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Duke University Dissertation Template Theories of Concepts and Ethics by John Jung Park Department of Philosophy Duke University Date:_______________________ Approved: ___________________________ David Wong, Supervisor ___________________________ Karen Neander ___________________________ Wayne Norman ___________________________ Daniel Weiskopf Dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the Department of Philosophy in the Graduate School of Duke University 2013 i v ABSTRACT Theories of Concepts and Ethics by John Jung Park Department of Philosophy Duke University Date:_______________________ Approved: ___________________________ David Wong, Supervisor ___________________________ Karen Neander ___________________________ Wayne Norman ___________________________ Daniel Weiskopf An abstract of a dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the Department of Philosophy in the Graduate School of Duke University 2013 Copyright by John Jung Park 2013 Abstract Psychological concepts are mental representations that represent, refer to, or are about properties and categories. In the philosophy of mind/cognitive science, there are various theories of what kinds of knowledge, or information carrying mental states, constitute our concepts. In other words, such theories provide views on what concepts are. The knowledge stored in concepts is thought to be used in the higher cognitive competences such as in categorization, induction, deduction, and analogical reasoning when we think or reason about the extension of the concept. While most concept theories have primarily focused on concrete concepts such as CHAIR, TABLE and DOG, I take such modern theories and apply them to abstract moral concepts such as VIRTUE, RIGHT ACTION, and JUSTICE. I argue for a new overall theory of moral concepts that combines and includes four theories of concepts. This dissertation addresses the question of what the nature of moral concepts is and what further implications this may have in ethics. I contend that our moral concepts may be constituted by prototype, exemplar, theory, and/or emotion-based kinds of knowledge. This tetrad view differs from, for example, certain Humean-based theories that contend that our moral concepts are only constituted by emotions and desires. Finally, I draw further philosophical implications my conclusion may have for applied ethics, normative ethical theory, political philosophy, and meta-ethics. Examining the nature of concepts is an area in the philosophy of mind/language and cognitive science, but it dates back to at least Early Modern Philosophy. Descartes, iv Locke, Berkeley, and Hume called concepts ideas that are the building blocks of thought and the human understanding. Such ideas are mental representations that generally refer to properties, categories, and things in the world. Furthermore, they are largely causally responsible for how we think and reason about the extension of our ideas. For example, for Hume, concepts are ideas that are derived from impressions or immediate sense data and are the basis of the human understanding. Hume claims that, “By ideas I mean the faint images of these [impressions] in thinking and reasoning… ” For Hume, concepts play a functional role in thinking and reasoning. A similar story can be told for Locke in An Essay Concerning Human Understanding. Locke writes, “Every man being conscious to himself, that he thinks, and that which his mind is employed about whilst thinking being the ideas, that are there…” Locke, for instance, explicitly believes that our idea of PERSONAL IDENTITY, is responsible for how we reason about what the conditions are for being the same person across time. Berkeley claims that our general concept TRIANGLE is constituted by (prototype) knowledge related to such things as having three angles that equal 180 degrees. Such knowledge is acquired based on our personal experiences with particular triangles (that in contemporary terms are mentally represented by exemplars). Berkeley maintains that TRIANGLE itself is constituted by images of particular triangles (exemplars). My overall dissertation project can be viewed as following in the footsteps of Hume’s A Treatise of Human Nature: Being an Attempt to Introduce the Experimental Method of Reasoning into Moral Subjects. For Hume, just as the three books that v constitute the Treatise synchronically are of the understanding, emotions, and morals, I likewise examine concepts, emotions, then moral concepts. As Hume unifies the books of the Treatise by drawing from his first two books to conclude in his final book that moral concepts are constituted by emotions, I likewise engage the contemporary concepts and philosophy of emotions literature in my dissertation to provide a new overall theory on the nature of moral concepts. Moreover, influenced by Newtonian philosophy, Hume attempted to use empirical-based methods in his examination of ethics. In the same general spirit, I in part rely on experimental data to help inform my overall theory of moral concepts. The first chapter distinguishes psychological concepts from other notions of concepts in philosophy. For example, mental concepts are distinguished from Platonic concepts that are abstract objects. Rather, concepts as understood here are mental states that are responsible for how we cognitively function in the world around us. As we can see from their functional definition, moral concepts are the very heart of moral cognition, but very few moral psychologists have explored the nature of moral concepts even though, unbeknownst to them, they may have run experiments that in some cases can lead to constitution claims on moral concepts. Furthermore, in Lockean terms, concepts are the building blocks or constituents of thought and how the mind is furnished. Concepts are also mental representations that represent things in the world. Later in this chapter, I discuss the overall views of concrete concepts held by Edouard Machery and Daniel Weiskopf. They argue that there may be various kinds of vi knowledge we have that constitute our concrete concepts, where several theories of concepts may be at play. Here, different kinds of knowledge for a concept can be at work in different situations. Discussing Machery and Weiskopf provides a partial outline for the tetrad view of concepts I adopt for moral concepts, where the four different kinds of knowledge that may constitute a moral concept may be used conjointly or separately in cognition depending on the circumstances. The second chapter examines the contemporary literature concerning the basis of the human understanding and explains the various theories in the literature for concrete concepts. I then take these theories and convert or alter them so they can account for moral features and be applicable to the moral domain and moral concepts. With this conversion, the classical view claims that moral concepts are constituted by bodies of knowledge that represent the necessary and sufficient conditions of a moral category. For example, ‘right action’ may be constituted by ‘an act must maximize the best consequences.’ Influenced by Wittgenstein’s notion of family resemblance for concepts, the prototype view states that moral concepts are constituted by prototypes or mental representations of the statistically frequent virtues, rules, reasons for action, and features of moral situations found in one’s experiences of virtuous individuals and moral acts. For example, my GOOD PERSON concept may be constituted in part by the concepts: JUST, BRAVE, HONEST, and KIND. This cluster of conceptual constituents is not taken to refer to necessary and sufficient conditions. For instance, I may meet a person who is vii just, honest, and kind, but not brave. Nevertheless, since she matches most of the features I think good people have, I still classify her as a good person. The exemplar theory states that concepts are exemplars or bodies of knowledge that refer to particular moral actions or particular exemplary individuals. Like the prototype theory, this view is not understood to claim that exemplars represent necessary and sufficient conditions. For example, my GOOD PERSON concept in part may be made up of the mental representations: MY MOTHER, ABRAHAM LINCOLN, and MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR. The theory-theory claims that concepts are constituted by mental representations of normative ethical theories. Such mental representations occupy defeasible placeholder positions, where such knowledge is consciously or subconsciously taken to be defeasible based on potential further moral learning. Thus, theory knowledge is not considered to be about necessary and sufficient conditions. For instance, my GOOD PERSON concept may be constituted by the particular virtue theory knowledge: ONE WHO HAS AND EXERCISES THE VIRUTES, WHERE THE VIRTUES LEAD ONE TO LIVE A GOOD LIFE. I also discuss what I call the emotion theory, where moral concepts are sentiments and emotions. This view has its roots in Hume and is currently espoused in various forms by philosophers such as Simon Blackburn and Jesse Prinz. For example, Prinz maintains a neo-empiricist view of moral concepts. Neo-empiricist views are modern versions of traditional empiricist theories of concepts held by the likes of Hume, Locke, and Berkeley, where in varying degrees, these three philosophers held that concepts are viii pictorial images. Prinz espouses the James/Lange view that emotions are in part perceptions
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