no less than 90% of daily passenger movement in Lagos is still by Governance road. Promises to improve the transport sys- Rapid population growth, poor service deliv- tem have outweighed delivery even though ery, high levels of informality, and a history the state government has introduced a Bus of military dictatorship have combined to Rapid Transport system alongside its Lagbus make Lagos almost ungovernable. But it’s the network, is building a monorail and plans to almost that’s important, because amidst its introduce a new ferry system. complexity and dysfunction, Lagos remains There is little doubt that Lagosians one of Nigeria’s best-performing states. deserve better than the service provided by Lagos operates under Nigeria’s three-tier 50 000 yellow minibus Danfos, famous for federal system as a city-state. Created in their lack of road manners (even by Nigerian 1999 at the end of military rule, the system standards) and touts hanging out of the open places the federal government on top with doors of dilapidated vehicles. the primary legislative authority, the state Little wonder that 87% of the city believes government, beneath it and the local govern- that transport urgently needs to be tackled. ment as the final tier, linking citizens to the Life is made tougher by a serious lack bureaucracy.72 The head of the state is the of electricity. Despite Nigeria’s status as Governor, supported by a 40-member House Africa’s largest oil producer, with some 2 mil- of Assembly that enacts legislative decisions. lion barrels per day of production in 2018, The country’s 36 states form part of a rev- the country has an installed power capac- enue-sharing arrangement with the Federal ity of just 7 100 MW, of which 4 100 MW is Government that disburses funds from the available for generation. On average Lagos national pot, mostly raised through oil and receives just 700MW of this capacity. A low gas exports, to the states, with the amount 45% of the population has access to the based on various formulas. The state gov- power grid. As a result, 80% of households ernments have wide administrative powers, rely on diesel generators. At the core of the one of which is to generate their own reve- problem is neglected infrastructure, a cul- nues. Lagos’s Internally Generated Revenues ture of non-payment and a practice of illegal significantly surpass those raised by other connections, with just 20% paying their bills. Nigerian states. Some 82% of Lagosians surveyed say that The restoration of civilian governance electricity provision needs to urgently be and democratic elections in 1999 promoted improved. political competition and strong incentives Lagos epitomises the future challenges for reform. Historically, Lagos has been an that African cities face, but on a scale that opposition-led state. This changed in 2015

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MALI

NIGER CHAD Lake Chad

Sokoto Katsina Maiduguri Kano Zaria BENIN Kaduna

Jos a N nu i g e e r B Ilorin Yola Ogbomoso Oshogbo Chappal Waddi Benin Makurdi Ibadan City Enugu Lagos Wami

Bight of Calabar CAMEROON Benin Port Harcourt Gulf of Guinea EQUATORIAL GUINEA when a new opposition coalition, the All regardless of party affiliation, often reversing Progressive Congress (APC) party, won the progress along with them. election nationally and in Lagos State, bring- The governance of Lagos State is divided ing the polity into the ruling party fold. It into Metropolitan Lagos (the urban centre) did so again in 2019 and the state remains and Greater Lagos Metropolis (the urban part of the ruling party, resolving the past periphery). The Metropolitan precinct occu- contestation between the country’s most pies 37% of the state’s total land mass and is commercially viable state and the federal home to 85% of its population.73 government in Abuja. Despite this perceived Lagos has 20 constitutionally recognised continuity, Lagos faces severe challenges in Local Government Areas (LGAs), 16 in the policy follow-through. New governors have urban centre and four in the periphery. In consistently introduced competing poli- 2003, in response to the growth of the city, an cies that replace those of their predecessor additional 37 councils called Local Council Development Areas (LCDAs) were created

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under the administration of Governor Bola The continued governance of Lagos by the Tinubu. This decision was highly controver- APC77 has raised concerns about the depth sial because it brought the total number of of political patronage networks within the local government entities to 57 and frag- party and the State itself.78 Corruption in the menting the city74 and led then-president Lagos State Police Command of the Nigerian Olusegun Obasanjo to cut Lagos’s access to Police Force is perceived to one of the worst funds from the federal account. problem areas. More than 80% of survey Lagos’ institutional framework presents respondents admitted to bribing the police in a major challenge for the fiscal and admin- 2016, followed by 22% to the tax services and istrative autonomy of its LGAs. While there 24% to the Judiciary.79 are high expectations for service delivery at The private sector battles to engage with the local level, the LGAs are perceived to lack the government of Lagos and its agencies. real autonomy within the federal system. Despite being Nigeria’s commercial hub, the Constitutionally, LGAs are mandated to city ranks 37 out of 37 states for dealing with provide primary health care and basic edu- construction permits on the World Bank’s cation, water supply and sewer reticulation, 2018 Doing Business in Nigeria report.80 The public infrastructure upgrades and agricul- process for allocating urban land is unclear, ture services. However, at least 60% of LGA with regulations such as the State Building budgets are allocated to capital projects, Code rarely enforced while over-regulation leaving scant resources for critical servic- occurs elsewhere. es.75 LGA chairmen complain about their budgets being far too small to deliver against Urban Finance their mandate. While they are permitted to Lagos is Nigeria’s most financially independ- raise funds of their own, LGA fundraising is ent state. In 2016, only 21.7% of the State’s restricted to 20 sources listed in the Lagos revenue came from the federal government.81 State Local Government Levies Law. On the Its collections accounted for 37% of state- public end, the budgetary information of level internally generated revenues across LGAs is often not published, nor transparent, Nigeria. Most revenue collections come from which limits public access to spending pat- the formal sector, with limited penetration terns and undermines democracy. into Lagos’s informal sector, which accounts The Local Chairman of Lagos Island, for most business activity, seriously under- Tijani Adetoyese Olusi, has remarked, ‘We mining the overall potential collections in are closest to the people on the ground, yet the state. we cannot afford to fulfil our responsibilities. The Nigerian Constitution mandates that Lagos State needs to work out how best to state governments provide social services use LGAs efficiently and effectively.’ and infrastructure, resulting in over a quar- ter of all federal revenue from the Federal Corruption Accounts Allocation Committee (FAAC) being Public sector corruption is a constant channelled to these administrations, com- challenge in Lagos, making the city’s devel- monly known as the federal allocation.82 opment all the more difficult. Corruption This funding is intended to supplement drains funds for key projects and deters the revenue collected through state taxes, international investors. Some 72% of although very few states’ IGRs surpass or ordinary Nigerians perceive the level of cor- even equal the amount provided by the fed- ruption to have increased significantly in eral allocation.83 Nigeria in recent years, particularly among Lagos, however, is the exception. Not only civil servants.76 does the state generate nearly 80% of its revenue internally, its inter-governmental

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revenue (IGR) is nearly seven times the Economic Growth national IGR per capita.84 This is largely In 2014, Lagos was ranked as the continent’s because of the relative weight of the private seventh largest economy ahead of Kenya sector in Lagos, which is home to most of the and Côte d’Ivoire,86 a position that inures multinational companies operating in the investors to the considerable challenges of country and the headquarters of the major- doing business, most notably, inadequate ity of Nigerian corporations. infrastructure, expensive power and a sticky Despite advances in collections, the infor- bureaucracy. mal sector remains largely untouched. While Lagos has strong services and manufac- informal operators in Lagos’ commercial and turing sectors, and its relatively high internal transportation sectors often report having revenues make its economy significantly to pay ‘taxes’ daily to various entities, these less dependent on Federal revenues, funded collections do not make it into the official mostly by oil and gas exports, than other funds and are not part of the LIRS formal states in Nigeria. Many large businesses, such payment system. Lagos has an estimated as Tata Motors, have set up assembly plants ten million eligible taxpayers, yet only 5.8 in and around the city, operating alongside million currently pay formal taxes. The city the existing 3.2 million small, medium and is constantly looking for ways to bring thou- micro enterprises. Lagos has an estimated sands of small traders into the net and the GDP of US$136.6 billion.87 Federal Government has introduced a new Once the capital of Nigeria, Lagos has identity card and is making its use manda- been a longstanding entry point for for- tory for essential services, which will help to eign investment in the country, and in formally capture citizens’ details. The last 2017, received US$5.49 billion in foreign census was in 2012. investment in the telecommunications, In the 2017 Lagos State Budget, the high- financial services and real estate sectors. est percentage of expenditure was dedicated Approximately 60% of industrial investments to capital investment, which the city des- in Nigeria are directed to Lagos, while 90% perately needs. However, Lagos’ budget of companies across Nigeria have chosen to statements are notorious for being purpose- locate their headquarters in the city. fully vague and lacking the detail that would Lagos is also home to Nigeria’s largest allow policy makers and citizens to hold the port, which contributes the lion’s share of state accountable for its expenditure.85 The the country’s N232.42 billion annual revenue governance of Lagos State is a study in opac- from its ports.88 To leverage its position, the ity, managing to be sophisticated, achieving state is developing free trade zones inside the complex feat of generating revenue and on the perimeters of the city. The through taxes in a challenging environment, Free Trade Zone, the largest of the projects, and yet failing to provide basic services to is finally coming to life after years of delays, residents. Citizens and the private sector with Africa’s largest oil refinery currently have come to see the tiers of government as being erected on the site by Nigeria’s biggest being driven by patronage and self-interest company, the Dangote Group. of officials rather than prioritising the deliv- The Lagos State Development Plan for ery of their service mandate. There will need 2012–2025 aims to build on the city’s eco- to be a distinct change in the social contract nomic prowess and develop Lagos as ‘Africa’s between the state and individuals if Lagos is model mega-city and global, economic and to achieve its full potential as one of Africa’s financial hub by 2025.’ These efforts have megacities, because in 2018, 37% of survey resulted in a notable improvement for Lagos respondents were not able to list a single on the World Bank’s Ease of Doing Business, achievement of government. ranked 169th in 2017 and jumping to 145th

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in 2018, and registering as a top ten improver market are enough to warrant investment. across all global cities assessed by the Bank.89 As the head of Investor relations at Africa As the economy keeps growing, and policy Capital Alliance, Kikelomo Longe, said, ‘Lagos reforms are implemented to expand key is looking to be the financial hub of West productive sectors, Lagos is set to surpass Africa, and investors are ready to come; they Johannesburg by 2035 and become Africa’s just need to find bankable projects.’ second-largest city by GDP behind Cairo.90 A key question is whether the Lagos of the Housing future will be ready to absorb the growing Nigeria suffers from a massive housing defi- number of workers. cit, currently estimated at 17 million units. The city’s success attracts the best and In Lagos alone, the shortfall varies between brightest of the country’s labour force, with two and five million units, with about 70% of 21% of Lagosians holding at least one degree Lagosians living informally without access to from a tertiary institution. One sector that basic services.93 This problem is compounded has shown labour absorptive growth is the by the fact that 3 000 migrants move to the informal economy. In the last quarter of city each day, or an estimated 86 per hour.94 2015, 95.4% of new jobs were created in the This section examines the nature of Lagos’ informal sector, relative to 5.5% in the for- housing crisis and the possibility for state- mal sector.91 Some 65% of Lagos’ working sanctioned, self-build initiatives to change population is in the informal sector and it the city’s housing landscape. accounts for an estimated 42% of all eco- The provision of housing in Lagos is nomic activities.92 dominated by the private sector, with public The informal economy is resilient, with provision at just 20%.95 Property prices mirror its own efficient rules and procedures that the city’s inequality, ranging from US$4 000/ have evolved over time to keep the wheels of m² (.4 million)96 on the estate, commerce turning. The informal economy to monthly rentals of US$8 ( 880) in an accounts for much of the transportation, informal settlement. manufacturing, real estate, building and The polarisation of the housing market construction, retail and wholesale and has led the private sector to invest heavily in Nollywood sectors. In fact, with the low lev- medium- to high-end property development, els of government service provision it would leaving few options for low-income families. be impossible for Lagos residents to com- Lekki is one such example – a few decades mute without the services of the informal ago, most of the area was thick forest. Today, transportation industry, made up of the it is packed with housing estates and office Danfos, Okadas and Keke Mawras. The infor- blocks, envisioned as Lagos’s new commer- mal economy is the backbone of the city’s cial centre for the needs of high-income economic prowess, providing nimble solu- residents. ‘The low end of the market is not tions to the bureaucratic stickiness that profitable,’ shares Lamre Sola-Olumofe of holds Lagos hostage. Brook Assets and Resources Ltd, ‘We are not Lagos is a city where US$600 charities. Building materials and land cost are sold on a street filled with potholes and the same, and we have to build to sell.’ poor drainage. It is a city where, depending On the supply side, the provision of on which part of town you’re in, you’re just affordable housing is marred by difficulty at as likely to bump into a Harvard educated all levels of the building process. Financing is millionaire as you are to someone living on onerous to acquire, with high lending rates less than a dollar a day. Lagos doesn’t fit eas- across the board. The official procedures ily into any traditional narratives. The high for proper building approvals are incredibly density, mobility and purchasing power of its slow and many developers are encouraged

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to pay bribes to smooth the process. Lagos state-driven housing solutions crowd out produces very few of its own building mate- many Lagosians. rials, leading to input costs that are at least Governor Akinwunmi Ambode, who double what they would be elsewhere. The served between 2015 and 2019, had an ambi- city also suffers from a shortage of skilled tious agenda to transform the city into the labour and artisans who are often brought continent’s third-largest economy. Several in from neighbouring countries. There are housing initiatives were launched during his also land shortages with so much of the tenure. One such programme is a state mort- city surrounded by water. As a member of gage scheme operated by the Lagos Building the Ministry of Physical Planning remarked, Investment Company (LBIC). Yet, this pro- ‘Land supply is fixed but demand for land duced only 27 mortgages, mainly due to keeps growing, we need to densify but that underfunding and underspending. also comes with issues.’ In the absence of a housing market that Lagos also faces acute challenges on with caters to their needs, most Lagosians are housing demand. Whilst demand for hous- left to build housing on their own. For low- ing exists at all income levels, earners on the income residents, this often means informal minimum wage are unable to afford housing and unsafe building practices in areas where contributions above US$15 (N5 400) a month. secure tenure is unheard of. For wealthier In addition, Lagos’ poorly developed mort- residents, the self-build process is more for- gage market limits access to well-priced, mal and relies on houses being built over long-term mortgages. So, even people who years as both funds and building permis- can access loans are deterred by exorbitant sions trickle in. interest rates of up to 24%. This has created The Lagos Urban Renewal Authority a dynamic where residents are unable to buy (LASURA) has driven a different approach property unless they can provide the full cost to housing that looks at options for in situ of the house upfront. As one survey respond- upgrading. ‘The government should not ent noted, ‘If the economy continues the way be in the business of building houses from that it is … they may not afford to live in scratch,’ says its Director Lateef Sholebo. ‘It Lagos. People will actually have to go back.’ must create an enabling environment for The Lagos Housing Ministry has not been others to do so. If best practices are used, able to provide a public solution to the hous- there is room for improvement,’ assures ing shortage. Between 1979 and 2017, only Sholebo. 25 880 housing units were constructed by the The problem of suitable housing is one Ministry,97 the majority of which occurred that is too complex for government to solve during the tenure of Governor Jakande alone. Lagos needs to develop the means to (1979–1983).98 deal with its current backlog as well as pre- Building the required 2–5 million houses pare for its future growth. The state system falls outside the government’s financial in place has been to promise new housing scope. In 2017, the allocated budget for developments at the start of each Governor’s Housing and Community Amenities was term, with limited commitment to complete N50.344 billion (US$140 million), 6.2% of the the housing projects already under construc- State’s N813 billion (US$2.26 billion) budget. tion. The response of the private sector has New government units are priced well out been to create high-cost housing with guar- of the average low-income family’s reach. anteed returns. Whilst both strategies have These range from N3 to N15 million, with a been pragmatic in terms of political and minimum bond repayment of over N60 000/ financial expediency, they have led to the month on a 20-year loan. It appears even enormous shortage we see today. Until the city taps into the self-build model currently

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utilised by citizens, as well as the resources Local residents would be trained to service available in both the private and the public the building. sectors, a solution to the city’s housing crisis The ground floor of the frame would be seems unlikely. constructed at double height to function as pedestrian commercial open space. A mix A New Housing Model for Lagos of market stalls, formal shops, public toilets The Brenthurst Foundation developed for and garbage rooms from ducts above form Lagos a three-storey multi-use housing part of the space, which is permeable along model (see the graphic, below) aimed at in- its street edges and in a multi-block format situ inner city slum upgrading. The model to encourage mass pedestrian movement was designed with the primary motivations in all directions. Effectively, the frame and of keeping costs low, preventing the dis- open space seek to replicate the crowded placement of residents, and harnessing and pavement space of Lagos so that a walkable developing local skill through self-build and urban terrain is formed. Smaller forms of maintenance strategies. transport, such as bicycles, can also safely The housing model proposes a four- negotiate the terrain. This strategy provides storey concrete beam and slab structure weather-protected public space and allows on piles, erected in existing open space on for unimpeded maintenance of services at access routes through slum areas, allowing ground level such as sewerage, water supply residents to largely remain in place during lines and power. construction. This structure would be devel- At completion of the framed levels, local oped either by Lagos State or a suitable residents would enter a self-build pro- private partner, and its construction could gramme for the units themselves, as all induct local young people into the construc- structural elements (floors, roofs, service tion industry. The beam and slab structure ducts) would be in place. Walling techniques is designed with centrally-located sanitation could comprise low-skill, cheap and well- and garbage disposal facilities on each floor, insulated sandbagging construction, for installed during construction, that allevi- example, as Lagos Lagoon is permanently ate pressure on municipal service provision. in the process of dredging. Clay bricks,

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breezeblocks and windows would be locally ease. Until power supply is guaranteed in sourced. Design principles include cross Lagos, housing solutions cannot rise above breezes at all points, large spiral staircases three-storey walk-ups. This housing pro- and common bathing, and wash up posal, however, suggests that piles are sunk facilities. Unit sizes are flexible. The main to permit future vertical extension of the access corridors are wide enough for home building to six or seven storeys once eleva- industry at each unit, so that circulation tors become feasible. Upper levels could also through the floors between the staircases take larger and more luxurious housing at results in a neighbourhood with the same a later date. The facades of the building are intimate and vibrant feel as neighbourhood permeable and varied, which enables many streets. types of personal expression. All units have In stage one of the project, the appointed balconies and windows onto the street so housing agency would insert a piled 8 x 8m that human connection at all levels is main- column grid and build large spiral staircases tained and encouraged. Tree planting is a at 32m centres along open access routes in a vital element in this scheme as can be seen target low income area. in the image on page 68. In stage two, the areas directly around This project aims to create a strate- the buildings would be cleared, and the gic framework for housing in the city that first- and second-floor precast concrete slabs allows in situ upgrading in its densest and would be laid. In stage three, residents would most chaotic parts. It harnesses the self- move up and build the walls between the build energy, vitality and responsibility of first and second floor slabs. Modular systems residents in their own neighbourhoods, while of housing include stairs and a wide, com- stimulating agency and belonging for all. It mon well-ventilated street running through effectively allows government to install sus- the centre of the housing clusters. Each stair tainable frameworks for the safety, growth core coincides with common laundry, gar- and prosperity of its people both in the now, bage and sanitation facilities, as well as open and towards the long term. A project of this air gathering spaces overlooking the street. nature would establish a new kind of African With an intention to reproduce the lively Urban Terrain – one that is not imported, and dynamic of Lagos and its people, construc- not imposed from elsewhere. The project is tion is modular yet flexible, obtaining gently a truly local housing solution that is excep- curving buildings at human scale with no tional and uplifting, both materially and resemblance to ‘Soviet’ style housing blocks. socially, and fosters the natural growth of After accommodation of all surround- Lagos and Lagosians. ing units, the ground plane between the new The implementation of large-scale hous- buildings is freed up to become park and ing innovation is not without significant play space, or parking space off the road- challenges. However, the case of Singapore’s way, for example. Existing historic buildings, Housing Development Board proves that like churches, could remain to form a new such challenges are not insurmountable. urban terrain that is lively and dense, yet Like Lagos, Singapore faced a growing popu- breathable. Weather events such as flooding lation in a tightly constrained space. In order are made easily manageable in this building to overcome the first challenge of access structure and no longer threaten residents’ to suitable land, the state introduced the homes. 1966 Land Acquisition Act, which allowed The roof plane has been developed as safe the government to obtain land quickly and play space for children and could accom- with some compensation. By 1979, 80% modate a crèche or school-type facility, of land was under government control vegetable gardens or residents’ park with and sold to developers through long-term

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(usually 99-year) leases. To address the per- accessible by three bridges, the Carter Bridge, ennial problem of funding, housing units Eko Bridge and Third Mainland Bridge, were funded through compulsory savings Africa’s second-longest bridge at 11.8km.100 schemes where employers and employees After 3.30pm on a weekday afternoon, contributed a maximum of 20% of their it is impossible to cross the Third Mainland salaries. Building costs were kept low by pri- Bridge without bumper-to-bumper traffic. oritising a ‘no frills’ approach as well as the Meetings are frequently scheduled around adoption of building technologies suitable to traffic flow. Lagosians endure an average the local context. Development didn’t stop commute time of four hours each day, a total at housing, the government pursued broader of three billion hours a year. urban development strategies to spur eco- Despite the abundance of waterways nomic growth and create a positive cycle of throughout the city, road travel makes up housing, employment and funding.99 the bulk of the city’s transportation. Every day, more than two million vehicles move across the 7 598km of state roads, about 264 Planning capacity vehicles/km, making roads highly congest- ed.101 The fact that Lagos is also the main port of entry for goods into Nigeria means Land Economic expropriation that, in the absence of a modern railway sys- development with compensation tem, freight vehicles move along its main road corridors, adding to the congestion.102 One of the reasons for Lagos’ poor road A sustainable High density funding infrastructure is the division of roads buildings mechanism between the three tiers of government. The state has jurisdiction over 59% of roads, For such a housing model to succeed, the with LGAs looking after 36% and the Federal state will need to implement the principles Government 5%.103 This interdependence highlighted in the Singaporean example, as means that while one road may be well- illustrated above. A dedicated team will need maintained, turn off to another road that to be tasked to manage the process effi- may have a gaping pothole that prevents ciently and effectively. There will need to be traffic flow. a clear policy on land acquisition that One such example is the ongoing repairs ensures current residents and beneficiaries on the Apapa-Oshodi Expressway, linking of any new developments are adequately the port to the city. Though the expressway compensated. The funding for the plan is under Federal jurisdiction, its repairs should be dynamic, making use of both resi- were awarded to the Dangote Group as part dent and state funds to ensure local of a tax incentive scheme to encourage pri- investment in the programme. This plan will vate actors to invest in infrastructure.104 need to fit into broader policy measures for However, the slow progress of the project has economic growth in the city in order to cre- severely increased travel time to and from ate a sustainable cycle of development. the port. At the time of research, trucks sat for an additional five days on the road in a Transport multi-kilometre queue that blocked a lane of Moving around Lagos is a daunting traffic across swathes of the city. Expressing experience. Lagos’s business activity is con- his frustration at the process, Gavin Pearson centrated on Victoria Island and the majority of the Imperial Group in Nigeria remarked, of the city’s administration and residential ‘Our drivers take five days to enter the port areas are located on the mainland, which is and four days to exit – this has a knock-on

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effect on our logistics service and the cred- ibility of our assets.’ In addition to its dilapidated road infra- structure, Lagos also suffers from poor public transport. Public transport services in Lagos account for less than 3% of daily mobility. The State’s Lagos Metropolitan Area Transport Authority (LAMATA) has tried to improve this figure by introduc- ing two bus services: the Lagos Bus Rapid Transit (BRT) with dedicated lanes on main transport corridors, and LAGBUS, a feeder system on smaller routes. But these have failed to take off. A Lagos Icon: The Danfo Nearly half of Lagosians use Danfos – the Danfos are privately owned and operated, often rickety and sometimes downright dan- offering the cheapest and most efficient way gerous yellow vehicles that dot the city’s for Lagosians to commute. There are cur- landscape – while some 40% walk to work, rently 50 000 vehicles registered.107 ‘Danfos and 11% use private cars. These journeys are are flexible and they can navigate the dif- supported by motorcycles called Okadas or ficult, narrow roads of informal settlement tricycles known as Keke Marwas for shorter areas,’ observes Lookman Oshodi of Arctic distances. Ride-sharing apps such as Uber Infrastructure. and Taxify are starting to make a dent in the However, the vehicles are poorly regu- market but face challenges of mapping, traf- lated and often poorly maintained, with fic congestion and driver relations.105 reckless drivers at the wheel who cause The state has attempted to introduce accidents and contribute to the city’s wide- non-motorised transport in the form of its spread traffic friction. A plan is in motion rapid rail network. Construction of the rail to phase out the Danfos by introducing a began in 2009, with the aim of building a new fleet of 5 000 buses.108 This fleet is envi- seven-line network named after various col- sioned as an entirely new public bus service ours – red, blue, green, yellow, purple, brown that will run alongside the existing LAGBUS and orange. The Blue Line, the first phase, and Lagos BRT. It reflects the State’s modus was scheduled to be operational by 2016 but operandi of replacing competitive informal by 2019 had yet to be completed. service providers with one formalised entity Funding was mobilised through a mix- – an approach that has so far yielded mixed ture of Lagos State and Chinese state-owned results. As Oshodi quips, ‘you can’t surrender enterprise funds, notably from the China the transportation mandate of a city as big Civil Engineering Construction Corporation. as Lagos to just one company.’ However, construction on the rail has stalled At present, there are plans under way to indefinitely106 and explanations for the provide more infrastructure for water travel. delays have lacked detail. Critics have said Thirty ferry routes have been identified for that railway development is more expensive dredging, and a few private operators are and complex than an upgrade of the cur- already offering a water taxi service. The rent BRT system, although much of the first poor condition of water transport options phase of the rail network is already built. has kept Lagosians on the roads for now but as services improve and become better regulated, the hope is that more commuters will take to the water.109 In late 2018, mobile

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operator MTN Nigeria donated a ferry termi- However, privatisation failed to address the nal to Lagos State as part of a public-private root causes of the country’s electricity back- partnership to increase the use of water log as a result of an inability to guarantee transport.110 However, it is too soon to predict cost-reflective payments across the sup- future levels of public uptake. ply chain and to secure available gas and Moving around Lagos is a process that is gas supply infrastructure.115 This has left fraught with frictional costs and the need Nigeria unable to develop a functional elec- for specialised knowledge on which routes to tricity supply industry that meets the needs take and when to take them. The state has of all citizens. acknowledged the problem. However, the Until recently, Nigeria’s legislation pre- current policies in place do little to address vented individual states from generating the backlog. The private sector has been a their own electricity. Power was conceived as champion in the city’s transport network nationally significant and thus placed on the but, Lagos’s traffic woes show the need for a exclusive list of services provided only by the co-ordinated transport policy across the city. federal government.116 State authorities, like Lagos, could do very little. Electricity All on-grid power was sent from the Despite its status as Africa’s largest oil pro- national generator and distributed regionally ducer, with some 2 million barrels per day through private distribution companies, for in 2018, Nigeria is electricity poor. As noted Lagos, the Eko Electricity Distribution Plc on above, the country has an installed capacity the island and Ikeja Electricity Distribution of just 7 100MW, of which 4 100MW is avail- Company on the mainland. However, there able for generation to supply 190 million was a provision for embedded power/own- people. This is well below the international use generation and the state government rule of thumb of one Gigawatt (GW) per was permitted to contract independent one million residents and lagging regional power producers (IPPS) to provide 48MW counterparts such as Ghana that has simi- of supplementary power for Lagos’ main lar capacity for a country of 30 million and government offices. South Africa with an installed capacity of In 2017, Governor Ambode presented the 44GW111 for a population of 55 million.112 ambitious Lagos State Electric Power Sector Just 45% of the population has access to Reform Bill as part of his ‘Light Up Lagos’ the power grid. Despite this, more than 50% initiative to provide 3 000MW of additional of Nigeria’s manufacturing sector is located power to the city by 2022. Power generated in Lagos.113 from the plan would bypass the transmis- Most of the city’s electricity comes from sion networks and be supplied directly to generators. Power from the national grid the distribution companies, classifying it costs approximately N30/kwH but, because as ‘embedded power’. The power would be it is notoriously unreliable most people gen- generated from a number of independently erate their own electricity at a rate at more owned power barges fuelled by liquefied than three times this cost, driving up the natural gas (LNG). Lagos State would act as cost of goods and services within the city. a guarantor for both the fuel inputs and the Lagos’ power woes are part of a larger generation infrastructure. A special purpose Nigerian problem. In 2001, the National vehicle would administer the tariff collection Electric Power Policy was the beginning process and ensure that the various stake- of the unbundling and privatisation of holders were given their appropriate share. Nigeria’s electricity supply industry with There were ambitious plans to expand, generation and distribution privatised and should the first 3 000MW be successful. transmission remaining a national asset.114

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‘Light Up Lagos’ was born from multi- and the remaining 90% was operational, stakeholder engagement meetings, over managing the transfer loading stations and 19 months, with concerned actors in the dumpsites, cleaning public areas. electricity supply industry including IPPs, The 2016 overhaul transferred responsi- Distribution Companies, regulatory authori- bility from multiple individual actors to the ties and others. But once Governor Ambode privately operated Visionscape. Some 27 500 was removed from office in the 2019 election, workers were employed using 600 trucks, the streets went dark once more, apparently LAWMA’s primary role was to regulate the because the diesel generators used to power system and informal waste collectors were the street lights were unsustainable.117 no longer recognised as a part of the waste economy. Waste Not, Want Not: Public-Private By 2017, challenges of poor co-ordina- Plans Go Awry tion and incapacity in the CLI system had Lagos generates approximately 17 000 met- emerged as rubbish began to pile up on ric tonnes of waste per day. At present, Lagos’ streets. As a member of the Waste more than 1.2 million Lagosians do not Management Society of Nigeria (WAMASON) have access to waste collection services. The remarked, ‘Waste doesn’t wait for govern- waste collection deficit chokes storm water ment bureaucracy, … its collection and drains, contributing to serious flooding in the management is a 24-hour business.’ rainy season. In October 2018, the Lagos Assembly In 2016, Governor Ambode introduced voted to scrap Visionscape completely and the Cleaner Lagos Initiative (CLI), inspired reinstate the PSP operators. The Speaker of by global cities like London and Dubai. the Assembly, Mudashiru Obasa, stated, ‘We Under the terms of this scheme, CLI would insist that we don’t know anything about centralise the majority of the city’s waste Visionscape because we were not consulted management services under a single opera- before they started work.’118 Proper vetting tor, Visionscape Sanitation Solutions, who might have prevented this problem. would be responsible for the collection of all household waste and the manage- Conclusion: A Model for Africa? ment of all landfills. CLI was introduced by The most impressive aspect of Lagosians an Executive Order with the tender given to is in their relentless energy, driven by a Visionscape quickly and non-competitively, knowledge that no-one will help them but without stakeholder engagement or public themselves. ‘The guy selling things in the consultation. traffic,’ says one hotel manager, ‘will make Prior to CLI, a system known as ‘Operation 350 naira in the morning, perhaps, with Clean Lagos’ was in place. Introduced in which he will buy lunch. And he will run 2000 during the Tinubu administration around for another five hours in the after- (1999–2007) and continued under Governor noon to make the same for his dinner.’ This Fashola (2007–2015), Operation Clean Lagos is a tremendous asset, often parodied and employed 450 small- to medium-sized pri- overlooked in caricatures of urban chaos, vate sector participants (PSPs) contracted risk and corruption: its people. through the Lagos Waste Management It’s likely to get more difficult for Authority (LAWMA) to collect household Lagosians without a change of government waste. This was augmented by an abun- attitude and capacity. Lagos is not only the dant informal community of scavengers largest city in Africa, surpassing Cairo in and waste pickers, many of whom are trade 2012, but also the fastest growing one. In the association members. In this system, 10% three years since 2015, Lagos’s population of LAWMA’s role was to regulate the PSPs, has grown by a staggering 1.7 million.119

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Unless there is a significant reset in the stake in the system with a better launch pad manner in which politicians approach the through improved housing, and by adding task of governance from revenue collec- value through increased electricity supply. tion to delivery, attempts to resolve the Underpinning all of this will be Nigeria’s city’s infrastructure challenges, in this envi- success in attracting the necessary capital. ronment, are unlikely to significantly and That will depend on ensuring a rate of return positively alter the city’s trajectory. As it commensurate with risk. Currently investors is, the sheer volume of migrants presents a expect a return of investment at around 25% vicious cycle of influx and infrastructure. The precisely because of the risk; for the econ- more there is provided, the more the demand omy to grow, this needs to be reduced. will remain given the stupendous rates of Turning Nigeria’s oil into wealth has so far population increase. But underlying these worked well for a tiny elite. Translating the problems is a complex and corrosive politi- widespread energy of Nigerians into wealth cal economy: a cocktail of weak governance, for the wider population is much more dif- widespread corruption, a time-consuming ficult, depending on resolute political will, legal system, and anaemic economic growth better governance, government planning, highly vulnerable to the vagaries of oil prices. persistence and execution. Future growth at the rate Lagos requires If only Nigeria’s government would give will be dependent on moving goods and peo- its people a chance. ple cheaper and quicker, giving people both a

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Hargeisa: Invisible City

Quick Facts Population: 1.2 million Remittances: US$700 million in remittances flowed into Hargeisa in 2019. Transport: The city’s central avenue, running from the downtown area past the Presidential Palace and government ministries, is the ‘only decent tarmac road’ in the capital city. Services: Fewer than 1% of households have access to piped water. Energy: Nearly all electricity generated comes from diesel generators running on imported fuel. Jobs: The youth unemployment rate is 75%.

When Afrah and her family left Hargeisa downtown Hargeisa’s appropriately named in 1988 she was just seven years old; like Freedom Square. many townspeople who fled that year, she Looking out the aircraft window as you remembers a very different city.120 The for- land today at Hargeisa Airport, with its mer seat of government of Britain’s colonial modernised terminal and newly extended Somaliland Protectorate and (for five days in runway, you see an almost completely June 1960) capital of the independent State rebuilt city. Driving into town you pass wel- of Somaliland, and by the late 1980s Hargeisa come signs from the Republic of Somaliland, – then a provincial city under socialist dic- official buildings bearing the government’s tator Siad Barre’s epically dysfunctional banner, neatly uniformed, unarmed traffic Somali Republic – was rapidly collapsing. At police directing a bustling flow of vehicles, least 80% of the town’s buildings had been and a series of thriving shops, hotels, cafes reduced to rubble, and more than 50 000 and restaurants. Hargeisa’s population today members of the region’s majority Isaaq clan is 1.2 million, roughly a quarter of the total had been massacred by government death population of Somaliland.125 The city has a squads in what observers later dubbed the safe, open, friendly vibe, even after dark – ‘Isaaq genocide’.121 Even today, unmarked almost unbelievably so for anyone who has graves of dozens killed in the 1980s are still spent time in Mogadishu, or even in other being discovered near Hargeisa.122 By late East African cities such as Mombasa, Maputo 1988, most of the city’s population of 500 000 or Dar es-Salaam. had fled, running from bombs dropped on Many buildings are under construction, the area by jets from their own Somali Air market stalls line the roads, stocked with Force.123 fresh fruit and vegetables (mostly imported Eyewitnesses told of warplanes launch- from Ethiopia) and manufactured goods ing from Hargeisa Airport on the city’s (from Vietnam and China). To be sure, those southern outskirts, turning back to bomb roads are terrible; sheep and goats graze on the town from which they’d just taken off, the streets and a fine grey dust covers almost then landing at the same airport to rearm every surface. In the afternoons, the streets and repeat.124 It was one of Barre’s last acts are busy. Trucks distributing the popular nar- of large-scale violence and repression before cotic khat plant arrive from Ethiopia at about his brutal regime collapsed and he too was 2pm, through checkpoints where officials swept away. A regime MiG shot down in the collect excise, and vehicles stop randomly fighting by local guerrillas of the Somali in the street while satisfied customers wan- National Movement (SNM) now serves as der about with leafy-topped bunches of the a war memorial, perched on a plinth in tightly-wrapped twigs.126 But modern malls

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and supermarkets are also springing up; because there is no internationally-approved billboards advertise banks, boarding schools Somaliland internet domain, and the coun- and universities, and the MiG monument – try is unrecognised by the international which, in photographs taken as recently as postal union, so the only way to mail some- 2012 appears to sit in an empty square – is thing from Hargeisa is via the slow and surrounded by stalls and overshadowed by expensive DHL shipping service.127 The bank buildings and telecoms offices. country is described as the ‘self-declared Given all that, you could be forgiven for but internationally unrecognised repub- thinking you’d arrived in the thriving capital lic of Somaliland’ and is considered by the of a rapidly developing, well-governed, inde- international community to be a breakaway pendent sovereign country, a town focused region of the Federal Republic of Somalia. on commerce and construction, and deter- This is the entity that succeeded Barre’s mined – 30 years after its destruction by regime; it was inaugurated in 2012 after dec- Barre – to put the past behind it. But you’d be ades of lethal anarchy in the south, cobbled wrong, for Hargeisa is an invisible city. together by the international community with UN supervision and under the guns of Invisible City an African Union peacekeeping force. The sovereign Republic of Somaliland Everything in Hargeisa – from the peace appears on no maps. It is listed in no offi- treaty pulled together by visionary elders cial register of the world’s countries, has no in 1991, to the city’s self-financed rebuild- seat at the United Nations and no interna- ing, to the unrecognised state of which it tional country code. Government officials forms a part, to the largely informal econ- are forced to use personal email addresses omy and homegrown political system that

DJIBOUTI Gulf of Aden

Berbera

SOMALILAND

HARGEISA

ETHIOPIA SOMALIA

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sustains it – is a bottom-up, do-it-yourself judiciary and a free press, and peaceful enterprise. This enterprise, evolving over the transfer of power between presidents fol- past 28 years through a remarkable process lowing free and fair elections has become of civic self-help, emerged not only without the norm. It is also enduring, with 28 years much international assistance but, at times, of homegrown stability and internal peace against active opposition from the world’s offering a stark contrast to the interna- self-appointed nation-builders and doers of tionally enabled chaos and violence in good. south-central Somalia. Even as the world was watching Somalia As the capital of a country that officially shred itself in a clan bloodbath and apoca- doesn’t exist, Hargeisa has no formal sta- lyptic famine in 1991-93 (the setting for tus. Yet, as a practical reality, it’s a thriving the book and movie Black Hawk Down, the commercial hub, the seat of a government defining image of Somalia for many western- that considers itself sovereign, it is regarded ers), an extraordinary process of grassroots as legitimate by its population, and admin- peacebuilding was quietly taking place in isters one of the more stable, peaceful the north. Over many months during the and democratic states in Africa. Hargeisa 1991–1993 period, Somalilanders met in the has consulates from Turkey, Ethiopia and Burao, Berbera, Sheikh, and Boorame peace Denmark, and a special envoy from the conferences, a series of local reconciliation United Kingdom. It receives international meetings brokered by traditional elders. This flights from Dubai and Addis Ababa, and resulted in peace agreements which then hosts UN agencies, international aid mis- proliferated throughout the former territory sions and Chinese, Kuwaiti and Emirati of British Somaliland, and its mostly Isaaq businesses. Invisible they may be, but and Darod clan groups.128 Hargeisa – and Somaliland – are very real. A constitutional convention, and subse- But there’s another, even more important, quent regional reconciliation agreements sense in which Hargeisa is an invisible city. formalised the establishment of an executive If one thought of it as simply a piece of presidency accountable to a bicameral legis- urbanised terrain, ‘Hargeisa’ is a town of lature, with a lower House of Representatives roughly 1.2 million people in the north-west- elected by the people, and an upper House ern Horn of Africa, its streets laid out in a of Elders elected by clans. A constitutional grid pattern over about 33km², situated on convention later confirmed this setup. a cool plateau 4 400 feet above sea level, in Somaliland’s governance structure, which a rough hourglass shape astride the usually has been described as a ‘hybrid political dry Maroodi Jeex (‘Elephant Creek’) and con- order’, may sound exotic, but the House of nected by road to the port of Berbera, two Elders has essentially the same function hours’ drive away on the Gulf of Aden. But as the British House of Lords, or the Senate the real city is vastly more than that. in Australia or the US.129 It plays a key role If, instead, we consider Hargeisa as a sys- maintaining balance among the clans and tem, with the city’s relatively small area of geographic regions that form an essential urbanised terrain sitting at the centre of a element of Somaliland (and indeed greater vast social, political and economic ecosys- Somali)130 life. This serves to contain the tem that includes not just the town itself destabilising, often lethal, escalation of zero- but also its diaspora – the thousands of sum competition among clan factions that Hargeisans who live in Europe, America, has occurred elsewhere. Ethiopia, Kenya, Canada, Australia, the Gulf This practical experiment in state- states and elsewhere, connected to their building has proven remarkably robust: city through remittances, e-banking, mobile Somaliland today possesses an independent telephones, Skype, social media, family ties,

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business deals, visits and investments – then with a single root system, is the key to see- we have a much clearer idea of what the city ing the real, invisible, Hargeisa-the-city is and how its political economy works. (magaalada-Hargeysa). Take Afrah as an example. Growing up in the United Arab Emirates and US, she is well- Clan and Camel educated, with degrees in hospitality and While Hargeisa’s global connectivity is a new tourism. She is also an experienced man- phenomenon, emerging in about the year ager and businesswoman who moved back 2000 as a result of the increasing ease of air to Hargeisa several years ago to look after travel and money transfers, the proliferation her elderly mother and ended up launch- of smartphones, penetration of the inter- ing a business with savings cobbled together net providing closer ties to the diaspora, it is during her time overseas. Today her tearoom utterly traditional for Somali city-dwellers to employs 25 people and does a lively trade maintain social and economic links to a rural serving civil servants from nearby ministries hinterland, and to the pastoralist nomads and she has reluctantly turned down offers who tend flocks and herds in the interior. Of to franchise her brand in other parts of the Somaliland’s population of 4.5 million (an region. Like many business owners (and, estimate only, since the most recent census, seemingly, most of the officials who patron- conducted by the Barre regime back in 1981, ise her café) she holds two passports, has almost certainly under-counted the country’s relatives in several countries, speaks multi- northern population) about 55% are nomadic ple languages, and travels regularly to Dubai or semi-nomadic, while 45% are urban. for banking and to supervise shipments for Pastoral nomadism – the tending of her business or meet investors. Far from seasonally-roaming herds of camels by men being a theoretical construct, the Hargeisan and boys who follow the rainfall (and there- diaspora is an ever-present social, political fore pasture) patterns, or of sheep and goats and economic reality. in static camps by women and girls – is the Somalilanders in the diaspora account for traditional, and in many ways the defining more than US$700 million in annual remit- feature, of Somali life and culture. Droughts tances – and much of that money flows to in 2011–2012 and in 2017 severely depleted or through Hargeisa.131 (For comparison, livestock, particularly camel herds, in the the total national government budget of interior and drove many pastoralists off Somaliland for 2018 was US$382 million, the land and into slums on the city’s edges. just over half the value of remittances.)132 Rains in 2018, though better than in recent In effect, the human and communication years, have not yet enabled a rebound.133 Yet networks and financial flows centred on the Somaliland’s only significant export remains city, invisible though they may be, are its the live animal trade to Saudi Arabia and the lifeblood, even though many nodes in these Gulf states, while the four noble clans of the networks are not physically in Hargeisa ethnic Somali region (including the majority at all. On a map of this real but invisible Isaaq clan of Somaliland) are all pastoralists. Hargeisa (see the map page 76) significant Fishing villages, farming communities and parts of the city, much of its population urban artisan and merchant centres do exist, and most of its wealth are in Amsterdam, but these sedentary populations were tradi- Cape Town, Copenhagen, Dubai, Durban, tionally the object of pastoralist contempt, Düsseldorf, Helsinki, London, Minneapolis, and of periodic plundering by desert raid- Nairobi, Oslo, Portland, Seattle, Sydney and ers. Somalilanders’ way of life is still, even in Toronto. Understanding Hargeisa-in-Africa 2018, closely tied to the herd and, above all, (Hargeysa ee-Afrika) in this way, as the tip to the prestige and power of camel and clan. of an iceberg, or one tree in a grove of trees

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to Dhagax Warabe Hargeisa to Urban Schematic Berbera

Cemetery

to Wajale & Boorama

to Burao Maroodi Jeex (‘Elephant Creek’) intermittent

0 1 2 3 N Kilometres Airport ' Lat. Long.: 9.558038 N, 44.066930 E (centroid) .139 D.J. Kilcullen 2018 ay 12 Elevation: 4.423' AMSL unw Basemap: Google Satellite image le r Sing to Baligubadle

Hargeisa urban schematic as of November 2018

Not that the city is separate from the the Gulf states – and a much higher-prestige clan: quite the contrary. As the scholar of occupation than the trade in small stock. Somalia and Somaliland, Ioan Lewis, has The camel trade is currently depressed; in written, ‘Nomads are not cut off from the life part this is due to the ongoing war in Yemen, of urban centres or culturally and socially Somaliland’s nearest Arab neighbour, lying separated from the majority of urban resi- only 260 kilometres away across the Gulf of dents…from the President downwards, at Aden, which has massively disrupted export all levels of government and administration, networks. Outbreaks of Rift Valley Fever those living with a modern lifestyle in urban in recent years also resulted in bans (now conditions have brothers and cousins living lifted) on exports to Saudi, Emirati and other as nomads in the interior and regularly have regional markets. shares in joint livestock herds. Civil serv- Even on a quiet day, and in the trade’s ants commonly invest in livestock, including reduced circumstances, Hargeisa’s livestock camels, that are herded by their nomadic market (at Seyladda, in the band of open kinsmen.’134 ground running through the city just south The Meccan hajj is the peak period for of the river) is a place of bustling activ- the trade in sheep and goats – demand in ity. Herders display stock for evaluation by Saudi Arabia spikes during and before the canny brokers who then make deals with holy month of Ramadan, when demand hard-bargaining individual export mer- for food increases as millions sacrifice ani- chants. Herders, brokers and merchants alike mals as part of the traditional pilgrimage. mostly wear traditional and are often Somaliland camels are also a key export to older, since many of Somaliland’s young

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people have abandoned the austere herd- and support networks – the starting point for ing lifestyle over the past generation for jobs a process of chain migration that helped to (or non-jobs) in and around Hargeisa.135 create today’s massive diaspora. Appearances are deceptive though. Hargeisa is far from being the only city Despite leathery faces, traditional walk- in Africa that has suffered under conflict, ing sticks and travel-stained garments, each and (as already noted) its dense network of herder carries at least one mobile phone and connections with its rural hinterland and is intimately familiar with the current inter- diaspora are entirely typical. As a result, national market rate for each type and grade there is much that other African cities can of animal, changing minute by minute and learn from Hargeisa, especially in its efforts continuously updated via text message.136 to improve agricultural security. Other cit- He negotiates with brokers while simul- ies might wish to study, and perhaps copy, taneously checking in – on WhatsApp or the Somaliland government’s recent, sen- other social media – with his extended kin, sible move to create a National Cereals and whether sitting in makeshift tents in the Produce Board, to co-fund a 767-hectare agri- interior, air-conditioned offices in downtown cultural project west of Hargeisa that grows Hargeisa, or internet cafés in Rotterdam, wheat, millet, maize, beans and sesame, and Oslo or Minneapolis. This family network to construct silos to stockpile produce as an – part-owners and co-investors in the live- insurance against famine in both rural and stock being traded – must be satisfied before urban areas. he can seal the deal. Again, traders haggling over Somali tea in the shade of a row of Diaspora and Development eucalypts along the edge of the market may One effect of the diaspora today is that appear, to the casual observer, to be throw- Somalis are now the world’s largest per cap- backs to a simpler age, but these are really ita recipients of remittances. Traditionally, international businessmen navigating com- livestock exports accounted for most of plex multi-party deals, in a global market, Somaliland’s inward cash flow – and as we’ve with a floating exchange rate, under the seen, the live animal trade still represents close scrutiny of a stakeholder network that the country’s largest source of export dollars, exists in the invisible, global Hargeisa – not though the government is urgently seeking to just the physical one. diversify the economy in the face of drought This means that cities like Hargeisa are and regional instability.138 Nevertheless, in not now (nor in fact have they ever been) terms of raw financial flows, as of 2018 more islands of settlement in a sea of nomads, as than 60% of the country’s income derives are some towns in Yemen, Oman or Central from the diaspora. Between 25% and 40% of Asia. Rather, Somali cities are closely tied to Somaliland households receive remittances their hinterlands and to the diurnal and sea- from relatives overseas; total annual remit- sonal flows of wealth, commerce and labour tance inflows in 2013–2014 totalled US$780 that eddy around and through them. In million, of which 70% went to individuals Somaliland in particular, even more than in and families and 30% to capital or finan- other parts of the Horn of Africa, a longstand- cial investments.139 This makes remittances ing tradition of individual labour migration the single biggest inflow to Somaliland: also exists, with locals working abroad as bigger than aid, humanitarian assistance seafarers, labourers or traders across the and trade combined and, as noted earlier, region and further afield.137 When the city roughly twice the size of the entire national emptied under Barre’s bombs in 1988, peo- budget. Remittances mostly go to servic- ple fleeing Hargeisa were able to plug into ing household costs and recurrent expenses a pre-existing web of external connections although some contribute to diaspora-owned

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businesses which create jobs in Hargeisa and money. Most of this mobile money activ- other towns. ity has been driven by Telesom ZAAD.’141 As Remittance transfers are made using tra- Pénicaud and McGrath note, Telesom learned ditional hawala networks, via Islamic banks from the experience of pioneers like M-Pesa such as Dahabshiil (the dominant player in in Kenya to focus on building a peer-to-peer Hargeisa’s financial sector) and distributed payment ecosystem, which has succeeded across platforms such as WorldRemit, which in encouraging users to store money for pay- use smartphone technology and are increas- roll and business transactions, not solely for ingly preferred for security and speed.140 short-term transfers. Five years on, ZAAD is In a city that lacks a modern conventional increasingly being challenged by competition (i.e. non-Islamic) banking system, within a from e-Dahab (owned by Dahabshiil). country that is unrecognised and therefore One problem with this system is another only tenuously connected to global banks, artefact of the reality that Somaliland is mobile money transfers are a common pay- unrecognised, namely that mobile phone ment method for everything from food and users cannot call phones on other networks. fuel to payroll and business purchases. Somtel users, for example, cannot reach the Popular platforms include e-Dahab (affiliated mobile number of someone on the Telesom with Dahabshiil but administered as a sepa- network, since the two networks have incom- rate business, and partnered with Dahabshiil patible numbering systems and work on the subsidiary Somtel) and ZAAD, pioneered in Somali (as distinct from Somaliland) country 2009 by Somaliland’s Telesom mobile phone code. As a consequence, many Somalilanders company. ZAAD is a direct system in which carry two phones or go through the awkward merchants (rather than agents, as for sys- process of continually swapping SIM cards tems such as M-Pesa) form the principal between phones in order to communicate.142 access point for customers and users. A user Further, counterintuitively, the use of may purchase Telesom airtime with cash electronic money underscores just how from a merchant, add cash as needed to cash-based (as distinct from credit-driven) finance purchases, store money, and receive Hargeisa’s economy is. Islamic banks like or transfer funds internationally through Dahabshiil do not offer credit cards, though ZAAD’s connection with WorldRemit. they do furnish fee-paying debit and ATM As Claire Pénicaud and Fionán McGrath cards, and their deposit accounts do not noted in a July 2013 case study, since its carry interest. So, many people work in cash, creation in 2009 ZAAD has gained signifi- withdrawing notes from ATMs then either cant traction: ‘in June 2012, almost 40% of paying cash or loading value into ZAAD or Telesom [mobile phone] subscribers were e-Dahab accounts on their phones by buy- active users of Telesom ZAAD. What is ing airtime from merchants, even though it most striking about the service is the level is also possible to buy airtime and internet of activity on the mobile money platform. data online. Somaliland maintains its own Active Telesom ZAAD users perform over currency – the Somaliland Shilling (SlSh) – 30 transactions per month on average, far as yet another indicator of its real though above the global average of 8.5 per month. unrecognised sovereign status, and small The World Bank’s Global Financial Inclusion purchases are often made in SlSh. But to a Database (Findex) recently revealed that surprising extent the country’s real economy Somalia [and Somaliland, as a whole] was is based on the United States dollar. one of the most active mobile money mar- In part this is because Somaliland’s kets: 26% of the population reported using unrecognised status makes it hard to con- mobiles to pay bills, which is the highest rate duct in SlSh the international transactions in the world, and 32% to send and receive that form the bulk of the country’s financial

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flows; in part consumer confidence in skills and knowledge transfer to Somaliland US dollars reflects recent instability and from people who have lived and been edu- inflationary pressure on the Shilling. The cated overseas—help to build Hargeisa’s Somaliland shilling, indeed, has been histori- human capital. Returnees from the dias- cally unstable and not widely trusted; there pora are over-represented within elites in were currency crashes in 1994 when the gov- Hargeisa, including civil servants, political ernment introduced the Shilling to finance a and business leaders, heads of community conflict against rebellious clans in the east- organisations and entrepreneurs. This can ern region, and again in 2002–2003 when the help build capacity, as the ‘brain gain’ government printed huge amounts of money from returnees – visiting or moving back to finance a constitutional referendum and to Hargeisa, helping establish businesses, parliamentary elections. The Rift Valley Fever schools and clinics, or representing the crisis, when Gulf countries banned livestock country’s interests overseas – contributes to imports from Somaliland, created further Somaliland’s development.143 currency pressure. Either way, though ATMs For many families, sending a child over- have proliferated in the past few years, and seas for work – or more recently, committing it is technically feasible to use international family members to the dangerous gamble of credit cards for an increasing range of trans- emigration to the Middle East or Europe – is actions, hard currency – overwhelmingly, a strategic calculation aimed at diversifying American dollars – is the basis for commerce the family’s income or improving its human in the city. capital.144 Still, from a social and political Although money transfers and remit- standpoint, the return of Somalilanders from tances may seem like a success story – and the diaspora is not always uncontroversial. indeed, they do represent remarkable inno- Hargeisans, who have spent the past three vation in inclusive banking, they highlight a decades dealing with the fallout from war key structural issue in Hargeisa’s economy and state collapse, can sometimes cast a as is also highlighted by the reliance on US sceptical eye over returnees who have lived dollars. Because Somaliland imports virtu- comparatively comfortable lives overseas, ally all products, from food and fuel to cars the more so since their presence drives up and clothing, remittances operate much housing, commodity and real estate prices like foreign assistance in a war zone: like (already extremely high, by local standards, so-called ‘aeroplane aid’ in Afghanistan, in Hargeisa) while their deeper pockets and remittances come into Hargeisa, touch access to overseas cash exert upward pres- down briefly, then fly right out of the coun- sure on essential consumer goods.145 try again as they are used to purchase goods There are subtle but significant linguistic that are overwhelmingly imported. Only a differences between returnees and locals, small proportion of financial remittances which (along with the returnees’ dress and – that percentage used to create jobs or standard of living) sets them apart, and some finance businesses – remains in Somaliland – particularly those seeking senior political or to help build economic capacity. Moreover, civil service roles while holding dual nation- since the government levies no tax on remit- ality – can even be seen as opportunistic tances, this primary financial inflow (and the carpetbaggers. This, of course, is a common largest single source of private income for problem in cities experiencing a post-conflict Somalilanders) generates no income for the return of refugees, and that return is in itself public. a good thing, as it contributes to the city’s But financial remittances are not the human and financial capacity and helps only inflow from the diaspora. In addi- unlock opportunities for growth that benefit tion, intellectual remittances – technology,

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everyone, not just the returnees. But manag- ministries) is the only decent tarmac road in ing it is neither simple nor risk-free. the city. Virtually every other paved street is potholed, and outside the business district Two-Speed City many roads are gravel or dirt. There are few Driving or walking around Hargeisa, one gutters and no properly constructed drain- is struck by the contrast between a pri- age system, so that on the rare occasions vate economy that is clearly thriving, and a when significant rain falls, large areas of the lagging public sector – including, particu- city are flooded, and mud makes the roads larly, urban infrastructure. While not a true impassable. reflection of John Kenneth Galbraith’s ‘pri- The resulting wear-and-tear on cars vate affluence and public squalor’ – since and trucks (mostly Toyotas and Nissans even the private sector is far from opulent imported second-hand by ship from ports in Hargeisa – this is a two-speed city.146 The in the Arabian Gulf) imposes a drag on busi- reasons for this are not simple and neither ness and household economies, while the is dealing with their consequences, but one time and cost of moving goods and people clear cause is the lack of a broad tax base. about the city is multiplied manyfold. Well- The government does not tax income, nor constructed houses and businesses (built, does it levy duties on remittances. It collects almost without exception, since the 1990s) excise on khat imports, and duties on other sit on pitted and poorly drained roads, in a goods coming in through ports and airports, physical reminder of the mismatch between as well as collecting landing fees and other a thriving private sector and a bare-bones payments from users of those points of entry. public purse. Businesses are taxed at 12%, payrolls at 6% But the city’s two-speed nature emerges and sales at 5%, but these rates sustain only most obviously in terms of basic household a very austere and limited government struc- necessities such as water, electricity and ture, one that lacks the resources to invest in fuel, where government investment in essen- public goods that could jump-start private tial services lags private enterprise which development. Somaliland’s six regions and provides – for those who can pay – a rela- 23 city governments raise taxes from their tively high standard of service. Fewer than own localities and then plough this back one in 100 households in Hargeisa has access (with varying degrees of probity and compe- to running water, with access dropping off tence) into development at the city level, and sharply as one moves out of the city cen- cities such as Hargeisa and Berbera, which tre. Most middle-class households purchase operate international points of entry, are plastic or metal water tanks which they allowed to keep a portion of their earnings.147 place on the roadside and replenish by pur- The lack of income tax is understandable in chasing water from donkey-driven carts that a country whose economy is largely infor- roam the streets at most hours of the day. mal or subsistence-based. But the failure to One thousand litres of water costs roughly tax remittances (or offer Somalilanders in US$6 as of late 2018, and lasts a family of the diaspora opportunities to contribute to a four about ten days.148 The carts are regu- public investment fund) is one clear area for lated by government, and their water comes consideration. from state-owned rigs and pipes in the city, Roads are an obvious example where but the water itself often originates from the lack of resources for public investment reservoirs and wells many miles from the hampers Hargeisa’s economic activity and city.149 Frequently, landowners commercial- social development. The city’s central ave- ise public water pipelines on their properties, nue (running through the downtown area, selling the water directly to consumers, and past the Presidential palace and government

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the government is paid by calculating the course, has ample sunlight with more than amount of water used. 340 sunny days per year, and the Hargeisa In poorer areas, such as the informal set- region has been assessed as one of the tlements peopled by new (or not-so-new) most promising locations for wind energy arrivals from the countryside, women and in Africa; small-scale solar installations are children gather around plastic water drums common and a pilot wind energy project dropped by trucks every few days and haul exists on the city’s outskirts.151 But for now, the water away in jerrycans for household most citizens depend on imported fuel, cre- use. ating vulnerabilities at city and national A private consortium, as part of a project level, and hampering commercial devel- under way since mid-2018 with funding from opment through lack of lighting, assured the German aid agency KfW (Kreditanstalt für cold-chain storage, and air conditioning. Wiederaufbau) and limited public funds, is Fuel for cooking presents a similar installing a water distribution pipeline and pattern. More than 80% of people in Hargeisa a system of household water supply, as well cook with charcoal, produced by local char- as public taps. The project, expected to take coal-burners who cut down and burn off three to five years, will go a long way towards the tree cover – mostly acacia thorn-scrub ameliorating this situation.150 – from areas 20 to 100 kilometres from the Still, given how arid Somaliland is, and city. Bags of charcoal are then bought and the known correlation between water insecu- collected by companies who transport them rity and urban unrest, the precarious water to Hargeisa and sell them to shop owners situation for ordinary Hargeisans – particu- and small merchants. People purchase bags larly those in informal settlements who are of charcoal with their groceries from mar- already the city’s most vulnerable – is one kets. At the upper end of the socio-economic of the major risks facing Hargeisa, and a key scale, another 10% of Hargeisa’s population obstacle to growth and stability. Likewise, cooks with small propane bottles purchased extended periods of future drought (and the through container-exchange schemes from inevitable depletion of artesian and surface local shops, or from companies like Somgas, water over time) pose a national-level risk while a further 10% or less have access to to the stability of Somaliland and the entire large propane tanks filled directly from gas region, and the amount of time and effort deposits. Tanker trucks also transport large Hargeisa’s residents are forced to put into propane tanks into the town for distribution basic tasks like hauling water imposes a to retailers. Again, major supply-chain assur- severe productivity burden on the economy. ance risks (and associated costs) result from Electricity and fuel supply in turn are this dependence on commodities imported closely linked, since virtually all electric- from the countryside, in the case of charcoal, ity generated in Hargeisa comes from or from overseas in the case of natural gas. diesel-fuelled generators running on The charcoal trade carries additional vul- imported petroleum. Some are large-scale nerabilities, since it has been banned by the generators owned by corporate entities from UN because the al-Qaeda affiliated Somali which businesses and households purchase guerrilla group al-Shabaab makes so much their electricity via a private metering sys- money from it. There is little evidence of tem; others are household generators run on Shabaab in Somaliland at present – the petrol or diesel bought from service stations group is largely restricted to south-central across town. These stations are serviced by Somalia, and in any case, many Shabaab fuel tanker trucks running overland from belong to the Hawiye clan which has no Djibouti or up the road from Berbera, which significant presence in Somaliland. Still, has an oil storage terminal. Somaliland, of Shabaab have started rebranding Somali

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charcoal as coming from somewhere else in major economic development opportunities order to sidestep the UN embargo, and this for the region’s major power, Ethiopia. Dubai may have disruptive effects in Somaliland Ports World signed a US$442 million agree- and elsewhere. Likewise, for an arid country ment with Somaliland in 2017, forming a with unreliable rainfall and sparse tree cover joint venture (DP World Berbera) with the at best, continuing to burn trees for fuel is government of Somaliland, with Ethiopia as a not a sustainable approach. 19% shareholder. The company was awarded Hargeisa’s dependence on diesel fuel a 30-year concession, with an automatic and gasoline, all of which is imported from ten-year extension, on the port of Berbera, in outside Somaliland, to operate electrical return for a commitment to double its size generators is another key challenge. Moving and transform it from a manual stevedoring away from diesel-powered generators toward operation into a modern container termi- wind, solar and other renewables is one nal.152 Work commenced in October 2018, option; developing the country’s oil and gas and involves ‘building a 400-metre quay reserves is another. Household-level solar and 250 000m² yard extension as well as the panels and wind turbines represent the development of a free zone to create a new lowest tier on the renewables ladder, with regional trading hub’.153 larger-scale projects (like the wind turbine The deal included a commitment to farm under construction near Hargeisa air- upgrade the road between Berbera and port, or the installation of larger fields of Hargeisa into a modern highway, turn- solar panels in and around the city or on ing Hargeisa into a major transport hub rooftops) are the next step up. for traffic from across the Horn of Africa Other cities can also learn from the issues to Berbera, which in turn would become a related to the use of charcoal and bottled key import-export terminal for goods and gas for most household cooking in Hargeisa. commodities. This investment, one of the Apart of the environmental degradation main achievements of the current govern- resulting from the charcoal trade, the UN ment in Hargeisa, has the potential to bring embargo makes charcoal supply precarious significant revenue to the state, enabling and its contribution to air pollution from infrastructure upgrades for both Berbera cooking also makes it a public health issue. and Hargeisa, with flow-on effects for ancil- These issues apply equally in many African lary industries, and potential for increased cities, especially in informal settlements. employment. The Berbera project will cre- ate access for economic improvement in Ports and Bases Somaliland while its demonstration effect is The discussion of international recognition likely to bring further foreign direct invest- may seem off-topic for a city-level analy- ment, increasing impetus for international sis of Hargeisa. In fact, it is central to the recognition. city’s future, since besides being the capi- Likewise, the airport in Berbera – a mili- tal and by far the largest city in Somaliland, tary airfield designed in the 1960s by the Hargeisa forms a key node in the largest, Soviet Union and rented by NASA through- and most potentially transformative infra- out the 1980s as a backup landing strip for structure project in Somaliland’s history. the Space Shuttle – is, at 13 582 feet long, This is the major upgrade of the port of one of the two longest airstrips in Africa. Berbera and the associated construction of Its size and proximity to the port gives it a Berbera-Hargeisa highway corridor. This potential as both an air cargo terminal and has the potential to make Hargeisa a hub passenger hub, creating the possibility for a for a regional transport and trading network multi-modal terminal and an associated free that would transform the city while opening trade zone in and around Berbera.

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Further up the coast, the United Arab the region (including Somalia and Djibouti, Emirates is constructing a military and naval currently not measured in the GHCR, and base. This base, conceived as part of a net- Ethiopia which currently ranks lowest work of regional outposts being constructed among large-population countries in sub- by the UAE to support its ongoing engage- Saharan Africa).154 Hargeisa is considering ment in the Saudi-led conflict in Yemen, benchmarking its human capital against this brings a formal, permanent international report, as a way of tracking progress even in military presence to Somaliland for the first advance of Somaliland’s international rec- time in its history. There is likely to be a mod- ognition – and this is something other cities est local economic boost from the new base, may also wish to consider. but its real importance is political, placing Another lesson that others can learn from Somaliland firmly in the Saudi-Emirati camp Hargeisa is in the development of vocational (rather than of Turkey, China, Iran or any of and technical skills in the urban population. the other powers jockeying for advantage Hargeisa’s ongoing construction programme in the region). While some Somalilanders (including several commercial properties as are understandably apprehensive about well as residential structures) and the road this, it is worth recognising that Somaliland construction and transportation industry has always – because of its dependence on opportunities associated with the Berbera animal exports to the Arabian Peninsula – project, provide an opportunity to develop a been in this sphere of influence: the Emirati base of vocational and technical skills in the presence is a formalisation, rather than a city’s workforce, with the potential for other revision, of the status quo. opportunities in the future, according to Nonetheless, a Hargeisa connected by some of our respondents. highway to a modern port in Berbera, with Education in Somaliland has seen signifi- a permanent international military pres- cant growth, with several universities and ence (with the implied security guarantee) higher-education colleges in Hargeisa and and strong transport links to regional and numerous language schools, vocational skills international trading hubs, will be a very institutes and private schools. This sector is different – and far less invisible – city than ripe for further development, but respond- the Hargeisa of today. While this develop- ents recognised that without an economy ment carries huge potential benefits for capable of absorbing higher-skilled gradu- Somaliland, it also embodies risks that will ates, improvements in educational capacity need careful management. may simply result in higher rates of emigra- tion since graduates will have no jobs to go Human Capital to. In a worst-case scenario, it may lead to Neither Somaliland nor Somalia is listed unrest and agitation as a large class of edu- in the latest Global Human Capital Report cated but unemployable youth emerges. (GHCR, 2017), nor is Somaliland likely to be For Hargeisa, as for other cities in simi- listed while it remains unrecognised. Still, lar circumstances, sequencing education the framework established in this bench- and skills creation in an integrated fashion mark global report, which categorises with economic development is likely to be human capital across capacity, development, an essential element of any sustainable deployment and know-how, was recognised national or city-level education and work- by several participants in the study as a force development plan. useful model for developing human capi- Likewise, most respondents recognised tal at the national and city level, as well that efforts in the public health sector would as for comparison with other countries in need to be coordinated with economic and

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educational developments, lest improve- leveraging diaspora capabilities in order to ments in infant mortality (currently one of benefit all Somalilanders was an idea that the highest in Africa) lead to a youth bulge, most respondents fully supported. with negative consequences for educa- tional and employment opportunities and Conclusion: Trapped in the social cohesion. Other cities have experi- Diplomatic Mist? enced similar effects and may wish to This chapter has not sought to tell Hargeisa’s development here. No respondent Hargeisans, who know their own city best, thought that the risk of a youth bulge was a how to develop their city or what to do reason to delay action on public health – on about the many problems and opportuni- the contrary, all felt that public and private ties that face the city. On the contrary, the medical and hospital services, health exten- strongest impression gained during our sion programmes and clinics needed greater months of research and fieldwork was of a investment for humanitarian reasons. But city, and of a group of townspeople, officials, these efforts need to be synchronised with community elders and business leaders who increases in educational and, subsequently, are justly proud of what they have achieved, employment capacity. know exactly where they want to go, and have a good idea how to get there. In each The Diaspora ‘Brain Gain’155 section so far, we have included specific As noted earlier, the ‘brain drain’ of indi- observations that might be of use to other viduals leaving Hargeisa for the diaspora, cities seeking to learn from Hargeisa’s being educated overseas, acquiring human experience. and financial capital and then returning to Hargeisa – both the physical city in assist in the city’s development, creates the Somaliland, and the larger invisible city opportunity for a ‘brain gain’. Workforce with a global presence and a worldwide skills, economic and investment capi- network – is a growing, dynamic, safe tal, and entrepreneurship within the city and vibrant place. The city is confident, could be jump-started by carefully leverag- building on 28 years of self-help and - ing returnees (or by establishing ongoing strapping, and is ready to take its place as supportive relationships with Hargeisans a major regional economic and trading hub. remaining in the diaspora). However, as While the issues and problems associated also noted, the return of wealthy and edu- with lack of recognition are real, the city’s cated Hargeisans from the diaspora, and future is bright, and there are many things their dominance of political, civil service Hargeisa can do to accelerate economic and and business roles, creates the potential for social development without waiting for the resentment and marginalisation of those world to recognise its progress. For those in citizens who remained and suffered through the diaspora who fled in the 1980s or grew several decades of conflict and reconstruc- up overseas since, the city is a welcom- tion. Again, this is issue is far from unique ing presence; for the region and the world, to Hargeisa and other cities facing simi- Hargeisa is open for business. With engage- lar challenges can learn from Hargeisa’s ment, patience, and a recognition that experience here. National ownership of the Somalilanders have done extremely well diaspora issue, involving harmonisation on their own, the opportunities for growth, of both groups and their different devel- development and resilience in this city are opment pathways, is probably the right clear and waiting. approach at this point. A conscious, thought- It would be easy to dismiss Hargeisa as through and carefully socialised policy on a unique case given Somaliland’s lack of

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international recognition. It is true that prosperity, Hargeisa illustrates the necessity this has led to a dearth of resources, even of self-reliance and local ownership. more so than other African urban centres. Other cities, both in Africa and through- But in facing the enormous infrastructure out the developing world, can learn a lot challenges of a fast-growing population, from Hargeisa in this regard. boosted by its record of relative stability and

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Buffalo City: From Lifeless Economy to Lifestyle Opportunity

Quick Facts Population: The population of the metro is 775 000 (according to the 2011 Census); 834 997 (according to the 2016 Community Survey). Revenue: Council revenue collection was R6.6bn in 2018/19 compared to R4.5bn in 2013/14. The metro houses one of eight national Special Economic Zones, which offer a 15% corporate tax rate. Housing: There are 154 informal settlements that needed to be provided with access to municipal services. Industry: The number of unionised workers has dropped to just over 1 000 from a peak of close to 50 000. The so-called ‘border industries’ have essentially ceased to exist. Transport: High dependency on public transport, with taxis accounting for 60% of public transport use; bus and train journeys together account for 9% of public transport use. The poor spend up to 25% of their incomes on public transport. Trans-shipment or haulage of containers to inter-continental ports adds a premium of around R12 000 per container. Energy: Buffalo City has the third highest tariffs of all South African metros. Only 60% of residents pay for electricity consumption; there are over 100 000 illegal connections. 87% of the population has access to electricity for lighting.

The Eastern Cape is South Africa’s third-larg- workers prior to 1994. When government est province by population, with 6.5 million did away with the subsidies that initially inhabitants in 2018.156 However, it has the attracted investors, the decline was precipi- lowest per capita income, and has star- tous with only a few factories still operating tling rates of migration to other parts of now. Wilsonia in East London continues to South Africa. The Buffalo City Metropolitan host industry, but its road and other infra- Municipality (BCMM) is one of two metropol- structure are in urgent need of renewal to itan municipalities in the province. persuade investors to remain. The region’s Once a beacon of industry, the region has industry is also highly vulnerable to high suffered major economic setbacks due to logistics and other operating costs. the contraction of the manufacturing sec- Dimbaza, originally known as Mnxesha, tor after 1994. This was, in part, due to the was created as dumping ground for apart- decision to abandon special economic zones heid in 1967, a place where people were in the Transkei and Ciskei homelands, which moved out of South Africa into a designated were incorporated into the province after homeland, a place then as now of grinding the end of apartheid, and, in part, due to the poverty. Today, with a population estimated absence of an effective plan to make up for at over 30 000, Dimbaza is a scrappy collec- these losses. By 2018, the number of workers tion of spaza and other, slightly larger shops signed up to the Metal Industry Bargaining along a main road that parallels the R63 to Council in the Border area dropped to just Alice and Fort Beaufort in the Eastern Cape. over 1 000 from a peak of close to 50 000 in This is one of the poorest areas of South 1994. Africa, the source of migrants to Cape Dimbaza and Wilsonia illustrate the Town and elsewhere. Dimbaza’s main road impact of de-industrialisation on Buffalo leads straight into the old industrial centre, City. Now largely derelict, Dimbaza once established during the apartheid years as hosted some 200 factories employing 16 000 one of the decentralised ‘border industries’

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ZIMBABWE

E U Messina Q BOTSWANA I B

M

A NAMIBIA Polokwane Z O

M PRETORIA Johannesburg (Tshwane)

Richards Kimberley Ladysmith Bay Upington Njesuthi Bloemfontein LESOTHO Durban

De Aar SOUTH INDIAN ATLANTIC SOUTH AFRICA OCEAN OCEAN Saldanha East London Cape Town Port Elizabeth

designed to create employment in the home- Across the city, former industrial sites lands. Today many of the factories have such as Frame Park have been converted into been vandalised, picked clean of their fit- office blocks occupied by government offices, tings, some just metal skeletons, the once and in 2018, Buffalo City’s largest employer active zone now framed by a collection of tin was the Buffalo City Municipality, with 5 100 shacks. Just three factories remain, two with employees, more than the region’s largest less than 30 workers. The largest, a cloth- private employer, Mercedes Benz, with 3 300. ing firm known locally as ‘KwaGuru’,157 was The steep decline in the number of taxpay- in the news in 2019 as it shed two-thirds of ers in Buffalo City over the last decade bears its once thousand-strong workforce amidst witness to this, from 96 000 to below 85 000. a labour dispute. Outside the gates women The automotive industry remains one of ask: ‘Wafuna jobs’ – we want jobs. the city’s economic bright spots. Mercedes Industrial decline has been a major con- Benz has been manufacturing cars in South tribution to the province’s unemployment Africa since 1958. Since then, 24 different rate of 34.1%.158 In Wilsonia, factories have Mercedes models have been produced at the been replaced by depots, conduits for goods plant including four generations of C-Class made elsewhere and traded locally, and sedans. In 2015 it produced its millionth car. between 2004 and 2014, manufacturing’s Today it is one of four global production sites contribution to the local economy fell from of the C-Class. In 2018, the company com- 17% to 11%. Customs, VAT and duties col- mitted to a R10 billion investment to build lected at the port have improved each year, the latest C-Class because of favourable but only by 2–3%. incentives set by the national government:

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a rebate for imports based on its exports, a performer in the province, where only 29% of capex rebate on its investment, and lower municipalities were able to produce reports electricity costs. Without that, its executives that were ‘useful and reliable’, the regression admit, they would not have done so. was concerning.

Buffalo City in a Comparative Pinpointing the Challenges Context As the above hints, Buffalo City is not inves- A 2018 World Bank report showed that tor friendly. The city faces major hardware the ease of doing business in major South and software challenges. African cities varies significantly, with slow The former range from unrepaired pot- reforms since the last report three years holes to logistical challenges such as an before. inability to effectively utilise the port due The report, Doing Business in South Africa to its size limitation. A premium on mov- 2018,159 surveyed nine major munici- ing containers from the R10+billion port of palities, namely Cape Town, Buffalo City, Coega built this century just 300km away Ekurhuleni, eThekwini, Johannesburg, towards Port Elizabeth (which remains half Mangaung, Msunduzi, Nelson Mandela Bay empty) pushes up the cost of selling and and Tshwane. It measured the regulatory bringing in goods. The city also faces high environment for small- and medium-sized costs and poor-quality delivery for munici- enterprises, such as time frames for pal services such as electricity and waste obtaining construction permits, electric- management. ity connection, property registration and More important are the software chal- trade across borders for port cities. No city lenges, centring around policy, government performed well across any areas meas- integration (between its different levels of ured, although Cape Town showed a major national, provincial and municipal) and its improvement in the time it takes to obtain ability to match promises with action, and construction permits for projects and get- undo red tape. The metro leadership is per- ting electricity. Cape Town outperformed ceived to be out of touch with business needs the average for Organisation for Economic and unable to service properly the facilities Co-operation and Development (OECD) high- that are designed to encourage investment, income economies. By contrast, Tshwane’s such as industrial parks. score placed it in the bottom half of global There is a long list of specific, additional economies, behind Eswatini and just ahead complaints by business. For example, it of Namibia.160 Buffalo City’s ranking across requires six steps to obtain an electricity the four indicators (dealing with construc- connection in the city, compared with four tion permits, getting electricity, registering steps elsewhere. property and enforcing contracts) was 6, 5, 6, At a meeting between Mayor Pakati and and 9. industrialists in the neglected Wilsonia area convened by The Brenthurst in November Doing Business in South Africa 2018 2019, many of the challenges faced by manu- – Where is it Easier? facturers were laid bare. The urban governance challenge is immense. The meeting took place as the appliance In 2018, the Auditor General reported that manufacturer, Defy, contemplated leav- Buffalo City was one of five Eastern Cape ing the metro due to relatively high costs municipalities that regressed from an when compared to those of its operation in unqualified audit opinion with findings in Kwa-Zulu Natal. The ‘death spiral’ – as one the previous year to a qualified audit opin- participant put it – was put down to: ion161. While it was by no means the worst

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› Large rates and electricity increases; encapsulated in the term the ‘Ten Minute › The failure to allow sustainable independ- City’ label which has been applied to the East ent power production; London portion of the metro. This describes › The absence of incentives which are only the short distance between key parts of the applied to the IDZ and Mercedes Benz; city such as its city centre and the suburbs. › The slow pace with which the council BCMM also has receptive political leadership dealt with project approvals; and and a strong emotional commitment of the › The high cost of logistics including having business community to the city, as well as to use distant ports and truck goods to the the co-location of its Industrial Development interior. Zone/Special Economic Zone (IDZ/SEZ) with a large labour pool, agriculture and services Foreign investors cite security as their big- sector, and unlimited sporting potential, gest issue. Additionally, they are critical from motor-racing to triathlons. of the city government’s ability to project Some of the challenges the city faces are a positive brand, to act on the concerns due to the broader South African macro- of business, to focus on productivity as a context, such as globalisation and the influx driver of competitiveness, and to ensure an of cheap goods from Asia. There are also incentive scheme that at least makes up for infrastructure failures such as the erratic the distance and cost to market. There is a supply of electricity which cannot be reme- perceived difference between macro-level died at a metro level. In the words of Buffalo economic policy (which has generally been City Mayor, Xola Pakati, ‘How do you attract sound) and micro-level actions (which have investment when here is no guarantee of generally been poor). electricity supply?’ Unless changes are made, business feels There are, however, some things that it that Buffalo City will remain trapped in is within the city’s power to change, includ- the cycle of despair along the lines of that ing revenue collection, the cost of rates and described below: electricity, the level of service delivery to Buffalo City’s Cycle of Despair businesses and investors, and the way the city is viewed by outsiders.

Weakly integrated government Government’s Ability to Address Challenges

Poor service delivery Revenue remains scarce, and it is question- Poor revenue and cumbersome collection processes able how well it is spent in the metro. In 2018, the metro had a debtor’s collec- tion rate of over 130%. The cost coverage Stagnant Loss of business ratio – a measure of business or govern- economic growth ment entity’s ability to meet its financial obligations – was about 1.5 times higher

Lack of new than for similar municipalities national- investment ly. 162 On the flip side, as noted above, the city faces a decreasing tax base. In munici- There is, however, some hope. pal services such as electricity and water, The metro has a number of strong only 60% of residents pay for their services selling points like its pristine beaches, life- whereas the remaining 40% are a combina- style attributes such as medical facilities tion of non-paying registered indigents and and top performing schools, an untapped boycotters. Some 76 891 households out of tourism market, the ease of local access a total of 253 477 were registered as indigent

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in 2015,163 and therefore exempt from paying Five case-studies below provide a for municipal services. Municipal revenue snapshot of the problems and potential of continues to face problems of stagnation as the city. the proportion of residents unable to pay increases with population growth and indus- Case Study 1: Da Gama Textiles trial stagnation. In electricity alone, there are Da Gama Textiles, the only makers world- over 100 000 illegal connections, which poses wide of authentic Shweshwe cloth, which is a revenue challenge, given that electricity extremely popular as the material for tra- sales make up the bulk of municipal income. ditional clothing in South Africa, is situated Over the last 20 years the city has been in Zwelitsha near King William’s Town. It unable to implement the large-scale policy has a long history of more than seven dec- solutions needed to address the revitalisa- ades in the region, and once employed tion of its industrial zones such as Dimbaza 8 000 people. The term isiShweshwe originally and Wilsonia. came from the noise that the starched fab- In Dimbaza, grounds owned by the ric made in the wind, the starch originally Eastern Cape Development Corporation being employed to preserve the material (ECDC) were supposed to become a turn- on the long sea journeys from Britain. In key site for new industrialists. In Wilsonia, 2005, Da Gama was delisted and sold by SA just 15kms from the Mayor’s offices, the Breweries to a foreign investor. By 2014 it metro was supposed to provide security and was teetering on the edge of bankruptcy, reliable electricity to the zone. These pro- under threat from cheap foreign imports and grammes have however failed to take off in suffering from poor management practices. part because of the inability of the munici- At the start of 2019 Da Gama employed pal, provincial and national governments to 750 people. It is the industrial mainstay of co-ordinate their efforts on hardware and the northern region of the Buffalo City metro, the software of costs, from labour to incen- with an annual turnover of R600 million. But tives. In the case of municipal services such its existence is precarious. It depends on as electricity, the municipality has placed highly geared loans from a state funder, the a major burden on customers who do pay Industrial Development Corporation (IDC), their bills in order to cross subsidise those to survive. The failure of national govern- who can’t. In East London, this has led to ment to police a 22% duty on products from a mark-up of 40% above the price set by inferior imported competitors – some of the national utility, Eskom, though some which brazenly pilfer Da Gama’s renowned businesses have been able to negotiate pref- Three Cats trademark with impunity – places erential rates. pressure on the business. The failure to provide adequate and reli- It goes without saying that the loss of the able waste removal services or to upgrade 750 jobs at the plant would be a huge blow infrastructure such as roads and sanitation to the metro’s economy, particular in the contributes to the non-payment of munici- ultra-depressed area of Zwelitsha. There are pal accounts as cynicism sets in about the a further 12 000 to 16 000 hawkers who use value of making such payments. It is firmly the material to make outfits, which within the grasp of the metro to alter this they sell for a living, who would similarly be dynamic by prioritising service delivery affected. and punishing failure through the proper Despite its importance to the sub-regional management of city departments and economy, Da Gama has little or no relation- employees. ship with the metro administration. It has begun work on a new water treatment plant

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and was unaware that the metro was build- the government’s transport parastatal. The ing a similar plant down the road. possibility of private sector involvement in A more proactive relationship with the the port – currently not official policy – is metro could reduce the costly duplication of now being considered. Transnet should be infrastructure and open discussions on how held to account on these plans. If it decides to reduce the factory’s overheads by subsi- not to go ahead, then the city should push dising water and electricity supply. for the facility’s concessioning. In addition, an unused portion of the Da Gama factory is to be developed into a Case Study 3: Latimer’s Landing new commercial zone. Co-ordination and the The Latimer’s Landing jetty on the Buffalo sharing of costs on infrastructure here could River is an historic landmark with great create many job opportunities for the area. tourist potential, but it has been neglected because of a lengthy stand-off between the Case Study 2: Port Buffalo metro and Heritage Council, which will only The docks of Port Buffalo are situated on the allow it to be rebuilt using a wooden struc- Buffalo River and include a special dock for ture identical to the original jetty which has the movement of vehicles manufactured by been closed to tourists since 2009. Mercedes Benz. This is the largest and most As a result, potential development of active part of the dock complex. this area – which could include a waterfront However, the rest of the dock suffers from hotel, creating a leisure precinct attracting several serious design problems. The con- tourists and providing locals with a desti- tainer facility is on the opposite side of the nation – has been put on hold even though river to the SEZ, so cargo has to be moved decisions have been to replace the original some way by road, adding time and expense. structure. In addition, the harbour is not large enough If the Portnet revamp of the harbour takes to allow for the docking of large inter- place, including the rebuilding of the bridge, continental container vessels. As a result, it could become a dock for larger cruise liners containers destined for abroad are loaded and a major tourism selling point. Currently or landed at Nelson Mandela Bay’s above- it is a blight, proof of the city’s decay, and not mentioned Coega Port or in Durban, adding the asset it could be. The metro should facili- anything upwards of R12 000 per container tate the immediate reconstruction of the for them to be moved to or from Buffalo landing by expediting the necessary approv- City by road or by sea in smaller container als and putting it out to tender. vessels. Plans for the revamping of the dock Case 4: Border Industries have been drafted by state utility Portnet Dimbaza, like other so-called ‘border’ and include proposals for two large (inter- industries including those at Butterworth, continental) container docks on the same Queenstown, Zwelitsha, and Umtata (now side of the river as the IDZ with a rail link to Mthatha), were founded on tax and, other, the IDZ as well as the restoration of rail to direct incentives. For example, in the late East London to ‘main line’ status. This would 1970s, investors were offered a R95 monthly substantially improve the competitiveness wage subsidy (at a time when the wage was of the port and reduce the cost of importing just 15c per hour), along with a training levy, and exporting in Buffalo City, with obvious free housing for the investor, a flat 15% tax, benefits for industry. and subsidised transport costs. Many of The proposed upgrade, which will need these factories were run by Taiwanese inves- capital of more than R20 billion, is being tors given the close relationship enjoyed considered by the board of Transnet, between that country and the apartheid

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state which had gone out of its way to attract East London is uniquely poised to ben- this group. By 2019, of the original 500 bor- efit from this burgeoning ‘new’ industry, der factories there were just five remaining. but only if it can position itself to promote While the subsidies dried up, the problems events attractive to a wealthy international of competitiveness continued to mount. In clientele. apparel, for example, the comparative costs Nearly six decades ago, on 29 December in neighbouring Lesotho are: 50% for electric- 1962, BRM clinched its one and only World ity, and one-third for labour. The net result, Championship, with Graham including greater labour efficiencies and a Hill winning the final GP of the season at 10% flat rate of tax, is that the cost per unit East London. Although South Africa had is just 20% of that of South African produc- staged Grandes Epreuves before, the 1962 tion. In the words of one industrialist who event in East London was the first time the has moved his manufacturing business away race carried World Championship status. It from Buffalo City, ‘the government has to was a day of high drama, well covered in the give us a reason to be here. At the moment, international media, Graham Hill snatching there is no reason to stay.’ victory only laps from the end when his great It is critical for the government to pro- rival Jimmy Clark’s Lotus failed. As his son, tect the remaining industries by acting on Damon Hill, himself a World Formula One their challenges in the areas that the metro champion in 1996, comments, ‘It is impos- can do something about, such as electricity sible to imagine how different our family’s and logistics, less Buffalo soldier than give us lives would be if Dad had not won the World hope Joanna. Championship in East London in 1962, 50 years ago. I had just turned two years old Case Study 5: East London’s Grand so can remember nothing of it, but … I can Prix Circuit imagine the tensions and drama that must Historic motorsport is the fastest-growing have visited East London on that momentous category of international motor racing, and day.’ a significant economy in its own right. There The East London Grand Prix track was are more than 40 global historic motorsport the latest iteration in several circuits in the festivals. The largest, at Goodwood in the area, the first being the 15.2-mile Marine UK, attracts 100 000 spectators per day, and Drive Circuit running along the coastal road, contributes over £100 million to the local where the First SA Grand Prix – labelled ‘The economy through just two annual events.164 Border 100’, South Africa’s longest running The value of the car restoration industry motor-race – was staged in December 1934, in the UK alone is estimated to be worth inspired by the enthusiasm of the motor- around £5.5 billion annually, employing 35 ing editor of the local newspaper, the Daily 000 people.165 This grew nearly 28% over the Dispatch, Brud Bishop. With a strong interna- five years to 2016. There were just over one tional representation of competitors making million registered historic vehicles in Britain the intrepid journey by sea and land, the in 2016, worth a staggering £17.8 billion. This event quickly became a feature on the global would place the value of the global historic motor-racing calendar. A second GP was vehicle industry, including trading, restora- held in January 1936 on a shortened 11-mile tion, racing, the manufacture of parts, and course. With a range of contemporary GP the staging of festivals and events north of stars participating, East London’s population R1.5 trillion. The value of trade in classic swelled from 22 000 people and 5 000 cars to cars alone has almost doubled globally in ten 100 000 and 25 000 cars. By 1937 the event years since 2008.166 was attended by the factory Auto Union team, the F1 uber-stars of the day.

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Motorsport returned after the war, Moving from Planning to Action initially to the Esplanade track in the city Although Buffalo City is facing a mas- centre, and in 1959 to the existing track sive challenge to turn back the tide of which incorporated elements of the old de-industrialisation and find new ways to Prince George Circuit, built then at a not attract investors, there is hope. The city’s inconsiderable cost of £30 000. The Sixth cycle of despair can be turned into a virtuous followed in 1960, cycle of growth, investment and job creation. won by Paul Frere from Stirling Moss, the To retain and expand the industrial sec- legendary English driver going one better in tor and agriculture under current adverse winning the 1961 race in a star-studded cast. economic conditions is an enormous chal- The GP continued until 1965 when it moved lenge, but the alternative – continuing the to the track in Johannesburg, ‘finan- present trajectory of city stagnation and cial considerations’ and having ‘outgrown inevitable decline – is far worse and will the small holiday city’ forcing ‘a switch to cause the metro’s finances ultimately to col- the far more populous Witwatersrand.’167 lapse as unemployment and instability rise Remarkably, the 1962 track is still in and the revenue from tax and property rates its original form, providing a commercial declines. opportunity to establish an annual historic There is an imperative to produce a festival, potentially in conjunction with virtuous circle of city improvement and Killarney circuit in Cape Town, which is investment in four priority areas. also unaltered since it staged the 1960 Cape The cycle of economic stagnation, rising Grand Prix. There are three other comple- numbers of indigent households and grow- mentary aspects. ing unemployment does not bode well for First, South Africa’s only Formula One the metro’s financial sustainability. No revi- champion, Jody Scheckter, hails from East talisation of the city will take place without a London. This provides a notable global strong, goal-directed and financially healthy branding opportunity, one simply that metro. The city will have to confront those money could not buy. As he writes: ‘My fam- households which do not pay their rates, ily has a bond with East London and the water and electricity bills. The enforcement Grand Prix track. It’s where my uncle partici- of the rule to promptly cut off non-paying pated in pre-war GPs. It is where I used to go customers is key, and to incentivise payment and watch my heroes … and where I started by improving the quality of municipal service my racing career. The famous circuit is a key provision by attending to road maintenance, part of our motoring history and, indeed, of waste collection and the reliable provision of South African heritage.’ electricity and water. The municipal balance Second, the virtual co-location of sheet can also be improved by more aggres- Mercedes Benz offers another motoring sive harvesting of national and provincial dimension, given the success of the company financing that is made available, for exam- in global motorsport. ple, for the Strategic Integrated Projects that And third, South Africa’s southern hemi- are relevant to the metro. sphere weather offers competitors an Despite the erosion of the metro’s indus- opportunity for a warm holiday and racing trial base, several industrial enterprises when northern hemisphere tracks are wet continue to operate successfully in Buffalo and many closed. City. Some 16% of the gross value added (essentially the value of goods and services) in the metro derives from manufacturing.168

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The stabilisation of the business envi- Economic Zones countrywide. The East ronment to secure the retention – and the London IDZ is one of eight such SEZs.169 expansion – of these businesses, which Like others, it offers a discounted corpo- employ many people and sustain a net- rate tax rate of 15%, compared to the usual work of service and supplier industries, is 28%. The record so far illustrates the power vital. It is important to develop an effective of incentives. By the start of 2019, the IDZ relationship with the largest employers – had a attracted a total of 23 tenants accord- Mercedes Benz, Aspen, Johnson & Johnson ing to its web site.170 These measures can be and Da Gama – so they can be encouraged extended to other manufacturing businesses to expand their investments and see Buffalo in the metro to encourage new investment City as competitive with alternative invest- in labour intensive industries, rather than ment destinations. Our discussions with be geographically constrained. One use- some of these employers have shown that ful criteria for such status would be relative there is poor communication with officials employment numbers. And the IDZ/SEZ ben- and a lack of sympathy for their problems. efits can be more aggressively extended to In addition, many established businesses sectors outside of automotive, which domi- operate in very poorly maintained envi- nates the facility, including Business Process ronments, disincentivising expansion and Outsourcing, which provides 4 500 jobs in the growth. The inadequate port facility and area and enjoys the advantage of high-speed the attendant need for cargo to move from fibre. Coega by land or sea at an additional sig- The conversion of the IDZ to a fully- nificant cost, undermines the attraction of fledged SEZ creates the overall opportunity locating near a port. to attract new investors to Buffalo City. The And then there is the question of metro is competing with other South African incentives. cities and, indeed, many global alternatives for this investment and the case must be Incentivising Business made aggressively. The first port of call for Industrialists in the region are understand- a new investor will be existing industry. The ably keen for the return of an aggressive city must leverage its existing strengths and incentive regime, one of course not based on its unique features to make its investment the political premise of the past, but rather case. the geographic disadvantage and thus cost of The priority for the city must be the stim- its relative distance from markets. ulation of investment and the expansion of Government is understandably reluctant the activities of the current investors. A 21st to engage in a structure that would poten- century incentive scheme should look at the tially, at least in the short-term, diminish its following key aspects: revenue stream, even though in the longer- term this is anyway threatened if the rate of › Tariff protection for textiles and related business closure is any indication. Without labour-intensive industries. something changing, on the current trajec- › A SA Revenue Service unit dedicated to tory, there will be no revenue to worry about addressing smuggling. anyway. Moreover, the nearly R10 billion › Corporate tax rates aligned with those effective subsidisation of the new Mercedes offered by the SEZs. Benz facility undermines this argument. › Electricity tariffs and capex support at the The government has rather preferred to same level as those available to Mercedes pursue a policy aimed at creating Special Benz.

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Buffalo City: A Fresh Cycle of Growth Other longer-term specific initiatives could include the establishment of a waterfront Well-integrated government vertically hotel as a part of a wider redevelopment (and horizontally) along the lines of (but on a smaller scale Multisector to) Cape Town, and the creation of a new, Good service delivery employment and and incentives economic growth high-tech automotive university, offering for business opportunities specialist engineering education, the first of its kind in Africa. Clean city, attractive New One of Buffalo City’s key competitive investment industries advantages in the fight for investment is environment that it is perfectly positioned to become a high-tech ‘lifestyle’ city. It has a mild cli- New investment mate with 12 months of sunshine and rainfall of 850mm.171 It has a beachfront with enviable potential and, as noted Conclusion: Lifeless Economy to above, one of the world’s last remaining Lifestyle City? ‘untouched’ historical Grand Prix circuits. Buffalo City is at an inflexion point. Slowing It hosts international surfing competitions revenue, declining municipal service provi- and the Iron Man event and is (relatively) sion and disillusioned investors threaten crime free. It hosts several prestigious to pull the metro into a downward spiral of schools which have strong academic and urban decline where jobs are lost, city rev- sporting records. It has attractive, estab- enues decline, service provision deteriorates, lished ‘garden suburbs’. and social unease grows. This can become a The city enjoys river frontage with self-perpetuating cycle of despair as inves- tourism potential and a small but well- tors become more disillusioned. resourced private conferencing venue. The The case of Defy illustrates perfectly this cost of living is favourable. You would need inflexion. In late 2019 the 200 jobs in the to earn R36,852 in Johannesburg to main- Turkish-owned fridge manufacturer based tain the lifestyle you can get for R29 000 in Wilsonia were threatened by a combina- in East London,172 assuming property is tion of high transport and electricity costs, rented. Consumer prices are 21% higher in and relatively low volumes in the stuttering Johannesburg, grocery prices are 34% more South African market worsening economies expensive and rentals are 48% higher. In of scale. Whereas the East London Defy plant December 2019, the IDZ will land a new produces 200 units per day, Chinese com- undersea cable that has the potential to petitors churned out 50 000. Cost cutting provide the metro with some of the fastest and improved efficiencies at the plant have internet in South Africa, which will add to its helped but there has inevitably been a push lifestyle credentials and, more importantly, to consolidate the operations at Defy’s much open opportunities for new investment in larger Ladysmith factory. Not only would technology-related businesses. this cost jobs at Defy in Wilsonia, but across a range of suppliers and service providers, from plastic injection moulders to transport haulers. Retaining these jobs would at a min- imum require the metro reducing electricity costs and rates.

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The economic future of Buffalo City can positive development track. In East London be summarised as: How can labour intensive the need to maintain political factions has and service sector industries best and cost- led to delivery inertia. efficiently be promoted? Buffalo City has much within its grasp: Competitiveness should not be measured a large labour pool, solid infrastructure and exclusively in labour costs; to the contrary, access via sea and air, tourism opportuni- government has a whole range of levers to ties, and a rump of existing investors. Many pull relating to the cost of doing business cities, in Africa and farther afield, would be that have no bearing on labour inputs and delighted at this inheritance and the stock of may, indeed, if handled correctly, raise the comparative advantages. Yet much potential return to labour. The inevitable comparison has been squandered amidst government between the and Buffalo inertia and vested interests. City is moot. The difference seems to be Buffalo City is ripe for change. As a first down fundamentally to a government that step, the municipality should develop a pack- is focused overwhelmingly on doing ‘stuff’, age that makes Buffalo City an attractive the other on politicking. The disruptive cost business destination and by developing the of the latter aspect can be seen in the tumult softer sport and leisure elements that make around Cape Town’s mayoral leadership in Buffalo City South Africa’s Lifestyle City. 2018, throwing Cape Town off its relatively

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Mombasa: Gateway City

Quick Facts Population: The population increased from 200 000 in 1960 to 1.4 million in 2019. Logistics: Mombasa’s annual throughput was doubled from the 2012 figure to 32 million tonnes. The Standard Gauge Railway moves 12–13 trains daily from the port facility; 80% of the containers that arrive in Mombasa by sea leave the harbour within four days. Transport: 95% of motorised commuters commute by matatu – this represents 60% of Mombasa’s transport. Some 30% of the population experiences a gap between availabil- ity and utilisation of public transport (attributed either to unaffordability, lack of route coverage, or poor service frequency); 30% of commuters walk. Energy: 75% of the population have access to electricity (2016 estimate by Mombasa County Government).

In 1593, King Philip II of Spain, at that time It anchored a new city on Mombasa Island, also King of Portugal, ordered his subjects to turning a cluster of fishing huts into the core build a fortress guarding the wonderful natu- of a dynamic urban area that today houses ral harbour at Mombasa on Africa’s Indian 1.4 million people and is one of the most Ocean coast. Philip was still smarting from important ports on Africa’s east coast. the defeat of the Spanish Armada in 1588; having put off earlier plans, he now renewed Gateway to Africa his push to control Mombasa, with its food The Republic of Kenya’s second-largest city and fresh water supplies, and its strategic and only major port, Mombasa is also the location as an ancient commercial hub trad- largest commercial harbour in East Africa ing as far afield as Persia, India, China and and a logistics and infrastructure hub for Oman.173 Given Philip’s geopolitical competi- the western Indian Ocean. The city’s con- tion with England and the Netherlands, both tainer terminals, at Kilindini Harbour and now seeking to exploit his Armada defeat, Port Reitz, along with the newly-completed, it made sense to secure a forward position Chinese-funded Standard Gauge Railway on Africa’s east coast.174 A base at Mombasa (SGR) to Nairobi, connect Kenya to Uganda, would allow him to control waters north to Rwanda, Burundi and the wider African the Horn and south to the Cape, trade with Great Lakes region. This makes Mombasa a the Swahili Coast, and protect communica- critical node in the global supply chain, and tions with the Portuguese colony at Goa in gives the city access to an international mar- India, while securing for Philip (and denying ket of more than 500 million people across to his rivals) the Indian Ocean trade. the central region of the world’s fastest- Philip never visited Africa; he thought of growing continent.175 Likewise, four (soon Mombasa as many have done, before and to be six) submarine cables – fibre-optic since: as a gateway to other places. But the telecommunications links whose landing town and its people were there for centu- stations in East Africa are all at Mombasa – ries before the Portuguese, Arabs or British make the city a digital hub with cheaper and arrived, and even since independence in faster internet, cable and telephone access 1963, the insider’s perspective has often been than the rest of Kenya, and indeed many very different from that of outsiders. Philip’s other parts of Africa.176 fortress – Fort Jesus, today a United Nations Mombasa is indeed a gateway to Africa. World Heritage site – has changed hands It is also a vibrant and diverse cultural, many times since its completion in 1596. residential and commercial centre in its own

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SOUTH SUDAN ETHIOPIA

Ilemi triangle Lake Turkana Lodwar Moyale

Marsabit UGANDA Y E L L Wajir A V T IF R T A SOMALIA E R G KENYA Eldoret Mount Meru Kisumu Kenya Garissa Lake Nakuru HIGHLANDS Victoria NAIROBI

Machakos N I A L P I T E G N E R E Malindi S

Mombasa INDIAN TANZANIA OCEAN

right with its own interests and needs. The India and the Middle East, and its principal city remains deeply affected by its trading geopolitical rival, the US. role, its strategic location on the East African This chapter draws on documentary seaboard, historic tensions between inland research conducted throughout 2018–2019, and coastal regions and religions, and global on fieldwork during 2019 in Mombasa and great-power competition. Today that compe- surrounding coastal districts, and on sur- tition plays out, not among the long-decrepit veys, polls and focus groups conducted in the European empires of the past, but between city. It examines Mombasa through the lens the rising global power of China, its rivals in of its gateway role, and the tension between

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that role and the interests of the city itself. trustworthiness to trading partners, and let The chapter explores the contrast between them access globalised financial services coast and hinterland, the trade-off between – including the ability to write a cheque in hardware and software, and between practi- Mombasa and cash it in Morocco, Cordoba or cal and aspirational goals. Finally, it suggests Bandar Aceh – only available to Muslims.181 ways in which other African cities might Swahili city-dwellers in Mombasa, Muslim learn from Mombasa. by religion and of mixed Afro-Arab descent, created trading routes into the interior, seek- A History of Connection and ing upcountry commodities for onward sale Exploitation to Zanzibar and Oman.182 In 1832, under The Portuguese cared little for Mombasa’s Seyyid Said, the sultanate relocated its capi- hinterland. When they were expelled tal from Oman to the island of Zanzibar, from Mombasa in December 1698, it was establishing a clove-growing industry, by another seafaring empire: the Omani raiding inland for slaves to work the new Arabs.177 Sailing trading dhows and fighting plantations, and creating the slave-trading ships from strongholds in Muscat and Suhar, entrepot (with an outpost at Mombasa) for the Omanis had built a commercial network which Zanzibar became infamous.183 Swahili across the Indian Ocean by the 10th Century traders penetrated east and central Africa: CE, bringing spices, dried fruits, salt fish, they built bases, stationed armed retainers grains and nuts to Mombasa from Arabia, to protect caravan routes and established and trans-shipping dates, carpets, saffron, representatives at the courts of inland rulers. rice, coffee, textiles and ceramics from India, But, like the Portuguese before them, they China and elsewhere in Africa.178 Coastal did not seek to govern upcountry regions.184 traders exchanged seaborne goods for gold, The slave trade drew the ire of the British, ivory, slaves and commodities from the hin- who, having outlawed it throughout their terland.179 Mombasa – sitting on an island dominions in 1807, spent much of the 19th at the junction of two large estuarine inlets, Century hunting down East African slav- each with its own freshwater creek and mul- ers and reducing their strongholds.185 It was tiple access points into the hinterland – was the unilateral action of one British naval ideally placed as an intermodal transporta- officer – Captain William Fitzwilliam Owen tion hub to connect inland producers with of Her Majesty’s Sloop Leven – that first overseas markets. brought Mombasa, whose local Mazrui rul- ers were then in a power struggle with the Mombasa under the Sultan Busaidi Sultan of Zanzibar – under British The city’s growth under the Omani sultan- protection.186 ate reflected this trading role, enhanced by Without Admiralty permission, Owen the emergence of Islam as a major religion sailed into Mombasa harbour in February along the entire coastline of East Africa: 1824, agreed to a Mazrui request for a pro- many Mombasa merchants converted to tectorate (thereby helping the locals fend off Islam (which in East Africa, as in Southeast Zanzibari control) and extracted in return a Asia, was a trader’s religion, spread more promise from local leaders to end the slave by commerce than the sword).180 Although trade.187 The crew of Owen’s ship established these converts were undoubtedly sincere, itself in a house – today named for the ship there were also distinct commercial advan- and registered as a national monument – in tages to the new religion. Conversion allowed the Old Town, only for British authorities to merchants to avoid the jizya tax levied on rescind Owen’s unauthorised protectorate in non-Muslims, enabled them to prove their 1826.188 But Mombasa, in part because British

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ships continued their anti-slavery blockade, which the colony, and later independent remained relatively independent of Zanzibar Kenya, took shape over multiple generations. despite the Sultan’s nominal sovereignty. This development also brought a power shift – influence flowed from coastal to Gateway to the Scramble for Africa inland regions, from Mombasa to Nairobi, In 1884, another unauthorized adventurer and from coastal Swahili populations to upended this balance. German explorer Carl upcountry population groups. These groups, Peters penetrated inland and, without per- who spearheaded the push for independ- mission from Berlin, signed treaties with ence from Britain and led the Mau Mau rulers in the hinterland of today’s Tanzania uprising of the 1950s, have dominated Kenya and Rwanda; prompted by pro-imperialist since Independence in 1963, contributing to public opinion, the Kaiser extended a protec- regional tensions that still affect Mombasa torate over the area.189 The challenge having today. been raised, Britain moved immediately to block Germany. In the ‘Scramble for Africa,’ Growing while losing influence Britain acquired inland colonies and eventu- Despite rapid growth in Mombasa, the even- ally colonised Kenya, but Mombasa was still faster growth of inland regions caused a seen as a gateway – an access point to more power shift, from coastal to inland areas and important inland areas such as Lake Victoria, from Arab and Afro-Arab coastal populations the Rift Valley or the fertile highlands around to inland Africans, with implications that Mount Kenya – rather than as a key centre still resonate for Mombasa today.192 Whereas in its own right. Indeed, ‘the territory now coastal Swahili traders, backed by the Sultan known as Kenya was for some years to figure of Zanzibar, had held the upper hand over in the minds of British statesman only as the upcountry populations for decades, under site of a railway, the Uganda Railway.’190 British rule Mombasa – along with a ten-mile That railway (construction of which began strip running the length of Kenya’s coastline, in 1896 and was completed in 1901) con- which still fell under the Sultan’s sovereignty nected Uganda to the coast at Mombasa. – rapidly lost influence even as the city grew. It sparked massive urban and commercial Mombasa’s urban footprint and demo- growth in Mombasa, and enabled the devel- graphic makeup shifted significantly during opment of Nairobi and the highlands, which, the 68 years of British rule, with rapid growth by reason of their temperate climate, fer- and the emergence of commercial agricul- tile soil and abundant agricultural labour, ture and shipping industries transforming became the centre for British colonial rule the city and its peri-urban areas.193 An influx and the dominant economic and political of Indian and Middle Eastern workers and region within the new Kenya Colony. Indeed, businesspeople, encouraged by colonial by one estimate, virtually all development in authorities, increased social and residential Kenya throughout the country’s history has diversity, with the Old Town now surrounded taken place within 200 miles of the railway.191 by administrative, residential and industrial The railway made Mombasa, establish- districts. The local fishing industry – always ing it as the critical intermodal transport a staple activity in Mombasa – expanded hub linking a vast inland area of Africa to rapidly, while a belt of agricultural and mar- the global economy. The development of ket-garden cultivation emerged around the Kenya can be explained (in spatial, economic city to supply food for its growing population. and ethnic-political terms) through the The urban area expanded well beyond impact of Mombasa’s railway and the port. its original footprint on Mombasa Island, Infrastructure became the skeleton around with new port and rail facilities appear- ing at Kilindini Harbour west of the island

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and at Port Reitz further up the same inlet, by 1965. This skyrocketing growth (a tenfold and informal settlements proliferated.194 increase in just two generations) led to fears Factories, warehouses and marshalling yards by coastal Arab and Swahili populations sprung up around the docks and the rail- that they would be swamped by upcountry way. Newcomers flooded in from other parts immigrants.201 of Kenya, drawn by better-paying jobs, free- Demographic change also disrupted land dom from the exploitative contract labour tenure, with unprecedented numbers of arrangements that were prevalent in many squatters occupying the estates of absentee parts of the rural hinterland, and by the landlords in Mombasa and along the coastal energy and prosperity of the gateway city.195 strip, a problem that has persisted into the The first big problem triggered by this modern era.202 As one recent analysis noted, growth appeared in Mombasa’s water supply. ‘people at the coast can feel a shared sense The city had traditionally relied on of grievance against upcountry people [but] wells bored into the coral rock of Mombasa there are multiple tensions within this imag- Island.196 But by the early 20th Century, rapid ined coast community – notably over land. urban expansion depleted these wells, mak- Many people at the coast are squatters, and ing water and sanitation major concerns. while some denounce upcountry people, This too was an effect of the city’s gate- others are equally quick to accuse Arabs of way role, with water shortage caused by having dispossessed them, especially on the ‘the enormous increase in commercial and southern half of the coast.’203 industrial use associated with the railway’.197 The most obvious impact of this pattern of As a consequence, the colonial govern- land tenure in Mombasa has been the spread ment undertook a major infrastructure of informal (slum) settlements. A system project in 1911 to 1918 – at considerable cost where land ‘is owned by a few individuals, in lives lost to disease, and in labour unrest who rent out land on condition that only – to pipe water from the Shimba Hills, 33km temporary structures can be developed…has southwest of the city, to Mombasa Island. caused the establishment of informal set- Ironically, the flood of inland people fleeing tlements, causing significant environmental coercive labour recruiters for that project, degradation’ and leading many urban-dwell- along with improved water supply and sani- ers, if not an outright majority of people in tation in Mombasa, only accelerated the Mombasa, to be officially considered ‘squat- rural-to-urban migration whose effects the ters’.204 This has been a major concern for project was designed to ameliorate.198 Mombasans: one man told our team in 2016 that ‘land should be prioritised. People are An urban explosion living on the land which they don’t own. From a population (centred on Mombasa Even the owner of the land can come and Island) of just 15,000-20,000 people in 1897, say I am going to demolish this house and the population had reached 40,000 by 1931, you won’t [be able to] do anything because double its pre-colonial level.199 By the 1950s, you have built on someone else’s land, and 4 000 new African immigrants were arriv- most of the time the lands on which people ing each year in Mombasa, attracted by the are building don’t have leases.’205 city’s opportunities, or fleeing upcountry violence generated by the Mau Mau insur- Coast versus Hinterland gency, and by British measures to suppress As a practical matter, until independence it – notably the ‘villagisation’ programme, Mombasa and the coastal strip were gov- which displaced a million Kenyans from erned from Nairobi under the Kenya Colony, inland settlements.200 Mombasa’s urban but in legal terms the coast remained a population swelled, reaching almost 200 000 separate Protectorate of Kenya, leased from

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the Sultan of Zanzibar and administered by adoption in 2013.211 At its core was the devo- Britain on his behalf.206 In the early 1960s, lution of authority from national to local as independence approached, this became level. Under Devolution, the provincial level a source of serious tension in and around of government was abolished and 47 coun- Mombasa. ‘Arabs and other coastal African ties replaced the eight former provinces. groups fearing upcountry domination of the Mombasa city became Mombasa County, an ocean-side region mobilised around the idea area that covers the urban zone itself and its of coastal ‘autonomy,’ or mwambao, and vari- peri-urban areas, with the former city limits ously theorised that the area could become of Mombasa expanding slightly to become an autonomous province of Kenya, Zanzibar the new county boundary. Apart from or an East African confederation.’207 This shrinking the geographical reach of officials spooked people in Mombasa, ‘many of them in Mombasa, the new arrangement merged migrants from upcountry, who saw mwambao the mayoral with the provincial administra- as ‘a political issue aimed at Arabs dominat- tion, turning the Mayor of Mombasa into the ing the Africans in this town.’208 Governor of Mombasa County – Kenya’s only Kenya since independence has been dom- fully urban county, and its smallest by area inated by a series of political coalitions and (though one of its most developed and heav- patronage networks that draw support from ily populated).212 powerful upcountry populations. Inhabitants Devolution was intended to address of coastal regions – including Mombasa – several problems that had emerged since have felt disenfranchised politically, even as independence, and which many Kenyans the city has played a critical role in ensur- believed had contributed to the violence of ing global trading and economic access for 2007–2008. These included decision-mak- the rest of Kenya. Indeed, as one researcher ing remote from local communities and noted in 2017, in some areas, ‘feeling is realities; perceived neglect and marginali- widespread that the upcountry has, since sation of some areas (including Mombasa) independence, lived parasitically off of the and minority populations; centralisation of coast… The sense of a coastal sovereignty resources at the national level, leaving cities separate from mainland Kenya has survived and provinces without the means to address and offers coastal residents an emotionally infrastructure shortfalls such as dilapidated attractive, if thus far impractical, alternative hospitals and roads; and victimisation based to [what some see as] the ignoble patronage on political affiliation. If an area did not competitions of Kenyan national politics.’209 support the government of the time, [it] did not receive any attention [and] had limited Discontent and Devolution resources.’213 For Kenya’s first 50 years of independence, In response, the 2010 constitution placed from 1963 until 2013, Mombasa was the capi- administrative functions under a county tal of Coast Province, an area that included executive council or public service board, the city itself, the 10-mile coastal strip of the with the county headed by an elected gov- old Protectorate, certain inland areas, and ernor and responsive to a county assembly coastal cities such as Diani, Malindi, Kilifi, including both elected and appointed mem- Watamu and Lamu.210 Mombasa formed bers. A county commissioner was responsible the political, educational, commercial and for day-to-day administration of services. transportation hub for the province. But fol- Devolution was generally popular among lowing inter-communal violence that threw those who spoke with our researchers: in Kenya into turmoil in 2007–2008, a process particular, decentralisation of decision-mak- of constitutional reform culminated in the ing made many Mombasans feel closer to drafting of a new constitution in 2010, and its their government. Still, competition between

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the county commissioner and the governor of extra-judicial ‘gangland-style’ killings struck some respondents as bad for security, of suspected extremists.219 Radical clerics, while others were concerned about cost- and inhabitants of informal settlements and resource-sharing between different levels of majority-Muslim constituencies saw heavy- government.214 The constitution mandated handed security.220 Somalis and Kenyans of sharing of resources between national and Somali descent were targeted after the surge county-level governments, with the central in terrorism that followed Kenya’s interven- government collecting revenues then return- tion in Somalia, which began in mid-October ing 15% of revenue to counties to meet their 2011.221 A string of grenade attacks, attempt- expenses.215 As we will see, in the case of the ing bombings, weapon-smuggling incidents highly-lucrative Port of Mombasa and the and other terrorism struck Mombasa in SGR, both of which generate significant funds 2011–2014, leading to police and intelligence for the national government, this allocation operations in Mombasa and other coastal leaves many in Mombasa dissatisfied.216 towns.222 These operations targeted radical cler- Conflict on the Coast ics, transnational jihadists including British Devolution coincided with a spike of violence citizen Samantha Lewthwaite (linked to driven by religious, ethnic and regional dif- the 2005 London bombing and the 2013 ferences founded in the distinct history of Nairobi Westgate Mall attack) whose last- the coastal region.217 After the 1998 bomb- known location was a flat in Kisauni’s ing of US embassies in Nairobi and Dar es Bakarani Estate, and returnees from the Salaam, Mombasa became a focus of coun- war in Somalia.223 Mosques such as Masjid terterrorism efforts ‘after security agents Musa in the Mombasa Island neighbour- traced the bombers’ movements to the hood of Majengo, linked to slain extremist metropolis and other coastal spots. Four cleric Aboud Rogo, saw police sweeps, mass years later…actionable leads were discov- arrests and large-scale protests during this ered’ following the April 2002 bombing of a period, including a major raid in November Jewish-owned hotel at Kikambala, 34 kilome- 2014 in which 250 young men were arrest- tres up the coast road from Mombasa (which ed.224 A month later, Kenyan police allegedly killed 13 and injured 80) and the attempted admitted to conducting a campaign of up shoot-down of an Israeli-chartered airliner, to 500 extra-judicial killings in and around using surface-to-air missiles, as it took off Mombasa, according to Al-Jazeera.225 They from Mombasa’s Moi Airport.218 claimed to have received British and Israeli assistance under a programme directed at Crackdown and Backlash the highest level from Nairobi. The Kenyan The 2002 attack, with its sharply negative government disputes this account and has impact on Mombasa’s important tourism denied the claims.226 industry, prompted a harsh crackdown by police and security services, which in turn Mombasa Republican Council led to a public backlash and the emergence During the same timeframe, a revival of of ‘no-go areas’, with alienated communities coastal separatist sentiment led to another and individuals willing to offer sanctuary to surge of violence in Mombasa.227 Local sepa- armed actors in some parts of the city. By ratists, loosely organised under the the time of the Devolution debate in 2010– of the Mombasa Republican Council (MRC) 2013, the anti-terror campaign (directed and including Muslim and Christian groups, from Nairobi and conducted by national engaged in street violence and alleged acts agencies) had prompted human-rights of terrorism, prompting another harsh gov- groups to accuse the central government ernment crackdown.228 MRC leaders wrote

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to the British government, the UN and oth- working with HAKI and other civil society ers, claiming distinct legal rights due to organisations to develop a plan that would the coast’s former Protectorate status, not only reduce jihadist and separatist vio- and alleging these had been betrayed dur- lence, but also reconcile alienated and ing Kenya’s independence process in the marginalised populations within the city. The 1960s.229 The group was outlawed; several British government funded and supported leaders were killed and the MRC’s head, the effort through local implementing part- Omar Hamisi Mwamnuadzi, was arrested in ners.234 The result was the Mombasa County October 2012.230 In the lead-up to the March Action Plan for Preventing and Countering 2013 election, ‘a series of lethal, if localised Violent Extremism, developed over months attacks raised the possibility of widespread of consultation among stakeholders, and violence’ or an MRC boycott; in the event, launched in May 2017.235 there were ‘savage attacks on police and poll- The process was guided by the National ing stations the night before the polls’ but Strategy for CVE, developed by the cen- large-scale unrest did not materialise.231 tral government through its National Counterterrorism Centre in Nairobi. The Countering Violent Extremism new strategy emphasised soft approaches Once the 2013 election was over and (‘encouragement of dialogue, rehabilitation Devolution began to be implemented, the and a multi-sectorial approach to counter- new government of Mombasa County moved ing violent extremism’)236 rather than hard quickly to reverse this history in which methods based on arrest, punishment ‘or local violence was exacerbated by harsh even execution of individuals suspected responses driven from Nairobi. The new of involvement in violent extremism’.237 In County Government, under Governor Hassan effect, it was a repudiation of the previous Joho, instituted a strategy for preventing and approach that had done so much to alien- countering violent extremism (CVE) through ate local communities. The action plan partnership with local communities, seeking built on the nine pillars of the national CVE to break the vicious cycle of crackdown and strategy (psychosocial, education, security, backlash that had doomed past efforts. The faith-based/ideological, training/capacity County worked closely with several civil soci- building, arts/culture, legal/political and ety groups, including HAKI Africa, a human media/online) alongside two additional ele- rights organisation working to improve ments: an economic pillar and a women’s livelihoods and enhance human rights in pillar. These were developed through a Kenya.232 process of dialogue with civil society organi- Founded at the height of the violence in sations and the public; they recognised the 2012, and based on Mikindani Road in the role of economic inequality in driving youth heart of old Mombasa, HAKI promotes part- toward extremism, and the fact that ‘women nership between state and non-state actors, were identified as both victims and perpetra- and ‘seeks to agitate for the recognition tors of violent extremism in Mombasa’.238 and empowerment of local communities in Largely as a result of this consultative Kenya to fully participate in rights and devel- approach, the Mombasa action plan has opment initiatives, with a view to improving become a model for other counties in Kenya. the standards of living amongst all includ- One woman in Mombasa told a focus group ing the poor and marginalized.233 HAKI’s conducted for this project that ‘concern- goals, which fitted well with the objectives of ing radicalisation, I think going forward it Devolution, made the group a natural part- may improve because our brothers from ner for Governor Joho’s new government, the Muslim community are doing some- which created a CVE Directorate and began thing to enlighten their kids not to join the

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Al Shabaab and they are telling them the a policy announced following public consul- right way to go for a Muslim. I think that has tations in March 2018, property owners in really assisted, plus the government also.‘239 the city were given only 14 days to imple- and indeed cities across Africa and else- ment the colour scheme at their own where could learn much from Mombasa’s expense, prompting some complaints.242 The experience, both in building the strategy and programme has undeniably given Mombasa in continuously monitoring its implemen- a much-needed facelift: one youth from tation and engaging with the community Nyali neighbourhood noted, ‘We complain to ensure transparency. This has been done but comply, and it’s actually not bad. It does through periodic mapping reports and com- give a sense of pride.’243 munity consultative summits. A related change has been the new There is thus no doubt that hard counter- county government’s effort to clean up the terrorism methods, including military and city’s sanitation and trash problems. As one police operations led by national agencies, woman told us, ‘Mombasa used to be a dirty will remain part of the CVE mix in Mombasa town by the way. Garbage was being thrown for the foreseeable future. Still, in compari- all over...Nowadays at least there are trucks, son to the violence that threatened the city so there is a central place where people in 2011–2014, it seems clear that the new dump the garbage … cleanliness in town has approach, with its themes of consultation, really improved. Also the county officials are dignity, access to justice, building resilience, also implementing it because there are some and enhancing cohesion and integration, has areas where people used to dump but they contributed to significantly improved pub- are always there to check who is dumping lic safety in Mombasa. As one man told our their trash there.’244 This is the most visible focus group, ‘for the last two years I think aspect of a suite of programmes to upgrade [in] Mombasa we are having challenges with Mombasa’s urban fabric, intended to help Al Shabaab and everything but it has gradu- the tourism industry recover, promote eco- ally improved. You will hear less cases of nomic and social development as part of a Al Shabaab in Mombasa, you can just hear national growth strategy, and address the them in other towns…security has been urban marginalisation, inequality and alien- beefed up which impact[s] more on tour- ation identified as drivers for extremism. ism and even the investors they are coming Improving informal settlements (slums) is a more, they feel Mombasa is a safe place for key aspect of urban upgrading.245 people to do business.’240 Informal settlements Upgrading the Urban Fabric Mombasa’s rapid growth and industrialisa- One of the first things one notices, walking tion, described earlier, inevitably led to the or driving around Mombasa, is the blue-and- emergence of informal settlements, espe- white colour scheme of virtually every cially since under colonialism domestic and downtown building, contrasting with the industrial workers were corralled into unser- beige and pink of Old Town and the world viced ‘African housing estates’ that were heritage area around Fort Jesus. Locals smile excluded from formal urban planning.246 In wryly at this newly paint job, part of many cases, slums offered the only avail- an effort by the County Government to fos- able housing for workers in local industries ter civic pride and a sense of progress, and and factories, or for those offering essen- thereby prompt broader improvements in tial goods and services as part of the jua kali Mombasa’s cityscape – a sort of urban-fabric (literally, ‘hot sun’) informal sector, which version of the crime-reduction strategy accounts for 95% of Kenya’s businesses and known as ‘broken windows theory’.241 Under entrepreneurs.247

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One 2012 study of an informal settle- assets at full replacement cost [along with ment in Changamwe constituency noted compensation payments as] livelihood res- that ‘60–80% of Kenya’s urban population toration measures while at the same time lives in slums [with] lack of access to water providing support to the [one affected resi- and sanitation, insecure tenure, lack of dent] identified as vulnerable due to chronic adequate housing, poor environmental con- illness ... Additionally, a Grievance Redress ditions, and high crime rates. For instance, Mechanism was established to receive and in Mombasa, about 40% of the population resolve grievances arising from titling com- lives in slums that [occupy] only five per- pensation’ and other issues.252 cent of the total land area and the growth Mombasa’s participative approach to of Mombasa’s slums is unprecedented; urban upgrading is something from which the population living in slums is expected other African cities – facing the same set of to double within the next 15 years.’248 To challenges – could learn. Giving residents address this problem, Mombasa County, proof of ownership of the land parcels they in conjunction with the national govern- occupy is a key idea, understanding that ment, the World Bank, UN Habitat and other with secure tenure, people are more likely to partners, is implementing an informal settle- make long-term investments on their land. ment improvement programme, as part of a As the county’s plan for Kindunguni notes, national campaign.249 ‘persons living in the informal settlements with no legal ownership of land parcels they The Case of Kindunguni occupy do not invest in permanent hous- As with CVE, Mombasa’s approach has been ing units for fear of demolitions or evictions strongly consultative, even though invol- [and] few of them take the risk and invest in untary resettlement of some residents did modern structures ... Secured land tenure turn out to be necessary. One recent effort will cause improvements in settlement infra- in Kindunguni, a settlement in the southern structure, increases in housing values/rents, mainland constituency of Likoni, involved access to credit, and access to infrastructure, working closely with a Settlement Executive ownership and titling. With the tenure of the Committee (SEC) chosen by local resi- land secured, it is expected that the benefi- dents (and with mandatory participation by ciaries in the settlement will invest in better women, who make up a significant propor- housing for their families.’ Or as one woman tion of householders and small business told us, ‘You know before you could buy land owners in Kindunguni) in a series of planning and there were no title deeds. At least at the and surveying activities to develop a base moment there are title deeds, you go pur- map of the settlement and identify struc- chase land and you get a real title deed and tures needing to be redeveloped or moved to you invest whatever you want to. At least you ensure safety, access and sanitation.250 know that land belongs to you so you have As a first step, residents were issued the confidence of investing whatever you ‘title deeds for the plots they occupy [as a want to. I think that one has given most peo- means to give them secure legal tenure of ple confidence of staying in Mombasa and at their property]. This involved the develop- least knowing that you are at home.’253 ment of a Local Physical Development Plan and surveying of the settlement where 524 Hardware versus Software beneficiaries owning 505 plots [were] issued Mombasa is increasingly matching its long- with title deeds.’251 Individuals who were standing emphasis on hardware – road and required to relocate in order to open road bridge infrastructure; the SGR and its asso- access to the settlement were given ‘appro- ciated container terminal, highway and priate compensation for their affected station complex; and the urban upgrading

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programme – with a focus on software. This Less than 200 metres from the SEACOM is true both literally, in the growth of com- station is Swahilipot Hub, a technology incu- puter-enabled systems and tech businesses bator established in April 2016, which offers across Mombasa, and figuratively in the a collaborative workspace for Mombasa- city’s emphasis on business improvement, based internet start-ups, artists and social education, health and human capital. enterprises. The hub ‘focuses on inspiring and developing upcoming innovative tech- Digital Gateway nology ideas and art through networking, Mombasa is not just a physical and commer- technical training, support, professional cial gateway; it is the primary East African mentoring and coaching. The goal is to access point for the fibre-optic cables that ‘promote a conducive environment for all enable global high-speed data telecom- community members to learn, share, explore, munications and form the backbone of the experiment, and build sustainable and internet.254 Mombasa has four submarine income-generating solutions, to encourage cable landing stations, connecting to four cooperation and interaction between Entities independent fibre-optic networks, with two with similar interests, both within and out- more to be ready for service by 2021. Of the side Mombasa (Coastal Region at large) existing cable landing stations, three are … [and] to advance Arts and Technology in the city itself and one is in the northern initiatives.’258 The hub addresses a clear need: urban district of Nyali. One station is owned as one Mombasa-based respondent told us, by a private consortium that includes South ‘[if] you have an idea, a technological idea, African, Indian, European and Middle Eastern [you need] a hub actually like in Nairobi we investors, and was the first to establish a have one, in Mombasa we are lacking that landing station at Mombasa, in July 2009.255 so we have good guys with ideas [but] they SEACOM owns the East Africa portion of cannot mature their ideas because we don’t the consortium’s network, with landing sta- have that infrastructure.’259 tions in South Africa, Mozambique, Tanzania, Swahilipot is co-sponsored by SEACOM, Kenya and Djibouti.256 the National Museums of Kenya (NMK), the As the first company to establish a cable US computer company Cisco, and Kenya’s station in Mombasa, and the first to set up as Ministry of Information, Communications an internet service provider, SEACOM domi- and Technology. It targets software develop- nates the Mombasa market for data and ers with links to universities in Mombasa, internet services, reflecting its multi-year as a way of connecting government, busi- head start over slower, government-owned ness and educational institutions to improve competitors. The company’s cable land- human capital in the coastal region. NMK ing station, on the south-eastern edge of donates office space to the hub, SEACOM Mombasa Island, gives SEACOM an inter- provides free high-speed internet data and net and data transmission Point of Presence web-hosting services, while computers, wi-fi in Mombasa, and links to Nairobi, Kampala routers and other systems are provided by and Kigali, thereby providing digital con- Cisco. Applications developed at Swahilipot nectivity for upcountry Kenya, Uganda and are ‘designed to help users solve their day to Rwanda, much as Mombasa provides road day problems, ranging from linking farmers and rail connections to the same places.257 to produce buyers to monitoring if a patient Unlike the infrastructure that supports those is taking a prescribed drug to locating a physical connections, however, the benefits restaurant.’260 As Mombasa’s first tech incu- to Mombasa of this digital connectivity are bator, Swahilipot gives the city’s start-ups a immediate and direct. much-needed space to grow and commer- cialise their ideas. In this, as in other areas,

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Mombasa is beginning to catch up with scooter). Like M-Pesa, Uber offers cashless Nairobi, which currently houses most of transactions, reduces the risk of crime, and Kenya’s technology incubators, serving thou- lets unbanked businesses and customers sands of developers whose smartphone apps participate in the economy. It also enables have helped Africans leap-frog a generation boda-boda or tuk-tuk drivers to monetise of mobile technology, attracting global firms their vehicles, build income and savings, and such as Nokia and Samsung, and bringing participate in the formal economy in ways foreign investors to Kenya.261 that would not otherwise be open to them. The Government of Kenya, with the Mobile Banking, Lending and Trading Mombasa County government, has made use This innovation is most visible in Mombasa of technology to enable an ‘e-governance’ through mobile money transfer apps, the programme that has significantly reduced ride-sharing service Uber, and mobile lending corruption for citizens interacting with gov- apps that help small businesses, unbanked ernment agencies, and improved ease of populations and jua kali operators access access and use of government services; credit and banking services. Fully 95 percent Mombasa has established a similar portal of Mombasa residents surveyed by our team for county-level business services.265 As the in 2016 owned one or more mobile phones.262 government’s ‘Vision 2030’ policy proudly Safaricom, Kenya’s dominant mobile affirms, ‘By leveraging technology, govern- phone provider, is well-known for its M-Pesa ment has revolutionised how citizens access mobile money system, which offers money its services, making it much easier to bring transfer, and for M-Shwari, an M-Pesa deriv- services closer to the people, cutting deliv- ative that enables savings and loans for a ery time and securing revenues paid for population with limited access to banking.263 such services. As a gateway to all govern- For businesses and their customers in high- ment services, the eCitizen portal has seen crime or poorly serviced areas, M-Pesa avoids the progressive addition of different agencies the need to travel long distances to bank enabling Kenyans and foreign nationals to branches or ATMs, and (perhaps most impor- access services digitally. There are 197 differ- tantly) to store or carry cash which might ent public services offered under the eCitizen make them vulnerable to theft or assault. portal and these include passport appli- Mobile lending services, which track cations, visa applications, driving licence user spending patterns and creditworthi- renewals, vehicle registration, business ness by monitoring their use of M-Pesa and registration, company searches and appli- mobile phone payment history, can pre- cations for certificates of good conduct.’266 cisely tailor loan amounts and repayment The impact on ease of doing business has terms to customers’ capacity, resulting in been significant: one woman told us that higher repayment rates and enabling micro- nowadays ‘it is easier to open a business in businesses who would otherwise lack access Mombasa because I think with the govern- to credit. In this way, software-enabled smart ment, county government, they have not put banking systems help alleviate the credit a lot of regulations to face us out. What they shortages constrain the growth of small and want is just your money and you pay your micro-businesses.264 licenses, just that.’ Another man noted that Similarly, Uber, widely used in Mombasa, ‘right now coming up with a business and lets travellers move easily about the city getting all the licenses and everything, it has by car, tuk-tuk (the brightly painted, three- become easy because previously we used to wheeled motorcycle taxis ubiquitous go physically to the office and obtain those across East Africa) or boda-boda (as a papers but right now you can get the papers pillion passenger on a motorcycle or from the comfort of your phone or laptop.’267

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Although Nairobi dominates the tech hub the port was handling 20 million tonnes of and software development space at present, cargo per year, compared to 7 million in the Mombasa is catching up. The public-private 1980s, well above the 3.5 million tonnes han- partnership model, inherent in Swahilipot dled in the rival port of Dar es Salaam.270 Hub and in the broader growth of mobile Conversely, the increasing demand for money transfer, savings, lending and equi- inland cargo distribution overwhelmed the ties trading platforms, and ride-hailing railway, despite periodic attempts to fix the apps such as Uber, has enabled informal- problem through state investment. sector businesses and individuals to access In 2014, the central government in Nairobi a modern national and global economy. In signed a memorandum of understanding so doing Mombasa has leap-frogged a gen- with China, under which the Export-Import eration of technology, and its e-governance Bank of China loaned Kenya US$3.24 bil- and e-business approaches offer signifi- lion to finance 90% of the construction cost cant lessons for cities in Africa, and in other for a standard-gauge railway connecting countries. Mombasa to Nairobi and running parallel to the old railway. Kenya agreed to finance Geopolitics on Rails the remaining 10%, or $360 million, for an Not all infrastructure investments in (Initial) total project cost of US$3.6 billion.271 Mombasa benefit businesses and local peo- China Road and Bridge Corporation was ple, and the insider’s view often differs engaged as prime contractor to construct sharply from that of outsiders. By far the the railway, which became the largest infra- best illustration of this is the Chinese-funded structure project undertaken in Kenya since Standard-Gauge Railway, the 21st Century’s independence. The Chinese contractor hired version of the Uganda Railway that put 25 000 Kenyans to build the railway, with Mombasa on the imperial map more than a construction commencing in 2016 and com- century ago. pleted on 31 May 2017. By the early 2000s, Kenya’s original British- The first passenger trains began running built railway was in deep disrepair, with in June 2017, sharing the route with freight dilapidated rolling stock, unsafe and poorly services from the Port of Mombasa after maintained tracks, unsanitary stations and January 2018. The system is dramatically a reputation for massive delays, with trains more efficient than its predecessor: clean, sometimes departing 8 to 12 hours late and fast and reliable, with two trains to Nairobi taking a full day to cover a distance that each day. Hundreds of thousands of passen- should take five hours at most.268 No new gers have ridden on the railway, while the railway track had been laid in Kenya since new freight service has relieved the trans- the completion of the original narrow-gauge modal bottleneck that had developed at Mombasa-Kampala line in 1901.269 The rail- the Port of Mombasa, enabling a massive way was rapidly losing money, as businesses improvement in the city’s cargo throughput shifted from rail to road transport to ship capacity. The ultimate cost of the project was goods from Mombasa to Nairobi and beyond. US$4.2 billion, even though the original deal Massive 18-wheel semi-trailer cargo trucks signed by Kenya’s Unity government before clogged the Mombasa-Nairobi highway, the 2013 election was just US$2.5 billion.272 generating traffic jams and damaging the Despite concerns about China’s pattern road surface. The railway’s failure became a of so-called ‘debt-trap diplomacy,’ worries development bottleneck, limiting growth at about Kenya’s sovereignty being compro- the Port of Mombasa, where cargo volumes mised by such a large and heavily-leveraged had been increasing since the 1980s. By 2013, project, and complaints about the failure of the year when Devolution came into effect, the Chinese contractor to replace expatriate

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senior management and technical person- and value-added processing in industries nel with Kenyans as required in the original such as apparel, fisheries, agriculture, and agreement, the general outsider perspective automobiles to make up the difference.276 But on the SGR has been hugely positive.273 this easier said than done, especially since a Combined with expanded container- great deal of retraining and vocational and handling and cranage capacity at the Port technical education is required, and now of Mombasa, the SGR has enabled growth that construction is complete, the SGR can at Mombasa’s harbour and container termi- absorb only a tiny fraction of the workforce nals (some of the city’s largest employers), employed to build it. Hence, in employment relieved overcrowding on the Mombasa- terms – and given the loss of economic activ- Nairobi highway, and generated significant ity occasioned by the closure of so many additional revenue for Kenya as a result of local firms – the SGR has been a net negative increased customs-and-excise payments. for Mombasa. The proposed continuation of the railway It might seem that increased throughput from Nairobi to Uganda, Rwanda, Tanzania at the port, and growth in landing and bun- and Burundi under the next phase of the kerage fees and customs-and-excise income, East African Railways Master Plan will fur- might make up for this. But as Kenya’s ther expand Mombasa’s reach as a gateway only port, Mombasa is a national asset and for central Africa, bringing a market of more administered by the Kenya Ports Authority than 550 million people within the city’s directly from Nairobi, with revenue going distribution network. All this seems like une- straight to the capital and only a small pro- quivocally good news. portion returning to Mombasa.277 Unlike But the view from Mombasa is very dif- other harbour cities in Africa, which keep ferent. Mombasa’s economy, pre-SGR, relied an agreed portion of the revenue they gener- heavily on storage, warehousing and truck- ate, Mombasa is not permitted to do so. And ing companies – dozens of local firms, mostly then there is the matter of customs clear- small and medium enterprises, who ran the ance, which takes place in Nairobi – formally warehouses and operated the semi-trailers considered the point of entry for foreign and container trucks that had stepped in to shipping containers – rather than Mombasa. replace the failing railway in the late 1990s The impact on local Mombasa businesses and early 2000s. One estimate suggests that is dire. As the CFO of a local chain of coffee roughly 43% of the city’s economy, prior to shops (which, tellingly, was until recently a the SGR, relied on transport and logistics.274 transport and warehousing company but The SGR put many trucking and ware- was forced to lay off most of its staff and housing companies out of business, while convert to the café business as a result of others moved to Nairobi. Youth unemploy- the SGR) points out, beverages or foodstuffs ment (for individuals under 35) averages imported through the port of Mombasa can’t 21% across Kenya as a whole, according to be accessed by the Mombasa-based busi- local officials; in Mombasa the rate is now nesses who paid for them until first being 44%, including a 30–50% increase directly shipped to Nairobi and clearing customs attributable to the SGR.275 Absorbing these there.278 They must then be shipped back at newly-unemployed young people into other the company’s expense to Mombasa, adding lines of work—and finding employment and an estimated 17.5% onto the cost of food and support for their families – is a key priority beverages, which – for this café chain, as for for the county government, which is focus- most restaurants and tourist businesses in ing on the city’s new Special Economic Zone, the coastal region – are largely imported. The the Japanese-funded port facility (which manager of a restaurant and hotel near the employs 8 000 people), light manufacturing, northern coastal town of Malindi confirms

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that the SGR has brought increased costs, Big 4 plan. Vision 2030 also seems to be more shipping delays, and loss or spoilage issues a political document, designed to offer some- for many tourism businesses on the coast.279 thing to everyone as a way of unifying the Given the history of coastal versus inland country after the 2007–2008 violence, than a rivalry, and the perception (ill-founded or serious planning tool. not) of corruption on the part of govern- For Mombasa’s leaders, living a city that ment officials, this understandably generates expects to have 2.3 million people by 2035 resentment on the coast, especially when the (adding roughly one million residents, or SGR’s benefits accrue mostly to Nairobi. slightly less than the city’s entire current population, in just the next 16 years), and Gateway to the Future? constrained by terrain and county bounda- Despite these tensions, as Mombasa looks to ries to an area of only 134km², the clear the future, county officials, business people practical needs are for urban renewal and and local communities seem upbeat about redevelopment. The phenomenal projected the city, its people and its gateway role. At growth in the city’s population (along with the national level, the Kenyan Government’s its already high traffic congestion and unem- ‘Vision 2030’ concept, launched in 2008, aims ployment) means that development planners to transform Kenya into a ‘newly-industri- in the Mombasa County government are alising, middle-income country providing a focused on meeting the demand for almost high quality of life to all its citizens by 2030 in 400 000 new housing units, and the needs of a clean and secure environment.’280 The gov- a growing, dynamic gateway city. Increased ernment’s recently-announced ‘Big 4 Agenda’ tourism – largely from non-traditional – an accelerated five-year development plan sources such as Ethiopia, Russia, Turkey and to fast-track Vision 2030 – comprises four pil- Eastern Europe – and the growth of mining lars: Manufacturing, Food Security, Universal in neighbouring Kwale County, which relies Public Health, and Affordable Housing. The on Mombasa for most support services and plan includes an impressively long list of accommodation, are simultaneously putting highly specific goals, covering everything pressure on the city’s urban system while from industry, housing, health, food secu- opening new growth opportunities.282 rity, ease of doing business, manufacturing, With its more practical orientation, the agricultural processing and foreign direct county government’s vision of the future investment, to farmers’ income, home own- is focused on housing, transportation, ership and construction. Enablers identified infrastructure, parks and recreation, and in the plan include macro-economic stabil- urban design. That said, the county’s inte- ity, completing major infrastructure projects, grated strategic urban development plan, investing in security to support a 24-hour ‘Mombasa Vision 2035’, can still sound economy, fighting corruption and increasing at least as ambitious and aspirational as accountability, leveraging technology and the national-level goals outlined in Vision innovation to improve government services, 2030.283 Its objectives include achieving bal- ensuring a competitive cost of energy and anced urban growth, turning Mombasa into equipping youth with vocational skills.281 a world-class commercial hub, creating It’s hard to dispute that these are the right well-distributed employment opportunities, goals – the issue for Kenya is whether such quality living for all residents, seamless extraordinarily aspirational objectives are connectivity through transport upgrades, achievable across a nation with such diverse infrastructure excellence, a well-nurtured levels of regional development and such environment including an extensive green rapid population growth, within the mere network, and conserving the city’s natural five years envisaged in the government’s and built heritage. An impressive animated

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video fly-through of the city of 2035, devel- telecommunications and solid waste man- oped by Nairobi design studio Vertex Studio, agement. A lengthy consultative and depicts a Mombasa international stadium stakeholder engagement process during in the northern coastal district of Mtwapa, 2016–2017 involved public meetings in every planned to seat 60 000 spectators, a passen- affected constituency, as well as a county- ger ferry system, complementing a renewed wide consultation process.288 Nyali bridge connecting Mombasa island to The way that Mombasa County has pur- the southern mainland, an upgraded Likoni sued these plans, and is now executing ferry in the south, proposed new Tudor Creek them, offers positive lessons to other cit- ferries and water buses from the island to ies. A strongly consultative, engaged and other parts of the county; a proposed new transparent process has ensured public Likoni bridge over Kilindini Harbour, con- and stakeholder participation in the plan- structed with sufficient elevation for major ning process and has ensured the plans ships to pass under it, and the construction align with community priorities. Likewise, of a series of new urban zones including an Governor Joho focused on resolving imme- Eco City, Knowledge City, Petro City, New diate, pressing everyday concerns for Jomvu City and a Special Economic Zone, Mombasa’s residents before launching the linked by a ring road and public transport plan (which might otherwise have seemed system.284 naively detached from reality). Cooperating Although it can seem similarly aspira- with multiple partners on these projects – tional on the surface, the Mombasa county including the British, Japanese and Chinese plan is significantly more practical than governments, private investors, multi- the national-level plan, reflecting the high national corporations and international degree of public consultation that pre- institutions such as the UN and World Bank ceded it. Governor Joho’s team conducted – has also ensured that Mombasa’s unique more than three years of public consulta- vision has not been derailed by any single tion and community discussions as they partner’s priorities, allowing the city and developed the city master plan, created county to maintain significant autonomy. new financial mechanisms and civil ser- vice structures to support it, and rolled it Conclusion: Finding the Balance out only after first focusing on pressing Mombasa will remain a gateway to Africa issues identified as priorities by the com- into the future, as it has been throughout munity, including health services, closure its history, and as the SGR extends its reach of a dangerous landfill dump, and upgrad- further inland, the county pursues its Gate ing of informal settlements.285 The county City master plan, and the harbour and con- government created a department of Lands, tainer terminals continue to grow, the city Planning and Housing to focus on urban will maintain its status as a trading and upgrading, redevelopment and land tenure transport hub and a vibrant cultural and issues.286 commercial centre in a changing Africa. As The Mombasa team then worked closely this history indicates, the city’s gateway role with the Japanese International Cooperation has often been in tension with the interests Agency (JICA) to translate the broad vision of of Mombasa itself, and of its citizens. Mombasa 2035 into a more practicable, fully- As the city has grown, the balance funded master plan, the Mombasa Gate City between hardware – transport, infrastruc- Master Plan.287 This plan integrates all exist- ture, the urban fabric – and software, ing infrastructure plans within Mombasa, including health, education and, more and included urban transport, railways, the recently, digital telecommunications and airport, power and water supply, sewage, computing, has become a key issue. Coastal

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and religious tensions, founded in the the negative legacies of colonialism while unique historical, religious and ethnic char- building on the benefits of its gateway role. acter of the coastal region, led groups of At the same time, insider-outsider, and separatists and jihadist cells in Mombasa to coastal-inland tensions still remain, notably engage in violence and terrorism in the early in the uneven (and in many ways quite nega- 21st Century, prompting harsh government tive) impact of the Standard Gauge Railway. crackdowns, spearheaded by national agen- Highly aspirational plans for Mombasa’s cies headquartered in Nairobi, which only growth out to 2035 can seem quite unrealis- exacerbated the problem. tic in this context, but the city’s track record Since Devolution, under Kenya’s 2010 since Devolution of consultative engage- Constitution, the reorganized County ment, public consultation and practical, Government of Mombasa has emphasised realistic approaches to funding and imple- inclusive, locally consultative means to pre- menting of projects, suggests that Mombasa vent and counter violent extremism, with will offer many lessons for other African cit- considerable (though not total) success. The ies in the future, even as its history offers same consultative approach infuses the city’s both positive and negative insights about approach to urban upgrading, infrastructure what it means to be a Gateway City. development, and the improvement of eco- nomic opportunities as it seeks to overcome

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Cape Town: A Tale of Two Transitions

Quick Facts Population: 4.25 million, with a population growth rate of 2.57% over ten years. It is forecast that the province’s population will see an inflow of 750 000 people between 2020 and 2025, mostly from the Eastern Cape. The province’s share of the South African population increased from 10.1% to 11.4% from 2006 to 2011. Cape Town’s population has more than doubled since 1994 to over four million. Investment Growth: Between 2015 and 2018, Wesgro attracted more than R8.5 billion of fresh investment creating more than 3 000 mostly high-end jobs in the Western Cape. Housing: Some 14% of Capetonians live in informal housing. The city has a 350 000-unit housing backlog. There were 347 informal settlements in 2018 with 146 000 households. Tourist Flows and Connectivity: Cape Town has increased its flow of international tourists from 1.33 million in 2013 to 1.73 by 2018, doubling the number of daily international flights to 30 in the last five years. Security: The city’s murder rate is 62.51 per 100 000 people (double the national aver- age), the 9th highest in the world. The police to citizen ration is 1:509, against the national average of 1:375. Revenue: Some 80% of the city’s income comes from the premiums charged on utilities (especially electricity), property rates and other charges. Transport: 400 200 commuters travel to the CBD daily between 6am and 7pm. The congestion level in 2018 was 31%, down by 1% since 2017.

Cape Town was ranked eighth on the Capetonians. Most of its residents are under Big 7 Travel listing of the ‘Top 50 Bucket 35 and living in self-built, corrugated iron List Destinations 2019’. The Mother City shacks with poor amenities.290 and Marrakesh in Morocco were the only two As the tourists draw closer to Table African cities to crack the Top Ten, with Bali Mountain, housing formalises, office blocks at No 1, New Orleans at No 2 and Ireland’s arise and Cape Town becomes a vibrant first Ring of Kerry at No 3. No surprise then that world city – the kind that wins international Cape Town has steadily increased its flow accolades, like World Design Capital for of international tourists from 1.33 million 2014 or World’s Best City for 2015/16 in the in 2013 to 1.73 by 2018. When foreigners Telegraph Travel Awards.291 visit Cape Town, they are likely to land at Little surprise then that Cape Town its award-winning airport, disembark from Design CEO Alayne Reesberg describes the one of the 30 non-stop daily flights to and city as ‘the gritty and the pretty’,292 fac- from international destinations, and hop ing the great challenge of bringing the into a shuttle that will transport them to the first world and the township world closer CBD and the pleasures of the Waterfront or together. ‘Design is all about turning a city in one direction, or towards the that the apartheid regime designed for sep- Western Cape’s Winelands in another. aration’, says Reesberg, ‘into one designed But first, on the N2 highway, they will for integration’.293 Achieving this will take pass Crossroads. more than urban design – it requires strong Home to an estimated 40 000 people, over governance and stable politics. half of whom are unemployed,289 Crossroads Cape Town is a low-density, sprawling township sits on the airport’s periphery and metropolis. It has a population of 4.2 million presents the stark reality of life for many across an area of 2 500km², growing more

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SOUTH ATLANTIC Vredendal OCEAN

Lambert’s Bay Clanwilliam Beaufort West Velddrif Citrusdal Vredenburg Saldanha Langebaan

Worcester Paarl Oudtshoorn Stellenbosch George CAPE TOWN Mosselbay Strand Riviersonderend Wilderness Plettenberg Bay Hermanus Knysna Kleinmond Gansbaai Struisbaai Cape Agulhas INDIAN OCEAN than 2% each year.294 Over the past decade, education system, the social malaise of crim- the city has enjoyed a minor economic boom, inal violence, and high unemployment. posting an average growth rate of close to Cape Town has thus faced two simultane- three percent, double the national aver- ous transitions. One from apartheid-induced age. Today it comprises one-tenth of South isolation to a globalised city; the other Africa’s economy, even though its population between those communities divided by is just 7.5% of the national total.295 South Africa’s racial past. This chapter exam- Still, Cape Town’s inequality is visible and ines how the City of Cape Town297 has tackled high.296 its apartheid legacy and planned for the next In part, this is down to infrastructure quarter century of urban development legacy. The government faces significant across the issues of governance, security, challenges in delivering decent housing and economic growth, housing, transport and crucial transport links and addressing the service delivery. Since the end of apartheid, city’’s water insecurity. Cape Town has made significant headway Some of it is political. The relationship in integrating its multiple worlds, but ques- with the national government has occa- tions remain: What more can be done? What sionally been fraught, with the Western could be done better? Why is it so difficult to Cape Province the only one of South Africa’s overcome this legacy? nine provinces controlled by an opposition party, in this case the official opposition, the The Context of Governance Democratic Alliance. And while many of the In part the answer to the above questions city’s challenges predate the advent of South lie in the duration and deep roots of colonial Africa’s democracy in 1994, they are com- division, the foundation of which was laid in plicated today by the effects of fast-paced the 1600s with the arrival of the Dutch East urbanisation, South Africa’s substandard India Company at the Cape of Good Hope.298

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A trade and slave-based economy under the spatial inequality sets the direction for name ‘’ evolved. what city administrations have prioritised From the early 20th century black resi- post-apartheid. dents began to be pushed out of the city centre, evictions that peaked during the The Legal Framework 1950s and 1960s during the height of apart- Finalised in 1996, the South African heid, with the relocation of thousands of Constitution sought to undo the damage black residents to the on the city’s wrought by apartheid era laws and create outskirts. This created issues of social cohe- a legislative framework that supported the sion and security that continue to bedevil development of a free and fair society. low-income settlements across the Cape The country adopted a multi-tier govern- Flats. ance system with a national, provincial and Legislated racial inequality affected all local level. The system rests on the princi- spheres of Cape Town life. The Western ple of co-operation across these three tiers Cape was the only region in South Africa to and supporting legislation formally organ- implement the Coloured Labour Preference ises functions, responsibilities and revenue Area Policy (CLPAP), entrenching the linkage division.299 between race and economic opportunity. The national government sets the long- The CLPAP created areas where coloured term vision and agenda of the state in a labourers were given preference for jobs National Development Plan, the current one thereby preventing black Africans from running until 2030.300 While the majority of living and working within the Western Cape. departments are replicated at the provin- Enacted in 1955, the CPLAP was a formali- cial level, Defence, Foreign Affairs, Water sation of historical sentiments that viewed and Forestry, Science and Technology, Trade black Africans as foreigners within the Cape, and Industry, Mineral and Energy, Public further deepening inequalities between the Enterprises, Home Affairs, and Public Service races. and Administration remain the exclusive The abolition of apartheid in 1994 did purview of national government.301 not offer an immediate solution to these Provinces are responsible for develop- longstanding economic and spatial inequali- ing the Provincial Growth and Development ties. Historical labour patterns entrenched Strategy (PGDS), frameworks to grow the inequality, with black African, Indian and provincial economy and improve ser- Coloured residents overrepresented in low- vice delivery. Each province is headed by and middle-income manufacturing jobs and a Premier who appoints Members of the White residents in the high-paying services Executive Council (MECs) to lead each pro- sector. Black South Africans ended up liv- vincial department.302 The MEC and the ing further from their places of work than Department of Local Government in each their white counterparts. This has placed a province are responsible for oversight of the premium on transport efficiencies and on various municipalities.303 efforts to decentralise economic activity. The municipal level is the final tier of As a consequence, Cape Town is no differ- government. Cape Town is categorised as a ent to the rest of South Africa in that one’s metropolitan municipality with over 500 000 place of birth still has an inordinate impact voters.304 The city’s core function is to coor- on one’s life. As Edgar Pieterse, Head of the dinate and deliver basic services to the African Centre for Cities, said, ‘90% of black metropolitan area, according to a munici- kids born in the township in Cape Town pal budget and development plan. Its work have no future economic prospects’. As a is driven through a Municipal Council, led result, the city’s history and subsequent by an Executive Mayor. According to the

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Constitution, the city maintains ‘the right tenure, she fought against her removal from to govern, on its own initiative, the local office by parties in opposition 13 times. government affairs of its community’ Cape Town is the opposition Democratic through municipal legislation whilst also Alliance’s stronghold. In 2011, the party being ‘subject to national and provincial won the governance of the city outright and legislation’.305 cemented its position in the 2016 municipal and 2019 national election. The Power of Politics The DA’s effective governance of the City Under the Democratic Alliance government, of Cape Town is tied to its dominance in the Cape Town has developed a reputation for Western Cape. At present, it is the only prov- delivery and governance excellence. Between ince not headed by South Africa’s African 2011 and 2016, the DA improved piped water National Congress (ANC). This disjuncture access by 18.9%, electricity access by 23.1% between national and provincial government and access to a formal dwelling (housing) remains a key area of conflict. This has prac- by 23.2%.306 In 2015, the South African Local tical consequences, as will be seen below. Government Association (SALGA) ranked Since its ascension to power in the Cape Town as the country’s best performing Western Cape, the DA has been able to metro. fundamentally transform the culture of gov- Ranking South Africa’s Metro Performance ernance, allowing for an increase in basic service provision to Cape Town’s residents. However, the challenges Cape Town faces illustrate that there are limits to the extent that better governance can address deep- rooted structural issues.

Metro Service Delivery Finances Human Resources Rank 1 City of Cape Town 1 2 3 Urban Finance 2 City of 1 7 1 With the end of apartheid, self-administered Johannesburg ethnic homelands were amalgamated into 3 Ekurhuleni 4 1 5 4 Ethekwini 6 4 2 new provincial structures. The Western Cape 5 Nelson Mandela 3 6 7 was free of this burden because no apart- Bay heid homeland had been located within its 6 Mangaung 6 3 6 boundaries. There were other challenges, 6 City of Tshwane 4 8 4 however, including the equitable sharing of 8 Buffalo City 8 5 7 government resources. This pushed the ANC government of 2002–2006 to create a policy Source: SALGA Municipal Barometer307 of ‘One City, One Tax Base’,308 which sought This rank was not easily won, as Helen Zille, to bring together sprawling townships, white Cape Town mayor from 2006 to 2009 and suburbs and city centres as a single tax subsequent Western Cape Premier, recounts. entity.309 ‘I found myself with a fragile coalition, a Municipalities in South Africa receive hollowed-out middle management and a spi- limited financial transfers from national gov- der’s web of corruption. I didn’t know where ernment and raise most income from utility to begin. So, I had to look at Cape Town as sales. In 2016/2017, for example, R764 billion a blank slate’, she recalls. Zille began the of the R1.33 trillion total National Treasury process of building the bureaucratic compe- budget was spent on financial grants to gov- tence to run the City. However, as she notes, ernment departments.310 Some 65% of this ‘my biggest job was political’. During her was allocated to the provincial government,

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14% to the local government and 11% for and attracts niche companies in film extra-budgetary spending in crises. production, fashion and advertising. At least 80% of the city’s income as a Cape Town’s growth has been the result of result comes from the premiums charged a deliberate focus from both provincial and on utilities (especially electricity), prop- local governments since 2006, through an erty rates and other charges. The remainder infrastructure-led economic development comes from three sources: a tranche from programme. ‘The first few years were annoy- the national government determined accord- ing, as the city was gridlocked’, notes the ing to a countrywide formula; conditional head of the Western Cape’s Tourism, Trade grants from the Treasury (which remove the & Investment Promotion Agency (Wesgro), discretion for municipalities to spend as they Tim Harris. ‘But we used the goodwill of a may need to); and a portion of the fuel levy new government to do the hard stuff, the raised on sales within the municipal bound- unsexy stuff’. Investments were funnelled to ary. The vast proportion of these funds (like improve roads, electricity and water, allow- other municipal budgets) is spent on main- ing the city to establish itself as being open taining and expanding infrastructure, and for business. Now, Cape Town’s Doing Business delivering basic services, including water, indicators are some of the best in South electricity and refuse removal, on the back of Africa: 1st for Dealing with Construction that infrastructure. The shortage of funding Permits; 2nd for Getting Electricity; and 4th is worsened by ‘unfunded mandates’, includ- for Starting a Business.314 ing library services and clinics. The city has managed to leverage This underscores once again, the impor- development opportunities through a three- tance of a good working relationship with the pronged approach that included public national government, which has been at best sector investments, public-private partner- ambivalent and at worst schizophrenic in its ships and government support of private relationship with Cape Town especially over investors. Three initiatives stand out as hav- the distribution of security resources. ing influenced the economic growth of the city: Wesgro; the CCID, a community-based Economic Growth programme to provide cleaning and security Fixing the challenges of legacy and inequal- services to businesses based in the Central ity requires a springboard of sound economic Business District (CBD); and the Victoria and management and growth. Cape Town has Albert (V&A) Waterfront, a private enterprise managed to achieve this, moving beyond that occupies a central role in the public life its moniker as ‘Slaapstad’,311 or ‘sleepy city’, of the city. and surpassing Durban to become South Wesgro started in 1983 as a joint initiative Africa’s second largest economy.312 As one between the province, city and the private survey respondent said, ‘Even if there is no sector, a public body steered by a private employment; somewhere, somehow there sector board. The venture was invigorated are more opportunities in terms of business’. when the DA came into power in the City in Three quarters of respondents to the poll 2006. Wesgro exemplifies what a good invest- conducted by The Brenthurst Foundation in ment body can achieve. The organisation May-June 2018 agreed that economic growth seats multiple actors at one table to pro- had led to tangible improvements in Cape mote and integrate efforts around tourism Town. and economic development. Between 2015 Three-quarters of the city’s GDP is gen- and 2018, for example, Wesgro attracted erated from service-based activities. Cape more than R8.5 billion in investment that Town has managed to position itself as a top created more than 3 000 mostly high-end tourist, events and conference destination,313 jobs in the Western Cape.315 It spearheaded

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a campaign to increase the number of direct Johannesburg ‘should be a spur,’ he observes, flights to the city, which have doubled in the ‘to national growth’. five years from 2014. In the process, Wesgro Now, says James Vos, the councillor in has become a model for brand management, charge of the City’s economic opportuni- investment promotion and job creation, ties, there is an ambitious agenda to become an outstanding South African institutional the ‘go-to city globally and locally for trade example of what a dedicated investment and investment.’ The city has identified high promotion agency can achieve. That this growth sectors for the largest return on institutional role is now being replicated at investment in terms of skills, training, jobs the city level by ‘Invest Cape Town’, while and commercial growth, namely boat build- perhaps costly and unnecessarily duplica- ing, tech, tourism and clothing and textiles. tive, is an indication of Wesgro’s success. The city has identified several initiatives Harris says that this performance is down to improve skills and the need to ‘take eco- to ‘fixing the basics, which is infrastructure, nomic opportunities to where people live’ in building it out and deepening it. Politicians including the use of incentives in certain ‘key should not,’ he notes, ‘get distracted by the nodes’. In particular, Vos wants to ‘use tour- shiny strategies and policy documents and ism as a tool for business transformation ... objectives, but rather just make things work to create many more opportunities.’317 – water, electricity, transport and ICT, which There are constraints, however, especially is now an important element of infrastruc- in terms of available resources. ture.’ While Cape Town’s lifestyle is a selling Like most African cities Cape Town has point, ‘there are beautiful cities everywhere very limited scope to act independently of which don’t work. If Cape Town was dysfunc- central government in dealing with its spe- tional, its natural beauty would not help.’316 cific challenges – or, more positively, to play If building out and maintaining economic to its strengths. The reasons for this, as in infrastructure is the ‘ultimate horizontal other areas, come down to money and auton- intervention’, another such intervention is omy. This fiscal and political environment ‘to remove blockages to investment (a la the severely limits the room for manoeuvre of province’s Red Tape Reduction Unit, or the Cape Town and other South African cities, to approach of our Investment One Stop Shop).’ act independently in designing strong invest- Harris also highlights the need for ‘horizontal ment incentives. It can offer ‘non-financial’ interventions to grow exports by intervening incentives: accelerated planning approvals, at firm level to help build their capacity for biodiversity offsets, an investment facilita- export, or dramatically increasing the num- tion touch-point in the mayor’s office, and ber of export missions conducted where the overall ‘lifestyle’ advantages. large and small firms ‘hunt as a pack’ to On the financial side to support invest- grow their global sales.’ ments, the city has been able to offer Fixing the basics, however, does not fix discounted electricity tariffs and waive everything. The ‘weight of history’ is another various application fees and develop- constraint, whereby Johannesburg’s com- ment contributions that would normally be mercial and consumer strength remains a incurred by infrastructure projects. It can significant business incentive. This explains, also offer discounted rates and land leases, Harris says, why Cape Town has focused though this is controversial within the on new sectors such as renewables and administration, not least given the budgetary Business Process Outsourcing. Moreover, that funding imperative. East London, Bloemfontein, Port Elizabeth, Cape Town’s safe, clean and thriving CBD Cape Town and Durban are challenging similarly stands out both in South Africa and the continent. In 2015, it became South

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Africa’s most visited tourist destination. Safety and Security But this was not always the case. In the late The racialised and spatial nature of inequal- 1990s ‘crime and grime’ was rife and inner ity in Cape Town carries into its experience cities across South Africa faced dilapida- of safety and security, creating a dynamic tion and capital flight. The Cape Town City where crime in one part of the city bears Manager Andrew Boraine, at the time under no relation to an area just a few kilometres an ANC government, identified certain prac- away. tical steps to revive the CBD. Most of Cape Town’s crime occurs in The Central City Improvement District the Cape Flats, an area beset with violent (CCID) was started with the support of the gangsterism. With deep networks, large aiming to partner memberships and access to weapons, the with the private sector to help restore the gangs are largely responsible for Cape Town’s CBD. Extra levies were charged to inner city record murder rates. Drugs and substance businesses for the provision of dedicated abuse problems feature prominently, too. services by the CCID. Their focus was on the In 2018, for example, reminds JP Smith, the practical elements of keeping the streets city councillor in charge of safety and secu- clean and providing security guards to police rity, nearly half of Cape Town’s murders were petty crime. gang-related.319 As one measure of the CCID’s suc- The once coloured-only township of cess, property values in the CBD rose from Hanover Park, one of the most violent areas R6.5 billion in 2006 to R43 billion in 2018.318 in the world with a murder rate in and Other CIDs have opened elsewhere to around its cinder-block two-story flats of attempt to replicate Cape Town’s success. around 100 deaths per 100 000. Due to simi- There were other, headline projects. The larly high rates of violence in the townships Victoria and Albert (V&A) Waterfront is a of Lavender Hill, Langa, and private venture which has brought extraor- Philippi, Cape Town has one of the world’s dinary public benefit. The vision was simple: highest murder rates at 62.51 per 100 000 to convert the activities of the historic 19th people, putting it in ninth place among the century port into a tourist attraction. Today, world’s most dangerous cities, in the com- the V&A provides 56 000 jobs both directly pany of Caracas, San Pedro Sula in Honduras, and indirectly, allows for the operation of and San Salvador.320 850 small businesses and welcomes over Hanover Park, an area of just 2km2, is 24 million annual visitors. The Waterfront’s formally divided by the police into two sec- management works closely with agencies tors; in reality, it is fragmented into several such as Wesgro so that it is perceived as pub- gang-run communities: Cowboy Town, Back lic space. The V&A illustrates how the private Streets, The States, The Taliban Area, The sector is instrumental to addressing public Valley of the Plenty, and The Jungle. Each issues such as unemployment and economic is controlled by a grouping that is essen- growth. tially an affiliate of two predominant major The impressive expansion of Cape Town’s gangs, the Mongrels (under the ‘British flag’) economy has given investors and citizens and the ‘Americans’. Gangs are a way of life alike hope of an economic future within among Hanover Park’s 55 000 people where the city and laid the foundations for infra- unemployment is endemic, despite the structure redress. As Harris confirmed, ‘the City’s relatively low rate (20.41%) of jobless- economic and the social are two sides of the ness compared to the South African average same coin’. (29%). Gang members often leave school early, earning their ‘rank’ in prison – known as ‘the University of Crime’ – in a strict

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hierarchy defined by ‘generals, ‘captains’ and The unemployment rate is 70%.322 With few ‘shooters’. Violent activities centre on the economic or education prospects, gangster- borders between ganglands, where there is ism seems like the next best bet. little movement of people, or where lighting As a consequence, bloodshed on the Cape is poor at night. Flats officially reached crisis proportions Cape Flats’ residents say that the govern- in 2019. Mortuary statistics indicated that ment is not doing enough. In October 2018, 900 people were murdered in gang violence there was a march by mothers in the Cape between January and June 2019, almost Flats protesting against the effects of gun double the previous year’s toll. Much of the violence on their children.321 As one respond- violence occurs in a small area of the Cape ent from the survey noted, ‘For us living out Flats. Nearly half of murders in 2018/19 that side, there is no protection at all from occurred, for example, in just ten police the government’. stations.323 In stark contrast, Cape Town’s CBD, Southern Suburbs and tourist areas appear Police stations with the most murders reported relatively safe havens, permitting residents (WC) 2018/2019 to walk the streets freely and enjoy public Nyanga 289 spaces. This has been attributed to a com- Delft 247 221 bination of heavy private investment and Philippi East 185 public-private interventions such as the Harare 166 CCID. 155 Cape Town’s safety and security problems 154 can be traced to the creation of perverse 151 social dynamics in the Cape Flats as a result 148 of apartheid forced removals. According 144 to Don Pinnock, a renowned local security 0 50 100 150 200 250 300 expert, ‘the Ghetto Act, the Bantustans and Source: WC Provincial Government the moved the City from class divisions to racial ones. It destroyed Poor and unprofessional policing with Lower Claremont, Wynberg and . grave disparities in the allocation of police It suddenly ‘‘ghettoised’’ poor people accord- resources does little to mitigate criminal- ing to their skin colour’. Previous familial ity. Across Cape Town, the ratio of police per dynamics, with extended families living 100 000 ranges from 139 in Harare township together in well-established community in Khayelitsha, to 1 708 in Cape Town Central structures that provided a distinct sense of precinct. Policing, however, is a national safety, were destroyed by the forced remov- function and outside of the jurisdiction of als. Families were scattered across various the municipal or provincial government, and locations in the Cape Flats. As Pinnock noted, the failure to deploy sufficient police to the ‘They built the townships for nuclear fami- province has been a perennial source of ten- lies with no regard for how people lived. sion with the national government. Townships fostered isolation and increased In April 2019, then Western Cape Security violence with one-third of all children grow- MEC (and premier after May 2019) Alan ing up in single parent families.’ Winde declared a formal intergovernmental The number of young, unemployed people dispute as a result of the national govern- living in the Cape Flats is high. In Khayelitsha ment ignoring the province’s urgent policing alone, Cape Town’s biggest township with a needs and priorities. He said the national population touching half a million people, Minister of Police, Bheki Cele, had ‘failed half of residents are under 19 years of age. to respond to our urgent requests,’ noting

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that ‘The Minister of Police is obliged by the average than other metros and the highest Constitution to consult and take account level of access to basic services. Rather he of the specific needs of our province when argues that Cape Town’s crime plague relates determining policy. By ignoring these needs predominantly to the prevalent gang culture. and priorities, Minister Cele is violating the The answer to the violence thus in the short- Constitution.’ term lies in a combination of focusing on a Winde said that the Western Cape handful of ‘gang [affected police] stations’, of urgently needed more police officers, adding which 16 are affected by such gang activity, that the ANC government has given the DA and of which just seven produce nearly half led province fewer resources to fight crime of violent crime. compared to other provinces. The province, The Premier in 2019 set an ambitious he noted, ‘is dramatically under resourced role in attempting to halve the murder rate compared to other provinces.’ While one through replicating an intervention con- officer must protect 375 people on average ducted in and Delft, which nationally, in the Western Cape, the ratio is provides dedicated resources, including plac- 1:560. Yet the murder-to-population ratio in ing an officer in every school known as the the Western Cape is 60 per 100 000, almost School Resource Officer, a programme copied double the national average; put differently, from the US, and several social interven- the province has 11.6% of South Africa’s tion packages including the identification population but 18.9% of its murders. Ideally, of youths at risk, copied from Toronto, all globally, the police: citizen ratio should be of which is backed up by a R1 billion urban around 1:220. regeneration infrastructure initiative includ- As a result, in July 2019 the Western Cape ing lighting and better work spaces. Premier took the step of requesting the ‘I can tell you,’ warns Smith, ‘that if army’s deployment to seize back control of do not get the conviction rates up, I don’t certain areas of the Cape Flats. While a sig- believe that these other gains are sustain- nal that the worsening situation could not able.’ Hence the need to increase the number continue, the army have, however, not con- of detectives in the city to reduce the case tributed positively to safety and security, load and drive up conviction rates. There is given the absence of crime intelligence which also a related effort to increase the num- should drive the policing operations. Rather bers of Metro Police. Currently there are 500 than a police or army presence, the prob- Metro Police, 600 Law Enforcement and 500 lem with criminality more generally lies in Traffic Officers, plus another 300 contract the lack of prosecutions, which reflects skills staff. ‘Ideally,’ says Smith, ‘we should have and resources. Alderman JP Smith says that around 5 000 Metro Police. The new joint critical to this situation is the low conviction venture between the City of Cape Town and rate, especially of gang-related crimes, which the Western Cape government will add,’ he are around 2–3%. In Hanover Park, he points said in October 2019, ‘add a further 1 000 out, there were some 86 murders over three per year thereafter which will give us the years, 51 arrests relating to those murders, enforcement staff numbers to compensate and no convictions. ‘If that is the case, then for the 4 500 SAPS officers which have been I am afraid those criminals have long and lost to this Province in the last four years at prosperous careers, until they are murdered the hands of national government.’ by another criminal.’ Cape Town’s government has realised In disputing the ‘poverty equals crime’ the importance of tailoring public security thesis, Smith contends that the city is faring solutions to specific areas. While the CCID much better in terms of growth and social has worked in the CBD, for example, it is spending, with 6% less unemployment on unlikely to be appropriate across the entire

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Cape Town metro as it requires heavy private There are several initiatives funded by sector support, which is absent in the Cape the City government to try to improve skills, Flats. security and business opportunities around Safety and security cannot be treated out- Khayelitsha’s key arteries. In adjoining side of a wider socio-economic environment, Harare and Kusaya townships, for example, including addressing the overall economic this involves building a series of rental sites conditions, education and healthcare. close to the rail station, featuring some of the Smarter, area-based solutions that combine township’s 3 000 spaza (small) shops, with local knowledge with security expertise and a well-patronised library at the centre. It is, an active creation of strong communities reflects one official, ‘an externalised shop- offer some possibilities. ping mall’. Through the Violence Prevention through Urban Upgrading (VPUU) project the Housing city has spent R1 billion in the area between The township of Khayelitsha, Xhosa for Harare police and rail stations, the highest ‘Our New Home’, was laid down 35-kms crime area in Khayelitsha, providing paving from the Cape Town CBD in the mid-1980s in and lighting, adult education facilities, astro- three initial sites, a last attempt at apartheid turf for sports facilities, and business spaces. spatial planning, and a solution to a then These initiatives have been enthusias- burgeoning problem of migrants, especially tically taken up by business people, if at a from the Eastern Cape, which had resulted considerable financial cost to the City: In in the creation of informal settlements like 2016 nearly R200 million was being spent Crossroads. Such pressures increased with on the above improvements in Harare and the scrapping of pass laws by 1987 as the Kusaya alone, and a further R627 million apartheid system unwound. was earmarked for the crime ridden area of Khayelitsha spreads over several sites, Hanover Park. But they remain complicated from the arrival station of new migrants to by issues of trust and leadership within the the southeast at Nkaneni, to the outlying communities themselves (who speaks for ‘suburbs’ of Harare and Monwabini. The pop- whom, and with what agenda), and by the ulation totals 800,000 in a location designed cultural baggage from the rural communi- for 250 000. It is young (just 7% of residents ties, including a preference for single story were over 50 in the 2011 census), and mostly dwellings. There is also little way around the comprises recent migrants (nearly two- realisation that Cape Town requires 350 000 thirds are rural to urban migrants), lending new dwellings, some in so-called ‘integra- the township to the term ‘Rural in an Urban tion zones’ closer to the city, along corridors Setting’.324 Set out across 43km2, it’s one of and through improved efficiencies. ‘Over the the poorest areas of Cape Town, where the next generation’, estimates one City official, average income per family is R20 000, about ‘80% of the population increase will be urban half of the average of the city. Half of the set- poor.’ Without action on housing, poverty tlements are informal ‘shanties’. It costs a will be ingrained into these townships, where worker daily R40 (about one-fifth of a daily houses are sub-let and ‘backyarders’ build casual wage) to commute to the Cape Town their own shelters in existing properties. city centre where most of the jobs are. This There are considerable benefits to improv- high cost reflects the geography: most peo- ing housing provision and access, which go ple don’t live where they work. Even so, this beyond having a comfortable, easily accessi- is below the norm across South Africa, where ble and warm place to stay. For one, there has workers commute an average of two hours been a global correlation between urbanisa- a day, with 40% of their wages spent on tion and GDP growth, because of higher rates transport. of productivity, better infrastructure and

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services such as education through popula- means to pay, are more likely to undergo tion density and economies of scale, and the densification because there is a high demand congregation of a large consumer market. and large return in the property market for The crossroads at Khayelitsha’s ‘Site C’ commercial developers. Nolungile Station where Japhta K Masemola A second challenge is that ‘if someone and Solomon Tshuku roads intersect, near living in an informal settlement is not going the ‘Kuwait’ taxi-rank, is a hub-bub of activ- to benefit personally, they are unlikely to ity, mamas shrouded in smoke, fanning braais move’. Squatters that already benefitted of chicken, offal, tripe, and other cuts amidst from a State-provided house, are not going to the containers housing funeral services, move if they are not eligible to benefit a sec- hair salons, surgeries and tailors. Despite its ond time. poverty, the area is, however, relatively safe Third, zoning regulations are quite inflex- because it’s busy, not least because vendors ible, initiating a change from one type of keep an eye out for their own goods all the dwelling to another. There is, fourth, a long time. Business inevitably congregates around lead time in housing projects. And finally, the flow of feet and money. at a macro level, the previous philosophy But the structural problem of Cape Town’s of ‘housing people where they are’, turned housing is less about shanty dwellings. Some settlements into townships, reinforcing 14% of Capetonians live in informal housing. the apartheid model. ‘There is’, she notes, This can be solved. But where they live is a ‘massive demand, and almost any supply in deeper constraint to inclusive growth and the affordable market meets a demand. We prosperity. cannot match the supply to the demand, ‘Capetonians inherited a little box far hence the ceaseless land invasions.’325 from the city’, said then Deputy Mayor Ian In 1994 the government inherited a hous- Neilson in 2018, ‘and to change this land use ing sector that was in crisis – a land use pattern of low density and long commuter pattern emblematic of apartheid spatial distances takes years’. With a population planning, and limited, poor quality housing density of 1 530 people per km2 compared, for stock. Across South Africa, the number of example, to Lagos’ 18 800/km2, Cape Town’s families without adequate housing was esti- demography geography is of a sprawling city, mated at 2.2 million and growing by 200 000 complicating the provision of housing and each year.326 transport. The response was to provide as many Zille says the provision of housing and the houses as quickly and as cheaply as pos- imperative of densification is exacerbated sible.327 Five broad housing projects were by a number of other factors less related to implemented: government subsidy housing the past than the present: First, when you (commonly known as RDP houses); com- go up to achieve greater density, you ‘very munity residential units (CRU); upgrading of quickly reach the limits of any state subsidy, informal settlements; emergency housing; which means people have to pay something finance-linked individual subsidy (or ‘gap’ to make up the balance. The whole of Joe housing) and social housing.328 The most Slovo’, she says, ‘the strip alongside the N2 prominent policy has been the construction next to Langa, is made up of those type of of fully-subsidised RDP housing for low- houses. Many other places too. They become income families earning less than R3 500 per unviable very quickly because of (often) a month.329 Between 1994 and 2015 2.9 million refusal to pay. People reckon, ‘why should I RDP homes were delivered, averaging out at pay to live in a flat (which I don’t want to do) under 150 000 annually.330 The private sec- when other people are getting a free house’. tor has delivered an additional 2.7 million Wealthier areas, where purchasers have the homes over this 20-year period,331 though

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amounting to a fraction of the construction Cape Town is a victim of its own success: sector’s capacity utilisation, with the total between 1996 and 2011, the population grew value of the sector down from R947 billion by over 1.2 million and is expected to hit in 2017/18 to around R220 billion in 2018/19, 4.5 million by 2023.335 Most migrants come according to industry specialists.332 This from neighbouring rural areas searching for would seem to tell a story less about skills better job and education prospects, while than government resources and will. some move for a lifestyle improvement, Number of housing units built in South placing inordinate strain on Cape Town’s Africa per year, 1995–2018 (thousands) housing. Three quarters of of respondents 250 not born in Cape Town felt that their living conditions in the city were either moderately 200 better or much better than their place of ori- gin, but only 38% of respondents to our poll 150 felt there was sufficient housing in the city. 100 There is a double whammy in the difficul- ties in delivering housing, since low wealth 50 leads to a failure to invest, and a failure to 0 grow other economic sectors. Just 15% of South Africa’s 15 million households are 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 estimated to be able to afford a mortgage.336 Source: Department of Human Settlements, via BBC333 Yet the multipliers are potentially tremen- Moreover, the RDP’s emphasis on quantity dous: the building of a single house in Africa has resulted in deficits in housing quality by creates an estimated five jobs.337 the national government’s own admission.334 To realise these job and other advan- RDP policy has also entrenched the govern- tages demands, at its core, investment. That ment as the national housing provider – an requires creating the right conditions for unsustainable position given South Africa’s growth on the one hand, and systems of weak economic growth. Demand for quality payment on the other. It demands planning. housing far outstrips supply, and families It also requires dealing with several aspects are left precariously on housing waiting lists. at once, including traffic congestion and pol- And RDP houses have been accused of lution. It needs land and title. It requires reinforcing apartheid spatial policy. In order partnerships to bring in expertise, technol- to encourage the delivery of mass housing, ogy and funding. And it demands dealing cheap land on the periphery of cities, like with policy impediments. Cape Town, was allocated to RDP builds. This The simple acceptance of the principle land was far from amenities and economic and practice of densification offers some of opportunities, and often prone to annual the solutions. Many of Cape Town’s town- flooding or fires. ships are already jam-packed: the 150 000 Cape Town’s central areas have undergone inhabitants of Delft, for example, near a housing price boom, pushing low-income Khayelitsha, is at 14 000 people/km2; the families even further away from economic 17 000 people of Sweet Home Farm, one opportunity and leading to increased hous- of Cape Town’s 347 informal settlements, ing activism. Reflecting a level of disquiet, located near Hanover Park and started on a the Reclaim the City social movement seeks rubbish dump, is estimated at 33 000/km2.338 to mobilise popular support for the better Mumbai, to make a comparison, is at assignment of prime land within Cape Town 21 000/km2. towards affordable housing.

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Acceptance of the principle of density in invariably about who gets resources and housing, land availability, the provision of opportunities, and why. Dealing with it bulk services especially electricity, and the requires trying to improve the extent of eco- capacity of construction companies to build nomic opportunities. This requires fixing the in volume are all required to manage the transport system, in which the train net- backlog. work is ‘our biggest blockage’ which should help in dealing with the poorest people living Transport the furthest from economic opportunities. Travelling away from the Cape Town city Rather than carrying its capacity of 650 000 centre towards the city’s Southern Suburbs people per day, the most cost-effective sys- on De Waal Drive at 3pm is not a place you tem of public transport in the train system is want to be. The traffic is painfully slow; ‘one carrying 200 000, the net effects flowing over downside of relative growth’, says Tim Harris. into the overstretched bus system and on the But it’s also because public transport has roads. ‘I believe,’ he states, ‘we should take not kept pace, and because this sector has over control of the train system’. become a target of political and commercial vandalism. Rail Transport has been a city development Cape Town hosts over half of South Africa’s priority for over decade, with significant Metrorail system.344 The service is crucial to investment in MyCiTi and a push to integrate the city’s functioning, though it is managed trains, buses and minibus taxis modes into nationally by PRASA, South Africa’s notori- one efficient system.339 Despite 1 014 km of ously corrupted rail company. rail network and 32km of dedicated bus rapid Unsurprisingly, Cape Town’s rail is in a transit (BRT) lanes, known locally as MyCiTi, state of crisis. As one survey respondent it’s still not working well enough to be con- shared, ‘It is always either delayed or they sidered a success. This tension is felt by have stolen the cables or burned stuff’. Since the residents, with 40% of poll respondents 2015, 175 train carriages have been dam- stating that improvements to either infra- aged by fires and in October 2018 alone, eight structure or public transport are viewed as carriages were destroyed.345 Cape Town is the greatest achievements of the municipal currently operating well below capacity with government. Two-thirds also felt that public less than half of the required 88 train sets in transport required urgent improvement. usage. On average, Capetonians endure an In an attempt to address the issues of extra travel time of 45 minutes per day and vandalism and passenger safety, the City 163 hours per year, making Cape Town South and Metrorail joined together to launch Africa’s most congested city.340 More than a 100-member Rail Enforcement Unit, an 50% of Capetonians use private vehicles to armed task force, to patrol trains across the get to work.341 Low-income households make metro. up the majority of the 47% of residents who ‘Rail is of great significance for Cape use public transport.342 The concentration of Town’, says Roger Behrens of the Centre for economic activity means that, on average, Transport Studies. ‘If it ceases to exist it will low-income workers travel more than an be a huge blow to our economy.’ The launch hour to work one way and spend 43% of their of the Rail Enforcement Unit is a step in the monthly income on transport.343 right direction, but for rail to succeed there Premier Alan Winde dealing with the will need to be greater coordination across spatial legacy is a very ‘difficult conun- all three government tiers. drum’ to deal with, given the solution is

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Buses and Taxis passenger demands, playing a substantial Cape Town has sought to alleviate its trans- role by moving more than 300 000 passengers portation bottlenecks through the flagship each day.349 The taxi drivers are members of MyCiTi BRT system. MyCiTi was launched 119 associations under the Western Cape in 2010 using targeted funds from National branch of the South African National Taxi Treasury’s Public Transport Infrastructure Council (SANTACO), an organisation with Systems Grant (PTISG). The grants covered lobbying power that gives the city constant the building of stations and dedicated bus headaches.350 lanes, and the buses themselves. In turn, the Cape Town’s transportation inheritance city was responsible for the system’s operat- was one of abundance. However, complex ing costs. governance structures and poorly imple- ‘MyCiTi has been an important advance, mented global models have prevented an but lessons have been learned about the integrated, efficient and affordable public need to adapt international best practice to transport system. In order to address this, local conditions,’ reflects one transport pro- the city has adopted a transport-oriented fessional. The MyCiTi system was based the development strategy that aims to coordi- Curitiba BRT model. But, Cape Town’s popu- nate policy through the Transport and Urban lation density, the x-factor that makes BRTs Development Authority (TDA). There is hope viable, is 1 530/km²,346Curitiba’s 4 405/km².347 that this initiative will improve coordina- Bogota’s, to take another successful BRT tion and remove the stickiness that governs rollout, is 4 300/km².348 large-scale investments. Cape Town’s density issues are further compounded by the sheer size of the city. Water Services ‘The viability of public transport in Cape In 2018 Cape Town made global headlines as Town is driven by distance,’ says Behrens, it nearly became the first city to run out of ‘because average travel distance is twice that water. Brought on by a relentless drought351, of international standards’. The number of in mid-2017 Cape Town’s six major dams kilometres travelled by the MyCiTi is a key were at a combined capacity of 23.3% – component of the operating costs, which are enough water to last 88 days. It was predicted now higher than what can be recouped from that ‘Day Zero’ would hit the city in March ticket sales. 2018, with household, school and business In addition, the Public Transport taps shut off and residents sent to commu- Infrastructure and System Grant (PTISG) has nal water collection points. Cape Town was been declining in real terms over the last in disaster-mode and had to act fast.352 few years, putting MyCiTi’s grand expansion The City responded by creating a water plan on hold. ‘It doesn’t make financial sense resilience task team of academics, members to grow the MyCiTi system now, but BRTs of civil society and government officials. The move the most people the most efficiently’, team actioned an aggressive campaign of insisted Claire Holderness, a transport plan- demand-side management that restricted ner in the TDA. However, again, this raises residents’ water use to 50 litres per day. concern about the ability of the BRT system This was largely directed at middle- to high- to cater for all Capetonians. Some of the first income residents, who consume 65% of Cape routes actioned by MyCiTi went from the city Town’s water,353 and achieved through meth- centre to and , affluent ods of public advocacy and penalties for parts of Cape Town. overconsumption. Like other African cities, privately owned In six months, Cape Town’s water usage minibus taxis have stepped in to fill the gaps. dropped to 50 million litres per day, with They are more flexible and responsive to residents across the city working together

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to reduce water consumption in both pub- turned the application down, refusing to lic and private life.354 The resilience task acknowledge the potential for crisis.358 team drew on the global experiences of As rain was low for 2016, the Western urban drought in cities like Melbourne and Cape government continued its appeals to Los Angeles to create a long-term strategy the NDMC for dam funding, even though for water supply that included desalination studies predicted a one-in-1 000-year chance plants, wastewater treatment works and of the 2017 rainfall being low. The predictions groundwater extraction projects.355 However, were incorrect, and a third year of drought these changes were not without cost and 54% ensued. Then , Patricia of survey respondents claimed that the qual- de Lille, appealed to the national government ity of water and sanitation had negatively to declare Cape Town a local disaster area. impacted on the health of their families. Rashid Khan, regional director of the national The rains returned to Cape Town in the Department of Water Affairs, rejected the winter of 2018 and the dams reached 75% request and responded by saying ‘although capacity, allaying immediate concerns of a the water situation is concerning, it is not yet Day Zero.356 ‘The story I often get asked when at crisis level as has been widely reported. I am overseas is how did Cape Town reduce We still have time for intervention’.359 No its water consumption so drastically?’ said such intervention was forthcoming and in Lance Greyling, then the City’s Trade and February 2018, Premier Zille criticised the Investment Director, ‘and the answer is that national government for not making the policymakers, businesses and Capetonians necessary funding available.360 all worked together’. Politics, as in transport and policing, Many have questioned how a disaster of trumped people’s needs. More positively, this magnitude came to be in the first place. the nature of the response and the success While climate change must be considered, of the water rationing measures exemplified South Africa’s water governance structures both the city’s resilience and the efficacy of played a prominent role, too. The supply of its governance structures. potable water is a municipal responsibility. However, like many other urban services, Electricity – The Politics of Power the planning and implementation of large- Cape Town’s electricity challenges aren’t scale water infrastructure falls to national what you’d expect from a growing urban government, with provincial government pro- metropolis. Post-1994, the city has been viding oversight and support. Disaster relief able to achieve full electrification for formal is a mandate of all three levels, but it is up dwellings and 94% for the total number of to the City to raise concern and the national households in the city.361 However, its conun- Department of Water and Sanitation to react drum lies in the fact that electricity demand accordingly. from wealthier residents and industry is Public discussion about Cape Town’s falling, thus challenging the viability of the possibility of losing water had been swirl- system to provide electricity for all. ing since the 1990s,357 but unusually low In South Africa, electricity generation and levels of rain in the 2015 winter raised this transmission are controlled by the national to a level of municipal and provincial, con- electricity utility, Eskom. At the provincial cern. In January 2016, these concerns were level, independent power producers (IPPs) taken by the Western Cape government to are permitted to generate under 1MW of the National Disaster Management Centre power. Eskom retains a monopoly on larger (NDMC) in the form of a disaster declaration electricity generation and, until now, on and application for relief funds. The NDMC transmission. Distribution rights are shared between Eskom and municipalities.

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As a result of these regulatory changes, of the relationship between electricity there are 3 000 small IPPS pushing around demand and economic growth. Historically, 126MW into the system in 2019. If the limit economic growth was spurred by indus- per IPP was to be increased to 10MW, believes tries such as manufacturing, with 60% of WInde, there would be 100 suppliers will- all city consumption from the commercial ing to sign up, quickly ending the province’s and industrial sectors.365 This has changed power problems. over the past two decades, with the manu- The City of Cape Town accounts for 45% facturing sector shrinking and Cape Town’s of all provincial electricity distribution in economic growth being led by the tertiary the Western Cape and 6% of national dis- sector. The shift from heavy-duty industrial tribution. In 2013, the estimated demand activities to lighting, heating and ventila- for maximum electricity consumption was tion of office buildings has led to a decrease just over 1 900MW, three quarters of which in electricity usage. So, despite economic is distributed by the City with the remainder growth of 2.5% between 2012 and 2016, the supplied directly by Eskom.362 energy consumption of large power users did Though Cape Town has a near total elec- not grow.366 trification and doesn’t struggle with supply In addition to a changing economic cli- issues beyond those caused by the national mate, Cape Town households have shown system,363 the cost of energy as a percent- significant price elasticity with consump- age of income for lower income families is a tion decreases after electricity tariff hikes, major issue. Some 38% of the city’s residents and the introduction of prepaid meters.367 would be described as energy poor, falling Residents are also moving towards renew- into the group of low-income households able energy solutions as the costs of these that spend up to 25% of their income to meet rapidly decrease. Studies predict that a 4.5% energy demands. Only 34% of The Brenthurst loss of the city’s total revenue will occur Foundation’s survey respondents felt that over ten years as a direct result of residents electricity supply is reliable, while 42% felt choosing solar PV interventions, such as that electricity supply is sufficient. solar water heaters.368 In order to address this, the City has taken considerable steps to ensure that all house- Technology – Data is Falling, The holds have access to at least some basic Possibilities are Great forms of energy. These include the provision In terms of telephony, South Africa has not of individual metering to backyard dwell- issued access to low-band spectrum (700–800 ers so that residents can access the national Mhz), which enables companies to cover free basic electricity (FBE) subsidy. FBE uses large areas without densification. While funds from the national ‘lifeline tariff’ to there is 99% call coverage in South Africa, provide poor households, those already con- there is probably only 75% 3G coverage, and nected to the electricity system and using 55–60% high-speed 4G. less than 450 kWh per month. It is an elec- There is an urgent need to release the tricity voucher that covers the first 50 kWh, low-band spectrum, as has been done in valid for one month only to cover basic light- much of the rest of the continent. There is ing and water heating.364 Once the 50kWh however a fear on the part of government has been exhausted, qualifying house- that once liberalised, the opportunity is gone, holds must begin paying for their electricity and will benefit all companies equally. The consumption. failure to issue licences for this spectrum In recent years, electricity usage in Cape has led to a system which is four times more Town has been declining due to a decoupling expensive than the low-band option.

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Beyond liberalisation, this requires electri- investors. And really we have worked very cal power for this roll-out, which stresses the hard over the last few years to enable the need for solar or diesel generation of towers. economy, to look at what was missing in There is also a need to open the environ- the economy, red tape reduction, making ment up to more than the extant duopoly to sure that we are cutting wherever possible enable price competitiveness. in making it easy to do business, making These problems apply of course to all sure that we are open for business, really areas of South Africa, of course, but more going that extra mile … which I think has especially affect those cities aggressively definitely made a big impact on investment pursuing the high-tech sector, though the coming to the region … .’ more data is used, the cheaper it is in South The lessons for others are clear. Use your Africa. This would likely open up new pos- comparative advantage well. In Cape Town’s sibilities in health-care, education, pensions case this is about tourism, lifestyle and the and other welfare payments, agriculture, migrants who flow with it. Improve your gov- e-government, systems of water reticulation ernance institutions, and create new levers (and leakage), and crime prevention. for delivery. Wesgro has been instrumental Winde sees three immediate benefits of in facilitating a dynamic and tech-centred improved connectivity for the province: con- economy, even though by its own admission necting consumers to information, economic more could be done if it were given greater development, and innovative and responsive national policy latitude on matters like government. Data and digitisation will drive visas, investment incentives, and exchange cities of the future, and South Africa is no controls. Build on fragile political coali- different. tions. The city has shown how government and private sector actors can proactively Conclusion: Transitioning from Two form successful partnerships in pushing Cities? Cape Town’s economy from ‘Slaapstad’ to a Cape Town has been cited as a case of South hub for services, deepening the basis of co- African exceptionalism. This is true of its operation as the benefits accrued. And act governance and growth record. But this argu- on spatial constraints, in Cape Town’s case ment also fails to consider how much of the the legacy of apartheid living and work. Even city’s challenges are those of any growing though this particular challenge is as diffi- African urban space. cult to overcome as it is socially deep-rooted, The Premier, Alan Winde, says Cape consistency is key. Town’s success is in part down to the ‘place In so doing, Cape Town has demonstrated that we have … We have a great place that where you begin should not determine [which] is interesting for international where you end up.

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Rabat and Salé: Bridging the Gap

Quick Facts Population: 580 000 (Rabat), 890 000 (Salé) Housing: 150 000 new units were built over five years. The Villes sans Bidonvilles (Cities without Slums) programme, introduced nationally in 2004, achieved a nearly 50% reduction in the number of slum dwellers as a proportion of the urban population. Jobs: Over 13 000 direct jobs were created through new industry over a ten-year period in Salé. Energy: 98% of the population have access to electricity.

When Ridley Scott was looking for a loca- With a young, sometimes restive popula- tion for his 2001 filmBlack Hawk Down, which tion, Morocco has had to work hard to create depicts the 1993 US mission to capture a the opportunities needed for social stability. Somali warlord that went disastrously wrong, Such challenges are nothing new. The the original site of the event, Mogadishu, focus following independence in 1956 was was deemed to be far too dangerous. Instead to deliver political stability and territorial they shot the film in Morocco, with Salé’s consolidation along with basic infrastruc- Sidi Moussa district being transformed into ture. In the process the government, led by the Somali capital and the 17th Century the monarchy, had to confront huge social Rabat medina becoming Mogadishu’s ‘Bakara challenges. By 1981 as much as 60% of the Market’. population lived below the poverty line, Today they would have to go else- unemployment was at 20% (perhaps twice as where. Morocco’s slum removal initiative high among the youth), and 20% of those in Program National d’Action pour l’Urbaine Fabric, the cities lived in shanties. launched in 2001, and the subsequent Villes There were bread riots and other popular Sans Bidonvilles programme ‘Cities without protests. Improved economic growth (driven Slums’, launched in 2004, combined with an by privatisation), multiparty elections and a aggressive industrialisation and job creation 1996 trade agreement with Europe alleviated strategy, are dramatically changing the face some of the building social pressure. of cities across the country. Such initiatives King Mohammed VI, who succeeded his have been underpinned by strong growth in father King Hassan II in 1999, embarked on the economy which was expected to average widespread social and political reforms, free- 3.3% in 2020-2021.369 ing political prisoners, improving the position For Africa, where population numbers will of women under the law, improving social double to 2.5 billion by 2050 of which nearly conditions, and stimulating the economy. two-thirds are projected to live in cities, Nowhere can this be seen more than in Morocco’s experience is instructive. Salé, on the north side of the Bouregreg River At independence in 1956, Morocco’s pop- from the capital Rabat. ulation was 10.5 million. Sixty years later it Once a haven for pirates, Salé was the has more than tripled to 34.8 million. This target of western navies retaliating for trend is flattening with population growth attacks on European traders crossing the falling from a high of 3.3% per annum in the Atlantic. Today its function is somewhat less late 1950s to 1.4% in 2016. Urbanisation has dramatic; a satellite town to the nation’s been similarly rapid. At independence 29% of capital. In its transition from pirate town the population lived in cities, now it is close to dormitory, its one million inhabitants to 60%. largely got left behind and, by the end of the

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20th Century, conditions were more akin to Marina development, with high-priced apart- Mogadishu than Rabat: large slums, high ments, restaurants, shops, sports facilities unemployment, lack of economic diversifi- and, critically, fresh jobs. With a need to cre- cation – with textile factories providing the ate jobs for 200,000 graduates every year, majority of jobs – and poor water supply and the pressure is on not just to plan, but to do. sanitation. The development of Rabat and Salé pro- Now another transition is in progress as a vides a dynamic case study of what it means result of which, in just ten years, the city has to actively tackle the challenges of urbanisa- changed beyond recognition. tion and rapid population growth in the 21st A smart, modern tram links Salé to Rabat, Century. This chapter examines the twin the cost of a single ticket being just 6 MAD cities’ turnaround, following each sector of (or $0.60). The slums have now largely been governance, economic growth, transport, cleared and replaced with five-storey blocks housing and service delivery. of flats through a mix of public and private From the scale of development, it is dif- funding. ficult now to imagine how such a modern Salé now boasts a new ‘technopark’ looking city like Salé could, less than two modelled on the success of similar pub- decades ago, have been selected as a stand-in lic-private enterprises designed to spur for battle-weary Mogadishu. Today, it’s a city, start-ups in Casablanca and Tangier. At like the country, in a hurry. the mouth of the Bouregreg River is a new

SPAIN Mediterranean Strait of Gibraltar ! ! Ceuta (Sp.) Tangier Sea Tétouan Melilla (Sp.) !

Nador Kenitra RABAT Fès Oujda Mohammedia NORTH Casablanca Meknès ATLANTIC MOROCCO Bou Arfa OCEAN Sa Marakech

Jebel Ouarzazat Agadir Toubkal

ALGERIA Tarfaya Sebkha Tah

WESTERN SAHARA MAURITANIA

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Setting the Scene population, constrained by city boundaries Although separated by the common and restrictive planning regulations, has Bouregreg estuary, Rabat and Salé took dif- remained stagnant. ferent historical paths. Rabat was made Rabat remains Morocco’s showpiece; Salé the centre of economic and political power, exists in its shadows. This is embodied in the while Salé embodied the rebel city and 2014 naming of Rabat as La Ville Lumière371 la ville doirtoir – the place where workers go to by King Mohammed VI, a 450 million MAD sleep. Nearly two decades later, efforts have (Moroccan Dirham) cultural project from been made to change the power dynam- which Salé will benefit by proximity. Still, the ics and bring the cities closer together Moroccan government has had to actively through means such as integrated service temper the disparities and tensions between delivery. Yet, these have not been enough. its cities. One such response has been to ‘It is difficult to undo 200 years of neglect in ensure that Morocco remains secure from 20 years of development,’ observes historian violent extremism. Mohammed Krombi. At its founding in 1030, Salé was the dom- The Security Imperative inant city, boasting a tight-knit community In a post-9/11 global order, security has been led by prominent Moroccan elites. Things a key driver of Morocco’s development suc- changed at the turn of the 20th Century cess. The 2003 Casablanca bombings, the when French colonisers introduced la ville deadliest attack in the Kingdom’s history, nouvelle370 policy, choosing which cities would followed by an Arab Spring in 2010 raised advance into the new era. ‘Salé had strong insecurity to a level of national imperative, thinkers that drove a resistance against the forcing the King to take action. This set in French,’ said Hassan Benzalla, Director of the motion a series of policy changes to tackle Salamoustaqbal Association – an organisa- the basics. tion representing residents in Salé. ‘This is Morocco sits in a region prone to insta- why it was historically isolated’. Salé did not bility and Islamic terrorist activity.372 On 16 receive a ville nouvelle status. Rabat, in con- May 2003, Casablanca was hit with co-ordi- trast, did – it was dubbed Morocco’s capital nated suicide bombings across five different and enjoyed an injection of fresh investment, locations. The attacks killed 33 civilians and enticing the relocation of many of Salé’s 12 of the attackers, injuring hundreds elites. ‘Salé only survived and grew because more. The terrorists, reportedly members of its proximity to Rabat,’ noted Krombi. of the Al-Qaeda-aligned Moroccan Islamic Many Moroccan cities that were not villes Combatant Group (MICG), were in their nouvelles have since perished. early twenties and lived in the slums of Sidi By the 1990s, post-independence, Rabat Moumen, Thomasville and Carriere Thomas grew into a concentrate of jobs and ser- on Casablanca’s periphery. Most of them vices with a network of satellite cities fast were poorly educated and unemployed.373 developing on its periphery, including Salé, This event shone a spotlight on the vulner- Temara, Tamesna and Kénitra. Today these ability of low-income Moroccans living in cities are reservoirs of skilled human capi- bidonvilles374 to radicalism, placing human tal, offering cheaper property and living development at the centre of anti-terrorism. costs than Rabat, but fewer amenities and Within weeks of the attack, dozens of services. This dynamic has spurred a daily suspected extremists were arrested and the commuter-culture into Rabat, justifying country’s religious system was restructured the need for strong transport links like the to embody moderate Islam.375 The King then tramway. Interestingly, the population of the launched the National Initiative for Human satellite cities continues to rise, while Rabat’s Development (INDH) in 2005 to uplift poor

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Moroccans and limit their vulnerability to stage of la régionalisation avancée (advanced terrorist groups.376 INDH comprised targeted regionalisation), a process of decentralisa- programmes through public-private part- tion. This reduced the number of regions to nerships. The Villes sans Bidonvilles is one 12 and created commissions to coordinate such programme. Five years after launching, the many actors in the process. The King INDH had improved 264 urban areas and 403 recently announced his intent to move to the rural.377 second stage, which gives even more auton- In December 2010, after Tunisian street omy to the lower levels of government.379 vendor Mohammed Bouazizi’s self-immo- The Ministry of Interior remains the back- lation, the Arab Spring erupted across the bone of governance in Morocco. It supervises region. The following May, thousands of urban development and other strategic sec- Moroccans took to the streets to protest tors of the economy and oversees various the country’s social ills. The King quickly officials and local government institutions. announced major democratic reforms, The Ministry sets the long-run development including a new constitution and the choice vision for the nation, with its head appointed of a Prime Minister from the opposition directly by the King. As the Director General Islamist Justice and Development Party of Local Communities, Wali Khalid Safir, said, (PJD).378 King Mohammed VI’s moderate ‘Politicians, when they come into power, they stance and proactive administration assisted have programmes and clear objectives that Morocco in dodging the Arab Spring. they need to achieve as soon as possible. Underlying this shift has been a policy The representative of the government has no focus on economic growth and spending on deadlines, they are there to protect and serve key infrastructure. The poll conducted of citizens and make sure that what is going on Rabat-Salé by The Brenthurst Foundation in is equitable.’ 2018 shows that 85% of respondents linked Morocco now comprises 12 regions, economic growth to the improvements in the 62 provinces, 13 préfectures380 and 1 503 city, in spite of continued concerns about municipalities, known as communes. At each crime, healthcare and unemployment. level there are both elected and appointed The lesson from the transformation of government officials. Notably, in 2011, Rabat- Salé is that clear, robust policies can democratic reforms to the constitution affect real change, even if the odds seem placed much greater authority and financial stacked against you. resources in the hands of elected officials. The graphic, below, illustrates Morocco’s gov- Governance ernance framework.381 Changes to Morocco’s governance structures At the municipal level, the fourth layer have facilitated this change. The 2000s were in the table, urban agencies have been marked by active reform and decentralisa- established to manage the administration tion ushering in a more democratic model of services and projects in Moroccan cities. whilst retaining a strong central state. These agencies each have a specific goal, Officially, Morocco is a parliamen- allocated resources and are given consider- tary constitutional monarchy with both able freedoms to achieve their objectives. appointed and elected officials. The country Urban planning is centralised through has gone through three major governance the Conseil Supérieur de l’Aménagement du reforms over the last half century, first in Territoire (Higher Council for Territorial 1976 when municipalities were recognised Development),382 the second layer of Figure 3, as legal entities, then in 1997, when regions which retains decision-making prerogatives were established and, most recently, in 2011 for the entire region, operating under the when the new constitution launched the first Ministry of Interior. Elected local officials

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Nominated National Level Elected Institutions Ministry of Interior representatives of the Ministry of Interior

Conseil Régional Wali of the Region Regional Level (Regional Council) Executive Power (12)

Province Conseil Principal/ Governor of Province/ (rural) (62) préfectoral Executive Power Préfecture (Urban/Rural Préfecture (urban) (13) Council)

Municipality Supervisory Function Caid/Pacha (known locally Conseil Communal (Chief/Municipal as a commune) (Town Council) Leader) (1 503)

Chef du cercle (District Leader)

District Level Cheik/Moqadem (Neighbourhood Government Representative)

have a minor role in shaping critical urban responsibilities with less financial resources,’ policies. a World Bank official confirmed. Urban Finance in Morocco is significantly Urban development in Rabat-Salé has centralised with funds for capital expendi- been able to deliver against a long-term ture and running costs disbursed by the plan for the region, largely thanks to the central government as transfers, grants, strength of Moroccan institutions and the loans, or centrally managed municipal tax ability of the Ministry of Interior to execute revenue. This centralisation leaves munici- the will of the King. This combination of a palities with little space for fiscal autonomy. monarchy and a long-run political horizon Balancing resources and responsibili- has provided the ever elusive ‘political will’, ties between préfecture and regional levels ensuring a tight focus on delivery, and the remains a challenge. The recent constitu- clout necessary to obtain resources and over- tional reforms gave more financial power come obstacles. However, political will is only to the regions, allowing them to raise one ingredient in Morocco’s success story, capital from various sources as well as another key input has been the country’s ensuring that, by 2020, 30% of VAT and 5% economic development, discussed in the of company taxes will be allocated to them. following section. However, responsibilities have not been realigned to match this, creating an imbal- Economic Growth ance. ‘Regions have already been allocated Since 2000, Morocco has seen a dramatic financial resources without the requisite increase in economic growth and diversifica- responsibilities, while préfectures have the tion. Its GDP per capita has grown from less than $1,972 in 2000 to $3,292 in 2017, a 67%

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increase.383 A significant part of this growth departments. It is a quick and nimble unit can be attributed to the focus on opening with the authority and means to pursue up Morocco to the world. Between 2000 and complex tasks such as the development of 2016, the rate of the economic openness seven new bridges between Rabat and Salé, increased from 49% to 62.2% – higher than the Oudayas tunnel, the Rabat-Salé tramway other middle income countries like South and the Bouregreg Marina. Africa, Turkey and Brazil, with rates of 57%, The AAVB has been used as a mecha- 42% and 19%.384 This was achieved through nism to pursue the high-profile projects macro-economic policies that focused on that require coordination across a number diversifying exports to include textiles and of government departments and they cur- manufactured goods, attracting foreign rently spearhead the development of Rabat investment through agreements with major and Salé’s newest cultural landmarks, Zaha economic centres such as the EU and the Hadid-designed Grand Théâtre de Rabat and US, promoting tourism and subsidising the the tallest tower in Africa, dubbed the ‘Rabat development of offshoring industries and Tower’. incubators.385 The Agency acts as a developer and inves- These changes were implemented at tor, with the prerogative for urban planning both the national and local level. The cities at the municipal level. It has the authority to of Rabat and Salé show how Morocco’s eco- issue development permits and to regulate nomic reforms have been implemented in an all land transactions. The only exception is urban context. that AAVB does not appropriate land belong- ing to Rabat and Salé, and local taxes from The Bouregreg Valley Development the valley are still paid to the respective Agency municipalities. ‘The divisions existed in people’s minds, a The AAVB has turned the Bouregreg Valley result of historical rivals in the Kingdom into a tourist destination and a commercial where rebellious royal cousins fought for the enclave. However, some critics have raised throne from Salé,’ asserts archaeologist and concerns that the agency has prioritised van- historian Mohammed Es-Semmar. Though ity projects that fail to address the pressing Rabat and Salé are separated by a river, they social needs of the region. Nevertheless, the have always operated as one. This idea cap- organisation’s key benefit has been in its tured King Mohammed VI’s attention and ability to mobilise funds and complete com- supported his 2004 vision of bringing the plex infrastructure projects. two cities together again through the birth of Rabat has historically been the heart of the Agence pour L’Aménagement de la Vallée du economic activity in the region. Its economy Bouregreg (AAVB). is largely services- and education-based, Established by Dahir (royal decree) in boasting numerous higher education institu- November 2005, the AAVB is governed and tions, with almost all government offices and funded by an administrative council386 under foreign missions choosing the city for their the supervision of the Ministry of Interior. headquarters. Almost two thirds of Rabat’s 387 It has authority over the Bouregreg Valley residents who responded to our surveys territory that lies between the two cities, and agreed that the quality of state education a mandate to bring Rabat and Salé together was better than elsewhere in the country through major investment in infrastructure and the availability of skilled labour was and cultural projects. listed by the majority of respondents (71%) The AAVB is an agency mandated by the as the main facilitator for starting a business state, but outside of traditional hierarchies in Rabat or Salé. and processes that hamper government

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However, the high cost of land within city trying to run a 24-hour food processing fac- limits has prevented the development of tory in a region where very few businesses non-service-based industries. As such, the operate at such scale, Mohamed notes they city has leveraged its comparative advantage stuck it out because, ‘our DNA is in this area. to become the regional services hub with We would never move.’ Things under the most of its economic output coming from new government have eased so much that Government Administration and the services Hassan feels business owners are no longer industry. ‘just viewed as a taxpayer. There is more In contrast, the satellite towns surround- mutual respect’. This has enabled the busi- ing Rabat, such as Salé, have been identified ness to open of a new factory. as sites to expand industrial activities, with Technopolis, alongside the Université production in textiles, construction materi- Internationale de Rabat (located in Salé) and als and food processing sectors. large-scale projects by the Bouregreg Valley Salé once boasted a vibrant textile Development Agency on the Salé side of the industry. However, at the onset of growing river, show the efforts to diversify economic competition from low-cost Asian manufac- activity across the region. Opened in 2008, turers, many operators in Salé’s textile sector Technopolis comprises internationally com- were unable to survive and between 2006 petitive office spaces for outsourcing services and 2010, nearly 20,000 jobs were lost. and high-tech industry as well as a manu- Some companies however, such as facturing free­zone in the Rabat-Salé-Kenitra Thirteen AMP Morocco, a member of SOMITEX area. In ten years the park has been able to Textile Group and the largest textile com- attract international companies like LEAR, pany in Salé, were able to find innovative Amazon, as well as to create over 13 000 ways to withstand tough market conditions. jobs. Operated by Casanearshore, a private Abdelhai Bessa and Wafaa Benchekroun company, on the edge of Salé, Technopolis have been working together as a husband has been able to expand into a second phase and wife duo since 1991, employing 1 400 with government support. workers in two Salé factories and produc- Some 85% of residents polled believed ing 1.2 million garments a year. Their staying that economic growth has led to improve- power lies in being selective on products and ments in the city over the last four years. ensuring high quality. ‘We have to choose Through its strategy to replicate national what we do and do it well,’ said Bessa – these goals at the local level, Morocco has been efforts have rendered Thirteen AMP the last able to create the conditions for sustained textile company in Morocco to supply Marks economic growth. and Spencer (M&S). But while the duo would never leave Salé, Infrastructure the challenge is ‘to consistently develop and The development of these twin cities has grow. We want to keep the business for our largely been propelled by housing and trans- sons to take over.’ port projects that, not without their flaws, King Mohammed VI has adopted a pro- have enabled greater access to decent amen- business approach that aims to achieve a ities and better economic opportunities for balance between the public and private sec- low-income residents. Rabat and Salé have tor. Dari Couspate in Salé can attest to this developed a clever concessionary system change. A family business in couscous and that integrates the private sector to deliver pasta products started by Mohamed Khalil, municipal services, from which other African now run by his son Hassan, Dari Couspate cities could learn. has been operating in Salé for the last Inaugurated in 2004 by King Mohammed 15 years. Although it was originally tough VI, the Villes sans Bidonvilles (VSB), or Cities

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without Slums, is an ambitious plan to rid project has been further extended with no Moroccan cities of squatter settlements clear end date. by 2010.388 Bidonvilles have been a feature Overall, the VSB programme has faced of Moroccan urbanism since 1918. Despite some major challenges in its process of various attempts since 1948, the 2003 ter- resettlement. VSB actively pursued a policy rorist attacks placed urban housing on the of involuntary removals that have displaced national agenda. communities today. Plans have often fallen During a speech in 2006, the King short due to the inability of Al Omrane to expounded on his vision for the VSB; ‘What enforce the contractual obligations of private we definitively envision is not just cit- actors. Nearly 90% of our poll respondents ies without slums, nor to substitute slums felt that housing projects urgently need to be with soulless concrete blocks, impervi- improved. ous to sociable lifestyles. We understand, VSB is a programme that has been lauded rather, that it is to transform our towns into internationally for its ability to deliver spaces apt for social interaction, warmth and decent quality housing to citizens who dignity and, while turning cities into invest- would have otherwise been excluded. The ment and growth poles, we ensure that they programme utilised the power of PPPs to remain attached to their own specific and increase the level of housing stock available original style.’389 to low-income residents – a lesson worth Administered through the Ministry of learning for other African cities facing lim- Housing and Planning alongside Al Omrane, ited housing stock. However, it also points to a state-owned housing utility, VSB aimed to the dangers of failing to get the social fac- eradicate slums in 83 cities. The plans were tors of mass housing right. This can create initially scaled according to need. It was a ticking time bomb of unrest. Housing is a estimated that 30% of current housing struc- complex sector that requires nuanced solu- tures were in sufficient condition to qualify tions that the VSB did not quite provide. for in-situ upgrading, but the remaining 70% would require relocations on new plots. Transport Initial provisions were made for the reset- Transport lies at heart of the twin cities’ suc- tlement of 150,000 families over five years. cess. The Rabat-Salé Tramway, introduced in Very low-income residents (10%) were pro- 2007 has changed the way residents move, vided with completely free housing, while with 77% of poll respondents reporting that the remaining 90% received housing units at public transport is affordable. The Tramway a subsidised rate, paid directly or through a illustrates that with proper planning and mortgage.390 $3 billion was set aside for the clever private sector collaboration, large project, with the Moroccan state providing scale transport infrastructure can be built in $1.2 billion and the rest mobilised though African cities to improve urban mobility and investment. UN Habitat, the World Bank unlock benefits for local economies. In turn, and the Agence Développement Française (AFD) smaller scale transport providers will adjust offered support.391 Almost half of our poll to fill the gaps. respondents agree that housing in Rabat and In 2008, Morocco’s new national strategy Salé is better than elsewhere in Morocco. for urban transport allowed transport opera- By 2010, VSB had only been able to clear tions to be agglomerated.392 This led to the 32 cities, decreasing the slum population creation of Local Development Companies from 8.2% of total urban population in 2004 (LDCs) and the expansion of private sector to 3.9%. This resulted in the project’s exten- investment through organisations such as sion to 2015. At present, there are 58 cities Tramway Company of Rabat-Salé and Stareo, that have been declared ‘slum-free’ and the a Moroccan bus company. Public funds were

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made available, in particular the Hassan II AFD with Natixis financing the tram wagons. Fund and a special urban transport fund Repayment began five to seven years later, known as FART.393 with a term of 20 to 25 years. In 2009, bus contracts were concessioned One of the keys successes of the tram has to a subsidiary of Veolia Transport. It was an been the concession agreement developed ambitious project to provide new buses and with Transdev, a French company with a dedicated bus lanes, as well as train and 30-year contract to operate the tram system. employ 3,000 staff. However, this did not go Enacted in 2011, the contract gave Transdev as planned. After operating for 18 months, the responsibility to operate the tram, from Veolia withdrew from the contract and a new ticket sales to wagon maintenance. The con- operator, Stareo, took over the 15-year con- tract stressed training and skills transfer. tract. Stareo absorbed the existing vehicles Now, only six years later, engineers such as and staff, renewed the bus fleet and restruc- Mohammed Ihrou feel that local operators tured the bus network routes. However, after have developed the technical skills to oper- a failed attempt to renegotiate tariffs, Stareo ate the tram successfully. ‘Six years since the was forced to file for bankruptcy, leaving tram started operating, we are now compe- the bus system in the control of Al Assima, tent on our own … the trams are assembled a local government agency.394 here, and we also manufacture some of the In 2005, as part of the transport devel- spare parts locally,’ he said. opment mandate of the AAVB, new Transdev runs 22 trams, acquired for transportation studies were conducted 40 to 45 million MAD each, with a lifespan for the Rabat-Salé region. According to of 30 years. Tickets can be purchased at each Mohammed Souafi, a member of the tram stop with conductor checks per waggon. Commission Consultative de la Régionalisation, In 2017, Transdev was able to cover over 96% 2007 was the first time that the elements of of operational cost from ticket sales alone. political will, financing and operational tools The tram services about 110,000 passengers such as PPPs came together to create a viable a day and more than 32 million passengers opportunity for large-scale investment in a year. transport. The tram is widely viewed as a success. Construction began on the tramline in It is one of the projects that has been able 2007. A subsidiary of the AAVB, the Société du to strike the balance between promoting Tramway de Rabat Salé (STRS), was formed in the vision of a world class city and serving 2009 to manage the implementation of the the needs of its citizens. A plan is currently tram project and subsequent expansions. underway to expand the tram by 7km to Houda Drissi, the Project Manager for STRS, serve all the main routes into the city and its has noted that ‘at the start of the study, it surrounding areas, such as Hay Riad, Temara was thought that transportation was only and Salé El Jadida, at an estimated cost of needed in the Bouregreg region but dur- 1.7 billion MAD. Rabat-Salé has largely got ing the study, we realised that it needed to urban transport right, with the Rabat-Salé expand to the general areas of Rabat and Tramway as the beacon of excellence in the Salé.’ sector. The management and capacity of The financing for the tram was secured public transport systems have largely been through a 50:50 split of government fund- improved by the creation of transport enti- ing and international development loans. ties and the right financing mechanism. The money from the government came This combined public and private funding, through the FART fund, while global funds mobilised through concessions to private were acquired through the EU Bank, EIB and companies.

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Developing local technical capacity has The introduction of private contractors been crucial to the outcome of projects, seen in the final stage of service delivery has in the failure of the bus system versus the improved the quality of services provided to success of the Rabat-Salé tramway, which citizens. However, the trend has also led to is now self-sustaining just six years after its an increase in the cost of service provision launch. to municipalities. Wali Khalid Safir reiterated Nevertheless, Rabat and Salé still face the however, ‘If we had continued to self-man- challenge of densifying to support effective, age, it would be worse, in terms of quality.’ efficient and affordable public transporta- tion. As Fathallah Oualalou, former mayor Electricity of Rabat, noted, ‘the deficit of the bus sys- The electrification rate is 98.96% and the tem encouraged the growth of the informal final 1.04% who cannot access the service are sector … They will remain until there’s a suc- in rural areas and served by off-grid energy cessful modern transportation system, the solutions. Our poll revealed that 77% of resi- tramway isn’t enough. The tram costs more dents reported an improvement in electricity than informal measures, so it’s important to supply over the last four years, and 89% felt develop transport.’ that it is sufficient. Generation and transmission within the Service Delivery Moroccan electricity supply industry is con- In order to address the need for effective trolled by the national operator ONEE. In the service delivery in urban centres, Morocco case of Rabat and Salé, however, distribution has experimented with private sector con- has been contracted to the private French cessions as the main mode of delivery for company Redal, a subsidiary of Veolia. In municipal services, such as electricity, water 2000, Redal won a 30-year contract to pro- and waste management.395 vide the distribution services for Rabat and Casablanca was the first Moroccan city to Salé. Pricing is calculated as a fixed per- adopt concessions in the late 1990s, followed centage of the tariff over the period of the by Rabat by the early 2000s. The region of contract, with the tariff set by the Ministry Rabat-Salé and Kénitra developed the novel of Interior and subject to review upon solution of a regional coordination body, upstream changes in production costs. The Établissement de Coopération Intercommunale contract is performance-based and reviewed (ECI) Al Assima (henceforth Al Assima), to by Al Assima every five years. Redal oper- manage the concession process. ates a metered system with very few prepaid Founded in 2011 by a royal decree, meters. Nevertheless, it has been able to Al Assima manages the contracts for munici- obtain a 100% collection rate for private citi- pal service delivery, providing clarification zens due to their ability to cut off buildings on the different roles of the municipality and households for non-payment. and concessionaire. It oversees concession- The process of concessioning public infra- aires’ performance and implements various structure services was one of considerable penalties for non-compliance. Al Assima trial and error. As one Redal employee men- is a division of the Ministry of Interior and tioned it was only possible through, ‘clear reports to the regional municipalities. It is fixed objectives, adequate control mecha- directed by a 43-member council consist- nisms, sufficient indicators and detailed ing of the 17 elected presidents from the contracts.’ Prior to the concessionary system, municipalities, as well as 26 members that municipalities held the distributor role, but are proportionally representative of each this led to significant challenges as many municipality. municipalities, especially smaller ones, did

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not have the technical ability to deal with a subsidiary of ONEE. ONEP also distributes complex distribution issues. water to 500 small towns across Morocco, When the private companies entered the as well as creating the piped water network market, they had to make significant invest- and treating sewage and wastewater. In ments to the distribution and customer Rabat, Casablanca, and three other large cit- service infrastructure. These investments ies, however, water is supplied by ONEP and have proved profitable in the long run. distributed by Redal through a concession. Rabat and Salé have been able to crack Water supply was previously co-ordinated the code of efficient distribution by providing by an Inter-Ministerial Committee that was cost-reflective tariffs to consumers that ena- chaired and supported by the former King. ble the smooth functioning of the electricity But the Committee is defunct and has been supply system. replaced. The new Commission is working to decide on water priority issues but remains Water Services committed to the supply of fresh drinking Morocco sits in a desert region. Yet, the coun- water to the urban poor as instructed by the try’s water supply is relatively secure, as a King in his National Human Development result of its aggressive national dam-building Initiative (INDH). initiative 25 years ago. The Sidi Mohamed As a country on the edge of the Saharan Ben Abdellah Dam on the Bouregreg River Desert, Morocco has long taken the manage- supplies Rabat, Salé and their satellite towns, ment and preservation of its water resources and neighbouring Casablanca and Kénitra. very seriously. It has, so far, been able to keep In 2003, the dam was heightened by five pace with increasing demand. While rapid metres to increase resilience to drought. As population growth is now levelling off, rising an additional resilience measure, the coun- living standards and increased urbanisation try has invested heavily in desalination and will continue to drive higher demand. But a project is currently under way to build the there are still long-term initiatives in the pro- world’s largest desalination plant in Agadir, gramme to meet these challenges. Ensuring 550km from Rabat. a viable water supply is both a national The administration of water resources in and a city responsibility, and governance Morocco is split across four ministries: the arrangements need to reflect this reality. The Ministry of Interior responsible for munici- arrangements in Morocco appear complex, pal water supply with a legal responsibility but they have worked to provide adequate to provide drinking water; the Ministry of supply in a challenging region. In 2018, Cape Equipment, Logistics and Water, responsible Town nearly became the first modern city to for dams and water-related infrastructure; run out of water. As those in office attempt the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and to avert this situation, they would do well to Water, responsible for irrigation and soil study the Moroccan experience. erosion; and the Ministry of Energy, Mines, What the Rabat-Salé metropolis has Water and Environment, responsible for achieved is to boost the role of multiple, pollution control and water resource man- small concessions to provide a public urban agement. ‘Despite this setup, there is little service instead of one large, overarching conflict between Ministries,’ an interviewee contract as is found in many other African at the GIZ Water Programme confirmed, ‘as countries. Small concessions allow many the roles in the environmental side and the actors to operate in one sector, encour- user side of water are clearly defined.’ aging competition and efficiency, whilst The supply of bulk water services in urban minimising the effects of opaque, and often areas across Morocco is conducted solely overpriced, public tenders. The introduction by Office National de l’Eau Potable (ONEP), of Al Assima as a regional oversight body

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is an incredible initiative that removes the officials and ordinary citizens. The historical barriers that prevent government from nego- patterns of power embedded in the monar- tiating effectively with the private sector and chy and state bureaucracy will take a while ensuring quality service provision. to undo. Very few of these changes would have Conclusion: Do Interventions been possible without the economic growth Matter? Morocco has witnessed over the last two The story of Rabat and Salé reflects the decades. In opening up the economy and changes that have shaped Morocco over the focusing on diversifying exports and attract- last 20 years. Theirs remains the tale of what ing foreign investment, Morocco has been happens when the process of development is able to source the capital needed to pay for conceived and led by local actors. Morocco’s large scale infrastructure investment. The staggering growth marks the kind of progress application of those goals at the regional that can only be achieved through consistent level has been an additional boon and policy and fixed objectives. allowed for sustained growth over time. The security threats of the early 2000s, The key factor shaping positive outcomes with 9/11 and the Casablanca bombings, in Morocco is the high level of political will. were the driving force to implement radi- With the vision set by King Mohammed, cal changes in the country’s urban policy. the Ministry of Interior has enjoyed the The local bidonvilles had become breeding authority across all spheres of governance. grounds for Islamic extremism and terrorist As Fathallah Oualalou, former Morrocan recruitment. Through extensive infrastruc- Minister of Finance and Mayor of Rabat, has ture projects in housing, Morocco was able to noted: Morocco did something unique when declare 58 cities as slum free and drastically there was a planning shift from ‘focusing on reduce the number of urban residents living the small things to focusing on long term in slums. modernisation strategies.’ Not only was there considerable effort There are aspects to Morocco’s reform to move citizens out of slums, but the last process which have failed, not least what one 17 years have also seen investment into senior adviser calls the ‘crisis’ of the judicial building cities where people want to live, system, public health, and public educa- with modern transport like the Rabat-Salé tion. At the same time, he notes, there is ‘no tramway, clean water and functional waste reason why’ with ‘political will’ this cannot management. Rabat and Salé have managed be turned around quickly. It’s this attitude to introduce these changes by harnessing that has enabled the progress visible in Salé. the power of concessions in the delivery of The scenes from Black Hawk Down bear municipal services. no resemblance to contemporary Salé. The The 2011 constitutional reforms paved city has transformed from a warzone proxy the way for more democratic measures to a thriving urban hub, catalysed by govern- at the local government level. In the most ment action. The sheer scale and rapidity of recent iteration of advanced regionalisation, this change in half a generation is something the Kingdom’s commitment to increasing that few cities across the world have been democratic participation and building a solid able to achieve. It is the scale and speed of base of local government is deeply evident. change in Morocco from which other African However, Rabat and Salé continue to balance cities can learn and take heart. power between the bureaucracy, elected

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Conclusion: Between Wakanda and Dystopia

Themes transactions, revenue collection and permits. Electricity: Solving the problem of electric- This will depend on bandwidth availability ity supply depends on a complex system of and private sector participation. New cities issues, including getting the pricing right are largely an elite preoccupation and and achieving generation efficiencies. There solution. is a need to find private partners mandated Transport: The efficiency of public trans- to deliver low cost electricity, and expand- port, including BRTs, hinges on encouraging ing the grid, especially through renewable density, and careful integration. Bolster regu- energy projects. While unbundling may help lation and management of private commuter to improve efficiencies, the challenge of elec- services to ensure safety and affordability. tricity supply in Africa’s cities centres on No silver bullet solution is likely, and expen- generation, not transmission or distribution. sive schemes can often be elusive without Governance: Plans need to be imple- the necessary governance underpinnings mented and regulations enforced fairly, – the hardware and the software have to speedily and free from political intrigue and match. corruption. Match planning ambition with ‘I dream of a South Africa where the resources. The institutional software should first entirely new city built in the demo- be improved and regulatory space provided cratic era rises, with skyscrapers, schools, to give investors the confidence to fund the universities, hospitals and factories,’ South hardware. Africa’s President Cyril Ramaphosa said as Housing: Overwhelmingly neglected. he concluded his 2019 State of the Nation Greater focus on in-situ upgrading schemes. address.396 He also spoke of his dream of a Densification to be encouraged as a corollary bullet train linking all major South African of efficiency, especially for transport. Need cities. The President said that his ambition for more focus on workable Public Private had been fuelled by several conversations Partnerships; land and service provision inter alia with Chinese leader Xi Jinping, matched with investment in housing. ‘whose account of how China is building a Political Economy: Without economic new Beijing has helped to consolidate my growth, and the better policy choices and dream’.397 institutional structures that give rise to it, With a projected 70% of South Africans cities will not prosper. Attention must be living in urban areas by 2030, the President paid to the kernel of reforms that will deter- said, ‘The cities of Johannesburg, Tshwane, mine the future growth and prosperity path Cape Town and Ethekwini are running out of of African cities. Until now this has been space to accommodate all those who throng largely exclusive, not inclusive. to the cities. Has the time not arrived for us Security: Resource and technology-driven, to be bold and reach beyond ourselves and but not dependent on these. Solutions have do what may seem impossible? Has the time to link to wider economic opportunities and not arrived to build a new smart city founded social infrastructure. Requires national, on the technologies of the fourth industrial regional, and metropolitan organisational revolution?’ collaboration. Ramaphosa is not the first to dream Technology: Data and digitisation will of such an advanced city. Canberra, drive cities of the future, and Africa is no Washington and Brasilia were all prod- different. Mobile telephony remains a sig- ucts of such imagination. Africa has had its nificant and underexploited opportunity own share, including Yamoussoukro in Cote to deliver ‘e-governance’, by expediting d’Ivoire, Abuja and Eko-Atlantic in Nigeria,

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New Cairo in Egypt, Konza Technology City in terms of transportation, technology, in Kenya, Senegal’s $2 billion Diamniadio housing, electricity, waste and sanitation. Lake City, Tanzania’s Dodoma, or Vision City We applied this framework to the six cities in Rwanda. There are at least 18 new cities we researched with varying results. planned in Africa. In some cities we were able to instantly Africa’s planned new city projects gain access to high ranking security officials and theorists who helped us decode patterns Centenary City, Nigeria in the city. In others, the work of diligent Tatu, Kenya NGOs provided the key to understanding Konze Tech City, Kenya how informal transactions have shaped the Modderfontein, SA formal market. In some, a lack of accessible Eko Atlantic, Nigeria Diamniadio Lake City, Senegal data meant that whilst we spoke to a variety Nkwashi, Zambia of stakeholders, data was difficult to access, Asokoro Island, Nigeria not least on rates of migration. It confirmed Kiswishi, DRC that many African governments, especially King City, Ghana local governments, struggle with a data 0 5 10 15 20 problem. Visionary, tech-driven mega-city ventures The process highlighted the variance of are routinely touted by both public and pri- cities across the continent and that attempt- vate sectors as panaceas for Africa’s urban ing to devise a one-size-fits-all methodology problems. But they are unlikely to solve any would be severely misguided. of the pressing issues beyond perhaps those Most African cities are battling to build experienced by the elites. The minimum new infrastructure fast enough to cope with price for a home unit in Kigali’s Vision City is the flood of new residents. The complex- about $160,000 while up to 80% of the city’s ity of the demands – of sanitation, potable population live in slums.398 water, roads, electricity, public transport, Instead, the solutions to Africa’s con- health services, education – are overwhelm- temporary urban problems lie in creating ing to most governments, especially where sustainable financing and revenue models they are under-resourced and under-capital- to fund not only new cities, but upgrades ised. Nowhere are the problems of hardware and expansions of existing ones; of the more apparent than in Lagos, a city which skills needed to engineer solutions to waste has grown at a rate that has far outstripped and water, and of the governance standards infrastructure development. required to ensure high-tech connectivity. African cities – in contrast to those in East Asian countries – have lower capital invest- Hardware and Software ment budgets, with only about 20% of GDP At the start of the project, the thesis seemed allocated to rolling out new infrastructure. clear: there was a set of essential building China’s capital investment allocation rose blocks to create a thriving African city. The from 35% to 48% of GDP between 1980 and initial inclination was that the end results 2011 as rapid urbanisation got under way.399 of the research would show which of those In East Asia as a whole, capital expenditure blocks to prioritise in order to translate the was an average of 40% of GDP – twice as sites of despair of many African urban milieus much as the African allocation – during this into poles of prosperity, and in as short a period.400 time as possible. The blocks were divided But it is not just the budgets that are into a framework of hardware and software: problematic. Allocating capital expenditure the latter (software) comprising governance, to infrastructure without effective city man- security and policy; the former (hardware), agement, financial controls and governance

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– the appropriate software – leads to poor unfinished after years of delays. The serial execution of projects and, in some cases, ferry schemes are fated, it seems, to go much no outcome at all. the same way, victims of a deadly combina- Africa’s cities are struggling to cope with tion of ‘transactionalism’, little attention to rapid urbanisation because, in the words of the software of integration, a lack of leader- the World Bank ‘the urbanisation of people ship in providing oversight and attention to is not accompanied by an urbanisation of detail, and weak governance. capital’.401 This lends itself to inefficient and While we have focused on best (and some expensive transport, housing, electricity and bad) practice examples in Asia and Latin water supply. America, there are examples worth study- As one consequence, city economies ing closer to home. Cape Town’s Wesgro underperform and fail to provide the vol- investment and tourism agency has enjoyed ume of jobs to meet the rising number of remarkable success in facilitating invest- work seekers. Instead of benefitting from ment and, notably, air connections with the the economies of scale that result from Western Cape province. Morocco also offers urban agglomeration, these environments hope in the manner in which government become inefficient and expensive places to interventions have delivered almost immedi- live, buckling under services and infrastruc- ate results. ture backlogs, and unattractive to investors. This reminds that geography and even As one measure, manufacturers in African demography is not destiny. While Rabat may cities pay higher wages than those in other be just four hours flying time from Lagos, developing regions.402 The World Bank report it’s a world away. finds, for example, ‘Manufacturing firms in Instead of paralysing traffic, transport African cities pay higher nominal wages than moves quickly on a multilane highway, not a urban firms in other countries at compara- pothole in sight. Instead of sprawling tin and ble development levels: unit labour costs are wooden slums, the expressway offers views three times higher in Djiboutiville, Djibouti, of cranes atop new multi-story housing set- than in Mumbai, India and 20% higher in tlements stretching out towards the horizon. Dar es Salaam, Tanzania than in Dhaka, Instead of clusters of yellow Lagosian danfo Bangladesh.’ taxis clustered at informal stops hindering The resultant lack of investment traffic flows, Morocco’s roadside amenities ensures a vicious cycle of low growth, scant and its péage would not be out of place in resources, weak management, negligible Europe; nor would Casablanca’s surly immi- capital expenditure, expensive and time- gration officers. consuming governance transactions, and few As you leave the city, instead of bush jobs, all of which limits the money available and mounds of garbage there are ploughed to deal with infrastructure. fields, acres of which are under a different Lagos also illustrates how the roll-out of sort of plastic — greenhouses producing for infrastructure depends on software – in this Europe’s tables just 14 kms away across the instance a combination of good governance Gibraltar Strait from Tangier. For a while and the delivery of plans, which requires the 350km road from Casablanca to Tangier proper financial controls, managerial over- hugs the TGV rail-line, which was opened in sight, and technical skills. Perhaps most November 2018 after ten years of planning emblematic of an infrastructure project and construction, cutting the journey to a stuck in the mire of poor software is Lagos’ fuss-free two hours. ‘blue line’ train project which was supposed Traditions remain. Women in jellaba and to provide public rail transport to allevi- men in Obi Wan Kenobi-style pointy-hatted ate the city’s traffic congestion but remains

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amama tend sheep on the verges of the surprising effects. Ironically, the initial motorway. reason behind Lagos’s success in collect- This merging of European modernity and ing revenue was the Federal Government Berber tradition, which has so far worked to reducing funding to the city. Also in Lagos, Morocco’s advantage, the economy touch- a drive for centralisation and a lack of trust ing 5% growth for nearly 15 years, has been has severely limited the role for local gov- driven by foreign investors and they, in turn, ernment and communities are suffering as by a sweated combination of good policy a result. For cities to be successful, consid- and governance, an enabling environment erable thought needs to be applied to the (supported by stability) and infrastructure governmental arrangements so that they are and service delivery, and a healthy openness reinforcing rather than inhibiting. to technology and innovation. Ensuring an Enabling Environment Four Threads of Reform Second, inclusive governance and prosperity We have learnt much about what works and requires both growth and security. Much can what does not, in Africa and further afield. be done to set the right environment for From all of this, four reform threads emerge. development so that when it does occur, its First and, the most essential, is that poli- effect is multiplied in a positive direction. tics and governance have to be aligned and right. Africa is blessed with an abundance of ener- There are many examples where vested getic young people, who, properly enabled short-term interests were preventing pro- and supported, have the potential to drive gress and driving investment away. Big significant change. Principally this is about infrastructure projects that take longer than planning and regulation, but it is also about the political cycle are of particular concern security. and often expand in time and cost accord- Security is of key importance for a city ingly, something that Africans can ill afford. to develop and thrive. Provision of a secure There is also a political attraction to large environment is a major challenge in every services projects, such as the Private Finance sub-Saharan African city we studied. It is a Initiative for refuse collection in Lagos, when complex area where national, regional, and such a large-scale approach is very difficult, metropolitan organisations often compete, perhaps impossible to deliver, and fraught instead of co-operating. Both Lagos and Cape with transactional opportunity rather than Town have put considerable efforts into guaranteeing the prospect of delivery. securing their central business districts but By getting the politics right we mean set- have struggled to make an impact beyond ting an environment that is supportive to these areas. citizens and investors alike, one that gains As was noted in the international section, their trust and instils confidence that pro- Latin America offers interesting lessons in gress against such colossal challenges can how improvements can be quickly achieved and is being made. It is about active messag- with decisive action, a merit shared by Rabat. ing backed up with substantive actions. In Security is invariably a casualty of such an environment it is likely that many systemic economic crises and the under- small steps taken together offer a better resourcing of police and other security prospect for delivering more radical change services. Medellín in Colombia, in particular, than large projects. provides an example of how the combination We also found several examples of city, of credible policing plus intelligence, tech- regional and national governments not co- nology (notably CCTV) and infrastructure operating on key issues. This can produce spending can transform an area where these

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are combined with a bottom-up community is cost-effective with population density. approach to address the underlying social Any regulation that limits building height, causes of the problem. These examples are and thus density, as we observed in Rabat, transferable. has consequences for public transport. Recife, the fourth largest city in Brazil Sprawling development, such as in Cape with a population of four million, has copied Town, does not lend itself to public transport. the Medellín approach with some success, Most cities possess plans of varying detail though Brazil’s inner-city woes with crime, and ambition, but they usually lack match- unemployment and social dislocation do not ing regulations, funding and institutional augur well for Africa. If a country as edu- resources. In many cases, we observed that cationally and economically sophisticated the building and planning regulations bore as Brazil is struggling, how can countries in distinct colonial hallmarks and were charac- Africa cope with the coming challenge given terised by stultifying bureaucratic inertia. All comparatively less diversified economies and too often, we found the process open to cor- educated populations? ruption and political intrigue. What makes the security dilemma appar- Africa’s urban living costs are higher than ently so intractable in the cities we studied those of comparable cities elsewhere. Food, were the large-scale nature of youth unem- rents, goods and services are all more expen- ployment and the lack of resource with sive. African city dwellers pay 35% more for which to fund the required measures. These food than low or middle-income countries issues make it all the more imperative to elsewhere. Housing is 55% more expensive achieve unity of effort between all stake- and transport 42% more costly. ‘Overall, holders engaged in this area, both public and urban households pay 20% to 31% more for private. goods and services in African countries than Our studies reinforced how difficult it in other developing countries,’ a World Bank was for many to set up and run small and study found.403 Anything that can be done, medium sized businesses. Problems range however small, to chip away at this issue to from the number of permits required, to the reduce the costs of the operating environ- challenges of intermittent electricity and ment is vital. internet access, to dealing with corrupt prac- Across Africa, as we noted in the Cape tices and low productivity. Such issues drive Town chapter, acceptance of the principle up costs. A consequence of poor urban devel- of density in housing, land availability, the opment that is frequently overlooked is the provision of bulk services – especially elec- high cost that must be borne by residents tricity – and the capacity of construction due to such inefficiencies. companies to build to scale are all required to manage future housing challenges. Delivering Infrastructure Three further things will need to happen The third thread relates to the delivery of to deliver African housing that meets the infrastructure and services to the benefit of urban demands of citizens, and which will in turn populations. assist in creating employment.404 It is essential to have a realistic, clear First, given the complexity of land title long-term view of how the city needs to and the prioritisation of funding, there needs develop and then to put in place the regu- to be a political push in this sector. Success lations to support delivery of the plan. The will necessarily have to be multifaceted. lesson from Curitiba, the birthplace of the Financing options must include greater Bus Rapid Transport (BRT) system, Colombia autonomy for local authorities to generate and elsewhere, is that public transport and spend revenue. Without this, they have

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little interest in promoting economic growth requiring large amounts of regulatory over- and nor can they afford essential infrastruc- sight or financial burden, are preferable. ture, without which ‘sensible plans become Government has to improve bureaucratic idle dreams’.405 This requires the banks, efficiencies to leverage housing opportuni- developers and governments to come up ties. The average waiting time in Africa for with funding schemes that share risk and a construction permit is 162.2 days, while reward. registering property costs 8.3% of the value.409 Second, as is hinted above, housing needs Job creation in Africa would be greatly to be made affordable, both in terms of build- assisted by allowing people to live within ing and financing. The Centre for Affordable easy access to the places they work. Much Housing Finance in Africa (CAHF) has cal- of low-tech, high-labour manufacturing can- culated that the price of the least expensive not, by definition, be done virtually. Equally, newly built house by a formal, private devel- the growth of Africa’s middle class will occur oper in select countries is $31 085, while through home ownership, which increases the mean per capita income is $1 764. This their stake in economic, policy and political compares to the standard global affordabil- stability. To achieve this future, the provision ity measure of three to five times the annual of housing in Africa will have to involve both household income.406 Little wonder then that the private and public sectors. It will unques- most move instead into the informal sector, tionably be a marathon with no finishing where costs range from 2% (in Malawi) to line, a self-licking lollipop, since the more 15% (Zambia) of the cheapest formal unit. one gets things right in the city, the more This requires building in a manner that people will come, and the more difficult it keeps costs to appropriate levels, as well as will be to achieve success. It will be closely through innovative financing models, includ- tied in with land title and banking systems, ing subsidised houses and loans. Moreover, and the establishment of credit through Africa’s mortgage market, for example, careful profiling. is hopelessly underserviced. Typical terms on African mortgages are an interest rate The Thread of Technology and of around 22% and a term of only ten years, Innovation catering thus to a ‘to a tiny income elite’.407 Fourth, and finally, new technology and smart Third, there needs to be clarity on legal use of data offer the prospect of some devel- title and rights. There are a number of opmental shortcuts but no silver bullet. positive ways in which government might For example, Africa has jumped over fixed, become involved. It could be by relaxing by- wired phones straight into mobile commu- laws to allow residences to legally become nications, circumventing weak and predative businesses, making land available for high- government. employment businesses in tough areas at At an early point in our research we vis- peppercorn rentals or for the building of ited the Building Research Establishment high-rises. There is a related need to address in the UK. It is an impressive organisation not only the ownership of land, including the that is driving real change and betterment. promotion of sectional title, but also its avail- But it was not, unsurprisingly, focused on ability, through state intervention. Currently African issues. If donors wanted to make a most cities are locked into a ‘straitjacket of real impact in helping Africans deliver suc- insufficient space’.408 Those opportunities not cessful urbanisation in a more sustainable way, funding research into building methods

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and techniques applicable to the continent Intelligence to predict when trees might would be a useful contribution. Urbanisation fall across train tracks using data from on its current track will bring with it a huge the cameras in the drivers’ cabs, their aim demand for electricity and consequent car- being to reduce delays by better targeting bon emissions; this does not have to be the maintenance. case. Our work on affordable housing in For western cities, the move to ‘smart’ Lagos, as part of this project, hints at possible status offers the prospect of incremental alternative, or homegrown approaches. Many gains; for African cities it could offer some of these advantages are private sector driven, step changes. It is the very lack of legacy including the growth impact of mobile bank- structures and linear development that ing, still to be fully exploited. avails these environments to the prospect Innovation, in turn, relies on accurate of leapfrogging, but it will require consider- data for planning and troubleshooting. In able mental agility. Data would be useful, for many of the cities in which we worked, lack instance, in evaluating the value of informal of accurate data for city planning was a sig- systems of service delivery that have grown nificant issue. Yet we are equally convinced to cover for the lack of formal provision. that a lot of useful data did exist or could In an environment where there is often a be acquired relatively easily. For example; chronic lack of trust in all forms of govern- Uber, Google and MTN must all have data ment, such advances will need to be handled on traffic flows in Lagos. This could be used extremely carefully. to ensure that best use is made of existing Digitisation offers the promise of infrastructure. In Mombasa when the flow smoother and faster delivery of services. But of traffic over the bridges was optimised the biggest short-term gain for African cities to allow more lanes going into the city in is probably in e-government, more a con- the morning and more coming out in the temporary buzzword than an African city evening, traffic congestion was eased consid- operating system. On one side of the ledger, erably. Our contention is that by focusing on cashless banking also offers enormous gains, the holistic collection of data and its analy- estimated by Visa at $12 trillion over 15 years sis, considerable improvements can be made until 2032.410 Citi estimates, for example, in the way existing infrastructure is used. that even a 10% increase in digital money The drive to ‘Smart Cities’ is taking this readiness could help up to 220 million indi- idea many steps further. London, with its viduals enter the formal global financial stated aim of becoming the ‘smartest city sector with an annual gain of $1 trillion. On in the world’, has been experimenting. For the other, smart city benefits are possible example, in 2018 Transport for London across a number of areas, from transport to adapted onboard bus CCTV to conduct accu- commerce. The benefits of this approach are rate passenger counts, and it also recorded estimated for a mid-size city (1.5 million peo- how many passengers were using their smart ple) to be in the order of $100–$110 million phones to connect to Wi-Fi. Their aim was to in direct value and $275–$500 million in better understand how their customers use indirect value annually.411 their network. The British Department of The areas of potential gain are highlighted Transport has funded a trial using Artificial in the table, below:412

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Eight Areas of Smart City Benefit Key Performance Widely Available Pilot Phase Cutting Edge Indicator Environment Connected bins which Connected LED lights Underground waste notify when full, optimizing adapting to natural vacuum systems with garbage truck routes lighting levels and flow automated sorting and of people recycling Transport Traffic lights to prioritise Traffic lights which Autonomous car sharing traffic in a binary system prioritise based on with automated routing flows and recognised by based on traffic and cameras incidents Safety Connected CCTV which Predictive policing Facial recognition of monitors the city based on camera feed people from CCTV and and crowd analysis automated tracking Utilities Smart meters which monitor Automated reporting Smart grid, enabling bi- consumption and sends data to citizens about their directional energy flow to energy/water provider at energy usage and plan with adaptive energy regular intervals for optimising energy storage and power use management Health Repartition of patients in Real-time air quality Body temperature and function of hospital capacity measurement at health parameters granular local level monitored on-street to detect epidemics Communities Non-emergency problems Digital kiosk widely e-participation of escalated to the municipality installed throughout citizens into decision the city making of municipality Tourism & Location-based event Crowd management to Drone surveillance of Entertainment advertisement optimise crowd moves large-scale events Commerce Smart lockers for last mile User-customised Drone deliveries to delivery adverts on street decongest ground traffic screens Source: BCG, GSMA

But Africa has some way to go to realise Despite the advantages of the existing and these benefits. new technologies on offer, the prospect of a The Eden Strategy Institute has ranked Wakanda is illusionary, not least because smart city government worldwide.413 Europe, some of the reform basics are missing. America and Asia all featured strongly. Africa’s only entry in the top 50 was Kigali at The Imperative of Endless Reform #50. Still relatively small with a population In No One Writes to the Colonel, the Nobel of about one million, the Rwandan capital’s Laureate Gabriel García Márquez tells the numbers are expected to triple by 2040. The story of a retired military man struggling ranking was weighted towards leadership, with poverty and the corruption of local offi- vision, people and policies, with the empha- cials, forgotten in a small town, hoping to get sis being on the overall approach rather than the pension promised years before. Márquez the hard cash resources available. But even poignantly explores the impact of govern- given this methodology, Africa’s showing, ment and unemployment during a time of overall, was weak. While qualitative, non- violence and political tension. He may have scientific metrics of city life and appeal are been writing about Colombia but could so important to liveability, low crime, efficient easily have been writing about much of transport, effective public services, and Africa. health and sanitation count for more.414

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International experience shows that the protectionism and subsidisation – rent- most progress against the twin challenges of seeking – and discouraged the inclusive population growth and urbanisation, at any investment in institutions and regimes level, has been made when there has been necessary to ensure the high-growth devel- both a clear vision and strong leadership. opment path seen elsewhere. It is possible to tackle such huge Certainly, Africa can learn from oth- challenges, and keep moving forward, with ers who have attempted to rebalance elite unified action across government across interests in promoting reforms. Fernando departments and between local, provincial Henrique Cardoso devised ‘Plan Real’ as and national levels. A long-term boost via Finance Minister to rid Brazil of hyperinfla- upfront investment in education is vital, as tion, which had hit 2,000% annually, in part is a short-term focus on getting the security by curbing monetary indiscipline in pegging and rule of law, infrastructure and business the new currency to the US dollar. It was regulation pieces right. Ultimately it will be, impossible to address policies for growth and as Jaime Lerner, the father of the BRT system, inclusion without underlying macro-stability. has pointed out, creating a sense of shared There are lessons the two-time president responsibility between the government and says apply to reformers outside Brazil too. its citizens and between the public and ‘I think the key question for any reformer private sectors that will provide the momen- is how to build a political constituency and tum to turn population growth and sound system at the same time,’ he says. increasing urbanisation into a force for eco- ‘To do this, you have to promote good lead- nomic empowerment. And this will require ership, and you have to have a vision about pushing on with reforms that aim to trans- what is happening around the world, with form the nature of the political-economy – the which you can integrate your policies and system of who gets what, when and how (the efforts. You also have to have sound eco- core questions of the discipline of politics) in nomic policies. And you have to keep tabs on the context of scarcity (the issues or patterns crony capitalists. If you do all of this, you will of production and distribution alongside the have a chance to get things done.’ key questions of the discipline of economics). This is sage advice from a president who The nature of the political economy sets the did things few have attempted and even boundaries for reform and growth.415 fewer successfully so in stabilising a large Whether Africa’s changing demography hyperinflating economy and instituting presents more apparently unassailable prob- tough reforms within a fractious democratic lems, or a great opportunity will to a great environment. As Africa’s leaders ponder the extent depend on how governments respond challenges of rapid urbanisation, changing – in a phrase, on the breadth and depth of demography and the linked imperative to their institutional and policy reforms. create jobs, they would do well to heed such Until now most African countries have experience – of the importance of match- continued with the economic structures ing redistributive impulses with continuous inherited at independence, based on com- reforms, investing less in mega-projects than modities, where a greater effort was made in services and security, and avoiding the post-independence to share the spoils, but costs to competitiveness of capture by busi- among the elites. This has not spurred higher ness of the state, and vice versa. productivity even if it ensured a meas- The challenges are enormous. African cit- ure of political buy-in and stability. Rather ies are a highly complex mix of formal and this system has generally perpetuated informal systems and economies. Each city

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has its own distinct character and issues. the hardware. Clever thinking, a common Whilst there is no one answer, after all this purpose, unity of effort, a determination to work we are inclined to suggest an approach make effective use of Africa’s greatest asset that seeks to improve the software in order in its young work force, all have a key role to to give investors the confidence to fund play in tackling Africa’s urban dilemma.

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Endnotes

Preface and Acknowledgements 10 Max Fischer, ‘The Amazing, Surprising, 1 Somik Vinay Lall, J Vernon Henderson and Africa-Driven Demographic Future of Anthony J. Venables, Africa’s Cities: Opening the Earth, in 9 Charts.’ Published online Doors to the World, Washington, D.C.: World by The Washington Post, 2013, http: // Bank Publications, 2017, p. 11. www.washingtonpost .com/blogs/ 2 Jeff Desjardins, ‘By 2100 none of the worldviews/wp/2013/07/16/the-amazing- world’s biggest cities will be China, the surprising-africa-driven-demographic US or Europe’, Published online by The -future-of-the-earth-in-9-charts. World Economic Forum, 2018, https:// 11 International Monetary Fund, ‘Regional www.weforum.org/agenda/2018/07/ Economic Outlook: Sub-Saharan Africa’, by-2100-none-of-the-worlds-biggest-cities- ISBN-13: 978-1-47551-995-2, 2015. will-be-in-china-the-us-or-europe. 12 African Development Bank Group, African Economic Outlook 2019. ISBN 978-9938-882- Introduction: The Rise and Rise 87-2, 2019. of the African City 13 Mark Anderson and Achilleas 3 Ibid, p. 26. Galatsidas, ‘Urban population boom 4 Edward L Glaeser, Agglomeration Economics, poses massive challenges for Africa Chicago and London: The University of and Asia’, Published online by The Chicago Press, 2007, p. 1. Guardian, http://www.theguardian. 5 Africa’s Cities, op cit, p. 10. com/global-development/2014/jul/10/ 6 Steve Connor, ‘Global population will urban-population-growth-africa-asia- soar to 11.2bn by 2100 – with Africa united- nations, 2014. accounting for much of the growth, 14 United Nations Department of says UN forecast’, Published online Economic and Social Affairs, ‘World by The Independent, 2015, http://www. Urbanisation Prospects: The 2014 independent.co.uk/news/world/africa/ Revision’, http://www.un.org/en/ global-population-will-soar-to-112bn-by- development/desa/news/population/ 2100-with-africa- accounting-for-much-of- worldurbanization- prospects-2014.html. the-growth-says-un-10448880.html. See also http://www.prb.org/publications/ 7 AfrAsia Bank and New World Wealth datasheets/2013/2013-world-population- reports that Johannesburg is home to 23 data- sheet/data-sheet.aspx. 400 millionaires, 30% of the African total, 15 Remi Jedwab, Luc Christaensen and with Egypt second on 10 200, Lagos third Marina Gindelsky, ‘The Speed of with 9 100, Cape Town with 8 900, and Urbanization and Economic Development: Nairobi with 6 200. See ‘The richest city A Comparison of Industrial Europe and in South Africa’, Published online by the Contemporary Africa,’ Presented to BBC, 2015,https://www.bbc.com/news/ the World Bank-GWU Conference on world-africa-34138610. Urbanization and Poverty Reduction, 8 United Nations Department of Economic http://siteresources.worldbank.org/ and Social Affairs, ‘World Population INTIE/Resources/475495-1368648404460/ Prospects: The 2012 Revision’, Working Jedwab_The_Speed_of_Urbanization_ Paper No. ESA/P/WP.228, 2013. Tales_from_ Europe_and_Africa.pdf. 9 Ibid. 16 Max Fischer, op cit.

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17 We are grateful to Paul Collier for this 2000: Synthèse des changements et bilan insight. statistique’, Population, vol. 59, no. 3, 2004, 18 Louis Wirth, ‘Urbanism as a Way of Life’, pp. 455–555. American Journal of Sociology, Vol. 44, 1938, 25 See https://populationpyramid.net/ pp. 1–24. world/2090/ and on African figures, and 19 For discussion of geographic-functional https://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/ definitions of the city, see Richard G. Fox, worldviews/wp/2013/07/16/the-amazing-. Urban Anthropology: Cities in their Cultural 26 The Congrès internationaux d’architecture Settings, Englewood Cliffs: Prentice- moderne (CIAM), or International Hall, 1977; Smith, Michael E. (1989), Congresses of Modern Architecture, was ‘Cities, Towns, and Urbanism: Comment a hugely influential organization founded on Sanders and Webster’, American in 1928 and disbanded in 1959. It was Anthropologist, Volume 91, pp. 454–461; and responsible for a series of conferences in Michael E. Smith, Aztec City-State Capitals, Europe attended by the most prominent Gainesville: University Press of Florida, architects of the era, aimed at developing 2008 . the view that building design and urban 20 United Nations, Department of Economic planning were economic and political and Social Affairs, Population Division, tools that could be used to improve the World Urbanization Prospects: The 2014 world. Revision, Highlights., New York: United 27 Carlos Nunes Silva, Urban Planning in Sub- Nations, p. 5, 2014. Saharan Africa; Colonial and Post Colonial 21 Washington DC Government, ‘District’s Planning Cultures. New York: Routledge, Population Continues to Grow: Census 2015 p. 9. Figures Show District Gained 9 782 28 Ibid p. 21. Residents over Year that Began July 2013’, 29 For example see: Paul E Peterson, City Press Release, 23 December 2014, http:// Limits. Chicago and London: The University dc.gov/release/district’s-population- of Chicago Press, 1981. continues-grow. For Greater DC Metro 30 See http://www.seguridadjusticiaypaz. Area demographic data see Montgomery org.mx/biblioteca/prensa/ College, DC-VA-MD-WV Metropolitan Area send/6-prensa/231-caracas-venezuela-the- Demographic Data, online at http://cms. most-violent-city-in-the-world, Accessed montgomerycollege.edu/EDU/Department. 28 January 16. aspx?id=45952. 31 David Kilcullen presentation to The 22 United States Department of Defense, ‘JP Brenthurst Foundation’s Future of African 3-06 Joint Urban Operations’, 2013, p. 7. Cities conference in Mombasa, Kenya, 23 David Kilcullen, ‘The City as a System: November 2019 Future Conflict and Urban Resilience’,The 32 Martin van Creveld, Fighting Power: German Fletcher Forum of International Affairs, Vol. and US Army performance, 1939–1945. 36 No. 2, 2012, pp. 19–39. See also David J. Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1982. Kilcullen, Out of the Mountains: The Coming Age of the Urban Guerrilla. New York: Oxford Section One: International Comparisons University Press, 2013, Chapter 1 and 33 This section is based on a research trip to Appendix A. Recife, Suape, Salvador, Brasilia, Curitibe, 24 For an in-depth study of the population São Paolo and Rio de Janeiro in November grow dynamics of this period see: 2015. Unless otherwise indicated, the D Tabutin and B Schoumaker, ‘La quotations and statistics are derived from démographie de l’Afrique au sud du interviews conducted during that visit. Sahara des années 1950 aux années

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34 See https://www.worldatlas.com/articles/ 43 Commonly held to be: Lee Kuan Yew, murder-rates-by-country.html. lawyer David Marshall, unionist Devan 35 At https://www.pulse.ng/bi/politics/ Nair, lawyer Eddie Barker, Goh Keng Swee these-were-the-50-most-violent-cities-in- the economist, Lim Kim San, Ong Pang the-world-in-2018/rl5n5yj , last accessed Boon, Othman Wok, S Rajaratnam, and 24 October 2019. Toh Chin Chye. 36 IM Pei, who inter alia had designed the 44 Cited in ‘Founding Fathers’. Singapore: The pyramid at the Louvre, and Kenzo Tange New Paper, 2015, p. 123. were roped in to improve the cityscape 45 Discussion, HDB, Singapore, 5 December of Singapore in the 1970s. Lee had met 2013. Tange when receiving an honorary degree 46 At http://eresources.nlb. at the University of Hong Kong in 1970, gov.sg/history/events/ and the following year invited him to c4c0b6bf-d674-4851-a3d4-fcc0b9d785d2. the Istana. Tange redesigned the United 47 See Stephen Dobbs, The Singapore River: Overseas Bank building, while Pei designed A Social History, 1819-2002. Singapore: the Raffles City complex and rebuilt the Singapore University Press, 2003. Overseas Chinese Banking Corporation. 48 This is based, in part, on two trips to 37 This and the other interviews cited here Indonesia: to Jakarta, Semarang, Yogykarta were conducted on 18-20 January 2016 and Japara in August 2014; and Bandung in Singapore, unless otherwise indicated. and Jakarta in January 2016. See also Remarks by Peter Ho at the Public 49 See Joe Studwell, How Asia Works. Profile: Conference on ‘Lee Kuan Yew and the London, 2014. See also Elizabeth Pisani, Physical Transformation of Singapore’, 18 Indonesia Etc. WW Norton: New York, 2014. September 2013. See ‘Liveable Sustainable 50 The rate of urbanisation was provided by Cities’. Singapore: Centre for Liveable Cities, the Government of Jakarta, 26 January 2014. 2016. 38 See for example, http://www. 51 Discussion, Jakarta, 26 January 2016. worldairportawards.com/awards/world_ 52 The first phase of the LRT project airport_rating.html. construction will cost around US$900 39 http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/ million for three covering 17.9 kms. NY.GDP.PCAP.CD?page=6. 53 See for example, ‘Top architect uses role 40 See Huang Lijie and Joyce Fang, Front Page as mayor to transform Indonesian city’, Stories of Singapore Since 1845. Singapore: Financial Times, 7 April 2014, at http://www. Strait Times Press, 2015. ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/0820c7c4-b358-11e3- 41 Shanghai is the world’s busiest port in b09d-00144feabdc0.html#axzz3y1vJAR2I. 2019. See Nick Routley, ‘Here are the 54 See http://vanmediagroup.com/ twenty busiest ports on the planet’, World blog/wp-content/uploads/2017/07/ Economic Forum, 5 February 2019, at https:// Siemens-Bandung-Cities_Magazin- www.weforum.org/agenda/2019/02/ Final_17June17_use-this.pdf. visualizing-the-world-s-busiest-ports. 55 See, for example, http://www. On the history of Singapore, see Iain thejakartapost.com/news/2014/03/23/ Manley, Tales of Old Singapore. Hong Kong: blusukan-essential-jokowi-s-bid.html. Earnshaw Books, 2010, p. 9. 56 The first phase of the LRT project 42 See https://www.thetropicalist. construction will cost around US$900 press/2015/12/theverandahriots/ million for three covering 17.9 kms. 57 Ibid.

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58 See https://www.ozy.com/fast-forward/ 68 Ignatian Solidarity Network, ‘Central why-rio-is-brazils-new-murder- American Migration’, January 2016. capital/95015/. 69 At https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/ 59 See ‘SDGs in the Rio de Janeiro NY.GDP.PCAP.KD?locations=IN-ID-NG. Metropolitan Area and in Brazil’, https:// 70 Lagos is both a city and a state. Under issuu.com/casafluminense/docs/caderno_ Nigerian legislation, it is one of 36 states ingl__s, accessed 24 October 2019 in the federal republic. However, as the 60 At https://www. smallest state geographically, it also americasquarterly.org/content/ operates as a single metropolis. qa-why-prison-violence-so-bad-brazil 71 The introduction is extracted from 61 See https://urban-leds.org/wp-content/ Greg Mills and Dickie Davis, ‘Lagos, the uploads/2019/resources/case_studies/ Relentless City’. Daily Maverick, October ICLEI_cs_190_Curitiba_Urban-LEDS.pdf. 2017 62 See https://onlinepubs.trb.org/onlinepubs/ 72 This setup created one Federal Capital tcrp/tcrp90v1_cs/Curitiba.pdf. Territory (FCT) in Abuja, 36 states, and 63 ‘Inter-American Development Bank 768 LGAs across Nigeria, embodied in the Report: Industrial Clusters and Economic 1999 Constitution, to distribute national Performance in Brazil’, October 2013 revenue fairly and devolve administrative http://idbdocs.iadb.org/wsdocs/ duty where necessary. getdocument.aspx?docnum=38216320, 73 See, ‘The History of Lagos’ available at last accessed 3 April 2016. lagosat50.org.ng. 64 At https://colombiareports.com/medellin- 74 Fabienne Hoelzel (ed), Urban Planning crime-security-statistics/, last accessed 24 Processes in Lagos, Heinrich Böll Stiftung October 2019 and Fabulous Urban, 2016, at https:// 65 See Fox News Latino, ‘Honduran City is ng.boell.org/sites/default/files/160206_ World Murder Capital; Juarez Drops for urban_planning_processes_digital_new. Second Year in a Row’, 6 February 2013, pdf. online at http://latino.foxnews.com/latino/ 75 See ‘Governance Institutions: Local news/2013/02/08/honduran-city-is-world- Government in Lagos’. CPPA Research, murder-capital-juarez-drops-for-second- 2015 year-in-row/#ixzz2KuzDXdTH. 76 See Transparency International: ‘Global 66 This section draws on original research Corruption Barometer’ at https:// produced by a Caerus Associates field www.transparency.org/gcb2013/ team led by Stacia George and Dr. country?country=nigeria. Christopher Johnson, which conducted 77 The All Progressive Congress is a merger of fieldwork in 2012-2013 in San Pedro Sula. three of Nigeria’s main opposition parties, See Caerus Associates, ‘The City as A Action Congress of Nigeria, the Congress System: Understanding Illicit and Licit for Progressive Change and the All Nigeria Networks in San Pedro Sula, Honduras’, Peoples Party. (Washington DC: unpublished research 78 See Transparency International: ‘Global paper, 6 February 2013). Corruption Barometer’ at https:// 67 James Bargent, ‘Latin America Dominates www.transparency.org/gcb2013/ World’s Most Dangerous Cities List’, Insight country?country=nigeria. Crime, Friday, 8 February 2013, online at 79 Ibid. http://www.insightcrime.org/news-briefs/ 80 World Bank: ‘Doing Business in latin-america-dominates-worlds-most- Nigeria 2018’, World Bank Group, dangerous-cities-list. 2018, at https://www.doingbusiness. org/content/dam/doingBusiness/

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media/Subnational-Reports/DB_in_ 94 Charles Kumolu and Prince Okafor, Nigeria_2018_w-bookmarks.pdf. ‘86 migrants enter Lagos every 81 BudgIT. 2017. ‘Lagos State 2017 Budgit’ hour – Ambode’, Vanguard, February at http://yourbudgit.com/wp-content/ 2017, at https://www. vanguardngr. uploads/2017/07/Lagos-State-Budget-2017. com/2017/02/86-migrants-enter-lagos- pdf. every-hour- amb ode/ 82 R.A Adams, Public Sector Accounting and 95 CO Olatubara, Fundamentals of Housing. Finance. Lagos: Corporate Publishers Housing Development and Management, a Venture, 2006 Book of Reading. 2007 83 Lagos Internal Revenue Service (LIS), at 96 Currency conversion was done at the http://www.lirs.gov.ng/. exchange rate at the time of writing, US$1 84 See https://www.vanguardngr.com/2012 = N360. /06/self-assessment-practice-in-nigeria/. 97 Lagos State Government Ministry of 85 BudgIT, 2017, op cit. Housing. ‘Number of Houses Built between 86 See Yomi Kazeem, ‘Lagos is Africa’s 7th 1979–2017.’ largest economy and is about to get 98 Governor Jakande was Lagos’s last civilian bigger with its first oil finds’,Quartz governor before the advent of military rule Africa, https://qz.com/africa/676819/ in 1983. lagos-is- -7th-largest 99 Greg Mills, ‘Up the Creek with a -economy-and-is-about-to-get-bigger- Paddle: Building Modern Singapore’, with-its-first-oil-finds/. Brenthurst Foundation Discussion Paper, 87 Lagos Global: Office of Overseas Affairs 3/2016, available at http://www. and Investment. 2017. See http://www. thebrenthurstfoundation.org/workspace/ lagosglobal.org/about-lagos-state/. files/brenthurst-paper-201603.pdf. 88 Nigerian Port Authority: Budget and 100 Segun Adewole, ‘15 things to know about Statement, 2017, at http://yourbudgit. third mainland bridge in Lagos’, Kemi com/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/ Filani News, April 2018 at https://www. NIGERIAN-PORT-AUTHORITY-2017- kemifilani.com/2018/04/third-mainland- Financial-Report-Analysis.pdf. bridge-lagos.html. 89 World Bank. 2018. ‘Doing Business in 101 Jointly published by the Heinrich Böll 2018: Reforming to Create Jobs’ at http:// Stiftung Nigeria and Fabulous Urban. www.doingbusiness.org/content/dam/ 2016. ‘Urban Planning Processes in Lagos: doingBusiness/media/Annual-Reports/ policies, laws, planning instruments, English/DB2018-Full-Report.pdf. strategies and actors of urban projects, 90 Carin Smith, ‘Lagos set to overtake urban development and urban services in Johannesburg as 2nd largest African Africa’s largest city’. city by GDP’, fin24, December 2017 at 102 Lagos State Government: https://www.fin 24.com/ Economy/ ‘Towards Reforming Lagos’ lagos-set-to-overtake-johannesburg-as- Transport Sector’, 2016 at https:// 2nd-largest-african-city-by-gdp-20171 224. lagosstate.gov.ng/blog/2017/03/28/ 91 Heinrich Boll Stiftung, ‘Lagos’ Informal towards-reforming-lagostransport-sector/. Sector: Taxation and Contribution to 103 Urban Planning Processes in Lagos, 2016. Economy’ at https://ng.boell.org/sites/ 104 ‘FG Hands Over 35km Apapa- default/files/uploads/2017/02/budgit_ Oworonshoki Expressway to Dangote final_report_30.1.17.pdf. for Repair’, This Day, 16 September 92 Ibid. 2016, at https://www.thisdaylive. 93 The deficit depends on how estimates are com/index.php/2017/09/16/ calculated.

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fg-hands-over-35km-apapa-oworonshoki- 115 OU Paul, Obanor Albert and Aliu Sufianu expressway-to-dangote-for-repair/. Adeiza. 2015. ‘Electricity Crisis in Nigeria: 105 Emmanuel Okogba, ‘Uber monthly The Way Forward.’ American Journal of passenger base in Nigeria hits 267,000’, Renewable and Sustainable Energy, Vol. 1, No. Vanguard, August 2018 at https://www. 4: 180–186. vanguardngr.com/2018/08/uber-monthly- 116 ‘Nigeria: Exclusive Legislative List, a Great passenger-base -in-nigeria-hits-267000/. Impediment to Regional Development’, 106 Urban Planning Processes in Lagos, 2016. Elombah, June 2017, https://elombah.com/ 107 Ibid. nigeria-exclusive-legislative-list-a-great- 108 Lagos State Government: impediment-to-regional-develop ment/. ‘Towards Reforming Lagos’ 117 Jude Egbas, ‘Lagos govt says your dead Transport Sector’, 2016 at https:// street lights will soon be back on’, Pulse, lagosstate.gov.ng/blog/2017/03/28/ October 2019, at https://www.pulse.ng/ towards-reforming-lagostransport-sector/. news/local/lagos-govt-says-your-dead- 109 ‘Ambode orders dredging ferry street-lights-will-soon-be-back-on/ routes’, This Day, at https:// 44cq60l businessday.ng/news/article/ 118 ‘Lagos Assembly disowns Visionscape, ambode-orders-dredging-4-ferry-routes/. orders PSP back to work’, Pulse, October 110 ‘MTN Nigeria gives Lagos State an ultra- 2018, at https://www.pulse.ng/news/local/ modern ferry terminal’, This is Lagos, lagos-assembly-disowns-visionscape- September 2018 at http://thisislagos.ng/ orders-psp-back-to-work-id8993684.html. mtn-nigeria-gives-lagos-state-an-ultra- 119 World Population Review: ‘Lagos modern-ferry-terminal/. Population 2019’, May 2019, at http:// 111 Department of Energy: ‘2018 South African worldpopulationreview.com/world-cities/ Energy Sector Report’, 2018, at http://www. lagos/. energy.gov.za/files/media/explained/2018- 120 This chapter is based on documentary and South-African-Energy-Sector-Report.pdf archival research conducted from January 112 I Lewis, ‘Lagos eyes LNG imports to to November 2018 in the United Kingdom launch private power plan’, Petroleum and the United States, and on a series Economist, 2018 at https://www. of direct observations and interviews petroleum-economist.com/articles/ conducted during fieldwork in Hargeisa politics-economics/africa/2018/lagos-eyes- in October-November 2018. Where lng-imports-to-launch-private-power-plan. respondents’ names are given, these are 113 Jointly published by the Heinrich Böll used with permission; where names have Stiftung Nigeria and BudgIT. 2017, been changed this is footnoted in the text. Lagos’ Informal Sector: Taxation and 121 For a contemporaneous report see United Contribution to the Economy. Available: States Government Accountability https://ng.boell.org/2017/02/22/ Office, ‘Somalia: Observations Regarding working-poor-informal-sector-and-their- the Northern Conflict and Resulting contribution-urban-economy. Conditions’, May 1989, GAO/NSIAD-89/159, 114 AN Nnenne, ‘Remedying the power sector Washington DC: GAO, at https://www.gao. for service delivery,’ The Nation. Available gov/assets/220/211267.pdf. Online: http://thenationonlineng.net/ 122 Kilcullen, interview with Somaliland remedying-the-power-sector-for-service- government official, Hargeisa, 12 delivery/. November 2018

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123 Mohamed Haji Ingiriis, ‘We Swallowed of Africa, ‘af-Somali’ the Somali language, the State as the State Swallowed Us’: The and ‘Somalia’ the internationally- Genesis, Genealogies, and Geographies of recognised Federal Republic of Somalia Genocides in Somalia’ in African Security with its capital in Mogadishu. Vol. 9 Issue 3, 2016, pp. 237–258. 131 Kilcullen, interview with Somaliland 124 Scott Peterson, Me Against My Brother: Ministry of Finance, Hargeisa 6 November At War in Somalia, Sudan and Rwanda. 2018 and interview with branch manager, London: Routledge, 2014, p. 14; see also Dahabshiil Bank, Hargeisa, 12 November Africa Watch Committee (1990) ‘Somalia: 2018. A Government at War with its own 132 Kilcullen, interview with Somaliland people – Testimonies About the Killings Ministry of Finance, Hargeisa 6 November and the Conflict in the North’, London: 2018 Human Rights Watch, online at https:// 133 Kilcullen, interview with government www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/ officials in Hargeisa 5 November 2018 somalia_1990.pdf and with urban livestock partners, 14 125 Estimate based on discussions with November 2018. four government officials in Hargeisa, 134 Ioan Lewis, ‘Understanding Somalia and November 2018. Somaliland’, London: Hurst & Co, 2008, p. 126 Kilcullen, personal observation and 56 discussion with local customers, Hargeisa, 135 Kilcullen, discussion with livestock traders 14 November 2018. from Hargeisa and Berbera, 14 November 127 Kilcullen, interview with business leaders, 2018. Hargeisa 14 November 2018. 136 Kilcullen, personal observation at Saylada 128 See Ahmad Yasin Farah and I.M Lewis livestock market, 12 and 14 November (1997) ‘Peace-Making Endeavors of 2018, and discussion with livestock traders Contemporary Lineage Leaders in from Hargeisa and Berbera. ‘Somaliland’’ in Hussein M. Adam and 137 Lewis, op cit, p. 57 Richard Ford (eds), ‘Mending the Rips in 138 Scott Peterson, ‘Amid persistent drought, the Sky’, Lawrenceville, NJ: Red Sea Press, a nation of camel-herders plots a new pp. 317–325. course’ in Christian Science Monitor, 129 See Nubar Piriyeva (2015) ‘Hybrid Political 27 July 2017, online at https://www. Orders: in the case of Somaliland’ at csmonitor.com/World/Africa/2017/0727/ https://www.transcend.org/tms/2015/02/ Amid-persistent-drought-a-nation-of- hybrid-political-orders-in-the-case-of- herders-plots-a-new-course. somaliland/ and Volker Boege, Anne 139 Omar Jama Diriye, ‘Somaliland Diaspora: Brown, Kevin Clements and Anna Nolan, Contribution to Development’, Ås, Norway: ‘Hybrid Political Orders and Emerging Norwegian University of Life Sciences, States: What is Failing – States in the Masters Dissertation, 2014, p. 4. Global South or Research and Politics in 140 See https://www.dahabshiil.com and the West?’ in Sabine Fischer and Beatrix https://www.worldremit.com/en/ Schmelzle (eds) Building Peace in the Absence how-it-works. of States: Challenging the Discourse on State 141 Claire Penicaud and Fionan McGrath, Failure. Berlin: Berghof Research Centrer, ‘Innovative Inclusion: How Telesom ZAAD 2009, pp. 15–36. Brought Mobile Money to Somaliland’, 130 In this chapter, ‘Somalilander’ denotes 2013, at https://www.gsma.com/ a citizen of the Republic of Somaliland, mobilefordevelopment/wp-content/ ‘Somali’ a member of the Somali ethnic uploads/2013/07/Telesom-Somaliland.pdf. group that is widespread across the Horn

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142 Kilcullen, direct observation, Hargeisa 5 157 At https://www.dispatchlive.co.za/ and 14 November 2018 and Berbera, 12 news/2019-01-24-736-fired-in-dimbaza- November 2018. for-unlawful-strike/. 143 Omar Jama, op. cit. 158 See https://www.dispatchlive.co.za/ 144 Penicaud and McGrath op. cit. p. iii. news/2017-11-01-stats-reveal-province- 145 Kilcullen, interviews with two civil has-highest-unemployment-rate/. servants and three business leaders, 159 See http://www.doingbusiness.org/ Hargeisa, 11 and 13 November 2018. content/dam/doingBusiness/media/ 146 John Kenneth Galbraith, The Affluent Subnational-Reports/DB18_South-Africa. Society. Fortieth Anniversary Edition, New pdf. York: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1998, 160 At https://www.fin24.com/Economy/ first published 1958. South-Africa/slow-progress-in-business- 147 Kilcullen, interview with Somaliland environment-reforms-for-sa-cities-world- Finance Ministry officials, Hargeisa, 6 bank-2018 0919. November 2018. 161 Auditor General’s report, 2017–18, 148 Kilcullen, interview with OH, Hargeisa, 5 Provincial overviews, at https://www.agsa. November 2018. co.za/Portals/0/Reports/MFMA/2019.06.25/ 149 Ibid. MFMA2017-18%20-%20Section%20 150 Kilcullen, interviews with local business 6%20-%20Provincial%20overviews. leaders, Hargeisa, 11 and 14 November, pdf?ver=2019-06-25-165522-903. 2018. 162 Municipal Money – Buffalo City: https:// 151 Matthew Newsome and Nicholas municipalmoney.gov.za/profiles/ Parkinson, ‘Somaliland gets wind in municipality-BUF-buffalo-city.pdf. its sails for revamping power sector’ 163 Buffalo City Metro Municipality socio in The Guardian, 15 April 2013, online economic review and outlook 2017, Ecsecc, at https://www.theguardian.com/ p 10. global-development/2013/apr/15/ 164 See https://www.telegraph.co.uk/ somaliland-wind-power-sector. cars/news/goodwood-festival-speed- 152 See DP World, Berbera—Somaliland at contributes-69m-economy /. https://www.dpworld.com/en/what- 165 At https://www.classicandsportscar. we-do/our-locations/Middle-East-Africa/ com/news/general-classic-car-news/ berbera-somaliland classic-car-industry-worth-five-and-a- 153 DP World, ‘Groundbreaking Ceremony half-billion-pound s. Marks Start of Work at DP World Berbera 166 At https://www.businessinsider.com/the- in Somaliland’, press release, 11 October classic-car-market-is-a-perfect-example- 2018, at https://www.dpworld.com/en/ of-how-bubbles-collapse-2017-5?IR=T. media/media-centre/Groundbreaking- 167 Ken Stewart and Norman Reich, Sun on the Ceremony-Marks-Start-of-Work-at-DP- Grid. London: Bookmarque, 1998 (second World-Berbera-in-Somaliland. edition). 154 See World Economic Forum, ‘Global 168 Ibid. Human Capital Report 2017’, at 169 These are: Coega, Richards Bay, Saldanha https://weforum.ent.box.com/s/ Bay, East London, Dube Tradeport, Maluti- dari4dktg4jt2g9xo2o5pksjpatvawdb a-Phofung in the Free State, OR Tambo 155 The author is indebted to Omar Jama IDZ, and Atlantis in the Western Cape. Diriye for this insight. At https://www.iol.co.za/business-report/ 156 StatsSA mid-year population estimates, economy/gallery-view-the-list-of-special- 2018, https://www.statssa.gov.za/ economic-zones-in-sa-11183315. publications/P0302/P03022018.pdf. 170 See http://www.elidz.co.za/.

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171 Buffalo City Metro Municipality, op cit. study’ in Hervormde Teologiese Studies, Vol. 172 Cost of living comparison between 74, No. 3, 2018. See also Iqbal Akhtar, Johannesburg and East London, at ‘South Asian Muslims in East Africa’ in https://www.numbeo.com/cost-of-living/ Routledge Handbook of Africa–Asia Relations. compare_cities.jsp?country1=South+Afric London: Routledge, 2017, pp. 60–73. a&city1=East+London&country2=South+A 182 Robin Hallett, Africa to 1875: A Modern frica&city2=Johannesburg. History. Ann Arbor, MI: University of 173 Geoffrey Parker, The Military Revolution: Michigan Press, 1970, p. 277. Military Innovation and the Rise of the 183 Said-Ruete, op. cit. p. 424. West, 1500–1800. Cambridge: Cambridge 184 Roland Oliver, ‘Some Factors in the British University Press, 1996, p. 104. Occupation of East Africa, 1884–1894’ 174 Ibid. See also Rudolf Said‐Ruete, ‘The in The Uganda Journal, Journal of the Al‐Bu‐Said Dynasty in Arabia and East Uganda Society, Vol. 15 No. 1, March Africa’ in Journal of The Central Asian Society, 1951, p. 51. online at https://ufdc.ufl.edu/ Volume 16, No.4 , July 1929, p. 418. UF00080855/00029/59j 175 Kilcullen, discussion with county 185 For an account of the Royal Navy’s role in government infrastructure officials, this effort, see Christopher Lloyd, The Navy Mombasa, 11 June 2019. and the Slave Trade: The Suppression of the 176 Government of Kenya, ‘2009 – African Slave Trade in the Nineteenth Century, Transforming Connectivity and Vision’ London: Routledge, 1968. at Kenya Vision 2030, https://vision2030. 186 See Mark Hobbs, ‘Mombasa: Britain’s go.ke. For a list of current and planned Shortest-Lived Protectorate’ at Qatar submarine cables linking to Mombasa, see Digital Library, online at https://www.qdl. also Telegeography, Submarine Cable Map qa/en/mombasa-britain’s-shortest-lived- – Mombasa, Kenya, online at https://www. protectorate submarinecablemap.com/#/landing-point/ 187 Chris McIntyre, ‘Early anti-Slaving’ in mombasa-kenya Zanzibar Travel Guide, London: Bradt Guides 177 See Arye Oded, ‘The Omani Sultanate (6th Edition), pp. 158–9 at http://www. in Zanzibar And East Africa – Historical, zanzibar-travel-guide.com/bradt_guide. Political, Economic and Religious Aspects’ asp?bradt=1589 in RIMA Historical Papers, Vol. 5, Number 2, 188 Hobbs, op. cit. April 2017. 189 See Carola Frentzen, ‘Ein Privatmann 178 Omani House inscription, Fort Jesus, erwarb die größte deutsche Kolonie’ in Mombasa, June 2019. Die Welt, 25 May 2014, online at https:// 179 See Gwyn Campbell and Edward A. Alpers, www.welt.de/geschichte/article128383715/ ‘Introduction: Slavery, Forced Labour and Ein-Privatmann-erwarb-die-groesste- Resistance in Indian Ocean Africa and deutsche-Kolonie.html. Asia’ in Slavery and Abolition, Volume 25, 190 Oliver, op. cit. p. 63. No. 2, August 2004, p. xv. 191 Kilcullen, discussion with Mombasa 180 See Nazeer Ahmed, ‘Islam in East Africa’ County economic planning officials, in History of Islam: An Encyclopedia of Mombasa, 11 June 2019. Islamic History, at https://historyofislam. 192 See James R. Brennan, ‘Lowering com/contents/the-modern-age/ the Sultan’s Flag: Sovereignty and islam-in-east-africa/ Decolonization in Coastal Kenya’, 181 See Maniraj Sukdaven and Ensieh Bagheri, Comparative Studies in Society and History, ‘Spreading of Islam without any violence Vol. 50 No. 4, 2008, p. 851. in Central, East and West Africa as a case

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193 London declared an East Africa 204 Mohamed Omar Said Mohamed, J.G, Kairo, Protectorate in 1895, assuming control Farid Dahdouh-Guebas and Nico Koedam, from the financially-foundering British ‘How Sustainable is the Utilization East Africa Company; it proclaimed the of Mangrove Products in Peri-Urban Kenya Colony in 1920, with a ten-mile Mombasa, Kenya?’ in Ecology and Society, coastal strip, the Kenya Protectorate, Manuscript #: ES-2008–2617, Version 1, p. administered by Britain under the 61, 76. suzerainty of the Sultan of Zanzibar, 205 Sabi Strategy Group, African Cities – until both colony and the protectorate Mombasa and Kisumu: Quantitative and were granted independence in June 1963 Qualitative Research, December 2016, p. 57 – meaning that Kenya experienced a 206 Brennan, op. cit. relatively short-lived period of colonialism, 207 Devin Smart, ‘Developing the racial city: only 68 years (counting the Protectorate) conflict, solidarity and urban traders in or 43 years (counting only the Colony). late-colonial Mombasa’ in Journal of Eastern 194 For a series of images and maps African Studies, Volume 11 No. 3, 2017, pp. documenting the port’s development 429–30. see Friends of Mombasa, ‘Historic Old 208 Ibid. Port of Mombasa, in the 1890s lack of 209 Ibid. pp. 859, 860. facilities to offload Railway equipment 210 For a historical political map of led to the development of Kilindini as Kenya showing former Coast Province a port on the west side of the island’, Boundaries, see U.S. Government (1988) at http://www.friendsofmombasa. Kenya Political, at http://legacy.lib.utexas. com/historic-areas-entry-exit-points/ edu/maps/africa/kenya_pol88.jpg kilindini-makupa/. 211 See Eric Kramon and Daniel N. Posner, 195 Justin Willis, ‘‘Men on the Spot,’ Labor, and ‘Kenya’s New Constitution’ in Journal of the Colonial State in British East Africa: Democracy, Vol. 22, No. 2, March 2011, pp. The Mombasa Water Supply, 1911–1917,’ 89–103. International Journal of African Historical 212 For the full text of the Constitution see Studies, Vol. 28, No. 1, 1995. Constitution of Kenya, 2010, at http://www. 196 Ibid. kenyalaw.org:8181/exist/kenyalex/actview. 197 Ibid. xql?actid=Const2010. 198 Ibid. 213 Julie Kwach, ‘Challenges facing Devolution 199 Willis op. cit. p. 31. in Kenya, 2019’ at https://www.tuko. 200 See David French, The British Way in co.ke/264362-challenges-facing- Counter-Insurgency, 1945–1967. Oxford: devolution-kenya.html#264362. Oxford University Press, 2011, p. 120. 214 Sabi strategy group, op. cit. pp. 72–73. 201 Brennan, op. cit. p. 851. 215 Ibid. 202 Karuti Kanyinga, ‘Re-distribution from 216 See International Crisis Group, ‘Kenya’s Above: The Politics of Land Rights and Coast: Devolution Disappointed’, Brussels: Squatting in Coastal Kenya’, Research Crisis Group Africa Briefing No. 121, 13 July Report no. 115, 2000, Uppsala: Nordiska 2016. Afrikainstitutet, pp. 31–45. 217 Paul Goldsmith, ‘Digital radicals on the 203 Justin Willis and Ngala Chome, Swahili coast’, New African, April 2016, pp. ‘Marginalization and political participation 52–55. on the Kenya coast: the 2013 elections’ in 218 Wanjohi Kabukuru, ‘How idyllic Mombasa Journal of Eastern African Studies, Volume 8 lost its groove to ‘war on terror’, New No. 1, 2014, pp. 115–134. African, June 2015, p. 15. 219 Ibid. p. 21.

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220 See Andrew Kasuku, ‘Majengo and Kisauni: at https://www.nation.co.ke/news/ Mombasa’s terror hubs’ in The Star, 5 Sheikh-Abubakar-Sheriff-alias-Makaburi- February 2019, at https://www.the-star. /1056-2018322-u8gbkt/index.html and co.ke/news/big-read/2019-02-05-majengo- Weldon Kipkemoi, ‘Former Al Shabaab, and-kisauni-mombasas-terror-hubs/ gang members, recruited to combat and William R. Patterson, ‘Islamic terrorism at the Coast’ in The Standard, Radicalization in Kenya’ in Joint Forces 13 February 2019, at https://www. Quarterly, Vol. 78 No. 3, 3rd Quarter, 2015, standardmedia.co.ke/article/2001312951/ pp. 16–23. al-shabaab-returnees-ex-gang-members- 221 See Daniel Wesangula, ‘The Unseen War’ join-war-on-terr orism. in The Standard, Special Report, 2019, at 224 Kasuku, op. cit. See also K24 Television, https://www.standardmedia.co.ke/special- ‘125 People Arrested At Masjid Musa report/the-unseen-war/ (Part 1) and Arraigned In Court, Remanded For 5 https://www.standardmedia.co.ke/special- Days’, 3 February 2014, at https://www. report/the-unseen-war-part2/ (Part 2). youtube.com/watch?v=3bcRUDLG570 222 For details of attacks during this and Wachira Mwangi and Daniel Tsuma period see William Maclean, Noor Nyassy, ‘One shot dead in mosque raid as Khamis and Mohamed Ahmed, 250 arrested’ in The Nation, 17 November ‘Special Report: In Africa, a militant 2014, at https://www.nation.co.ke/news/ group’s growing appeal,’ Reuters, 30 Masjid-Musa-Sakina-Mosques-Raid- May 2012, at https://www.reuters. Police/1056-2525964-mql7w1/index.html com/article/us-shabaab-east-africa/ 225 Al Jazeera Africa, ‘Kenyan counter- special-report-in-africa-a-militant-groups- terrorism police confess to extra judicial growing-appeal-idUSBRE84T0NI20120530, killings’ in Modern Ghana, 7 December David Ochami and Philip Mwakio, ‘Three 2014, at https://www.modernghana.com/ killed, 30 hospitalised in Mombasa news/585087/1/kenyan-counter-terrorism- blast’ in The Standard, 25 June 2012, police.html. at https://www.standardmedia.co.ke/ 226 Ibid. article/2000060541/n-a, Philip Mwakio 227 Parselelo Kantai, ‘Kenya’s Mombasa and Cyrus Ombati, ‘Sunday grenade Republican Council : The Coast attacks in Mombasa, Nairobi leave 15 calls for freedom’ in Africa Report, injured’ in The Standard, 10 June 2013, 17 May 2012, at https://web. at https://www.standardmedia.co.ke/ archive.org/web/20120702202413/ article/2000085594/n-a, James Macharia, http://www.theafricareport.com/ ‘Bombings threaten Kenya growth goals, index.php/20120517501811752/ open new strains with wary West,’ Reuters, east-horn-africa/kenya-s-mombasa- 1 June 2014, at https://uk.reuters.com/ republican-council%E2%80%A9-the-coast- article/uk-kenya-security-tourism/ calls-for-freedom-501811752.html. bombings-threaten-kenya-growth-goals- 228 For a discussion of the MRC and its open-new-strains-with-wary-west- underlying grievances see Justin Willis and idUKKBN0EC1D720140601 and Tom George Gona, ‘Pwani C Kenya? Memory, Burridge, ‘Funding jihad: Al-Shabab cash Documents and Secessionist Politics in lures in young Kenyans’ in BBC News, 12 Coastal Kenya’ in African Affairs, Vol. 112 December 2014, at https://www.bbc.com/ No. 446, December 2012, pp. 48–71. news/world-africa-30419987?print=true. 229 Kantai, op. cit. 223 See Kasaku, op. cit., Galgalo Bocha, 230 See ‘The Swahili Coast: Contagion of ‘Mombasa: 4 killed Aboud Rogo Discontent’ in The Economist, 3 November Style’ in The Nation, 4 October 2013 2012, at https://www.economist.com/

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news/middle-east-and-africa/21565641- Paint-town-houses-white/1954178- muslim-extremism-spreads-down-east- 4335940-10mqqr3z/index.html. africa’s-coastline-contagion-discontent. 243 David Kilcullen, interview, Nyali district, 231 Justin Willis and Ngala Chome, Mombasa, 16 June 2019. ‘Marginalization and political participation 244 Sabi Strategy Group, op. cit. p. 126 on the Kenya coast: the 2013 elections’ in 245 Kenya has two distinct programs for Journal of Eastern African Studies, 2014, Vol. upgrading of informal settlements – the 8, No. 1, p. 115. Kenya Slum Upgrading Project (KENSUP) 232 For a full list of civil society organizations and Kenya Informal Settlements involved in the CVE effort, see Mombasa Improvement Program (KISIP). For a County Government, Mombasa County historical background and overview of Commissioner’s Office and HAKI Africa these programs, see Mark Anderson (2017), Mombasa County Action Plan for and Keziah Mwelu (2013), ‘Kenyan Slum Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism Upgrading Programs: KISIP & KENSUP’ 2017–2022, p. iii. at http://healthycities.berkeley.edu/ 233 See ‘About HAKI Africa’ at http:// uploads/1/2/6/1/12619988/kenya.pdf. hakiafrica.or.ke/about-haki/ 246 Ibid. 234 Mombasa County Government (2017) op. 247 See World Bank, ‘Informal Enterprises cit., p. 9. in Kenya’, World Bank Group, 2016, p. 1. 235 Government of Kenya, Mombasa County online at https://www.enterprisesurveys. Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) org/~/media/GIAWB/EnterpriseSurveys/ Mapping Report, July 2018, p. 8. at http:// Documents/ResearchPapers/Informal- www.mombasa.go.ke/wp-content/ Enterprises-in-Kenya-2016.pdf. uploads/2018/10/FINAL-REVISED- 248 Righa Edwin Mwacharo, ‘Factors MAPPING-REPORT.pdf. Influencing Growth of Informal 236 Ibid, p. 3. Settlements: A Case of Bangladesh Slum, 237 Ibid. p. 4. Changamwe Constituency, Mombasa 238 Mombasa County Government (2017), op. County, Kenya’, Master’s thesis, University cit. pp. 10–11. of Nairobi, 2012, p.3, at http://erepository. 239 Sabi Strategy Group, African Cities – uonbi.ac.ke:8080/xmlui/bitstream/ Mombasa and Kisumu: Quantitative and handle/11295/6672/Righa_Factors%20 Qualitative Research, December 2016, p. 62 influencing%20growth%20of%20 240 Ibid. p. 87 informal%20settlements.pdf;sequence=1. 241 For details of the theory see George 249 Hellen Ndaiga, ‘Kenya to speed up Kelling and Catherine Coles, Fixing Broken its slum upgrading programme’ in Windows: Restoring Order and Reducing Crime Construction Kenya, 2 May 2017, at https:// in Our Communities. New York: Touchstone www.constructionkenya.com/2435/ Press, 1997. For a more recent application kenya-slum-upgrading/. to crime hotspots see Anthony Braga and 250 Republic of Kenya, Ministry of Brenda Bond, ‘Policing Crime and Disorder Transport, Infrastructure, Housing and Hot Spots: A Randomized Controlled Trial’ Urban Development, ‘Kenya Informal in Criminology, Vol. 46 No. 3, 2008, pp. Settlements Improvement Project 577–607. (KISIP) Abbreviated Resettlement Action 242 Mohamed Ahmed, ‘Paint town houses Plan (ARAP) For Mombasa County white, orders Mombasa county’ in Kindunguni Informal Settlement’, The Nation, 10 March 2018, at https:// March 2019, p. 10. Online at http://www. www.nation.co.ke/counties/mombasa/ housingandurban.go.ke/wp-content/

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uploads/2019/06/1-DISCLOSURE-COPY- 266 See Government of Kenya, ‘Public Service RAP-Report-Kindunguni-WB-FINAL.pdf. Reform’ at Kenya Vision 2030: The Progress 251 Ibid. p. 2. So Far, timeline entry for 2014, at https:// 252 Ibid. p. 3. vision2030.go.ke. 253 Sabi Strategy Group, op. cit. p. 241 267 Sabi Strategy Group, op. cit. p. 241 254 See TeleGeography, ‘Submarine Cable 268 Knowles, op. cit. Map: Landing Point Mombasa Kenya’, at 269 David Mugwe, ‘Rail Transport Makes a https://www.submarinecablemap.com/#/ Comeback’ in The Daily Nation, 19 August landing-point/mombasa-kenya and 2013, at https://www.nation.co.ke/ Submarine Cable Map: Landing Point Nyali business/infrastructure/Rail-transport- Kenya at https://www.submarinecablemap. makes-a-comeback/1959776-1959748- com/#/landing-point/nyali-kenya. 9h58gcz/index.html. 255 See SEACOM, ‘Our History: July 2009’, 270 Ibid. at https://seacom.com/#history 271 The Nation, ‘Kenya, China sign standard and TeleGeography, ‘SEACOM/ gauge railway agreement’ in The Nation, Tata-TGN Eurasia’ at https:// 11 May 2014, at https://www.nation.co.ke/ www.submarinecablemap.com/#/ news/East-Africa-China-Standard-Gauge- submarine-cable/seacomtata-tgn-eurasia. Railway/1056-2310836-vvl2cjz/index.html 256 TeleGeography, op. cit. 272 Discussion, Raila Odinga, Nairobi, October 257 SEACOM, ‘Our Global Network’, at https:// 2019. seacom.com/network. 273 For some of these concerns see Eyder 258 Ibid. Peralta, ‘A New Chinese-Funded 259 Sabi Strategy Group, op. cit. p. 116 Railway In Kenya Sparks Debt-Trap 260 See ‘SEACOM, Cisco partnership sets up Fears,’ 8 October 2018 at https://www. technology hub in Mombasa’ in Business npr.org/2018/10/08/641625157/a-new- Daily Africa, 5 April 2016, at https://www. chinese-funded-railway-in-kenya-sparks- businessdailyafrica.com/corporate/ debt-trap-fears, Paul Wafula, ‘Behind technology-hub-in-Mombasa/539550- the SGR Walls’ in The Nation, 8 July 2018 3147390-n6i1s5z/index.html. at https://www.standardmedia.co.ke/ 261 Ibid. article/2001287119/behind-the-sgr- 262 Sabi Strategy Group, op. cit. p. 247 walls and Paul Wafula, ‘Revealed: the 263 Ndunge Kiiti and Monique Hennink, The 5000-strong Chinese Army powering Use and Impact of M-Shwari as a Financial the SGR’, The Nation, 15 July 2018, at Inclusion Banking Product in Urban and Rural https://www.standardmedia.co.ke/ Areas of Kenya. Irvine, CA: University of article/2001288060/exclusive-5000-strong- California Irvine, Institute for Money, chinese-army-behind-sgr-walls Technology and Financial Inclusion, 274 Kilcullen, interview with senior Mombasa 2016, at https://www.imtfi.uci.edu/files/ County officials, 11 June 2019, Mombasa. docs/2015/M-Shwari%20Final%20Report_ 275 Ibid. Final-Feb%2028%202017-CLN.pdf. 276 Ibid. 264 Ibid. p. 6. 277 Kilcullen, interview with senior Mombasa 265 For the national version, see https:// County officials, 11 June 2019, Mombasa. www.ecitizen.go.ke. For the Mombasa 278 Kilcullen, interview, 19 June 2019, Nyali. government’s similar portal, focused 279 Kilcullen, interview, 13 June 2019, Vipingo. on business services, see https:// 280 See Government of Kenya, ‘Big 4 Agenda’, ebusinesspermit.mombasa.go.ke/index. at https://big4.president.go.ke/ php?id=1. 281 Ibid.

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282 Brian Munene, ‘Mombasa Vision 2035: A 2014’, 13 December 2013 at http://www. City Reinventing Itself’ in Buildesign Kenya, uncubemagazine.com/blog/11762959 6 November 2017, at http://buildesign. 293 ‘Cape Town: World Design Capital co.ke/mombasa-city-vision-2035/. 2014’, Financial Times, 2014 at 283 See Mombasa County Government, https://www.ft.com/content/ ‘Mombasa Vision 2035 Master Plan: e8abc21c-b371-11e3-bc21-00144feabdc0. Integrated Strategic Urban Development 294 Stats SA, ‘The City of Cape Town’, Plan (ISUDP)’, 17 August 2017, at https:// 2018 at http://www.statssa.gov. lead-innove.blogspot.com/2017/08/ za/?page_id=1021&id=city-of-cape-town mombasa-vision-2035-master-plan.html. municipality 284 See Vertex Studios, ‘Mombasa Vision 295 ‘City of Cape Town Socio-Economic 2035’ at https://www.vertexstudio.co.ke/ Profile’, 2017 at https://www.westerncape. animation; see also https://www.youtube. gov.za/assets/departments/treasury/ com/watch?v=TWW13UxJlY8. Documents/Socio-economic-profiles/2017/ 285 See Winnie Atieno, ‘Joho explains why city_of_cape_town_2017_socio-economic_ it took over five years to give Mombasa profile_sep-lg_-_26_january_2018.pdf. a new look’ in The Nation, 19 September 296 Cape Town’s Gini Coefficient is 0.61. It 2018, at https://www.nation.co.ke/ measures income inequality on a level counties/mombasa/Hassan-Joho-says- of 0 to 1, with 0 being the most equal why-it-took-five-years-to-give-Mombasa- and 1 being the most unequal. See Jason new-look/1954178-4765926-gfgqsnz/index. Felix, ‘Inequality levels in Cape Town html. the highest in 10 years’, IOL, 1 October 286 Mombasa Government, ‘Lands, Housing 2018 at https://www.iol.co.za/capeargus/ and Physical Planning’, at https://www. news/inequality-levels-in-cape-town-the- mombasa.go.ke/lands-planning/. highest-in-10-years-17288968. 287 Mombasa County Government, ‘Mombasa 297 Hereafter, City (capital C) refers to the Gate City Master Plan: A Premier Gateway City of Cape Town government, while city Port City that Upholds Diversity and refers to Cape Town itself. Heritage’, 2017, at http://gatecitymp. 298 Vereenigde Landsche Ge-Oktroyeerde mombasa.go.ke/sites/default/files/ Oostindische Compagnie in Dutch. Mombasa%20Gate%20City%20Master%20 299 This includes the Intergovernmental Fiscal Plan%20Pamphlet_light_2.pdf. Relations Act (1997); Municipal Structures 288 Mombasa County Government, ‘Mombasa Act (1998); Municipal Systems Act (2000); Gate City Master Plan’ at http:// Intergovernmental Relations Framework gatecitymp.mombasa.go.ke. Act (2005). 289 Crossroads’ unemployment rate is 54%. 300 SA Government, ‘National Development 290 Picture source: https://onlineimages. Plan 2030’ at https://www.gov.za/issues/ smugmug.com/Places/South-Africa/ national -development-plan-2030. Cape-Town/i-LVF2jzr. 301 ‘The three spheres of Government’, ETU 291 Telegraph Travel, ‘Telegraph Travel toolbox, at http://www.etu.org.za/toolbox/ Awards: your favourite airlines, docs/govern/spheres.html. hotel groups, tour operators and 302 The number of departments varies destinations’, 12 April 2016 at https:// between provinces. However, they www.telegraph.co.uk/travel/news/ generally consist of a combination of 12 telegraph-travel-awards-2015-16-winners/ of the following departments; Finance, 292 Rob Wilson, ‘The Gritty and the Pretty Economic Development, Tourism, Housing, – Cape Town: World Design Capital Education, Health, Social Development, Transport, Public Works, Planning and

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Environment, Sport, Recreation, Art & 317 The meetings with Alderman Vos, Premier Culture, Agriculture, Local Government, Winde, and Alderman Smith were held on Safety and Security or Community Safety. 28 and 29 October 2019 in Cape Town. 303 ‘The three spheres of Government’, ETU 318 ‘Central City Improvement District. The toolbox, at http://www.etu.org.za/toolbox/ State of Cape Town Central City Report docs/govern/spheres.html. 2017 – A Year in Review’, 2017, at https:// 304 Ibid. propertywheel.co.za/2018/05/ the- 305 Chapter 7: Local Government. 1996 2017-state-of-cape-town- central-city Constitution of the Republic of South report-released/. Africa. 319 Approximately 107 379 crimes were 306 City of Cape Town,‘ Socio-Economic drug-related. Profile’, 2016, at https://www. westerncape. 320 For the international ‘league table’ on gov.za/assets/departments/ treasury/ violent cities, go to http://www.worldatlas. Documents/Socio-economicprofiles/2016/ com/articles/most-dangerous-cities-in- City-of-Cape-Town/ city_of_cape_ the-world.html. town_2016_socio-economic_ profile_sep-lg. 321 Sune Payne, ‘If it takes me until I die, I will pdf. seek justice for my son – anguished Cape 307 SALGA, ‘The Municipal Barometer’, at Flats mothers‘, Daily Maverick, 4 October http://www.municipalbarometer. co.za/ 2018 at https://www.dailymaverick. CrossCompare. co.za/ article/2018-10-04-if-it-takes-me- 308 This fell under the Municipal Structures untili-die-i-will-seek-justice-for-my- Act of 1998. sonanguished-cape-flats-mothers/. 309 Dominique Wooldridge, ‘Introducing 322 Beyond Our Borders, ‘The Khayelitsha Metropolitan Government in South Africa’, Project’ at http://beyondourborders.net/ 2002, p. 128. the-khaye litsha-project/. 310 Stats SA, ‘National government 323 At https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/ funding allocations: who are the main article/2019-07-12-army-deployed- beneficiaries?’, June 2018 at http://www. as-gang-violence- escalates-to- un statssa.gov. za/?p=11277. precedented-levels-and-residents-cry- 311 Sleep City. out-for-help/. The table is sourced from 312 City of Cape Town, ‘Cape Town comes https://www.timeslive.co.za/news/ after Johannesburg’, 2017. Available: south-africa/ 2019-09-12-crimestats-cops- https:// www.westerncape.gov.za/assets/ have-lost-the- war-says-western-cape- departments/treasury/Documents/ premier/. Socio-economic-profiles/2017/ city_ 324 This section is based on a research trip to of_cape_town_2017_socio-economic_ Khayelitsha, Harare, Langa, and Hanover profile_sep-lg_-_26_january_2018.pdf. Park in June 2016 arranged by the office 313 ibid of the mayor of the City of Cape Town. 314 World Bank, Ease of Doing Business in See also https://www.capetown.gov.za/en/ Cape Town, World Bank Group, 2018 at stats/2011CensusSuburbs/2011_Census_ http://www.doingbusiness.org/data/ CT_Suburb_Khayelitsha_Profile.pdf. exploreeconomies/south-africa/sub/ 325 This is based on a meeting with the cape-town. Premier in April 2018, and subsequent 315 Correspondence with Tim Harris, 26 email correspondence. October 2019. 326 The Fuller Centre for Housing, ‘Housing 316 This is based on several exchanges, Delivery in South Africa’, 2014 at including an interview and email https://fullercenter.org/wp-content/ correspondence on Sunday 17 February.

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uploads/sites/default/files/Housing%20 stocktaking-of-the-housing-sector-in-sub- delivery%20-%20South%20Africa.pdf. saharan-africa-summary-report.pdf. 327 The strategies of the Housing White 338 Go to http://mnrowland.blogspot. Paper were: 1. Stabilising the housing co.za/2010/07/scandal-of-sweet-home- environment; 2. Mobilising housing farm.html. credit; 3. Providing subsidy assistance; 339 See ‘Integrated Public Transport 4. Supporting the Enhanced People’s Network Plan 2032’ at https:// Housing Process; 5. Rationalising tdacontenthubfunctions.azurewebsites. institutional capacities; 6. Facilitating the net/Document/13. speedy release and servicing of land; 7. 340 TomTom Index at https://www.tomtom. Co-ordinating government investment in com/en_gb/trafficindex/city/cape-town. development. 341 53% of workers Cape Town use private 328 GroundUp, ‘Everything you need to know transport. about government housing’, 20 July 342 Low to low-middle income households 2017, at https://www.groundup.org.za/ make up 95% of public transport users, article/everything-you-need-know-about- approximately 2 528 000 daily passengers. government-housing/. 343 City of Cape Town, ‘Cape Town’s Transport 329 The criteria includes: A South African Picture’, 2016. citizen; over 21 years old; married or living 344 ibid with a partner, single or with dependents; 345 ‘Expect delays after Cape Town train fire’, earning less than R3 500 per household; IOL, 9 October 2018, at https://www.iol. first-time home owner. co.za/news/ south-africa/western-cape/ 330 See Africa Check at https://www. expect-delaysafter-cape-town-train- thesouthafrican.com/news/ fire-17411502. no-the-anc-has-not-built-five-mil 346 ‘Cape Town Population 2019’, lion-houses-since-1994/. World Population Review, at http:// 331 See https://www.sanews.gov.za/ worldpopulationreview.com/world-cities/ south-africa/housing-delivery-sa-how- cape-town-population/. have-we-fared. The table is sourced 347 ‘Brazil – South Region’, City Population, at from https://www.bbc.com/news/ https://www.citypopulation.de/php/brazil- world-africa-48093711 regiaosud-admin.php?adm2id=4106902. 332 See http://www.sabuilder. 348 See http://worldpopulationreview.com/ co.za/2018/08/22/ world-cities/bogota-population/. state-of-the-construction-industry/ 349 City of Cape Town, ‘Cape Town’s Transport 333 See https://www.bbc.com/news/ Picture’, 2016. world-africa-48093711 350 Tshego Lepule, ‘Neglected’ taxis 334 At https://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/ threaten to wreak havoc on Cape’s News/Sexwale-Housing-backlog-at- transport system’, IOL, 3 June 2018 21m20130607. at https://www.iol.co.za/weekend- 335 Statistics South Africa, ‘Population argus/neglected-taxis-threaten Dynamics in South Africa’, 2011 at -to-wreak-havocon--transport- http://www.statssa.gov.za/publications/ system-15287632. Report-03-01-67/Report-03-01-672011.pdf. 351 In 2017, Cape Town had the worst rainfall 336 At https://fullercenter.org/wp-content/ in 84 years, the worst in recorded history. uploads/sites/default/files/Housing%20 352 Picture source: Planet Labs Inc. delivery%20-%20South%20Africa.pdf. 353 Gopolang Makou, ‘Do formal residents 337 See http://www.worldbank.org/content/ use 65% of Cape Town’s water, with half dam/Worldbank/document/Africa/Report/ going to gardens & pools?’, Africa Check,

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21 August 2017, at https://africacheck. 364 ‘Faqs: Free Basic Electricity’, Department org/reports/do-formal-residents-use-65- of Energy, at http://www.energy.gov.za/ of-cape-towns-water-with-half-going-to- files/faqs/faqs_freebasic.html. gardens-pools/. 365 City of Cape Town, State of Energy, 2015. 354 Krista Mahr, ‘How Cape Town was 366 Ibid. saved from running out of water’, The 367 Ibid. Guardian, 4 May 2018, at https://www. 368 A Janisch, M Euston-Brown and M theguardian.com/world/2018/may/04/ Borchers, ‘The Potential Impact of back-from-the-brink-how-cape-town Efficiency Measures and Distributed -cracked-its-water-crisis. Generation on Municipal Electricity 355 Gina Ziervogel, ‘Cape Town’s Bid Revenue: Double Whammies and Death to Lock Down the Water Crisis’, Spirals,’ at http://www.cityenergy.org.za/ Daily Maverick, 20 December 2017 uploads/resource_23.pdf. at https://www.dailymaverick. 369 ‘World Bank: Morocco’s Economic co.za/ article/2017-12-20-op-ed-cape Growth to Rise to 3.3 in 2020-2021’, North -towns-bidto-lock-down-the-water-crisis/. Africa Post, 12 October 2019, at http:// 356 City of Cape Town, Dam Levels, at http:// northafricapost.com/34631-world-bank- www.capetown.gov.za/Family%20and%20 -economic-growth-to-rise-to-3- home/residential-utility-services/ 3-in-2020-2021.html residential-water-and-sanitation-services/ 370 Literally meaning ‘the new town.’ this-weeks-dam-levels. 371 Meaning ‘the City of Light.’ 357 Lisa Isaacs, ‘#WaterCrisis: 1990 article 372 With a contingent of approximately 1, 500, shows Day Zero plans should’ve began Morocco is considered one of the main years ago’, IOL, 1 February 2018 at exporters of foreign fighters to ISIS. https://www.iol.co.za/capetimes/ news/ 373 July 2008. Combatting Terrorism Centre at watercrisis-1990-article-showsday-zero- West Point. Uncovering Extremist Violence plans-shouldve-began-yearsago-13044464. in Morocco. Available: https://ctc.usma. 358 ‘The Cape Water Crisis – FAQs and honest edu/uncovering-extremist-violence-in- answers’, Western Cape Government, 30 morocco/. October 2017 at https://www.westerncape. 374 Bidonville is a French/North African term gov.za/news/water-crisis. meaning an impoverished, informal 359 Ibid. dwelling, built largely with tin. 360 Bekezela Phakathi, ‘Zille criticises national 375 Article 41 of the Moroccan Constitution government for turning its back on decrees the King Amir Al Mouminine, drought-ravaged Cape Town’, Business or Commander of the Faith. This tasks Live, at https://www.businesslive.co.za/ him to oversee national respect for Islam bd/national/2018-02-23-zille-criticises- and guarantee free exercise of religious/ national-government-for-turning-its-back- cultural beliefs. on-drought-ravaged-cape-town/. 376 Assia Bensalah Alaoui, ‘Morocco’s security 361 City of Cape Town State of Energy, 2015 strategy: preventing terrorism and at http://www.africancityenergy. org/ counter extremism’, Sage Journals, 7 July uploads/resource_22.pdf. 2017, at http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/ 362 ibid full/10.1007/s12290-017-0449-3 363 Historically, a lack of timely investment in 377 Ministere de l’Inerieur, ‘Investir dans le infrastructure by Eskom has led to cyclical Capital Humain pour relever les défis energy shortages, as seen in 2007 and de demain’, at http://www.indh.ma/en/ 2014. presentation

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378 Nicolas Pelham, ‘How Morocco Dodged Republic of Algeria Mortgage Finance the Arab Spring’, The New York Review Technical Assistance Project’, at http:// of Books, 5 July 2012 at https:// www. documents.worldbank.org/curated/ nybooks.com/daily/2012/07/05/ en/713801468052844398/pdf/554270PPAR0 how-morocco-dodged-arab-spring/. Box1ficial0Use0Only01061.pdf. Accessed: 379 See articles on this at http:// 15 August 2018. northafricapost.com 390 Ibid. 380 A prefecture is predominantly urban; a 391 UN Habitat, ‘Kingdom of Morocco, Al province is a predominantly rural, they Omrane – Leading Actor for Settlements both sit directly under the regional level of Upgrading’, 2010 government. 392 Third United Nations Conference 381 The progress in decentralisation realised on Housing and Sustainable Urban so far was strengthened by the launch Development, Morocco National Report, 2014 of National Plan for Strengthening 393 FART: Fonds d’Accompagnement des Decentralisation (NRDP) in 2010 and Réformes du Transport routier urbain et dedication of funds and expertise for interurbain. implementation. 394 World Bank, ‘Urban Transport Sector 382 This replaced the former Inter-Ministerial Development Policy Loan’, World Committee for Planning Bank Group, 14 June 2016 at http:// 383 The administrative council is represented documents.worldbank. org/curated/ by all key government officials; Minister en/632691468304811669/ pdf/106390-ppar- of Interior, Wali, governors of prefectures, P115659-PUBLICmorocco-2016.pdf council presidents and director of the 395 In the case of water and electricity, AURS. the concessionaire contracts are for 384 Koenraad Bogaert, ‘New State Space distribution at the local level with the Formation in Morocco: The Example generation, transmission and purification of the Bouregreg Valley’, Sage Journals, administered by the government utility, 2012 at http://journals.sagepub.com/ Office National de l’Electricité et de l’Eau doi/10.1177/0042098011400770 Potable (ONEE). 385 World Bank Data, see https://data. 396 Cyril Ramaphosa, ‘State of the Nation worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.KD Address 2019’, South African Government, 386 See, Summary of the 2018 Economic and 20 June 2019 at https://www.gov.za/ Financial Report, at https://www.finances. speeches/2SONA2019. gov. ma/Docs/depf/2018/summary_ref_ 397 https://www.businesslive.co.za/bd/ plf2018. Pdf. national/2019-06-20-in-full-president- 387 Steven, J. Freidman, ‘A Tale of Two cyril-ramaphosas-state-of-the-nation- Economic Developments: Tunisia and address/. Morocco’, University of Pennsylvania, 2010 398 At https://qz.com/africa/1461626/ at https://repository.upenn.edu/ curej/120/ eko-atlantic-diomniadio-tatu-africas-new- 388 World Bank, ‘Cluster Project Performance billion-dollar-cities/. Assessment Report. People’s Democratic 399 Africa’s cities, op cit, p. 11. Republic of Algeria Mortgage Finance 400 Ibid, p. 11. Technical Assistance Project’, 2010 http:// 401 Ibid, p. 10. documents.worldbank.org/curated/ 402 Ibid, p. 19. en/713801468052844398/pdf/554270PPAR0 403 Ibid, p. 17. Box1ficial0Use0Only01061.pdf 404 This draws on Greg Mills, Olusegun 389 World Bank, ‘Cluster Project Performance Obasanjo, Dickie Davis and Jeffrey Herbst, Assessment Report. People’s Democratic

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Making Africa Work. Cape Town: Tafelberg, 410 For details, please see Citibank, Digitising 2017. Government: The Journey to Enacting a Digital 405 Ibid. Agenda, Citi GPS Global Perspective and 406 Cited in http://www.worldbank.org/ Solutions, October 2019. content/dam/Worldbank/document/ 411 Ibid. Africa/Report/stocktaking-of-the-housing- 412 See ibid. This table was assembled by sector-in-sub-saharan-africa-summary- GMSA – the association of global mobile report.pdf. network operators – and the Boston 407 See Paul Collier and Anthony Venables, Consulting Group. ‘Housing and Urbanization in Africa: 413 See https://www.smartcitygovt.com, unleashing a formal market process,’ CSAE accessed 9 September 2019. Working Paper WPS/2013 01, Department of 414 See the rankings, for example, of liveable Economics, Oxford University. 9 January cities in ‘What does it take to make a city 2013. At http://www.csae.ox.ac.uk/ both liveable and lively?’, Monocle, 45, 5, workingpapers/pdfs/csae-wps-2013-01.pdf. July/August 2011. 408 Discussion, Andrew Charman, , 415 This issue is explored further in Greg June 2016. Mills, Olusegun Obasanjo, Hailemariam 409 At http://www.worldbank.org/content/ Desalegn, and Emily van der Merwe, dam/Worldbank/document/Africa/Report/ The Asian Aspiration. Johannesburg: stocktaking-of-the-housing-sector-in-sub- Panmacmillan, 2020 (forthcoming). saharan-africa-summary-report.pdf.

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The Asian Experience

The Singapore Story

Indonesia: Infrastructure and Iconography

Latin America

Security in Recife – Pact for Life

The Security Challenges of Rio

Curitiba and the Bus Rapid Transport

The Transformation of Medellín

Honduras: Urban Overstretch in San Pedro Sula

Summary of Observations

Section Two: African City Case-Studies

Lagos: The Relentless City

Hargeisa: Invisible City

Buffalo City: From Lifeless Economy to Lifestyle Opportunity

Mombasa: Gateway City

Cape Town: A Tale of Two Transitions

Rabat and Salé: Bridging the Gap

Conclusion: Between Wakanda and Dystopia

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