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Waterboarding Prisoners and Justifying Torture: Lessons for the U.S. from the Chilean Experience by Cristián Correa*

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Waterboarding Prisoners and Justifying Torture: Lessons for the U.S. from the Chilean Experience by Cristián Correa* Waterboarding Prisoners and Justifying Torture: Lessons for the U.S. from the Chilean Experience by Cristián Correa* espite its recent prevalence in the Western news Waterboarding in Chile media, waterboarding, or “the submarine” (as it is On September 11, 1973, a Military Junta led by Augusto known in some Latin American countries), is any- Pinochet overthrew President Salvador Allende’s democratically- thing but novel in the realm of torture. elected government in Chile. Pinochet’s dictatorship lasted 17 DWaterboarding entails many different methods of torture, each years and made extensive use of torture, especially following its ini- using water to suffocate detainees and provoke the sensation of tial rise to power. Immediately after the coup, massive repression drowning. The effect results within a few seconds or minutes and led to hundreds of deaths and the detention of thousands of peo- leaves no external injuries, thereby eluding a definition of torture ple. More people were detained in the first two-and-a-half months of the dictatorship than in the remaining 17 years of Pinochet’s which requires proof of injury, bleeding, or other physical harm. rule.1 Indeed, ten percent of all those detained over the 17 years of Waterboarding has been designed to cause intense psychological the dictatorship were detained in the first two days following the pain while granting technical impunity to those administering the coup. Victims ranging from ministers and members of Congress to punishment. civic leaders in small towns were arrested in every community in The profoundly debilitating and long-lasting effects of water- the country. The techniques employed were initially unsophisti- boarding were recently exposed in Chile through victim testimony cated, and the torturers did not seem concerned about leaving vis- to the Commission to Investigate and Report on Cases of Torture ible scars or signs. and Political Imprisonment during the Augusto Pinochet dictator- As the military regime later tried to legitimize control of the ship from 1973-1990. The Commission’s ensuing report con- country and create institutions that resembled a democracy, other tained testimony of waterboarding victims who attested that more techniques began to be used. Laws were passed to criminalize sub- than 30 years after being tortured, they continued to suffer the versive behavior like “terrorism,” which was broadly defined, to use devastating effects of psychological torture. military courts to judge those cases, and to limit the use of habeas Notwithstanding the Chilean experience, the Bush adminis- corpus. The regime also tried to avoid its responsibility for human tration argues that waterboarding does not cause long-term effects rights violations by passing an amnesty law that covered the worst or serious injury or harm, and should not be considered “torture.” years of repression. The administration’s efforts to legitimize the use of torture, issue exceptions to its absolute prohibition, and limit its definition The Findings of the Valech Commission demonstrate that torture is still considered an important tool in In November 2003, President Ricardo Lagos established the the U.S.-led “War on Terror.” They also demonstrate that legiti- National Commission of Political Imprisonment and Torture of mate, long-standing democracies are not immune from violating Chile, known as the Valech Commission.2 According to the human rights, despite being signatories to international conven- records presented, the Commission was created to identify those tions prohibiting such behavior and having long-standing reputa- who, for political reasons, suffered imprisonment and torture at tions as human rights protectors. the hands of state agents or people in its service between While such conclusions cast doubt on the true advances September 11, 1973 and March 10, 1990. After interviewing more humankind has made toward securing international human rights than 35,000 people during a period of six months, the protections, the Chilean government’s recent step toward recogni- Commission found evidence that 28,459 were victims of political tion and reparation for state-sponsored torture is a hopeful exam- imprisonment and torture.3 ple of how a country bearing a history of gross violations of human Waterboarding was included among the torture methods rights may acknowledge the past while instituting protections to recorded. The report describes methods such as the asphyxiation of prevent future violations. Chile also serves as both an example and the detainees, aimed at causing physical and psychological suffer- a warning to countries like the United States that continue to jus- ing by confronting them with the possibility of death. tify the use of the same types of torture that caused long-lasting Asphyxiation was usually caused by submerging the detainee’s head psychological pain to thousands of Chileans. The legacy of Chile’s into water several times, producing a near-death experience. In dictatorship exposed the indisputably debilitating effects of water- some cases, detainees were hung from their legs with ropes and boarding and other types of torture, and it leaves little room for the submerged in water tanks. Usually the water used was contami- Bush administration to justify the use of these techniques. nated or filled with debris. Other alternatives included putting the detainee’s head inside a plastic bag, causing asphyxiation, or forc- ing with high pressure great amounts of water through hoses into the detainee’s mouth or nose.4 The report describes the testimony of a man, tortured in * Cristián Correa is an attorney and former Secretary of the National Commission of September 1973, at a Navy compound: “[T]hey put cotton on Political Imprisonment and Torture of Chile. both eyes, then taped them and tightened a hood around my neck. 21 They tied my hands and legs and submerged me in a 250-liter tank society as a whole.” This is the main purpose of torture and the rea- that had ammonia, urine, excrement, and sea water. They sub- son dictators use it. merged me until I could not breathe anymore. They repeated it over and over, while beating me and asking me questions. That is The Legacy of the Pinochet Regime what they called the submarine.”5 Pinochet’s dictatorship was not just the product of a handful The effects of torture by “submarine” were very similar to the of unscrupulous soldiers, but was supported by a large percentage effects experienced by those who suffered other types of torture of Chileans. When Pinochet was defeated in the 1988 plebiscite, described to the Valech Commission. Besides physical pain, torture which led to the restoration of democracy, he obtained 44 percent also provoked a near-death experience that made victims feel help- of the popular vote. Pinochet’s promise of stability, order, and less. Most victims reported feeling deep humiliation and that their progress seduced a large portion of Chilean society that was tired lives were entirely at the mercy of their torturers. According to the or afraid of the social unrest that characterized the Allende admin- report, this is precisely why torture is used: to destroy prisoners’ istration. Supporters of the dictatorship felt the violence and insta- will, dignity, and moral, psychological, and physical resolve, so that bility prevalent in Chile at the time justified the use of torture. they reveal the desired information. The Commission report Many accepted the need to take “special measures” in “special cir- describes the deep psychological trauma suffered by torture victims cumstances,” even though such measures lasted for 17 years. At the not only at the time of their torture, but, significantly, thirty years time of Pinochet’s death, despite the lack of state honors or public later. Most victims reported having some or all of the symptoms of recognition, thousands of supporters attended his military funeral post traumatic stress disorder, including feelings of insecurity or to pay their respects. And even after his death, Pinochet continues fear, humiliation, worthlessness, shame, guilt, depression, anxiety, to divide Chilean society, serving as a reminder of its painful past. and hopelessness. A man tortured at age 22 said, “Even today I wake up because of having nightmares of dying from drowning.”6 A woman declared, “I suffer long periods of insomnia and recurrent night- mares: the noise of opening and closing fences, the noise of chains and steps that stop in front of my door. I see endless lines of bleed- “The legacy of Chile’s ing people passing in front of me. I wake up covered with sweat. Why haven’t I been able to forget, and to stop torturing myself in my dreams after so many years?”7 dictatorship exposed the These consequences were well documented by the victims’ relatives. They emphasized how their parents or spouses changed indisputably debilitating after being released from prison and how they became irritable, introverted, or depressed. For many people life changed dramati- effects of waterboarding and cally, in some cases leading to divorce or alcoholism, or seriously affecting their ability to establish permanent interpersonal rela- tionships or trust other people. Many never talked about their other types of torture, and it experience even to their spouses or closest relatives, staying isolated by their silence, revealing the profound dimension of their trau- leaves little room for the Bush matic experiences. The numerous and long-lasting effects of torture identified Administration
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